REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEPART OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
NATIONAL XX

SECOND DIVISION

XXX-Appellee,

 - versus - OFW (M) 03-XXX

XXX,
Respondents-Appellants.

x--------------------------------------------------------x

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Respondents-Appellants, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Office,

most respectfully state:

1. On XXX, Respondents-Appellants received the Resolution dated 13 March 2009

rendered by this Honorable Commission. Under XXX Procedure, Respondent-Appellant has ten

(XXX, within which to file the instant motion. Considering, however, XXX falls on a Saturday,

XXx has been declared a non-working holiday, Respondents-Appellants have until the next

working day, or until XXX, within which to file this Motion for Reconsideration. Inasmuch as

the instant Motion for Reconsideration is filed not later than XXX the same should be considered

as filed on time.

2. In the said Resolution, this Honorable Commission ruled in favor of the

Complainant-Appellee, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto. The instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
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SO ORDERED.”

3. With all due respect to this Honorable Commission, it gravely erred in awarding

Complainant-Appellee disability compensation, for being contrary to law and evidence. Thus,

Respondents-Appellants pray that this Honorable Commission re-examine and re-evaluate

thoroughly the evidence, applicable laws and jurisprudence in the interest of justice and

reconsider XXX.

4. This Honorable Commission affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the

disease suffered by Complainant-Appellee is work-related and hence, compensable. It did not

agree with the contention of the Respondents-Appellants that his illness is not work-related. This

Honorable Commission stated that, since the “XXX definitely, work-related” (emphasis

supplied). The Respondents-Appellants beg to disagree. In concluding as such, this Honorable

Commission in effect totally disregarded the POEA Standard Employment Contract, which

provides that an illness must be work-related in order to be compensable.

5. The POEA Standard Employment Contract unequivocally states that “[f]or an

occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensation, all of the

following conditions must be satisfied”:

“1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described

herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the

seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of

exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it;

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the

seafarer.”

In addition thereto, a cardio-vascular disease may be deemed work-related if any of the

following conditions is met:

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(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present

during employment, there must be proof that an
acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the
unusual strain by reasons of the nature of the work.

(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack

must be sufficient severity and must be followed
within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac
insult to constitute causal relationship.

(c) If a person who was apparently asymtomatic before

being subjected to strain at work showed signs and
symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance
of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted,
it is reasonable to claim causal relationship.

6. None of the aforequoted conditions exists in the instant case. The overwhelming

evidence presented by the Respondents-Appellants were glossed over and/or entirely disregarded

by this Honorable Commission which Respondents-Appellants have proved that the duties of the

Complainant-Appellee as DD did not bring about his illness. Most important of which were the

logbook entries, on and days before the Complainant-Appellee collapsed, where it is evident that

he was merely performing his ordinary functions, which only involved oversight, supervision

and monitoring. These were supported by the written statements of DDD that the Complainant-

Appellee was only checking and signing Safety Management System (SMS) documents; that the

Complainant-Appellee was never assigned duties other than those he was obliged to do as a

DDD; and that there was no unusual operation carried out which Complainant-Appellee was

actively and physically involved in where work was carried our for strenuous hours. A copy of

the DDD which laid down the duties performed by the Complainant-Appellee was also

presented, but similarly ignored by the Honorable Commission.

7. To justify his award of disability benefits, this Honorable Commission stated in its

Decision that the nature of Complainant’s work as a Third Mate subjected him to stress and

strain resulting in the wear and tear of his human body, citing the case of the LDDDC. However,

we cannot agree with this Honorable Commission as no sufficient evidence was cited to support
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Complainant-Appellee’s claim. It was error for this Honorable Commission to adopt the

Complainant-Appellee’s bare allegations that he was exposed to situations that often bring

mental and physical strain and that he works for several hours without ample time to rest Thusly,

it is height of injustice to award disability benefits based on mere self-serving and totally

unsubstantiated claim or allegation of the Complainant without any evidence supporting it.

8. Finally, the attention of this Honorable Commission must be called to this portion

of the Resolution, to wit:

“And although, there is a disparity in the findings of the company-

designated physician and the independent doctor consulted by complainant-
appellee; and, while, the latter doctor declared him unfit to work, the former
declared him to engage only in “low exertional activities”.

9. To clarify matters, the company-designated physician did not declare

Complainant-Appellee to engage only in “low exertional activities”. Rather it was his personal

doctor, Dr. DDD, that indicated in her medical report that “low exertional activities

allowed”Respondents-Appellants find it highly irregular for this Honorable Commission to give

credence to Dr. DDDo’s findings, considering that she treated the Complainant-Appellee only

once, compared to the exhaustive examinations conducted by the company-designated physician.

More baffling is her assessment of Grade 1 DDD, which totally contradicts her statement in the

medical report that low exertional activities are allowed.

10. It may be that it is not necessary that the employment be the sole factor in the

growth, development or acceleration of the illness to entitle the claimant to the benefits provided

therefor.” However, it must be shown that the illness has been brought about mainly by the

conditions attendant in seafarer's work. This is mandated by the conditions laid down in the

POEA Standard Employment Contract before an illness can be qualified as work-related. These

conditions are not present in the case of Complainant-Appelle. The Appellee failed to show that

his illness was work-related as required under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The

Complainant-Appellee merely alleged that the he collapsed during the period of employment.
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Consequently, this is not enough to conclude that his illness was work-related.

11. As mentioned in the case of SSS v. CA (175 SCRA 1), a workmen’s compensation

case should be decided not from a sympathetic point of view which the working class well

deserves, but in accordance with the proven facts and the law applicable thereto. This is in line

with the present rule in the Labor Code abolishing the presumption of compensability and the

rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of employment. The reason is “to restore a

sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s compensation

and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability x x x”

(Dabatian v. GSIS, 149 SCRA 123). The law in protecting the right of the laborer authorizes

neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. More importantly, while the

Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class,

it should not be supposed that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor

(Makati Haberdashery, Inc. v. NLRC, 179 SCRA 448; Manila Electric Co., v. NLRC, 175 SCRA

277).

12. In sum, let it be remembered that while labor contracts are impressed with public

interest and the provision of the POEA Standard Employment Contract must be construed fairly,

reasonably and liberally in favor of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board

ocean-going vessels, we should always be mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving,

to be dispensed with in the light of established facts, the applicable law, and existing

jurisprudence.1 Thus, Respondents pray that this Honorable Commission re-examine and re-

evaluate thoroughly the evidence, applicable laws and jurisprudence in the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Resolution of this Honorable

1 Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. et al. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S. Allas,
G.R. No. 168560.
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Commission dated DDD reconsidered.

Other reliefs, just and equitable, under the premises are likewise prayed for.

Makati City for DDD.

DDD
By:

DDD

COPY FURNISHED:

ATTY. DD Admiralty Bldg.

1225 DD

EXPLANATION

Pursuant to Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission, undersigned counsel respectfully manifests that copies of the foregoing
Motion for Reconsideration were served on the other party by registered mail in lieu of personal
service due to distance and time constraint.

DDD