EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION with such medical services and appliances as the

Prepared by: Atty. Edwin E. Torres (MSU Sept nature of his sickness or injury and progress of
2018) his recovery may require, subject to the expense
limitation prescribed by the Commission.
REHABILITATION SERVICES: The System shall,
as soon as practicable, establish a continuing
A. LEGAL BASIS. Employees’ compensation program of the rehabilitation of injured and
is government by PD 626 which amended Title II handicapped employees, who shall be entitled to
of Book IV on Employees' Compensation and rehabilitation services, which shall consist of
State Insurance Fund (Articles 165 to 206) of the medical, surgical or hospital treatment,
Labor Code of the Philippines. It is administered including appliances if he has been handicapped
by the GSIS for government employees and the by the injury, to help him become physically
SSS for employees in the private sector. The independent.
benefits under employees’ compensation are:
1. First, PD 626 abandoned the presumption
(a) Medical benefits of compensability and the theory of aggravation
(b) Disability benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Second,
for the sickness and resulting disability or death to
(1) Temporary Total Disability be compensable, the claimant must prove either of
(TTD) two (2) things: (a) that the sickness was the result
(2) Permanent Total Disability of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
(PTD) the Rules on Employees' Compensation (Hipatitis B
(3) Permanent Partial Disability is not listed); or (b) if the sickness is not so listed,
(PPD) that the risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the claimant's working conditions.
(c) Death benefits. Third, the claimant must prove this causal relation
between the ailment and working conditions by
B. COVERAGE. Coverage in the State substantial evidence, since the proceeding is taken
Insurance Fund shall be compulsory upon all before the ECC, an administrative or quasi-
employers and their employees not over sixty judicial body. Within the field of administrative law,
years of age: Provided, That an employee who is while strict rules of evidence are not applicable
over sixty years of age and paying contributions to quasi-judicial proceedings, nevertheless, in
to qualify for the retirement or life insurance adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
benefit administered by the System shall be evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not
subject to compulsory coverage: Provided, evidence cannot be disregarded. Finally, in case of
further, That in case of an employee who is both doubt in construction and interpretation of social
covered by the SSS and GSIS, only his legislation statutes, the liberality of the law in favor
employment under the GSIS shall be considered of the working man and woman prevails in light of
for purposes of his coverage. Compulsory the Constitution's social justice policy. 1
coverage of the employer during the effectivity
of this Title shall take effect on the first day of 2. Under said law, for an illness to be
his operation, and that of the employee on the compensable, it must be done definitely accepted as
date of his employment. an occupational disease listed by the Commission,
or any illness caused by employment subject to
C. JURISDICTION. The SSS/GSIS has proof by the employee that the risk of contracting
original and exclusive jurisdiction to settle any the same was increased by working conditions.
dispute arising from employees’ compensation, Rheumatoid Arthritis, was not an occupational
subject to appeal to the Employees disease, and that, as required by law, petitioner
Compensation Commission. The decisions by failed to show proof that the risk of contracting the
the Commission may be reviewed on certiorari disease was increased by his working conditions. 2
by the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
3. Under Section 1(b), Rule III implementing
____________________________________________________________ P.D. No. 626, sickness or death is compensable if the
__________________________ cause is included in the list of occupational diseases
annexed to the Rules. If not so listed, compensation
BENEFITS may still be recovered if the illness is caused or

A. MEDICAL BENEFITS: Immediately after 1

GSIS vs. CA and Liwanag (G.R. No. 128523, 28
an employee contracts sickness or sustains an
September 1998).
injury, he shall be provided by the System 2
Rosales vs. ECC, et al. (G.R. No. L-46443, 28 June
during the subsequent period of his disability
1988).
 2
precipitated by factors inherent in the employee’s
work and working conditions. Here, strict rules of
evidence are not applicable since the quantum of
evidence required under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, which means "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." What the law
requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is sufficient that the
hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based
is probable since probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone. Inasmuch as Cordero’s disease was not
listed as an occupational disease, it is incumbent
upon her to adduce substantial proof that would
show that the nature of her employment or working
conditions increased the risk of End Stage Renal
Disease or Chronic Glomerulonephritis. The
evidence presented by Cordero shows that her
Chronic Glomerulonephritis that led to End Stage
Renal Disease was caused by hypertension. At
the onset, Cordero was given a clean bill of health
and declared fit-to-work when she was employed
by GSIS in 1987. But in 1995, she contracted
hypertension. While End Stage Renal Disease
secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis is not
among those enumerated as an Occupational
Disease under Annex "A" of the ECC Rules, it is
scientifically linked to hypertension, a compensable
illness. Hence, we cannot close our eyes to the
reasonable connection of her work vis-à-vis her
ailment.3
4. When the petitioner was first employed by
the Bureau of Elementary Schools as a classroom
teacher, she was in good health. During the twenty
years that she rendered service to the government,
the petitioner's work was not confined to the
routinary classroom activities. She was also
assigned to supervise students on out-campus
government programs in green revolution and
youth civic action programs (YCAP). The petitioner
was an active participant in scouting and at
teachers' seminars and conferences and was
involved in various community work and civic
activities such as food production, organization
of purok and barangay youth, as an election
committee chairman, and attendance at barangay
and PTA meetings and community assemblies.
Occasionally she went with her co-teachers on a
house to house visit to conduct census activities
required by the government. There is also a
showing that her classroom had no ceiling. Hence
she was exposed to heat from the galvanized iron
roof. The nature of the out-campus activities of the
petitioner could easily have caused the formation of
kidney stones which may be due to inability to
urinate regularly. The formation of the stones in the
kidney made the kidney susceptible to infection.
The infection of said kidney resulted to
3 5
GSIS vs. Cordero (G.R. No. 171378, 17 March
2009).
pyelonephritis. The heat in the classroom must
have contributed also to her ailment. Although the
ailment is not listed by the National Labor Relations
Commission as compensable disease, the evidence
of record has established the causal relation
between the ailment of Staghorn Calculi,
pyelonephritis and the nature of the work and
activities of the petitioner.4
5. The cataract compensable under the law is
limited to what is known as "glass blower’s
cataract" common among furnace men, glass
blowers, bakers, blacksmiths, foundry workers, and
other workers exposed to infrared rays. However,
inasmuch as respondent’s illness does not squarely
fall within the abovementioned category,
respondent is still not precluded from claiming
reimbursement as she has proven the merit of her
claim by showing that her risk of contracting
cataracts was increased by her working conditions.
The degree of proof required under PD No. 626 is
merely substantial evidence, or "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." We have
repeatedly held that to prove compensability, the
claimant must adequately show that the
development of the disease is brought largely by the
conditions present in the nature of the job. What
the law requires is a reasonable work-connection
and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that
the hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is
based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary
can be disregarded especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection.
Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. PD
626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the
presumption of compensability and the theory of
aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment,
however, the present law has not ceased to be an
employees’ compensation law or a social legislation;
hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the
working man and woman still prevails, and the
official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should
adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in
deciding claims for compensability, especially in
light of the compassionate policy towards labor
which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. 5
6. Petitioner’s chronic open angle glaucoma
is not listed as an occupational disease; hence, he
has the burden of proving by substantial evidence,
or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion,
that the nature of his employment or working
4
Santiago vs. ECC and GSIS (G.R. No. L-47405, 12
September 1980).
GSIS vs. De Guzman (G.R. No. 173049, 21 March
2009).
 3

conditions increased the risk of contracting the enough to support the claim of petitioner that his
ailment or that its progression or aggravation was wife is entitled to employees compensation.
brought about thereby. Perusal of the records, Petitioner failed to show that the progression of the
however, regrettably reveals petitioner’s failure to disease was brought about largely by the conditions
adduce any proof of a reasonable connection in Rosario’s work. Not even a medical history or
between his work as a seaman and the chronic open records was presented to support petitioner’s
angle glaucoma he had contracted. At the most, he claim.7
merely claims that he performed odd jobs without
fail – cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat 8. ECC Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977
dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and includes cardio-vascular or heart diseases in the list
washing dirt and rusts inside the tank – strenuous of occupational diseases and enumerates the
tasks which according to him required climbing, conditions under which they are considered work-
bending over and running for so many times. related and, thus, compensable, viz.:
Adding thereto were the perils of the sea and the
homesickness he said he experienced which (a) If the heart disease was
allegedly caused emotional strains on his part. known to have been present
Other than positing the foregoing, petitioner during employment, there
presented no competent medical history, records or must be proof that an acute
physician’s report to objectively substantiate the exacerbation was clearly
claim that there is a reasonable nexus between his precipitated by the unusual
work and his ailment. Without saying more, his bare strain by reasons of the
allegations do not ipso facto make his illness nature of his/her work.
compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest
on speculations or presumptions. The claimant (b) The strain of work that brings
must present concrete evidence to prove a positive about an acute attack must be
proposition.6 of sufficient severity and
must be followed within 24
7. The coverage of leukemia as an hours by the clinical signs of a
occupational disease relates to one’s employment as cardiac [injury] to constitute
an operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to causal relationship.
anesthetics. In the case of petitioner’s wife, the (c) If a person who was
nature of her occupation does not indicate exposure apparently asymptomatic
to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of before being subjected to
developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. strain at work showed signs
There was no showing that her work involved and symptoms of cardiac
frequent and sufficient exposure to substances injury during the
established as occupational risk factors of the performance of his/[her]
disease. Thus, the need for the petitioner to work and such symptoms and
sufficiently establish that his wife’s job as a teacher signs persisted, it is
exposed her to substances similar to anesthetics in reasonable to claim a causal
an environment similar to an "operating room." relationship.
This leans on the precept that the awards for
compensation cannot rest on speculations and Myocardial infarction is the clinical term for a
presumptions. The petitioner must have at least heart attack. It is caused by occlusion (blockage) of
provided sufficient basis, if not medical information, the coronary artery (atherosclerosis) or a blood clot
which could help determine the causal connection (coronary thrombosis), resulting in the partial or
between Rosario’s ailment and her exposure to total blockage of one of the coronary arteries. When
muriatic acid, floor wax and paint as well as the this occurs, the heart muscle (myocardium) does
rigors of her work. Instead, petitioner merely insists not receive enough oxygen. There was no evidence
on the supposition that the disease might have been to show that respondent was previously diagnosed
brought about by the harmful chemicals of floor with a heart ailment or that he was under a severe
wax and paint aggravated by the fact that the strain of work sufficient to have caused the heart
Manggahan Elementary School is just along the attack since a board meeting could hardly inflict
highway which exposed Rosario to smoke belched such a severe strain. Moreover, from the evidence
by vehicles, all contributing to her acquisition of the at hand, we cannot safely conclude that the
disease. Such factors are insufficient to respondent's case falls under paragraph (c). While it
demonstrate the probability that the risk of is true that the clinical abstract showed that on the
contracting the disease is increased by the working day prior to the incident respondent experienced
conditions of Rosario as a public school teacher;

6 7
Debaudin vs. SSS and ECC (G.R. No. 148308, 21 Lorenzo vs. GSIS and DEPED (G.R. No. 188385, 2
September 2007). October 2013).
 4
three episodes of chest pains, this alone would not
satisfy the requirements of paragraph (c), more
specifically the condition that the claimant must
have shown signs and symptoms of cardiac
injury during the performance of his work and such
symptoms and signs persisted. To successfully
recover compensation for his heart ailment, the
respondent must therefore prove, through
substantial evidence, that the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by the nature of his work
and working conditions.8
9. Six primary risk factors have been
identified with the development of atherosclerotic
coronary artery disease and myocardial
infarction: hyperlipidemia or high blood
cholesterol, diabetes mellitus, hypertension or high
blood pressure, smoking, male gender, and family
history of atherosclerotic arterial disease. While the
Court recognized stress as one of the predisposing
factors of myocardial infarction, it also noted that
"stress appears to be associated with elevated blood
pressure." The ECC, for its part, does not seem to
treat stress as a separate risk factor for myocardial
infarction. In fact, in its decision, it stated that
hypertension is the sole risk factor in the
development of a coronary artery disease that is
considered work-related. Some references,
however, include stress as a risk factor, distinct
from hypertension. Noticeably, the record is devoid
of any medical information on the cause of
respondent's acute myocardial infarction which
could help the Court determine whether there was a
causal link between the respondent's allegedly
stressful work and his ailment. A physician's report
would have been the best evidence of work-
connection of workmen's ailments. Medical
evidence is particularly vital where the causal
connection is not clearly apparent to an ordinary
person or readily observable or discoverable
without medical examination for it is not our task to
determine where the connection lies. The claimant
must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the
development of the disease was brought about
largely by the conditions present in the nature of
the job. What the law requires is a reasonable work
connection and not a direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the workmen's
claim is based is probable. Probability, not the
ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in
compensation proceedings. And probability must
be reasonable; hence, it should, at least, be anchored
on credible information. Moreover, a mere
possibility will not suffice; a claim will fail if there is
only a possibility that the employment caused the
disease. The absence of any medical information
stating that the respondent's illness could have
been caused by stress and not by any other factor
reduces the respondent's claim of work connection
8 11
GSIS vs. Cuntapay (G.R. No. 168862, 30 April
2008).
to a mere possibility. Such deficiency restrains the
Court from concluding that the respondent's illness
is compensable.9
10. Cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are considered as occupational
diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of
Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No.
626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there
be proof of causal relation between the work and
the illness which resulted in the respondent’s
disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general,
a covered claimant suffering from an occupational
disease is automatically paid benefits. However,
although cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their
compensability requires compliance with all the
conditions set forth in the Rules. In short, both are
qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-
vascular accident, the claimant must prove the
following: (1) there must be a history, which should
be proved, of trauma at work (to the head
specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary
physical or mental strain or event, or undue
exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2) there
must be a direct connection between the trauma or
exertion in the course of the employment and the
cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or
exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage.
On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of
function of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain, resulting in permanent disability,
provided that, the following documents substantiate
it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood
chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-
T scan.10
11. While Parkinson’s disease is not included
in the list of compensable diseases under the law
then prevailing, it was found by the Court of
Appeals that the conditions prevailing at LGP
largely led to the progression of the ailment. The
respondent’s functions entailed constant exposure
to hazardous or toxic chemicals such as carbon
disulfate, carbon monoxide, or manganese. As the
ECC itself admitted in its judgment, the exposure to
these toxic substances is among the possible causes
of this disease. Where it was established that the
claimant’s ailment occurred during and in the
course of his employment, it must be presumed that
the nature of the claimant’s employment is the
cause of the disease.11
9
Ibid.
10
GSIS vs. Calumpiano (G.R. No. 196102, 26
November 2014).
Republic of the Philippines vs. Mariano (G.R. No.
139455. 28 March 2003).
 5
12. Barrios was tasked with transporting NIA
officials, various consultants, and even World Bank
officers, to different destinations in Metro Manila
and the surrounding provinces of Central Luzon and
Southern Tagalog. These travels required him to sit
behind the wheel for many hours. Job efficiency
required him to transport his passengers to their
respective destinations on time. He thus faced a
situation where he had to forego urinating for
hours. To this must be added the stress and strain
every driver encounters while on the road. Barrios
had waiting times during which he could freely
relieve his bladder. But what the court overlooked
was his need to urinate frequently due to his
diabetes. This ailment afflicted him not only when
he was resting, but also when he was on the road.
With high ranking passengers in his charge, he had
no choice but to drive continuously most of the
time. As a consequence, his disease was
aggravated. Nephropathy then set in with fatal
results. Diabetes mellitus is "a metabolic disorder
in which the ability to oxidize carbohydrates is
more or less completely lost, usually due to faulty
pancreatic activity, especially of the islets of
Langerhaus and subsequent disturbance of normal
insulin mechanism. End stage renal disease, on the
other hand, is attributable to complications of
diabetes. The kidneys or renal system filter waste
products out of the blood and recycle other
important substances. This ailment is the stage
where the kidneys or renal system fail to perform
their function of filtering waste products out of the
blood. Damaging chemicals, such as creatinine and
urea, remain in the blood, thus, necessitating
dialysis or mechanical cleansing of the blood.
Diabetes is "a deficiency condition marked by
habitual discharge of an excessive amount of urine."
Simply put, a diabetic sufferer has to urinate
frequently. Otherwise, he will
suffer nephropathy or kidney disease.12
13. While "neuromyelitis optica" or "Davic’s
disease," a disorder of the spinal cord, is not listed
as an occupational disease in Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employee Compensation, it is
proved to have been aggravated by the working
condition of Judge Vallar. Judge Vallar was a front-
line officer in the administration of justice, being the
most visible living representation of this country’s
legal and judicial system. As a magistrate in the far-
off province of Camiguin, he resolved disputes
arising from simple rural folks who comprise the
great bulk of our populace. In his daily judicial
functions, he had the closest and most frequent
contact with the people at the grass roots level. As
visible representations of the law and the justice
system, trial judges, like Judge Vallar, are bound to
dispose of the court’s business and to decide cases
within the required period. In order to achieve this,
12
Barrios vs. ECC and GSIS (G.R. No. 148089, 24
March 2006).
they are expected to keep abreast of all laws and
prevailing jurisprudence. Judge Vallar did his best
to live up to these exacting standards. He worked
long hours and burned the midnight oil reading
records of cases, transcripts of stenographic notes,
law books, legal periodicals and other legal
materials. Often, he had to work at home and even
during weekends. His daily routine certainly
subjected him to visual fatigue, stress and strain.
These severely strenuous working conditions
contributed to the weakening of his immune system
and caused him to contract neuromyelitis.13
B. DISABILITY BENEFITS:
TEMPORARY TOTAL DISABILITY. Under such
regulations as the Commission may approve,
any employee under this Title who sustains an
injury or contracts sickness resulting in
temporary total disability shall for each day of
injury or fraction thereof, or for each day or
fraction thereof after the third day of sickness,
be paid by the System an income benefit
equivalent to ninety per cent of his average daily
salary credit, subject to the following conditions:
(1) The daily income benefit shall not be less
than two pesos and fifty centavos nor more than
sixteen pesos nor paid for a continuous period
longer than one hundred twenty days, and (2)
The System shall be notified of the injury or
sickness.
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. Under such
regulations as the Commission may approve,
any employee under this Title who contracts
sickness or sustains an injury resulting in
permanent total disability shall for each month
until his death but not exceeding five years be
paid by the system during such disability an
income benefit to be computed according to
regulation. The following disabilities shall be
deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total
disability lasting
continuously for more
than one hundred
twenty days;
(2) Complete loss of sight of
both eyes;
(3) Lost of two limbs at or
above the ankle or wrist;
(4) Permanent complete
paralysis of two limbs;
13
GSIS vs. Vallar (G.R. No. 156023, 18 October
2007).
 6

(5) Brain injury resulting in a loss of the arm. A loss

incurable imbecility or of an ankle shall be
insanity; and considered as loss of the
foot, and a loss of a knee
(6) Such cases as considered as a loss of
determined by the the leg. A loss of more
Medical Director of the than one joint shall be
System and approved by considered as a loss of
the Commission. the whole finger or toe,
and a loss of only the
PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY. Under such first joint considered as
regulations as the Commission may approve, a loss of one-half the
any employee under this Title who contracts whole finger or toe:
sickness or sustains an injury resulting in Provided, That such loss
permanent partial disability shall for each shall be either the
month not exceeding the period designated functional loss of the use
herein be paid by the System during such or physical loss of the
disability an income benefit equivalent to the member.
income benefit for permanent total disability.
(d) In cases of permanent
(b) The benefit shall be paid partial disability less
for not more than the than the total loss of the
period designated in the member specified in the
following schedule: preceding paragraph,
the same monthly
income benefit shall be
Complete and permanent loss of the use No. of paid for a portion of the
of: months period established for
the total loss of the
One thumb 8 member in accordance
with the proportion that
One index finger 6
the partial loss bears to
One middle finger 5 the total loss. If the
result is a decimal
One ring finger 4 fraction, the same shall
be rounded off to the
One little finger 2 next higher integer.
One big toe 5
(e) In cases of simultaneous
Any toe 2 loss of more than one
member or a part
One hand 31 thereof as specified in
this Art., the same
One arm 40 monthly income benefit
shall be paid for a
One foot 25
period equivalent to the
One leg 37 sum of the periods
established for the loss
One ear 8 of the member or a part
thereof. If the result is a
Both ears 16 decimal fraction, the
same shall be rounded
Hearing of one ear 8 off to the next higher
Hearing of both ears 40 integer.

Sight of one eye 20 1. Under Article 192 (c) of PD No. 442, as

amended (the Labor Code of the Philippines), the
following disabilities are deemed total and
(c) A loss of a wrist shall be
permanent: (1) Temporary total disability lasting
considered as a loss of
the hand, and a loss of
an elbow considered as
 7

continuously for more that one hundred twenty equivalent to the lesser of the balance of his
days.14 income benefit or thirty times his monthly
income benefit and six thousand pesos.
2. The right to compensation extends to
disability due to disease supervening upon and 1. Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on
proximately and naturally resulting from Employees' Compensation provides that:
compensable injury.15
“Section 1. Grounds — (a) For
3. A person’s disability might not emerge at the injury and the resulting
one precise moment in time but rather over a disability or death to be
period of time. It is possible that an injury which at compensable, the injury must be
first was considered to be temporary may later on the result of an employment
become permanent, or one who suffers a partial accident satisfying all the
disability becomes totally and permanently disabled following conditions:
by reason of the same cause.15 Thus, while
respondent had been awarded 38 months of PPD
benefits commensurate to his physical condition at (1) The
the time of his retirement, this does not preclude employee
the conversion of the benefits to which he is entitled must have
as a result of the fact that he later on became been injured
permanently and totally disabled. When an at the place
employee is constrained to retire at an early age due where his
to his illness and the illness persists even after work
retirement, resulting in his continued require him
unemployment, as in this case, such a condition to be;
amounts to total disability which should entitle him
to the maximum benefits allowed by law.16 (2) The
employee
C. DEATH BENEFITS. Under such must have
regulations as the Commission may approve, the been
System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries performing
upon the death of the covered employee under his official
this Title a monthly income benefit equivalent to functions;
the monthly income benefit for permanent total and
disability increased by ten per cent for each
dependent child but not exceeding five, (3) If the injury
beginning with the youngest and without is sustained
substitution: Provided, That the portion elsewhere,
equivalent to the monthly income benefit for the
permanent total disability shall be guaranteed employee
for five years; Provided, further, That if he has must have
no primary beneficiary the System shall pay to been
his beneficiaries or legal heirs a lump sum executing an
benefit equivalent to the lesser of thirty times order of the
the monthly income benefit for permanent total employer.”
disability and six thousand pesos.
The concept of a "work place" referred to cannot
(b) Under such regulations as the Commission always be literally applied to a soldier in active duty
may approve, the System shall pay to the status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker
primary beneficiaries upon the death of a in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a
covered employee who is under permanent total particular fixed office. A soldier must go where his
disability under this Title the balance of his company is stationed (Hinoguin v. ECC, 172 SCRA
income benefit plus ten per cent of the monthly 350 [1990]). In the case at bar, Pfc. Nitura's station
income benefit for each dependent child but not was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte.
exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and But then his presence at the site of the accident was
without substitution: Provided, That if he has no with the permission of his superior officer having
primary beneficiary the System shall pay to his been directed to go to Barangay San Jose, Dipolog
beneficiaries or legal heirs a lump sum benefit City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass
by the hanging bridge which connects the two
14
Mabioso vs. GSIS (G.R. 148323, 29 April 2005). places. He fell from the bridge and died. A place
15
Ibid. where soldiers have secured lawful permission to
16 be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from
GSIS vs. Casco (G.R. No. 173430, 28 July 2008).
 8

a place where they are required to go by their such causal-connection, the claim cannot be
commanding officer. As to the question of whether granted.18
or not he was performing an official function at the
time of the incident, it has been held that a soldier
on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day
official duty status and is subject to military
discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior
officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except,
of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus,
a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty
unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition
temporarily by going on an approved vacation
leave. Even vacation leaves may, it must be
remembered, be pre-terminated by superior orders.
In the instant case, the deceased was neither on
vacation leave nor on an overnight pass when the
incident occurred. In fact, he was directed by his
superior to check on several personnel of the
command then attending the dance party, as
attested to by his Battalion Commander. Hence,
since Pfc. Nitura was not on vacation leave, he did
not effectively cease performing "official functions."
With regard respondents' contention that the claim
is precluded by the fact that the deceased was
drunk and acted with notorious negligence, it has
been held that even if it could be shown that a
person drank intoxicating liquor it is incumbent
upon the person invoking drunkenness as a defense
to show that said person was extremely drunk. This
is so because a person may take as much as several
bottles of beer or several glasses of hard liquor and
still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic
drink. Thus, intoxication which does not
incapacitate the employee from following his
occupation is not sufficient to defeat the recovery of
compensation, although intoxication may be a
contributory cause to his injury. It must be shown
that the intoxication was the proximate cause of
death or injury and the burden of proof lies on him
who raises drunkenness as a defense. While it may
be admitted that the deceased drank intoxicating
liquor at the dance party, respondents ECC and GSIS
have not established that the state of drunkenness
of the deceased is the proximate cause of his
death.17

2. Mauricio de la Rea was undisputedly on

vacation leave in his hometown in Halang, Amadeo,
Cavite when after alighting from a jeepney, he was
shot twice by a certain Pepito Montoya with a .45
caliber pistol. The motive behind the killing was
unknown. The records do not even show, much less
was evidence presented, that the death which befell
Mauricio arose as an incident to the performance of
his duties in the Philippine Navy or that the same
arose from the perils of his work. In the absence of

17 18
Nitura vs. ECC and GSIS (G.R. No. 89217, 4 Dela Rea vs. ECC and GSIS (G.R. No. L-66129, 17
September 1991). January 1986).