As 2067-2016 Substations and High Voltage Installations Exceeding KV A.C.

LICENCE
for
AS 2067:2016 Substations and high voltage installations exceeding kV a.c.
Licensee: Mr apd admin
Date: Tuesday, 11 October 2016 4:54 PM
Licence Agreement
This is an agreement between the end user of the Product ("Licensee") and SAI Global Limited, Level 37, 680 George Street,
Sydney NSW 2000 AUSTRALIA, ABN 67 050 611 642.
1. Definitions and Interpretations
Australian Standards means Australian Standards and includes Joint ISO/Australian Standards, Joint NZ/Australian Standards,
current Draft Australian Standards, and amendments to Australian Standards.
Concurrent Users means the maximum number of people able to access the Product at any one time, and is limited to the
number of Licences purchased.
ISO Standards means Standards published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), for which SAI Global is
an authorised distributor.
IEC Standards means Standards published by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), for which SAI Global is an
authorised distributor.
Internal use means use of the Product within the Licensee’s organization.
Licence means the right to access and use the Product.
Licensee means the purchaser and user of the Product.
Product means Australian Standards, ISO Standards and IEC Standards ordered and purchased through the infostore, and
downloaded as electronic PDF files.
Click on the red box above to activate the Licence Agreement scroll bar.
2. Product Availability
See publications
2.1. The Product is available via the World covering the same
Wide Web through Subject
the use of a web Area
browser. Documents are provided as PDF files,
viewable through the use of the latest version of Adobe Reader®.
Subscribe to our Free Newsletters about Australian Standards® in
3. Licence Agreement
Legislation; ISO, IEC, BSI and more
Learn
3.1. By using the Product thehow to Manage
Licensee Standards
agrees to be bound by theCollections Online
Licence Agreement for the Product.
3.2. The Licensee isLearn

grantedabout LexConnect,
a non-exclusive All Jurisdictions,
and non-assignable Standards
Licence to use referenced
the Product. in
Australian legislation
3.3. Licensees are permitted to use the Product the following extent:
Know when a Standard has changed
3.3.a. PDF (Personal Use) Format - Purchasers of personal user Licences for the PDF format of the publication may locally
install and use the publication
Becomeonan theSAI
number of individual
Global computers
Standards corresponding
Sales Affiliate to the Quantity specified in the SAI Global
Infostore order. Licensees are permitted to print once for Internal use limited to the Quantity specified in the SAI Global Infostore
order only (excludes electronic pads of forms). Licensees are permitted to store one electronic version of the publication for
backup purposes. Representing hundreds of Standards bodies including:
For reproduction of the PDF (Personal Use) publication or portions thereof, and for which are outside the circumstances included
in this agreement, permission must be sought in writing from SAI Global, Copyright Officer at copyright@saiglobal.com.
3.3.b. PDF (Copy/Paste) Format - Purchasers of personal user Licences for the PDF(copy/paste) format of the publication may
locally install and use the publication on the number of individual computers corresponding to the Quantity specified in the SAI
Global Infostore order. Licensees are permitted to print once for Internal use limited to the Quantity specified in the SAI Global
Infostore order only (excludes electronic pads of forms). Licensees are permitted to store one electronic version of the publication
Licensed to Mr apd admin on 11 October 2016. 3 concurrent user network licenses. Copying of 50% only for internal use documents permitted. (10629830).
Get permission to copy from this publication www.saiglobal.com/licensing
AS 2067:2016
Substations and high voltage

installations exceeding 1 kV a.c.
AS 2067:2016
This Australian Standard® was prepared by Committee EL-043, High Voltage Installations. It
was approved on behalf of the Council of Standards Australia on 4 August 2016.
This Standard was published on 14 September 2016.
The following are represented on Committee EL-043:
 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

 Australian Industry Group
 Bureau of Steel Manufacturers of Australia
 CIGRE
 Communications, Electrical and Plumbing Union—Electrical Division
 Consult Australia
 Department of Industry, Skills and Regional Development, NSW
 Department of Mines and Petroleum, WA
 Electrical Regulatory Authorities Council

 Energy Networks Association
 Engineers Australia
 Institute of Electrical Inspectors
This Standard was issued in draft form for comment as DR AS 2067:2014.
Standards Australia wishes to acknowledge the participation of the expert individuals that
contributed to the development of this Standard through their representation on the
Committee and through the public comment period.
Keeping Standards up-to-date

Australian Standards® are living documents that reflect progress in science, technology and
systems. To maintain their currency, all Standards are periodically reviewed, and new editions
are published. Between editions, amendments may be issued.
Standards may also be withdrawn. It is important that readers assure themselves they are
using a current Standard, which should include any amendments that may have been
published since the Standard was published.
Detailed information about Australian Standards, drafts, amendments and new projects can
be found by visiting www.standards.org.au
Standards Australia welcomes suggestions for improvements, and encourages readers to

notify us immediately of any apparent inaccuracies or ambiguities. Contact us via email at
mail@standards.org.au, or write to Standards Australia, GPO Box 476, Sydney, NSW 2001.
AS 2067:2016
Australian Standard®
Substations and high voltage

installations exceeding 1 kV a.c.
Originated as AS 2067—1977.
Previous edition 2008.
Third edition AS 2067:2016.
COPYRIGHT
© Standards Australia Limited
All rights are reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or copied in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without the written
permission of the publisher, unless otherwise permitted under the Copyright Act 1968.
Published by SAI Global Limited under licence from Standards Australia Limited, GPO Box
476, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia
ISBN 978 1 76035 559 3
AS 2067:2016 2
PREFACE
This Standard was prepared by the Standards Australia Committee EL-043, High Voltage
Installations, to supersede AS 2067—2008, Substations and high voltage installations
exceeding 1 kV a.c.
The objective of this Standard is to provide common rules for the design and the erection of
electrical power installations in systems with nominal voltages above 1 kV a.c. and nominal
frequency up to and including 60 Hz.
The objective of this revision is to incorporate changes derived from experience and
feedback following the issue of the 2008 edition of this Standard, amendments that have
been made to IEC 61936, and to incorporate review of consideration of fire issues,
requirements related to the mining area for fixed installations, as considered by EL-023,
Electrical Equipment in Mines and Quarries, and substantially expand the sections and
clauses on earthing, following reference to ENA’s Handbook ENA Doc 025, EG-0 on
earthing.
This Standard is based on but not equivalent to IEC 61936-1:2010, Power installations
exceeding 1 kV a.c., Part 1: Common rules, and its Amendment 1 (2014).
Where a reference is made to ‘national regulations’, it is intended to encompass national,
state or territory and local regulations.
The terms ‘normative’ and ‘informative’ are used to define the application of the appendix
to which they apply. A normative appendix is an integral part of a standard, whereas an
informative appendix is only for information and guidance.
Statements expressed in mandatory terms in notes to figures and tables are deemed to be
requirements of this Standard.
3 AS 2067:2016
CONTENTS
Page
SECTION 1 SCOPE AND GENERAL

1.1 SCOPE ......................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 APPLICATION ........................................................................................................... 6
1.3 NORMATIVE REFERENCES .................................................................................... 6
1.4 DEFINITIONS............................................................................................................. 8
SECTION 2 FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................. 18
2.2 ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................ 19
2.3 CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 21
2.4 CLIMATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS ........................................... 27
2.5 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... 30

2.6 SITE SELECTION .................................................................................................... 31
2.7 RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................. 31
SECTION 3 INSULATION
3.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................. 33
3.2 SELECTION OF INSULATION LEVEL .................................................................. 33
3.3 VERIFICATION OF WITHSTAND VALUES ......................................................... 33
3.4 MINIMUM CLEARANCES OF LIVE PARTS ......................................................... 34
3.5 MINIMUM CLEARANCES BETWEEN PARTS UNDER SPECIAL
CONDITIONS ........................................................................................................... 39
3.6 TYPE TESTED EQUIPMENT .................................................................................. 40
SECTION 4 EQUIPMENT
4.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................. 41
4.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................... 42
SECTION 5 INSTALLATIONS
5.1 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................. 52
5.2 OUTDOOR INSTALLATIONS OF OPEN DESIGN ................................................ 57
5.3 INDOOR INSTALLATIONS OF OPEN DESIGN .................................................... 64
5.4 INSTALLATION OF PREFABRICATED TYPE-TESTED SWITCHGEAR ........... 65
5.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS ...................................................................... 66
5.6 HIGH VOLTAGE/LOW VOLTAGE PREFABRICATED SUBSTATIONS ............. 71
5.7 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS ON A MAST, POLE OR TOWER ..................... 71
SECTION 6 SAFETY MEASURES

6.1 GENERAL ................................................................................................................. 72
6.2 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT CONTACT ...................................................... 72
6.3 MEANS TO PROTECT PERSONS FROM INDIRECT CONTACT ........................ 74
6.4 MEANS TO PROTECT PERSONS WORKING ON OR NEAR ELECTRICAL
INSTALLATIONS .................................................................................................... 74
6.5 PROTECTION FROM DANGER RESULTING FROM ARC FAULT ..................... 77
6.6 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT LIGHTNING STRIKES................................... 77
6.7 PROTECTION AGAINST FIRE AND EXPLOSION ............................................... 78
6.8 PROTECTION AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INSULATING LIQUIDS AND SF6 ........... 91
6.9 IDENTIFICATION AND MARKING ....................................................................... 96
6.10 PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ......................................... 97
AS 2067:2016 4
Page
SECTION 7 PROTECTION, CONTROL AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

7.1 PROTECTION SYSTEMS ........................................................................................ 98
7.2 MONITORING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS ........................................................... 99
7.3 A.C. AND D.C. SUPPLY CIRCUITS...................................................................... 100
7.4 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS ............................................................................. 101

7.5 SF6 GAS HANDLING PLANT ............................................................................... 102
7.6 BASIC RULES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY
OF CONTROL SYSTEMS ...................................................................................... 102
SECTION 8 EARTHING SYSTEMS

8.1 GENERAL ............................................................................................................... 105
8.2 FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................... 105
8.3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND DUE DILIGENCE ................................................... 106
8.4 DESIGN .................................................................................................................. 107
8.5 CONSTRUCTION ................................................................................................... 121
8.6 COMMISSIONING AND ONGOING MONITORING ........................................... 122

8.7 MAINTENANCE, MODIFICATION AND REFURBISHMENT ........................... 123
8.8 TESTING................................................................................................................. 124
8.9 DOCUMENTATION ............................................................................................... 124
SECTION 9 INSPECTION AND TESTING

9.1 INSPECTIONS AND TESTS .................................................................................. 126
9.2 DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS .................................................................. 127
9.3 VERIFICATION OF SPECIFIED PERFORMANCES ............................................ 127
9.4 TESTS DURING INSTALLATION AND COMMISSIONING .............................. 127
9.5 TRIAL RUN ............................................................................................................ 127
SECTION 10 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL .......................................... 128
APPENDICES
A VOLTAGE LIMITS AND RISK LEVEL ................................................................ 129
B SUBSTATION EARTHING SYSTEM.................................................................... 134
C FIRE RISK ZONES FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATIONS ................................. 145
D EMF AND SAFETY ISSUES—OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO THE DESIGN
OF THE INSTALLATION ...................................................................................... 154
E TYPICAL SYSTEM FOR FUNCTIONAL IDENTIFICATION OF SMALL
WIRING .................................................................................................................. 155
F POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION .......................................................................... 158
G EARTHING VOLTAGE LIMIT CASE STUDIES .................................................. 175
H EARTH SYSTEM TESTING .................................................................................. 204
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 220

5 AS 2067:2016
STANDARDS AUSTRALIA
Australian Standard
Substations and high voltage installations exceeding 1 kV a.c.
S E C T I O N 1 S C O P E A N D G E N E R A L
1.1 SCOPE
This Standard provides minimum requirements for the design and erection of high voltage
installations in systems with nominal voltages above 1 kV a.c. and nominal frequency up to
and including 60 Hz, so as to provide safety and proper functioning for the use intended.
For the purposes of this Standard, a high voltage installation is considered to be:
(a) An electricity network substation, under the control of an electricity network operator
or entity authorized by a licence or other legal instrument to convey electricity.
(b) The high voltage parts of an electrical installation of a power station including all
auxiliary systems and interconnecting lines and cables between power stations if on
the same site.
(c) Electrical installations built at offshore platforms, e.g. offshore wind power farms.
(d) The high voltage parts of an electrical installation that are not covered in (a) or (b)
above. This may include but not be limited to consumer and customer electrical
installations serving premises such as factories, commercial facilities, industrial
plants, institutional facilities and mine sites.
A high voltage installation includes, but is not limited to, the following equipment:
(i) High voltage electrical installations on masts, poles and towers.
(ii) Switchgear and/or transformers and/or electrical equipment located outside a closed
electrical operating area.
(iii) Rotating electrical machines.
(iv) Switchgear, controlgear and assemblies.
(v) Transformers and reactors.
(vi) Converters.
(vii) Cables.
(viii) Lines.
(ix) Wiring systems.
(x) Batteries, battery chargers and associated d.c. supply systems.
(xi) Capacitors.
(xii) Earthing systems.
(xiii) Buildings and fences that are part of a closed electrical operating area.
(xiv) Associated protection, control, auxiliary and ancillary systems.
(xv) Structures, foundations, earthworks and drainage.
NOTE: In general, a product Standard for an item of equipment takes precedence over this
Standard.
www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

AS 2067:2016 6
This Standard does not apply to the design and erection of any of the following:
(A) Overhead lines and underground cables between separate installations.
(B) Installations on ships and off-shore installations in accordance with IEC 61892 series.
(C) Underground parts of mine site electrical installations, or parts of such installations,
for which mining industry specific legislation sets other requirements.

(D) Switchgear and/or transformers and/or electrical equipment located within a closed
electrical operating area supplied at low voltage and where contact cannot be made
with high voltage conductors.
(E) Test sites.
1.2 APPLICATION
1.2.1 General
Substations and HV installations shall be designed to fulfil their functional aspects and also
to allow safe operation and maintenance. Operational and maintenance requirements are
covered in documents such as AS 5804 series and the ENA NENS guidelines.
This Standard does not apply to the design of factory-built, type-tested equipment for which
separate Australian Standards exist (or IEC Standards where Australian Standards do not
exist) to the extent of the scope of the Standards. However, all other requirements of this
Standard not covered by the type tests for the type-tested equipment shall comply with this
Standard. In particular, ground safety clearances and section safety clearances shall comply
with this Standard.
The relevant regulatory authority or electricity network operator may require proof that the
design and construction of the high voltage electrical installation complies with this
Standard and other relevant Standards and regulatory requirements, including local service
and installation rules. Therefore the relevant regulatory authority or electricity network
operator should be consulted prior to commencement of the design of the installation.
NOTES:
1 Users of this Standard should be aware of existing local, state territory and national
regulations.
2 Further requirements for specific locations may also be referenced or applied through
legislation.
3 High voltage a.c. installations associated with electric traction systems are included in the
scope of this Standard.
1.2.2 Existing installations
Existing installations are not automatically required to comply with this Standard.
In recognition of changes introduced, existing installations should be reviewed against the
requirements of this Standard.
1.3 NORMATIVE REFERENCES

The following are the normative documents referenced in this Standard:
NOTE: Documents for informative purposes are listed in the Bibliography.
AS
1170 Structural design actions
1170.4 Part 4: Earthquake actions in Australia
1210 Pressure vessels
1319 Safety signs for the occupational environment
© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

7 AS 2067:2016
AS
1824 Insulation co-ordination
1824.1 Part 1: Definitions, principles and rules
1824.2 Part 2: Application guide
1905 Components for the protection of openings in fire-resistant walls
1905.1 Part 1: Fire-resistant doorsets

1931 High-voltage test techniques
1931.1 Part 1: General definitions and test requirements
1940 The storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids
2293 Emergency escape lighting and exit signs for buildings
2293.3 Part 3: Emergency escape luminaires and exit signs
2676 Guide to the installation, maintenance, testing and replacement of secondary
batteries in buildings (series)
2865 Confined spaces
3600 Concrete structures

3700 Masonry structures
4100 Steel structures
60529 Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP Code)
62271 High-voltage switchgear and controlgear
62271.1 Part 1 Common specifications
62271.200 Part 200: a.c. metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages
above 1 kV and up to and including 52 kV (IEC 62271-200, Ed. 1
(2003) MOD)
62271.201 Part 201: High-voltage switchgear and controlgear—AC insulation
enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltages above
1 kV and up to and including 52 kV
62271.202 Part 202: High-voltage switchgear and controlgear—High-voltage/low
voltage prefabricated substation
62271.203 Part 203: Gas-insulated metal-enclosed switchgear for rated voltages above
52 kV
AS ISO
10007 Quality management systems—Guidelines for configuration management
AS/NZS
1170 Structural design actions
1170.0 Part 0: General principles
1170.1 Part 1: Permanent, imposed and other actions
1170.2 Part 2: Wind actions
1170.3 Part 3: Snow and ice actions
1768 Lightning protection
2344 Limits of electromagnetic interference from overhead a.c. powerlines and
high voltage equipment installations in the frequency range 0.15 to 1000 MHz
2802 Electric cables—Reeling and trailing for mining and general use (other than
underground coal mining)
3000 Electrical installations (known as the Australian/New Zealand Wiring Rules)

AS 2067:2016 8
AS/NZS
3008 Electrical installations—Selection of cables
3008.1.1 Part 1.1: Cables for alternating voltages up to and including 0.6/1 kV—
Typical Australian installation conditions
7000 Overhead line design—Detailed procedures
60076 Power transformers

60076.2 Part 2: Temperature rise for liquid-immersed transformers (IEC 60076-2,
Ed.3.0 (2011) MOD)
60079 Explosive atmospheres
60079.10.1 Part 10.1: Classification of areas—Explosive gas atmospheres
(IEC 60079-10-1, Ed.1.0 (2008) MOD)
60079.10.2 Part 10.2: Classification of areas—Combustible dust atmospheres
60479 Effects of current on human beings and livestock
60479.1 Part 1: General aspects
IEC
60071 Insulation co-ordination
60071-1 Part 1: Definitions, principles and rules
60071-2 Part 2: Application guide
60255 Measuring relays and protective equipment (series)
60287 Electric cables—Calculation of the current rating (series)
60865 Short-circuit currents—Calculation of effects
60865-1 Part 1: Definitions and calculation methods
60909 Short-circuit currents in three-phase a.c. systems (series)
60949 Calculation of thermally permissible short-circuit currents, taking into
account non-adiabatic heating effects
61219 Live working—Earthing or earthing and short-circuiting equipment using
lances as a short-circuiting device—Lance earthing
61230 Live working—Portable equipment for earthing or earthing and short-
circuiting
IEC/TS
60815 Selection and dimensioning of high-voltage insulators intended for use in
polluted conditions
60815-1 Part 1: Definitions, information and general principles
60815-2 Part 2: Ceramic and glass insulators for a.c. systems
60815-3 Part 3: Polymer insulators for a.c. systems
IEC/TR
61000 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
61000-5-2 Part 5-2: Installation and mitigation guidelines—Earthing and cabling
Australian Building Code Board (ABCB)
NCC National Construction Code
1.4 DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of this Standard, the following definitions apply.
1.4.1 Automatic reclosing
Automatic reclosing of a circuit-breaker associated with a faulted section of a network after
an interval of time that permits that section to recover from a transient fault.

9 AS 2067:2016
1.4.2 Boundary clearance

The smallest permissible clearance between an external fence and live parts or those parts
that may be subject to a hazardous voltage.
1.4.3 Bund
An embankment or wall that may form part or all of the perimeter of a compound.
1.4.4 Busbar
In a substation, the assembly necessary to make a common connection for several circuits.
Example: Three busbars for a three-phase system.
1.4.5 Circulating transformer neutral current
Portion of fault current that flows back to the transformer neutral point via the metallic
parts and/or the earthing system without ever discharging into ground.
1.4.6 Clearance
Distance between two conductive parts along a string stretched the shortest way between
these conductive parts (the taut string distance).
1.4.7 Closed electrical operating area
A room or location for operation of electrical installations and equipment to which access is
intended to be restricted to skilled or instructed persons or to lay personnel under the
supervision of skilled or instructed persons, e.g. by opening of a door or removal of
protective barrier only by the use of a key or tool, and which is clearly marked by
appropriate warning signs.
1.4.8 Common earthing system (combined earthing system)
An earthing system where the earthed components from the various parts of the asset are
directly electrically connected by conductor or conductors.
Example: A common 11 kV\LV earthing system.
1.4.9 Common multiple earth neutral (CMEN)
A system of supply in which the LV neutral conductor on an MEN system interconnects a
number of common or bonded substation earths, HV distribution equipment earths
(including gas switches, poles, etc.), LV earths and consumer earths.
1.4.10 Confined space
An enclosed or partially enclosed space that is not intended or designed primarily for
human occupancy, as defined in AS 2865.
1.4.11 Containment tank/system
Tank or bund around equipment to prevent the escape into the environment of insulating
liquid.
1.4.12 Cross country fault
A phase-to-phase fault occurring when an earth fault on an impedance or resonant earthed
system in one location leads to an earth fault at another location on a different phase.
1.4.13 Danger zone
Area limited by the non-flash over distance (N) around live parts that are without complete
protection against direct contact.
NOTE: Infringing the danger zone is considered the same as touching live parts.

AS 2067:2016 10
1.4.14 Earth electrode

Conductive part that is in electric contact with the earth and that may be embedded in a
specific conductive medium (e.g. in concrete).
1.4.15 Earth fault
Fault caused by a conductor being connected to earth or by the insulation resistance to earth
becoming less than a specified value.
[IEC 60050-151:1978, 151-03-40]
NOTE: Earth faults of two or several phase conductors of the same system at different locations
are designated as double or multiple earth faults.
1.4.16 Earth fault current, (I F)
Current that flows from the main circuit to earth or earthed parts at the fault location (earth
fault location).
NOTES:
1 For single or double line to earth faults, this is in systems with—
(a) isolated neutral, the capacitive earth fault current;

(b) high resistive earthing, the earth fault current;
(c) resonant earthing, the earth fault residual current; and
(d) solid or low impedance neutral earthing, the line-to-earth short-circuit current.
2 Further earth fault current may result from double earth fault and line to line to earth.
1.4.17 Earth potential rise (EPR)
Voltage between an earthing system and remote earth.
1.4.18 Earth rod
Earth electrode consisting of a metal rod installed into the ground, commonly vertically.
1.4.19 Earthing conductor
Conductor that provides a conductive path, or part of the conductive path, between a given
point in a system or in an installation or in equipment and an earth electrode.
[IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-02-03—modified]
NOTE: Where the connection between part of the installation and the earth electrode is made via
a disconnecting link, disconnecting switch, surge arrester counter, surge arrester control gap, etc.,
then only that part of the connection permanently attached to the earth electrode is an earthing
conductor.
1.4.20 Earthing system
Arrangement of connections and devices necessary to earth equipment or a system
separately or jointly.
[IEC 60050-604:1987, 604-04-02]
1.4.21 Effective step voltage (VSE) (loaded step voltage)
Voltage between two points on the earth’s surface that are 1 m apart when a person has one
foot in contact with each point.
NOTE:1 m is considered to be the stride length of a person.
1.4.22 Effective touch voltage (VTE) (loaded touch voltage)
Voltage between conductive parts when touched simultaneously.
NOTE: The value of the effective touch voltage may be appreciably influenced by the impedance
of the person in electric contact with these conductive parts.
[IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-05-11, modified]

11 AS 2067:2016
1.4.23 Electrical equipment

Any item used for such purposes as generation, conduction, conversion, transmission,
distribution and utilization of electrical energy, such as machines, transformers, apparatus,
measuring instruments, protective devices, equipment for wiring systems and appliances.
1.4.24 Electric resistivity of soil (ρE)
Resistivity of a typical sample of soil.

1.4.25 Enclosure
Part providing protection of equipment against certain external influences and, in any
direction, protection against direct contact.
1.4.26 Everyday load
The loads on the structural system with a conductor temperature equivalent to the mean of
the local area temperature in the coldest month with negligible wind loads, i.e. in still air.
1.4.27 Exposed conductive part
Conductive part of equipment that can be touched and that is not normally live, but which
can become live when basic insulation fails.
[IEC 60050-826:2004, 826-12-10, modified]
1.4.28 Extraneous conductive part
Conductive part not forming part of the electrical installation and liable to introduce an
electric potential, generally the electric potential of a local earth.
[IEC 60050-826:2004, 826-12-11, modified]
1.4.29 Feeder
Electric line originating at a main substation and supplying one or more secondary
substations, or one or more branch lines, or any combination of these two types of
installations.
1.4.30 Ferroresonance
Resonance of the capacitance of an apparatus with the inductance of the saturable magnetic
circuit of an adjacent apparatus.
1.4.31 Gas-insulated equipment (GIE)—Also referred to as ‘gas-insulated metal
enclosed equipment’
Equipment in which the insulation is obtained, at least partly, by an insulating gas other
than air.
1.4.32 Global earthing system
Equivalent earthing system created by the interconnection of local earthing systems that
ensures, by the proximity of the earthing systems, that there are no dangerous touch
voltages. Such systems permit the division of the earth fault current in a way that results in
a reduction of the earth potential rise at the local earthing system.
NOTE: Such a system could be said to form a quasi equipotential surface.
1.4.33 Ground safety clearance (G)
The minimum distance required between the earthed end of any exposed insulator carrying
or containing live parts and ground or the floor of permanent walkways used for normal
inspection and operational functions. This distance is equivalent to the reach of a person at
ground level (2440 mm), which includes an allowance of 300 mm for tools.

AS 2067:2016 12
1.4.34 High voltage (HV)

Voltage exceeding 1000 V a.c.
1.4.35 Highest voltage for installation (U m)
Highest r.m.s. value of phase-to-phase voltage for which the installation is designed in
respect of its insulation.

1.4.36 Horizontal work safety clearance (H)
The minimum distance measured horizontally between live parts and the work object.
Where work is to be carried out from a ladder, the horizontal work safety clearance is
applied from extremities of the work object horizontally to the nearest live parts. This
distance includes an allowance of 300 mm for tools.
1.4.37 Impedance earthed (low or high, resistor, reactor or transformer)
A system where the neutral point is connected to earth via an impedance greater than a
direct bond.
Example: NERs and earthing transformers.

1.4.38 Impedance to earth (ZE)
Impedance at a given frequency between a specified point in a system or in an installation
or in equipment and remote earth.
NOTE: The impedance to earth is determined by the directly connected earth electrodes and also
by connected overhead earth wires and wires buried in earth of overhead lines, by connected
cables with earth electrode effect and by other earthing systems that are conductively connected
to the relevant earthing system by conductive cable sheaths, shields, PEN conductors or in
another way.
1.4.39 Indoor installations
Electrical installations within a building or room in which the equipment is protected
against the weather.
1.4.40 Installations of enclosed design
Installations where the equipment has protection against direct contact.
NOTE: For degrees of enclosure protection, see AS 60529.
1.4.41 Installations of open design
Installations where the equipment does not have protection against direct contact.
1.4.42 Interlocking device
Device that makes the operation of a switching device dependent upon the position or
operation of one or more other pieces of equipment.
1.4.43 Isolated neutral (unearthed)
A system in which the neutrals of transformers and generators are not intentionally
connected to earth, except for high impedance connections for signalling, measuring or
protection purposes.
[IEC 60050-601:1995, 601-02-24, modified]
1.4.44 Isolating distance
Clearance between open contacts meeting the safety requirements specified for equipment.
1.4.45 Isolation
Switching off or disconnection of an installation, a part of an installation or an equipment
from all non-earthed conductors by creating isolating gaps or distances.

13 AS 2067:2016
1.4.46 Line (electric)

An arrangement of conductors, insulating materials and accessories for transferring
electricity between two points of a system.
1.4.47 Live part
Conductor or conductive part intended to be energized in normal operation, including a

neutral conductor but by convention not a PEN conductor or PEM conductor or PEL
conductor.
NOTE: For definitions of PEM and PEL, see IEC 60050-195:2005, 195-02-13 and 195-02-14.
1.4.48 Local control
Control of operation from a point on or adjacent to the controlled switching device.
1.4.49 Local earth
Part of the Earth that is in electric contact with an earth electrode.
NOTE: The potential of the local earth is not necessarily equal to zero.
1.4.50 Low voltage (LV)

Voltage exceeding 50 V a.c. but not exceeding 1000 V a.c.
1.4.51 Maximum sag
The lowest point of a flexible conductor measured during maximum design load conditions
and under maximum design fault conditions.
1.4.52 Minimum height
Smallest permissible vertical clearance between accessible surfaces and live parts without
protection against direct contact or those parts that may be subject to a hazardous voltage.
1.4.53 Minimum phase to earth clearance
Smallest permissible clearance in air between live parts and earth or between live parts and
parts at earth potential.
The clearances to earth between live parts and earthed material apply to any structure or
surface substantially at earth potential, including any fixed or portable screens which may
be provided. Earthed material includes a poor conductor such as concrete.
1.4.54 Minimum phase-to-phase clearance
Smallest permissible clearance in air between live parts of different phases or between the
same phase that are electrically separate from each other.
1.4.55 Multi-earthed (multi-grounded) high voltage neutral conductor
Neutral conductor of a distribution line connected to the earthing system of the source
transformer and at regular intervals along its length.
1.4.56 Multiple earth neutral (MEN)
A method of multiple connections between an LV system neutral and earth and the general
mass of earth such that the reticulated neutral can return earth fault current and earth paths
can return neutral current.
1.4.57 Nominal value
Value of a quantity used to designate and identify a component, device, equipment or
system.
1.4.58 Nominal voltage of a system (Un)
Suitable approximate value of r.m.s. phase-to-phase voltage used to designate or identify a
system.
AS 2067:2016 14
1.4.59 Non-flashover distance (N)

The minimum phase to earth clearance that includes a margin of 10% (for clearances of
1300 mm or less) and 6% (for clearances of greater than 1300 mm) to allow for variations
in construction dimensions.
1.4.60 Oil containment tank/system
See Clause 1.4.11, Containment tank/system.

1.4.61 Operating areas subject to fire hazard
Rooms, areas or locations, indoors or outdoors, where there is a danger due to local or
operating conditions that hazardous quantities of easily combustible solid materials may
come so close to the electrical equipment as to cause a fire hazard resulting from the high
temperature of the equipment or due to arcing.
1.4.62 Outdoor installations
Electrical installations that are outdoors.
1.4.63 PEN conductor

Conductor combining the functions of both protective earthing conductor and neutral
conductor.
[IEC 60050-826:2004, 826-13-25]
1.4.64 Potential
Voltage between an observation point and remote earth.
1.4.65 Power station
Installation whose purpose is to generate electricity and which includes civil engineering
works, energy conversion equipment and all the necessary ancillary equipment.
1.4.66 Power transformer
A static piece of apparatus with two or more windings which, by electromagnetic induction,
transforms a system of alternating voltage and current into another system of voltage and
current usually of different values and at the same frequency for the purpose of transmitting
electrical power.
1.4.67 Prospective step voltage (VSP)
Voltage between two points on the earth’s surface that are 1 m apart when no person is
present.
NOTE: The stride length of a person is considered to be 1 m.
1.4.68 Prospective touch voltage (VTP)
Voltage between simultaneously accessible conductive parts when those conductive parts
are not being touched.
[IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-05-09, modified]
1.4.69 Protection against direct contact
Measures that prevent persons coming into hazardous proximity to live parts or those parts
that could carry a hazardous voltage, with parts of their bodies or objects (reaching the
danger zone).
1.4.70 Protection in case of indirect contact
Protection of persons from hazards that could arise, in the event of a fault, from contact
with exposed conductive parts of electrical equipment or extraneous conductive parts.

15 AS 2067:2016
1.4.71 Protective barrier

Part providing protection against direct contact from any usual direction of access.
1.4.72 Protective barrier clearance
Smallest permissible clearance between a protective barrier and live parts or those parts that
may become live subject to a hazardous voltage.

1.4.73 Protective obstacle
Part preventing unintentional access to an area where safety clearances will be infringed,
but not preventing access to this area by deliberate action.
1.4.74 Protective obstacle clearance
Smallest permissible clearance between a protective obstacle and live parts or those parts
that may become live subject to a hazardous voltage.
1.4.75 Rated value
Value of a quantity used for specification purposes, established for a specified set of
operating conditions of a component, device, equipment, or system.

1.4.76 Rated voltage (Ur)
The voltage assigned by a manufacturer for a specified operating condition of a component,
device or equipment and which it will withstand when tested in accordance with the
appropriate Australian Standard.
1.4.77 Remote earth
Part of the Earth considered as conductive, the electric potential of which is conventionally
taken as zero, being outside the zone of influence of the relevant earthing arrangement.
NOTE: The concept ‘Earth’ means the planet and all its physical matter.
[IEC 60050-195:1998, 195-01-01, modified]
1.4.78 Remote control
Control of operation at a point distant from the controlled switching device.
1.4.79 Resonant earthed
A system in which one or more neutral points are connected to earth through reactances
which approximately compensate the capacitive component of a single phase-to-earth fault
current.
[IEC 60050-601:1995, 601-02-27]
NOTE: With resonant earthing of a system, the residual current in the fault is limited to such an
extent that an arcing fault in air is usually self-extinguishing.
[IEC 60071-1]
1.4.80 Segregated earthing systems (separated earthing systems)
Earthing systems that are not electrically connected other than via the general mass of earth.
1.4.81 Section safety clearance (S)
Safety clearance required for access for operational purposes. The non-flashover distance
(N) plus the ground safety clearance (G) measured along a taut string between the ground or
operating platform and the live part.
1.4.82 Solidly earthed
A system where the neutral point is directly bonded to the system earth via a minimal
impedance.

AS 2067:2016 16
1.4.83 Short-circuit time constant of primary windings (primary time constant)

Time required for the d.c. component present in the short-circuit primary winding current,
following a sudden change in operating conditions, to decrease to 1/e, that is 0.368 of its
initial value, the machine running at rated speed.
1.4.84 Structural earth electrode
Metal part, that is in conductive contact with the earth or with water directly or via
concrete, whose original purpose is not earthing, but which fulfils all requirements of an
earth electrode without impairment of the original purpose.
Examples: Pipelines, sheet piling, concrete reinforcement bars in foundations and the steel
structure of buildings, etc.
1.4.85 Substation
Part of a power system, concentrated in a given place, including mainly the terminations of
transmission or distribution lines, switchgear and housing and which may also include
transformers. It generally includes facilities necessary for system security and control
(e.g. the protective devices).

Examples: Transmission substation (of a transmission system), distribution substation,
400 kV substation, 20 kV substation.
NOTE: According to the nature of the system within which the substation is included, a prefix
may qualify it.
1.4.86 Sump
Receptacle that is intended to receive the insulating liquid of a transformer or other
equipment in case of leakage.
1.4.87 Taut string distance
The distance between two parts measured along a taut string stretched the shortest way
between those parts.
1.4.88 Tested connection zone
Zone in the vicinity of equipment terminals that has passed a dielectric type test with the
appropriate withstand value(s), the applicable conductors being connected to the terminals
in a manner specified by the manufacturer of the equipment.
1.4.89 Transferred potential
Potential rise of an earthing system caused by a current to earth transferred by means of a
connected conductor (e.g. a metallic cable sheath, PEN conductor, pipeline, rail, fences)
into areas with low or no potential rise relative to remote earth, resulting in a potential
difference occurring between the conductor and its surroundings.
NOTE: The definition also applies where a conductor, which is connected to remote earth, leads
into the area of the potential rise.
1.4.90 Transient overvoltage
Short duration overvoltage of a few milliseconds, or less, oscillatory or non-oscillatory,
usually highly damped.
1.4.91 Vertical work safety clearance (V)
The minimum distance measured vertically between live parts and the highest part of the
work object. Where work is to be carried out from a ladder, the vertical work safety
clearance shall be applied from the highest parts of the work object vertically to the nearest
live parts. This distance includes an allowance of 300 mm for tools.

17 AS 2067:2016
1.4.92 Voltage Range I

Voltage in the range 1 kV < U m ≤ 245 kV.
1.4.93 Voltage Range II
Voltage in range U m > 245 kV.
1.4.94 Working clearance

Minimum safe distance to be observed between normally exposed live parts and any person
working in a high voltage installation or any conductive tool (or object) directly handled.
NOTE: Values for electrically skilled or instructed persons are given in Figure 5.8. This refers
only to non-live working. Specific definitions related to live working practices are found in
IEC 60050-651.
1.4.95 Work section
A defined space where a person can work safely provided that some part of the person
always remains within that space.

AS 2067:2016 18
S E C T I O N 2 F U N D A M E N T A L R E Q U I R E M E N T S
2.1 GENERAL
2.1.1 General requirements

Installations and equipment shall be capable of withstanding electrical, mechanical, climatic
and environmental influences anticipated on site.
The design shall take into account—
(a) the purpose of the installation;
(b) the users requirements such as power quality, reliability, availability, and ability of
the electrical network to withstand the effects of transient conditions such as starting
of large motors, short power outages and re-energization of the installation;
(c) the safety of the operators and the public;
(d) the environmental influence;

(e) the possibility for extension (if required) and maintenance; and
(f) continuous full load, maximum design short circuit fault levels with respect to fault
time.
The user should define preferences for specific maintenance features and should identify
the safety requirements to be met for levels of segregation of the switchgear and control
gear to ensure minimal plant shutdown. Where necessary, the levels of segregation of
switchgear shall be provided to secure safety during operation, inspection, cleaning and
maintenance and be arranged to minimize the spread of a fault, including a fire, occurring
in any defined module into adjacent modules.
There are operating conditions of low occurrence or low cumulative duration which can
occur and for which specific design criteria may be agreed between the user and the
manufacturer.
In such cases measures required to prevent unsafe conditions and to avoid damage to
electrical or plant equipment are to be taken.
Unless the installation is intended to operate solely in an islanded mode, the generators
shall be capable of meeting the requirements for connection to the power system grid,
e.g. for voltage regulation, frequency response, etc.
Design of substations and high voltage installations is a multidisciplinary activity involving
several specialized engineering disciplines. Design in each of these disciplines shall be
carried out by personnel who are qualified and competent in the particular discipline. The
specialized disciplines include high voltage engineering, protection, control, high voltage
testing, metering, civil and structural. The requirement for qualified and competent
personnel extends to field activities such as installation, testing, commissioning and
maintenance.
2.1.2 Agreements between supplier (manufacturer) and user
The working procedures of the user shall be taken into account in the design of the
installation.
For design and erection of high voltage installations, additional agreements between
manufacturer/contractor/planner and user/orderer/owner may impose contractual
obligations. These agreements may also cover issues relating to essential operational
requirements.

19 AS 2067:2016
2.2 ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS

2.2.1 Methods of neutral earthing
The method of neutral earthing of a system is important with regard to—
(a) selection of insulation level;
(b) characteristics of overvoltage limiting devices such as spark gaps or surge arresters;
(c) selection of protective relays; and
(d) design of the earthing system.
The following are examples of neutral earthing methods:
(i) Isolated neutral.
(ii) Resonant earthing.
(iii) Impedance earthing.
(iv) Solid (low impedance) earthing.
The choice of the type of neutral earthing is normally based on the following criteria:
(A) Local regulations (if any).
(B) Continuity of service required for the network.
(C) Limitation of damage to equipment caused by earth faults.
(D) Selective elimination of faulty sections of the network.
(E) Detection of fault location.
(F) Touch and step voltages.
(G) Inductive interference.
(H) Operation and maintenance aspects.
One galvanically connected system has only one method of neutral earthing. Different
galvanically independent systems may have different methods of neutral earthing. If
different neutral earthing configurations can occur during normal or abnormal operating
conditions, equipment and protective system should be designed to operate under these
conditions.
The requirements of this Standard apply for all systems of earthing, including systems that
are earthed with methods other than neutral earthing.
Refer to Appendix B for further details regarding methods of neutral earthing.
2.2.2 Voltage classification
The user shall define the nominal voltage and the maximum operating voltage of the
system. Based on the maximum operating voltage the highest voltage for the installation
(U m) shall be selected either from Tables 3.1 or 3.2.
2.2.3 Current in normal operation
Every part of an installation shall be designed and constructed to withstand currents under
defined operating conditions.
2.2.4 Short-circuit current
2.2.4.1 Mechanical and thermal effects
Installations shall be designed, constructed and erected to safely withstand the mechanical
and thermal effects resulting from short-circuit currents.

AS 2067:2016 20
Where an installation has on-site generation, motors or parallel operation with a network
(co-generation), allowance shall be made for the increased fault levels.
Where the high voltage installation is connected to a transmission or distribution network,
information regarding design prospective short-circuit and fault currents at the point of
supply may be obtained from the local electricity distributor.
2.2.4.2 Types
For the purpose of this Standard all types of short-circuit shall be considered, e.g.—
(a) three-phase;
(b) phase-to-phase;
(c) phase-to-earth; and
(d) double phase-to-earth.
Installations shall be protected with automatic devices to disconnect three-phase and
phase-to-phase short-circuits.
Installations shall be protected either with automatic devices to disconnect earth faults or to
indicate the earth fault condition. The selection of the device is dependent upon the method
of neutral earthing.
Protection co-ordination shall be designed to take into account minimum and maximum
short circuit currents.
2.2.4.3 Rated duration
The standard value of rated duration of the short-circuit is 1.0 s.
NOTES:
1 If a value other than 1 s is appropriate, recommended values would be 0.5 s, 2.0 s and 3.0 s.
2 The rated duration should be determined taking into consideration the fault switching time.
2.2.4.4 Calculation
Methods for the calculation of short-circuit currents in three-phase a.c. systems are given in
IEC 60909.
2.2.4.5 Effects
Methods for the calculation of the effects of short-circuit current are given in IEC 60865-1
and, for power cables, in IEC 60949.
2.2.5 Rated frequency
Installations shall be designed for the rated frequency of the system in which they shall
operate.
2.2.6 Corona
2.2.6.1 General
The design of installations shall be such that radio interference, e.g. caused by corona
effects, will not exceed a specified level.
NOTES:
1 Maximum permissible levels of radio interference may be given by national or local
authorities.
2 Guidance on acceptable levels of radio interference voltage for switchgear and controlgear
can be found in AS 62271.1.

21 AS 2067:2016
When the acceptable value is exceeded, the corona level may be controlled, for example, by
the installation of corona rings or the recessing of fasteners on fittings for high voltage
suspension insulator assemblies, busbar support assemblies, busbar connections and
equipment terminals.
2.2.6.2 Radio and television interference
Corona generates interference over a wide band of frequencies.

The degree of annoyance caused by radio and television interference is determined by the
‘signal-to-noise ratio’ at the receiving installation. When establishing limits for the
emission of radio noise, the radio and television signal strengths to be protected have to be
determined.
The allowable levels of radio interference voltage (RIV) and television interference (TVI)
are given in AS/NZS 2344.
2.2.6.3 Audible noise
The most common form of audible noise is a hissing or frying sound (broadband crackle)
audible in wet weather. During fair weather, a constant low frequency (100 Hz) hum may
also be heard.
Designers need to take into account the requirements of the relevant environmental
protection agencies, government authority or local council regulations. The total random
audible noise consisting of both broadband and 100 Hz hum needs to be addressed in the
design process.
2.2.7 High voltage design practices with respect to EMF
High voltage installations shall be designed with consideration to Electrical and Magnetic
Fields (EMF). EMF limits shall comply with those in ICNIRP, Guidelines for limits
exposure to magnetic and electric fields (1 HZ to 100 kHz).
NOTE: Further details are provided in Appendix D.
2.2.8 Overvoltages
Equipment shall be protected against overvoltages resulting from switching operations or
lightning that could exceed the withstand values according to IEC 60071-1 and
IEC 60071-2.
2.2.9 Harmonics
Consideration should be given to the effect of harmonic currents and harmonic voltages on
the installation (e.g. in industrial installations). Harmonic analyses may be required to
determine what corrective measures are needed to meet local regulations and/or to ensure
correct operation of the whole electrical system.
2.3 CIVIL AND STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS

2.3.1 General
This Clause provides the basis for the structural design of structures associated with HV
installations and should be read in conjunction with AS/NZS 1170 series.
The general principles of structural design are based on the limit state concept used in
conjunction with a load and material strength reduction factor appropriate to the reference
limit state.
The values of these factors depend on the degree of uncertainty for the loads, resistances,
material properties, geotechnical parameters, geometrical quantities, design model, the type
of structure and the type of limit state. These factors can also depend on the strength
co-ordination and failure containment principles envisaged for the installation.

AS 2067:2016 22
Any element of the installation that carries a structural load or is a secondary structural or
framing element should be considered as a ‘structural element’ in the context of this Clause.
Structures and components should be designed using a reliability-based (risk of failure)
approach. The selection of load factors in particular for weather related loads, and
component strength reduction factors are based on achieving acceptable risk of failure for
the selected importance level and operational performance.

The AS/NZS 1170 series and Table 2.1 provide the relevant load factors and strength
reduction factors for the various structural elements used in HV installations.
Refer also to AS/NZS 1170 series for suitable annual exceedance probabilities based on the
importance level and design working life of the structures (see Note 1).
The material reduction factors do vary for each component in the tension chain (conductor,
fitting, insulator and structure). The performance of the structural system shall be evaluated
for an appropriate combination of serviceability and strength states as set out in the
following clauses.
Structural steel design shall be carried out in accordance with AS 4100. Concrete structure
design shall be carried out in accordance with AS 3600.

NOTES:
1 AS/NZS 7000 provides guidance on the application of this Clause. It also contains component
strength reduction factors for various components.
2 HB 331 contains application information and worked examples.
2.3.2 Equipment and structures
2.3.2.1 General
Equipment and structures, including their foundations shall withstand all the anticipated
load combinations.
The AS/NZS 1170 series contains the structural design actions to be considered, including
permanent (dead loads-long term), imposed (live loads-short term), including wind, seismic,
snow and ice. Additional loads such as short circuit, switching, and special loads, such as
impact, construction and maintenance are provided in this Standard or shall be determined
by the designer.
2.3.2.2 Permanent loads (G)
Self-weight of structures, insulators, equipment and conductors act as permanent loads as
defined in AS/NZS 1170.1.
Gs represents the vertical load on the structures and shall be the vertical force due to the
structures' own mass plus the mass of all equipment, ancillaries and attachments.
Gc represents the vertical loads of conductors and attachments such as spacers, insulators
and droppers.
2.3.2.3 Imposed and other loads (Q, W, E)
The following imposed and other loads shall be considered:
(a) Wind loads
All structures shall be designed for a peak gust regional wind speed for the relevant
region and average recurrence interval as defined in AS/NZS 1170.2. AS/NZS 7000
provides further guidance on the selection of the wind return period for structures that
support flexible conductors as well as defining the regions where synoptic and/or
downdraft winds shall be considered.

23 AS 2067:2016
Wind loads, which can be very different depending on the local topographic
influences and the height of the structures above the surrounding ground, shall be
taken into account. The most unfavourable wind direction shall be considered. The
design wind pressure, pz shall be calculated for the site location. This pressure will
depend on factors such as terrain, topography, regional wind speed, return period,
structure height and wind direction. If designing a suite of structures it may be
advisable to use a wind direction multiplier of Md = 1 and a shielding factor of

Ms = 1.0 to enable flexible location and orientation of the structures.
AS/NZS 1170.2 contains a table of drag factors for various structural sections and
shapes and dynamic response factors.
(b) Seismic loads
Where HV installations are to be constructed in seismically active regions,
consideration shall be given to the forces on the structures due to earthquakes and/or
seismic tremors. Reference shall be made to AS 1170.4 for relevant design
provisions.
(c) Snow and ice loads

Snow and ice loads S y shall be applied to all elements of the HV installation in the
appropriate regions. AS 1170.3 provides snow and ice loads.
In regions where icing can occur, the resulting load on flexible conductors and on
rigid busbars shall be taken into account.
If local experience or statistics are not available, the minimum design loads shall be
based on a radial ice thickness of 10 mm with a density of 900 kg/m3 and coincident
with a wind pressure of 100 Pa at a conductor temperature of –5°C. These loads may
be taken as corresponding to a return period of 50 years although the appropriateness
is uncertain. Useful guidance is available in Appendix EE of AS/NZS 7000.
(d) Short-circuit loads
The mechanical effects of a short circuit can be estimated by the methods detailed in
IEC 60865-1. Alternatively, finite element analysis permits a generally more detailed
and precise analysis of the structure under dynamic loading.
NOTE: The CIGRE Technical Brochures No.105 and No.214 parts l and ll, as well as
IEEE Std 605, give additional advice.
(e) Switching loads
Switching forces shall be considered when designing supports. The forces shall be
determined by the designer of the equipment.
2.3.2.4 Special loads
Consideration shall be given to the following loads:
(a) Maintenance/construction loads
The structural supports shall be able to withstand all imposed construction and
maintenance loads Q m , which are likely to be imposed on them with an appropriate
load factor, taking into account working procedures, temporary guying and lifting
arrangements. Overstressing of the structure shall be prevented by specification of
allowable procedures and/or load capacities.

AS 2067:2016 24
The conditions shall be based on the worst weather conditions (wind and temperature)
under which maintenance will be carried out. The design wind pressure for general
outdoor maintenance work is recommended to be 100 Pa, with a minimum of 50 Pa.
The designer needs to consider all potential aspects that may arise from maintenance
practices. For example, lowering a strung bus may result in approximate doubling of
the conductor tension and weight Gc on the structure under consideration.
For all structural elements that can be climbed and are inclined with an angle less the
30 degrees to the horizontal, a characteristic imposed load of 1.5 kN acting vertically
at any point along the member shall be considered without any other coincident loads.
In addition for all structures which are designed to be climbed, anchorages to provide
for limited fall arrest system ultimate loads shall be considered. Refer to
AS/NZS 5532 and AS/NZS 1891 series for further guidance.
An imposed erection load of 1 kN at the most critical position of the supporting
structure shall be considered.
(b) Loss of conductor tension
A structure with tension insulator strings shall be designed to withstand the loss of
conductor tension resulting from breakage of the insulator or conductor that gives the
most unfavourable load case.
NOTES:
1 General practice is to base the calculation on 0°C, no ice and no wind load.
2 For bundle conductors, only one conductor is assumed to fail.
(c) Vibration
Vibration caused by wind, electromagnetic stresses, traffic (e.g. temporary road and
railway traffic) shall be considered. The withstand capability of equipment against
vibration shall be given by the manufacturer.
(d) Other loads
The loads due to forces such as ground water and flood flows shall also be considered
where appropriate. The effect of buoyancy on below ground structures shall be taken
into account.
2.3.3 Coincident temperatures
For structures that are subject to temperature dependent loads, such as those that support
flexible conductors, the temperature effects for the following conditions shall be
considered:
(a) Minimum temperature with no other climatic conditions.
(b) Ambient temperature for ultimate wind speed condition.
(c) A temperature shall be assumed for icing.
NOTE: For the main types of icing, a temperature of 0°C may be used.
In addition, a temperature of −5°C with 100 Pa wind pressure with ice load should be
considered. Refer to Clause 2.3.2.3.
2.3.4 Load components
This Clause applies to structures and attachments that support flexible conductor loadings
and should be read in conjunction with Table 2.1.
Although any attached conductor (wire) will impose a single force on the structure, this
force is resolved into orthogonal components with respect to the structure geometry. This
allows the longitudinal, transverse and vertical components to be calculated and appropriate
load factors applied to each component.

25 AS 2067:2016
Fsc is the horizontal component of the conductor tension in the longitudinal direction when
subject to short circuit.
Ftw is the horizontal component of the conductor tension in the longitudinal direction when
subject to design wind pressure.
Ftm is the horizontal component of the conductor tension in the longitudinal direction when
subject to maintenance calculated for a wind pressure of 100 Pa.

Fte is the horizontal component of the conductor tension in the longitudinal direction when
subject to no wind.
2.3.5 Load combinations
In the design of the structures, a range of loading conditions shall be considered that will
provide due consideration for all possible service conditions that the structure may be
subjected to throughout its service life.
The required load factors and load combinations to be used shall be in accordance with
AS/NZS 1170 for general structures, and with Table 2.1. The most unfavourable load
case(s) shall be used to determine the design of the structure.

The load factors given in AS/NZS 1170 and Table 2.1 reflect the uncertainty in the
derivation of the particular load. The value of each load component shall be calculated
separately for each loading condition.
For structures that support flexible conductors, the load components shall include the
potential effects of differential tensions across the structure due to the effects of unequal
spans and wind pressures that may exist at the structure.

AS 2067:2016
© Standards Australia
TABLE 2.1
LOAD COMBINATIONS AND LOAD FACTORS
Load factors
Loading condition Wind load
Sy Gs Gc F tm F tw F te F sc Q
Wu
Maximum wind pz
1.1 1.25 1.25
(design wind pressure) (see Note 1)
Everyday condition 1.1 1.25 1.1
Snow and ice (see Note 6) 100 P a 1.0 1.1 1.25 1.1
Serviceability—Deflection limit
500 P a 1.1 1.1 1.0
(see Note 3)
Serviceability—Damage limit
500 P a 1.1 1.1 1.0
(see Note 3)
1.5 1.5
Maintenance 100 P a 1.1 2.0
(see Note 2) (see Note 2)
26
Seismic 1 1.3 1.25
1.25 1.0
Short circuit 0.25 pz 1.1 1.25
(see Note 5) (see Note 4)
NOTES:
1 Design wind pressure p z is derived from AS/NZS 1170. Loads from all wind directions to be considered.
2 Conductor tensions and weight of conductors under maintenance shall be treated as a live load with a corresponding load factor.
3 To be determined based on structure material and location (less flexibility may be required in some areas). The serviceability damage limit shall be used where the
damage is of a ductile nature.
4 This is the tension at no wind and with a short circuit.
5 Tension F te for conductors not in short circuit should be based on a temperature corresponding to everyday load conditions with a nominal wind pressure of 0.25 times
the ultimate design wind pressure.
6 See Appendix EE of AS/NZS 7000:2010 for further guidance.
www.standards.org.au
7 Due to the very dynamic nature of short circuit forces, they may be reduced from the foundation action calculations.
27 AS 2067:2016
2.3.6 Deflections and serviceability limits

Ultimate and serviceability limit state loads shall be considered in determining structure
deflections.
Under ultimate and normal service conditions, structure deflections shall not result in
infringement of electrical clearances. Refer to Clauses 3.4 and 3.5 for clearance
requirements details.
The serviceability damage limit loading conditions shall be used where the damage is of a
ductile nature.
2.4 CLIMATIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

2.4.1 General
Installations, including all devices and auxiliary equipment that form an integral part of
them, shall be designed for operation under the climatic and environmental conditions listed
below.
The presence of condensation, precipitation, particles, dust, corrosive elements and

hazardous atmospheres shall be specified in such a manner that appropriate electrical
equipment can be selected. Zone classification for hazardous areas shall be performed in
accordance with AS/NZS 60079.10.1 and AS/NZS 60079.10.2.
2.4.2 Normal conditions
2.4.2.1 Indoor
For indoor installations, normal conditions shall be as follows:
(a) The ambient air temperature does not exceed 40°C and its average value, measured
over a period of 24 h, does not exceed 35°C.
The minimum ambient air temperature is –5°C for Class ‘–5 indoor’, –15°C for Class
‘–15 indoor’ and –25°C for Class ‘–25 indoor’.
On auxiliary equipment, such as relays and control switches, intended to be used in
ambient air temperature below –5°C, an agreement between supplier and user is
necessary.
NOTE: In many parts of Australia, special service conditions apply (see Clause 2.4.3.4).
(b) The influence of solar radiation may be neglected.
(c) The altitude does not exceed 1000 m above sea level.
(d) The ambient air is not significantly polluted by dust, smoke, corrosive and/or
combustible gases, vapours or salt.
(e) The average value of the relative humidity, measured over a period of 24 h, does not
exceed 95%.
NOTES:
1 Condensation may occasionally occur. Condensation can be expected where sudden
temperature changes occur in periods of high humidity.
2 To avoid breakdown of insulation and/or corrosion of metallic parts due to high humidity
and condensation, equipment designed for such conditions and tested accordingly should
be used.
3 Condensation may be prevented by special design of the building or housing, by suitable
ventilation and heating of the station or by the use of dehumidifying equipment.
4 In many parts of Australia, special service conditions apply (see Clause 2.4.3.4).

AS 2067:2016 28
(f) Vibration due to causes external to the equipment or to earth tremors is negligible.
NOTE: In many parts of Australia, special service conditions apply (see Clauses 2.4.3.5
and 2.4.3.6).
(g) Electromagnetic disturbances shall be considered as described in IEC Guide 107.
2.4.2.2 Outdoor
For outdoor installations, normal conditions shall be as follows:

(a) The ambient air temperature does not exceed 40°C and its average value, measured
over a period of 24 h, does not exceed 35°C.
The minimum ambient air temperature is –10°C for Class ‘–10 outdoor’, –25°C for
Class ‘–25 outdoor’ and –40°C for Class ‘–40 outdoor’.
Rapid temperature changes shall be taken into account.
NOTE: Examples of rapid temperature changes are sudden drops in temperature of up to 20°C
in a period of 20 min.
Auxiliary equipment, such as relays and control switches, intended to be used in
ambient air temperatures below –5°C, shall be the subject of an agreement between
supplier and user.
NOTE: In many parts of Australia, special service conditions apply (see Clause 2.4.3.4).
(b) Maximum solar radiation does not exceed 1.1 kW/m2 (equivalent to a black body
temperature of 80°C).
NOTES:
1 Under certain conditions of solar radiation, appropriate measures, for example roofing,
forced ventilation, etc., may be necessary, or derating may be used in order not to exceed
the specified temperature rises.
2 Details of global solar radiation are given in IEC 60721-2-4.
3 UV radiation can damage some synthetic materials. For more details, see AS 60068.2.9.
(c) The altitude does not exceed 1000 m above sea level.
(d) The ambient air is not significantly polluted by dust, smoke, corrosive gases, vapours
or salt. Pollution does not exceed pollution Class c—Medium, according to
IEC/TS 60815-1.
(e) The ice coating does not exceed 1 mm for Class 1, 10 mm for Class 10 and 20 mm for
Class 20. Additional information is given in Clause 2.3.2.3(c).
(f) The wind speed does not exceed the Region A 50 year average recurrence interval
wind speed (see Clause 2.4.3.7).
(g) Account shall be taken of the presence of condensation or precipitation. Precipitation
in form of dew, condensation, fog, rain, snow, ice or hoar frost is to be taken into
account.
NOTE: Precipitation characteristics for insulation are described in AS 1931.1 and AS 1824.1.
For other properties, precipitation characteristics are described in IEC 60721-2-2.
(h) Vibration due to causes external to the equipment or to earth tremors is negligible.
NOTE: In many parts of Australia, special service conditions apply (see Clauses 2.4.3.5
and 2.4.3.6).
(i) Electromagnetic disturbances shall be considered as described in IEC Guide 107.

29 AS 2067:2016
2.4.3 Special conditions

2.4.3.1 General
When high voltage equipment is used under conditions different from the normal
environmental conditions given in Clause 2.4.2, the user’s requirements shall refer to the
standardized steps given in Clauses 2.4.3.2 to 2.4.3.7.
2.4.3.2 Altitude
For installations situated at an altitude higher than 1000 m above sea level, the insulation
level of external insulation under the standardized reference atmospheric conditions shall be
determined by multiplying the insulation withstand voltages required at the service location
by a factor Ka in accordance with AS 62271.1.
NOTES:
1 For internal pressurized insulation, the dielectric characteristics are identical at any altitude
and no special precautions need be taken.
2 For low voltage auxiliary and control equipment, no special precautions need be taken if the
altitude is lower than 2000 m above sea level. For higher altitudes, see IEC 60664-1.
3 The pressure variation due to altitude is given in IEC 60721-2-3. Regarding this phenomenon,
particular attention should be given to—
(a) thermal exchanges by convection, conduction or radiation;
(b) efficiency of heating or air-conditioning;
(c) operating level of pressure devices;
(d) efficiency of diesel generating set or compressed air station; and
(e) increase of corona effect.
4 The correction factor Ka of AS 62271.1reflects the fact that modification is not required for
altitudes below 1000 m.
2.4.3.3 Pollution
For equipment in polluted ambient air, a pollution class d (heavy), or class e (very heavy),
as defined in IEC/TS 60815-1, shall be specified.
2.4.3.4 Temperature and humidity
For equipment in a place where the ambient temperature can be significantly outside the
normal service condition range stated in Clause 2.4.2, the preferred ranges of minimum and
maximum temperature to be specified should be as follows:
(a) –50°C and +40°C for very cold climates.
(b) –5°C and +50°C for very hot climates.
In certain regions with frequent occurrence of warm, humid winds, sudden changes of
temperature may occur, resulting in condensation, even indoors.
In tropical indoor conditions, the average value of relative humidity measured during a
period of 24 h can be 98%.
In some underground installations, equipment might be located under water. Such
equipment shall be designed accordingly and proper operating procedures defined.
2.4.3.5 Vibration
Special conditions and requirements are the subject of agreement between user and supplier
(see also Clause 2.4.3.6 for seismic loads).
Vibration caused by wind, electromagnetic stresses, traffic (e.g. temporary road and railway
traffic) and industrial processes shall be considered. The withstand capability of equipment
against vibrations shall be given by the manufacturer.

AS 2067:2016 30
The service stresses of equipment, which may be transmitted through a common monolithic
foundation or floor (e.g. opening/reclosing of circuit-breakers), shall be taken into account.
2.4.3.6 Seismic vibration
Installations situated in a seismic environment shall be designed to take this into account as
defined in AS 1170.4. This shall be achieved by applying the following measures:
(a) Any individual equipment shall be designed to withstand the dynamic forces resulting
from the vertical and horizontal motions of the soil. These effects may be modified by
the response of the foundation and/or the supporting frame and/or the floor in which
this equipment is installed. The spectrum of the impulse earthquake shall be
considered for the design of the equipment.
(b) The layout shall be chosen in order to limit the following loads to acceptable values:
(i) Loads due to interconnections between adjoining devices needing to
accommodate large relatively axial, lateral, torsional or other movements,
bearing in mind that other stresses may develop during an earthquake.
(ii) The service stresses of equipment which may be transmitted through a common
monolithic foundation or floor (for example, opening/reclosing of circuit-
breakers).
Where load specifications apply to the installation of civil work or equipment to meet
seismic conditions, then these specifications shall be observed.
2.4.3.7 The effect of wind
The effect of wind in excess of the Region A 50 year average recurrence interval wind
speed shall be determined in accordance with AS/NZS 1170.2 for the particular location
involved.
2.5 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

2.5.1 Effects of small animals and micro-organisms
If biological activity through birds (such as cockatoos), small animals, termites or micro-
organisms is a hazard, measures against such damage shall be taken. These may include
appropriate choice of materials, measures to prevent access and adequate heating and
ventilating (for more details see IEC 60721-2-7).
2.5.2 Noise level
If noise level limits are given (usually by regulatory or administrative authorities), they
shall be achieved by appropriate measures such as—
(a) using sound attenuating enclosures or barriers;
(b) using low noise equipment; and
(c) providing sufficient distance to sensitive noise receptors.
Criteria for noise evaluation for different places and different periods of day are given in
AS 1055.1.
NOTE: Consideration should be given to—
(a) impact on the local environment (see environmental protection agencies guidelines);
(b) impact on the working environment (local occupational health and safety guidelines); and
(c) equipment noise (see AS/NZS 60076.10 for transformers).
2.5.3 Transport
Transport to site, e.g. large transformers, and storage constraints may have consequences on
the design of the high-voltage electrical installation.

31 AS 2067:2016
2.6 SITE SELECTION

HV installations range from simple pole mounted substations to major transmission
installations. The selection of a suitable site will include many considerations and these will
vary for each installation. This Clause provides the ideal site characteristics, and where
these cannot be met, the basic design should be amended to provide mitigation for the
undesirable features of the site.

The location should be near the load and appropriate electricity easements (for both cables
and overhead lines), have appropriate land title or tenure, zoning and ordinance and
compliance with national, state and local regulations.
The site should consider the impact of airborne pollution and the need for appropriate
ventilation for indoor installations.
The proposed site should have space for future development, have minimum earth
movement and disposal requirements, be able to be drained and be above the local flood
level.
The site should have adequate access ways to allow safe operation, egress and maintenance
activities.
The soil should be suitable for the construction of roads and foundations, preferably have
low thermal and electrical resistivity and not have any contamination.
The topography should be a low slope with minimum cut to fill, not be located in or near
earthquake zones, fault lines, flood paths or swamps.
Community requirements should be met including the following:
(a) Special design consideration for sensitive sites such as schools, day care centres,
preschools and swimming pools.
(b) Have minimal visual, noise, amenity and traffic impacts.
(c) Be sensitive to heritage and cultural issues.
Site selection should meet environmental requirements including increasing the run off
from site, minimizing the impact on local fauna and flora, and not polluting the local
environment. Consideration should also be given for any future vegetation control or soil
treatment.
2.7 RISK MANAGEMENT

Asset owners, designers and others carry common law and legislative obligations to manage
risks to health and safety of personnel. The following hierarchy of risk controls provide
guidance on meeting these obligations:
(a) Elimination of the hazard.
(b) Minimization of the risk by the following means:
(i) Substitution (to get a lower hazard).
(ii) Isolation (from persons).
(iii) Engineering controls.
(c) Administrative controls.
(d) Personal protective equipment (PPE).

AS 2067:2016 32
Elimination of the hazard is rarely an option given the utility/amenity involved. Minimizing
the risk is non-trivial with fundamentally hazardous substances such as electricity. Duty of
care is demonstrated when all reasonably practicable precautions have been taken. What is
reasonably practicable includes a measure of the significance of the risk versus the effort
required to reduce it. The risk that is assessed in this process includes the risk imposed on
any individual (commonly determined for the maximally exposed, reasonably behaved
individual) and for the risk imposed on society (commonly determined for multiple fatality
risk for a single event). For further guidance on risk management see AS/NZS ISO 31000.
Nominal risk targets for hazards in HV installations, even those within levels recognized by
the international safety industry as being 'safe' may not be sufficient to meet a duty of care
obligation. It is, however, reasonable that all known and commonly applied precautions
have been assessed, and applied so far as is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP) or as low as
reasonably practicable (ALARP) where the cost/risk reduction is not grossly
disproportionate. A risk target below the assessed mean risk for all other hazards across all
asset classes of the enterprise could also be used to help decide when seeking further
precautions for a particular hazard will no longer be required.
High voltage installations require a detailed quantitative risk assessment, based on industry
or enterprise data including previous assessments. Realistic estimates of the associated cost
increments are required to ensure the decision to not use a risk treatment, where the cost is
disproportionate to the risk reduction, is soundly based.

33 AS 2067:2016
SECTI ON 3 INSULATI ON
3.1 GENERAL
As conventional (air-insulated) installations are normally not impulse tested, the installation
requires minimum clearances between live parts and earth and between live parts of phases
in order to avoid flashover below the impulse withstand level selected for the installation.
Insulation coordination shall be in accordance with AS 1824, Parts 1 and 2.
For minimum phase-to-phase and phase-to-earth clearances required refer to Tables 3.1
and 3.2.
NOTES:
1 AS 1824.1 relates values for the highest voltage for equipment U m to rated lightning impulse
withstand voltages as well as rated short-duration power-frequency withstand voltages or
rated switching impulse withstand voltages.
2 Standard nominal voltages for traction systems are also given in AS 60038. Other relevant
values for traction systems can be interpolated from those in Table 3.1 of this Standard.
3.2 SELECTION OF INSULATION LEVEL

3.2.1 General
The insulation level shall be chosen according to the established highest voltage for
equipment U m and/or impulse withstand voltage.
3.2.2 Consideration of methods of neutral earthing
The choice should be made primarily to ensure reliability in service, taking into account the
method of neutral earthing in the system and the characteristics and locations of
overvoltage limiting devices to be installed.
In installations in which a high level of safety is required or in which the configuration of
the system, due to the adopted method of neutral earthing or the protection by surge
arresters, makes it appropriate to increase the level of insulation, one of the higher
alternative values of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shall be chosen.
In installations in which the configuration of the system, due to the adopted method of
neutral earthing or the protection by surge arresters, makes it appropriate to lower the level
of insulation, the lower alternative values of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 may be applied.
3.2.3 Consideration of rated withstand voltages
In the voltage Range I (1 kV < U m  245 kV) the choice shall be based on the rated
lightning impulse withstand voltages and the rated short-duration power-frequency
withstand voltages of Table 3.1.
In the voltage Range II (U m > 245 kV) the choice shall be based on the rated switching
impulse withstand voltages (SIWV) and the rated lightning impulse withstand voltages
given in Tables 3.1 or 3.2 for rod to structure and conductor to structure geometry
respectively.
NOTE: The application of the safety clearances included in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is discussed
further in Clauses 5.1 and 5.2.
3.3 VERIFICATION OF WITHSTAND VALUES

If the minimum clearances in air given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are maintained, it is not
necessary to apply dielectric tests to the air-gap.
www.standards.org.au  Standards Australia

AS 2067:2016 34
If the minimum clearances in air are not maintained the ability to withstand the test voltages
of the chosen insulation level shall be established by applying the appropriate dielectric
tests in accordance with AS 1931.1 for the withstand voltage values given in Tables 3.1
and 3.2.
If the minimum clearances referenced in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are not maintained in parts or
areas of an installation, dielectric tests restricted to these parts or areas will be required.
3.4 MINIMUM CLEARANCES OF LIVE PARTS

3.4.1 General
The minimum clearances in air given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 apply for altitudes up to 1000 m
above sea level. For higher altitudes, see Clause 2.4.3.2.
NOTE: The values in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 have their origin primarily in AS 60038 and AS 1824.1.
If parts of an installation can be separated from each other by a disconnector, the parts shall
be tested at the rated impulse withstand voltage for the isolating distance (see AS 62271.1).
If between such parts of an installation the minimum phase-to-phase clearances of Table 3.1
for Range I, and Table 3.2 for Range II, in this Standard are increased by 25% or more, it is
not necessary to apply dielectric tests.
3.4.2 Minimum clearances in voltage range I
In the voltage Range I (see Table 3.1), the minimum clearances in air are based on
unfavourable electrode configurations with small radii of curvature (that is rod-plate or rod
structure).
The minimum clearances in air between phases or between conductors of the same phase
that are separable electrically from each other shall be at least 15% greater than the values
given in Column 6 of Table 3.1 (for voltages up to and including Um = 245 kV).
At U m > 245 kV, phase-to-phase clearances may need to be more than 15% greater than
phase-to-earth clearances.
3.4.3 Minimum clearances in voltage range II
In voltage Range II the clearances in air are determined by the rated SIWV. They depend
substantially on the electrode configurations. Table 3.2 shows clearances for Range II
voltages based on a conductor-structure geometry. In cases of difficulty in classifying the
electrode configuration, it is recommended to make a choice based on the phase-to-earth
clearances of the most unfavourable configuration, such as the arm of a disconnector
against the tower construction (rod-structure). These clearances are shown for Range I and
Range II voltage levels in Table 3.1. See also Figure 3.1.

35 AS 2067:2016
N
S tr u c ture
c
LEGEN D:
N = N o n -fl a s h over d i st an c e for ro d - str u c ture g e o m etr y (refer to Ta b l e 3 .1)
b + c > = N
FIGURE 3.1 MINIMUM DISCONNECTOR CLEARANCES TO EARTH


AS 2067:2016
TABLE 3.1
DESIGN AND SAFETY CLEARANCES ROD TO STRUCTURE/PLATE GEOMETRY (VOLTAGE RANGE I AND VOLTAGE RANGE II)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Rated Design clearances Safety clearances for operational purposes
Rated switching and maintenance work
Rated short
lightning impulse
duration
Highest impulse withstand
power Ground
Nominal voltage withstand voltage Minimum Minimum Non-
frequency safety
voltage voltage Section Horizontal Vertical work
withstand Us phase-to- phase-to- flashover clearance
Un U m r.m.s. safety work safety safety
voltage Up earth phase distance G
(see note 6) Phase-to- clearance clearance N clearance clearance clearance
1.2/50 μs earth S=N+G H = N + 1900 V = N + 1340
U d r.m.s.
(peak value) 250/2500 μs
(peak value)
kV r.m.s. kV r.m.s. kV r.m.s. kV peak kV peak mm mm mm mm mm mm mm
Up to 3.3 Up to 3.6 10 40 60 70 65 2440 2505 1965 1405
6.6 7.2 20 60 90 105 100 2540 2000 1440
36
11 12 28 75 120 140 130 2570 2030 1470
28 (95) (160) 185 175 2615 2075 1515
22 24 50 125 220 255 240 2680 2140 1580
50 (145/150) (270/280) 325 310 2750 2210 1650
33 36 70 170 320 370 350 2790 2250 1690
70 (200) (380) 440 420 2860 2320 1760
66 72.5 140 325 630 725 695 3135 2595 2035
110 123 185 450 900 1035 990 3430 2890 2330
230 550 1100 1265 1210 3650 3110 2550
(continued)
TABLE 3.1 (continued)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Rated Design clearances Safety clearances for operational purposes
Rated switching and maintenance work
Rated short
lightning impulse
duration
Highest impulse withstand
power Ground
Nominal voltage withstand voltage Minimum Minimum Non-
frequency safety
voltage voltage Section Horizontal Vertical work
withstand Us phase-to- phase-to- flashover clearance
Un U m r.m.s. safety work safety safety
voltage Up earth phase distance G
(see note 6) Phase-to- clearance clearance N clearance clearance clearance
1.2/50 μs earth S=N+G H = N + 1900 V = N + 1340
U d r.m.s.
(peak value) 250/2500 μs
(peak value)
132 145 230 550 1100 1265 1210 3650 3110 2550
275 650 1300 1495 1430 3870 3330 2770
220 245 360 850 1700 1955 1800 4240 3700 3140
37
395 950 1900 2185 2015 4455 3915 3355
460 1050 2100 2415 2225 4665 4125 3565
275 300 395 950 750 1900 2600 2015 4455 3915 3355
460 1050 850 2400 3100 2545 4985 4445 3885
330 362 460 1050 850 2400 3100 2545 4985 4445 3885
510 1175 950 2900 3600 3075 5515 4975 4415
500 550 630 1425 1050 3400 4600 3605 6045 5505 4945
680 1550 1175 4100 5000 4345 6785 6245 5685
NOTE: Refer to Notes following Table 3.2.
AS 2067:2016
AS 2067:2016
 Standards Australia
TABLE 3.2
DESIGN AND SAFETY CLEARANCES CONDUCTOR TO STRUCTURE GEOMETRY, U m >245 kV (VOLTAGE RANGE II)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Rated Safety clearances for operational
Design clearances
Rated switching purposes and maintenance work
Rated short impulse
lightning
Highest duration withstand
impulse Ground
Nominal voltage power voltage
withstand Minimum Minimum Non- safety Section Horizontal Vertical
voltage frequency
voltage Us phase-to- phase-to- flashover clearance safety work safety work safety
Un U m r.m.s. withstand
Up Phase-to- earth phase distance G clearance clearance clearance
(see Note 6) voltage
1.2/50 s earth clearance clearance N` S=N+G H = N + 1900 V = N + 1340
U d r.m.s.
(peak value) 250/2500 s
(peak value)
275 300 395 950 750 1700 2300 1800 2440 4240 3700 3140
460 1050 850 1900 2600 2015 4455 3915 3355
330 362 460 1050 850 1900 2600 2015 4455 3915 3355
38
510 1175 950 2200 3100 2330 4770 4230 3670
500 550 630 1425 1050 2600 3900 2755 5195 4655 4095
680 1550 1175 3100 4200 3285 5725 5185 4625
39 AS 2067:2016
NOTES TO TABLES 3.1 AND 3.2

1 The clearances in Table 3.1 and 3.2 are based on the climatic conditions described in Clause 2.4.
2 The phase-to-earth clearances given in Column 6 of Table 3.1 are for unfavourable configurations of
live and earthed parts, i.e. the ‘rod-structure’ arrangement, and may be used for determining clearances
to earth from live parts of any configuration.
3 The phase-to-earth clearances given in Column 6 of Table 3.2 for U m > 245 kV r.m.s. are for
‘conductor-structure’ configurations normally employed at the higher voltages. (For background
information on electrode configurations, refer to CIGRE Technical Brochure 72-1992 and to
AS 1824.2.)
4 The higher values shown in parentheses in Column 4 are included to cover those distribution
installations that may be exposed to higher than normal overvoltages or where a higher level of safety
or withstand is required. For other installations the lower values are preferred.
5 The values shown in parentheses in Column 6 correspond to the rated lightning impulse withstand
voltages shown in parentheses in Column 4.
6 For U m < 36 kV r.m.s., it may be desirable to increase the phase-to-earth and phase-to-phase clearances
where the presence of birds or vermin could cause a hazard or for constructional or other reasons.
7 The non-flashover distances given in Column 8 include a margin of 10% up to an air clearance of
1300 mm in Column 6 and 6% for 1400 mm and above to allow for variations in construction
dimensions. This margin may be deleted when the conditions for carrying out the work are adequate to
ensure that the minimum phase-to-earth air clearance is observed in all cases.
8 If considered desirable, the section safety clearance given in Column 10 may be increased to 3000 mm
as a minimum for air clearances up to 380 mm, in Column 6.
9 For voltages up to and including 245 kV (Range I), the minimum clearances in air between phases or
between conductors of the same phase separable electrically from each other, are 15% greater than the
corresponding Ph-E minimum clearances in Table 3.1 (refer to Clause 3.4.2 and AS 1824).
10 For voltages greater than 245 kV, because of the greater phase stresses that are present (>15%) due to
switching impulses, the switching impulse withstand voltages (Ph-Ph) are between 1.5 to 1.8 times the
Ph-E (pk) value than the corresponding Ph-Ph clearances listed in column 7 of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (refer
to Clause 3.4.2 and AS 1824).
3.5 MINIMUM CLEARANCES BETWEEN PARTS UNDER SPECIAL

CONDITIONS
The minimum clearances between parts of an installation that may be subject to phase
opposition shall be 20% higher than the values given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The minimum clearances between parts of an installation, which are assigned to different
insulation levels, shall be at least 125% of the clearances of the higher insulation level.
When conductors swing under the influence of short-circuit forces, 50% of the minimum
clearances of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shall be maintained as a minimum phase-to-phase and/or
phase-to-earth clearance.
When conductors swing under the influence of wind, 75% of the minimum clearances of
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shall be maintained as a minimum phase-to-phase and/or phase to earth
clearance.
In the event of rupture of one sub-chain in a multiple insulator chain, 75% of the minimum
clearances of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 shall be maintained as a minimum phase-to-phase and/or
phase-to-earth clearance.
If neither the neutral point nor a phase conductor is effectively earthed in an installation
that is fed via auto transformers, the insulation of the lower voltage side shall be rated
according to the highest voltage for equipment on the higher voltage side. Attention should
be paid to neutral point insulation according to the method of neutral earthing.

AS 2067:2016 40
3.6 TYPE TESTED EQUIPMENT

Information on mounting and service conditions supplied by the manufacturer shall be
observed on-site.
NOTE: For type tested equipment, the minimum clearances according to Tables 3.1 and 3.2 need
not be maintained because the ability to withstand the test voltage is established by a dielectric
type test. See Clause 1.2.1.


41 AS 2067:2016
S E C T I O N 4 E Q U I P M E N T
4.1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1 Selection
Equipment shall be selected and installed to satisfy the following requirements:
(a) Safe physical arrangement when properly assembled, installed and connected to
supply.
(b) Safe and proper performance taking into account the external influences that can be
expected at the intended location.
(c) Safe and proper performance during normal operation and in the event of reasonably
expected conditions of overload, abnormal operation and fault, without resulting in
damage that would render the equipment unsafe.
(d) Protection of personnel during use and maintenance of the equipment.

Consideration should be given to the whole-of-life costs and impact on the environment
during normal operation use and end-of-life disposal.
4.1.2 Equipment Safety
All electrical equipment shall—
(a) be safe to use when properly assembled, installed and connected to the supply in
accordance with this Standard; and
(b) not cause a danger from electric shock, fire, high temperature or physical injury in the
event of reasonably expected conditions of overload, abnormal operation, and fault or
external influences.
NOTE: Electrical equipment is deemed to comply with this Clause if it satisfies one or more
of the following conditions:
(a) The safe design, construction, installation and performance provisions of an Australian,
New Zealand or Australian/New Zealand Standard that is appropriate and relevant to
the type of electrical equipment.
(b) The safe design, construction, installation and performance provisions of a recognized
international or equivalent national Standard that is appropriate and relevant to the type
of electrical equipment and to the electrical installation conditions in Australia.
Operational and safety procedures specific to a certain installation shall be in accordance
with additional requirements specified by the user.
4.1.3 Personnel safety
Particular attention shall be given to the safety of personnel during the installation,
operation and maintenance of equipment. Clear and adequate space shall be provided for
the safe operation, isolation, earthing and manipulation of all switchgear including fuses.
Control of circuits shall be provided for the safe opening and closing of switchgear by
appropriately trained and authorized personnel. Protective devices shall automatically
disconnect under fault conditions to protect the operator.
Personnel safety measures may include—
(a) manuals and instructions for transport, storage, installation, operation and
maintenance;
(b) special tools required for operation, maintenance and testing;

AS 2067:2016 42
(c) safe working and access procedures developed for specific locations (e.g. basement or
other below ground indoor substations);
(d) safe earthing measures; and
(e) operating procedures, training and authorization for qualified operating personnel.
NOTE: Section 6 provides requirements for safety measures.
4.1.4 Labels
All labels required for the safe operation and maintenance of the equipment shall be
provided and secured in a visible position adjacent to the means of operation when the
equipment is mounted in its normal operating position.
Labels shall be indelibly and legibly marked in English and, including their fasteners, shall
be suitable for the environment in which the equipment is mounted.
NOTE: Clause 5.1.8 specifies additional requirements for labelling.
4.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1 Switching devices

All high voltage circuits, including the incoming supply, shall be controlled by appropriate
switching devices.
The switching device shall be capable of performing at least the following operational
functions:
(a) Make and break full load current.
(b) Carry the prospective fault current.
(c) Make prospective fault current.
Switches that are not capable of making prospective fault current may be used where
satisfactory interlocking or switching procedures are provided.
A facility shall be provided to indicate the contact position of the interrupting or isolating
equipment (including earthing switches). The method of indication in accordance with the
equipment Standard should be specified by the user.
The position indicator shall provide an unambiguous indication of the actual position of the
equipment primary contacts.
The device indicating the open/close position shall be easily visible to the operator.
Disconnectors and earthing switches shall be installed in such a way that they cannot be
inadvertently operated by tension or pressure exerted manually on operating linkages.
Where specified by the user, interlocking devices and/or locking facilities shall be installed
to provide a safeguard against inappropriate operation of either primary plant or control and
protection devices.
If an interlocking device is provided that prevents the earthing switch from carrying the full
short-circuit current, it is permissible, by agreement with the user, to specify a reduced
rating for the switch that reflects its possible short-circuit-current stress.
Equipment shall be installed in such a way that ionized gas released during switching does
not result in damage to the equipment or endanger operating personnel. ‘Damage’ is
considered to be any failure of the equipment that impairs its function.

43 AS 2067:2016
Ratings of switchgear shall be based on the AS/NZS 62271 series of high voltage standards.
The switching of certain circuits may however require the use of more severe constraints
than defined in those standards. Examples of such circuits are filter banks and loads having
very high X/R ratios such as large transformers and generators. The specific requirements
of switchgear for such circuits will be agreed between the user and supplier.
All switching equipment should be adequately rated for its intended use and not
overstressed intentionally.
4.2.2 Power transformers and reactors
Unless otherwise stated, this Clause applies to both transformers and reactors even if only
transformers are referred to in the text.
The main selection criteria for transformers are given in Section 2 and Section 6.
The transformers are classified taking into account the dielectric in contact with the
winding and the type of internal or external cooling as described in AS/NZS 60076.2.
When designing the transformer or reactor installation, the possibility of fire propagation
and explosion (see Clause 6.7) shall be considered. Similarly, means shall be implemented
to limit, if necessary, the acoustic noise level (see Clause 2.5.2).
For transformers installed indoors, suitable ventilation shall be provided (see Clause 5.5.7).
Water (ground water, surface water and waste water) shall not be polluted by transformer
installations. This shall be achieved by the choice of the design of transformer type and/or
site provisions. For measures see Clause 6.7.
If it is necessary to take samples (oil sampling) or to read monitoring devices (such as fluid
level, temperature, or pressure) which are important for the operation of the transformer
whilst the transformer is energized, it shall be possible to perform this safely and without
damage to the equipment.
Air-core reactors shall be installed in such a way that the magnetic field of the short-circuit
current will not be capable of drawing objects into the coil. Adjacent equipment shall be
designed to withstand the resulting electromagnetic forces. Adjacent metal parts such as
foundation reinforcements, fences and earthing grids shall not be subject to excessive
temperature rise under normal load conditions.
NOTE: Refer to Appendix D for additional information on EMF.
The risk of damage to transformers from overstresses resulting from ferroresonance,
harmonics and other causes should be minimized by undertaking appropriate system studies
and implementing appropriate control/protection measures.
Transformer pressure relief devices, if used, shall be arranged to direct the oil discharge
downwards and away from the operational controls where personnel are likely to be
standing.
4.2.3 Gas-insulated metal-enclosed equipment (GIE), metal-enclosed switchgear,
insulation-enclosed switchgear and other prefabricated type-tested switchgear and
fusegear assemblies
The requirements for gas insulated metal-enclosed switchgear (GIS), metal enclosed
switchgear, insulation-enclosed switchgear and other prefabricated type-tested switchgear
assemblies are given in Clause 5.4. For safety of personnel and gas handling, refer to
Clauses 6.8.2 and 7.5.
Provision of suitable access shall be made for maintenance and testing of GIE, in particular,
for indoor installations.

AS 2067:2016 44
4.2.4 Instrument transformers

4.2.4.1 General
The secondary circuits of instrument transformers shall be bonded to earth, or the secondary
circuits shall be segregated by earthed metallic screening, in accordance with Clause 8.2.3.
The earthable point of the secondary circuit shall be determined in such a way that
electrical interference is avoided.
Instrument transformers shall be installed in such a way that their secondary terminals are
easily accessible when the switchgear assembly has been de-energized.
4.2.4.2 Current transformers
The rated overcurrent factor and the rated burden shall be selected so as to ensure correct
functioning of the protective equipment and prevent damage to measuring equipment in the
event of a short-circuit.
In high voltage networks where the primary time constant is long and where reclosing is
practiced, it is recommended that the transient stress due to the aperiodic portion of the
short-circuit current be taken into account: the recommendations of IEC 61869-2 should be
considered.
If measuring devices are also connected to protective current transformer cores, the
measuring devices shall, if necessary, be protected against the damage resulting from large
short-circuit currents by means of suitable auxiliary transformers.
If necessary, an effective screen between the primary and secondary circuit shall be
provided for the reduction of the transient overvoltages on secondary circuits arising from
the switching operation.
To protect against dangerous overvoltages, provisions shall be made to facilitate shorting
the secondary windings of current transformers.
4.2.4.3 Voltage transformers
Voltage transformers shall be selected in such a way that the nominal output and accuracy
are adequate for the connected equipment and wiring. The effects of ferroresonance shall be
considered.
The secondary side of voltage transformers shall be protected against the effects of short-
circuits, and it is recommended that protective devices be monitored.
4.2.5 Surge arresters
Surge arresters shall be designed or positioned in such a way as to provide personnel safety
in case of breaking of the housing or operating of any pressure relief device.
The volt-time characteristics of surge arresters installed in the same circuit as current-
limiting fuses shall take into account the overvoltages produced by the fuses.
If monitors are provided in the earth conductor of non-linear resistor type arresters, then the
conductor between an arrester and the monitor and the monitor itself shall be protected to
prevent it being touched. It shall be possible to read the monitors and any counters with the
equipment energized.
4.2.6 Capacitors
The risk of resonance and overvoltages due to harmonics shall be taken into consideration,
and appropriate means for limitation of this risk shall be provided.
For the selection of the nominal voltage and the current capacity of capacitors, the voltage
increase caused by inductive reactances connected in series such as damping reactors and
sound frequency or filter circuits shall be considered.

45 AS 2067:2016
Capacitors for coupling, voltage measuring and overvoltage protection shall be selected
according to the rated voltage of the switchgear, even if the operating voltage is lower.
Safe discharge of power capacitors shall be guaranteed. Discharge units shall be thermally
and mechanically capable of carrying out their task.
The short-circuiting and earthing facilities provided for a capacitor bank shall take into
account the interconnection of units within the bank, the discharge resistors and the type of
fusing.
4.2.7 Line traps
The bandwidth should be determined in accordance with the network frequency allocation.
4.2.8 Insulators
Unless otherwise specified, the minimum specific creepage distance of insulators shall
comply with IEC/TS 60815-1, IEC 60815-2 and IEC 60815-3 for the level of pollution
specified by the user.
The requirements of the wet test procedure of AS 62271.1 shall apply for all external
insulation.
Insulator profiles and/or requirements for performance of outdoor insulators in polluted or
heavy wetting conditions may be specified by the user.
4.2.9 Insulated cables other than for overhead lines
4.2.9.1 General requirements
Insulated cable shall be selected to suit the electrical duty required plus the method of
installation and related physical protection. Notwithstanding requirements of special service
conditions in substations and industrial installations such as mine sites the following
general principles apply for high voltage cables:
(a) Cables installed underground in areas accessible to the public (within a high voltage
installation) shall be buried at a depth which ensures the top of the cable is at least
0.75 m below the finished ground level. Mechanical protection and cable marking in
accordance with AS/NZS 3000 shall be used. In areas where access is restricted to
authorized personnel or substation area, other types of installation methods may be
used, for example, cables trays, cable trenches, troughing, etc. For these installations
appropriate mechanical protection shall be provided based on a risk assessment.
NOTE: Local regulations may require increased depth of burial or additional mechanical
protection.
(b) Fault-rated screened or armoured type cables may be installed above ground in robust
enclosures. If the enclosure is metallic, it shall be appropriately earthed along its
route.
(c) Cables without a fault-rated screen or with partial screening may be used only within
substations or within fully enclosed and earthed high voltage switchboards.
The current rating of a cable depends on the installation method (in conduit, direct buried,
in air, grouping, earthing arrangement, cable sheath bonding, etc.). Cable ratings shall be
determined by reference to manufacturer’s information or in accordance with IEC 60287
(or AS/NZS 3008.1.1 for LV cables), which provides appropriate current derating factors
that ensure the design conductor temperature is not exceeded. The current rating of buried
cables may be increased by the use of appropriate backfill materials.
NOTE: Heating due to eddy currents should be considered in the design of metallic enclosures.

AS 2067:2016 46
4.2.9.2 Temperature
Insulated cables shall be selected and laid in such a way that the maximum permitted
temperature is not exceeded for conductors, their insulation, the connections, the equipment
terminals or the surroundings under the following conditions:
(a) Normal operation.
(b) Special operating conditions, subject to previous agreement between the supplier and
the user.
(c) Short-circuit.
The connection of a cable to equipment (for example motors, circuit-breakers) shall not
result in the cable being subjected to temperatures higher than those admissible for the
cable in the foreseeable operating conditions.
Refer to IEC 60287, IEC 60853 and IEC TR 62095 regarding the current rating of cables.
4.2.9.3 Stress due to temperature changes
The stress on equipment due to temperature-dependent changes in the length of conductors

shall be taken into account. If necessary, the stress shall be relieved by suitable measures
(for example flexible connections, expansion terminations or snaking). If these measures
are not taken, the additional forces due to temperature changes shall be taken into account
during verification of the design strength of the equipment.
4.2.9.4 Flexible reeling and trailing cables
Flexible reeling and trailing cables shall be selected in accordance with the following
requirements and conditions:
(a) Trailing cables or cables having at least equivalent mechanical and electrical
characteristics shall be used for supplying power to hoisting, mobile or moveable
equipment.
(b) In the case of more severe mechanical stress, for example where the cables are
subject to abrasion, tension, deflection or winding during operation, double-sheathed
trailing cables or cables with at least equivalent mechanical and electrical
characteristics shall be used.
(c) Insulated cables for the power supply of hoisting, mobile or moveable equipment
shall contain a protective earth conductor.
(d) The design of any connection, be it a joint, termination or other connection
arrangement shall be such that in the event of a strain being placed upon the cable the
protective earth conductor shall be the last to part or separate.
(e) Insulated cables that are to be wound on a drum shall be dimensioned so that when
the conductor is fully wound and subject to the normal service loading, the maximum
permitted temperature is not exceeded.
The terminal ends of flexible and trailing cables shall be free from tension and
compression; cable sleeves shall be protected against stripping and cable ends against
twisting. The terminals shall also be designed so that the cables will not kink.
AS/NZS 2802 specifies requirements for reeling and trailing cables.

47 AS 2067:2016
4.2.9.5 Crossings and proximities

Where insulated cables cross or are near to gas, water or other pipes, an appropriate
clearance shall be maintained between cables and the pipelines. Where this clearance
cannot be maintained, contact between the cables and the pipelines shall be prevented, for
example, by the insertion of insulating shells or plates. These measures shall be coordinated
with the operator of the pipeline. In the case of a long parallel routing, a calculation of the
overvoltage induced on the pipeline during a short-circuit shall be performed. It may be
necessary to determine appropriate measures to reduce the induced voltage, for example, an
alternative routing for the cables or pipelines, or a greater clearance between cables and
pipelines.
NOTE: AS 4853 provides guidance on electrical hazards on metallic pipelines.
Where insulated cables cross or are near to telecommunication installations, an appropriate
clearance shall be maintained between cables and telecommunication installations.
In the case of a long parallel routing, the overvoltage induced on the telecommunication
installation during a short-circuit shall be calculated. HB 100, HB 101, HB 102, HB 103
and AS/NZS 3835 provide guidance on electrical hazards on telecommunication

installations. It may be necessary to take appropriate measures to reduce this overvoltage
(alternative routing for the cables or the telecommunication installations, greater clearance
between cables and telecommunication installations).
Where insulated cables cross or are near to other insulated cables, the mutual thermal
effects shall be calculated in order to determine the minimum clearance between cables or
to determine other appropriate measures to reduce mutual heating effects to acceptable
levels, for example, derating. Cables shall be installed at a sufficient distance from heat
sources or shall be separated from such heat sources by means of thermal insulating shields.
NOTE: National regulations and standards may have additional requirements for crossing and
proximity of insulated cables, gas and water pipes or other pipes and appropriate clearances.
4.2.9.6 Installation of cables
Provision of suitable access shall be made for the maintenance and testing of cables.
To protect the cable from mechanical damage during and after installation, the following
measures shall be taken:
(a) The laying operations shall be performed at the ambient temperature specified by the
equipment standards or the manufacturer.
(b) Single-core insulated cables shall be laid in such a way as to ensure that the forces
resulting from short-circuit currents do not cause damage.
(c) The method of laying shall be chosen to ensure that the external effects are limited to
acceptable safe values. In addition, when buried in troughs, the cables shall be
installed at a specific depth and covered by slabs or a warning grid to prevent any
damage being caused by third parties.
NOTE: Underground and submarine cables should be mechanically protected where they
emerge from the water or the soil.
(d) Laying of cables in earth shall be carried out on the bottom of a cable trench free of
stones. The bedding material shall be sand or soil, free of stones.
NOTE: Special constructions of cables may be chosen, if necessary, to protect against
chemical effects.
(e) Measures shall be taken to prevent cables in troughs from being damaged by vehicles
running over them.
(f) Ground movements and vibrations shall be taken into account.

AS 2067:2016 48
(g) For vertical installations the cable shall be supported by suitable cleats at intervals
determined by the cable construction and information provided by the manufacturer.
(h) If single-core cables are laid through reinforced ceilings and walls the possibility of
heating the steel reinforcing bars must be considered. If necessary, suitable structural
measures to limit the heating must be determined.
(i) Insulated cables installed as overhead lines shall comply with the requirements of
AS/NZS 7000.
AS/NZS 3013 provides guidance for mechanical and fire protection for cables.
Cables installed in metallic pipes shall be grouped in such a way that the conductors of all
phases (and the neutral, if any) of the same circuit are laid in the same pipe to minimize
eddy currents. Consideration should be given to the location of the earthing conductor.
Insulated cables shall be installed so that touch voltages are within the permissible values,
or so that accessible parts with unacceptable touch voltages are protected against contact by
adequate measures.
Metallic sheaths shall be earthed.

NOTES:
1 There may be a risk of high circulating currents in screens of sheathed single-core cables,
especially when laid flat.
2 When earthing metallic screens and sheaths consideration should be given to issues such as
circulating currents, induced voltages, fault ratings, transfer voltages and current transformer
locations.
The length of cable connecting transformers and reactors to a circuit should be selected so
as to minimize the occurrence of ferroresonance.
Care shall be taken to limit the mechanical stress on equipment when connecting power
cables.
The position of cable risers should be such that personnel access is not impeded by the need
to remove plant and equipment or be located within an area classified as hazardous or a
confined space.
4.2.9.7 Bending radius
The minimum values of bend radius during and after installation are dependent on the type
of cable. These are given in the relevant standards or shall be specified by the manufacturer.
4.2.9.8 Tensile stress
The maximum permissible tensile stress during laying depends on the nature of the
conductor and on the type of cable. These are given in the relevant standards or shall be
specified by the manufacturer.
The continuous static and peak tensile stress applied to the conductors of flexible and
trailing cables shall be as small as possible, and shall not exceed the values given by the
manufacturer.
4.2.10 Conductors and accessories
This Clause deals with conductors (rigid or flexible) and accessories which are part of
outgoing feeders or busbars in installations.
Covered and bare conductors installed as overhead lines shall comply with relevant
standards for overhead lines (refer to AS/NZS 7000).
Where conductors and accessories are directly associated with a circuit-breaker, fuse-switch
or switch, the value and duration of the rated short-time withstand current of the conductors
and accessories shall be not less than the design rating of the installation.

49 AS 2067:2016
Provision shall be made to allow for the expansion and contraction of conductors caused by
temperature variations. This shall not apply where the stress caused by temperature
variations has been allowed for in the conductor system design.
Joints between conductors and connections between conductors and equipment shall be
without defects and shall not deteriorate while in service. They shall be chemically and
mechanically stable. The joint faces shall be suitably prepared and connected as specified
for the type of connection. The temperature rise of a connection between conductors and
switchgear in service shall not exceed the values specified in AS/NZS 7000.
The open ends of tubular busbars should be plugged to prevent corrosion and bird nesting.
Provision shall be made to avoid possible resonant oscillation caused by wind on tubular
busbars.
4.2.11 Rotating electrical machines
The risk of personal injury from faults within the terminal boxes of machines shall be
minimized. The terminal boxes of motors shall withstand the local short-circuit conditions.
Current-limiting devices may be necessary.
The degree of protection against the ingress of objects, dust and water shall be chosen in
accordance with the special climatic and environmental conditions at the site of installation.
Hazardous parts of the machine shall be protected against accidental contact by persons.
The degree of protection shall be defined in accordance with IEC 60529.
The insulation level of the machine shall be selected in accordance with AS 60034.1.
Sufficient cooling shall be provided.
Machines should be protected against exceeding the maximum permitted temperature rise
by use of suitable electric protective devices. Particularly for large machines or those
critical for a production process, protection devices should be installed that indicate an
internal fault of the machine or, if necessary, automatically shuts it down.
The overall design of the installation shall identify requirements for the type of motor
enclosure, particularly if the motor is to be installed in a hazardous area. In addition, safety
issues such as noise levels, maximum temperature of surfaces accessible to personnel,
control of spillage and guarding, shall meet the particular requirements of the installation.
Starting large motors results in voltage drops in the electrical distribution system. Different
techniques are available for reducing the impact on the electrical network when starting
large motors. The protection equipment shall be designed to provide adequate protection of
the motor during the complete starting sequence.
The contribution of large motors to the short-circuit current shall be considered.
4.2.12 Generating units
The type of power rating for the generating unit shall be stated (e.g. continuous, prime, or
standby power). Operation of the generator in parallel with the utility or in parallel with
other generators should be stated. The switching devices to be used for synchronizing shall
be defined.
The overall design of the installation shall identify the general safety requirements specific
to the equipment, particularly for fire protection and use of hydrogen (see IEC 60034-3).
4.2.13 Generating unit main connections
For small generating units, selection and specification of generator main connections
(busbars) may be based upon appropriate sections of AS 62271.200.
However, particular care shall be taken in the selection of rated peak making currents. It
may also be necessary to specify additional testing for connections that are not factory-built
and type-tested.
AS 2067:2016 50
Where necessary, fault studies shall be conducted to establish peak making and short-time
withstand currents, particularly for branch connections of reduced cross-section (e.g. to
auxiliary transformers).
For larger generating units, and where higher system security is required, the use of phase
isolated or phase segregated busbar systems is recommended.
The impact of the magnetic field due to the use of generating unit main connections without
metallic enclosures shall be considered in the design of the installation.
The design shall include measures to protect persons against the possibility of shock from
induced voltage when a generating unit is off line but is being rotated at low speed to
prevent deformation of the generator shaft. The design shall include the provision of
facilities to allow the safe changing of the circuit tap position on transformers connected
directly to generator terminals.
When connections between the generator and the transformer are short, provision should be
made to add capacitors in the connection gear to limit overvoltages which can occur during
switching.
4.2.14 Static converters

Accessible parts of converter units that can carry dangerous voltages during normal
operation or under fault conditions shall be adequately marked and shall be adequately
protected against accidental contact by persons. This may be achieved by providing suitable
protective barriers.
The cooling and heat transfer mediums shall not contain mechanical pollution or chemically
aggressive components that might cause malfunction of the equipment.
When water is used as coolant, the possibility of corrosion caused by leakage currents
(currents due to the conductivity of water) shall be considered.
When oil is used as coolant, similar protection against fire and pollution of ground water
shall be provided as for oil-filled transformers and reactors.
When planning the layout of converter units, the possibility of magnetic interference,
caused by high alternating currents, on other equipment or parts of the installation,
especially steel components, shall be considered.
4.2.15 Fuses
4.2.15.1 Clearances
Minimum electrical clearances for fuse assembly installations shall take into consideration
all possible positions of the live parts before, during and after operation.
Vented fuses shall be provided with adequate clearances or appropriate protective barriers
in the direction or directions in which they are vented. Discharges from vented fuses may
contain hot gases, arc plasma and molten metal. They may also be conductive.
Facilities should be provided to ensure that personnel are not exposed to discharges of
vented fuses either during replacement or when working in the area (see Section 6).
NOTE: When this is not possible, the circuit feeding the fuse should be de-energized prior to
possible exposures, or the personnel should use protective shielding and clothing.
4.2.15.2 Fuse replacement
Fuses shall be installed in such a way that their replacement can be carried out safely
according to manufacturer’s instructions.
NOTE: All necessary information should be available to the operating and maintenance personnel
for the proper selection of replacement fuses.

51 AS 2067:2016
4.2.16 Electrical and mechanical interlocking

Interlocking may be necessary to ensure the correct sequence of operation of equipment, to
prevent danger to personnel, and to prevent damage to the equipment.
Interlocking shall be of robust design and construction. This may be achieved by electrical
or mechanical methods. In the event of the loss of power supplies, electrical interlocking
schemes should be designed to be fail-safe.


AS 2067:2016 52
S E C T I O N 5 I N S T A L L AT I O N S
5.1 MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

5.1.1 General
This Clause specifies only general requirements for the installations regarding choice of
circuit arrangement, circuit documentation, transport routes, lighting, operational safety and
labelling.
For consumers’ high voltage installations, reference should be made, where relevant, to
network connection requirements.
Distances, clearances and dimensions specified are the minimum values permitted for safe
operation. They are generally based on the minimum values given in AS 1824.1. A user
may specify higher values if necessary.
NOTE: National, state and territory regulations may require the use of higher clearance values.
Operating procedures are the subject of agreement between the manufacturer, the user and
the network operator (where the user and network operator are separate entities). Persons
who operate a high voltage installation shall be appropriately trained and competent to
carry out the operating procedures.
5.1.2 Circuit arrangement
5.1.2.1 Design
The circuit arrangement shall be chosen to meet regulatory and operating requirements and
to enable implementation of the safety requirements in accordance with Clause 6.4. The
continuity of service under fault and maintenance conditions, taking into account the
network configuration, shall also be considered. The circuits shall be arranged so that
switching operations can be carried out safely and quickly.
The design shall ensure that isolated sections of an installation cannot be inadvertently
energized by voltage from parallel connected secondary sources (e.g. instrument
transformers).
5.1.2.2 Protective measures
Installations shall be capable of withstanding the thermal and dynamic stresses resulting
from short-circuit current in accordance with Clause 2.
5.1.3 Documentation
Where applicable, sufficient documentation shall be provided with each installation to
allow erection, commissioning, operation, maintenance and environmental protection.
Adequate up-to-date instructions, diagrams, and data, shall be available to persons
operating, in charge of work or working in electrical areas, to ensure proper and safe
control of equipment and isolation for working. Compliance with AS 1100 and
AS/NZS 1102.111 is recommended.
Notices and labels required by statutory regulations shall be displayed together with any
other notices or labels necessary for identification of equipment and its function.
5.1.4 Transport routes
Transport routes, their load capacity, height and width shall be adequate for movements of
anticipated transport units. They are the subject of agreement between the supplier and the
user.

53 AS 2067:2016
Within high voltage installations, the passage of vehicles or other mobile equipment
beneath or in proximity to live parts (without protective measures) is permitted, subject to
regulatory requirements where they exist. Where no regulatory requirements exist, the
following conditions shall be met whilst vehicles are in transit (see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3
and refer to Clause 3.3 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for safety clearances):
(a) Where vehicles that personnel do not sit or stand upon or within whilst the vehicle is
in transit are used for transporting equipment, clearance T = N + 100 (minimum
500 mm) shall apply between the vehicle and its load and any live part.
Section safety clearance (S) shall be provided between the operator’s walkway and
any live part at all times (refer to Figure 5.1).
(b) Where personnel are required to remain within the cab of the vehicle whilst it is in
transit, clearance T = N + 100 (minimum 500 mm) shall apply between the vehicle
(with open doors) and its load to live parts, at all times (refer Figure 5.2).
Where personnel remain in vehicles or mobile equipment, there shall be adequate
protective measures on the vehicle or mobile equipment (e.g. the cab roof) to ensure
that the danger zone defined above cannot be infringed.

(c) Where mobile equipment can be moved whilst being stood or sat upon, the greater of
the following clearances shall be applied (refer Figure 5.3):
(i) Section safety clearance (S) applied from any part of the vehicle or mobile plant
where a person would normally sit or stand to live parts.
(ii) Clearance X = N + 1900 applied horizontally from the extremities of the vehicle
when against the kerb line or side of the access way to live parts and exposed
conductors.
Procedures shall be implemented to ensure safe passage of vehicles and mobile plant.

AS 2067:2016 54
Live par t s
T N Dang er zo ne T
Live par t s
T
≥S
LEGEN D: B ar r i er
T = N + 10 0 ( 5 0 0 m in) Ve hi c l e
N: N o n -fl a s h over d i st an c e
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e
DIMENSIONS IN MILLIMETRES
FIGURE 5.1 MINIMUM APPROACH DISTANCE FOR TRANSPORT IN TRANSIT—

TYPICAL INDOOR INSTALLATION WHERE THE VEHICLES CANNOT BE STOOD
OR SAT UPON OR SAT WITHIN WHILST IN TRANSIT

55 AS 2067:2016
Dang er zo ne
N
T
T
≥S
Ac c e s s i b l e sur fac e
LEGEN D:
T = N + 10 0 (5 0 0 m in)
Ve hi c l e
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e Tr ans p or t route

TYPICAL OUTDOOR INSTALLATION WHERE PERSONNEL MUST REMAIN
WITHIN THE CAB WHILST IN TRANSIT

AS 2067:2016 56
Live par t s
X X
LEGEN D:
X = N + 19 0 0
N: N o n -fl a s h over d i st an c e Ve hi c l e w hi c h c an b e sto o d or s at u p o n
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e Ed g e of ker b or all owa b l e ac c e s s area

TYPICAL OUTDOOR INSTALLATION WHERE THE VEHICLES CAN BE STOOD
OR SAT UPON WHILST IN TRANSIT
5.1.5 Aisles and access areas

The width of aisles and access areas shall be adequate for work, operational access,
emergency access, emergency evacuation and for transport of equipment.
Egress paths shall be provided such that the failure of any item of equipment will not
prevent the unimpeded egress from the work area.
NOTE: This would normally entail a minimum of two egress paths.
5.1.6 Lighting
Accessible indoor and outdoor installations shall be provided with suitable lighting for
routine operations. Lighting levels are the subject of agreement between supplier and user.
Emergency/auxiliary lighting shall be provided, if necessary; this may be a fixed
installation or portable equipment.
In some cases, in small distribution substations, a lighting installation may not be required.
In such cases, the presence and extent of the lighting are the subjects of agreement upon
between the supplier and the user.

57 AS 2067:2016
Any part of the lighting installation that needs maintenance or replacement, (e.g. lamps)
shall be installed so that when the work is carried out correctly, the working clearance to
live parts can be maintained.
NOTE: Guidance on lighting levels may be obtained from the AS/NZS 1680 series.
5.1.7 Operational safety
The design of high voltage installations shall be such as to provide operational safety. This
includes ensuring the escape and rescue paths and the emergency exit can be safely used in
the event of a fire, and that protection and environmental compatibility are ensured.
Where necessary, installations themselves shall be protected against fire hazard, flooding
and contamination. If required, additional measures shall be taken to protect important
installations against the effects of vehicle impact.
5.1.8 Labelling
All important parts of the installation, (e.g. busbar systems, switchgear, bays, conductors,
and protection indication) shall be clearly and uniquely labelled.
All equipment with rear access shall be appropriately labelled at all points of the access on
a fixed portion of each piece of equipment.
Safety warnings (e.g. warning notices, safety instruction notices and informative notices)
shall be provided at suitable points in the installation (see Clause 6.8).
Informative notices should be provided for the operation of any key-interlocking schemes.
Safety warnings shall be provided wherever multiple sources of high voltage power are
required to be disconnected for the complete de-energization of equipment or where
equipment may be inadvertently back-fed.
The operational state of the switchgear shall be clearly shown by indicators except when the
main contacts can be clearly viewed by the operator.
Cable terminations and components shall be identified including relevant details making
identification possible in accordance with a wiring list or diagram.
NOTES:
1 AS 1319 provides requirements for safety signs.
2 Refer to Appendix E for a typical system for functional identification of small wiring.
5.2 OUTDOOR INSTALLATIONS OF OPEN DESIGN

5.2.1 General
The layout of open type outdoor installations shall take into account the minimum phase-to-
phase and phase-to-earth clearances given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
The design of the installation shall be such as to restrict access to danger zones, taking into
account the need for operational and maintenance access. External fences shall therefore be
provided and, where safety distances cannot be maintained, permanent protective facilities
shall be installed. For electrical installations on a mast, pole or tower, external fences may
not be required if the installation is inaccessible from ground level to the general public and
meets the safety distances given in Clause 5.7.
A separation shall be provided between bays or sections by appropriate distances, protective
barriers or protective obstacles. Temporary barriers or obstacles may be installed to achieve
the required safety clearances under maintenance conditions.
The design of the installation shall allow work sections to be established when maintenance
work is to be carried out.

AS 2067:2016 58
5.2.2 Protective barrier clearances

Protective barriers shall be of substantial construction and be suitable for the environment
in which they are located. They shall limit the approach of personnel carrying out routine
inspections, operations or maintenance to a safe distance from the live parts.
Within an installation, the following minimum protective clearances shall be maintained
between live parts and the internal surface of any protective barrier (see Figures 5.4
and 5.5):
(a) For solid walls, without openings, with a minimum height of 1800 mm, the minimum
protective barrier clearance shall be the greater of non-flashover distance (N) and the
taut string section safety clearance (S) (see Figure 5.4).
(b) Barriers with openings shall have a degree of protection of at least IP1XB or IP2X
[maximum mesh opening of 50 mm and 12.5 mm respectively (see AS 60529)] and
shall have a minimum height of 1800 mm. The barrier clearance shall be the greater
of N + 300 mm and the taut string section safety clearance (S) (see Figure 5.5).
For non-rigid protective barriers and wire meshes, the clearance values shall be increased to
take into account any possible displacement of the protective barrier or mesh.
5.2.3 Protective obstacle clearances
Within installations a minimum clearance of N + 300 mm (minimum 600 mm) shall be
maintained from live parts to the internal surface of any protective obstacle
(see Figure 5.6).
Protective obstacles shall be located so that the minimum clearance from where an operator
may stand on the accessible side of the obstacle to the live part is section safety clearance S.
Protective obstacles shall be labelled such that their purpose as an obstacle is clear.
Where appropriate, to be effective, protective obstacles shall be fitted at a minimum height
of 1200 mm and a maximum height of 1400 mm.
D a n g er zo n e N
N
C l e ar a n c e e nve l o p
Live par t s S
N o n - ac c e s s i b l e sur fac e in s i d e bar r i er or s c re e n B ar r i er or s c re e n (s o li d c o n str u c t i o n)

m i n i m u m h e i g ht 18 0 0
LEGEN D:
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e
FIGURE 5.4 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT CONTACT BY PROTECTIVE BARRIERS/

SCREENS WITHIN CLOSED ELECTRICAL OPERATING AREAS—WHERE THE
PROTECTIVE BARRIERS ARE SOLID WALLS WITHOUT OPENINGS

59 AS 2067:2016
D a n g er zo n e N
N
C l e ar a n c e e nve l o p
Live par t s S
N+ 3 0 0
N o n - ac c e s s i b l e sur fac e in s i d e barr i er or s c re e n B arr i er or s c re e n w it h o p e nin g s

LEGEN D: to IP1XB or IP2 X
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e m i n i m u m h e i g ht 18 0 0
FIGURE 5.5 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT CONTACT BY PROTECTIVE

BARRIERS/SCREENS WITHIN CLOSED ELECTRICAL OPERATING AREAS—WHERE
THE PROTECTIVE BARRIERS HAVE OPENINGS OR ARE OF MESH CONSTRUCTION
Dang er zo ne Live par t s
N
O b st ac l e
c l ear an c e S
Cl ear an c e < S
C o n str u c t i o n w hi c h infr in g e s O b st ac l e preve nt s ac c e s s

se c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e (S) to t h e area w h ere se c t i o n
c l ear an c e (S) infr ing e d
O b st ac l e c l ear an c e LEGEN D:
= N + 20 0 in d o or s (5 0 0 m inimu m) S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e
= N + 3 0 0 o utd o or s (6 0 0 m inimu m) N: N o n -fl a s h over d i st an c e
FIGURE 5.6 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT CONTACT BY PROTECTIVE

OBSTACLES WITHIN CLOSED ELECTRICAL OPERATION AREAS
5.2.4 Boundary clearances

The external fence of outdoor installations of open design shall have the following
minimum boundary clearances in accordance with Figure 5.7:
(a) Solid walls (height: see Clause 5.2.8) ................................................... N + 1000 mm.
(b) Wire mesh/screens (height: see Clause 5.2.8) ........................................................... S.

AS 2067:2016 60
The maximum opening of the wire mesh/screens shall not exceed 50 mm.
Where maintenance is required to be performed on the boundary wall or fence from a
ladder, then horizontal work safety clearance (H) is required between the live parts and the
boundary wall or fence.
H = N + 1900 mm
Where maintenance is required to be performed on the boundary wall or fence from a

platform, then section safety clearance (S) is required between the live parts and the
boundary wall or fence.
S = N + 2440 mm
When a boundary fence is to be used as a barrier or obstacle it shall also meet the
requirements of Clauses 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Dang er zo ne
N
Area without
live par t s
or insulator s
H e i g ht a s p er
Clau se 5.7
a
b
Ac c e s s i b l e s ur fac e
B o u n d ar y fe n c e B o u n d ar y LEGEN D:
25 0 0 m i n i m u m h e i g ht c l ear an c e S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e
H: H or izo nt al wor k s afet y c l ear an c e
(N + 19 0 0)
B ound ar y c l earan c e
= N + 10 0 0 w h e n b oun d ar y fe n c e i s s o li d wall
= N + 24 4 0 (S) w h e n b oun d ar y fe n c e i s m e s h c o n str u c t i o n
= N + 19 0 0 (H ) m ainte nan c e ac c e s s by l ad d er to fe n c e
= N + 24 4 0 (S) m ainte nan c e ac c e s s by p l at for m to fe n c e
a: If t h e d i st an c e to li ve par t s i s l e s s t han S, p r ote c t i o n by b ar r i er s o r o b s t a c l e s

s hall b e prov i d e d
b: If t h e d i st an c e i s s m all er t han G (24 4 0), prote c t i o n by barr i er s or o b st ac l e s s hall
b e prov i d e d
FIGURE 5.7 BOUNDARY DISTANCES AND MINIMUM HEIGHT

AT THE EXTERNAL FENCE/WALL

61 AS 2067:2016
5.2.5 Minimum height over access area

The minimum height of live parts above surfaces or platforms where only pedestrian access
is permitted shall be as follows:
(a) For live parts without protective facilities, a minimum height of the section safety
clearance S = N + 2440 mm shall be maintained (see Figure 5.8). The height S is
referenced to the maximum conductor sag (see Clause 1.4.51).

(b) The lowest part of any insulation, for example the upper edge of metallic insulator
bases, shall be not less than the ground safety distance G = 2440 mm above accessible
surfaces unless other suitable measures to prevent access are provided.
Where the reduction of safety distances due to the effect of snow on accessible surfaces
needs to be considered, the values given above shall be increased.
Live par t s
N Dang er zo ne
V
S
S H
LEGEN D:
G: G r o u n d s afet y c l e ar a n c e (24 4 0)
S : S e c t i o n s afet y c l ear an c e (N + G)
H: H or izo nt al wor k s afet y c l ear an c e (N + 19 0 0)
V: Ver t i c al wor k s afet y c l ear an c e (N + 13 4 0)
FIGURE 5.8 MINIMUM HEIGHTS AND MINIMUM WORKING CLEARANCES

WITHIN CLOSED ELECTRICAL OPERATING AREAS
(FOR ELECTRICALLY SKILLED OR INSTRUCTED PERSONS)
5.2.6 Minimum clearances for maintenance

Where maintenance work may be required on normally live equipment, the installation shall
be designed so that there are adequate work safety clearances between the equipment for
this purpose. The work safety clearances are section safety clearance (S), horizontal work
safety clearance (H) and vertical work safety clearance (V) as follows:
(a) Section safety clearance (S) is applicable from the work platform, ground or access
way on which personnel may stand or sit to perform the maintenance activity to the
nearest live part. Section safety clearance is measured from the foot position, over
guard rails and screens by taut string measurement to the nearest live part.

AS 2067:2016 62
(b) Horizontal work safety clearance (H) is applicable where work is to be carried out
from a ladder. Horizontal work safety clearance is measured from the extremities of
the work object horizontally to the nearest live parts.
(c) Vertical work safety clearance (V) is applicable where work is to be carried out from
a ladder. Vertical work safety clearance is measured from the highest part of the work
object vertically to the nearest live parts.

Clearance values shall be in accordance with Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Figure 5.8 illustrates
example applications of the clearances.
These work safety clearances are related to the dimensions of a tall person using light hand
tools or materials up to 300 mm in length. Where larger tools or equipment are to be used,
an appropriate provision shall be made in the work safety clearances.
5.2.7 Clearances to buildings within closed electrical operating areas
Where bare conductors cross buildings that are located within closed electrical operating
areas (see Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11), the following clearances to the roof shall be
maintained at maximum sag and maximum swing:
(a) The clearances specified in Clause 5.2.5 for live parts above accessible surfaces,
where the roof is accessible when the conductors are live.
(b) N + 500 mm where the roof and wall cannot be accessed when the conductors are
live.
(c) H in lateral direction from the end (edge) of the roof, if the roof is accessible (only by
ladder) when the conductors are live. If access is by means other than by ladder, the
greater of section clearance S (as defined in Clause 5.2.6) and H shall apply.
Where bare conductors approach buildings that are located within closed electrical
operating areas, the following clearances shall be maintained, after allowing for the
maximum sag/swing in the case of stranded conductors:
(i) Outer wall without windows or with screened windows (screened in accordance with
Clause 5.2.2)—protective barrier clearances N + 300 mm (minimum 600 mm) in
accordance with Clause 5.2.2, where the roof and walls cannot be accessed.
(ii) H in lateral direction from the end (edge) of the roof, if the roof and or wall is
accessible (only by ladder) for maintenance when the conductors are live. If access is
by means other than by ladder, the greater of section clearance S (as defined in
Clause 5.2.6) and H shall apply.

63 AS 2067:2016
N d an g er zo n e N d an g er zo n e
N + 500 S (N + 24 4 0)
N + 3 0 0 (m in. 6 0 0) H (N + 19 0 0)
Dang er zo ne Dang er zo ne
R o o f a n d wa l l s c a n n o t b e a c c e s s e d R o o f a n d wa l l s c a n b e a c c e s s e d
w h i l s t c o n d u c to r s ar e l i ve w h i l s t c o n d u c to r s ar e l i ve
NOTE: H shall apply if access/work is from a ladder. If access/work is from a work platform or from on top of the
roof, the greater of section clearance S (as defined in Clause 5.2.6) and H shall apply.
FIGURE 5.9 APPROACHES TO BUILDINGS (WITHIN CLOSED ELECTRICAL

OPERATING AREAS)—OUTER WALL WITHOUT WINDOWS
N + 3 0 0 (m in 6 0 0) H (N + 19 0 0)
Dang er zo ne
Dang er zo ne
R o o f a n d wa l l s c a n n o t b e a c c e s s e d R o o f a n d wa l l s c a n b e a c c e s s e d
w h i l s t c o n d u c to r s ar e l i ve w h i l s t c o n d u c to r s ar e l i ve
NOTE: H shall apply if access/work is from a ladder. If access/work is from a work platform or from on top of the
roof, the greater of section clearance S (as defined in Clause 5.2.6) and H shall apply.

OPERATING AREAS)—OUTER WALL WITH SCREENED WINDOWS

AS 2067:2016 64
H (N + 19 0 0) H (N + 19 0 0)
Dang er zo ne
Dang er zo ne
NOTE: This applies whether or not the roof and/or walls can be accessed when the conductors are live. In
consideration of access, H shall apply if access/work is from a ladder. If access/work is from an open window, work
platform or from on top of the roof, the greater of section clearance S (as defined in Clause 5.2.6) and H shall apply.

OPERATING AREAS)—OUTER WALL WITH UNSCREENED WINDOWS
5.2.8 External fences or walls and access doors

Measures shall be taken to minimize the risk of unauthorized access to outdoor high voltage
installations.
Where this is by means of external fences or walls, the height and construction of the
fence/wall shall be adequate to deter climbing. Additional precautions may be required in
some installations to prevent access by excavation beneath the fence. The external
fence/wall shall be at least 2500 mm high. The lower edge of a fence shall not be more than
50 mm from the ground (for boundary distances see Clause 5.2.4 and Figure 5.7).
The fence/wall shall be constructed so that it cannot be readily climbed or penetrated
without the use of substantial tools and equipment. The top 500 mm of the fence shall be
strands of barbed wire or similar with at least 4 strands at a maximum of 150 mm apart.
Alternative equivalent solutions are also acceptable.
Access doors to outdoor installations shall be equipped with security locks.
External fences/walls and access doors shall be marked with safety signs in accordance with
Clause 6.9.
In some cases, for public security reasons, additional measures may be necessary.
Consideration shall also be given to the location of any adjacent fences, other structures and
trees outside the installation.
Installations such as distribution kiosk substations that comprise fully enclosed and vandal
resistant equipment may not require provision of security fence as determined by a risk
assessment.
Guidance can be found in ENA DOC 015 which defines greater requirements for the areas
accessible to the public.
5.3 INDOOR INSTALLATIONS OF OPEN DESIGN

The layout of open-type indoor installations shall take into account the minimum phase-to-
phase and phase-to-earth clearances specified in Clause 3 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).
The design of the installation shall be such as to prevent access to danger zones taking into
account the need of access for operational and maintenance purposes. Therefore, safety
distances or permanent protective facilities within the installation shall be provided.

65 AS 2067:2016
Protective barrier and obstacle clearances, safety distances and minimum height, shall
comply with Clauses 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
Buildings, corridors, escape routes, doors and windows, shall comply with Clause 5.5.
5.4 INSTALLATION OF PREFABRICATED TYPE-TESTED SWITCHGEAR

5.4.1 General
This Clause (5.4) specifies additional requirements for equipment that apply to external
connections, erection and operation at the place of installation. The installation shall be
dimensioned and designed to avoid danger to persons and damage to property, taking into
account the type of installation and local conditions.
Factory-built, type-tested high voltage switchgear shall be manufactured and tested in
accordance with relevant Standards such as AS 62271.1, AS 62271.200, AS 62271.201 and
AS 62271.203.
The switchgear shall be well adapted to its purpose, clearly arranged and so designed that
essential parts are accessible for erection, operation and maintenance. Arrangements and
access shall be provided to permit assembly at site. Future possible extensions should be
considered.
Appropriate arrangements shall be made for external connections. Conductors and cables
shall be selected and arranged in such a way as to ensure safe insulation level between
conductors and between each conductor and surrounding earthed metallic structures.
Safety devices that are intended to reduce the internal switchgear pressure resulting from a
fault shall be designed and arranged with consideration for their potential hazard to
personnel. The accumulation of dangerous concentrations of gas decomposition products in
switch rooms shall be prevented.
5.4.2 Additional requirements for gas-insulated metal enclosed equipment (GIE)
5.4.2.1 Design
If platforms and ladders are necessary for operation and maintenance, they shall be
designed and arranged to provide safe access for personnel. These elements may be fixed or
movable.
Where necessary, arrangements shall be made to protect the switchgear from dangerous
vibrations from transformers/reactors with gas-insulated connections. Bellows shall be
provided, where necessary, to allow for heat expansion, erection tolerances and settlement
of foundations.
For gas-insulated installations with several pressure chambers, clear labels shall be
provided indicating the construction of the installation and the position of partitions.
Monitoring devices shall be clearly marked and located to permit easy supervision.
Gas pipelines and fittings in areas where mechanical damage is possible shall be protected.
SF6 gas pipelines shall be marked where there is a possibility of confusion with other
pipelines (see Clause 6.8.2).
5.4.2.2 Erection on site
Erection of GIE shall be carried out in a clean environment.
For outdoor installations, it may be necessary to provide a suitable temporary enclosure
over the work area to protect the equipment from the environmental conditions whilst
installation and/or maintenance is taking place.
For SF6 gas handling, see Clause 7.5.
For SF6 leakage, see Clauses 6.8.2 and 6.8.3.

AS 2067:2016 66
5.4.2.3 Protection against overvoltages

Protection of the GIE against overvoltages should normally be provided by the surge
arresters installed on the feeders. In some cases, the protection given by this equipment may
be inadequate. This situation arises mainly in the following configurations:
(a) Large distance between the GIE and transformers.
(b) Transformers connected to the GIE by means of cables.

(c) Open ended long busbars.
(d) Connection to overhead lines by means of insulated cables.
(e) Locations with high probability of lightning strikes.
For these configurations, the installation of additional surge arresters may be required.
Their location should preferably be based on calculations.
5.4.2.4 Earthing
The enclosure of a GIE should be connected to the earthing system at least at the following
points:
(a) Inside the bays—
(i) close to the circuit-breaker;
(ii) close to the cable sealing end;
(iii) close to the SF6/air bushing; and
(iv) close to the instrument transformer.
(b) On the busbars, at both ends and at intermediate points, depending on the length of
the busbars.
(c) The three enclosures of a single-phase type GIE shall be bonded together with short
connections and earthed at least at the end of the enclosure of the outgoing and
incoming feeders.
Additional bonding straps are not required at flange joints if it can be ensured that the
contact pressure of the flange provides adequate contact connection for high frequencies.
Earthing conductors of surge arresters for the protection of gas-insulated installations shall
be connected to the enclosure by a low impedance connection.
Metallic sheaths (e.g. metal enclosures, armoured coverings, screens) of cables with
nominal voltages above 1 kV should be connected directly to the GIE enclosure.
In some special cases, e.g. cathodic protection of cables, it may be necessary to separate the
earth connection of the cables from the GIE enclosure. In this case, the installation of a
voltage surge protection device is recommended between the sealing end and enclosure.
5.5 REQUIREMENTS FOR BUILDINGS

5.5.1 Introduction
As a minimum, substation buildings shall comply with the requirements of the National
Construction Code (NCC) where appropriate and with the relevant requirements of this
Standard. Particular consideration should be given to explosions and pressure venting in
substations.
NOTE: The NCC specifies certain requirements for electrical substations and similar installations
(Clause C2.13 of Volume 1), but does not allocate an unambiguous classification to stand-alone
infrastructure buildings such as electricity substations. The requirements for NCC Class 8
buildings may be used as a basic guide for these buildings. This Standard provides additional
requirements. The NCC does contain specific provisions and exemptions for electricity network
substations owned by network operators.

67 AS 2067:2016
Requirements for mitigation of fire are covered in Clause 6.7.

Clauses 5.5.2 to 5.5.8 specify the requirements for areas or locations where electrical
equipment for high voltage installations is installed. For the purpose of this Standard,
prefabricated substations covered by AS 62271.202 are not considered as buildings.
5.5.2 Structural provisions
5.5.2.1 General
Load-carrying structural members, partition walls, claddings, enclosures, etc. shall be
selected to achieve the appropriate fire rating.
Electrical operating areas shall be designed to prevent ingress of water and to minimize
condensation.
Where possible, materials used for walls, ceilings and floors on the ground shall not be
damaged by water penetration or leakage. If this requirement cannot be met, precautions
shall be taken to prevent the consequences of a leak or of condensation affecting the
operating safety.
The building design shall take into account the expected mechanical loading and internal
pressure caused by an arc fault.
Pipelines and other equipment, if allowed in substations, shall be designed so that the
electrical installation is not affected, even in the event of damage to the pipe or other
equipment.
5.5.2.2 Specifications for walls
The external walls of the building shall have sufficient design strength for the
environmental conditions.
The design strength of the buildings shall be sufficient to withstand all static and dynamic
loads due to normal operation of the installation and abnormal conditions associated with
equipment failure, not limited to but including internal pressure caused by an arc fault or oil
vapour explosion.
The passage of pipes or wiring systems shall not affect the structural integrity of the walls.
Metal parts that pass through walls shall meet the requirements of Section 8.
Panels of the exterior surface of buildings that are accessible to the general public shall not
be removable from the outside. The constituent materials of the external enclosures shall be
capable of withstanding the attacks of atmospheric elements (rain, sun, aggressive wind,
etc.).
5.5.2.3 Windows
Windows shall be designed to deter and delay intrusion. This may be achieved by one or
more of the following measures:
(a) The window is made of unbreakable material.
(b) The window is screened by appropriately rated security-standard material that in
cyclone prone regions shall also protect against windborne material.
(c) The lower edge of the window is at least 1.8 m above the access level.
(d) The building is surrounded by an external fence at least 2.5 m high.
5.5.2.4 Roofs
The roof of the building shall have sufficient design strength to withstand the
environmental conditions.

AS 2067:2016 68
If the ceiling of the switchgear room is also the roof of the building, the anchoring of the
roof to the walls shall be adequate in terms of withstanding internal pressure caused by an
arc fault or oil vapour explosion.
5.5.2.5 Floors
The floors should be flat and stable and should be able to support the static and dynamic
loads.
Raised floors should be arranged so that the spread of fire is minimized.
5.5.3 Rooms for switchgear
The dimensions of the room and of required pressure relief openings depend on the type of
switchgear and the short-circuit current.
If pressure relief openings are necessary, they shall be arranged and situated in such a way
that when they operate (blow out due to an arc fault) the danger to persons and damage to
property is minimized.
5.5.4 Service areas
Service areas comprise, access areas, handling passages and escape routes.
Access areas shall be adequately dimensioned for carrying out work, operating switchgear
and transporting equipment, and to enable work to be carried out safely.
The minimum width of service areas shall not be reduced, even where equipment projects
into the service areas, e.g. permanently installed operating mechanisms or switchgear trucks
in isolated positions. Refer to Figure 5.12 for guidance.
Space for evacuation shall be at least 600 mm, even when removable parts or open doors,
which are blocked in the direction of escape, intrude into the escape routes.
≥600 ≥600
≥600
Lif t of f panels AC B
Hinged doors
or panels ≥600
Fuse d switc hes (CFS)
≥600 D e ad fro nt
≥600 ≥600
≥600
Rac k out sw itc h g ear
FIGURE 5.12 ACCESS TO SWITCHBOARDS—FREESTANDING SWITCHBOARD

69 AS 2067:2016
Erection of service access ways behind closed installations (solid walls), shall not be less
than 600 mm wide.
Where front access equipment is used and rear access and clearance is not required, such
equipment may be installed in close proximity to a wall. If the minimum of 600 mm
clearance cannot be maintained any space between the wall and the rear of this equipment,
this space shall be adequately protected from any person being able to gain access, vermin
gaining access or rubbish accumulating.
Clear and safe access for personnel shall be provided at all times.
So as to not hinder escape, the doors of switchgear cubicles, panels or bays should, where
possible, close in the direction of egress.
Below ceilings, covers or enclosures, except cable accesses, a minimum height above floor
level of 2.0 m is required.
Exits shall be arranged so that the maximum length of the escape route complies with the
requirements of Section D of the National Construction Code. This does not apply to
accessible bus ducts or cable ducts. Alternative escape route distances may be adopted
utilizing a risk/probability approach where it can be demonstrated that equal personnel

protection is provided.
Permanently installed ladders or similar are permissible as emergency exits in escape
routes.
Below-ground substations shall have two ‘dedicated’ access ways to the substation.
‘Dedicated’ access ways shall not enable or provide for access to or from any place or
anything other than the substation. This includes associated doors, stairs, hatchways,
ladders, passages, chambers, etc. and shall be suitable for transport of small items of
equipment. Stairs or permanent ladders shall be provided in accordance with the applicable
building code.
For below-ground substations in public areas, preference should be given to having
dedicated access ways to the substation from separate doorways at street level.
NOTE: This requirement does not apply to substations located in underground mines.
5.5.5 Doors
Access doors shall be secured to prevent unauthorized access.
Access doors shall open outwards and be provided with safety signs in accordance with
Clause 6.9.
Where the access door provides direct access to areas where outward opening doors may be
blocked by the action of others, inward opening doors may be used.
Where there is an airlock the internal doors shall swing into the airlock to assist egress.
Substation layout shall be arranged to allow easy and unimpeded access to all emergency
exits.
Doors shall be positioned such that they do not create a personnel hazard or allow blockage
by parked vehicles.
To prevent obstructions being placed in the path of opening doors, installation of bollards
or barricades (permanent or temporary) should be considered.
Doors between various rooms within a closed electrical operating area are not required to
have locks.
It shall be possible to open emergency doors from the inside without a key by using a latch
or other simple means, even when they are locked from the outside.

AS 2067:2016 70
Panic bars or downward action levers shall be fitted on all outward opening doors used for
emergency egress from rooms containing high voltage switchgear.
The minimum dimensions of the opening for an emergency door shall be 1980 mm high and
750 mm wide.
Hatch covers at street level that are used for emergency access or egress shall be located
where vehicles cannot drive over them. Hatch covers should be located in a position where
a truck with a hoist can stand and deliver equipment.
Hatches may be provided for large items of equipment such as transformers and switchgear,
etc. The method of lowering or raising such equipment shall be considered at the design
stage. These hatches shall not be considered as one of the means of personnel egress
required by Clause 5.5.4.
Sliding and rolling doors are not permitted as emergency doors. Emergency doors built into
larger sliding doors but opening outwards are acceptable.
5.5.6 Draining of insulating liquids
Protective measures shall be taken when insulating liquids are used (see also Clause 6.7).
5.5.7 Heating, ventilation and cooling
5.5.7.1 General
NOTE: Guidance on the design and installation of air conditioning and ventilation systems is
given in the AS/NZS 1668 series.
Suitable indoor climate conditions shall be provided to ensure correct operation of the
electrical equipment (e.g. by adequate cooling, heating, dehumidifying, ventilation or by
attention to the design of the building).
Adequate ventilation shall be provided to dissipate heat generated by the electrical
equipment.
It is preferable to use natural ventilation wherever possible. Substations and equipment
rooms should be provided with good natural ventilation throughout.
Mechanical ventilation systems (permanent or temporary) shall be designed to take smoke
management into consideration. They shall be so arranged that inspection and maintenance
can be carried out even when the electrical equipment is energized with consideration to
location of equipment pressure relief vents.
Monitoring the operation of permanent ventilation fans is recommended.
Ventilation openings shall be designed to prevent any danger with regard to proximity to
live parts and/or from ingress of foreign bodies.
Coolants and heat transfer media shall not contain impurities or chemically aggressive
substances in quantities or qualities that may be hazardous to the correct function of the
equipment installed.
Filters or heat exchangers shall be installed if required.
Basement substations shall be provided with dedicated inlet and outlet ventilation ducts
terminating outside the building.
Ventilation ducts shall not contain any other services, provide access to any other portions
of the building or form part of the ventilation system serving any other part of the building.
Wherever possible, air intakes should be positioned remote from any potential source of
atmospheric contamination.

71 AS 2067:2016
5.5.7.2 Ventilation of battery rooms

Rooms containing batteries shall take into account the ventilation requirements to prevent
the explosive build-up of combustible gas during battery charging. AS 2676.1, AS 2676.2
and AS 3011 give guidance on battery ventilation rooms for emergency generating units.
5.5.7.3 Rooms for emergency generating units
Consideration should be given to installing emergency generating units in separate rooms.

Ventilation equipment shall be provided. Containment shall be provided to capture and
control fuel or lubricating oil spills.
Engine exhaust systems shall be installed and located such that exhaust fumes shall not
return to the ventilating air intake of the switchgear and control rooms, nor enter the air
intake for the emergency generating unit.
5.5.8 Buildings that require special consideration
For high voltage installations located in public or residential buildings, special conditions
shall be imposed, if required, in accordance with existing standards or regulations.
5.5.9 Confined spaces

All confined spaces shall be categorized and managed in accordance with AS 2865 and
other appropriate regulations.
Consideration should be given to cable pits and other spaces which may be classified as
confined spaces with possibility of hazardous gas build up.
5.6 HIGH VOLTAGE/LOW VOLTAGE PREFABRICATED SUBSTATIONS

For the rules governing manufacture and testing, see AS 62271.202 and HB 242.
Prefabricated/package substations shall be situated so that they are unlikely to be damaged
by road vehicles. Adequate space for operating and maintenance purposes shall also be
provided.
5.7 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS ON A MAST, POLE OR TOWER

The minimum height of live parts above surfaces accessible to the general public shall be in
accordance with Table 3.6 of AS/NZS 7000:2010.
Where the reduction of safety distances due to the effect of snow on accessible surfaces
needs to be considered, the values given above shall be increased.
Isolating equipment and fuses shall be arranged so that they can be operated without
danger. If necessary, isolating equipment shall be capable of being locked. The operating
rods shall be compliant with the relevant standard.
Safe phase-to-phase connection and earthing of the overhead line shall be possible.
NOTE: Guidance on clearances from ground and structures is provided in AS/NZS 7000.

AS 2067:2016 72
S E C T I O N 6 S A F E T Y M E A S U R E S
6.1 GENERAL
Installations shall be constructed in such a way as to enable the operating and maintenance
personnel to circulate and intervene within the framework of their duties and authorizations,
according to circumstances, at any point of the installation.
Specific maintenance work, preparation and repair work, which involves working in the
vicinity of live parts or actual work on live parts, is to be carried out observing the rules,
procedures and work distances as defined in national standards and regulations.
6.2 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT CONTACT

6.2.1 General
Installations shall be constructed so that unintentional touching of live parts or
unintentional reaching into a dangerous zone near live parts is prevented.

Protection shall be provided to prevent contact with live parts, parts with functional
insulation only and parts that can be considered to carry a dangerous potential.
Examples of such parts are as follows:
(a) Exposed live parts.
(b) Parts of installations where earthed metallic sheaths or conducting screens of cables
have been removed.
(c) Cables and accessories without earthed metallic sheaths or earthed conducting
elastomeric screens, as well as flexible cables without conducting elastomeric
screens.
(d) Terminations and conducting sheathing of cables, if they can carry a dangerous
voltage.
(e) Insulating bodies of insulators and other such parts, for example electrical equipment
insulated by cast resin, if a dangerous touch voltage can occur.
(f) Frames or cases of capacitors, converters and converter transformers, which can carry
a dangerous voltage during normal operation.
(g) Windings of electrical machines, transformers and air-cored reactors.
Protection may be achieved by different means, depending on whether the installation is
located in a closed electrical operating area or not.
Information on protection against electric shock is given in IEC 61140.
6.2.2 Measures for protection against direct contact
6.2.2.1 Recognized protection types
The following types of protection are recognized:
(a) Protection by enclosure.
(b) Protection by barrier.
(c) Protection by obstacle.
(d) Protection by placing out of reach.

73 AS 2067:2016
6.2.2.2 Design of protective measures

Protective barriers can be solid walls, doors or screens (wire mesh) with a minimum height
of 1800 mm to ensure that no part of the body of a person can reach the dangerous zone
near live parts.
Protective obstacles can, for example, be covers, rails, chains and ropes as well as walls,
doors and screens that are less than 1800 mm high and therefore cannot be considered as
protective barriers. Protective obstacles are placed to direct persons away from areas where
safe clearances would be infringed.
Protection by placing out of reach is achieved by placing live parts outside a zone extending
from any surface where persons can usually stand or move about, to the limits that a person
can reach with a hand in any direction (see Section 5).
Protective facilities used as a protective measure against direct contact, such as walls,
covers, protective obstacles, etc., shall be mechanically robust and securely mounted.
Doors of switchgear rooms or bays used as a part of an enclosure shall be designed so that
they can be opened only by using a tool or a key. In areas outside closed electrical
operating areas, these doors shall be provided with security locks.

Movable, conductive protective facilities shall be secured so that when correctly used the
relevant protective barrier or protective obstacle clearance is maintained; otherwise they
shall be made of insulating material or dry wood. It is permitted that a rail may be removed
without the use of a tool. Protective rails shall be rigid.
In areas or rooms accessible to the public, protective facilities shall not be easily removable
from outside with normal tools.
6.2.3 Protection requirements
6.2.3.1 Protection outside of closed electrical operating areas
Outside the closed electrical operating areas, only protection by enclosure or protection by
placing out of reach is allowed.
When protection by enclosure is used, the minimum degree of protection shall be IP2XC.
NOTE: As an exception, ventilation openings may be such that a straight wire cannot intrude into
the equipment in such a way that it causes danger by approaching parts needing to be protected
from direct contact.
When protection by placing out of reach is used, the vertical clearances between accessible
surfaces and the parts to be protected from direct contact shall be in accordance with
Clauses 5.2.7 and 5.7 (also see Figure 5.7).
6.2.3.2 Protection inside closed electrical operating areas
Inside closed electrical operating areas, protection by enclosure, protective barrier,
protective obstacle or placing out of reach is allowed.
When protection by enclosure is used, the minimum degree of protection shall meet the
requirements of IP2X. However, special protection measures to meet danger resulting from
arc faults may be necessary:
(a) When protection by protective barrier is used, see Clause 5.2.2.
(b) When protection by protective obstacle is used, see Clauses 5.2.3 and 5.3.
(c) When protection by placing out of reach is used, see Clauses 5.2.5 and 5.2.6.
NOTE: For more detailed requirements on external fences, transport routes, crossings and access
to buildings, etc., see Section 5.

AS 2067:2016 74
6.2.3.3 Protection during normal operation

Protection measures in an installation shall take into account the need for access for
purposes of operation and control and maintenance, such as—
(a) control of a circuit-breaker or a disconnector;
(b) changing a fuse or a lamp;

(c) adjusting a setting value of a device;
(d) resetting a relay or an indicator;
(e) earthing for work;
(f) erection of a temporary insulating shutter; and
(g) reading the temperature or oil level of a transformer.
In installations with Um ≤52 kV, where doors or covers have to be opened in order to carry
out normal operation or maintenance, it may be necessary to provide fixed non-conductive
rails as a warning.
NOTE: The relevant operating practices of the owner/operator of the electrical installation should
be taken into account.
6.3 MEANS TO PROTECT PERSONS FROM INDIRECT CONTACT

Measures to be taken in order to protect persons from indirect contact are given in
Section 8.
Information on protection against electric shock is given in IEC 61140.
6.4 MEANS TO PROTECT PERSONS WORKING ON OR NEAR ELECTRICAL

INSTALLATIONS
6.4.1 Construction and working procedures
Electrical installations shall be constructed and installed to ensure that the measures
necessary for the protection of persons working in or on electrical installations can be
employed. The relevant standards for operation and maintenance of high voltage
installations shall also be taken into account. The working procedures are the subject of
agreement between the supplier and the user.
NOTES:
1 Whilst individual functions are considered in separate clauses, these functions may be
combined in a single item of equipment.
2 Further guidance on working procedures may be obtained from ENA NENS 03–2006.
6.4.2 Equipment for isolating installations or apparatus
Equipment shall be provided by means of which the complete installation or sections
thereof can be isolated, depending on operating requirements.
This may be achieved by disconnectors or switch disconnectors (see Clause 4.2.1) or by
disconnecting part of the installation, for example by removing links or cable loops. Any
disconnection shall be supplemented by the use of approved portable and fixed earthing
equipment.
Installations or parts of installations that can be energized from several sources shall be
arranged so that all sources can be isolated from points of supply from which each section
or part thereof can be made live.

75 AS 2067:2016
If the neutral points of several pieces of equipment are connected to a common neutral
busbar, it shall be possible to isolate each neutral point individually. This also applies to
associated earth fault coils and resistors. The overvoltage protection shall be maintained in
operational condition and subject to regular testing.
Where equipment may be charged at some voltage following disconnection from the
installation, for example capacitors, devices shall be provided to discharge the

system/equipment.
Isolating gaps may only be bridged by insulators if leakage currents from the terminal on
one side to the terminal on the other side are prevented.
6.4.3 Devices to prevent inadvertent closing of isolating devices
Suitable devices shall be provided to render inoperative the actuating force (that is spring
force, air pressure, electrical energy) or the control of power mechanisms used for the
operation of switchgear employed for isolating purposes. Users may require that these
devices are lockable.
Where removable parts such as fuses or screw-in circuit breakers are used for complete
disconnection and are replaced by screw caps or blank inserts, these caps or inserts shall be
such that they can only be removed using an appropriate tool such as a key.
Manually operated switches shall permit the use of mechanical locking devices to prevent
reconnection to the system following isolation.
Where locking of the manually operated switch is not practical, operating procedures shall
be relied on to prevent reconnection to the system following isolation.
6.4.4 Devices for determining the de-energized state
Devices for determining that equipment is no longer energized shall be provided, where
required, taking operational requirements into consideration. The extent of such provisions,
wherever practicable, are the subject of agreement between the supplier and the user.
All devices supplied shall permit the de-energized state to be checked at all points where
the work is to be done and that have previously been live, without danger for the
operational personnel.
Either fixed equipment (see IEC 62271-206) or portable devices (see IEC 61243) may be
used to meet this requirement.
6.4.5 Devices for earthing and short-circuiting
Each part of an installation that can be isolated from the system shall be arranged to enable
it to be earthed and short-circuited.
Equipment (e.g. transformers and capacitors) shall be provided with a means of earthing
and short-circuiting adjacent to the equipment. This requirement shall not apply to parts of
a system where this is not practicable or is unsuitable (for example, transformers or
electrical machines with flange-mounted cable sealing ends or with cable connection
boxes). In these cases, earthing and short-circuiting shall be effected by the application of
circuit main earths at the associated switchgear cubicles or bays on the primary and
secondary sides. Normally it should be possible to earth and short-circuit all sides of a
transformer, including neutrals.
The following shall be provided for or supplied as earthing and short-circuiting devices,
with the scope being agreed between the supplier and the user:
(a) Earthing switches (preferably fault-making and/or fitted with interlocking devices).
(b) Earthing switch trucks.
(c) Earthing equipment integrated with other switching devices, e.g. a circuit breaker.

AS 2067:2016 76
(d) Free earthing rods and short-circuiting equipment (see IEC 61230).
(e) Guided earthing rods and short-circuiting equipment (see IEC 61219).
For each part of an installation, suitably dimensioned and accessible connection points shall
be provided on the earthing system and on the live parts for connection of earthing and
short-circuiting equipment. Switchgear cubicles or bays shall be designed so that
connection of the earthing and short-circuiting equipment by hand to the earth terminal
point can be carried out in accordance with the rules for carrying out work in the vicinity of
live parts.
When earthing and short-circuiting is achieved by remotely controlled earthing switches,
the switch position shall be reliably transmitted to the remote control point.
When earthing is achieved through a load-breaking device having control circuits, all
control circuits of the load-breaking device shall be made inoperative following the
application of the circuit main earth and inadvertent re-energization of the control circuits
shall be prevented.
6.4.6 Equipment acting as protective barriers against adjacent live parts
6.4.6.1 General
All boundary elements (e.g. walls, floors, etc.) shall be constructed according to Clauses 5.2
or 5.3.
If walls or protective facilities do not exist, the separation to neighbouring bays or sections
shall comply with the appropriate distances.
If working clearances cannot be maintained, live parts in the vicinity of the working area
shall be capable of being covered by insertable insulated partitions or walls in such a way
that accidental proximity to these parts by body parts, tools, equipment and materials is
prevented.
6.4.6.2 Insertable insulated partitions
Insertable insulated partitions shall meet the following requirements:
(a) The edges of insulating shutters shall not be located within the danger zone.
(b) Gaps are permissible outside the danger zone—
(i) up to 10 mm wide without limitation;
(ii) up to 40 mm wide provided the distance from the edge of the shutter to the
danger zone is at least 100 mm; and
(iii) up to 100 mm wide in the vicinity of disconnector bases.
Insertable insulated partitions used as protective barriers against live parts shall be part of
the equipment or provided separately in accordance with operational requirements by
agreement between the supplier and the user.
Insertable insulated partitions shall be capable of being secured so that their position cannot
be accidentally altered where this would lead to a hazardous condition.
Insertable insulated partitions used as protective barriers against live parts shall not touch
or be in contact with live parts.
It shall be possible to install and remove insertable insulated partitions without persons
being required to enter the danger zone.
NOTE: This can be achieved by the type of insulating shutters (for example, angled plate,
associated insulating rods, suitable operating rods) or by the installation of, for example, guide
rails.

77 AS 2067:2016
6.4.6.3 Insertable partition walls

For installations without permanently installed partition walls, suitable insertable partition
walls shall be provided to isolate adjacent live cubicles or bays in accordance with the
operational requirements. When required, the extent is the subject of agreement between the
supplier and the user.
Partition walls that enter the danger zone during installation or removal, or that lie within
the danger zone when fitted, shall meet the requirement for mobile insulating plates.
Insertable insulated partitions used as protective barriers against live parts shall not touch
or be in contact with live parts.
6.4.7 Storage of personal protection equipment
If personal protection equipment is to be stored in the installation, a place shall be provided
for this purpose where the equipment is protected from humidity, dirt and damage whilst
remaining readily accessible to operational personnel.
6.5 PROTECTION FROM DANGER RESULTING FROM ARC FAULT

Electrical installations shall be designed and installed so that personnel are protected as far
as practicable from arc faults during operation.
The following list of measures to protect against dangers resulting from arc fault serves as a
guide in the design and construction of electrical installations. The degree of importance of
these measures is the subject of agreement between the supplier and user.
(a) Protection against operating error, established, for example, by means of—
(i) load break switches instead of disconnectors;
(ii) short-circuit rated fault-making switches;
(iii) interlocking devices; or
(iv) non-interchangeable key locks.
(b) Operating aisles as short, high and wide as possible (see Clause 5.5).
(c) Solid covers as an enclosure or protective barrier instead of perforated covers or wire
mesh.
(d) Equipment tested to withstand internal arc fault instead of open-type equipment
(refer to AS 62271.200, AS 62271.203 and AS 62271.202).
(e) Arc products to be directed away from operating personnel, and vented outside the
building, if necessary.
(f) Use of current-limiting devices.
(g) Very short tripping time; achievable by instantaneous relays or by devices sensitive to
pressure, light or heat.
(h) Operation of the plant from a safe distance.
(i) Prevention of re-energization by use of manually resettable devices which detect
internal equipment faults and which incorporate pressure relief and provide an
external indication.
6.6 PROTECTION AGAINST DIRECT LIGHTNING STRIKES

Different methods of analysis are available. The method to be used is the subject of
agreement between the supplier and user.
The user shall select the level of protection to be achieved, depending on the reliability
level required, and the protection method to be used.
AS 2067:2016 78
Lightning rods and shield wires shall be earthed.

It is not necessary to equip a steel structure with a separate earthing conductor where it
provides a suitable path for the lightning current itself.
Shield wires shall be connected to the steel structure or earthing conductor to ensure that
the lightning current flows to earth. For buildings and similar structures, see AS/NZS 1768.
NOTE: For technical and economic reasons, damage resulting from lightning strikes cannot be
fully prevented.
6.7 PROTECTION AGAINST FIRE AND EXPLOSION

6.7.1 Risk
6.7.1.1 General
Clause 6.7 provides fire prevention and fire protection recommendations for HV
installations. These recommendations provide for the safety of construction, operating and
maintenance personnel, the physical integrity of plant components and the continuity of
plant operations.
For each installation a fire risk assessment (FRA) should be undertaken as described in
Clause 2.7. The FRA should consider the following:
(a) The subdivision of the plant to prevent the spread of fire, protect personnel and to
limit the consequential damage (provision of appropriate redundancy/security).
Methods may include the provision of physical separation or barriers.
(b) The control or elimination of ignition sources.
(c) The detection and suppression of fires.
(d) Protection of adjacent property.
(e) Protection of public in the vicinity of HV installations against fire and explosion.
Guidance on fire safety practices is available in CIGRE Technical Brochure No 537,
IEEE Std 979 and ENA Doc 018.
A fire risk control strategy should be developed for each installation as they are all subtly
different in physical construction and operational requirements. The fire risk control
program should consider the conservation of property, continuity of operations, and
protection of safety to life by adequate fire protection and fire prevention measures.
NOTE: In addition to life safety and equipment protection, the insurer of the installation may
have additional requirements that need to be considered.
6.7.1.2 Fire and explosion risk zones
There are multiple heat energy sources (ignition sources) in HV installations and all shall
be considered. Heat sources include but are not limited to the following:
(a) Power transformers.
(b) Instrument transformers.
(c) Capacitors.
(d) Circuit breakers.
(e) Oil filled cables.
(f) Cable sheaths.
(g) Emergency diesel generators.

79 AS 2067:2016
Every high voltage installation has a potential fire risk zone that extends in every direction,
from its perimeter. If any part of the fire risk zone extends to include other buildings, parts
of the same building that house the high voltage installation, fire escape routes, or other fire
sensitive locations and facilities, then a potentially high fire hazard exists. Consideration of
the area surrounding the installation should also be included, in particular the effect of fire
on or from surrounding vegetation.
Openings should be provided in high voltage installation enclosures for appropriate

ventilation and pressure relief for gaseous products. Ventilation is required to assist air
circulation and help cool transformers. Transformer enclosure natural ventilation provisions
can be designed to also satisfy pressure relief requirements.
For roofed enclosures housing HV switchgear only, specific arrangements need to be made
for pressure relief in the absence of adequate ventilation openings. Alternatively, the
enclosure shall be designed for the calculated internal pressure rise.
Consideration should be given to segmenting the high voltage installation with fire-resistant
barriers, for security of supply, safety of personnel and to facilitate fire fighting.
6.7.1.3 Fire and explosion sources risk assessment

The origins of fire hazards from within high voltage installations or switching stations can
be categorized as follows:
(a) Plant and equipment containing combustible insulating liquids may rupture due to
internal failure, there may be an explosion and ignition may occur, with serious fire
risk.
(b) Plant and equipment without combustible insulating liquids may rupture due to
internal failure; there may be an explosion and modest fire risk.
(c) Other plant and equipment such as cables, batteries, and drainage pipes may catch fire
and spread the fire.
Pressure associated with explosion may be substantial. The risk assessment shall include the
evaluation of the ability of the fire doors, plant and equipment, fire suppression systems,
structures and any other parts of the installation to withstand explosion.
The assessment of these risks shall take into account the location of the high voltage
installation and the extent to which the security of supply is preserved.
6.7.1.4 Fire and explosion risk management
The fire and explosion risk management measures to be applied to each high voltage
installation should comply with the requirements of this Clause, which sets out acceptable
methods of protection.
All high voltage installations that have equipment containing combustible insulating liquids
and are within a building, or adjoin a building that has doorways or other openings (other
than fire sealed cable ducts and trenches) leading into the building, shall have sumps
installed for the containment of combustible insulating liquids.
The extent to which a high voltage installation is protected from external fire hazards shall
be determined by reference to the National Construction Code and any additional
requirements of the network operator or building owner.
Additionally, fire alarm and fire mitigation systems such as gas flooding may be required
by local regulatory requirements for high voltage installations or switching facilities in
certain types of buildings or locations. It should also be noted that whilst insulating liquid
containment may not be required for all high voltage installations from a fire and general
hazard management perspective other than as required by AS 1940 and above, it may be
required by local environmental regulatory requirements.

AS 2067:2016 80
Where multiple transformers are arranged in banks consideration should be given to their
separation by a fire barrier which may also be designed to withstand impact and blast forces
in addition to its fire resistance. Transformers insulated with either less-combustible or
combustible liquids should have a firewall between them for additional protection if the
separation distance specified in Clauses 6.7.4 and 6.7.5 is not met or other requirements are
determined for large installations in accordance with a risk management process. These
walls should be a minimum of 300 mm higher than the highest oil-containing component of
either transformer, and extend 300 mm horizontally beyond any transformer component that
could be pressurized as a result of an electrical fault (see Figure 6.1).
Examples of measures available to treat the risks in an acceptable manner are as follows:
(a) Position the high voltage installation (whether in an external open type substation
building or kiosk/cubicle) at a location where the explosion and fire risk is of
potentially negligible impact.
(b) Position the high voltage installation (whether in an external open type substation
building or kiosk/cubicle) at a location where the explosion and fire risk is managed
by one or more fire barrier or blast walls, to protect nearby people and property. The
fire resistance level shall be chosen to reflect the level of hazard (e.g. FRL
120/120/120 to be used in the case of combustible insulating liquids).
(c) In the case of fire and explosion sources in Clause 6.7.1.2(a) and 6.7.1.2(b), enclose
the high voltage installation with fire rated walls, doors and roof, provide a bunded
sump with drainage for insulating liquid containment, and allow explosion pressure
relief via fire-damper controlled ventilation openings, flaps or explosion panels.
NOTE: Consideration should be given to the management of fire fighting water when designing
sumps and bunds to prevent the spread of fire from overflowing burning insulating liquid.
Guidance on fire protection and explosions for high voltage installations is given in
ENA Doc 18.
6.7.1.5 Fire resistant barriers
Where a fire hazard exists, and the required separation distances cannot be achieved, then
appropriate fire barriers within or adjacent to buildings shall be designed with a minimum
NCC fire resistance level (FRL) of 120/120/120. Consideration should be given to
providing a greater duration fire rating for transformer fires as they may exceed 2 h
duration.
The National Construction Code and relevant local government regulations apply to the
building of fire resisting barriers.
All fire doors, including panic release bars, shall have a FRL of –/120/30 fire-rated and
shall comply with AS 1905.
Masonry fire walls are deemed to comply with FRL 120/120/120 if they are constructed in
accordance with AS 3700 and are either—
(a) Double clay brick on a concrete footing.
(b) 150 mm thick solid concrete blocks.
Reinforced concrete floors and roofs/ceilings shall be built to have not less than a 100 mm
thickness at the point of minimum cross-section in order to achieve a FRL of 120/120/120.
Other construction methods and materials may be used provided they achieve the required
rating.
NOTE: A hydrocarbon fire is a fire fuelled by hydrocarbon compounds, having a high flame
temperature achieved almost instantaneously after ignition.

81 AS 2067:2016
A rapid rise in temperature can have a significantly adverse impact on the performance of
reinforced concrete structures that are not adequately considered in the respective
Australian Standards. Premature and excessive spalling of concrete structures is likely to
result when exposed to high and rapidly rising heat flux levels characteristic of hydrocarbon
fires. This can lead to premature failure of a reinforced concrete structure.
6.7.1.6 Protection of personnel within high voltage installations

Equipment, with pressure relief devices, including transformers and arc contained
switchgear, shall be arranged so that any emission from the device is directed away from
the normal operating position. The high voltage installation building shall be able to
withstand any build-up of internal pressure or suitable pressure relief devices shall be
provided.
HV cable termination boxes and cubicles should not face onto operating areas or panels.
Where this is not practicable consideration should be given to increasing the separation
between the HV cable termination box and the operating area or alternatively, a suitable
barrier should be provided between the HV termination box and operating area. Operating
and emergency escape passageways shall be provided in accordance with the requirements
of Section 5 and the National Construction Code.

At least one portable manually operated fire extinguisher suitable for suppressing an
electrical fire should be installed in an easily accessible location external to (or immediately
internal to) all main entries to each compartment of an indoor high voltage installation
(see AS 2444).
The provision of eyewash and safety showers should be considered. Portable units may be
appropriate for some situations.
6.7.2 Buildings
6.7.2.1 General
The protection of buildings against fire shall comply as a minimum with the requirements
of the National Construction Code where appropriate and with the relevant requirements of
this Standard.
Particular consideration should be given to explosions and pressure venting in substations.
Protection shall be provided against fire initiated or propagated by any part or element of
high voltage installations.
Fundamentally, the installation design and construction should provide for the protection of
the following:
(a) Each building adjacent to or near a high voltage installation from the potential
hazards presented by the equipment within the high voltage installation.
(b) A larger building enclosing one or more high voltage installations from the potential
hazards presented by the equipment within the high voltage installation.
(c) High voltage installations from fire hazards originating in the buildings in which they
are housed or in the surroundings.
(d) Key items of electrical equipment within a high voltage installation from the hazards
presented by other items of equipment within the high voltage installation, to ensure
security of supply.
Refer to Clause 5.5.1 for other building requirements including compliance with NCC.
6.7.2.2 Fire alarm systems
The installation of fire alarm systems may be a condition for building approval. The
relevant Local Government Authority may require such systems to be fitted, or they may be
fitted at the discretion of the owner.
AS 2067:2016 82
For indoor high voltage installations, the minimum recommended requirements are for
either thermal or smoke detectors and that smoke detectors be installed in rooms housing
electrical equipment.
Fire alarm systems should ensure relevant ventilation fans are shut down and make-up air
dampers closed on detection of fire.
6.7.2.3 Fire suppression systems

The installation of fixed fire suppression systems may be a condition for building approval.
The relevant Local Government Authority may require such systems to be fitted, or they
may be fitted at the discretion of the owner.
The fire suppression system shall satisfy the following minimum performance requirements:
(a) Comply with relevant Australian Standards.
(b) Be maintained as required to comply with applicable Standards, regulations and
legislation.
(c) Have provision for the deactivation of the suppression system whilst personnel are
working on the installation.

The fire suppression system should also satisfy the following performance requirements:
(i) Use of dual activating systems (smoke and thermal detectors).
(ii) The released suppression medium should not damage the equipment it is protecting
from fire, or interfere with other equipment in the area.
For indoor high voltage installations the use of gas flooding, high velocity water spray or
foam (dry head) fire suppression systems should be considered.
6.7.3 Plant and equipment requirements
If it is deemed appropriate or necessary by the network operator or owner to protect certain
equipment within a high voltage installation from the risks presented by other equipment
within that high voltage installation, then suitable measures against fire and explosion
should be installed in accordance with the requirements of Clauses 6.7.1.3 and 6.7.1.4.
6.7.4 Transformers, reactors
6.7.4.1 General
In the following subclauses the word ‘transformer’ represents ‘transformers and reactors’.
6.7.4.2 Fire mitigation options for transformers
To minimize the risks associated with a transformer fire, the following steps should be
followed:
(a) Minimize the risk of a fire starting.
The transformer specification should consider insulation levels, operating
temperatures, cooling systems, protection systems, operation (including the effect of
prolonged overloading) and maintenance practices.
(b) Minimize the risk of transformer failure developing into an oil fire.
Consideration should be given to insulating liquids type, tank strength, low explosion
risk bushings, and pressure relief.
(c) Minimize the impact of a transformer fire on the environment, other assets, and
humans.
Consideration should be given to; fire segregation, oil containment systems, access
for fire fighting, fire suppression systems and adjacent equipment and buildings.
Guidance on transformer fire safety practices is available in the CIGRE Brochure No 537.

83 AS 2067:2016
6.7.4.3 Transformer fire damage control measures

When a transformer failure has developed into a transformer fire, the transformer is in most
cases destroyed beyond economic repair. Therefore, the control measures shall minimize
the damage resulting from the fire, generally in the following order of priorities:
(a) Minimize risk of loss of life and injury to humans by—
(i) providing adequate clearance around transformers particularly those with sound
enclosures;
(ii) providing adequate access for fire fighting equipment; and
(iii) providing adequate egress routes.
(b) Minimize the risk of the fire spreading or causing damage to adjacent transformers,
control building, structures and other items of plant and equipment. These items may
be critical for maintaining supply during a transformer fire or for restoring supply
quickly after a transformer fire if supply cannot be maintained during the fire. Fire
damage can be minimized by—
(i) providing passive protection systems in the form of; adequate separation
distances, fire barriers, constructing buildings of fire resisting materials. For
more information see the following clauses; and
(ii) providing active suppression systems such as deluge, water mist, or gas
flooding.
(c) Minimize contamination and damage to the environment by provision of oil
containment systems, bunding.
(d) Minimize overall economic loss.
6.7.4.4 Outdoor transformers
Table 6.1 provides guidance for the minimum distances G1 required for the separation of
outdoor transformers without an enclosure and also for the separation of transformers and
buildings. The dimension G1 is measured from the inside edge of the fire source transformer
bund to the nearest protrusion of the adjacent transformer or building. When the separation
distances cannot be met, a barrier with a FRL of 120/120/120 should be provided between
the transformers as shown in Figure 6.1, or between the transformer and buildings as shown
in Figure 6.2.
For a building, the fire barriers can take the form of a fire resisting wall. The fire resisting
section needs to extend in a vertical direction up to the dimension G4 as shown in Table 6.1,
or to the building height plus a 750 mm parapet, whichever is less. The building fire
resisting wall should be a distance of at least G3 from the inside edge of the bund of the fire
source transformer. G3 may be reduced if the fire resisting wall is constructed to a higher
FRL or is protected by water sprays. Refer to FM Global document 5-4 for further
guidance.
An alternative performance-based analysis can be carried out by calculation of radiated heat
flux which is dependent on the oil pool area and depth of bund for fire duration to
determine separation distances to accurately model the fire conditions and the impacts to
the adjacent equipment and buildings. Refer to CIGRE Technical Brochure 537 and
IEEE Std 979. Further guidance can be obtained from the International Fire Engineering
Guidelines published by Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB).

AS 2067:2016 84
TABLE 6.1
CLEARANCES FOR OUTDOOR TRANSFORMERS
Clearances to
other
Clearances to buildings
transformers or
equipment
Liquid Horizontal
Horizontal
volume separation G 1 Vertical extent
Transformer type Horizontal clearance G 3 to
to other G 4 for 2 hour
clearance G 2 to 2 hour fire
transformers or fire resistant
combustible resistant
non- surfaces of
surfaces surfaces of
combustible buildings
buildings
surfaces
L m m m m
100
1 6 1 4.5
1000
>1000
3 7.5 1.5 7.5
2000
>2000
Oil-insulated 5 10 4.5 15
20 000
transformers (O)
>20 000
10 20 7.5 30
45 000
>45 000
15 30 7.5 30
60 000
>60 000 23 30 7.5 30
100
Less combustible 1 6 1 4.5
1000
liquid-insulated
transformers (K) >1000
1.5 7.5 1.5 7.5
without enhanced 38 000
protection
>38 000 4.5 15 4.5 15
Vertical extent
G 4 for 2 hour
Less combustible Clearance G 1 to other transformers or building surfaces fire resistant
liquid-insulated surfaces of
transformers (K) with buildings
enhanced protection
Horizontal Vertical
(refer to Note 1)
m m
0.9 1.5
Dry-type
transformers (A) Fire 1.5 3.0
behaviour class F 0
 Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

85 AS 2067:2016
NOTES TO TABLE 6.1:

1 Dry-type transformers (A): Air-insulated or cast resin transformer in accordance with AS 60076.11.
Oil-insulated transformers (O)—From AS/NZS 60076.2 and IEEE C57.12.00—mineral oil or synthetic
insulating liquid with fire point less than or equal to 300°C (referred to as combustible liquids according
to AS 1940).
Less combustible liquid-insulated transformers (K) without enhanced protection: From AS/NZS 60076.2
and IEEE C57.12.00—insulating liquid with fire point greater than 300°C (such as FR3, silicone, Midel,
Biotemp).
Less combustible liquid-insulated transformers (K) with enhanced protection: Either an FM approved
transformer or an equivalent transformer. The enhanced protection consists of tank strength, pressure
relief, protection against high energy faults and protection against low energy faults. For an example of
enhanced protection, see Factory Mutual Global Standard 3990, or equivalent.
2 Fire behaviour Class F 0 is defined in CENELEC HD 464 S1 test standard for dry-type, cast resin
transformers. In addition to fire behaviour, HD 464 S1 also tests the transformer for resistance to
climatic conditions and environmental conditions. The fire behaviour class is defined as:
Class F 0 = No special risk of fire to be considered.
3 The oil volume is that of the main tank where the conservator is fitted with a cut-off valve or the total
volume if a cut-off valve is not fitted.
If automatically activated fire suppression equipment is installed, the clearances G 1 and G 2 can be
reduced. Any such reduction shall be supported by a fire risk analysis.
4 Refer also to Clause 5.8 and Appendix H of AS 1940—2004.
5 A non-combustible material is defined in AS 1530.1 and AS 1530.4. Also refer to NCC.
6 A fire resistant surface is one that complies with the NCC definition of fire resistance level (FRL) which
assigns a fire rating (FR) grading period in minutes to three distinct criteria, namely; structural
Adequacy/Integrity/Insulation.
7 The distances G 1 , G 2 and G 3 listed in Table 6.1 are referred to the closest (inner) edge of the oil
containment bund. G 1 , G 2 or G 3 dimension may be taken from the extremities of the transformer if the
bund contains rock for fire suppression as per Clause 6.8.1.
8 For oil insulated transformers 100 – <1000 l refer also to Clause 6.7.6.
6.7.4.5 Indoor transformers

Table 6.2 provides guidance relating to the minimum fire safeguards for indoor
transformers.

AS 2067:2016 86
TABLE 6.2
MINIMUM FIRE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE INSTALLATION
OF INDOOR TRANSFORMERS
Transformer type Liquid volume
Safeguards
(see Note 2) L
1000 FRL 120/120/120

Oil-insulated transformers (O) FRL 120/120/120 or FRL 60/60/60 and
>1000
automatic fire suppression protection
Less combustible liquid-insulated
FRL 120/120/120 or FRL 60/60/60 and
transformers (K) without enhanced
automatic fire suppression protection
protection
10 MVA and FRL 120/120/120 or separation distances
U m 36 kV 0.9 m horizontally and 1.5 m vertically
Less combustible liquid-insulated
transformers (K) with enhanced Fire behaviour class
protection
FRL 60/60/60 or separation distances
F0
Dry-type transformer (A) 0.9 m horizontally and 1.5 m vertically

F1 Non combustible walls
NOTES:
1 FRL relates to fire resistance level (FRL) as defined in the National Construction Code and defines
structural adequacy, integrity and insulation in that order.
Consideration should be given to explosion forces and the structural capability of the building beyond
the specified FRL.
Consideration should be given to using non-oil-based equipment indoors to reduce smoke and fire
hazards.
2 Dry-type transformers (A)—Air insulated or cast resin transformer.
Oil-insulated transformers (O)—From AS/NZS 60076.2 and IEEE C57.12.00—mineral oil or synthetic
insulating liquid with fire point less than or equal to 300°C (referred to as combustible liquids
according to AS 1940).
Less combustible liquid-insulated transformers (K) without enhanced protection: From
AS/NZS 60076.2 and IEEE C57.12.00—insulating liquid with fire point greater than 300°C (such as
FR3, silicone, Midel, Biotemp).
Less combustible liquid-insulated transformers (K) with enhanced protection: Either an FM approved
transformer or an equivalent transformer. The enhanced protection consists of tank strength, pressure
relief, protection against high energy faults and protection against low energy faults.
For an example of enhanced protection, see Factory Mutual Global Standard 3990, or equivalent.
3 Fire behaviour Classes F 0 and F 1 are defined from the European CENELEC HD 464 S1 test standard
for dry-type, cast resin transformers. In addition to fire behaviour, HD 464 S1 also tests the
transformer for resistance to climatic conditions and environmental conditions. The fire behaviour
classes are defined as:
Class F 0 = No special risk of fire to be considered
Class F 1 = There are risks of fire effects with accepted limited flammability. Self-suppression of the
fire shall occur within 60 min. Materials shall be free from halogens while emission of toxic
substances and thick smoke must be reduced to a minimum.
 Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

87 AS 2067:2016
H1 H
H2
LEGEN D:
H ≥ H 1 + 3 0 0 m m (w it h H 1 > H 2 )
L ≥ B 2 (w it h B 1 < B 2 )
L ≥ T2 + 6 0 0 m m
≥ 300 mm
B1 L T2 B2
≥ 300 mm
M inimu m fire re s i st an c e FR L 120/120/120
FIGURE 6.1 SEPARATING WALLS BETWEEN TRANSFORMERS

AS 2067:2016 88
PL AN
G2
G1
Zo n e Zo n e Zo n e
A B C
G1
G2
ZO NE BUILDING CO NSTRUCTIO N
A Fire r ate d
B N o n c o m b u s t i b l e m ater i a l s
C N o r e q u ire m e nt s
FIGURE 6.2(A) FIRE EXPOSURE PROTECTION FOR BUILDINGS

89 AS 2067:2016
E x p o se d buil d ing wall
E x te nt of fire
r e s i s t a nt b ar r i er
O utd o or
In d o or
G4
ELE VATIO N
Bund
wall
>G 3
FIGURE 6.2(B) FIRE EXPOSURE PROTECTION FOR BUILDINGS
6.7.5 Cables
The danger created by the spread of fire and its consequences should be reduced, as far as
possible, by selecting suitable cables and by the method of installation. Cables should be
selected with due regard for their current carrying capacity as well as the method of
installation so as to avoid the generation of excessive temperatures. Consideration should
also be given to low smoke sheaths and/or fire retardant cable coatings. Cable routes should
be selected to avoid fire risk zones, such as adjacent to oil filled transformers. Diverse cable
routes can also be considered to increase security.
The cables may be assessed by reference to the following categories:
(a) Cables without particular fire performance characteristics.
(b) Cables with resistance to flame propagation.
(c) Cables with low emission of acidic and corrosive gases (IEC 60754-1).
(d) Cables with fire-resisting characteristics (IEC 60331-21 or IEC 60331-31).
(e) Cables installed on cable tray and cable tray separation.
Cables in trenches and buildings shall be laid in such a way that the fire safety of the
building is not adversely affected. For example, to avoid fire propagation, holes through
which the cables pass from one room to another shall be sealed with suitably fire resistant
material.
A physical separation or different routing of power circuits from the control circuits for
high voltage equipment is recommended if it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the
latter as long as possible following damage to the power circuits.
Consideration should also be given to installing fire alarms and either active or passive fire
suppression systems in cable tunnels and in cable racks in the basement of high voltage
installation control buildings (see also Clause 6.7.4.3).

AS 2067:2016 90
6.7.6 Distribution substations

6.7.6.1 Special requirements for distribution kiosk/padmount cubicles and walled high
voltage installations
This Clause applies to distribution kiosk/padmount cubicles, and walled high voltage
installations (those with no roof and with a single leaf masonry wall).
Distribution substations of the types stated above should be separated from buildings in
accordance with Table 6.1 unless a fire risk assessment is undertaken to justify a reduction
in distance. A fire barrier or other fire mitigation measures may be used.
For distribution substations with no more than 1000 L of oil in low density residential
situations, the horizontal separation to National Construction Code Class 1 or Class 10
buildings may be 3 metres. A fire risk assessment may be undertaken to justify a reduction
in this distance.
For the assessment of fire risk, consideration should be given to the following:
(a) Property and quantity of insulating oil.
(b) Size of the potential oil spill.

(c) Use of the adjacent building and structure.
(d) Fire resistance of adjacent buildings and structures.
(e) Fire suppression measures provided.
(f) Protection clearing time.
(g) Likelihood and consequence of fire events.
The horizontal separation around the distribution substation should not be reduced to less
than 1 m unless a fire barrier is provided and the adequacy of the fire barrier is validated.
Consideration shall be given to allow adequate access around the distribution substation.
6.7.6.2 Special requirements for distribution indoor high voltage installations
The fire protection requirements of the National Construction Code apply (Section C) and
in particular the requirements of its Clause C2.13, Electricity supply system.
Appropriate pressure relief shall be provided to ensure the fire rating of the enclosure is
maintained in the event of an explosion.
Consideration should be given to using non-oil-based equipment indoors to reduce smoke,
fire and explosion hazards.
Indoor high voltage installations shall be separated from all parts of a building by an
enclosure constructed to an FRL not less than 120/120/120.
Indoor high voltage installations shall be fitted with self-closing fire doors having an FRL
not less than –/120/30 when—
(a) an enclosure door opens to any part of a building; or
(b) an enclosure door with a fire risk zone as per Clause 6.7.1.1 impinges on parts of a
building.
Provided there are no fire exits or areas set aside for fire escape purposes within 6 m,
ventilation or pressure relief device openings in an indoor high voltage installation may
vent to—
(i) external free air; or
(ii) normally unoccupied freely ventilated spaces such as car parks, including basement
car parks.

91 AS 2067:2016
Ventilation or pressure relief device openings in an indoor high voltage installation shall be
fitted with self-closing dampers having an FRL –/120/ when—
(A) fire exits or areas set aside for fire escape purposes are within 6 m of such openings
(although there shall be no opening to a fire isolated stairwell); or
(B) there is not more than 2 m clear space in front of the opening.
The requirement of the fitting of self-closing dampers will not apply when ventilation ducts
of a suitable length are installed external to the enclosure and such ducts have an FRL of
not less than 120/120/120.
Refer to AS 1682 and AS/NZS 1668 for details of fire-rated dampers.
All HV cables feeding an indoor high voltage installation shall be enclosed or otherwise
protected by an enclosure constructed to an FRL of not less than 120/120/120, where they
pass through areas of a building which are not part of the HV installation.
NOTE: For Clauses 6.7.6.1 and 6.7.6.2, refer to Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for clearance guidance.
6.8 PROTECTION AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INSULATING LIQUIDS AND SF6

6.8.1 Oil containment
Every indoor and outdoor high voltage installation containing equipment with more than
1000 L of an insulating liquid such as transformer insulating oil shall have provision for
containing the total volume of any possible leakage. Leakage can occur due to many
reasons including equipment tank rupture, and can cause a fire hazard as well as other
environmental hazards. If the insulating liquid is combustible, then any drainage facility
should be provided with a flame trap and containment tank.
The minimum requirements relating to on-site insulating liquid containment are contained
in Clause 5.8 and Appendix H of AS 1940—2004.
Suitable arrangements are depicted in Figures 6.3 to 6.8. These figures are included as
examples of what may be provided and do not prevent the use of other
containment/separation systems that achieve the overall objective of AS 1940—2004,
Appendix H.
Transformers shall be located in a bunded area, which may be rock filled. The bund should
be sized to contain the volume of the insulating oil in the transformer together with the
maximum expected discharge of any fire deluge or fire fighting water for 20 min. Sumps
and bunds provided for insulating liquid containment should include provision for the
management of fire fighting water to prevent the spread of fire from the overflow of
burning insulating liquids. Typically, for outdoor sites, equipment to separate oil
contamination from storm water will be required.
For rock filled bunds the volume of the rock needs to be considered. Rock filled bunds need
to have provision to drain any rainwater, this could be via a manual valve. Unless the bund
contains rock large enough in size to allow liquid to drain through the bed and small enough
to prevent propagation of fire into the drainage system, a flame trap should be provided.
NFPA 850 contains guidance on rock selection including depth required for flame arresting.
Rock filled bunds may require regular maintenance as they are subject to accumulation of
wind borne dust and dirt.
Common sumps or containment tanks, for several transformers should be arranged so that a
fire in one transformer cannot spread to another. Gravel layers or pipes filled with fluid can,
for example, be used to prevent the spread of fire. Arrangements that minimize the fire
hazard of the escaped fluid are preferred.

AS 2067:2016 92
The arrangement of bunding and oil containment shall take into account the effect of
radiant heat from burning oil on adjacent equipment (see Clause 6.7.4.3).
NOTE: Environmental protection legislation may place other requirements on the operator/owner
regarding the containment of spilled insulating liquid and contaminated storm water on the site.
6.8.2 SF6 leakage
Recommendations for the use and handling of SF6 gas are given in AS 2791.
In rooms with SF6 installations that are above ground natural cross-venting is sufficient. In
this case, approximately half of the cross-section of the ventilation openings required shall
be close to the ground. This measure depends on the size of the room and the gas quantity.
In cases of malfunction, mechanical ventilation may be required.
In rooms with SF6 installations that are below ground on all sides mechanical ventilation
shall be provided if gas quantities that pose an intolerable risk to the health and safety of
personnel (see Note 2) are capable of collecting due to the gas quantity and the size of the
room.
Chambers, ducts, pits, shafts, etc., situated below SF 6 installation rooms and connected to
them, shall be able to be ventilated.
Mechanical ventilation may be omitted provided the gas volume of the largest gas
compartment at atmospheric pressure does not exceed 10% of the volume of the room. In
this case the total volume (calculated at the normal temperature and pressure) of SF 6 gas in
the cylinders connected to the SF6 installations shall be taken into account for the purposes
of calculation.
No part of equipment in contact with air may exceed a temperature of 200°C.
NOTES:
1 Permanent ventilation may be omitted for chambers in installations that are not accessible.
For small installations (total quantity of SF 6 ≤1000 litres under atmospheric pressure),
ventilation on one side of the room is sufficient.
2 For maximum SF 6 concentration, national regulations should be considered.
6.8.3 Failure with loss of SF6 and its decomposition products
Recommendations for the use and handling of SF6 gas are given in AS 2791.
NOTE: For guidance, refer to CIGRE 23-04.

93 AS 2067:2016
b
LEGEND:
a = Containment: the entire quantity of fluid of the transformer plus rain water
b = Gravel layer for fire protection
NOTE: In addition, the water from the fire suppression installation (if any) should be considered.
FIGURE 6.3 SUMP WITH INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT TANK
Plint h
To c atc h m e nt t ank
Rock filled for fire
suppression
NOTES:
1 The containment volume of the bund should be a minimum of 20% of the fluid from the transformer plus
an allowance for fire suppression liquid.
2 An allowance for the volume of rock should be made. The void space, a space available for containment in
rock filled volume, typically is 30% to 40%.
3 There may be a high rate of discharge of oil from the transformer. The containment volume of the bund and
rate of discharge to the catchment tank should be considered.
FIGURE 6.4 SUMP WITH SEPARATE CONTAINMENT TANK

AS 2067:2016 94
a
b
LEGEN D:
a C o nt ain m e nt o utd o or: t h e e nt ire q u ant it y of flui d of t h e l ar g e st tr an sfor m er p lu s r ain water
C o nt ain m e nt in d o or: t h e e nt ire q u ant it y of flui d of t h e l ar g e st tr an sfor m er
b Gr ave l l ayer for fire prote c t i o n se e 6.8.1
FIGURE 6.5 SUMP WITH INTEGRATED COMMON CONTAINMENT TANK
T hr e s h o l d
NOTE: The dotted area denotes the volume to be contained.
FIGURE 6.6 SMALL TRANSFORMERS WITHOUT GRAVEL LAYER

AND CONTAINMENT TANK

95 AS 2067:2016
Bund
BUNDED ARE A wall
Grat ing
O ut l et
Nominal liquid
seal leve l
Un
U n d er fl ow
(a)
BUNDED ARE A Bund

wall
Grat ing
O ut l et
Nominal liquid
seal leve l
S te e l p i p e
Un
U n d er fl ow
(b)
FIGURE 6.7 FLAME TRAP

AS 2067:2016 96
M an h o l e s for c l eanin g an d in s p e c t i o n
Inl et
fro m O ut l et
bunds to drain
S lu d g e tr a p
NOTES:
1 The length L is calculated to provide flow conditions sufficiently quiescent to allow globules of free oil to
rise to the surface and coalesce into a separate oil phase. Environmental Guidelines for Water Discharges
from Petroleum Industry Sites in New Zealand, 1998 provides design guidance.
2 The tank is to be normally filled with water.
FIGURE 6.8 OIL SEPARATION AND CONTAINMENT TANK
6.8.4 Fire protected high voltage installation examples for distribution substations
Typical high voltage installation arrangements to satisfy the minimum fire protection
requirements of this Standard, the National Construction Code and AS 1940 are provided in
Appendix C. The following is to be noted:
(a) It is the responsibility of the owner/operator to ensure that a high voltage installation
enclosure is correctly sited and constructed in accordance with all relevant regulatory
requirements.
(b) The cases shown serve as a guide for typical installations. Doors and vent locations
are not shown in detail as drawings are intended only to show fire risk details.
(c) In all cases, the choice exists as to whether to fire rate the high voltage installation
enclosure or the various other structures in the fire risk zone.
(d) For simplicity, the drawings show only one of the two doors of high voltage
installations, even when two doors are normally required.
6.9 IDENTIFICATION AND MARKING

6.9.1 General
Clear identification and unambiguous marking are required to avoid incorrect operation,
human error, accidents, etc. while operation and maintenance are carried out (see also
Clause 5.1.8). Where a switchboard consists of two or more units of switchgear with access
to the rear, such labelling shall also be located on a fixed portion at the rear of each unit.
Signs, boards and notices shall be made of durable and non-corrosive material and printed
with indelible characters.
The operational state of switchgear and controlgear shall be clearly shown by indicators
except when the main contacts can clearly be viewed by the operator.
Cable terminations and components shall be identified. Relevant details making
identification possible in accordance with a wiring list or diagram shall be provided.

97 AS 2067:2016
6.9.2 Information plates and warning plates

In closed electrical operating areas and in industrial buildings, all electrical equipment
rooms shall be provided, on the outside of the room and on each access door, with
necessary information identifying the room and pointing out any hazards.
Wording on signs at these locations shall consist of letters not less than 12 mm high and
shall contain the words ‘DANGER—HIGH VOLTAGE’.

The colours and contrasting colours shall comply with national regulations.
NOTE: Requirements for safety signs are contained in AS 1319.
6.9.3 Electrical hazard warning
All access doors to closed electrical operating areas and all sides of outer perimeter fences
shall be provided with a warning sign.
Wording on signs at these locations shall consist of bold letters not less than 40 mm high
and shall contain the words ‘DANGER—HIGH VOLTAGE’.
The signs shall comply with national regulations.
NOTE: Requirements for safety signs are contained in AS 1319.

6.9.4 Installations with incorporated capacitors
The capacitors shall be provided with a warning label indicating the discharge time.
6.9.5 Emergency signs for emergency exits
Emergency exits shall be indicated by the appropriate safety warning sign. The signs shall
comply with national regulations including the NCC. Requirements for emergency
luminaries and exit safety signs are contained in AS 2293.3.
6.9.6 Cable identification marks
The position where cables enter buildings should be identified. Identification marks shall
not be placed on removable covers or doors that could be interchanged.
6.10 PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS

For guidance on prevention of unauthorized access to electricity infrastructure refer to
ENA Doc 015 National Guidelines for Prevention of Unauthorised Access to Electricity
Infrastructure.

AS 2067:2016 98
S E C T I O N 7 P R O T E C T I O N , C O N T R OL A N D
AUXIL I ARY SYSTE MS
7.1 PROTECTION SYSTEMS

The consequences of inadequate protection at any level of the power system or within
consumers’ installations are severe, which can result in major damage, injury or loss of life,
and disruption to electricity supply.
Power system protection is a field of engineering expertise requiring specialized education,
training and experience. This is applicable both with respect to design and to field
activities. Provision of protection functions within a substation and high voltage installation
shall be carried out by competent persons.
NOTE: Appendix F provides a summary of protection issues and their impact on substation
design.
Consideration should be given for protection against the effects of the events as follows,
including final certification following commissioning:
(a) Overcurrent, short-circuit and earth fault.
(b) Overload and thermal effect.
(c) Overvoltage.
(d) Undervoltage.
(e) Underfrequency.
(f) Reverse power and pole slip for rotating machines.
Protection coordination studies shall be conducted to determine the types of protection to be
used and to determine the settings of the protective devices. Back-up protection shall be
considered.
Low frequency conditions generally indicate power system problems. For installations
supplied by a power system, low frequency disconnection devices may be required in
accordance with local regulations or power system requirements. For installations having
their own independent power supply, consideration should be given to implementing load
shedding to prevent total loss of power during disturbances.
Investigations shall be performed to determine possible overvoltages during operating
conditions. Protection shall be installed where overvoltages may exceed tolerance limits of
the installed equipment.
The effects of undervoltages on the operation of electrical equipment shall be considered.
Devices to detect undervoltages shall be provided where necessary in order to initiate
automatic transfers to an alternative supply, or to disconnect the equipment to prevent
incorrect operation or damage from occurring.
Integrated control and protection apparatus/equipment may be used provided that it can be
demonstrated that the protection functions are functionally independent of the control
functions, i.e. failure or mal-operation of the control features will not impair operation of
the protection system.

99 AS 2067:2016
7.2 MONITORING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

Monitoring and control systems shall comply with the following:
(a) Monitoring, protection, regulating and control devices shall be provided, as
necessary, for the correct and safe functioning of the equipment.
(b) Electrical equipment shall be effectively and safely disconnected by protective

devices in the event of a fault occurring.
(c) Automatic devices, designed to offer selectivity and quick operation, shall provide
protection against the effects of unacceptable overload and internal and external
faults appropriate to the size and significance of the installation.
(d) Equipment shall comply with the severity class (see IEC 60255) corresponding to the
part of the installation in which it is located.
(e) Facilities shall be provided for isolating the control circuit of each primary switching
equipment or each switchgear bay in order to allow maintenance of high voltage
equipment to be performed safely.
(f) Provision shall be made to allow for repair, maintenance, and/or testing to be carried
out on protection and control devices to minimize risk to personnel or the equipment.
(g) Control circuits and signalling circuits shall be functionally separated.
NOTE: Tripping signals should be displayed on the protection panel if it exists.
(h) Alarm and fault-indicating equipment shall clearly indicate danger and fault
conditions; several signals can be combined as a common signal to be transmitted to a
remote control point.
(i) The control equipment and system, including cables and cords, shall be designed and
installed to minimize the possibility of damage or maloperation to the connected
equipment due to electromagnetic interference. Basic rules are given in Clause 7.6.
(j) The control equipment and system, including cables and cords, shall be designed and
installed in such a way that they minimize the danger from operating failure,
inadvertent operation or incorrect information. In meeting this requirement,
influences such as voltage dips, supply failure, insulation faults and electromagnetic
interference effects shall be taken into account.
(k) The actuating elements for the control of switchgear shall be designed and installed in
such a way that accidental actuation is avoided.
(l) Where a remote control is available, local/remote control selection shall be provided
at the local operating position (i.e. at or in the close vicinity of the switches).
(m) The control circuit of switching devices operated remotely or automatically shall be
provided with suitable means near the device to prevent accidental operation during
planned outages.
(n) When required, the monitoring and control system shall implement load shedding,
emergency shutdown, automatic transfer and network reconfiguration, motor
reacceleration and restarting, etc. in order to maintain safe operating conditions
during electrical system disturbances.
For safety reasons it is recommended that hard-wired interfaces to industrial process control
equipment be designed such that maintenance of the process control circuits can be carried
out without requiring access into high voltage equipment, for example by using interposing
relays installed in a separate cubicle.
NOTE: The above requirements should also be considered associated with high fault level low
voltage systems.

AS 2067:2016 100
7.3 A.C. AND D.C. SUPPLY CIRCUITS

7.3.1 General
Auxiliary power supply systems shall be designed for the permitted voltage fluctuation
range and suitable power capacity which is required by the equipment for protection,
control and auxiliary systems.
Low voltage a.c. and d.c. systems shall be designed in accordance with the requirements of
AS/NZS 3000.
Auxiliary switchboards shall be provided to separate and protect the various auxiliary
circuits.
A voltage loss or failure in the supply circuit should initiate a signal to a control location.
Power supply systems may be categorized into essential and non-essential groups. Essential
supplies should be continuously available without any interruption, whereas non-essential
ones may be subject to interruptions.
7.3.2 a.c. supply
For supplies belonging to the essential group, such as the supplies to a computerized control
system, liable to process incorrect signals after a transient loss of power, the provision of a
suitable UPS (uninterruptible power supply) or automatic changeover to a fully rated back-
up supply is recommended.
7.3.3 d.c. supply
7.3.3.1 Capacity
A d.c. supply unit shall be capable of supplying power to all permanent loads and to the
loads associated with essential operations and battery bank recharging following a battery
bank discharge. This may be achieved by choosing an appropriate number of independent
units of sufficient capacity.
7.3.3.2 Monitoring voltage and current
It is recommended that d.c. supply units such as batteries and chargers be provided with
instruments for monitoring voltage and current. Internal impedance measurement of storage
batteries may be employed to ensure that the battery will also perform well under load.
Essential supplies shall be monitored.
7.3.3.3 Sizing and selection of batteries
Batteries shall be sized to provide power for operation of an electrical installation during
total loss of a.c. station services. The most probable duration of a.c. station services loss has
to be evaluated to allow proper sizing and selection of batteries.
Sizing of batteries shall be based on worst case scenarios that might cause a total loss of
a.c. station services (i.e. total blackout, fault on a major bus in the installation, etc.). As a
minimum, the batteries shall have enough capacity to trip breakers and switches at the
beginning of the discharge period, to supply power to the continuous d.c. load and to close
the elements of the installation that will restore a.c. services.
7.3.3.4 Battery rooms and cubicles
Battery banks with exposed live parts shall be kept in a room or cubicle accessible only to
authorized personnel.
Battery rooms or cubicles shall be dry and adequately ventilated to limit hydrogen
accumulation. Allowable hydrogen levels and recommended number of air changes shall
conform to national regulations.

101 AS 2067:2016
An easy means of escape from battery rooms shall be provided. The provision of eyewash
and safety showers should be considered. Portable units may be appropriate for some
situations.
Battery banks should be isolated from control rooms to prevent the spread of fumes and to
prevent accidental contact.
NOTE: For guidance on battery accommodation see AS 2676.1 and AS 3011.1 or AS 2676.2 and
AS 3011.2.
Safety signage designed and constructed to comply with AS 1319 shall be installed in
accordance with the requirements of AS 2676.1 or AS 2676.2 as applicable.
7.3.3.5 Protection against corrosion
Notwithstanding the ventilation provided, rooms containing open type lead batteries shall
be considered as locations with corrosive environments. Walls, ceilings and floors shall
meet the requirements for protection against corrosion and gaseous products. Means shall
be provided to prevent corrosive substances from entering any drainage systems.
7.4 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS

7.4.1 Design
Compressed air systems shall be designed to comply with AS 1210.
Instruments and alarms shall be provided to ensure safe and reliable operation of the
compressed air system.
7.4.2 Relative humidity
The compressed air system shall be capable of providing air of relative humidity
appropriate to the type and operating pressure of the equipment to be supplied under all
environmental conditions. Where necessary, drying equipment shall be provided.
Compressed air systems shall be designed so that water can be drained from all receivers or
other points where it may collect during operation.
7.4.3 Operating capacity
The compressed air system shall be designed to operate at its maximum and minimum
capacity over the full range of environmental conditions expected for the associated
switchgear and/or system. Adequate compressor cooling shall be provided as well as
suitable protection to allow intermittent operation under freezing conditions.
7.4.4 Protection against corrosion
Pressure vessels and pipelines shall be protected against corrosion internally and externally.
7.4.5 Marking
The function of various components of the compressed air system shall be clearly indicated
on the equipment. Different pressures shall be identified on pipework, vessels and diagrams
by a method acceptable to the purchaser.
7.4.6 Isolation and drainage
The compressed air system shall be provided with sufficient points of isolation and drainage
to allow sectionalization for maintenance in accordance with the operating and safety rules
of the user.
7.4.7 Arcing
Pipes that are permanently under pressure shall be protected against damage due to direct
arcing.

AS 2067:2016 102
7.4.8 Accessible controls

All controls of the compressed air system that have to be used during operation shall be
arranged so that they are safely accessible.
7.5 SF6 GAS HANDLING PLANT

Where gas has to be handled and retrieved, a mobile plant shall be used to transfer gas to
and from gas-filled equipment in order to permit maintenance on the primary equipment.
This plant shall be capable of evacuating and storing the largest quantity of gas specified
and of evacuating the largest volume specified to the vacuum level and refilling to the
highest filling pressure specified by the manufacturer. The design and capacity of the plant
shall be determined in agreement between supplier and user.
The plant shall also be capable of extracting air at atmospheric pressure from the largest
volume specified to the vacuum level specified by the manufacturer. The plant shall be
capable of returning gas to the equipment and recycling used gas through filters.
NOTE: Guidance on handling of plants containing SF 6 is given in IEC 60480 and AS 2791.
7.6 BASIC RULES FOR ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY OF CONTROL

SYSTEMS
7.6.1 General
This Clause deals with the protection of control circuits against electromagnetic
interference.
NOTE: Reference should be made to EMC standards such as the IEC 60255 series.
IEC/TR 61000-5-2 and CIGRE Technical brochure 535.
7.6.2 Electrical noise sources in high voltage installations
Interferences may be transmitted into high voltage installations by means of conduction,
capacitive coupling, induction or radiation as follows:
(a) High frequency interferences are produced by—
(i) switching in primary circuits;
(ii) lightning strikes on overhead lines or on grounded components of high voltage
installations;
(iii) operation of surge arresters with gaps;
(iv) switching in secondary circuits;
(v) high frequency radio transmitters; and
(vi) electrostatic discharges.
(b) Low frequency interferences are produced by—
(i) short circuits;
(ii) earth faults; and
(iii) electromagnetic fields generated by equipment (busbars, power cables, reactors,
transformers, etc.).
The following two general principles apply for protection against interference:
(i) Reduction of the penetration of electromagnetic fields into the equipment.
(ii) Establishment of equal potential between every piece of equipment and the earthing
system.

103 AS 2067:2016
7.6.3 Measures to be taken to reduce the effects of high frequency interference

The following recommendations are the most important ones for reducing the effects of
high frequency electromagnetic interference:
(a) Suitable construction of instrument transformers (voltage transformers, current
transformers), effective shielding between primary and secondary winding, testing of
high frequency transmission behaviour.

(b) Protection against lightning strikes.
(c) Improvement of the earthing system and earthing connections.
(d) Shielding of secondary circuit cables should—
(i) be continuous;
(ii) have a low resistance (a few ohms per kilometre);
(iii) have a low coupling impedance within the interference frequency range;
(iv) have earthing that is as short as possible;
(v) be earthed at both ends and intermediate points where possible for LV, CT
secondary, VT secondary and multicore cables;
(vi) be earthed as recommended by equipment manufacturers for instrumentation,
communications, data and sensitive protection circuits; and
(vii) be earthed at their entry to the control cabinets so that the currents circulating
in the shields do not affect the unshielded circuits.
NOTE: Connections should preferably be circular by means of using suitable cable
glands or a welding procedure.
(e) The incoming and outgoing wires associated with the same function should be
grouped within the same cable in order to reduce the differential mode overvoltages.
As far as possible, control cables should be segregated from other cables.
7.6.4 Measures to be taken to reduce the effects of low frequency interference
The following recommendations are the most important ones for reducing the effects of low
frequency electromagnetic interference.
(a) When laying cables—
(i) separate control cables from power cables by using spacing or different routes;
(ii) lay power cables in trefoil formation in preference to a flat formation;
(iii) as far as possible, cable routes should not be parallel to busbars or power
cables;
(iv) control cables should be laid away from inductances and single-phase
transformers.
(b) The circuit arrangement should—
(i) avoid loops;
(ii) for d.c. auxiliary supply circuits, prefer a radial configuration to a ring
configuration;
(iii) avoid the protection of two different d.c. circuits by the same miniature circuit
breaker;
(iv) avoid parallel connection of two coils located in separate cubicles;
(v) locate all wires of the same circuit in the same cable. When different cables
have to be used, they should be laid in the same route.
(c) Twisted pairs cables are recommended for low level signals.

AS 2067:2016 104
7.6.5 Measures related to the selection of equipment

7.6.5.1 Zones
The installation shall be divided into different zones, each of them corresponding to a
specific class of environment (see Clause 2.4).
In each zone, equipment shall be selected in accordance with the associated class of
environment.
7.6.5.2 Internal circuitry
Where necessary, the following measures shall be taken in the internal circuitry:
(a) Metallic isolation of the I/O signal circuits.
(b) Installation of filters on auxiliary power supply circuits.
(c) Installation of voltage-limiting devices such as—
(i) capacitor or RC circuits;
(ii) low voltage surge arresters;

(iii) zener diodes or varistors; and
(iv) transzorb diodes.
These devices shall be installed inside the protection and control equipment.
7.6.5.3 Gas-insulated switchgear
Additional measures concerning gas-insulated switchgear are as follows:
(a) Connection of concrete reinforcement grids to the earthing system at various points,
especially in the floor (see CIGRE TB 44).
(b) Adequate earthing at the GIS/air-bushings and at the GIS-tubes by multiple
connections between the enclosure and the building wall (to the reinforcement grid or
metallic cladding) and multiple connections between the wall and earthing system.
(c) Adequate design and testing of secondary equipment concerning their immunity
against electrical transients.
Refer also to Clause 5.4.2.
7.6.6 Other possible measures to reduce the effects of interference
The following recommendations supplement, when applicable, the previous
recommendations:
(a) Control cables should be installed in metallic cable ducts. Continuity and earthing of
ducts should be ensured along their whole length.
(b) Where possible, cables should be installed along metallic surfaces.
(c) Optical fibre cables should be used with appropriate equipment.

105 AS 2067:2016
S E C T I O N 8 E A R T H I N G S Y S T E M S
8.1 GENERAL
This Section provides the criteria for design, installation, testing and maintenance of an
earthing system such that it operates under all conditions and ensures acceptable safety
compliance in any place to which persons have access. It also provides the criteria to ensure
that the integrity of equipment connected to and in proximity to the earthing system, is
maintained.
The use and reliance of another party's equipment for design purpose shall be confirmed
with the other party to ensure earthing system integrity and that future requirements that
may compromise the design are included or monitored to ensure hazards that may be
introduced are mitigated to lower the final risk.
NOTE: The numbers given within square brackets in this Section correspond to the referenced
documents specific to Appendix G of this Standard.
8.2 FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

8.2.1 General
This Clause specifies fundamental requirements for earthing systems which are collected
into three categories as follows:
(a) Safety of people.
(b) Protection of equipment.
(c) Support operational security.
8.2.2 Safety of people
Under all reasonably foreseeable conditions the earthing system shall not impose on any
person or group of people an unreasonable risk. An unreasonable risk is one that is
considered intolerable or a risk that whilst ‘tolerable’ is not negligible and can be further
lowered at a cost that is not grossly disproportionate to the change in risk achieved.
NOTE: Appendix A provides guidance on how earthing related hazards can be assessed against
this requirement.
8.2.3 Protection of equipment
Under all reasonably foreseeable conditions the earthing system should provide for the
expected operation without damage to any component. Equipment protection will typically
include the following functional requirements:
(a) The earthing system, its components and bonding conductors shall be capable of
distributing and discharging the fault current without exceeding thermal and
mechanical design limits based on backup protection operating time.
(b) The earthing system shall maintain its integrity for the expected installation lifetime
with due allowance for corrosion and mechanical constraints.
(c) The earthing system performance shall avoid damage to equipment due to excessive
potential rise, potential differences within the earthing system and due to excessive
currents flowing in auxiliary paths not intended for carrying a portion of the fault
current.
(d) The earthing system performance shall contribute to ensuring electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC) among electrical and electronic apparatus of the high-voltage
system in accordance with IEC/TR 61000-5-2.

AS 2067:2016 106
8.2.4 Support operational security

Under all reasonably foreseeable conditions the earthing system shall not, by action or
inaction negatively impact the operation of the power system other than where intended for
the safety of people or the protection of equipment. Specific measures that support
operational security include the following:
(a) Maintaining a voltage reference for control, protection and communications systems.
(b) Providing or assisting to provide electrical noise immunity for conductive and
inductive hazards.
8.3 RISK MANAGEMENT AND DUE DILIGENCE

8.3.1 General
Elimination of all hazards associated with earthing systems is rarely possible. This
understanding necessitates the careful consideration and application of risk management
and due diligence principles. This Clause 8.3 details the cause of the hazards associated
with earthing systems and the risk management processes to minimize the associated risks.
Further guidance on risk management and due diligence is to be found in Clause 2.7.
8.3.2 Touch and step voltage hazards and risks
The principal hazard (or credible threat) to a person associated with earthing systems is
current flowing through the heart leading to ventricular fibrillation. Whether fibrillation
will occur or not for a given person is not determinable with certainty but is dependent on
variables such as the persons physiology (sensitivity), the amount of current flow through
the heart, the duration of the current flow and whether the exposure will interfere/coincide
with the vulnerable period of the person’s heart cycle (see AS/NZS 60479).
The magnitude of current flow through the human heart for an applied voltage (touch or
step) is also not determinable with certainty for an unknown individual. Guidance is
however provided for a population in AS/NZS 60479 where probability distribution data is
provided for body impedance against applied voltage and current sensitivity against time.
Guidance is also provided for body impedance changes (resistance path factor) and changes
in current through the heart (heart current factor) based on the points of contact associated
with the voltage difference.
To achieve negligible hazard levels is rarely practicable. To determine the hazard level, that
is the associated fibrillation risk, necessitates the use of probability calculations (e.g. Monte
Carlo or convolution) based on the data provided in AS/NZS 60479. The current limit and
impedance present in the body current path, for power frequency purposes, shall be derived
from AS/NZS 60479.1.
If hazards cannot be reduced an assessment of risk is required that should include
consideration of the occurrence rate and duration of the voltages (faults) and the frequency
and duration of contacts (the person in contact with two different voltages). To reduce the
risk, precautions or risk mitigation shall be applied so far as is reasonably practicable
(SFAIRP) or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), which is where the cost is not
grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained.
NOTE: A process that can be followed to determine the level of risk associated with voltage
limits is shown in Appendix A. Case studies are provided as guidance in Appendix G of common
scenarios including the boundary conditions for which the criteria have been calculated.
ENA Doc 025, EG-0 provides detailed guidance on known and commonly applied
precautions that may be required to reduce risk levels.

107 AS 2067:2016
8.4 DESIGN
8.4.1 Introduction
The goal of earthing system design is to ensure adequate robustness in the design at the
same time as finding a balance between cost, practicality and management of risk. Multiple
risk scenarios (e.g. with both touch and step voltage hazards) should be analysed with
regard to interactions between individual scenarios and the impact of the various design
configurations on the overall risk profile for the site and system. The design process goals
include the following:
(a) Identify and satisfy appropriate safety criteria.
(b) Operational requirements.
(c) Equipment interference requirements.
(d) Corrosion requirements.
(e) Be cost effective.
(f) Practical to implement.

(g) Testable at time of commissioning.
(h) Provide for cost effective monitoring of key performance parameters and critical
items.
(i) Reliable and robust over the whole of life (i.e. resistant to critical failure modes and
easily testable for longer acting deterioration mechanisms).
The performance goals identified above may be used within a risk-cost-benefit analysis
when resolving competing design configurations. The risk-based design process is outlined
in Clause 8.4.2, and the individual design steps are discussed more fully in the ensuing
Clauses.
Standard design layouts may be used to good effect provided the ‘limits of applicability’ or
boundary conditions are well understood and assessed prior to application.
Appendix B specifies additional requirements for substation earthing system design.
8.4.2 Design process overview
The following design procedure (presented in Figure 8.1) is a high level view of the
recommended process for earthing system design. It is structured to provide flexibility, and
lead designers to make informed decisions, to identify hazards, meet appropriate risk levels
and facilitate ongoing compliance. In this way risks may be managed in a cost effective,
practical, supportable manner that is clearly documented and implemented.
The design process outlined in Figure 8.1 and Table 8.1 is described in the remainder of this
Clause and Appendix A.
The selection and assessment of safety criteria is part of the design process. There are two
methods of safety criteria selection:
(a) Standard curves (case matching) Aligning the design to be undertaken with a
published case and using the specified voltage/time curve (which was
probabilistically derived for a given risk level) as the design safety criteria
(see Clause 8.4.7.3 and Appendix G).
(b) Direct probabilistic Directly calculating contact and fault incidence, coincidence
and fibrillation probability to assess the risk associated with a given hazard scenario,
or to derive a ‘design specific’ safety criteria (see Clause 8.4.8 and Appendix A).
In either method, precautions or risk mitigation shall be applied so far as is reasonably
practicable (SFAIRP) or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), which is where the cost
is not grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained.
AS 2067:2016 108
D e s i g n r e q u ire d
S te p 1: D at a g at h er i n g
S te p 2: In i t i a l c o n c e pt d e s i g n
S te p 3: D eter m i n e d e s i g n EPR
S te p 4: D et a il e d ear t h in g l ayou t
(e st im ate ha z ar d l o c at i o n s an d m ag nitu d e s)
S te p 5: S t a n d ar d V/ t c r i ter i a c h o s e n
(fr o m c a s e s tu d i e s)
Does design
m atc h c a s e s tu d y No S te p 6: D o ‘d ire c t
circumstances? pro ba b ili st i c ’ d e s i g n
Ye s
Does
Ye s design comply
w i t h s e l e c te d V/ t
c r i ter i a
No
S te p 7: M it i g ate /re d e s i g n
Does
design comply with No
s e l e c te d V/ t
c r i ter i a
S te p 8: L i g ht n i n g a n d t r a n s i e nt d e s i g n
S te p 9: C o n s tr u c t i o n su p p or t
S te p 10: C o m m i s s i o n in g pro g r am
and c o m p lian c e review
S te p 11: D o c u m e nt at i o n
D e s i g n c o m p l ete d
FIGURE 8.1 EARTHING DESIGN PROCEDURE

109 AS 2067:2016
TABLE 8.1
EARTHING DESIGN STEP DESCRIPTIONS
Step Process description
Data gathering and project integration
1 The validity of any design is contingent on the accuracy of the data used. The data is
collected in a staged manner, as required by the designer (see Clause 8.4.3).
Initial design concept
Determine the earthing system that will likely meet the functional requirements. Detailed
design is necessary to ensure that all exposed conductive parts, are earthed. Extraneous
2 conductive parts should be earthed if appropriate. Any structural earth electrodes
associated with the installation should be bonded and form part of the earthing system. If
not bonded, confirmation is necessary to ensure that all safety requirements are met
(see Clause 8.4.4).
Determine design EPR
Based on soil characteristics and the likely proportion of total earth fault currents flowing
3 into the local earthing system (see Clause 8.4.4.1), determine the expected earth potential
rise (EPR). Include the full extent of the system under consideration by including the
effect of interconnected primary and secondary supply systems for each applicable fault
scenario (see Clause 8.4.5).
Detailed earthing layout (see Clause 8.4.6)
Conductor configuration
Generate an earthing conductor layout to meet earthing system functional requirements
4
Shock hazards-location identification and magnitude
Identify locations where staff or the public may be exposed to shock hazards. Such hazards
include, touch, step, transfer and hand-to-hand contacts. For each location calculate the
expected shock voltages for each applicable fault scenario identified in Step 3.
Standard V/t design criteria applicable at hazard locations
5 Based on the specifics of the design concept and the broader context, attempt to match the
design to a standard voltage/time (V/t) curve or curves from the case studies. Conservative
assumptions and comparisons are advisable (see Clause 8.4.7).
Undertake direct probabilistic design (see Clause 8.4.8)
For each shock risk location determine the probability of fatality. This is calculated from
the fault/presence coincidence and probability of fibrillation taking into account the shock
circuit impedances (e.g. footwear and asphalt). The probability of fatality for the shock
voltage (Step 4) will fall in one of the three categories.
Intolerable—Unacceptable risk. Mitigate the risk.
ALARP region—Reduce the risk to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) or so far as
6
is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP). A risk cost benefit analysis may be required to assess
the cost of the risk treatment against a range of criteria. For risks classified to be in the
ALARP Region the cost and practicality of any mitigation measure is assessed against a
range of criteria.
Negligible—Risk generally tolerable, however, a normally accepted risk treatment may be
applied if the cost is not grossly disproportionate to the benefit (e.g. operator equipotential
mats within switchyards). If the EPR is sufficiently low it is a simple matter to classify the
whole system as presenting a tolerably low risk.
Mitigation and redesign
7 Improve the design and identify and implement appropriate risk treatment measures.
Typical treatment measures might include global and/or local risk reduction techniques
(see Clause 8.4.9).
(continued)

AS 2067:2016 110
TABLE 8.1 (continued)
Step Process description

Lightning and transient design
8 Consider the need to implement any particular design precautions to manage the impact of
lightning and other transients (see Clause 8.4.10).
Construction support
9 Provide installation support as necessary to ensure design requirements fulfilled and
construction staff safety risk effectively managed (see Clause 8.5).
Commissioning program and design compliance review
10 Review the installation for physical and safety compliance following the construction
phase of the project. Ensure that the earthing system performs adequately to meet the
requirements identified during the design (see Clauses 8.6 to 8.8).
Documentation
11 Documentation is to include the physical installation description (e.g. drawings) as well as

electrical assumptions, design decisions, commissioning data, and monitoring and
maintenance requirements (see Clause 8.9).
8.4.3 Data gathering

The validity of any design is contingent on the accuracy and adequacy of the data used. The
data is collected in a staged manner, as required by the designer.
The initial data gathered is intended to enable the designer to prepare a preliminary design
from which a maximum projected earth potential rise (EPR) may be deduced. While the
available information will differ, depending upon the system under design
(e.g. transmission, distribution or major substations), generally the following data would be
required:
(a) Fault levels and protection clearing times (for relevant fault scenarios).
(b) Soil resistivity and geological data.
(c) Site layout (e.g. structure placement).
(d) Primary and secondary power system conductor details (e.g. cable sheaths, overhead
shield wires/earth wires).
(e) Data concerning existing earthing systems (e.g. location, test results).
(f) Points of exposure (services search, e.g. Dial Before You Dig, and neighbouring
infrastructure).
8.4.4 Initial concept design
8.4.4.1 General
Determine the earthing system that will likely meet the functional requirements. Detailed
design is necessary to ensure that all exposed conductive parts, are earthed. Extraneous
conductive parts should be earthed, if appropriate. Any structural earth electrodes
associated with the installation should be bonded and form part of the earthing system. If
not bonded, verification is necessary to ensure that all safety requirements are met.
The process and complexity of an earthing system design varies according to the
requirements of the application. However, a number of design considerations are largely
universal when designing an earthing system and their early consideration in the initial
concept design phase will assist the detailed design and minimize re-design requirements.
These are detailed in the following clauses and listed as follows:
(a) Fault current and duration.
(b) Conductor sizing.

111 AS 2067:2016
(c) Soil resistivity.

(d) Layout practicalities.
(e) Coordinated design.
(f) Current injection.
(g) Special considerations.

8.4.4.2 Fault current
The worst case fault scenario for every relevant aspect of the functional requirements shall
be determined. The following points should be considered at each voltage level present in
the installation:
(a) Single phase-to-earth fault and double phase-to-earth fault conditions.
(b) Faults both within and outside the installation site, should be examined to determine
the worst case earth potential rise.
(c) The combined effect of the magnitude (including d.c. offset) and duration of the fault
should be used to determine the levels of stress imposed on a person or equipment

(including earthing system components).
(d) While the fault level selected should be the highest which is likely to occur with
allowance for future increases (e.g. future maximum that could be reasonably
expected), some allowance may also be made for line and fault impedance. It is not
usually appropriate to use the equipment fault short circuit rating when selecting
future fault levels.
(e) Future fault level increases may be due to the following:
(i) Installation of additional transformers or larger transformers.
(ii) Installation of generation equipment.
(iii) Removal of fault limitation devices such as neutral earthing resistors or reactors
(NERs), earthing transformers or line reactors.
(f) System reconfiguration (e.g. new power lines which interconnect power systems).
Often only a proportion of the prospective earth fault current will return via the general
mass of the earth (through the local earth grid and the soil). In some cases, fault current is
diverted from the mass of the earth via cable screens, overhead earth wires, LV neutrals
(MEN conductors) or other bonded conductors such as pipelines. Some of the earth fault
current may also circulate within an earth grid and not contribute to the earth potential rise.
Therefore, before calculating the earthing system potential rise, step voltages and touch
voltages, it is important to first calculate the realistic earth return current which will be a
portion of the total earth fault current.
8.4.4.3 Earth fault duration
Realistic earth fault current clearing time shall be considered for the calculation of the
earthing conductor sizes and when assessing step and touch voltage hazards.

AS 2067:2016 112
The following factors need to be considered:

(a) Personal safety
The fault clearance time of the first upstream primary protection device, e.g. primary
protection time plus circuit breaker break time, total fault clearing time of a fuse)
shall be used for personal safety against a worst case fault magnitude. Where High
Speed Single Phase Auto Reclosing (HSSPAR) is used the clearing times for the two
events (or multiple events) should be summated. HSSPAR is used on transmission
lines, not on distribution lines (which typically have much longer no-voltage times
between successive auto reclose attempts).
The assessment of step and touch voltage hazards often requires the consideration of
a number of earth fault scenarios with different fault clearing times (other than
primary). It is then necessary to evaluate which combination of fault current and
clearing time represents the worst case for step and touch voltage hazards assessment.
Quite often, it may be necessary to assess more than one set of fault current and fault
duration scenarios.
(b) Conductor sizing

Fault duration (corresponding to total clearing time), also determines the electrical
rating of earthing conductors. The conductor and connecting joint thermal
requirements should be of sufficient size to withstand maximum earth fault current
for back-up protection operating time plus circuit breaker operating time.
8.4.4.4 Soil resistivity
As soil resistivity and soil structure have significant effect on earth potential rise of the
earthing system, care must be taken to ensure that reliable data is obtained from field
testing encompassing a sufficiently wide traverse in order to establish resistivity variations
with depth. Consideration shall be given to the variation of soil resistivity due to
temperature and moisture.
8.4.4.5 Layout practicalities
Where influence on property selection for a substation site is possible, data gathering in all
categories listed in Clause 8.4.3 will help determine the site which best achieves a simple
and effective earthing system design. Possible transferred voltage hazards may dominate
site selection.
Influences which may prevent the best layout and positioning in terms of an earthing system
include minimizing earthworks and the protection of vegetation, and although in the end,
such influences may override gains achieved in the efficiency of the earthing system, it is
important that all aspects be considered in the final decision.
8.4.4.6 Coordinated design
Earthing system design should take into consideration interactions with the following
systems (if applicable):
(a) Metallic pipelines.
(b) Telecommunications network.
(c) Metallic structures (e.g. fences, hand rails, conveyors, industrial plant).
(d) Interconnected power earthing systems.
NOTE: The use of interconnected earthing system is recommended unless separation provides
a lower overall risk.

113 AS 2067:2016
8.4.4.7 Current injection

Current injection testing may be employed during the initial design phase in order to gather
information about the behaviour of existing earthing systems. This can provide a fall of
potential (surface gradient) of the soil and input impedance of an existing earthing system.
8.4.4.8 Special considerations
Special considerations may be necessary which include the following:

(a) Staged implementation
The design must also consider any known staging requirements during the course of a
project, identifying and designing out any associated touch, step and transferred
potential conditions at the timing of each stage.
(b) Gas insulated switchgear (GIS)/gas insulated line (GIL)
The earthing system of GIS and/or GIL may need special consideration due to—
(i) reduced substation area;
(ii) induced currents; and

(iii) high frequency transients.
8.4.5 Determine design EPR
Based upon the soil characteristics and the likely proportion of total earth fault currents
flowing into the local earthing system the expected EPR is calculated for each of the key
fault cases identified. This is the major outcome of the initial design concept phase as it
enables assessment of which areas require further consideration. Fault scenarios that are not
significant may be acknowledged and discounted from further analysis.
This first pass sets a conservative upper limit for the EPR. It enables assessment of which
fault scenarios should be the focus of the detailed design effort. Some fault scenarios may
later be shown to exhibit a maximum EPR that is less than the applicable compliance
criteria (e.g. relevant V/t design criteria) and so achieve compliance without specific
mitigation. These values are critical in that all other hazard voltages (e.g. step, touch,
transfer) are calculated by scaling based on the relative EPRs for each key fault case.
8.4.6 Power frequency design
8.4.6.1 General
The power frequency design of an earthing system should take into account all the relevant
parameters. The design parameters critical to the design include the fault current magnitude,
fault current duration, soil resistivity, current splits, earth grid area, interference and
coordination. A number of the design parameters are briefly discussed in the following
clauses.
8.4.6.2 Earthing conductor layout
An earthing system bonds the required equipment and structures to the general mass of
earth via some form of earth grid. The physical practicalities of the design need to achieve a
level of robustness for the life of the installation. Earthing equipment and material selection
is therefore critical. The method of installation and manner in which conductors are
protected, the level of redundancy and the corrosion consideration employed will need to
ensure the correct outcomes are achieved. The design should specify conductor sizing,
terminations, acceptable jointing methods, material types, conductor protection, provision
for portable earthing, labelling and inspection and testing requirements as a minimum.
Special consideration should be made to ensure the integrity of connection between critical
equipment and the earthing system. Many of the provisions are addressed in some detail in
other guides such as ENA EG-1 and IEEE Std 80 [1].

AS 2067:2016 114
8.4.6.3 Dimensioning of earthing conductors

Parameters relevant to earthing system dimensioning include magnitude and duration of
fault current and soil characteristics. These parameters combine to define conductor sizing
in terms of electrical and mechanical rating:
(i) Electrical rating
For electrical rating, the fault currents used to calculate the conductor size should
take into account the possibility of future growth. The temperature rise involved in
calculating electrical rating shall be chosen to avoid reduction of the mechanical
strength of the earthing system (including conductor jointing) and to avoid damage to
any surrounding materials, (e.g. concrete or insulating materials).
Back-up relay protection operating time, plus circuit breaker break time should be
used when designing conductor and connecting joint thermal requirements. For
conductor sizing the total accumulated fault time needs to be considered where
auto-reclose is applied, as there is very little cooling during the auto-reclose dead
time.
Consideration may also be given to current splitting on the assumption that fault
current on entering the buried section of the earth grid travels in multiple directions,
and, as such, these buried conductors are not required to be rated at full fault current.
(ii) Mechanical rating
Externally applied forces (resulting in physical stress of the conductor) include direct
impact, soil movement and compaction of surrounding soil.
Electromagnetic forces are due to the flow of fault current through the conductor and
although significant, do not dictate minimum conductor size. However, where a
conductor is used for down leads from mounted equipment to earth grid connection
points, they shall be fastened to the structure as often as necessary to withstand the
short circuit dynamic forces.
The earthing conductors, being directly in contact with the soil, shall be of materials
capable of withstanding corrosion (chemical or biological attack, oxidation, formation
of an electrolytic couple, electrolysis, etc.). They have to resist the mechanical
influences during their installation as well as those occurring during normal service.
Note that composite conductors can also be used for earthing provided that their
electrical and mechanical properties are equivalent and do not compromise the
integrity of the earthing system. Aluminium conductors shall not be used for buried
earthing applications.
It is acceptable to use steel reinforcing bars embedded in concrete foundations and
steel piles as a part of the earthing system, provided thermal ratings for conductors
and joints are not exceeded.
To prevent theft and/or vandalism, consideration should be given to protecting
exposed components and/or selecting alternative materials.
For direct buried or exposed conductors a minimum size of 35 mm2 copper equivalent
conductor is considered prudent for high voltage earthing. Further guidance regarding
sizing of conductors to meet thermal requirements is given in the ENA EG-1.
Provision for portable earthing should meet electrical and mechanical rating
requirements, be located for convenient and safe usage (including putting on, taking
off), and facilitate maintenance.

115 AS 2067:2016
8.4.6.4 Transferred potentials

Earthing systems can cause inductive and conductive interference to other metallic systems
which requires coordination. Consideration shall be given to the following:
(a) Transferred potentials to plant, personnel and the public The substation earthing
system shall be designed to ensure that interference with other utilities, plant and
personnel (e.g. telecommunications, pipelines, railways, mine infrastructure, houses,

LV MEN), by conductive or inductive coupling, takes into consideration appropriate
standards and guidelines.)
(b) Corrosion control Earthing system components may be subject to corrosion from, or
be the cause of corrosion in, other systems. Corrosion control coordination may also
extend to the interconnection of different earthing systems comprising of different
earthing materials (e.g. power station and adjacent transmission switchyard).
8.4.6.5 Hazard location identification
The design shall identify locations where personnel or the public may be exposed to shock
hazards. Such hazards include, touch, step, transfer and hand-to-hand contacts shown in
Figure 8.2. Hazardous step and touch voltages can appear on the metal structures or
equipment associated with high voltage power systems, or may be transferred via soil,
metal structures or equipment located near high voltage power systems due to one or a
combination of the following factors:
(a) Electrical insulation failure or mechanical failure or both.
(b) Human error, resulting in accidental livening of station equipment, and/or lines
circuits.
(c) Electric field (capacitive) coupling.
(d) Magnetic field (inductive) coupling.
Hazardous voltages on conductive parts may appear between the hand and one or both feet
of a person, or between the two hands (i.e. reach touch voltages). Hazardous voltages may
also appear across the surface of the ground and therefore between the feet of a person
(i.e. step voltages). Such voltage differences can occur within and around HV installations,
and also on metallic structures along the length of, or close to power lines, under earth fault
current conditions.
Voltage differences may also need to be controlled, to ensure that insulation breakdown or
failure does not occur on apparatus connected to points outside the station. Cable sheaths,
metallic pipes, fences, etc. which are connected to the station earthing system will transfer
earth fault voltages from the station earth electrode to the remote points. Similarly, cable
sheaths, metallic pipes, etc. which are connected to remotely earthed structures but isolated
from the station earth electrode will transfer the earth fault voltage of the remote structure
into the station.

AS 2067:2016
116
1m Pit wor ker 1m

E E
S u b s t at i o n EPR
To u c h
Mesh vo lt ag e V T P Po l e EPR
vo lt ag e
Fe n c e EPR
Tr an sfer Tr an sfer
vo lt ag e vo lt ag e V T P
Tr an sfer S te p vo l t ag e V S P Sur fac e vo lt ag e c o nto ur

vo lt ag e
Re m ote ear t h p ote nt i al
FIGURE 8.2 HAZARDOUS LOCATIONS RELATED TO AN EARTH FAULT (EPR)
117 AS 2067:2016
The specific hazard locations will represent different risk profiles by virtue of the fact that
there will be different coincidence probabilities of system events and human contacts and
different series impedance (for example, footwear and surface coverings). Consideration
should be given to factors such as the following:
(i) Probability of multiple simultaneous human contacts (particularly in public places),
(i.e. touch, step, hand-to-hand or transfer voltage impacts).

(ii) Susceptible locations (wet areas with little or no additional series resistance).
(iii) Controlled access areas (fenced easements or remote areas).
(iv) Series impedance (surface coverings and footwear).
(v) Future possible encroachments upon the electrical network and the effect of system
events on those encroachments.
(vi) Conductive and inductive coupling into non-power system plant such as
communications infrastructure, telecoms, pipelines and conveyors.
Not all risk is imposed by the earthing system. There are external factors that may also
impact upon the earthing system resulting in a change in the risk profile of the installation.
Figure 8.3 shows the main risk elements in each category.
El e c tr i c al system I n s t a l l at i o n a n d
c o n fi g ur at i o n c ha n g e s c o m m i s s i o nin g
inad e quate
S e c o n d ar y
Pe o p l e
Ear thing
e q u i p m e nt
H a z ar d o u s vo l t ag e s
D a m ag e o r o p er at i o n a l
to wor ker s an d pu b li c
und er ear t h
fau l t c o n d i t i o n s
system inter feren c e (lig htning
an d ear t h fault
c o n d it i o n s)
Phys i c a l c o n fi g ur at i o n
D e s i g n i n ad e q u a c y
c han g e s
Corrosion
inter feren c e
(e.g. r e i nfor c e m e nt ,
p i p e l i n e s, c a b l e s)
LEGEN D:
Ear t hin g syste m im p o se d r i s ks
R i s ks im p o se d u p o n ear t hin g syste m
NOT E: Subst at ion se c ond a r y e q u ipme nt is a s so ciat e d w it h e q u ipme nt s uch a s SCA DA ,

com mu n ic at ion s or prot e c t ion syst e m s.
FIGURE 8.3 RISK PROFILES OF EARTHING SYSTEM
The interaction between the substation or powerline earthing systems and secondary
systems (e.g. SCADA) also needs to be considered as those systems can adversely affect
each other.

AS 2067:2016 118
8.4.7 Safety criteria for design

8.4.7.1 Safety criteria
The effective management of the shock hazard requires an understanding of the ventricular
fibrillation (VF) risk and of the following circumstances that make indirect electric shock
accidents from earthing systems and earthed metalwork possible:
(a) Current flowing to earth of sufficient magnitude in relation to size of the earthing
system and soil resistivity.
(b) Soil resistivity and distribution of earth fault current flow such that voltage gradients
are possible at one or more locations.
(c) Presence of an individual at such a location, at a time, and in a position that their
body bridges at least two points of different voltage.
(d) Insufficient series resistance to limit the current flow through the body (e.g. skin,
shoes, gloves).
(e) Duration of the fault of sufficient time to cause harm at the given location.
As many of these variables are probabilistic in nature (see AS/NZS 60479) there is no
simple relation between the resistance of an earthing system as a whole, the maximum
shock current to which a person might be exposed, and the likelihood of VF causing a
fatality. The process for determining shock safety criteria outlined in Appendix A enables
an earthing system designer to allocate limited resources in a manner that provides a level
of safety to people corresponding to the probability of a hazard occurring. The analysis
recognizes realistic operating conditions and safety constraints in order to provide
requirements which are both technically and economically feasible.
Consideration of appropriate safety criteria (usually a shock voltage) is required for all
electrical assets that form part of the network. As hazards can be coupled to non-power
system plant, particularly during earth faults, consideration shall be given to any voltages
created at those locations outside the substations and easements.
8.4.7.2 Risk quantification and individually derived safety criteria
The risk profile associated with earthing systems varies greatly for different locations and
circumstances. During the first phase of an earthing system design or redesign it is
necessary to identify the hazard scenarios applicable to the particular site and power system
configuration that could be presented during the period of the project and life of the
installation/asset.
Where a design requires that a certain hazard scenario or class of hazard be mitigated and
the risk reduction quantified to demonstrate due diligence, the process summarized in
Appendix A may be adopted. The ENA Doc 025, EG-0 guide and associated safety analysis
software facilitates this process. The application of individually derived safety criteria shall
be accompanied by sufficient justifying documentation.
8.4.7.3 Guidance on standard safety criteria
The probabilistic method in ENA Doc 025, EG-0 describes a number of standard safety
criteria curves that were produced for a given risk level. The scenarios have been selected
to cover a number of cases that are commonly met by design engineers within power
systems.
The value of the probabilistic method lies in being able to—
(a) identify hazard scenarios where more traditional approaches are non-conservative and
more stringent criteria may be justified on account of the risk profile to which the
public or operational personnel may be exposed;

119 AS 2067:2016
(b) identify hazard scenarios where the risk profile is very low and less stringent than
previously adopted may be justified; and
(c) more effectively identify which design parameters are contributing to the risk profile.
This then allows the designer to undertake a risk cost benefit analysis of the various
risk mitigation options.
The risk of these hazards should now be assessed by either aligning hazards with standard
contact scenarios in Appendix G (if they meet the boundary conditions) or by assessing the
risk associated with a given hazard location identified.
As a guide, representative touch voltage (Vt) limits for a given risk level that may be
applied to accessible metalwork for a number of typical cases not covered in the list of
Standards and industry guidelines (Clause 8.4.7.4) are shown in Appendix G. The cases
covered are as follows:
(i) Residential distribution—includes commercial sites (e.g. shopping centres), and
aquatic centres (e.g. public pools).
(ii) Light industrial—sawmill, batching plant, abattoir.
(iii) Large interconnected systems—power stations, heavy industrial, wind turbines.

(iv) Mining—surface plant operations.
(v) Mining—underground coal.
(vi) Mining—underground metals.
(vii) Mining—open cut.
(viii) Mining—road tunnels – construction and operation.
The process in Appendix A should be used to determine the level of hazard associated with
voltage limits. The standard safety criteria curves provided in Appendix G are derived using
the Appendix A process for a given risk level. For each case study the curve details (figure
and equation) and assumptions governing the range of applicability have been included. If
the hazard situation under consideration does not meet the case study boundary conditions,
the direct probabilistic design approach outlined in Clause 8.4.8 should be performed to
assess the risk or generate appropriate design curves.
The following cases are not covered in the Appendix G case studies or the standards in
Clause 8.4.7.4 and require case specific design to be undertaken:
(A) Long overland conveyors.
(B) Railway systems.
(C) Theme parks.
8.4.7.4 Safety criteria within other standards and guidelines
Safety criteria are provided within other Standards and Guidelines applicable to specific
assets or hazard scenarios. Consideration should be given to the following:
(a) Metallic pipeline exposure: AS/NZS 4853.
(b) Telecommunications worker exposure—AS 3835 on earth potential rise (EPR)
hazards, SA HB 101 on low frequency induction (LFI) hazards.
(c) Transmission and distribution line hazards: AS/NZS 7000.
(d) Power system plant and substations, and major substations: ENA Doc 025, EG-0.

AS 2067:2016 120
8.4.8 Perform direct probabilistic design

In the event an identified hazard does not align with a published case study, expected fault
and contact scenarios may be used to assess the probability. These can be compiled by
using sources of information that may include the following: past fault records, use of
models and simulations, practice and relevant experience, published literature, industry
data, results of public consultations, and specialist and expert judgment.

All assumptions, boundary conditions, and design decisions determined in the analysis
should be articulated in earthing system design documentations.
A direct probabilistic design uses risk boundaries to provide a range for what is considered
unreasonable/intolerable and negligible for both individual and societal (i.e. multiple
simultaneous) hazard exposures. ENA Doc 025, EG-0 details an approach that enables an
engineer or asset owner to assess the need to provide additional mitigation. The use of
safety analysis software (e.g. Argon) enables the risk associated with voltages to be
assessed for standard conditions or ‘one off’ situations.
8.4.9 Mitigation/redesign
Although earthing system design procedures involve the installation of a considerable

number of risk reducing measures (e.g. protection system, conductor mesh spacing) as part
of earthing system design, a range of additional site specific mitigation measures and/or
redesign options shall be evaluated. The selection of options should be based upon
managing the specific risk associated with the step, touch and transferred voltages for
identified hazard scenarios. The principles of the hierarchy of controls should be applied to
the mitigation/redesign process in determining priorities (see Clause 2.7).
The following options may be considered for mitigation or redesign (locally or via
interconnected systems):
(a) Reduction of the earth impedance of the earthing system.
(b) Reduction of earth fault current using alternative system configurations, e.g. system
neutral earthing via resistance or inductance, earth transformer, line reactor.
(c) Reduction of earth return current, e.g. utilizing inductive coupling between metallic
cable sheath, earth wire and phase conductor.
(d) Reduction of the fault clearing times.
(e) Interconnection or separation among earthing systems, e.g. impedance connection or
separation of HV and LV earth electrodes or systems.
(f) Site relocation.
(g) Installation of gradient control conductors.
(h) Installation of non-conductive materials (e.g. timber or non-conductive poles).
(i) Installation of a barrier fence to limit access.
(j) Installation of a high resistance surface layer (e.g. asphalt or crushed aggregate).
(k) Restricted access or PPE.
(l) Installation of signage.
The design should be evaluated to ensure all reasonable precautions have been included,
whose costs are not grossly disproportionate to the benefits. Assessment of risk mitigation
is an iterative process to reduce the earthing design risk so far as is reasonably practicable
(SFAIRP) or as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

121 AS 2067:2016
Often a combination of the abovementioned risk mitigation treatments may be required.

Furthermore, processes, procedures and routine maintenance may be required to ensure the
adequacy of proposed mitigation measures. The cost of maintenance over the life of the
asset should be considered.
8.4.10 Transient design
Lightning and switching operations are sources of high and low frequency currents and
voltages. Surges typically occur when switching reactors, back-to-back capacitors and
cables or when operating gas insulated disconnectors. Surges are able to be transferred via
transformers. Lightning events, incident either directly or indirectly (i.e. via phase
conductors) upon a HV Installation, may cause damage to both primary and secondary
plant. Collection and dissipation of the incident energy always involves components within
the earthing system. Configuring the earthing system to effectively manage this energy is
one task of the design engineers. Additional guidance may be found in AS/NZS 1768.
While earthing of secondary systems may not be the direct responsibility of the HV earthing
system design engineer, incorrect coordination with the earthing and grounding of the
secondary systems (i.e. protection, d.c. and a.c. auxiliary power and control wiring) may
result in the following:

(a) Equipment damage (e.g. relays damaged).
(b) Operational reliability reduction (e.g. false or no CB tripping).
(c) Human safety risk (e.g. fires due to sparking in hazardous areas).
Assessing electromagnetic interference (EMI) sources, coupling mechanisms, interference
levels, and resultant physical damage or operational impact regarding the impact of the
earthing system configuration, should be part of the earthing system design considerations,
as it is always harder to mitigate EMI risks following installation.
8.5 CONSTRUCTION
Earthing system construction generally involves the installation of horizontal, vertical or
inclined electrodes, buried or driven into the general mass of earth. Construction may also
include connections to cable screens, equipment, structures, fences and OHEWs. During the
site construction phase of the project it should be ensured that the physical implementation
of the design is compliant and installed/built to an appropriate standard/quality. Unless
prescribed otherwise in the design the following recommendations apply:
(a) Chemicals should not be used to alter soil resistivity.
(b) Dissimilar metals should not be used in the earthing system unless corrosion risks are
properly addressed.
(c) Special attention should be taken to avoid corrosion where the bare earthing
conductor enters the soil or concrete.
(d) Backfill should not include foreign materials.
(e) Installation methods should exclude anything that increases corrosion risk.
(f) The path of the earthing conductors should be as short as possible.
(g) Conductors should be installed with additional protection against mechanical damage
during the construction phase (where and as appropriate).
(h) Risers should be given extra consideration for mechanical protection at and around
ground level and other exposed points.
(i) Where inspection or testing pits are used, consideration should be given to
mechanical protection, corrosion and drainage including during construction.

AS 2067:2016 122
(j) Vertical electrodes should be separated by a distance not less than the length of the
electrode.
(k) Vertical electrodes should be driven using appropriate tools to avoid any damage to
the electrodes when driving them in. Where the stratum is too hard for the electrodes
to be hand or machine driven they may be dropped into a bored hole and care should
be taken to ensure that the electrode reaches the bottom of the hole. This hole can be
backfilled with suitable material that is non-corrosive and non-abrasive.
(l) The joints used to assemble rods should have at least the same mechanical strength as
the rods themselves and should be able to withstand mechanical stresses during
driving.
(m) Mechanical joints should not become loose and should be provided additional
protection against corrosion as required.
(n) Horizontal buried conductors should be at a depth of 0.5 m to 1 m below ground
level.
(o) Conductors embedded in concrete should have adequate concrete coverage to control
corrosion.
When construction work is connected to, or is in the area of effect of, an existing earthing
system, protective measures shall be taken to protect people from electrical hazards that
arise due to load or earthfault conditions. The following requirements and recommendations
apply:
(i) During construction consideration should be given to exclusion zones, how power
supply can be safely arranged, and how connections to or isolations from existing
earthing systems, including fences, guardrails, LV neutrals and cable shields or
screens, are managed.
(ii) Precautions shall be taken to avoid parts of a metal framework becoming
disconnected from the earthing system when temporary dismantling takes place. Such
precautions may include additional earthing or bonding.
(iii) Construction site management shall include earthing safety consideration of lay down
areas and materials handling, particularly with respect to conductive materials of
significant length and the associated conductive or inductive hazard transfer risks.
(iv) Construction work associated with earthing systems that may encounter voltage
hazards shall only be undertaken by staff that has suitable training, experience and
site safety inductions relating to earthing safety and this shall be documented.
NOTE: Refer to ENA EG-1 for further guidance.
8.6 COMMISSIONING AND ONGOING MONITORING

All new or modified earthing systems shall be commissioned to validate the adequacy of the
design, relevant design inputs, and installation. The plan for commissioning shall consider
closely the key performance criteria identified in the hazard identification and mitigation
analysis phases.
The commissioning inspection and testing plan shall prove adequacy of the earthing
installation (basic material selection, installation quality and as-built drawings), as well as
design criteria compliance, and provide the ongoing supervision process with benchmark or
baseline figures (e.g. continuity test results).
Commissioning of the earthing system shall be performed in accordance with Clause 9.4.

123 AS 2067:2016
Field testing shall include visual inspection and proving continuity. Other tests may include
earth resistivity testing, and current injection testing. Measurements may include the
earthing system impedance, current distributions within and from the system, prospective
touch and step voltages at relevant locations, and transfer voltages. Loaded voltage
measurements (i.e. across a resistor simulating the body impedance) are susceptible to
errors introduced by contact impedances and care should be taken to ensure contact
impedances in the measurement circuit are appropriate and do not unduly dominate the
measurement.
The ongoing supervision program should monitor aspects of the installation critical to
maintaining safe operation and consider any ‘external risks’ identified during the design
phase (e.g. monitoring separation distances).
The condition of the earthing system components shall be examined or assessed
periodically. Visual inspection including excavation at representative locations and
component testing are appropriate means. Other field activities should generally follow the
commissioning program including continuity tests and measurements (and/or calculations)
of the earthing system performance. These activities shall be carried out at intervals
appropriate to the operating environment and operational risks of the system or following
major changes to the installation or power system which affect the fundamental
requirements of the earthing system.
8.7 MAINTENANCE, MODIFICATION AND REFURBISHMENT

Earthing systems are often considered ‘bury-and-forget’ components of the power system,
however this is never prudent. Whilst it is true many earthing systems require little
maintenance, their criticality and propensity for latent failures require lifetime management
that should include some level of ongoing supervision including inspection, testing and
maintenance. As components may deteriorate and system requirements change, supervision
should also include guidance on modification and refurbishment.
This Clause applies equally and shall be considered even where manufacturers recommend
modification or refurbishment be carried out for component upgrades or improvements.
This is necessary as the complete range of installation circumstances and conditions are
commonly beyond the foresight of the manufacturer.
Maintenance commonly refers to activities of a routine nature. Such activities may be
considered to include inspection, testing and servicing of components. Maintenance may
also be considered to include like for like replacement of components where there is no
change to the performance of the system as a result of the change compared to its original
condition, and where the replacement can be undertaken without a need for redesign.
A maintenance schedule shall be implemented and developed from manufacturers/suppliers
and/or designers recommendations considering other factors such as operational and
environmental conditions. Consideration should be given to the following:
(a) Scheduled inspection and testing requirements.
(b) Event triggered inspection and testing requirements (events may include impact,
explosion or fire, electrical fault or protection mal-operation, vandalism, increased
corrosion, increased activity in the area and system changes).
(c) Inspection and testing methods (see Section 9).
(d) Serviceable items and their maintenance requirements.
Where it is identified that changes beyond like for like replacement are required then a
more detailed assessment is required. This may require a design check or re-design.

AS 2067:2016 124
8.8 TESTING
Testing is essential as a validation step for the design, installation and maintenance of
earthing systems. In most cases tests shall measure the performance outputs of the earthing
system in terms of produced voltages and current distributions rather than solely earth
resistance. The testing should consider the key performance criteria identified in the hazard
identification and treatment analysis phases.

Earthing system testing normally consists of the following six core activities. In some
instances, not all activities are required:
(a) Visual inspection.
(b) Continuity testing.
(c) Earth resistivity testing.
(d) Earth potential rise (EPR) measurement.
(e) Current distribution measurement.
(f) Transfer, touch and step voltage testing.

NOTE: Appendix H provides guidance on the application of testing methods.
When measuring touch and step voltages under test conditions, two choices are possible.
Either measure the prospective touch and step voltages using a high impedance voltmeter,
or measure the effective touch and step voltages appearing across an appropriate resistance
that represents the human body. The safety criteria for design cited in Clause 8.4.7 are
prospective touch voltage criteria and as such refer to the voltage measured using a high
impedance voltmeter. Care should be taken not to confuse the effective touch voltage
(i.e. loaded case) with the prospective touch voltage criteria.
Test results should be analysed and compared against the expected design performance and
any high or low values explained.
As it is not always possible to foresee all hazard mechanisms at the design stage, which can
then become evident only at the testing stage. Testing should identify the need for any
secondary mitigation and any additional requirements for telecommunication coordination,
pipeline interference coordination, other metallic infrastructure coordination or mitigation.
Testing results will often include measurement errors. These errors should be understood,
identified and minimized. Where the errors are significant, analysis shall be used to assess
and correct for these.
Testing should also be used to identify changes in the performance of the earthing system
during the life of the installation.
NOTE: For guidance on suitable testing methods, refer to Appendix H.
8.9 DOCUMENTATION
Owners or users of electrical installations shall establish and operate systems that provide
for the storage of information relating to the design and commissioning of the earthing
installation, along with the collection and storage of data relating to maintenance activities
undertaken, for the life of the installation.
Documentation shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(a) Details of the earthing installation with sufficient information to enable repair or
restoration activities to be effectively undertaken during the life of the installation
(e.g. earthing system layout drawings).
(b) All assumptions and the justifications for those assumptions.
(c) Design calculations and decisions.

125 AS 2067:2016
(d) Commissioning data.

(e) Monitoring and maintenance requirements.
For a new or modified installation, there should be a formal ‘sign-off’ and handover
process, whereby the design documentation and ongoing management requirements are
collated for inclusion in the operational support documentation and programmes for the
installation.
Where an existing installation is being assessed or modified, whether due to internal or
external changes, documentation should include any analysis of existing information or
testing undertaken to assess the impact of the changes. Where modifications have been
made to the installation as a function of the changes, documentation relating to the changes
should include all information required for a new installation.

AS 2067:2016 126
S E C T I O N 9 I N S P E C T I O N A N D T E S T I N G
9.1 INSPECTIONS AND TESTS

Inspections and tests shall be carried out to verify compliance of the design and installation
with this Standard, and the design and compliance of the equipment with the applicable
technical specifications.
The following shall be subject to agreement between the supplier and the user:
(a) The extent of the inspection and testing.
(b) Which specifications are applicable.
(c) The extent and type of documentation provided.
(d) Inspection and test plan.
NOTE: Specific tests on site for factory-built and type tested equipment and for factory-built
assemblies are indicated and are based on Australian and IEC Standards.
Verification may be achieved by the following methods:
(i) Visual inspections.
(ii) Functional tests.
(iii) Measuring.
Inspections and tests on parts of high voltage installations may be carried out before and/or
after delivery as well as when the installation has been completed.
The following tests shall be carried out:
(A) Verification of minimum clearances between live parts and between live parts and
earth.
(B) Verification of minimum heights and of protective barrier clearances.
(C) Visual inspections and/or functional tests of electrical equipment and parts of
installation.
(D) Functional tests, verification of settings and circuitry and programming, verification
of operation and configuration by measurement or testing of protective, monitoring,
measuring and control devices.
(E) Inspection of markings, safety signs and safety devices.
(F) Verification of correct fire ratings for buildings/enclosures.
(G) Verification that emergency exits are operational.
(H) Verification of the earthing system (refer to Clause 8.6).
The following tests may also be carried out:
(1) Verification of characteristics of the equipment (including rated values) for the given
operating conditions.
(2) Power-frequency test for switchgear.
(3) Voltage test for cables.

127 AS 2067:2016
9.2 DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS

All measurements and tests required by this Standard shall be recorded and the
documentation kept for the life of the asset. The documentation shall include all relevant as-
built drawings.
9.3 VERIFICATION OF SPECIFIED PERFORMANCES

Tests will, in general, be carried out on the various items of equipment comprising an
installation at appropriate stages of the project to ultimately verify performance of the
installation. The tests required, their conditions and organization to be defined. This may
include definition of the provision of site services, personnel, etc.
9.4 TESTS DURING INSTALLATION AND COMMISSIONING

The user and supplier shall agree on the requirements (methods and acceptance criteria) for
tests during installation and commissioning together with a listing of the testing standards
to be applied. This may include functional tests to demonstrate the ability of the equipment
to satisfy the operational requirements.

The test equipment required for demonstration of design requirements should be agreed
between the user and supplier.
A schedule of tests is required for components and systems during the installation and
commissioning period. Details of the schedule are the subject of agreement between the
user and supplier. The necessary services to allow the tests to be carried out should also be
agreed between the parties.
NOTE: Appropriate training arrangements should be agreed on between the user and supplier.
9.5 TRIAL RUN

The scope of work agreed between the user and supplier includes a trial run, a trial run shall
be performed. The purpose of the trial run is to prove the functional capability of the high
voltage installation. During the run, therefore, all significant components shall be in
operation.
The agreement should define under what circumstances a breakdown of a significant
component will constitute an interruption of the trial. The user may also give exception
criteria for breakdowns of a very short period, e.g. simply extending the period of the trial
by the outage time.
The conditions that have to be met for the successful completion of the trial run should be
agreed between the user and supplier.

AS 2067:2016 128
S E C T I O N 1 0 O P E R A T I O N A N D
M A I N T E N A N C E M A N U A L
Each installation should have an operation manual describing the normal, emergency and
maintenance procedures as well as safety instructions for the operation of the high voltage
electrical installation.
Each installation should have a set of up-to-date drawings and operating diagrams
accessible from the premises. These drawings and diagrams should allow operation and
maintenance personnel to provide safe and efficient interventions in the installation.
Manufacturers of major components of an installation should provide operation and
maintenance manuals and test and in-service reports. These documents should be readily
available for use when necessary.
Emergency routes to the nearest hospital and emergency phone numbers should be
displayed in a visible location in the installation.

Personnel who are required to operate or maintain a high voltage system installation shall
be appropriately trained and deemed competent to carry out the operating procedures and
perform the required maintenance tasks.

129 AS 2067:2016
APPENDIX A
VOLTAGE LIMITS AND RISK LEVEL
(Informative)
A1 GENERAL
NOTE: The numbers given within square brackets correspond to the referenced documents
specific to this Appendix. Details of the referenced documents are listed in Paragraph G6 of
Appendix G.
This Appendix outlines a process whereby shock safety criteria may be assessed in order to
provide a ‘tolerable’ level of safety including consideration of the probability of a hazard
occurring [6]. All earthing design is risk based by virtue of the fact that all significant
parameters (power system, human interaction, and enveloping environment) are necessarily
statistical in nature. The use of quantified risk analysis provides a more objective method
by which an engineer can gain an understanding of the significance of the components that
directly affect the risk level.
The use of safety criteria based upon a quantification of the risk associated with a given
shock hazard scenario has been used internationally since the early 1970s [14] and within
Australia since the 90s (e.g. ESAA HB C(b) [12] superseded by AS/NZS 7000).
ENA DOC 25, EG-0 provides a Monte Carlo sampling method of integrated probabilistic
risk assessment using data from AS/NZS 60479 [2] to determine the probability of
fibrillation. Using such techniques organizations and design engineers are empowered to
address the most significant drivers of the problem and are also provided with a non-
technical medium for communicating the decision basis with other stakeholders.
Research by Biegelmeier [3] and Ferris [4] indicated that the sensitivity of the heart to
electrical stimuli varies throughout its cycle. They showed that shocks of duration less than
100 ms will not create VF unless they coincide with the partial refractory phase of the heart
cycle (10%–20% of heart cycle). That is to say the chance that a person will experience
fibrillation depends upon where the fault occurs relative to their heart cycle. For a short
current pulse applied during this vulnerable period the VF threshold is inversely
proportional to the time duration of the current pulse. Thus, for circuits with fast clearing
times, the fibrillation threshold increases, and the shock may not coincide with the
vulnerable period. Accordingly, for long fault duration the probability of fibrillation
increases.
An approach to the shock safety criteria determination and earthing system design is
required, whereby, the allocation of limited resources is made in a manner that provides a
tolerable level of risk.
The probability of fatality may be expressed as follows [5]:
Pfatality = Pfibrillation × Pcoincidence . . . (A1)
where
Pfibrillation = f (Vapplied, tf, Rseries, contact configuration)
Pcoincidence = f (fault and contact frequency and duration)

AS 2067:2016 130
The value Pfibrillation is the probability that the heart will enter ventricular fibrillation (VF)
due to contact with an external voltage. It is a function of applied voltage, fault duration,
series resistances (such as footwear or asphalt), and contact configuration (such as hand to
hand contact). (Refer to Paragraph A2.) The value Pcoincidence is the probability that a person
will be present and in contact with an item at the same time that the item is affected by a
fault. (Refer to Paragraph A3.) Paragraph A4 describes a process which may be used to
calculate the probability of fatality for a given contact scenario. It is a function of fault and
contact frequency and duration.
A2 FIBRILLATION CHARACTERISTICS
The body current withstand probabilities may be translated into voltage limits for
comparison with calculated or measured step and touch voltages, taking into account the
impedance present in the body current path. The prospective (i.e. open circuit) touch
voltage VTP may be expressed in terms of body current withstand ib and total series
impedance path as given in Equation A2.
If a current sensitivity curve and body impedance curve for a particular percentile are
chosen, an associated prospective touch voltage may be calculated as given in Equation A3:
VTP = prospective touch voltage
I B ( t, % )
= × ⎡⎣ Z B ( VTE , % ) × RPF + R series ⎤⎦ . . . (A2)
HCF
IB (t)
= × ⎡ Z B ( VTE ) × RPF + R series ⎤⎦ . . . (A3)
HCF ⎣
where
IB(t,%) = body current [a function of fault duration (t) and population (%)]
HCF = heart current factor (e.g. 1.0 for left hand to feet contact)
ZB (VTE, %) = body impedance [a function of loaded touch voltage (V TE) and
population (%)]
RPF = body resistance path factor (e.g. 0.75 for hand to feet contact)
Rseries = resistance of series paths (e.g. resistance of shoes, foot to ground
resistance and gloves)
t = touch voltage duration, commonly the fault clearing time
The probabilistic nature of the human response is clearly articulated within AS/NZS 60479.
A3 COINCIDENCE FORMULATION
The fault/contact coincidence probability, for both individual and societal (multiple) risk
exposures, may be calculated using the formulae given in ENA DOC 25, EG-0 [5]. The
contact frequency relates to the times when a person is in a position to be exposed to the
hazard voltage under examination. The selection of contact frequency and duration is a
process that is new to most designers, and one for which very little published literature is
available. Nevertheless it is implicit within all previous design methodologies and targets. It
is usual that a conservative value be assumed in the first instance, and only revised
downward as required.

131 AS 2067:2016
A4 APPLIED VOLTAGE RISK ANALYSIS

A method for calculating the risk associated with a voltage characteristic is described in
Figure A1.
D eter m in e to l er a b l e B o d y Im p e d an c e at D eter m in e fault an d

b o d y c urre nt lim it s p ower fre q u e n cy hum an c o nt ac t
AS / NZS 6 0 479.1:2010 AS / NZS 6 0 479.1:2010 c o in c i d e n c e like lih o o d
Fi g ure 20 R efer Ta b l e s 1- 9 Pc o i n c i d e n c e
H ear t c urre nt fac tor for Ad d bare han d to

tou c h vo lt ag e d e p e n d in g ear t hing path resist an c e
of b o d y c urre nt pat h and if applicable
AS / NZS 6 0 479.1:2010 i n d i v i d u a l p r ote c t i ve
Ta b l e 12 e q u i p m e nt
Ad d bare fo ot to
D eter m in e all owa b l e ear t hing resist an c e and
b o d y c ur re nt if applicable individual
prote c t i ve e q u i p m e nt
Cal c ul ate vo lt ag e ac ro s s Cal c ul ate tot al pat h

b are b o d y c o nt ac t p o int s i m p e d an c e
Vo lt ag e lim it valu e s to D eter m in e Fi br ill at i o n

c o m pare ag ainst Pro ba b ilit y (if pre se nt at
c al c ul ate d or m ea sure d
vo lt ag e s
t im e of fault)
P fibrillation
X
Cal c ul ate Pro ba b ilit y of

Fat alit y
Pfatality
NOTES:
1 Body impedance depends on voltage across body. Voltage limits for other body contact situations can be
calculated in a similar way.
2 If additional resistance between bare hands and/or feet is considered in the formulation, then the voltage
must be clearly denoted as a prospective touch voltage and tested accordingly (refer to Clause 8.8
regarding measurements).
FIGURE A1 METHOD OF CALCULATING THE RISK LEVEL
Requirements for documentation of assumptions and analysis processes are specified in

Clause 8.4.2. Configuration management requirements are set out in AS ISO 10007:2003.

AS 2067:2016 132
A5 RISK LEVEL ASSESSMENT

Based on analysis of existing approaches [5, 6, 8, 9, 11] and comparative risks, the risk
criteria shown in Table A1 are considered appropriate guidelines for demonstrating due
diligence in the management of indirect electric shock under the ‘faulted’ state of the
electric power network.
TABLE A1
INDIVIDUAL RISK BOUNDARIES
Probability of Resulting implication for risk
Risk classification for public death
single fatality treatment
≥10 –4 High or intolerable risk Must prevent regardless of costs
Must minimize occurrence unless
–4 –6 risk reduction is impractical and
10 – 10 Intermediate or ALARP region
costs are grossly disproportionate
to safety gained
Risk generally tolerable, however,

a normally accepted risk treatment
≤10 –6 Low or negligible risk may be applied if the cost is not
grossly disproportionate to the
benefit.
Shock risk levels that are considered ‘tolerable’ are determined in conjunction with an
assessment of the practicability of the design implementation. The use of risk boundaries
for gauging a range for what is considered unreasonable/intolerable and negligible for both
individual and societal (i.e. multiple simultaneous) hazard exposures are useful guidelines.
ENA DOC 25, EG-0 [5] details an approach that enables an engineer or asset owner to
assess the need to provide additional mitigation. The use of safety analysis software Argon
[7] enables risk to be calculated for a given hazard scenario enabling tolerable voltage
criteria for standard conditions or ‘one off’ situations to be defined.
Example: Probability of touch voltage fatality.
Consider a person exposed to a touch voltage of say 430 V for 500 ms, a value considered
an acceptable or tolerable target from a recognized standard. A quantified risk analysis
[8, 9] using AS/NZS 60479 [2] as the base heart and body resistance criteria results in a
fibrillation probability of 0.652, or a survival chance of 1 in 1.5. Additional series
impedances with footwear can reduce the heart current, and a typical range of electrical
worker’s footwear [10] reduces the fibrillation probability to 0.175 (1 in 5.7). These values
are well above an individual risk target of 1 in 1 000 000. As the absolute voltage level
recommended by a recognized standard is insufficient to provide an acceptable level of
safety, the likelihood of coincidence must also be evaluated to determine the probability of
an individual fatality.
A6 COST DISPROPORTIONALITY ASSESSMENT

The earthing design process begins with an initial functional earthing design which meets
the fundamental electrical and mechanical performance requirements of the earthing system
(thermal, fault clearance, etc.). The risk level of the various hazard scenarios associated
with the initial functional design, being the Probability of Fatality (Pfatality), can be
determined using safety analysis software (e.g. Argon [7]).

133 AS 2067:2016
The risk may be further reduced by implementing additional mitigation options. The risk
reduction benefit obtained from the various mitigation options may then be measured
against the cost of the mitigation to determine if the cost of mitigation is grossly
disproportionate to the cost of risk reduction benefit. If the cost of mitigation is not grossly
disproportionate to the risk or liability benefit, and the initial installation and ongoing
management of the risk reduction measure is reasonably practicable, then the mitigation
should be implemented in accord with the SFAIRP or ALARP principles.

To determine gross disproportionality, a disproportion factor (DF) should consider the
involuntary nature of the risk which is inescapable and with no warning [6]. The cost of
liability associated with a given risk reduction measure for an enterprise may be determined
using in ENA DOC 25, EG-0 Appendix F [5] or reference [13, 15].
The assessment of one mitigation option applied after another is an iterative process to
determine if the second or subsequent mitigation option is reasonably practicable.
In some circumstances where the additional mitigation costs are large it may be useful to
undertake additional analysis and quantify the liability benefit using a net present value
(NPV) calculation.

AS 2067:2016 134
APPENDIX B
SUBSTATION EARTHING SYSTEM
(Normative)
B1 EARTHING SYSTEM CONNECTION PRINCIPLES

B1.1 Distribution substations, e.g. 11 kV/400 V or 22 kV/400 V
The following earthing system connection requirements and recommendations apply for
distribution substations:
(a) The star point of all 3 phase transformer LV windings or the neutral connection of
single phase transformer LV windings shall remain securely connected to the Neutral
bar of the substation at all times (otherwise excessively high or low voltages will
occur on the LV network).
(b) The neutral bar at the substation shall remain securely connected to the appropriate
substation earth bar at all times (otherwise phase to earth faults on the LV network
and customers’ installations will not be detected by protection and excess voltages to
earth will occur on the unfaulted phases). Where interconnection to the low voltage
network is required to meet the design assumptions, the installation shall have a
combined (or common) earthing system.
(c) The term ‘MEN Link’ refers to a removable link at LV main switchboards. It does not
apply at the source substation where a permanent neutral to earth connection is
required.
(d) A ‘combined earthing system’ is strongly recommended for all distribution
substations. A combined earthing system is one in which the high voltage and low
voltage electrical equipment is earthed to a common terminal bar (or equivalent
conductor).
A ‘segregated earthing system’ is permitted for distribution substations, where
appropriate, however, there is a particular safety hazard to manage with segregated
earthing systems. Refer to Paragraph B3.
(e) The outgoing LV neutral to the LV network and HV earthing conductors to the HV
network, forms a significant interconnection to the earthing at other distribution
substations. The number of electrodes at a substation can be designed with
consideration of such interconnections.
(f) Facilities should be provided to test earth electrodes without disconnection of the
earthing system from the energized substation.
B1.2 Higher level substations, e.g. 66 kV/22 kV, 132 kV/11 kV, 132 kV/33 kV
The following earthing system connection requirements and recommendations apply for
zone substations, sub-transmission substations and transmission substations:
(a) These substations should use a combined earthing system except in the case of
substations where it is shown that a segregated earthing system is appropriate (e.g. for
underground mining). Refer Paragraph B3.
(b) Testing of the complete earthing installation by current injection shall be undertaken
at commissioning and at intervals thereafter.
(c) The substation generally requires a buried earth grid near the surface to control step
and touch voltages. The many earth electrodes are connected directly to this earth
grid.

135 AS 2067:2016
(d) A distribution substation within a higher level substation shall have its neutral bar and
main earth bar connected directly to the higher level substation’s earth grid.
B1.3 All substations
The following earthing system connection requirements and recommendations apply to all
substations:
(a) All exposed metalwork evaluated to be at risk of direct or indirect energization in the
substation shall be permanently connected to the substation earthing system. This
includes transformer tanks, switchgear frames and enclosures, substation enclosures,
building reinforcing steel (for fences, refer to Paragraph B2.5).
(b) Conducting earth return paths entering or leaving the substation shall be permanently
and securely connected to the substation earthing system. These include cable sheaths
and screen wires, overhead earth wires, water pipes, interconnecting earth conductors
to other substations, earthing conductors to main switchboards of directly fed
customers.
(c) Consideration should be given for redundancy of critical earth connections such as
star point to neutral bar and neutral bar to earth bar.

(d) Termination of all earthing and neutral conductors to earth and neutral bars shall be
by individual bolts and bolt holes for each conductor.
(e) Connection of the earthed down leads of surge arresters is best carried out directly to
the tank of the transformer or item of equipment to be protected because any
additional length of earth lead will add its own voltage rise under lightning surge to
the protective level of the arrester.
(f) Creation of earth loops or neutral loops should be avoided in order to minimize EMF
fields.
B1.4 Cable sheaths
All HV cable sheaths or screens shall be connected to earth. If this connection is broken the
cable acts as a capacitive divider and a hazardous voltage appears on the sheath or screen
which may exceed personnel safety or equipment voltage limits. This effect is greatest for
single core cables and ‘triplex’ cables made up of three individually screened single core
cables. In the case of 3 core ‘belted’ cables having a single overall sheath the effect is
partially mitigated by the balanced capacitances of the 3 phases. For single core cables the
unearthed end of the cable sheaths may be earthed via sheath voltage limiters.
Substations often have short runs of single core HV cables and are the termination point and
earthing point for external feeder cables. The short runs of cable are often earthed by
‘single point bonding’ to prevent circulating sheath currents and the consequent de-rating of
the cable. This single earth connection is a safety critical item because if it is disconnected
or broken the sheath experiences a voltage rise. This situation is a trap because connections
to the sheath and possibly parts of the sheath are exposed and because people do not expect
a voltage on earth connections.
Staff should be trained to understand the importance of these earthing connections and to
keep away from any damaged or broken earth strap. It is recommended that warning labels
be placed on single point bonded cable sheath or screen to earth connections.
B1.5 Fence earthing
Consideration should be given to the direct and indirect energization mechanisms of
metallic fencing. Earthing and/or bonding should be provided as appropriate with
consideration of foreseeable hazards, current carrying capacity and contingencies.

AS 2067:2016 136
Metallic boundary fences for high voltage installations are commonly bonded to the high
voltage installation earthing system at several places, or to a separate fence earthing system.
Internal fences are usually bonded to the high voltage installation earthing system. Buried
grading conductors may be necessary outside and inside high voltage installation fences to
control touch voltages. A permanent bonding conductor is often installed across gate
openings to prevent voltage differences appearing across the opening. Care shall be taken to
control the transfer of hazardous voltages to metallic fences outside the high voltage
installation.
B2 COMBINED (COMMON) EARTHING SYSTEM

Figures B1 to B7 show typical earthing and neutral connections for a range of substation
situations. They are schematic drawings and the earthbars shown may be dedicated
earthbars or simply represent connections.
HV c a b l e s h e at h s
HV sw itc h g ear
HV sw itc h g ear
ear t h bar
1 or m ore transfor mer s

(e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
M et alli c
s u b s t at i o n
e n c l o s ure O n e N to E T h e n eutr al to ear t h
connection c o n n e c t i o n i s m ad e
by br i d g in g t h e
N N an d E bar s at t h e
LV sw itc h b oar d LV S w itc h b oar d.
(e n c l o se d)
E
S u b s t at i o n e ar t h b ar
Grad ing r ing Fl o or an d wall

i f r e q u ire d reinforc ing
s te e l
El e c tro d e s El e c tro d e s
FIGURE B1 DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION—EARTHING CONNECTIONS—

(WITH METAL ENCLOSED LV SWITCHBOARD)—COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM

137 AS 2067:2016
HV c a b l e s h eat h s
HV sw itc h g ear
HV sw itc h g ear
ear t h bar

(e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
S e p ar ate l y b o l te d c o n n e c t i o n s
to n eutr al bu s hin g
M et alli c
s u b s t at i o n
e n c l o s ure T h e n eutr al to ear t h
c o n n e c t i o n s are m ad e
by c o n n e c t in g t h e LV
N st ar p o int of eac h
tr an sfor m er to t h e
E su bst atio n ear t h bar.
LV sw itc h b oar d
(e n c l o se d)

s te e l
FIGURE B2 DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION—EARTHING CONNECTIONS ALTERNATIVE

METHOD OF EARTHING NEUTRALS (METAL ENCLOSED LV SWITCHBOARD)
COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM

AS 2067:2016 138
HV sw itc h g ear
HV sw itc h g ear
ear t h bar

(e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
A c o m m o n bar o n t h e LV
M et alli c sw itc h b oar d i s u se d for
s u b s t at i o n b ot h N eutr al an d ear t h
e n c l o s ure fun c t i o n s.
C o m b i n e d n e u t r a l a n d e ar t h
N+E
bar of LV sw itc h b oar d
Fr am e of LV sw itc h b oar d
O n e N to E c o n n e c t i o n

s te e l
FIGURE B3 DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION—EARTHING CONNECTIONS

(WITH OPEN TYPE LV SWITCHBOARD) COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM

139 AS 2067:2016
HV c a b l e s h e at h s
HV sw itc h g ear
HV sw itc h g ear
ear t h bar
El e c tro d e s
Group 1 Gr o u p 2
Ca b l e s h e at h
b o n d e d b ot h e n d s.

(e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
M et alli c
s u b s t at i o n
e n c l o s ure
LV sw itc h b oar d
N (e n c l o se d)
E O n e N to E
connection
El e c tro d e s Grad ing Fl o or an d El e c tro d e s

r in g i f wall
re quire d reinforc ing
s te e l
Us in g c a b l e s h eat h

(WITH METAL ENCLOSED LV SWITCHBOARD) COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM.
TRANSFORMERS REMOTE FROM HV SWITCHGEAR USING HV CABLE SHEATH

AS 2067:2016 140
HV sw itc h g ear
HV sw itc h g ear
ear t h bar
El e c tro d e s
Group 1 Group 2
Ear t h c o nt inuit y
c o n d u c tor Ca b l e s h e at h
s i n g l e p o i nt b o n d e d.
Ca b l e s h e at h i s o l at i o n

(e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
M et alli c
s u b s t at i o n
e n c l o s ure
LV sw itc h b oar d
N (e n c l o se d)
E O n e N to E
connection
El e c tro d e s Grad ing Fl o or an d El e c tro d e s

r in g i f wall
re quire d reinforc ing
s te e l
Using ear t h c o ntinuit y c o ndu c tor

w h ere HV c a b l e s h eat h i s
s i n g l e p o i nt b o n d e d.
FIGURE B5 DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION—EARTHING CONNECTIONS (WITH METAL

ENCLOSED LV SWITCHBOARD) COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM. TRANSFORMERS
REMOTE FROM HV SWITCHGEAR USING EARTH CONTINUITY CONDUCTOR

141 AS 2067:2016
HV dro p p er s
Tr an sfor m er s (e g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V )
Surg e ar rester
N LV n eutr al
S e p ar ate l y b o l te d
c o n n e c t i o n s to
neutral bushing

TYPICAL POLE TRANSFORMER COMBINED EARTHING SYSTEM

AS 2067:2016 142
O ver h ead
Ca b l e ear t h wine
s h e at h
HV sw itc h g ear or
outd o or c irc uit- breaker s
ear t h sw itc h e s etc.
All connections
M ain Tr ansfor mer s ↓ to ear t h gr i d
(e g. 6 6 /2 2 kV )
Auxiliar y
tr ansfor m er
(e g. 2 2 kV/4 0 0 V ) 2
Switc hg ear
Ear t h bar
(par t of ear t h gr i d)
Eq ui p m e nt ear t h ↓ c o n n e c te d d ire c t ly to
t h e n et wor k of ear t h bar s at t h e c l o se st p o int .
Fe n c e 1
Ear t h gr i d
B ur i e d
g r ad i n g LV n eutr al
c o n d u c tor
Water p i p e 1
Ear t hing inst allation
c o n s i st in g of ear t h bar s
t hr o u g h o u t t h e s u b s t at i o n
an d bur i e d ear t h gr i d M u l t i p l e e ar t h e l e c tr o d e s
1
Bonding the station earth grid to metallic facilities such as the perimeter fence and water pipes may not be
appropriate in some cases. Touch voltages and transfer potentials associated with these facilities shall be
assessed.
2
Auxilliary transformer earthing in accordance with appropriate Figures B1 to B5.
FIGURE B7 ZONE SUBSTATION OR TRANSMISSION SUBSTATION—

TYPICAL EARTHING CONNECTIONS

143 AS 2067:2016
B3 SEGREGATED (SEPARATED) DISTRIBUTION EARTHING SYSTEMS

Typical earthing and neutral connections for segregated or separated earthing systems are
shown in Figure B8.
HV dro p p er s
Tr an sfor m er s (e g. 11kV/4 0 0 V )
Surg e ar rester
N bu s hin g LV n eutr al
S e p ar ate l y b o l te d
c o n n e c t i o n s to
neutral bushing
HV ear t h bar LV ear t h bar
group HV g r o u p LV
FIGURE B8 DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATION—EARTHING CONNECTIONS—

TYPICAL POLE TRANSFORMER SEGREGATED EARTHING SYSTEM
There is a particular safety hazard associated with segregated earthing systems as shown in
Figure B8. An LV phase to tank contact (which may be external or internal) applies 240 V
to the HV earthing system whereas the neutral is connected to the LV earthing system.
Current is limited by the resistance between the HV and LV earthing electrodes to a low
value, perhaps 20 A or less, which will not blow fuses and not burn off any connections. As
illustrated in the example in Figure B9, there is 240 V continuously and permanently
between the HV and LV electrodes and between the two earthing conductors and their
connections on the pole. This constitutes a safety hazard to staff and public and there have
been accidents as a result. In a fuse protected distribution substation it is not possible to
provide relay protection against this condition because there is no circuit breaker to trip.
This dangerous situation remains undiscovered indefinitely until someone receives a shock.

AS 2067:2016 144
1A
3
e.g. 11 kV/4 0 0 V
N
24 A
HV ear t h LV ear t h
24 0 V
S ay 10 o h m s
FIGURE B9 SEGREGATED EARTHING HAZARD—TYPICAL POLE TRANSFORMER
For this reason the use of segregated earthing systems at distribution substations should be
minimized and not used indiscriminately. Use should be subject to individual risk
assessment.
If combined earthing is impractical, the following risk mitigation measures may be
considered:
(a) Covering all exposed metalwork (e.g. downleads covered with a timber batten or
polymeric cover) to a height of 2.4 m.
(b) Access by staff to structure/asset only undertaken once earth leads successfully
proven to be dead.
A minimum separation distance of 4 m is suggested between the HV and LV earthing
systems. In some instances the required separation may be much larger (i.e. low/high
resistivity layering with a LV network of limited extent).
The same hazard exists if an isolating transformer is used to bring a LV supply in to a major
substation in an attempt to isolate the external LV network from the major substation’s
earth potential rise.
In special circumstances such as HV supplies to underground mining installations it may be
necessary to segregate the higher and lower voltage earthing systems and the same hazard
arises.

145 AS 2067:2016
APPENDIX C
FIRE RISK ZONES FOR DISTRIBUTION SUBSTATIONS
(Informative)
This Appendix provides examples of fire risk zones from oil insulated distribution
substations (i.e. kiosks/padmount cubicles) based on Table 6.1 separation distances. When
those distances cannot be met, verification by fire risk assessment (FRA) is required.
If transformers are not segregated by G1 distance in Table 6.1 or by fire rated walls, the
combined oil volume of the transformers should be used.
Distribution substations that do not have integral fire protection or barriers are referred to
as non-fire rated substations.
Figure C1 applies to single transformer substations with not more than 1000 L of oil per
installation.
Figure C2 applies to non-fire rated substations incorporating HV equipment with
combustible liquid dielectric.
Figure C3 applies to non-fire rated substations incorporating only dry-type HV transformer
or HV equipment with less-combustible liquid dielectric (switchgear).
Figure C4 applies to non-fire rated substations incorporating HV equipment with
combustible liquid dielectric abutting high building.
Figure C5 applies to attached or adjacent substations with fire-rated walls and roof and non-
fire-rated doors and vents.
Figure C6 applies to indoor substations with public access above.
Figure C7 applies to open top substations with fire rated walls and non-fire rated doors.
Figure C8 applies to non-fire rated substations in a commercial/industrial area incorporating
HV equipment with combustible liquid dielectric and fire-rated blast wall.
The fire risk zones are categorized as follows:
(a) Fire Risk Zone I—no building structures in this area.
(b) Fire Risk Zone II—to protect adjacent buildings use a two-hour fire rated wall or
carry out a fire risk assessment to determine other suitable fire protection methods.
The vertical dimension G4 applies to height of two hour fire resistant surfaces of buildings.
The vertical extent of the fire risk zone should be determined by a fire risk assessment with
due consideration of overhanging structures.
NOTES:
1 Refer to Clause 6.7.4.4 and Table 6.1 for definition and value of G1, G2, G3 and G4.
2 In Figures C2 to C4, SWG stands for switchgear.
3 In Figures C1 to C4, T x stands for transformer.

AS 2067:2016 146
C o m b u s t i b l e b u il d i n g 10 0 0
10 0 0
TX
3000
10 0 0 3000
PL AN
Zo n e II Zo n e I Zo n e II
TX
10 0 0 10 0 0
Combustible 3000 3000
b u il d i n g
ELE VATIO N
LEGEN D:
Fire r i s k zo n e - I
Fire r i s k zo n e - II
NOT E: Fi re r isk a s se s sme nt shou ld b e u nde r t a ke n i f Z one I I is t o b e re duce d
FIGURE C1 NON-FIRE RATED KIOSK-TYPE SUBSTATION IN A LOW DENSITY

RESIDENTIAL AREA (NCC CLASS 1 OR 10 BUILDING)

147 AS 2067:2016
G3
Tx
LV
LV
SWG
Tx
G2
Zo n e II Zo n e I Zo n e II
SWG Tx FG L
G3 G3
G2 G2
ELEVATION
LEGEN D:
NOTE: For HV equipment with less-combustible liquid dielectric, G3 and G2 should be taken from HV equipment with
combustible liquid dielectric. Minimum clearance for operational and access requirements from HV equipment should
still be applied.
FIGURE C2 NON-FIRE RATED SUBSTATION INCORPORATING HV EQUIPMENT

WITH COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID DIELECTRIC

AS 2067:2016 148
G1
2 h our fire r ate d barr i er Tx

SWG
Tx
G1
PL AN
2 h our fire r ate d barr i er

Fire r i s k zo n e II
G4
SWG Tx FG L
G1
N ote
ELEVATION
LEGEN D:
NOTE: For HV equipment with less-combustible liquid dielectric, G1 should be taken from Dry-Type HV transformer.
Minimum clearance for operational and access requirements from HV equipment should still be applied.
FIGURE C3 NON-FIRE RATED SUBSTATION INCORPORATING ONLY DRY-TYPE

HV TRANSFORMER OR HV EQUIPMENT WITH LESS-COMBUSTIBLE
LIQUID DIELECTRIC (SWITCHGEAR)

149 AS 2067:2016
G3
G2
TX
LV
LV
High
SWG
building
TX
G2
2 h our fire r ate d barr i er
G2
PL AN
W in d ows, etc, p er m it te d
su bj e c t to fire r i s k a s se s s m e nt
B u il d i n g wall
Zo n e I Zo n e II
G4
SWG TX
FG L
2 h our fire r ate d barr i er G3

G2
N ote
ELEVATION
LEGEN D:
NOTE: For HV equipment with less-combustible liquid dielectric, G3 and G2 should be taken from HV equipment with
combustible liquid dielectric. Minimum clearance for operational and access requirements from HV equipment should
still be applied.
FIGURE C4 NON-FIRE RATED SUBSTATION INCORPORATING HV EQUIPMENT

WITH COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID DIELECTRIC ABUTTING HIGH BUILDING

AS 2067:2016 150
20 0 0 20 0 0 NOT E:
Ve nt op e n i ngs t o not
exce e d 60 0 x 60 0 m m
Ve nt o p e nin g FR L 120/120/120
M ain wall
(small)
b u il d i n g
20 0 0 Ve nt s
20 0 0
Fire r i s k
zo n e
6000
6000
6000
PL AN
FR L 120/120/120
r o of
20 0 0
20 0 0
M ain
b u il d i n g
20 0 0
20 0 0
FG L
A ll su b st at i o n wall s D o or s an d ve nt s n ot
FR L 120/120/120 re quire d to be fire rate d
ELE VATIO N
LEGEN D:
NOT E:
= Fire r i s k zo n e II T h is d r aw i ng is i nd icat ive on ly.
T he f i re r isk z one ex t e nd s 60 0 0 m m f rom
t he e d ge of t he do or op e n i ng. I f d r y-t y p e
e qu ipme nt is i n st a l le d t he 60 0 0 m m d ist a nce
m ay b e re duce d t o 20 0 0 m m.
T he se d ist a nce s shou ld b e ve r i f ie d by F R A.
FIGURE C5 ATTACHED OR ADJACENT SUBSTATION WITH FIRE-RATED WALLS

AND ROOF AND NON-FIRE-RATED DOORS AND VENTS

151 AS 2067:2016
Open S o l i d (m a s o nr y)
balustrad e balustrad e
Pu b li c
ac c e s s / walk way
6000
20 0 0
6000 S u b s t at i o n 20 0 0
20 0 0
6000
Pu b li c
Open S o l i d (m a s o nr y)
balustrad e balustrad e
PL AN
Open C o n c rete s l a b S o l i d (m a s o nr y)
balustrad e FR L 120/120/120 balustrad e
75 0 m in. 75 0 m in.
Pu b li c
S u b s t at i o n wal l
S u b s t at i o n
Ve nt o p e nin g s to n ot
20 0 0 exc e e d 6 0 0 x 6 0 0 m m
FG L
S u b s t at i o n
wall
ELE VATIO N
LEGEN D:
NOT E:
= Fire r i s k zo n e II T h is d r aw i ng is i nd icat ive on ly.
T he f i re r isk z one ex t e nd s 60 0 0 m m f rom
t he e d ge of t he do or op e n i ng. I f d r y-t y p e
e qu ipme nt is i n st a l le d t he 60 0 0 m m d ist a nce
m ay b e re duce d t o 20 0 0 m m. T he se d ist a nce s
shou ld b e ve r i f ie d by F R A.
FIGURE C6 INDOOR SUBSTATION WITH PUBLIC ACCESS ABOVE

AS 2067:2016 152
B u il d i n g S u b s t at i o n B u il d i n g
CL
20 0 0 20 0 0 N o s p e c i al
tre at m e nt r e q u ire d
as out s i d e fire r isk
zo n e
N o n fire
6000 r ate d
d o or
PL AN
W in d ows etc. p er m it te d
o nly out s i d e t h e fire
r i s k zo n e
6000
6000
Wall s, ro ofs, etc.
within fire r isk
zo ne must be fire
r ate d
4 5°
1500 B u il d i n g
B u il d i n g S u b s t at i o n
FG L
FR L 120/120/120 ELE VATIO N

wall s
LEGEN D: NOT E:
T h is d r aw i ng is i nd icat ive on ly.
= Fire r i s k zo n e II
T he f i r e r i sk z one ex t e nd s 6 0 0 0 m m f rom
t he out e r p oi nt of a l l ele c t r ic a l e q u ipme nt
w it h i n t he s u b st at ion a r e a . I f d r y-t y p e
e q u ipme nt i s i n st a l le d t he 6 0 0 0 m m d i st a nc e
m ay b e r e d uc e d t o 20 0 0 m m . T he se d ist a nce s
shou ld b e ve r i f ie d by F R A.
FIGURE C7 OPEN TOP SUBSTATION WITH FIRE RATED WALLS

AND NON-FIRE RATED DOORS

153 AS 2067:2016
6000
NOT E:
D ot t e d l i ne on pla n
v iew shows t he ef fe ct on
t he f i re r isk z one of
ex t e nd i ng t he ret u r n on t he
bla st wa l l.
20 0 0
N o ot h er str u c ture s PL AN
in t hi s zo n e (unl e s s
fire prote c te d)
NOT E:
D ot t e d l i ne on
elevat ion v iew shows 6000
t he ef fe ct on t he r isk
z one of i nc re a si ng t he
heig ht of t he bla st wa l l
bu i ld i ngs or ot he r 4 5°
e qu ipme nt t h at m ay b e
lo cat e d close r t o t he 15 0 0
bla st wa l l
ELE VATIO N
NOT E:
LEGEN D:
T h is d r aw i ng is i nd icat ive on ly.
= Fire r i s k zo n e II T he f i re r isk z one ex t e nd s 60 0 0 m m f rom
t he out e r p oi nt of a l l ele ct r ica l e qu ipme nt
w it h i n t he s ubst at ion a re a . I f d r y-t y p e
e qu ipme nt is i n st a l le d t he 60 0 0 m m
d ist a nce m ay b e re duce d t o 20 0 0 m m.
T he se d ist a nce s shou ld b e ve r i f ie d by F R A.
FIGURE C8 NON-FIRE RATED SUBSTATION IN A COMMERCIAL/INDUSTRIAL AREA

INCORPORATING HV EQUIPMENT WITH COMBUSTIBLE LIQUID DIELECTRIC
AND FIRE-RATED BLAST WALL

AS 2067:2016 154
APPENDIX D
EMF AND SAFETY ISSUES—OBLIGATIONS RELATED TO THE DESIGN OF
THE INSTALLATION
(Informative)
The designer has an obligation to ensure that the installation design is carried out in such a
way to—
(a) provide for the safety of persons, including employees of and contractors to the
operator;
(b) reduce the exposure of persons, including employees of and contractors to the
operator and the public, to electric and magnetic field effects; and
(c) measures to mitigate EMF to meet international guidelines should be undertaken.
Other than where EMF exposures are being implemented to comply with Australian or
International guidelines, the costs of precautionary measures should be very low.
There are five basic techniques that should be used in the design and installation processes
to reduce EMF:
(i) Reduce electrical current by using more energy efficient equipment for large
electrical loads such as lift motors, air conditioning equipment, industrial motors and
manufacturing equipment.
(ii) Balance circuits to minimize net magnetic fields.
(iii) Reduce magnetic fields by circuit installation arrangements that reduce distance
between, or coordinate the relative placement of, all conductors in the same circuit
including the avoidance of creation of earth or neutral loops.
(iv) Allow appropriate separation distance between EMF sources and sensitive areas
where the level, duration, affected persons or other consequences of exposure may
warrant attention.
(v) Shield sources by containment or dispersal behind specialized barriers.
NOTES:
1 Further information on the wiring matters and EMF and health issue is available at Energy
Networks Association EMF web page (www.ena.asn.au/emg).
2 Further information on the EMF and health issue is available at the Australian Radiation
Protection and Nuclear Safety Council (ARPANSA) web site (www.arpansa.gov.au) and
ICNIRP*.
* Refer ICNIRP (International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection) ‘Guideline for Limiting
Exposure to Time Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields (1 Hz to 100 kHz) 2010’. (www.icnirp.de)

155 AS 2067:2016
APPENDIX E
TYPICAL SYSTEM FOR FUNCTIONAL IDENTIFICATION OF SMALL WIRING
(Informative)
E1 SCOPE
To assist in the preparation of diagrams and for the purposes of checking circuits, fault
finding and modification work, the ends of each wire should be identified by suitable
marking to show its function.
Each function (e.g. current transformer for primary protection or control circuit for circuit-
breaker) can be defined by a distinctive code consisting of numbers or a combination of
numbers and letters. There are a number of different codes in existence established by the
various supply authorities. This Appendix sets out one typical system which is based on the
use of letters and numerals and complies with the requirements of this Standard.
E2 WIRE NUMBERING CODE

E2.1 Identification
Every branch of any connection should bear the same identification mark. Where, however,
it is necessary to identify branches which are connected to a common point, e.g. current-
transformer leads, different numbers for the branches may be employed only if they are
connected through links, or are connected to separate terminals which are then joined by
removable connections.
E2.2 Identification according to function
A recommended system of marking providing functional identification is described below
and summarized in Table E1:
(a) Each wire should have a letter to denote its function, e.g. control of circuitbreaker,
current transformer for primary protection, voltage for instruments, metering and
protection.
(b) Each wire should have a suffix number identifying the individual wire and its
function. This may consist of one or more digits as required. F or functions A-G, H, J
and M, the suffix numbers should be as given in the column under ‘wire numbers’.
Direct-current supplies from a positive source should bear odd numbers and d.c.
supplies from a negative source should bear even numbers commencing from the
source of supply. Where coils or resistors are connected in series the change from odd
to even should be made at the coil or resistor lead nearest to the negative supply.
(c) Where a number of similar leads from separate units are taken to a common panel,
e.g. bus-zone protection, summation metering, suffixes A, B, C, etc. should be used to
distinguish them. Where two associated equipments are mounted on one panel,
e.g. generator and unit transformer, HV and LV sides of one transformer, all leads of
the subsidiary or lower-volt age equipment of the two should be distinguished by
adding 500 to the numbers of wires in the common panel and associated
interconnecting cores only.
(d) Where more than one function is covered by common apparatus, the first of the
appropriate function letters in the table should be used. This applies only to parallel
circuits, and where these circuits split at a separate contact, e.g. fuse-link, switch or
relay contact, the function on letter should change if necessary from the splitting
point onwards.

AS 2067:2016 156
(e) Where relays are employed, the coil and the contact circuits do not necessarily bear
the same function letter, which should be determined by the function of the individual
circuit containing them, e.g. the coil circuit of an interposing relay should be ‘W’ but
the contact circuits may bear letters such as ‘K’, ‘L ’, or ‘N’, as appropriate.
(f) Current and voltage-transformer function letters should follow through any
interposing and auxiliary current and voltage transformers, including such

transformers when used for light-current circuits. Where an a.c. supply reflecting the
primary quantities and derived from a current or volt age transformer is rectified for
the operation of instruments or relays, the d.c. circuit should carry the same function
letter as the a.c. circuit.
(g) Circuits having functions not included in the function letter table should not have
prefix letters.
(h) Where the manufacturer has been unable to ascertain from the purchaser the function
letters and numbering to be assigned to equipment wiring by the time that wiring is
required, the manufacturer should himself provide wire numbers prefixed by the letter
‘O’. Where the appropriate function letter only can be determined, it should be
preceded by ‘0’ and followed by the manufacturer’s own number. The same
procedure may be applied in the case of equipment or parts of equipment not assigned
to specific contracts at the time of manufacture, subject to the purchaser’s approval
and to the use of ferruling in accordance with approved standard diagrams to the
extent that those diagrams apply.
(i) Light-current equipment, e.g. telephone-type or electronic signalling equipment may
require numbering schemes differing from the above for complete identification. In
such cases, where connections from such equipment are associated with power
equipment wired in accordance with this Appendix, the numbering of such
connections should include the appropriate prefix letter (J, W, X, or Y) to distinguish
them.
TABLE E1
CIRCUIT AND WIRE IDENTIFICATION CODE
Wire numbers (see Note 1)

Letter Circuit function
[see Paragraph E2.2(b)]
A Current transformers for primary protection, 10-29 Red phase
excluding overcurrent
30-49 White phase
B Current transformer f or busbar protection 50-69 Blue phase
C Current transformers for overcurrent protection 70-89 Residual circuits and neutral
(including combined ear through-fault protection current transformers
and instruments)
90 Earth wires directly
D Current transformers for instruments, metering connected to the earth bar
voltage control
91-99 Test windings, normally
E Reference volt age of instruments, metering and inoperative
protection
F Reference voltage for voltage control
G Reference voltage for synchronizing
H a.c. and a.c./d.c. supplies 1-69 Switchgear and generators
70-99 Transformers
J d.c supplies 1-69 Switchgear and generators
(continued)

157 AS 2067:2016
TABLE E1 (continued)
Wire numbers (see Note 1)

Letter Circuit function
[see Paragraph E2.2(b)]
K Closing and tripping control circuits Any number from 1 upwards
L Alarms and indications initiated by auxiliary
switches and relay contacts, excluding those for

Any number from 1 upwards
remote selective control and for general indication
equipment
M Auxiliary and control motor devices, e.g. govern or 1-19 Switchgear
motor, rheostat motor, generator automatic voltage
20-69 Generators
regulator control, spring-charging motors,
transformer cooler-motor control, motors for isolator 70-99 Transformers
operation
N Tap-change control including automatic voltage
control, tap position and progress indication
O An indication that the ferruling is not in accordance
with the general scheme and that if it is not altered

double ferruling will be required for coordination Any number from 1 upwards
with the remaining equipment in the station
[see Paragraph E2.2(h)]
P d.c. tripping circuits used solely for busbar
protection
R Interlock circuits not covered above Any number from 1 upwards
S d.c. instruments and relays, exciter and field circuits
for generators
T Pilot conductors (including directly associated
connections) between panels, independent of the
distance between them, for pilot-wire protection, for
intertripping or for both
U Spare cores and connections to spare contacts Spare cores should be numbered from
1 upwards in each cable, and should
be so arranged that they can be
readily identified on site with the
cable containing them. This should
be achieved by suitable grouping,
and unless the location of each group
is clear from the diagram, the groups
should be labelled. Alternatively the
core number should be preceded by
the cable number.
W Connections to and from light current control
equipment
X Alarms and indications to and from general
indication and remote selective control equipment Any number from 1 upwards
(see Note 2)
Y Telephones Any number from 1 upwards
NOTES:
1 If, for functions A-G and for functions H, J and M, more number s are required, add multiples of one
hundred, e.g. 10-29 may be extended to 110-129, 210-229.
2 The term ‘remote selective control’ denotes ‘control at a point distant from the switchgear by the
transmission of electrical signals through common communications channels using selective means to
operate one of a number of switching devices’.

AS 2067:2016 158
APPENDIX F
POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
(Informative)
F1 GENERAL
This Appendix provides guidance on issues and considerations relating to the application of
power system protection on high voltage systems, in particular the influence on other
aspects of substation design.
Protection is a specialized discipline and requires people qualified or appropriately trained
and competent in the discipline to carry out the various protection functions such as
protection planning, system analysis, design and specification of relay systems, circuit
design, relay settings, testing, installation, and commissioning.
The purpose of this Appendix is to draw attention to those aspects of protection which have
particular influence on other aspects of substation design and to highlight where interaction
and coordination between protection and the other disciplines is necessary.
F2 SAFETY
Safety of power systems is identified in legislation as paramount and is required to be given
priority over all other aspects of management and operation of the power system. This
requirement applies particularly to ‘safety in design’.
Protection systems, although provided to clear failed cables, transformers, etc., from the
power system, are also essential for the safety of both staff and public. Protection has a
great influence on the consequences of electrical failure and on the level of injury
sustained, and is therefore a major consideration with respect to safety.
Safety of staff and the public is dependent on protection systems in three particular ways:
(a) Dependability The protection system should always operate to clear a primary
system fault (the safety outcome for people in the vicinity of a fault will be much
worse if the protection fails to operate).
(b) Coverage The protection system should be capable of detecting all faults. (No fault
should be beyond the reach of the protection.) Refer to Paragraph F4.2.
(c) Speed of operation Fast fault clearance limits the harm to people compared to slow
clearance. (there is a large difference to the safety outcome between clearance times
of say 0.1 s and 1.0 s). Fast fault clearance can in many cases prevent splitting of
equipment tanks, and prevent or lower the incidence of fires.
F3 PROTECTION OBJECTIVES
Following are the eight basic objectives in the application of protection:
(a) To minimize the risk of injury to the public and personnel.
(b) To disconnect the faulted circuit or piece of equipment leaving the remainder of the
system in a healthy state.
(c) To interrupt the fault current with sufficient speed to ensure system stability is not
compromised.
(d) To maximize the electricity supply reliability by disconnecting only the failed
equipment or circuit.
(e) To prevent through-fault damage to upstream conductors and equipment.
159 AS 2067:2016
(f) To preserve power system security by remaining secure against unintended tripping
on through-fault currents.
(g) To minimize the damage to network equipment at the fault location.
(h) To minimize damage to property.
F4 BASIC PRINCIPLES
F4.1 General
The objectives in Paragraph F3 lead to the following basic principles which are generally
applicable to all levels of the system.
F4.2 Primary protection
A system of primary protection should be provided to detect all faults and disconnect all
faulted items of equipment from the power system. It should have no blind spots. That is,
no fault should be beyond the reach of the protection.
In principle, protection should be provided capable of detecting any fault on the power
system, particularly faults which can constitute a hazard. However, it is recognized that it is
not always technically practicable to detect certain very low level faults, such as may occur
when an overhead conductor falls to ground, or when vehicle tyres restrict the current.
Nevertheless, the industry is under obligation to apply the best practicable protection to
these situations. In substations, it should always be practicable to provide protection for low
level faults.
F4.3 Back-up protection
A system of back-up protection should be provided, which should also have no blind spots.
Back-up protection may utilize the principles of remote back-up or of local back-up as
appropriate to the level of the system.
Back-up should be provided for the failure of any element of the protection system to
operate, as follows:
(a) Relays and IEDs (intelligent electronic devices).
(b) Circuit breakers.
(c) d.c. supplies.
(d) Wiring and cabling including optical fibres.
(e) Current transformers and voltage transformers.
An exception to this back-up policy is generally made for fuses, but it is dependent on the
correct type and rating of fuse being installed.
F4.4 Fault clearance times
Fault clearance times should be such that there is no damage (other than at the fault
location) due to the passage of through-fault current and that no additional faults are caused
by it.
The type of protection chosen and the relay settings applied should limit temperatures on
overhead line conductors, cables, sheaths, earth conductors, and equipment so as to prevent
mechanical damage, significant annealing, thermal damage to insulation, and excessive sag.
F4.5 System stability
Fault clearance times should be limited and coordinated to ensure network integrity and
system stability are maintained. The fault clearing time should meet the requirements of the
relevant network authorities.

AS 2067:2016 160
F4.6 Effects of faults

The protection system should limit the effects of faults and the damage at the fault location
to reduce the risk of harm to the public, personnel and property.
This is achieved by primary system design and equipment design as well as speed and
sensitivity of protection. Special precautions are taken in relation to major hazard facilities,
locations with potentially flammable or explosive atmospheres, swimming pools,

communication lines and cables, railways, mines, and high rise buildings.
F4.7 Prevent/minimize loss of supply
The protection system should prevent or minimize loss of supply by confining the outage
for a particular fault to defined sections of the system consistent with planning reliability
policies.
F4.8 Legislation and regulations
Legislation and regulations on protection apply, e.g. Australian National Electricity Rules
and the Western Australian Technical Rules.
F5 SEGREGATION
Larger substations are designed on an N-1 basis; that is, the failure of any one item of
primary equipment or outage for maintenance can be accommodated while permitting the
substation to continue to supply its rated load. This concept requires that segregation of the
primary equipment items should be provided so that failure of one does not damage another,
e.g. a transformer fire should not damage adjacent transformers, or one busbar damage
another. Extending this concept, there should be no credible event possible which affects
more than one item of equipment.
This concept applies equally to the protection system of each of the primary items,
particularly to the secondary wiring and cabling. It would be inconsistent to provide
segregation of the primary equipment items but not carry this through to the corresponding
protection equipment.
Physical segregation of the protection cabling and equipment belonging to one item of
primary equipment from that of other equipment is therefore recommended.
The segregation can be achieved in different ways, by physical separation, by barriers, by
use of robust and fireproof cabling, or by a combination of these measures.
NOTES:
1 PVC and XLPE cable insulation and sheathing have very poor fire performance.
2 Recovery time from an event which damages or destroys many protection circuits or cables is
likely to be unacceptably long, in the order of days or weeks, for cabling to be replaced, and
the testing and commissioning processes to be carried out.
Not all substations will require full segregation of protection to match primary equipment
segregation. It may be that loss of more than one feeder bay, for example, can be tolerated
in a particular substation without compromising its main function; if so, then segregation of
protection of those feeders from one another may not be essential. A risk assessment of
each individual situation should always be carried out to determine the extent of
segregation employed in the design. If, for example, the substation is smaller and can be
fully supported by adjacent substations via the lower voltage network then the risk
consequences of not providing this protection circuit segregation are clearly reduced.
An exception to the above concept may be for certain industrial process substations
(as distinct from utility substations) where the process itself may have to shut down, even
for loss of part of the substation.

161 AS 2067:2016
Further, for each item of primary equipment, physical segregation of the ‘A’ (or ‘X’)
protection from the ‘B’ (or ‘Y’) protection is recommended to prevent the functionality of
both protection schemes being affected by a single credible event or credible combination
of events.
Even if one of the A and B protection schemes is still undamaged and functioning, the local
regulatory requirements may place a limit on the time a HV circuit is permitted to remain in
service relying on one protection. This can be as short as 8 h depending on the
circumstances and position in the network.
F6 GENERAL PRINCIPLES
F6.1 General
The following general principles derive from and expand the basic principles and are also
generally applicable to all levels of the system.
F6.2 Components
A protection scheme involves all the components needed to detect when a fault occurs, to
decide whether to trip, and to isolate the faulted item from the system.
These components include the following:
(a) The current transformers and voltage transformers.
(b) The protection relays including intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) used for
protection functions.
(c) Digital communications components such as network switches, routers, media
converters, merging units, multiplexers, teleprotection devices and other devices used
for protection functions.
(d) Components such as ethernet switches, routers, merging units and multiplexers used
for protection functions.
(e) Batteries and d.c. supply arrangements.
(f) The circuit-breakers.
(g) The circuitry that functionally interconnects all these components.
(h) The physical wiring and cabling.
F6.3 Power system
The protection system should leave the power system in a healthy state following a power
system fault or protection operation. That is—
(a) the remaining feeders or items of plant should not be left in an overloaded state;
(b) the remaining feeders and plant should be able to be satisfactorily operated; and
(c) fault levels in the remaining network should be such that faults can be reliably
detected by protection.
Intervention may be necessary, either manually by operators or by additional protection, to
safeguard the network from these conditions. For instance, by manually shifting load or
shedding load or rearranging the network. Or by protection initiated automatic means such
as load shedding, auto-closing, or automatic switching. These measures are an integral part
of protection design in conjunction with the network design.
F6.4 Protective earthing
A system of protective earthing should be provided and co-ordinated with active protection
devices to limit voltages during fault conditions to acceptable levels. Refer to Section 8.

AS 2067:2016 162
F6.5 Fault protection and protection against overloading

The protection system is intended to protect the network and its components against the
effects of faults. A distinction should be made between fault protection and overload
protection. It is possible to do both with the one relay, but requirements are often
conflicting. It is essential that fault protection be provided by relaying or other automatic
means whereas overloading should be prevented by load monitoring, system planning, and
operating.
Nevertheless, there are certain specific cases where protection against overload is provided
in the form of load relief, or thermal relays. This, however, is additional to the normal fault
protection and must not interfere with the co-ordination of the normal fault protection.
Protection of motors is a particular case, generally requiring protection against overloading.
F6.6 Rating of primary equipment
Protection should not limit the rating of the primary equipment. The thermal rating of the
relays, current transformers, and the relay settings, should be arranged to be above the
emergency rating of the feeder, transformer, or busbar.
F6.7 Circuit breakers

A sufficient number of circuit-breakers should be provided on the primary system to:
(a) Enable automatic isolation of faults without complicated switching procedures.
(b) Enable Back-up protection principles to be applied.
(c) Enable protection circuits to be designed as far as possible in discrete independent
zones with a minimum of complicated secondary circuit interconnections between
zones.
(d) Facilitate straightforward operating procedures and avoid operating complications
and ‘traps’.
(e) Facilitate standard substation designs.
This should be balanced against the cost of installation and maintenance of circuit-breakers
and the need to provide protection of the circuit-breakers (and associated equipment)
themselves.
F6.8 Electrical interference
Protection systems should be designed to function correctly in the presence of various kinds
of electrical interference, including in particular any interference which may be generated
by system faults and switching operations. It should be recognized that the electric power
system and substations are a harsh environment for electronic equipment (surges and
transients) and also a harsh physical environment (shock and vibration).
The relays and protection equipment should be robust and immune to damage from these
various forms of interference. They should not be inhibited from operating correctly when
required. They should not be caused to operate incorrectly at any time, particularly during
the presence of fault current. Settings, logic, software, or firmware may be corrupted by
interference if action is not taken.

163 AS 2067:2016
The design of protection equipment should comply with the type tests shown in the
following table, as specified in IEC 60255-5 and IEC 60255-26:
Insulation 50 Hz IEC 60255-5:2000 This requirement arises

withstand test (2 kV RMS 1 minute) from voltage induced into
secondary wiring from

(1 kV DC) power system fault currents
Impulse 1.2/50 μs IEC 60255-5:2000 This arises from lightning
withstand test (5 kV peak) currents in substation
earthing conductors
inducing corresponding
impulse voltages into
secondary wiring
Interference 1 MHz bursts IEC 60255-26:2013 This arises from HV
test (2.5 kV longitudinal) disconnector switching
generating high frequency
(1 kV transverse) interference which couples

into secondary wiring
Fast transient 1 MHz bursts IEC 60255-26:2013 This arises from relay,
test (3 kV) circuit-breaker, and
contactor d.c. coils being
switched and generating
these surges directly in the
d.c. circuits in the
substation
Gradual shut- For d.c. power supply IEC 60255-26:2013 Represents a battery going
down/start-up to relays flat or being re-charged
test
For each of these tests the test voltage is selected from a range depending on the severity
class of the installation, as defined in IEC 60255. The values in brackets are typical test
levels used for protection equipment and schemes.
In addition, relays and equipment should be designed to not generate electrical interference,
conducted or radiated, of a level which could affect other relays and equipment in the
substation.
Intertrip systems using pilot cables should be designed to withstand without breakdown,
maloperation, or failure to operate, the high levels of voltage, interference, and noise, which
are induced into pilot cables by power system faults and switching operations.
F6.9 Sources of energy
Protection systems and relays should use sources of energy for their operation which are
independent of the power system a.c. voltage. This is necessary because of the following:
(a) The a.c. system voltage is depressed or disturbed during power system faults.
(b) The protection has to be operational prior to energization of the a.c. system which it
protects.
(c) Protection has to be operational throughout a supply interruption in readiness for
restoration.
The sources of energy will generally be in the form of battery supplies.
The d.c. supply to protection is a critical function and should always be available.

AS 2067:2016 164
F6.10 Voltage range

Battery and unregulated d.c. supply systems will inherently deliver a voltage which varies
over a range, the magnitude of which is dependent on several influencing factors.
Regulated d.c. supplies by design deliver a tightly controlled output voltage but allowance
still has to be made for voltage drops in wiring and cabling.
Protection relays and systems including circuit-breaker trip coil circuits should be designed
and proven to function correctly over a voltage range which exceeds the d.c. supply range.
A substantial margin of safety at the lower end is necessary in view of the nature of the
influencing factors stated below. A margin of 15% to 20% is recommended.
The specification of the relay range is problematic for the following reasons.
IEC 60255-1:2009 currently specifies a range of 80% to 110% of relay rated voltage, which
results in requirements on the range provided by the battery system which are impracticable
to meet, having regard to the following:
(a) The effects of depleted battery capacity near the end of an extended power system
interruption, the maximum current drawn by a protection operation plus other

loading, the battery internal resistance as affected by low temperature, age and
condition, and voltage drops in wiring, cabling, etc.
(b) The need to allow a margin of safety between the lowest voltage from the battery
system and the minimum operating voltage of the relays and other protection
components.
(c) The need to not exceed the relays’ upper limit when the battery is fully charged on
float voltage (typically about 115% of nominal).
(d) The need to not exceed the relays’ upper limit where boost or equalizing charging is
employed. Some battery systems require boost or equalizing charges of at least 120%
nominal voltage from time to time to restore capacity and achieve expected life.
NOTE: The battery nominal voltage depends on the number of cells chosen and is not necessarily
the same as the relay rated voltage. The matter is further complicated if relays having slightly
different rated voltages are involved, e.g. 110 V and 125 V, in the one substation.
Circuit breaker standards, AS 62271.1:2012 and IEC 62271-1:2011 by contrast, specify a
range of 70% to 110% of circuit breaker rated auxiliary voltage.
It is recommended that a range of 70% to 120% be specified for protection relays and
systems, as well as for circuit breakers.
The factors which need to be considered in the design of the battery and d.c. supply system
to deliver a voltage within a given range include the following:
(i) Battery type and capacity, in amp hours (Ah).
(ii) The number of cells and the nominal voltage.
(iii) The maximum current to be supplied during a protection trip or other switch
operation.
(iv) The standing load on the battery system.
(v) The required time period for which the d.c. supply system is required to maintain
supply capability without power system a.c. voltage.
(vi) The minimum d.c. voltage to be delivered to protection at the end of the battery
discharge time (while the battery charger is without a.c. voltage).
(vii) What load is connected to the battery other than protection.

165 AS 2067:2016
(viii) The lower limit of the state of charge which is to be designed for. It is recommended
that it should not be allowed to fall below 30%.
(ix) Design life of battery.
(x) Minimum and maximum temperature.
(xi) Voltage drops in wiring, cabling, and any series relay coils, when delivering the
highest current.
(xii) The voltage present when the battery is on floating charge.
(xiii) The highest voltage which may be delivered when the battery is on boost charge.
(xiv) Future loads that may be connected to the d.c. supply during the life of the substation.
(xv) Battery internal resistance.
F6.11 Major system shutdown
Relays and other electronic devices add permanent standing load to the protection batteries.
Battery capacity or the equivalent should be provided to safely ride through a wide and
extended blackout or power system shutdown. Supply to substation battery chargers will not
be available from the power system during this period.
The duration of a major system shutdown requiring a ‘black start’ depends on the network
and the location of the substation within the network, and is nowadays assessed to be in the
range of 10 h to 36 h. The availability of d.c. supply throughout and at the end of this
period is critical. Protection, SCADA and local control functions at all substations should
be kept ready throughout this period to allow progressive and controlled restoration of
feeders and loads at the call of the system operator and at any stage of the restoration
process.
Similarly supply to substations can be interrupted for extended periods due to bushfires or
flooding.
The designer in consultation with the owner should calculate the expected duration for a
major system shutdown and the expected time the substation equipment is to be supplied by
the battery without external supply to the chargers. The battery capacity should be sized to
ensure correct operation of all protection devices for the outage period and a minimum of
two protection trip operations (e.g. bus zone trip) at the end of the outage period.
Consideration should be given to provision of backup a.c. generation in the substation as a
means of maintaining the protection d.c. supply capability through an extended power
system interruption. Other options which could be considered in various different situations
are as follows:
(a) Use relays and devices having low standing d.c. drain.
(b) Use self-powered relays where appropriate (particularly in distribution substations).
(c) Use additional batteries to minimize the standing load on protection batteries.
(d) Use separate batteries for substation emergency lighting.
(e) Disable non-essential functions for the duration of such an event.
F6.12 Functional proving of relays and systems
Consistent with the high degree of dependability required, protection relays and systems
should be proven to function correctly at commissioning and at defined intervals. These
tests should involve the injection and measurement of operating quantities and should prove
the system by direct or simulated means.
It is necessary to prove that the scheme functions as designed and intended. That it does
what it is supposed to do. And to prove that it does not do anything else.

AS 2067:2016 166
Most substations have to remain in service at all times while providing for failure of
individual items of equipment and also providing for disconnection of individual items from
time to time for maintenance, calibration, repair, refurbishment, or replacement. There is
therefore need to functionally test individual protection schemes or devices while other
parts of the substation are in service.
F6.13 Verification of relay settings

Verification of relay configurations and settings to ensure that they have taken effect in the
device is necessary at commissioning and at defined intervals thereafter. This may be
carried out by secondary current and voltage injection and measurement where appropriate,
or by injection of sampled values in the digital environment, or by primary injection in
some cases. Reliance for correct operation should not depend on settings established solely
by downloading settings or by positioning dials and plugs without verification at least at the
next defined interval test. Due to the inherent safety aspects of protection systems, a relay
settings change management process is required. The injected or simulated current or
voltage has a sinusoidal wave shape and the measurements need to be taken with calibrated
instruments.
F6.14 Functional testing

Functional testing of a protection scheme is necessary prior to commissioning, after any
alteration, and after maintenance.
The functional testing must prove all parts of the scheme. There are many functions to be
proven:
(a) Relays, correct calibration, settings, logic.
(b) CTs and VTs—ratio, polarity, phase, class.
(c) Circuit-breakers—correct adjustment and operation.
(d) Wiring, cabling, and fibres—correct type, destination, and connections.
(e) D.C. supplies—correct source, range.
(f) Functioning as a complete scheme.
It is never possible to functionally prove a protection scheme by direct testing as it would
be when in service, as this would amount to putting it into service and throwing a primary
system fault. A system of simulated tests on the scheme components is therefore necessary,
comprising all or some (depending on the nature of the work) of the following sequence of
steps:
(i) Prove CT ratios and polarities by primary current injection.
(ii) Prove CT classes and accuracies by a ‘saturation’ test.
(iii) Prove CT secondary resistances as intended.
(iv) Similar tests of ratio, class, etc. of VTs.
(v) Verify relay settings and intended functions by injection of secondary current and
volts into relay.
(vi) Wiring checks to verify that the scheme is wired correctly to the schematic diagram
and that all connections are sound.
(vii) Prove any intertripping functions similarly.
(viii) Verify link integrity alarming for any trip or inter-trip functions that provide
supervision, such as trip circuit supervision or GOOSE subscription alarms.
(ix) Carry out balances of differential schemes.
(x) Prove correct phasing of CT and VT outputs.

167 AS 2067:2016
(xi) Close all secondary links, VT fuses, etc.

(xii) Prove all tripping functions from relays to circuit-breakers by injection into relay
current and voltage inputs.
(xiii) First place the protection equipment into service and then energize the primary
equipment.
(xiv) Take in-service measurements of all a.c. currents and voltages to prove the integrity
of CT and VT inputs.
(xv) Carry out directional proving tests on directional overcurrent, directional earth fault,
and distance relay schemes.
The above simulated approach to functionally testing protection is quite different to setting
to work a process control scheme, e.g. a tapchanger control scheme, and requires a different
mind-set. In a control scheme one can set it to work and observe whether it is working
correctly. In the case of protection this approach cannot be taken. Proof is required that it
functions correctly beforehand because it is the protection, and a primary system fault may
occur when the circuit is first energized.
This simulated type functional testing has to be done on each protection scheme while the
remainder of the substation is energized and supplying load.
Facilities need to be incorporated in the design to allow this functional testing to be carried
out safely and with confidence that the scheme will work as intended.
There needs to be isolating and test links or an equivalent facility between each of these
component parts to allow this individual testing to be carried out in such a way as to not
disturb or temporarily alter any of the connections, so that the schemes are tested as they
would be in-service.
Finally, when the component testing is complete, the isolating links or equivalent are closed
and final trip checks carried out. The scheme is thus proven or authorized to go into service
without actual full testing of how it would behave in service.
In addition, there will be a number of tripping and transfer tripping and CT circuits to and
from adjacent protection schemes which are in service. These have to be isolated for work
on the scheme under access, and also have their functions proven.
F6.15 Secondary circuit isolation for work and functional testing
When an item of equipment such as a transformer or HV busbar is taken out of service for
work, it is necessary to isolate certain functions in its corresponding protection scheme,
such as:
(a) Tripping to circuit breakers.
(b) Transfer tripping or tripping functions to and from adjacent protection schemes.
(c) In some cases isolate CT inputs to the scheme or to adjacent schemes such as busbar
protection.
The isolations need to be visible, self-evident, labelled as to function, unique, and obvious
to all staff involved.
There are strong safety reasons for these isolations to be clear, uniform, and well
understood, and the processes of their use documented.
Not all of these secondary isolations are performed by protection staff. Some have to be
carried out by operating staff to give access to other staff such as substation technicians,
jointers, and linesmen.

AS 2067:2016 168
The isolations cannot be allowed to alter the scheme from what it would be in service and
from what has been functionally proven. Disconnecting wires or unplugging fibres are not
valid ways of achieving isolations.
Before restoring the HV equipment to service all secondary isolations have to be restored.
This process has to be rigorous so that HV equipment is not inadvertently re-energized with
any of its protection functions non-auto. Again this is a safety matter and the design of the
isolation facilities needs to enable this process without confusion.
F6.16 Balancing of differential protection schemes
It is necessary to prove correct balancing of differential schemes prior to commissioning
and following any alteration by injection of current at low voltage through the primary
circuit. There are very many connection errors which can result in wrong balance, some are
as follows:
(a) One set of CTs having reversed connections.
(b) One or two individual CTs in a set having reversed connections.
(c) Wrong CT ratios or tap connections.

(d) Rolls or crosses in CT connections.
(e) Any of the above errors on interposing CTs.
(f) Wrong relay connections.
(g) Wrong pilot cable connections in the case of feeder differential.
(h) Any combination of the above.
(i) Any software equivalent of the above.
In addition, the following points should be verified by test as they can result in unwanted
operation or failure to operate of differential schemes:
(i) Different class CTs.
(ii) CT knee-points insufficient for external through current stability.
(iii) Ratio of CT knee-point voltage/excitation current differ sufficiently to cause false
differential currents for through current operation.
(iv) Additional burdens in series with CTs (deliberate addition of equipment or bad
connections) which upset through fault stability.
F6.17 Directional testing and proving
Directional overcurrent, directional earth fault, and distance protections require the correct
direction of operation to be proven at commissioning and after any alteration. This involves
proving first the correct phasing of CTs and VTs by primary injection at low voltage, and
then energizing the circuit and using load current in a known direction to prove operation or
restraint.
F6.18 Points of comparison between fuses and relays/circuit-breakers
Amongst other points of comparison there is the following fundamental point. A fuse is a
single phase device. If a phase to phase fault occurs on a three phase system, invariably one
fuse will operate before the other. This leaves both conductors energized, but from the fuse
which did not blow, i.e. the fault is interrupted but all conductors are still energized.
Similarly a three phase ungrounded fault will be cleared by two fuses but all three phase
conductors will remain energized due to backfeed from the third fuse.

169 AS 2067:2016
Many HV current limiting fuses have striker pins which if used in a tripping type fuse
switch unit, cause tripping of the switch and interruption of all three phases. HV expulsion
fuses (drop-out fuses) do not have this facility and operate on a single phase basis only. LV
fuses do not have striker pins and operate on a single phase basis only.
By comparison, an overcurrent relay will detect a fault or overcurrent on one phase, but will
trip a circuit-breaker, opening all three phases and de-energize the circuit as well as
interrupting the fault. This is sometimes an advantage and sometimes a disadvantage.
F6.19 Open circuit faults and hot connection type faults
‘In-line’ type faults, either hot connections or arcing connections, broken conductors, or
completely open-circuits, cannot be detected by most forms of protection. Differential
protection, because it compares input current with output current, will not see this type of
fault. Overcurrent and distance protection will not. Earth fault protection will only see this
fault under some system configurations. Yet often this hot or arcing connection fault has
very serious consequences, particularly if under oil.
This is one reason for using ‘non-electrical’ forms of protection, such as Buchholz, to
supplement the ‘electrical’ protection schemes.

Negative phase sequence protection can be effective in detecting open-circuit type faults if
they occur under loaded conditions.
F6.20 ‘A’ and ‘B’ protection schemes
The ‘A’ and ‘B’ protection schemes (or ‘X’ and ‘Y’) should utilize relays from different
manufacturers or relays using different operating principles so as to avoid both schemes
being disabled by a common failure mode. This principle applies also where remote back-
up protection is applied.
F6.21 Duplicated protection schemes
As a general protection objective is to ensure all faults are correctly cleared, further
security can be provided by fully independent duplicated main protection systems
(including CT/VT, batteries, relays and circuit breaker trip coils). This is recommended to
prevent the functionality of both protection schemes being affected by a single credible
event or credible combination of events.
These duplicated systems should be designed as totally independent to ensure that no single
failure mode of any part of the system will impair the ability of the other system to operate
correctly. Duplicated main protection is intended that either may operate (a logical ‘or’
arrangement) with nominally similar discrimination zones with nominally the same fault
clearance times.
The design of duplicated systems needs to ensure that correct operation of one system does
not cancel out or oppose the correct operation of the other system (e.g. cross wired trip
coils). The principles of segregation discussed in Paragraph F5 should also be applied to
each of the duplicate systems.
Duplicated main protection schemes operating in parallel are intended to increase the
reliability and availability of the overall system to detect and clear any fault. This includes
failure of one protection scheme due to the following:
(a) Physical failure of the system components and/or connections.
(b) Inability of the protection operating principle to detect the fault.
(c) Design and/or settings (deliberate or otherwise) which preclude detection of the fault
by one system.

AS 2067:2016 170
Appropriate selection of each of the duplicated systems includes consideration of the

following:
(i) Same operating principle from two different manufacturers to avoid common mode
design flaws (bugs) and failure modes, e.g. two different vendors’ distance relays.
(ii) Completely different operating principles for each, e.g. distance and differential from
the same or different vendors.

(iii) Multifunction devices that revert from one principle to another in certain conditions,
e.g. differential with back-up distance for loss of communication channel.
(iv) Some electromechanical relays have excellent in service reliability for many decades
and hence the same vendor brand can be used for both systems.
(v) Some relays with large numbers of settings may be more reliable with the same
vendor used for both, rather than having two different vendors setting systems to be
mastered, however this should only be considered after the above have been ruled out.
F6.22 Secondary circuit isolating and testing facilities
The design of protection schemes should incorporate a.c. and d.c. secondary isolating and
injection testing facilities to enable an individual scheme to be worked on for maintenance,
repair, or testing, while the remainder of the substation is in service. The facilities should
enable temporary connection of testing equipment to be readily made to the protection
scheme without the need to remove or disturb circuitry connections.
F6.23 Safety in the design of protection systems
There are safety considerations for staff working on the protection equipment itself.
Consideration of the hazards is central to the design of protection systems and equipment
selection. The hazards include the following:
(a) Working on electromagnetic current transformer secondary circuits which generate
dangerous voltages if open circuited.
(b) Induced transients in metallic secondary wiring and cabling, and pilot cables.
(c) Arc flash and burn hazards from secondary equipment, both d.c. circuits and CT
circuits.
(d) Working on circuit-breakers which have stored energy mechanisms capable of
causing serious bodily harm (fatalities have occurred).
(e) Exploding porcelain of current transformer housings, voltage transformer housings,
circuit-breaker housings.
(f) Insulation failure and flashover between primary HV conductors and secondary
circuits of CTs and VTs.
(g) The need to functionally test individual protection schemes while other parts of the
substation are in service.
(h) The need to test protection schemes by injection of currents and voltages on to the
primary of HV equipment.
(i) The need to isolate protection secondary circuits from adjacent in-service sections of
the substation.
(j) The potential for the inadvertent or unexpected operation of primary or secondary
equipment because the functional isolations are either not implemented, not correct,
or not reliable.
(k) The potential for testing personnel to be exposed to dangerous voltages as a result of
an error in the primary or secondary isolations.

171 AS 2067:2016
(l) Working in close proximity to live electrical equipment in the substation.

A key requirement is therefore that protection design and equipment specification are
carried out in a way which provides for safe working practices and does not give rise to
safety traps and hazards.
F6.24 Interlock functions
Electrical interlocks between HV disconnectors, earthing switches, and circuit-breakers are

an option used in some cases.
These are for the purposes of safety to prevent accidental operation of the wrong switch, or
operation in the wrong sequence, either of which could result in a HV failure with explosive
type consequences. There are pros and cons about reliance on interlocks—they cannot cover
all situations and sometimes have to be defeated to carry out certain works.
Interlocks which are provided for prime safety reasons need to be capable of being
functionally proven in the same way as protection functions as detailed in Paragraph F6.14.
Suitable commissioning and maintenance testing procedures need to be developed by the
designer to ensure that the correct interlocking functionality is proven.

There has been a trend towards providing these interlocks by means of GOOSE messages.
This approach also requires that facilities be developed to carry out the necessary functional
proving.
F7 DIGITAL AND OPTICAL FIBRE BASED SYSTEMS

F7.1 General
This Paragraph deals with the application of digital and optical fibre based systems for
protection and control applications in substations in the context of IEC 61850.
It provides guidance in the application of digital and fibre based systems in substations, as
to what concept approaches are suitable. It deals also with the impact of these technologies
on other aspects of substation design.
It is important to clearly identify the functions which have to be performed by substation
secondary systems and to develop applications of the technology which are fit for purpose
in performing these functions. New ways of performing the functions will emerge and
opportunities for additional, previously not possible functions will also emerge. However,
the functional requirements of the substation and the power system remain the basis of
developing and applying the digital technology.
The principles set out in this Appendix are the fundamental requirements which apply
irrespective of the technology used, whether conventional copper wire based systems, or
fibre based systems. The means of satisfying these requirements may change or vary with
the technology, but the fundamental requirements remain the basis on which the changed
concepts and applications are built.
Most substations have to remain in service at all times while providing for failure of
individual items of equipment and providing for disconnection of individual items from
time to time for maintenance, calibration, repair, refurbishment, or replacement. There is
therefore need to functionally test individual protection schemes while other parts of the
substation are in service.
Two key points with respect to protection systems are as follows:
(a) They are required for safety reasons with respect to both staff and the public.
(b) That total loss of the main and back-up protection systems in a substation or circuit
means that the substation or that circuit cannot be used.

AS 2067:2016 172
F7.2 Safety
Refer to the overall statement about the role of protection systems in relation to safety in
Paragraph F2. Refer also to the statements about safety for staff working on the protection
equipment itself in Paragraph F6.23.
F7.3 Segregation
Refer to the overall statement in Paragraph F5 regarding the need for segregation of
protection equipment and circuits.
Optical fibres and fibre cables should be arranged to comply with these segregation
principles.
Commercial grade fibre cables are not very robust and are particularly susceptible to
physical damage and fire damage which heightens the need for segregation. Ruggedized
fibre cables are available and it is recommended that they be used in substations. They can
be designed to be resistant to crushing, fire, rodents, and termites.
An architecture where discrete process bus segments are set up to correspond to protection
zones will be necessary. Such an architecture is described in IEC 61850-9-2:2004 as

Alternative 4.
A station-wide process bus architecture would suit the concept of multi-casting, but would
not fulfil segregation requirements.
An Alternative 4 process bus segment architecture fulfils segregation requirements, but will
limit the station-wide sharing of information by multicasting.
The Ethernet network architecture used in a digital substation environment should be
designed to meet the end-user’s needs. If the Ethernet network is being used for protection
purposes then it should be designed for a very high overall availability. Guidelines for
designing such systems can be obtained from the IEC/TR 61850-9-2 and
IEC/TR 61850-90-4.
F7.4 DC supplies
Refer to Paragraphs F6.9, F6.10, and F6.11 for guidance on d.c. supplies for the protection
function.
The many electronic devices used for digital and fibre based protection functions will all
require d.c. power supplies. Such devices include the protection relays, merging units,
routers, ethernet switches, CT and VT interfaces, multiplexers, etc. Also the
circuit-breakers require d.c. supplies for protection tripping.
Although optical fibres forming the station bus and process bus can replace much of the
copper cabling in a substation, every device using a fibre path requires an electronic device
to interface with the fibre.
Each of these devices requires a d.c. power supply.
DC supplies should be split as separately fused ‘spurs’ to prevent a fault in one spur
disabling all other spurs. It is also recommended to segregate d.c. supply with independent
fusing for protection, control, monitoring and communication equipment which will also
facilitate independent maintenance activities.
The d.c. supply cabling should be split up and arranged to follow the rules of segregation
set out in Paragraph F5, i.e. a No.1 and No.2 supply (segregated from each other) and
segregated corresponding to each protection scheme.
These power supply cables and the electronic devices themselves will of course be subject
to the induced impulse and interference voltages dealt with in Paragraph F6.8.

173 AS 2067:2016
The change from electromechanical relays to devices requiring auxiliary voltage supply to
maintain the operation of the electronics, requires additional consideration of the
continuous drain on the d.c. system. This also extends to the drain associated with the
communication network equipment. The d.c. system capabilities should be designed to meet
all load requirements, inclusive of all digital devices including IEDs, SCADA gateways and
Ethernet. Consideration should be given to devices that allow any illuminated indicator or
display to be dimmed or extinguished in absence of human activity for an appropriate

duration.
F7.5 Impulse and disturbance immunity
Well developed and accepted requirements for impulse, disturbance, and interference
immunity of protection relays and schemes referred to in Paragraph F6.8 are contained in
IEC 60255-5 and IEC 60255-26. They represent the types and magnitude of electrical
interference and surges that occur in substations.
IEC 61850-3 defines the general requirements of communications equipment (including
protection relays, time servers and Ethernet switches).
All other devices used in conjunction with protection schemes and process bus, such as
merging units, routers, ethernet switches, multiplexers, etc., should comply with the same
impulse and disturbance immunity requirements and withstand levels.
Further, since these voltages exist in substations, all non-protection equipment associated
with the station bus concept should also comply with the same withstand levels.
The use of non-conductive signalling, such as fibre optic pilots or fibre optic Ethernet, can
provide required isolation for pilot signalling and communication within substation control
room.
F7.6 Functional proving requirements
Refer to Paragraphs F6.12 and F6.14 for a statement of principles for functional proving of
protection schemes generally.
Relating these concepts to digital and fibre based protection schemes, it will be necessary to
provide equivalent means of carrying out the simulated functional proving of the scheme as
it would be when in service. That is, without having to unplug fibre cables or alter a relay’s
configuration. This also applies to all the other IEDs which might be used in the scheme,
such as Ethernet switches, multiplexers, etc.
F7.7 Secondary circuit isolation for work and functional testing
Refer to Paragraph F6.15 for a statement of general principles of secondary circuit
isolations of protection functions.
The means of providing secondary circuit isolations in the digital environment must
similarly not alter the scheme from what it would be in service and from what has been
functionally proven. This should not be achieved by disconnecting wires or unplugging
fibres; nor by altering the proven configuration of a relay or IED, nor by altering the
structure of a GOOSE or other digital message.
Safe and secure isolation of the ‘virtual’ trip signals and similar functions necessary for
commissioning and ongoing work on the live power system is fundamental to the design of
such protection schemes and should not be viewed as just a working practice to be resolved
afterwards.

AS 2067:2016 174
Digital systems provide the possibility for the systems integrator to automate isolation
procedures in pre-engineered sequences, with step-by-step validation that eliminate human
error. ‘On-the-fly’ isolation procedures should be discouraged due to the complexity of IED
message dependencies. It is preferable that these operator facilities are not dependant on, or
variable according to the IED types at that location. Facilities need to be provided which
can be used by any authorized staff taking into account role based access controls, without
the need for staff having specialized tools, devices, computers or other hand-held devices.
As the work procedure may be the result of devices having failed in some way and may in
fact need replacement with new devices, the isolation facility should not be solely
dependent on any single device that serves an operational function in the system. Further,
failure of the isolation facility should be benign as far as the operational integrity of the
system and easily able to be replaced without any interference or risk to the system.
Standardized isolation mechanisms (physical presentation, operator procedure, sequencing,
validation and visual confirmation) are required to perform the safe and secure isolation of
the ‘virtual’ trip signals and similar functions that is necessary for commissioning and
ongoing work on the live power system.
Different techniques may exist for isolation. As an example, in order to make it possible to
carry out the isolation and testing of protection functions, some utilities provide isolating
links between sub-systems which use GOOSE messaging, and which need to be isolated for
work or functional proving of one sub-system, while adjacent sub-systems and the
remainder of the substation are in service. This enables the testing and functional proving of
GOOSE messaging within a sub-system to be carried out on the basis of ‘black-box’ units.
This would apply to the functions within the substation of—
(a) tripping functions between protection schemes; and
(b) transfer trip functions.
F7.8 Independence of A and B protection schemes
Full independence of ‘A’ and ‘B’ (or X and Y) protection schemes from each other is
necessary so that no one failure or event can render both inoperative.
In particular, the ‘A’ and ‘B’ (or X and Y) protection schemes should utilize relays and
IEDs from different manufacturers and should utilize different operating principles so as to
avoid both schemes being disabled by a common failure mode. This concept applies also to
the software.

175 AS 2067:2016
APPENDIX G
EARTHING VOLTAGE LIMIT CASE STUDIES
(Informative)
NOTE: Referenced documents specific to this Appendix G are listed in Paragraph G6 of this
Appendix. The numbers given within square brackets in this Appendix correspond to this
reference list.
G1 GENERAL
This Appendix outlines the results of the quantified risk analysis of the hazard scenarios
presented to the public or workers involved in a range of typical activities associated with
the following asset classes:
(a) Residential distribution—includes commercial sites (e.g. shopping centres), and
aquatic centres (e.g. public pools).

(b) Light industrial—sawmill, batching plant, abattoir.
(c) Large interconnected systems—power stations, heavy industrial, wind turbines.
(d) Mining—surface plant operations.
(e) Mining—underground coal.
(f) Mining—underground metals.
(g) Mining—open cut.
(h) Road tunnels—construction and operation.
Shock safety criteria are provided within other Australian Standards and guidelines
applicable to specific assets or hazard scenarios:
(i) Metallic pipeline exposure: AS/NZS 4853.
(ii) Telecommunications worker exposure: AS/NZS 3835 (series) and HB 101.
(iii) Transmission and distribution line hazards: AS/NZS 7000.
(iv) Power system plant and substations, and major substations: ENA DOC 025, EG-0 [5].
The following cases are not covered in the foregoing case studies or standards and require
case specific design to be undertaken:
(A) Long overland conveyors.
(B) Railway systems.
(C) Theme parks.
The following comments provide information regarding the background behind the curves
provided in the case study analysis:
(1) Conservatism Wherever possible a conservative approach has been followed in order
to widen the range of applicable conditions for a given curve type.
(2) Touch duration Contact duration of four (4) seconds has been taken as a general
case, except where otherwise mentioned.
(3) Surface soil resistivity A low soil resistivity value of 50 Ω.m has been used.

AS 2067:2016 176
(4) Standard public footwear A typical distribution of footwear resistance has been
selected in all cases except that of bare feet at swimming pools, and electrical worker
footwear inside substations.
(5) Surface layer materials Crushed rock with a resistivity of 3000 Ω.m and thickness
of 100 mm has been used within substations. Refer to ENA DOC 25, EG-0 [5] or
Argon software [7] for further details regarding the use of series impedance layers
such as asphalt or concrete slabs.
(6) Contact Configuration The case study curves (50 Ω.m) relate to prospective hand to
foot touch voltage, however, they can be applied conservatively to hand to hand touch
voltages and very conservatively to prospective step voltages.
(7) Wet Aquatic scenarios use wet body impedance, with no footwear. Risk targets: All
curves relate to a Probability of Fatality (Pfatality) of <1 × 10−6 as defined for
individual and societal risk as appropriate (see Appendix A).
(8) Contact scenarios Contact scenarios have been selected to represent each case study
based upon an analysis of a range of exposure scenarios for workers or the public.
The frequency and duration are listed for each case study. Remote locations are those
where the contact frequency is sufficiently low that the fault/contact coincidence
probability is less than the target fatality probability. In that case there is no touch
voltage target required.
(9) Fault frequencies and durations The fault frequencies and durations used are listed
with each curve. They are conservatively based upon the fault data given in
ENA DOC 25, EG-0 Appendix A-3.
(10) Curve shape selected A conservative curve fit has been selected based upon Argon
[7] generated curves corresponding to the cases under consideration. For clearing
time conditions outside those tabulated (i.e. <0.01 s and >10 s) the curve fit equations
are not valid.
NOTE: Notes at the bottom of each table provide further information regarding assumptions.
Suffixed numbers within each table refer to the appropriate note.
This process is aimed at providing engineers with constant probability design curves
complete with their boundary conditions well identified.
For each case study the following information has been included:
(aa) Curve details (figure and equation).
(bb) Assumptions governing the range of applicability.
If the boundary conditions do not meet the case under investigation the ‘by hand’ method
(see Appendix C of ENA DOC 25, EG-0[5]) or Argon [7] software may be used to assess
the risk and generate appropriate design curves.
G2 RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION
Residential distribution networks are those fed by overhead lines and cables with system
voltages less than 66 kV, and distribution transformers with LV secondary.
Hazard identification for residential distribution cases consists of seeking possible points
where hazardous voltages might manifest such as (refer to Figure G1)—
(a) touch voltage to metallic distribution assets;
(b) step voltage walking near distribution assets;
(c) metallic fence (local and remote ends) in the vicinity of a distribution asset;
(d) swimming pools in the vicinity of a distribution assets;

177 AS 2067:2016
(e) transfer voltages to customers connected to the distribution network; and

(f) third party assets (telecommunication, water or gas services) passing a distribution
asset.
To u c h vo lt ag e at To u c h vo lt ag e pu b li c an d
d i s tr i b u t i o n a s s et s pr i vate sw im m in g p o o l s
Vo lt ag e transferred to c u stomer
Vo lt ag e tr an sfer re d to m et alli c n eutr al t hrou g h LV C M EN
str u c ture s (e.g. fe n c e) (E x te n s i ve ur b a n a n d r ur a l c a s e)
FIGURE G1 EXAMPLE RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION HAZARD LOCATIONS
Comprehensive identification using a well-structured systematic process is important as a

hazard not identified at this stage may be excluded from further analysis. Identification
should include hazards whether or not they are under the control of the distribution network
asset owner.
The contact classifications relevant to residential distribution are as follows:
(i) Urban interface An asset which is located outside normal public thoroughfare areas
with low frequency of direct contact by a given person.
(ii) Backyard An area with a contactable metallic structure (e.g. fence, gate) subject to
fault induced voltage gradients. This metallic structure is not an HV asset but
becomes live due to earth fault current flow through the soil.
(iii) MEN LV MEN interconnected metalwork (e.g. household taps) under the influence
of either LV MEN voltage rise and/or soil potential rise.
(iv) Commercial Installations such as shopping centres may be considered as a special
case of the foregoing MEN classification. Although many people access such
installations there are very few locations where people can be exposed to a high
percentage of the EPR. In many cases the surface is either a reinforced concrete slab
or asphalt (which can provide a useful series impedance layer unless the associated
voltage causes flash over).
(v) Aquatic centres Indoor or outdoor swimming facilities open to the public are
assessed depending upon whether they are open 5 or 12 months of the year.

AS 2067:2016 178
(vi) Remote assets Assets may be considered as ‘remote’ if they do not require a certain
touch voltage in order to comply with the fatality risk targets. This occurs when the
coincidence probability is below the risk target.
Table G1 provides residential distribution case study descriptions.
TABLE G1
RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION CASE STUDY DESCRIPTIONS
Case Description Acronym
Contact with distribution asset in urban
DU
interface location.
Contact with metalwork in a backyard
effected by either transmission or distribution TDB
asset.
Contact with MEN connected metalwork
Distribution
(around house) where MEN or soil is effected TDMEN
G-1 assets
by either transmission or distribution assets.

(<66 kV)
Contact with metalwork associated with an
aquatic centre that operates five months of AQ5
the year.
Contact with metalwork associated with an
aquatic centre that operates twelve 12 months AQ12
of the year.
Refer to Figure G2 for distribution asset prospective touch voltage criteria curves.
10 0 0 0 0
LEGEN D:
DU
TD B
PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VO LTAGE, V
10 0 0 0 TD M EN
AQ 5
AQ12
10 0 0
10 0
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
FIGURE G2 DISTRIBUTION ASSET PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE CRITERIA

(P FATALITY <1 × 10 −6)

179 AS 2067:2016
Table G2 describes the basis of each prospective touch voltage curve shown above with
individual risk contact frequency and durations that are based upon a ‘typical maximally’
exposed individual (i.e. 90%–95% confidence limit). Table G3 provides the curve-fit
equations and constants that may be used to generate the curves in Figure G2.
TABLE G2
RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION-CURVE GENERATION DATA

Fault/contact Fault Vt at fault
Case Contact scenario
scenario rate/duration duration
1 fault in
Distribution urban—
DU 10 years ≤1 s 135 contacts/year for 4 s 800
Standard footwear
duration
Transmission
1 fault in
distribution
TDB 10 years ≤1 s Backyard-416 contacts/year for 4 s 181
backyard—Standard
duration
footwear
Transmission 1 fault in
TDMEN distribution MEN— 10 years ≤1 s MEN-2000 contacts/year for 4 s 112
Standard footwear duration
Aquatic centre Aquatic societal based gathering
5 months/year 1 fault in with a population size of 50,
AQ5 10 years ≤1 s gathering duration 10 h, 60
No footwear duration 5 contacts/hour/person for 2 s, and
Wet body impedance 150 gatherings/year
Aquatic centre Aquatic societal based gathering

all year- 1 fault in with a population size of 50,
AQ12 10 years ≤1 s gathering duration 10 hours, 52
No footwear duration 5 contacts/hour/person for 2 s, and
Wet Body impedance 365 gatherings/year
The following points provide an outline of the assumptions behind the fault rates used in
Table G2:
(A) Distribution assets A fault rate of one fault per 10 years relates to a range of
distribution assets including:
(i) 1 km of isolated underground cable at 10 faults/100 km/year.
(ii) Two 500 m underground cables feeding a substation at 10 faults/100 km/year.
(iii) 1 km line section (e.g. 10 by 100 m) with an earthwire shielded at
10 faults/100 km/year.
(B) Aquatic centres A fault rate of one fault per 10 years relates to 500 m of
underground cable and associated substation.

AS 2067:2016 180
TABLE G3
RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION-CURVE FIT EQUATIONS
Prospective touch voltage characteristic equation
Time period (s)
Vt = 5046 0.01 − 0.10

Vt = (8220.3651-16049.118*tc- 0.11 – 5.00
3233.5941*tc^2+22189.669* tc^3-
DU 17347.089* tc^4+8373.5787* tc^5)/(1+6.8997717* tc -
48.174695* tc^2+109.8737* tc^3-
118.88136* tc^4+51.807561* tc^5)
Vt = -1603.1+1547.5*tc -539.38*tc^2+97.049* tc^3- 5.01 – 10.00
9.6078* tc^4 +0.4982*tc^5-0.0106* tc^6
Vt = (1306.977 -7656.5354*tc + 15629.719*tc^2 -13132.913*tc^3 + 8186.177*tc^4 -
TDB 720.69321*tc^5 + 34.286727*tc^6) / (1 -4.274051*tc + 8.8931622*tc^2 -
23.10728*tc^3 + 37.115977*tc^4)
Vt = (755.24378 + 41139.79*tc -
80373.307*tc^2 + 71828.717*tc^3 + 2224.395*tc^4) / (1 + 59.009776*tc -
TDMEN
19.080367*tc^2 -112.64552*tc^3 + 467.0354*tc^4 -
85.236137*tc^5 + 8.3443789*tc^6 -0.31518979*tc^7)
Vt = (452.45232 -33697.407*tc + 667732.58*tc^2 -
1022880.6*tc^3 + 964064.36*tc^4 + 202401.9*tc^5 + 35978.983*tc^6 -
AQ5
1781.3645*tc^7) / (1 -72.785913*tc + 1354.1727*tc^2 + 79.501809*tc^3 -
947.33225*tc^4 + 13227.55*tc^5)
Tc = (355.4042 -3057.1445*tc -7519.6299*tc^2 + 23243.081*tc^3 -23094.891*tc^4 -
AQ12 44375.5*tc^5 -2270.4287*tc^6 + 124.87835*tc^7) / (1 -8.3457511*tc -
3.1030691*tc^2 -230.25728*tc^3 + 981.17818*tc^4 -1820.1784*tc^5)
NOTES:
1 Assets directly connected to major substations need to comply with the criteria listed in the section for
faults associated with the asset, as well as the appropriate major substation criteria for voltages
transferred to the asset under substation EPR conditions.
2 The fault rates chosen are above average for higher transmission voltage assets to simplify the criteria
generated. This does not preclude a utility from reassessing its own asset class and deriving less
stringent criteria if necessary.
3 Whenever safety criteria are selected (either standard curves or using Argon [7] software) it is important
that appropriate technical review be undertaken (e.g. peer and/or manager review and signoff). For
alternative curves generated within Argon it is also important that adequate sensitivity analysis be
undertaken and assumptions and decisions documented in a generated report.
4 A surface soil resistivity of 50 Ω.m has been used for all contact cases outside a major substation fence.
This is quite a conservative value as in many instances the higher surface soil resistivity would add
series impedance allowing higher perspective touch voltages. Figure G3 provides an example of the
Transmission/Distribution MEN contact criteria for a range of soil resistivity.

181 AS 2067:2016
10 0 0 0
10 0 0
LEGEN D:
TD M EN - 5 0 Ω.m
10 0
TD M EN - 10 0 Ω.m
TD M EN - 5 0 0 Ω.m
TD M EN - 10 0 0 Ω.m
TD M EN - 20 0 0 Ω.m
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
CLE ARING TIME, s
FIGURE G3 SURFACE SOIL RESISTIVITY EFFECT ON TDMEN

PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE CONTACT CASE
G3 LIGHT INDUSTRIAL—SAWMILL, BATCHING PLANT, ABATTOIR

Significant characteristics include the following:
(a) Distributed nature of installation (via LV cabling and/or metalwork) with limited
dedicated earthing.
(b) In some instances operator stations are located remote from the main substation
earthing system with staff in frequent contact with bonded metalwork.
(c) Footwear may be either dry workboots or rubber gumboots depending upon the
worksite.
Table G4 provides light industrial case study safety criteria assumptions with individual
risk contact frequency and duration based upon a ‘typical maximally exposed individual’.
Figure G4 provides the light industrial prospective touch voltage curves. Table G5 provides
the equations and constants that may be used to generate the curves in Figure G4.

AS 2067:2016 182
TABLE G4
LIGHT INDUSTRIAL—CASE STUDY SAFETY CRITERIA ASSUMPTIONS
Fault/contact Contact
Curve Fault rate/duration Vt at fault duration
scenario rate/duration
Primary fault
scenario at
incoming or ‘main’ 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s
TDMEN
substation – contact ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 1) (TDMEN)
plant area – normal
workboots
Primary fault
scenario at
incoming or ‘main’
1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year
A substation – contact 454 V at 0.5 s
≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 1)
plant area – safety
gumboots
(see Note 2)
Secondary cable 1 fault per year 2000 contacts/year 154 V at 0.5 s

B
fault on local ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 3) Normal fault case
reticulation with
contacts in plant 2 faults per year 2000 contacts/year 129 V at 0.5 s
C
areas ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s Higher fault case
D fault on local ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 3) Normal fault case
reticulation with
contacts in plant
areas – safety 2 faults per year 2000 contacts/year 176 V at 0.5 s
E
gumboots (see ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s Higher fault case
Note 2)
Secondary fault on
local reticulation at 272 V at 0.5 s
1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year
TDMEN non bonded
≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 4) (TDMEN)
location
(e.g. remote pump)
NOTES:
1 The main bench area or near buildings can have high contact rates but very low Vt (say <20%EPR) due to
high surface resistivity or the voltage grading effect of building foundations. Industrial plant buildings
are usually interconnected by power cable sheaths.
2 Safety gumboots may be issued for use as normal workboots, particularly in wet or dirty areas. The
Safety gumboot series impedance data used in the table relates to 5% of time boots being ineffective (i.e.
damaged) or the foot to ground impedance compromised. Safety gumboots provide a significant safety
gain, particularly if their use may be guaranteed. If boot condition and wear can be guaranteed the safety
gumboot withstand level may be utilized.
3 Often maintenance is done on disconnected equipment. Note that cable sheaths or pipes can maintain
voltage transfer to remote area even if power disconnected.
4 Maintenance staff overhauling equipment.

10
10 0
10 0 0
10 0 0 0
0.01
0.1
183
CLE ARING TIME, s

1
E
B
A
D
C
LEGEN D:
TD M EN
FIGURE G4 LIGHT INDUSTRIAL—PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE CRITERIA

10
AS 2067:2016
AS 2067:2016 184
TABLE G5
LIGHT INDUSTRIAL—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS
Prospective touch voltage

Curve Fault/contact scenario
characteristic equation
Primary fault scenario at incoming or ‘main’ Vt = (755.24378 + 41139.79*tc -

s/s—contact plant area—normal workboots 80373.307*tc^2 + 71828.717*tc^3
(TDMEN) + 2224.395*tc^4) / (1 +
59.009776*tc -19.080367*tc^2 -
TDMEN
112.64552*tc^3 + 467.0354*tc^4
-85.236137*tc^5 +
8.3443789*tc^6 -
0.31518979*tc^7)
Primary fault scenario at incoming or ‘main’ Vt = (1524.5922 -2041.5102*tc +
substation – contact plant area—safety 321516.18*tc^2 -302272.88*tc^3
gumboots + 129497.93*tc^4 +
A 76385.95*tc^5) / (1 +
1.8100958*tc + 103.71431*tc^2 +
946.60298*tc^3 -987.72051*tc^4
+ 1094.6104*tc^5)
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation Vt = (496.572 -2494.9295*tc +
with contacts in plant areas—1 fault/year in 5702.2036*tc^2 -6850.2827*tc^3
plant areas with standard footwear + 5195.0729*tc^4 -
1330.1921*tc^5 + 238.00349*tc^6
B
-21.113865*tc^7 +
0.72489871*tc^8) / (1 -
3.9643034*tc + 10.327861*tc^2 -
19.80675*tc^3 + 24.735198*tc^4)
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation Vt = (22655.276 + 47976210*tc +
with contacts in plant areas—2 faults/year in 2.7959543E+08*tc^2 -
plant areas with standard footwear 7.3785423E+08*tc^3 +
7.0276728E+08*tc^4 +
3.5319689E+08*tc^5 +
C
7.5312383E+08*tc^6) / (1 +
123191.94*tc + 579371.56*tc^2 +
1607677.2*tc^3 -6369784.5*tc^4
+ 8971655.4*tc^5 +
15147012*tc^6)
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation Vt = (629.41577 + 812.45736*tc -
with contacts in plant areas—1 fault/year with 1621.6516*tc^2 + 522.71004*tc^3
safety gumboots + 4297.0296*tc^4 -
265.28155*tc^5 + 46.263485*tc^6
D
-2.5157995*tc^7) / (1 +
2.9756213*tc + 6.3285588*tc^2 -
29.630808*tc^3 +
68.962554*tc^4)
(continued)

185 AS 2067:2016
TABLE G5 (continued)

Secondary cable fault on local reticulation Vt = (563.15353 -825.28972*tc +
with contacts in plant areas—2 faults/year 550.9835*tc^2 + 544.54767*tc^3
E with safety gumboots + 4.275711*tc^4) / (1 +

0.68334582*tc -3.4247095*tc^2 +
12.31514*tc^3)
Secondary fault on local reticulation at non As for above primary fault
TDMEN
bonded location (e.g. remote pump) scenario above (TDMEN)
NOTES:
1 Consideration should be given to identify situations where staff are exposed more frequently under
special conditions. These include construction and certain maintenance periods. In these cases a special
‘construction safety’ assessment should be undertaken and if necessary special precautions
implemented. Precautions include: installation of temporary barriers, isolated LV power or portable
generators, restrictions regarding site shed and material lay-down locations.
2 Safety gumboots may be issued for use as normal workboots, particularly in wet or dirty areas. The
Safety gumboot series impedance data used in the table relates to 5% of time boots being ineffective (ie
damaged) or the foot to ground impedance compromised. Safety gumboots provide a significant safety
gain, particularly if their use may be guaranteed. If boot condition and wear can be guaranteed the
safety gumboot withstand level may be utilized.
G4 LARGE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS

Large interconnected earthing systems are associated with installations such as power
stations, heavy industries (e.g. steel mills, refineries, aluminium smelters) and wind
turbines. Figure G5 shows typical large interconnected system configurations.

AS 2067:2016 186
B
A
C
B
LEGEND:
A = incoming supply fault scenario
B = local supply earth bonded fault scenario
C = local supply non earth bonded fault scenario
FIGURE G5 TYPICAL LARGE INTERCONNECTED—SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Table G6 provides large interconnected systems cased study safety criteria assumptions
with individual risk contact frequency and duration based upon a ‘typical maximally
exposed individual’. Figure G6 provides the large interconnected system prospective touch
voltage curves. Table G7 provides the equations and constants that may be used to generate
the curves in Figure G6.

187 AS 2067:2016
TABLE G6
LARGE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS—CURVE GENERATION DATA
Fault/contact Vt at fault
Curve Fault rate/duration Contact rate/duration
scenario duration
Primary fault 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s

scenario at ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 1)
(TDMEN)
TDMEN incoming or ‘main’
substation—contact
plant area
B fault on local ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 2)
Normal fault case
reticulation with
contacts in plant 2 faults per year 2000 contacts/year 129 V at 0.5 s
C areas ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s
Higher fault case
Secondary fault on 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s
local reticulation at ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 3)
(TDMEN)
TDMEN non bonded

location
(e.g. remote pump)
NOTES:
1 On main bench area or near buildings can have high contact rates but very low Vt (say <20%EPR) due
to high surface resistivity, voltage grading effect of building foundations. Industrial plant buildings are
usually interconnected by power cable sheaths. Pipelines around the perimeter of plant area get higher
Vt (as %EPR) (say 50%) but fewer contacts.


AS 2067:2016
10
10 0
10 0 0
0.01
0.1
188
CRITERIA
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
1
B
C
LEGEN D:
TD M EN
10
FIGURE G6 LARGE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE
189 AS 2067:2016
TABLE G7
LARGE INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS
Prospective touch voltage characteristic

equation
Vt = (755.24378 + 41139.79*tc -
80373.307*tc^2 + 71828.717*tc^3 +
Primary fault scenario at incoming or
2224.395*tc^4) / (1 + 59.009776*tc -
TDMEN ‘main’ substation—contact plant area—
19.080367*tc^2 -112.64552*tc^3 +
1 fault/10 year, standard footwear
467.0354*tc^4 -85.236137*tc^5 +
8.3443789*tc^6 -0.31518979*tc^7)
Vt = (496.572 -2494.9295*tc +
5702.2036*tc^2 -6850.2827*tc^3 +
Secondary cable fault on local 5195.0729*tc^4 -1330.1921*tc^5 +
B reticulation with contacts in plant 238.00349*tc^6 -21.113865*tc^7 +
areas—1 fault/year, standard footwear 0.72489871*tc^8) / (1 -3.9643034*tc +
10.327861*tc^2 -19.80675*tc^3 +
24.735198*tc^4)
Vt = (22655.276 + 47976210*tc +
2.7959543E+08*tc^2 -7.3785423E+08*tc^3 +
Secondary cable fault on local
7.0276728E+08*tc^4 + 3.5319689E+08*tc^5
reticulation with contacts in plant
C + 7.5312383E+08*tc^6) / (1 + 123191.94*tc +
areas—2 faults/year in plant areas with
579371.56*tc^2 + 1607677.2*tc^3 -
standard footwear
6369784.5*tc^4 + 8971655.4*tc^5 +
15147012*tc^6)
Secondary fault on local reticulation at As for above primary fault scenario above
TDMEN
non bonded location (e.g. remote pump) (TDMEN)
NOTES:
1 Transmission lines traversing plant lease will comply with AS/NZS 7000 with regard to local touch and
transfer hazards associated with towers or poles.
2 Interactions between power lines and long conveyors requires individual engineering assessment due to
the inductive coupling hazards combined with higher access requirements.
3 Short conveyors may be included within the plant area criteria as inductive interference from parallel
lines is limited, and often require limited maintenance access.
4 Interactions between power lines and long pipelines requires individual engineering assessment in
accordance with AS 4853.
5 Rail and ship loading and unloading facilities have low contact rates and may use the same criteria as
the main plant area.
6 Large buildings built on concrete slabs often with vertical foundations interconnected by power cables
and metallic systems (e.g. conveyors, pipelines, cable tray) have low EPR for faults on plant reticulation
due to high inductive return to source, and under primary fault conditions due to very low resistance
7 Take care to manage touch voltages at locations where workers or public could congregate such as
gatehouses, bathhouses, site viewing or picnic areas. Often LV reticulation can transfer hazards from the
main plant area.
G5 MINING OPERATIONS
G5.1 General
Mining operations may be broken up into several general areas of operation or types of
plant for the purpose of understanding hazard scenarios and applicable criteria as follows:
(a) Surface plant operations area—workshops, offices, washeries, crushers.
(b) Underground coal operation.
(c) Underground metal mining operation.
(d) Open cut mining, quarrying and mineral sand extraction.
(e) Road tunnels—construction and operation.

AS 2067:2016 190
G5.2 Surface plant operations area—workshops, offices, washeries, crushers

The surface operation of an underground mine has many attributes in common with other
industrial plants. The applicable criteria may be summarized as follows:
(a) Overhead lines—refer to AS 7000 for safety criteria.
(b) Earthing system design must consider both the effect of fault current on the surface
plant but also any interaction with underground workings either by induction or direct
conductive transfer through metalwork or the soil.
B
A
B
LEGEND:
FIGURE G7 MINING SURFACE OPERATIONS—SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Table G8 provides mining operations surface plant case study safety criteria assumptions
exposed individual’. Figure G7 provides the mining operations surface plant prospective
touch voltage curves. Table G9 provides the equations and constants that may be used to
generate the curves.

191 AS 2067:2016
TABLE G8
MINING OPERATIONS SURFACE PLANT AREA—CURVE GENERATION DATA
Fault/contact Contact
Curve Fault rate/duration Vt at fault duration
scenario rate/duration
Primary fault 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s

scenario at ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 1)
TDMEN incoming or ‘main’
plant area
fault on local ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 2) Normal fault case
B reticulation with
contacts in plant
areas
Secondary fault on 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s
local reticulation at ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s (see Note 3)
TDMEN non bonded
location
(e.g. remote pump)
NOTES:
1 On main bench area or near buildings can have high contact rates but very low Vt (say <20%EPR) due to
high surface resistivity, voltage grading effect of building foundations. Industrial plant buildings are
usually interconnected by power cable sheaths. Pipelines around the perimeter of plant area get higher Vt
(as %EPR) (say 50%) but fewer contacts.
10 0 0
LEGEN D:
TD M EN
B
10 0
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
FIGURE G8 MINING OPERATIONS—SURFACE PLANT: PROSPECTIVE TOUCH

VOLTAGE CRITERIA

AS 2067:2016 192
TABLE G9
MINING OPERATIONS SURFACE PLANT—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS

Vt = (755.24378 + 41139.79*tc -
80373.307*tc^2 + 71828.717*tc^3
+ 2224.395*tc^4) / (1 +
Primary fault scenario at incoming or ‘main’
59.009776*tc -19.080367*tc^2 -
TDMEN s/s contact plant area—1 fault/10 year, standard
112.64552*tc^3 + 467.0354*tc^4
footwear
-85.236137*tc^5 +
8.3443789*tc^6 -
0.31518979*tc^7)
Vt = (496.572 -2494.9295*tc +
5702.2036*tc^2 -6850.2827*tc^3
+ 5195.0729*tc^4 -
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation with
1330.1921*tc^5 + 238.00349*tc^6
B contacts in plant areas—1 fault/year, standard
-21.113865*tc^7 +
footwear
0.72489871*tc^8) / (1 -
3.9643034*tc + 10.327861*tc^2 -
19.80675*tc^3 + 24.735198*tc^4)
NOTE: Surface plant configurations designed to manage transfer voltage hazards may be compromised by
later installations if not adequately coordinated. Initial design documentation should clearly state any
assumptions and development restrictions. A relatively common threat is caused when non-electrical staff
install plant without consulting the electrical designer (e.g. metallic pipeline installation) (see following
section for more detail).
G5.3 Underground coal mining operations

Underground coal mining operations have the following distinct features:
(a) Mine cables, pipelines and conveyors extend over considerable distances often with
little effective contact with the earth, thereby forming an excellent path for
transferring voltages coupled conductively or inductively.
(b) Mining staff are in intimate contact with cables and machinery in wet/muddy
conditions many times hourly in the normal course of work.
(c) Sparking due to fault current or lightning current may give rise to a methane
explosion followed by the more onerous dust blast if appropriate care is not taken
with design and installation.
Refer to Figure G9 for coal mining-underground operations system configurations.

193 AS 2067:2016
C
A
B
B
LEGEND:
FIGURE G9 COAL MINING—UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS

SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Table G10 provides large interconnected systems cased study safety criteria assumptions
exposed individual’. Figure G10 provides the large interconnected system prospective touch
voltage curves. Table G11 provides the equations and constants that may be used to
generate the curves in Figure G10.

AS 2067:2016 194
TABLE G10
UNDERGROUND COAL MINING—CURVE GENERATION DATA
Contact
Curve Fault/contact scenario Fault rate/duration Vt at fault duration
rate/duration
12 000
contacts/year for
1 fault in 5 years 4s 147 V at 0.5 s
F
≤0.5 s duration (60 per day, for (high fault)
Primary fault scenario at 10 h day, 200 days
incoming or ‘main’ per year)
underground—standard 12 000
footwear contacts/year for
1 fault in 10 years 4s
G 176 V at 0.5 s
≤0.5 s duration (60 per day, for
10 h day, 200 days
per year)
12 000
contacts/year for
1 fault in 5 years 4s 197 V at 0.5 s
H
≤0.5 s duration (60 per day, for (high fault)
Primary fault scenario at 10 h day, 200 days
incoming or ‘main’ per year)
underground—safety 12 000
gumboots contacts/year for
1 fault in 10 years 4s
I 229 V at 0.5 s
≤0.5 s duration (60 per day, for
10 h day, 200 days
per year)
Secondary fault on local
12 000
reticulation with contacts 1 fault per year 90 V at 0.5 s
J contacts/year for
underground—standard ≤0.5 s duration Normal fault case
4s
footwear
12 000
reticulation with contacts 1 fault per year 137 V at 0.5 s
K contacts/year for
underground—safety ≤0.5 s duration Normal fault case
4s
gumboots

10
10 0
10 0 0
0.01
0.1
195
VOLTAGE CRITERIA
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
1
I
J
F
K
LEGEN D:
H
G
FIGURE G10 UNDERGROUND COAL MINING—PROSPECTIVE TOUCH

10
AS 2067:2016
AS 2067:2016 196
TABLE G11
UNDERGROUND COAL MINING—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS

Curve Fault rate/duration
Vt = (476.72084 -1020.6228*tc +
1104.76*tc^2 -848.66569*tc^3 +
Primary fault , standard footwear 2190.5909*tc^4) / (1 -
F
1 fault in 5 years ≤0.5 s duration 1.1868307*tc + 7.0432245*tc^2 -
23.943662*tc^3 + 42.310244*tc^4
+ 0.19125789*tc^5)
Vt = (574.06819 -1516.4881*tc +
1771.6962*tc^2 -683.20543*tc^3
Primary fault , standard footwear + 300.23443*tc^4 -
G −1 fault in 10 years ≤0.5 s 47.639411*tc^5 + 3.6708629*tc^6
duration -0.10822812*tc^7) / (1 -
0.78906877*tc -0.96015791*tc^2
+ 5.6642206*tc^3)
Vt = (618.30363 -1549.4382*tc +
1693.5783*tc^2 -643.04746*tc^3
+ 282.79025*tc^4 -
Primary fault , safety gumboots
H 45.416944*tc^5 + 3.6897283*tc^6
−1 fault in 5 years ≤0.5 s duration
-0.11996431*tc^7) / (1 -
0.3441084*tc -1.9276187*tc^2 +
5.435087*tc^3)
Vt = (689.26893 -2766.7334*tc +
4672.5017*tc^2 -4119.3126*tc^3
+ 2600.2639*tc^4 -
Primary fault , safety gumboots
388.85691*tc^5 + 42.224781*tc^6
I −1 fault in 10 years ≤0.5 s
-1.7477218*tc^7) / (1 -
duration
2.2376405*tc + 3.4590505*vt^2 -
9.4140426*tc^3 +
14.489888*tc^4)
Vt = (179.25468 -959.72834*tc +
4949.8361*tc^2 -8679.9273*tc^3
+ 14137.721*tc^4 -
Secondary fault, standard
1617.8492*tc^5 + 210.82094*tc^6
J footwear. −1 fault per year ≤0.5 s
-9.2196437*tc^7) / (1 -
duration
5.2473876*tc + 38.442214*tc^2 -
109.59648*tc^3 +
211.19862*tc^4)
Vt = (454.99001 -850.09708*tc +
842.16766*tc^2 + 191.76511*tc^3
Secondary fault, safety gumboots + 45.379725*tc^4 -
K
−1 fault per year ≤0.5 s duration 2.5949476*tc^5) / (1 -0.243188*tc
-0.88700738*tc^2 +
10.091794*tc^3)
NOTES:
1 As underground operations are relatively temporary with plug ended equipment there is little
opportunity for direct earthing.
2 It is most common to install an earthing system for the underground reticulation that is segregated from
the surface installation earthing system. Special care must be taken at the time of mine development to
institute the segregation in such a way that it is not easily defeated (e.g. by pipeline installation, or by
cabling or temporary switching operations). Mechanical protection, duplication, signage and operating
and maintenance procedures must be in place to protect the integrity of the configuration.
3 The mine reticulation is usually highly earth fault restricted (<25 A for 11 kV and <10 A for reticulation
to machinery) with fast definite time protection.
4 Special care is taken to limit the opportunity for lightning to be conducted (e.g. via cased bores, cable
sheaths, conveyors, lift cables) or HV fault energy to be induced into long underground metalwork
(e.g. cable sheaths, air, water or gas drainage pipelines, conveyors). This is best achieved at the time of
mine infrastructure and working layout design.

197 AS 2067:2016
G5.4 Underground metals operation/road tunnel initial installation and final

operational configuration
Underground metals operation are as follows:
(a) As per underground coal except fewer contacts for operators.
(b) Ore body usually located in a vertical orientation.

(c) More large cables with substations more permanently located.
(d) Large plant such as crushers and lifts installed permanently with large concrete
foundations (i.e. good contact with local rock).
(e) No ignition risk.
Underground road tunnel installation operations are as follows:
(i) Mine cables, pipelines extend over considerable distances often with little effective
contact with the earth, thereby forming an excellent path for transferring voltages
coupled conductively or inductively to equipment located underground.
(ii) Mining staff are in intimate contact with cables and machinery in wet/muddy
conditions many times hourly in the normal course of work. Staff usually wear safety
gumboots which are replaced if/when water enters boot due to damage.
(iii) Negligible risk of explosion due to sparks caused by fault current or lightning current.
(iv) Usually use rubber tyred vehicles for waste material extraction rather than conveyors.
(v) Pipes may be metallic (with ‘victaulic’ rubber ringed connections) or polymeric for
water supply and removal.
(vi) Surface infrastructure is temporarily installed, located in small area, with metallic
demountable buildings, often in an urban environment.
(vii) Supply often taken from local residential 11 kV supply is often non fault limited, and
may not have cable return to source substation, although MEN interconnection is
often achievable. Segregation of the ‘surface installation earthing’ and the
‘underground or mine earthing’ is sometimes hard to achieve. The underground
supply is usually ‘isolated’ and earth fault limited, with a ‘mine earth’ located
separate to the ‘surface earth’.
(viii) 11/11 kV isolation equipment and 11k V/415 V surface supply substation equipment
is usually U/G mine specified transportable substation equipment interconnected with
cables fitted with 11 kV plug fittings.
Refer to Figure G11 for Metaliferrous mining-underground operations system
configurations.

AS 2067:2016 198
B
B
LEGEND:
FIGURE G11 METALIFERROUS MINING—UNDERGROUND OPERATIONS

SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Table G12 provides Underground metals operation/road tunnels case study safety criteria
assumptions with individual risk contact frequency and duration based upon a ‘typical
maximally exposed individual’. Figure G12 provides the underground metals operation/road
tunnels prospective touch voltage curves. Table G13 provides the equations and constants
that may be used to generate the curves in Figure G12.

199 AS 2067:2016
10 0 0 0
LEGEN D:
TD M EN
A
B
D
10 0 0
10 0
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
FIGURE G12 UNDERGROUND METALS OPERATION/ROAD TUNNELS—

PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE CRITERIA
TABLE G12
UNDERGROUND METALS OPERATION/ROAD TUNNELS—CURVE
GENERATION DATA
Contact
Curve Fault/contact scenario Fault rate/duration Vt at fault duration
rate/duration
Primary fault scenario at 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 272 V at 0.5 s
incoming or ‘main’ ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s
TDMEN substation—contact
(most contacts high
underground—standard
impedance from
footwear
boots)
Primary fault scenario at 1 fault in 10 years 2000 contacts/year 454 V at 0.5 s
incoming or ‘main’ ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s
A substation—contact
(most contacts high
underground—safety
impedance from
gumboots
boots)
Secondary fault on local 1 fault per year 2000 contacts/year 154 V at 0.5 s
reticulation with contacts ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s
B
underground—standard
footwear
Secondary fault on local 1 fault per year 2000 contacts/year 204 V at 0.5 s
reticulation with contacts ≤0.5 s duration for 4 s
D
underground—safety
gumboots

AS 2067:2016 200
TABLE G13
UNDERGROUND METALS
OPERATION/ROAD TUNNELS—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS
Primary fault scenario at incoming or ‘main’ Vt = (755.24378 + 41139.79*tc -

substation—contact underground—1 fault/10 year, 80373.307*tc^2 + 71828.717*tc^3
standard footwear + 2224.395*tc^4) / (1 +
59.009776*tc -19.080367*tc^2 -
TDMEN
112.64552*tc^3 + 467.0354*tc^4
-85.236137*tc^5 +
8.3443789*tc^6 -
0.31518979*tc^7)
Primary fault scenario at incoming or ‘main’ Vt = (1524.5922 -2041.5102*tc +
substation—contact plant area—safety gumboots 321516.18*tc^2 -302272.88*tc^3
+ 129497.93*tc^4 +
A 76385.95*tc^5) / (1 +
1.8100958*tc + 103.71431*tc^2 +
946.60298*tc^3 -987.72051*tc^4
+ 1094.6104*tc^5)
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation with Vt = (496.572 -2494.9295*tc +
contacts in plant areas—1 fault/year, standard 5702.2036*tc^2 -6850.2827*tc^3
footwear + 5195.0729*tc^4 -
1330.1921*tc^5 + 238.00349*tc^6
B
-21.113865*tc^7 +
0.72489871*tc^8) / (1 -
3.9643034*tc + 10.327861*tc^2 -
19.80675*tc^3 + 24.735198*tc^4)
Secondary cable fault on local reticulation with Vt = (629.41577 + 812.45736*tc -
contacts in plant areas—1 fault/year with safety 1621.6516*tc^2 + 522.71004*tc^3
gumboots + 4297.0296*tc^4 -
265.28155*tc^5 + 46.263485*tc^6
D
-2.5157995*tc^7) / (1 +
2.9756213*tc + 6.3285588*tc^2 -
29.630808*tc^3 +
68.962554*tc^4)
G5.5 Open cut mining, quarrying and mineral sand extraction

A large part of open cut, quarrying and mineral sand extraction operations are temporary in
nature, with power supplies, pipelines, conveyors and substations moving regularly.
Nevertheless the risk to which staff are exposed will still accumulate in the course of a year
as the location rather than the amount of plant is changing.

201 AS 2067:2016
B
B
LEGEND:
FIGURE G13 OPEN CUT MINING OPERATIONS—SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
Table G14 provides open cut mining case study safety criteria assumptions with individual
risk contact frequency and duration based upon a ‘typical maximally exposed individual’.
Figure G14 provides the underground metals operation/road tunnels prospective touch
voltage curves. Table G15 provides the equations and constants that may be used to
generate the curves in Figure G14.
TABLE G14
OPEN CUT MINING—CURVE GENERATION DATA
Contact Vt at fault
Curve Fault/contact scenario Fault rate/duration
rate/duration duration
Primary fault scenario at 1 fault per year ≤0.7 s 1000 contacts/year 115 V at 0.7 s
transportable s/s—contact duration for 4 s
L
on machine (e.g. dragline (operator and
or transportable s/s) maintenance staff)
Secondary fault on local 10 faults per year ≤0.4 s 1000 contacts/year 120 V at 0.4 s
M reticulation to machines, duration for 4 s
machine contact

AS 2067:2016 202
10 0 0
LEGEN D:
L
M
10 0
10
0.01 0.1 1 10
CLE ARIN G TIM E, s
FIGURE G14 OPEN CUT MINING, QUARRYING AND MINERAL SAND EXTRACTION
PROSPECTIVE TOUCH VOLTAGE CRITERIA
TABLE G15
OPEN CUT MINING—CURVE FIT EQUATIONS
Prospective touch voltage characteristic
equation
Vt = (593.02315 -2000.6466*tc +
4951.1423*tc^2 -6070.418*tc^3 +
6694.8279*tc^4 -838.87407*tc^5 +
Primary fault scenario at
L 239.5746*tc^6 -20.692514*tc^7 +
transportable substation
0.63400106*tc^8) / (1 -1.805124*tc +
8.3287142*tc^2 -24.210666*tc^3 +
49.965078*tc^4 + 8.6567217*tc^5)
Vt = (212.16905 -1257.991*tc + 2749.298*tc^2
-3264.4693*tc^3 + 2848.6598*tc^4 -
342.40939*tc^5 + 37.804933*tc^6 -
M reticulation to machines,
1.4783303*tc^7) / (1 -5.2886439*tc +
machine contact
12.793133*tc^2 -27.046553*tc^3 +
34.292848*tc^4)
NOTES:
1 Mobile plant are fed via HV trailing cables that are often damaged during operation.
2 Long overhead lines feed transportable substations (e.g. 66/11 kV) that in turn feed draglines rope
shovels, drills and pumps.

203 AS 2067:2016
G6 REFERENCED DOCUMENTS SPECIFIC TO APPENDICES A AND G

[1] ANSI/IEEE Std 80-2000 ‘IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding’. IEEE,
New York, 2000.
[2] AS/NZS 60479.1:2010, Effects of current on human beings and livestock,
Part 1: General aspects
[3] Biegelmeier, G, Lee, W. New Considerations on the Threshold of Ventricular

Fibrillation for A.C. Shocks at 50–60 Hz. IEE Proc. Vol.127, No.2, Part A,
March 1980.
[4] Ferris, LP, King, BG, Spence, PW, Williams, HB. ‘Effect of Electric Shock on the
Heart’. Electrical Engineering. March 1936.
[5] ENA DOC 025 (2010) EG-0 Power system earthing guide, Part 1: Management
principles. Version 1 Earthing Networks Association Limited. May 2010.
[6] ‘Reducing risks, protecting people’ HSE (UK) Books 2001. ISBN 0 7176 2151 0
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/
[7] Argon safety assessment software, Energy Networks Association (Aust.).

www.ena.asn.au
[8] Carman, WD. Probabilistic comparison and application of international electrical
safety criteria. In Proc. International Conference on Power System Technology
PowerCon 2000, volume 3, pages 1347–1352 vol. 3, 2000. doi:
10.1109/ICPST.2000.898165.
[9] Carman, WD. Development of risk profiles associated with electrical power substation
earthing systems. In Proc. International Conference on Power System Technology
Power-Con 2000, volume 3, pages 1341–1346 vol.3, 2000. doi:
10.1109/ICPST.2000.898164.
[10] Carman, WD and Woodhouse, DJ. Performance evaluation of series impedance
insulation used as earthing system safety mitigation measures. In Proc. International
Conference on Power System Technology PowerCon 2000, volume 3,
pages 1353–1358 vol. 3, 2000. doi: 10.1109/ICPST.2000.898166.
[11] Hazardous Industry Planning NSW Department of Planning. Risk Criteria for Land Use
Safety Planning. Advisory paper No. 4.
[12] ESAA HB C(b)-1991 and 1999. Guidelines for design and maintenance of overhead
distribution and transmission lines.
[13] Department of Finance and Deregulation—Office of Best Practice Regulation
http://www.dpmc.gov.au/office-best-practice-regulation/cost-benefit-analysis.cfm
[14] Karkkainen,S and Palva, V. Applications of probability calculations to the study of the
earthing voltage requirements for electrical safety codes. Sahko Electricity in Finland,
No. 11, 1974.
[15] Oosthuizen, S and Peyper, J. What is Reasonably Practicable Earthing Design?. Down
To Earth Conference 2014, Perth, November 2014.

AS 2067:2016 204
APPENDIX H
EARTH SYSTEM TESTING
(Informative)
NOTE: Referenced documents specific to this Appendix H are listed in Paragraph H14. The
numbers given within curly brackets in this Appendix correspond to this reference list.
H1 INTRODUCTION
Earthing system testing is the process undertaken to verify the performance of an earthing
system at some designated stage of its operational lifetime. Importantly, an earthing system
is usually tested as part of the commissioning for the associated installation. The testing of
an earthing system, if it is to be performed correctly, involves some level of analysis, which
produces the relationship between design, testing and analysis described in Figure H1.
DESIGN
E x tr a p o l at i o n of
D r aw i n g s for
te st re sult s to set
c o n str u c t i o n
of fault s c e nar i o s
Unk n ow ns in
ANALYSIS d e s i g n to b e INSTALL ATION
d eter m in e d
Te st re sult s
N e e d to ver i f y
for te st
p er fo r m a n c e
s c e n ar i o /s
TESTING
FIGURE H1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TESTING, ANALYSIS AND DESIGN
An earthing system injection test provides the means of assessing the condition and
performance of an earthing system. It does this by simulating a system earth fault, hopefully
at much lower power levels, and so allowing scaled measurements of real hazards to be
undertaken. Traditionally these measurements were made solely within and around the
electrical installation under investigation. However, to properly assess the impact of an
earthing system on its environment, testing needs to extend well beyond the boundary of a
substation fence.
Owners or users of electrical installations need to take all practicable steps to maintain their
earthing systems in a configuration and condition to meet the requirements for safety and
functional operation. They should also establish and operate administrative systems
(including records of checks undertaken) that provide periodic safety checks at reasonable
intervals appropriate to the operating environment and operational risks.

205 AS 2067:2016
H2 ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES
H2.1 General
Earthing system current injection testing can be used to investigate earthing system
performance. There are three general categories of assessment:
(a) Commissioning.
(b) Verification.
(c) Interference.
Each category of assessment requires the correct execution of a current injection test to
simulate a power system earth fault.
H2.2 Commissioning
It is recommended that all significant new earthing systems be verified by injection test.
Commissioning assessments are nominally the most extensive suite of tests an earthing
system is subject to in its operational lifetime. Commissioning will determine the earthing
system initial compliance and set a benchmark or baseline for ongoing supervision. A
commissioning assessment should verify the design and provide sufficient information so
that future maintenance can determine and verify the condition of the earthing system.
In most cases commissioning should measure the outputs of the earthing system in terms of
produced voltages and current distributions rather than solely resistance. The
commissioning should consider closely the key performance criteria identified in the hazard
identification and treatment analysis phases of its design. As it is not always possible to
foresee all hazard mechanisms at the design stage commissioning testing should also
determine the need for any localised secondary mitigation and any additional requirements
for telecommunication coordination and pipeline interference coordination or mitigation.
H2.3 Verification
Existing earthing systems, even where current performance is unknown due to neglect,
historical or contractual influences, can be verified by injection test. There are many issues
involved with the verification of an earthing system that has been in service for some time.
Numerous tests are required to assess system failures such as conductor breakage, necking,
deterioration and corrosion.
It has been recommended {3} that earth system testing can be used to reduce uncertainty in
earthing system design. If it is recognized that each parameter in a design has a cost to
calculate or measure, it may become desirable to test the earthing systems associated with
an installation where—
(a) the design is significantly dependent on a single parameter and hence its variance; or
(b) the sensitivity to particular parameters may make verification by testing attractive to
reduce the overall design uncertainty.
H2.4 Interference
Interference from a power system is the result of conductive and/or inductive coupling.
These are described as follows:
(a) Inductive coupling The result of a magnetic coupling to a metallic system installed
with the electromagnetic influence of the power system under either steady state or
fault conditions. As fault levels increase the frequency and magnitude of this type of
interference increase.
(b) Conductive coupling Occurs where two earthing systems are installed within
sufficient proximity that current passing to earth via one earthing system creates a
voltage on the second earthing system.
Examples of systems subject to interference include pipelines, telecommunication circuits
and swimming pools.
AS 2067:2016 206
H3 ASSESSMENT CONTENT
The content of any earthing system assessment includes two categories of investigation, as
described in Figure H2. These relate to the performance and state of the earthing system,
which are described further in the following points:
(a) The performance of an earthing system relates to how it will respond to impressed
earth fault conditions.

(b) The state of an earthing system relates to—
(i) the interconnection of the earthing system components and structures;
(ii) the soil resistivity, which varies with moisture and temperature;
(iii) the network configuration which determines the hazards that the earthing
system may be subject to; and
(iv) the state may be used to—
(A) estimate the lifetime of an installation;
(B) assess its ability or suitability to survive an earth fault; and

(C) facilitate comparison of performance test at various points in the service
life of an earthing system.
Ear t hing
S ys te m
Inve st i g at i o n
S t ate Per for m an c e
C o nt i nui t y EPR
Visual Inj e c t i o n
inspection c urre nt
Soil Curre nt
resistivity d i s tr i b u t i o n
H a z ar d s
N et wor k (S te p, tou c h
c o n fi g ur at i o n and transfer)
FIGURE H2 INVESTIGATION STRUCTURE

207 AS 2067:2016
H4 PERFORMANCE
The tests outlined in this Appendix examine the response of an earthing system to an
impressed earth fault. The assumption is that the earthing system will not change its state
during such conditions.
H5 PURPOSE
The purpose of a complete suite of tests included in a performance assessment is to validate
the adequacy of an earthing system and prove compliance with design thresholds.
Injection testing simulates a power system line to ground fault. To achieve this, a circuit is
established between the earthing system under test and a remote injection point. Ideally this
circuit should reflect the actual fault return point. Where this is not possible post testing
analysis is necessary to reflect the actual fault scenario or scenarios. This may include
multiple points of return.
An injection test is typically made sustainable by injecting a small current, commonly
between 2 A and 20 A. The effects are made measurable, even on live systems, by injecting
at a frequency away from power system frequency and using frequency tunable
instrumentation. The test is referred to as a low current, off power frequency injection test.
H6 THE INJECTION CIRCUIT

H6.1 General
Refer to the most basic test configuration for an injection test, as shown in Figure H3, and
consider how to establish the test to maximize the quality of the results.
I I N J EC T
Inj e c t i o n c ur re nt
p ower s o ur c e
Ear t h Rem ote

syste m u n d er ear t hing
i nve s t i g at i o n syste m
R1 R2
FIGURE H3 THE BASIC TEST
The basic test configuration consists of—

(a) two earth grids (with equivalent resistances R1 and R2);
(b) a current source; and
(c) a connecting circuit.
For a test to qualify as a basic test the earthing systems need to qualify as ‘earth grids’. To
be explicit, the earth grids, represented by R1 and R2, cannot be connected to any external
earth grids that introduce relative components to the grid impedance.

AS 2067:2016 208
The ideal conditions for this test are as follows:

(i) R1 ≈ R2
(ii) The separation of the two earth grids should be such that the mutual effects should be
insignificant (unless the test configuration simulates the actual fault and return
points). The separation required is a function of the soil resistivity and the size of the
earthing systems. An estimate for the ‘mutual earth resistance’ (MER) error is given
by Equation (H1).
−ρ
RE= . . . (H1)
2πx
where
ρ = soil resistivity (Ω.m)
x = separation of the two earthing systems (m)
Dsub is defined as the largest dimension of either earthing system. For a rectangular earth
grid it is its diagonal measurement.

The generally accepted rule of thumb for sufficient separation of the two earth grids has
been 5–10 times Dsub. To achieve a configuration where the effects of MER may be
considered ‘negligible’ can require a minimum separation of 30 times Dsub.
If the ideal conditions for the basic injection circuit cannot be obtained, as usually is the
case, then the results of the test should be corrected.
H6.2 Mutual earth resistance correction
If sufficient separation cannot be obtained to correct the results then Equation H2 is
employed as follows:
RM = RT + RE . . . (H2)
where
RM = measured resistance (Ω)
RT = true resistance (Ω)
RE = resistance error due to MER (Ω)
The term RE can be calculated using Equation (H1), but only when the two earth mats are
equivalent and the soil resistivity homogeneous. If the conditions do not meet these criteria
then modelling should be used.
H6.3 Mutual induction correction
As outlined in Paragraph H6.1, to perform an injection test, an injection circuit is
completed, around which the injection current passes. As a consequence of current passing
around the test loop, the following consequences arise:
(a) Any voltage measurement lead parallel to the injection circuit has a voltage induced
into it by magnetic coupling.
(b) A voltage measurement lead skew to the injection circuit has a voltage induced into
it, which is a function of the angle. The level of induction can be calculated with a
standard empirical equation {7}.
(c) A lead run 90° to the injection path has minimal voltage induced into it by magnetic
coupling (as long as the lead is not involved with magnetic end effects from the
injection path).

209 AS 2067:2016
(d) A lead run at an obtuse angle to the injection path is subject to an induced voltage.
The level of induction for this case cannot be calculated except with complex
analytical methods as the induced voltage is due to magnetic end-effects.
Mutual induction can occur between any measurement lead and any current loop, for which
there are two main areas of concern, the current injection loop and the other system
components, as discussed in the following sections.

Mutual induction is of major concern for low impedance installations. By definition the
impedance of an earthing Zg is given as Equation H3:
EPR
Zg = . . . (H3)
I inject
The level of induction is proportional to the current available, so as the system impedance
decreases the voltage levels throughout the installation must reduce for a constant injection
level, making all measurements increasingly susceptible to magnetic coupling with the
injection current.
H6.4 Current injection loop

As the current injection loop contains the highest concentration of current, it is the greatest
source of induction. It is optimal test methodology to use test leads which run at 90° to the
current injection path. This is practically difficult to achieve for the following reasons:
(a) The injection path is not always a straight line between the earthing system under
investigation and the remote current electrode.
(b) Physical restrictions do not allow either optimal path to be used.
(c) Measurements are required to points on or near the path of the current injection loop.
The test lead used to measure the EPR of a system should be run at either 90° or less to the
injection loop, as at these angles the induced voltage is additive and hence a conservative
result can be obtained. However, the induced voltage in leads run at obtuse angles are not
easily calculated as it is a function of magnetic end effects.
The level of induction into measurement leads due to coupling with the injection current is
further complicated by complex earthing systems involving metallic return paths. Metallic
return paths are metallic conductors closely coupled to the injection circuit, to the earthing
system under investigation and the remote current electrode.
Examples of such paths include overhead earth wires (OHEWs) and cable sheaths.
They may also be found in other forms such as low voltage neutrals and pipelines. A
metallic return path is any continuous metallic path bonded to both the earthing system
under investigation and the remote electrode.
With a metallic return path, a large percentage of the test injection current returns in close
proximity to the injection circuit. The induction into measurement leads will reduce as the
nett current available is reduced. Although the induced voltage is additive in the case where
the measurement lead is acute to the injection path, using the full injection current to
correct for the induced voltage will result in a non-conservative result, hence it is critical to
accurately determine the current available for induction. It is feasible that the nett current
be measured directly but in some instances it may be necessary that the injection current
and the current in the metallic return path be determined separately.
If a metallic return path is associated with the injection circuit then the induced voltage is
determined as described in Figure H4.

AS 2067:2016 210
IF
Rem ote
Icond c ur re nt
e l e c tr o d e
I ind
Zm
V
Vm
Ear t hing
syste m Pote nt i al
e l e c tr o d e
Zg
FIGURE H4 DETERMINATION OF INDUCED VOLTAGE
H6.5 System components

All components of an earthing system carry current during an injection test. The mutual
induction from these components can be significant depending on measurement lead
orientation and the current level in the component. Components to be considered include
grid conductors, counterpoise conductors, pipelines, neutrals and continuous metallic paths.
H6.6 Power distribution
Further corrections need to be made where the resistances of the two earth mats are not of
the same order. Where one of the mat resistances is significantly larger than the other the
power dissipated by that mat will be significantly greater than the other. This unbalanced
power dissipation leads to some anomalous results, where the results are dominated by the
zone of influence of the smaller earth mat with the higher resistance. This is contrary to the
expectation in this situation that the larger electrode would be dominant component. Test
configurations such as these require modelling of the test to compensate for the test MER
error.
H6.7 Current source
The current source used as the basis of the injection test establishes the foundation for all
subsequent testing. Its stability, in both magnitude and frequency, throughout the test period
establishes the baseline accuracy for all the dependent tests.
Other considerations for the current source include its ability to reject standing frequency
noise and associated heating effects.
H7 MEASUREMENT OF RESPONSES
H7.1 Injection current
The injection current is the reference for all other measurements made during an injection
test. As such its accurate measurement and provision is essential for accuracy in all other
measurements. It is used to scale measurements to actual fault levels and as a phase
reference when measuring phasor quantities during a test.

211 AS 2067:2016
H7.2 Earth potential rise

The fall-of-potential (FOP) test is used to determine the EPR of a earthing system during an
current injection test. Subsequently the EPR of a earthing system resulting from a power
system ground fault may be calculated. The EPR of an installation is critical in determining
accurately the performance of the installation’s earthing system. This includes soil potential
contours around the installation, the impedance of the installation and its components, and
the interaction with a third party system {6, 4}. This test requires a test lead to be run out
from the earthing system to allow a series of voltage measurements to be made between the
earthing system under test and the ground. The route and distance is chosen to minimize
measurement errors.
The FOP method is the most reliable and accurate method for determining the EPR of an
earthing system. Some installations are located in environments unsuitable to performing
the FOP test, such as highly urbanized environments {13}. In these cases the FOP method
test spacings are restricted and alternative methods may be required to determine the EPR,
such as discussed in {9}.
From Figure H5 it is seen that the voltage measurements with respect to the earth grid
potential (EPR), acquired from a FOP test, plateaus as distance increases from the earthing
system. The response of the FOP test in proximity to the earthing system is steep due to its
dependence on earthing system geometry, requiring complex analysis to accurately
calculate. In contrast, the FOP response beyond the ‘knee’ approaches an inverse (or
hyperbolic) distance relationship as outlined in {12}. At these distances the influence of the
earthing system approaches that of a distant point current source {11}. The measurements
taken from the fall of potential test need to be processed for the difference between test and
power system frequency and for distance to remote earth. They can then be used to
determine the earth system impedance and the EPR under actual fault conditions.
Adjustments should also be made for mutual earth resistance and for mutual inductance as
required.
Direct remote earth measurements, such as voltage measurements to remotely earthed
communications or pilot wires, can also supply supplementary test data. However, with
single point measurement alone it is very difficult to correctly assess and correct the many
error sources that can be part of any measurement taken.
The usual method for determining EPR from a FOP test is to apply linear regression to the
FOP response {5}. The linear regression method uses a plot of the FOP response against the
inverse of the distance. The points beyond the knee which should appear to be linear, are
1 1
used to extrapolate to 0 (or ) in the plane, being equivalent to an extrapolation to
∞ x
remote earth (or ∞ m). It is commonly recommended that measurements of the
characteristic is required till the response ‘flattens’, i.e. 3 or 4 readings that are nearly
equal.

AS 2067:2016 212
EPR: 2. 5 47 V
2.6
2.4 Knee
2. 2
2
VO LTAGE TO GRID, V
1.8
Inver se
1.6
1.4
Prox im it y
1. 2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0. 2
0
0 20 40 60 80 10 0 120 14 0 16 0
DISTAN CE FRO M E ARTH GRID, m
FIGURE H5 TYPICAL FALL OF POTENTIAL RESPONSE
H7.3 Current distribution

In the situation where fault current leaves the earthing system through paths alternate to the
earth grid, such as cable sheaths or overhead earth wires, the current through those alternate
paths should be measured. This allows analysis of how fault energy is dissipated, its effect
on the alternate paths, e.g. cable sheath ampacity, and calculation of the earth grid
impedance from the total system impedance. In complex systems the results are particularly
important in modelling alternate fault scenarios and in-feeds not simulated during testing.
Analysis of current distribution is based upon comparison with the injection current. A
basic analysis is performed by expressing the current in each earthing system component as
a percentage of the injection current. Crude analysis of this form can be used to determine
the more significant components of the system.
If suitable readings are made to derive phasor information a better understanding of the
currents within the earthing system can be made. The result of the vectorial addition of all
measurable currents, including the injection current, should be the current passing to earth
via the earth grid. This should allow the resistance of the main earthing system to be
determined.
For smaller earth grids determining the minimum value of an earth grid is critical in
determining its performance over time, especially for maintenance purposes. As the
earthing system deteriorates its resistance increases, so monitoring the resistance allows the
buried system to be monitored. Lifetime monitoring of earthing systems relies on records of
the system resistance over the service lifetime.
Where the system tested is part of a complex network, possibly with multiple zero sequence
sources and operational configurations, then more complex analysis of current distribution
is required. Zero sequence current analysis is required to determine the current distribution
in the earthing network for each fault scenario as described in Std 367 {8}.

213 AS 2067:2016
By way of example consider the simple example described by Figures H6 and H7.
Figure H6 describes the test circuit used to test installation ‘A’. The normal supply
configuration is described by Figure H7. Even in the case where the transmission line
geometry between the installation is consistent, the inductive currents will remain
approximately constant but the conductive currents will be very different. The analysis will
be further complicated by changes in system construction and the addition of other circuits
and sources.
I n s t a l l at i o n ‘A’
FIGURE H6 EXAMPLE TEST CONFIGURATION
I n s t a l l at i o n ‘A’
FIGURE H7 EXAMPLE IN-SERVICE CONFIGURATION
H7.4 Hazard measurement

H7.4.1 Transfer, touch and step voltage testing
While test current is flowing in the fault circuit, measurements are made of actual transfer,
touch and step voltages. The purpose of such measurements is to directly measure the
earthing system’s outputs and the compliance with the determined safety criteria.
Safety criteria stipulate maximum prospective (or ‘open circuit’) voltages, and use
calculated factors to accommodate the effect of series impedance. It is often worth
investigating the actual touch and step voltages (or ‘loaded’ voltages).
A common test method involves a survey made with a driven stake and high impedance
voltmeter to ascertain the maximum prospective voltage. If this figure seems high at
particular points then it is worthwhile determining the actual expected ‘loaded’ voltage.
This is achieved by measuring the voltage drop across a simulated body impedance (say
1000), with the foot-to-ground contact resistance modelled using a weighted 8 cm radius
disc. Wetting the surface enables a worst case condition to be tested. This voltage is then
compared with the recommended limits of touch and step voltages. In many instances the
loaded voltage measured is much lower than the prospective touch voltage. In extreme
transfer potential cases the prospective and loaded touch voltages may be equal.

AS 2067:2016 214
H7.4.2 Telecommunications coordination

Where telecommunications equipment is installed within the area of influence of a high
voltage earthing system consideration is required of the hazards that may be created. In
such cases notification to the appropriate telecommunications group is required.
H7.4.3 Pipeline interference/coordination
Where pipelines are installed within the area of influence of a high voltage earthing system
consideration is required of the hazards that may be created. These hazards need to be
reviewed during commissioning. In such cases notification to owner/operator of the pipeline
is required.
H8 PHYSICAL STATE
In assessing the state of an earthing system the following questions need to be answered:
(a) Condition Will the earthing system in its entirety survive an earth fault?
(b) Location The performance of an earthing system is dependent its location within the
power network and the resistivity of the soil in which it is buried. Both parameters
can vary with time and need to be checked to establish current performance and
facilitate comparison of performance with previous benchmarks.
H9 CONDITION ASSESSMENT
H9.1 General
A condition assessment is based on a continuity test combined with visual and physical
inspections. The recommended process for evaluating continuity test results is—
(a) establish allowable resistance limits for different connection types, such as fence,
plant and busbar; and
(b) compare test results with established limits.
H9.2 Continuity testing
Continuity testing is used to measure the resistance between items of plant within the main
earth grid and to components that should be effectively bonded to the grid. This test is
especially important in large earthing systems where visual inspection of all conductors and
connections is more difficult. Adequate bonding is essential to ensure that personnel are
working only on equipment that is effectively connected to the earthing system.
The measurement of d.c. resistance is a well understood metrological problem when testing
a standalone resistor. When that resistor has a low value (< 2 Ω) in an earthing system, the
problem becomes more complex, as described in Figure H8.
As shown, the current and voltage require separate leads so that the contact resistance does
not affect the result. Because of the power system environment the measurement is
complicated by—
(a) standing power frequency currents in the earth grid, represented by Inoise; and
(b) induced voltage into the current and voltages leads, in the earthing system testing
application the lead lengths can extend to several hundred metres.
To overcome these issues the current source requires a high level of immunity to the
creation of currents in the current loop from external noise and the voltmeter needs to be
able to reject significant amounts of power frequency noise.
If significant accuracy is required of the measurement, as distinct from an indication of
connectivity, then the conductor material needs to be noted as well as the ambient
temperature and the time of the measurement.

215 AS 2067:2016
I
– +
+ε-
V
FIGURE H8 FOUR PROBE RESISTANCE TEST CONFIGURATION

H9.3 Visual inspection

The visual inspection typically involves the following checks:
(a) Design compliance and as-built drawing accuracy.
(b) Condition of earthing conductors and connections.
(c) Condition of earthing electrodes.
(d) Presence and condition of earthing bonds to equipment.
(e) Condition of surface layer materials (if required).
(f) Condition of access fences (if required).
(g) Presence of transfer hazards.
The inspection should also include the following physical checks:
(i) Physical manipulation of connections to check robustness.
(ii) Checks for strand damage.
(iii) Check for missing or damaged conductor restraints or supports.
(iv) Visual indications of conductor corrosion, contamination and method of installation.
H10 SOIL RESISTIVITY

It is often necessary to carry out earth resistivity tests in conjunction with performance
assessments to allow accurate error corrections and safety criteria determination. Even
where resistivity testing was undertaken at the design stage, additional testing (however
brief) may help to define measurement errors and periodic variations.
The analysis of soil resistivity results requires the matching of soil resistivity results with
the curves produced by soil multilayer soil models. The matching depends on the type of
test performed, such as Wenner method or Schlumberger method, which use different array
spacings. The matching is usually performed with suitable software available commercially
from a number of specialist providers.

AS 2067:2016 216
H11 NETWORK CONDITION

Earth fault levels are influenced by the configuration of the power system at the time of the
fault. Fault current can be supplied by both local and external sources. The EPR of an
installation is dependant on those sources external to the installation, a percentage of the
total fault current, whereas conductor sizing is based on the total fault current. Some
considerations which affect the fault current at an installation include transformer winding
configuration, system voltages and impedances.
Consider an earthing system which contains multiple metallic return paths, such as depicted
in Figure H9. The currents which constitute the fault current use the following paths:
(a) Through the earth mat to the neutral point/s of the fault current source(s).
(b) Through the grid to the neutral of any local transformers within the installation.
(c) Induced and conductive current components which flow in the OHEWs or cable
sheaths connected to the back to the installation with the neutral(s) of the
transformer(s) which supplies the fault current.
The magnitude of the earth fault current If can be calculated using symmetrical components
{10} and data is usually maintained by planning sections within most power authorities.
The level of inductive current in the OHEWs and cable sheaths can be calculated by
Equation H4.
Zm
I S = 3 .I 0 . . . . (H4)
Z0
= 3.I 0 .μ
= 3.I 0 .(1 − k )
where
μ = coupling factor
k = screening factor
If the inductive coupling of the return paths is equal (i.e. μ1 = μ2), then the test can be used
to determine all the parameters of the earthing system. However, if the two (or more)
coupling factors are unequal then an injection test cannot determine the performance of the
earthing system under all fault scenarios. For instance, take the case described in Figure H9
where the test, which is a simulated earth fault, is supplied on the transmission line with
coupling factor μ2, then the performance for any fault condition where the fault current is
not supplied 100% by this transmission line then the performance of the system is unknown.
This can be overcome by either—
(i) testing all configurations of earthing system and configurations of fault scenarios; or
(ii) determining sufficient information during the test of the single configuration to
determine the performance of all other configurations.
In some instances it is possible to test all fault configurations and earthing configurations.
However, it is rare for all configurations to be tested so it is more usual for only one, maybe
two, tests to be performed and enough information gathered of all components of the
earthing system that the performance of all the configurations can be determined. Note that
in some installations different fault scenarios also include fault locations. The maximum
EPR for the installation is a function of the earth mat, through which the current I e flows.
The determination of this current, as described in Figure H9, is complex and requires the
solution of the network described. EPR is also dependent on the location of the earth fault
and is usually a maximum at the location described in Figure H9.

217 AS 2067:2016
I1
3 I 01
I1
I S1 = (1- r 1)3 I 01
I f = 3 I 01 + 3 I 0 2 + I 1
3I 02
I S 2 = (1- r 2 )3 I 0 2
I e = K 1 3 I 01 + r 2 3 I 0 2
Ze
FIGURE H9 CURRENT DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS EXAMPLE
H12 ONGOING MONITORING AND MAINTENANCE

H12.1 General
The ongoing supervision program should monitor aspects of the installation critical to
maintaining safe operation and consider any ‘external risks’ identified during the design
phase (e.g. monitoring separation distances). The condition of the earthing system
components should also be examined periodically by inspection. Excavating at
representative locations and visual inspection are appropriate means.
Measurement of the earthing system performance should be carried out periodically or
following major changes to the installation or power system which affect the fundamental
requirements of the earthing system. Such measurements should generally follow the
commissioning program. Continuity tests should also be undertaken.
H12.2 Inspection and test intervals
The asset owner or user should determine appropriate inspections and tests intervals based
on knowledge of its own earthing installations and design standards, and on its
understanding of environmental conditions and assessment of risk (e.g. soil conditions, theft
of copper).
When work has taken place that may have interfered with the earthing system, the system in
that area should be inspected and checked. All parts of the earthing system exposed by
excavation should be inspected for damage or deterioration.
Where there is any probability of significant corrosion of the buried earth grid, more
frequent inspections of the earth grid and connections need to be carried out and
replacements made where necessary.
Typical intervals between performance assessments of earthing systems for major
substations is between 10 and 15 years. Continuity and visual inspections of earthing
systems have typical intervals of 1 to 3 years.

AS 2067:2016 218
H13 DOCUMENTATION AND RECORDS

H13.1 Design documentation
Documentation is to include the physical installation description (for example, earthing
system layout drawings) as well as electrical assumptions, design decisions, commissioning
data, and monitoring and maintenance requirements.
To be most effective the documentation process should be an integral part of the overall
design process, with the requirements well understood by designers, field staff and project
staff from the inception of the project {2}. Configuration management requirements
(see {1}) appropriate for a safety critical system such as an earthing system would include
identifying and including the requirements within the ‘system’. It is more likely that staff
will take the time to document the initial design and any ‘last minute’ changes.
The final stage of the design process should be a formal ‘sign-off’ or handover process,
whereby the design engineer is able to collate all the design documentation and ongoing
management requirements for inclusion in the operational support documentation and
programs for the installation.
H13.2 Test documentation

All test measurements should be properly recorded and the documentation stored
appropriately. To enable the condition of the earthing installation over its lifetime and its
suitability for present fault levels to be assessed the following records should be
maintained:
(a) Initial design calculations and decisions.
(b) Results of commissioning tests.
(c) Results of periodic inspections and measurements.
(d) Updating of fault levels.
(e) Drawings showing the earthing system layout including location and size of all earth
conductors and electrodes, and the location of all grid connections.

219 AS 2067:2016
H14 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS SPECIFIC TO APPENDIX H

{1} AS/NZS 3907:1996, Quality management—Guidelines for configuration
management.
{2} ENA DOC 025 (2010), EG-0 Power system earthing guide, Part 1: Management
principles. Version 1, Energy Networks Association Limited, May 2010.
{3} Carman, WD. A Systematic Earthing System Design Procedure Employing

Probabilistic Analysis of Discrete Decisions. PhD thesis, School of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science, University of Newcastle, Callaghan, Australia.,
February 2002.
{4} ENA EG1—2006, Substation Earthing Guide.
{5} Fortin, J. Guide for Measuring Hydro-Quebecs´ Grounding System Installations.
Master of Applied Science Thesis, Electrical Engineering Department, Ecole
Polytechnic, University of Montreal, CP 6079 Succ. A, Montreal, Canada H3C 3A7.,
December 1985. Report No. 85102.
{6} IEEE Std 81-2012 (Revision of 81-1983). IEEE Guide for Measuring Earth
Resistivity, Ground Impedance, and Earth Surface Potentials of a Grounding System.
URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=6392181.
{7} Rogers, EJ and White, JF. Mutual coupling between horizontal earth return
conductors using actual routing parameters. 5(3):1266–1274, 1990. ISSN 0885-8977.
doi: 10.1109/61.57965.
{8} IEEE Std 367. Guide for determining the electrical power station ground potential
rise and induced voltage from a power fault. 1987.
{9} IEEE Std 81.2. IEEE Guide for Measurement of Impedance and Safety
Characteristics of Large, Extended or Interconnected Grounding System. 1992.
{10} Stevenson Jr WD. Elements of power system analysis. McGraw-Hill College, 4th
edition, 1982.
{11} Sunde ED. Earth conduction effects in transmission systems. Dover Publications.
1968. Revision of publication by Bell Telephone Laboratories 1949.
{12} Woodhouse, DJ and Middleton, RH. Assessment of analysis techniques used in
determining grounding system potential rise from the fall of potential method. In
Proc. IEEE Power Engineering Society Summer Meeting, volume 2, pages 1153–1158
vol. 2, 2000. doi: 10.1109/PESS.2000.867542.
{13} Woodhouse, DJ, Carman, WD and Poon, PWY. Measuring the Performance of
Earthing Systems in Cable Fed Systems in Highly Urbanised Environments. In
CEPSI, Christchurch, NZ, September 1994.

AS 2067:2016 220
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Documents referenced for informative purposes are as follows:

AS 1055.1, Acoustics—Description and measurement of environmental noise, Part 1:

General procedures
AS 1100, Technical drawing
AS 1359.101, Rotating electrical machines, Part 101: General requirements—Rating and
performance
AS 1682, Fire, smoke and air dampers (series)
AS 1824.2, Insulation coordination (phase-to-earth and phase-to-phase, above 1 kV),
Part 2: Application guide
AS 2293.3, Emergency escape lighting and exit signs for buildings, Part 3: Emergency
escape luminaires and exit signs

AS 2444, Portable fire extinguishers and fire blankets—Selection and location
AS 2676.1, Guide to the installation, maintenance, testing and replacement of secondary
batteries in or on buildings, Part 1: Vented cells
AS 2676.2, Guide to the installation, maintenance, testing and replacement of secondary
batteries in or on buildings, Part 2: Sealed cells
AS 2791, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear—Use and handling of sulphur
hexafluoride (SF6) in high-voltage switchgear and controlgear
AS 3011, Electrical installations—Secondary batteries installed in buildings
AS 5804, High-voltage live working (series)
AS 60038, Standard voltages
AS 60068.2.9, Environmental testing, Part 2.9: Guidance for solar radiation testing
AS 62271.1, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear, Part 1: Common specifications
AS 62271.202, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear, Part 202: High-voltage/low-
voltage prefabricated substation
AS ISO 10007, Quality management systems—Guidelines for configuration management
AS/NZS 1102.111, Graphical symbols for electrotechnical documentation,
Part 111: Architectural and topographical installation plans and diagrams
AS/NZS 1668, The use of ventilation and air-conditioning in buildings (series)
AS/NZS 1680, Interior and workplace lighting
AS/NZS 1891 (series), Industrial fall-arrest systems and devices
AS/NZS 3013, Electrical installations—Classification of the fire and mechanical
performance of wiring system elements
AS/NZS 3100, Approval and test specification—General requirements for electrical
equipment
AS/NZS 3835, Earth potential rise—Protection of telecommunications network users,
personnel and plant (series)
AS/NZS 4853, Electrical hazards on metallic pipelines

221 AS 2067:2016
AS/NZS 5532, Manufacturing requirements for single-point anchor device used for
harness-based work at height
AS/NZS 60076.10, Power transformers, Part 10: Determination of sound levels
(IEC 60076-10, Ed.1 (2001) MOD)
AS/NZS 60479.1, Effects of current on human beings and livestock, Part 1: General
aspects
AS/NZS ISO 31000, Risk management—Principles and guidelines
SA HB 100, Coordination of power and telecommunications—Manual for the
establishment of safe work practices and the minimization of operational interference
between power systems and paired cable telecommunications systems
SA HB 101, Coordination of power and telecommunications—Low Frequency Induction
(LFI): Code of practice for the mitigation of hazardous voltages induced into
telecommunications lines
SA HB 102, Coordination of power and telecommunications—Low Frequency Induction
SA HB 103, Coordination of power and telecommunications—Crossings Code: The

arrangement of overhead power and telecommunications lines, pole stay wires, and
suspension wires
SA HB 242, High voltage mining equipment for use underground
SA HB 331, Overhead line design
IEC 60050(151):2001, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary—Part 151: Electrical and
magnetic devices
IEC 60050(195):1998, International Electrotechnical—Part 195: Earthing and protection
against electric shock
IEC 60050(601):1985, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary—Part 601: Generation,
transmission and distribution of electricity—General
IEC 60050(604):1987, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary—Part 604: Generation,
transmission and distribution of electricity—Operation
IEC 60050(651), International Electrotechnical Vocabulary—Part 651: Live working
IEC 60050(826):1982, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary—Part 826: Electrical
installations of buildings
IEC 60255-1, Measuring relays and protection equipment, Part 1: Common requirements
IEC 60255-5, Measuring relays and protection equipment, Part 5: Insulation coordination
for measuring relays and protection equipment - Requirements and tests
IEC 60255-26, Measuring relays and protection equipment, Part 26: Electromagnetic
compatibility requirements
IEC 60331-21, Tests for electric cables under fire conditions—Circuit integrity,
Part 21: Procedures and requirements—Cables of rated voltage up to and including
0.6/1.0 kV
IEC 60331-31, Tests for electric cables under fire conditions—Circuit integrity,
Part 31: Procedures and requirements for fire with shock—Cables of rated voltage up to
and including 0.6/1 kV
IEC 60480, Guide to the checking of sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6) taken from electrical
equipment and specification for its re-use

AS 2067:2016 222
IEC 60664-1, Insulation co-ordination for equipment within low voltage systems—
Part 1: Principles, requirements and tests
IEC 60721-2-2, Classification of environmental conditions—Part 2-2: Environmental
conditions appearing in nature—Precipitation and wind

conditions appearing in nature—Air pressure
conditions appearing in nature—Solar radiation and temperature
conditions appearing in nature—Fauna and flora
IEC 60754-1, Test on gases evolved during combustion of materials from cables,
Part 1: Determination of the amount of halogen acid gas
IEC 60853, Calculation of the cyclic and emergency current rating of cables
IEC 60865-1, Short-circuit currents—Calculation of effects, Part 1: Definitions and

calculation methods
IEC 60949, Calculation of thermally permissible short-circuit currents, taking into account
non-adiabatic heating effects
IEC 61100, Classification of insulating liquids according to fire-point and net calorific
value
IEC 61140, Protection against electric shock—Common aspects for installation and
equipment
IEC 61219, Live working—Earthing or earthing and short-circuiting equipment using
lances as a short-circuiting device—Lance earthing
IEC 61243, Live working—Voltage detectors (all parts)
IEC 61850-3, Communication networks and systems for power utility automation,
Part 3: General requirements
IEC/TR 61850-9-2, Communication networks and systems for power utility automation,
Part 9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM)—Sampled values over
ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC/TR 61850-90-4, Communication networks and systems for power utility automation,
Part 90-4: Network engineering guidelines
IEC 61869-2, Instrument transformers, Part 2: Additional requirements for current
transformers
IEC 61892, Mobile and fixed offshore units (all parts)
IEC 62271, High-voltage switchgear and controlgear (all parts)
IEC/TR 62095, Electric cables—Calculations for current ratings—Finite element method
IEC Guide 107, Electromagnetic compatibility—Guide to the drafting of electromagnetic
compatibility publications
CENELEC HD 464 S1, Dry Type Cast Transformers
IEEE 80-2000, IEEE Guide for Safety in AC Substation Grounding
IEEE C57.12.00, General Requirements for Liquid-Immersed Distribution, Power, and
Regulating Transformers
IEEE Std 605, Guide for Bus Design in Air Insulated Substations

223 AS 2067:2016
IEEE Std 979:2012, Guide For Substation Fire Protection

CIGRE Report 23-04:1972, Handling of SF6 and its decomposition products in gas
insulated switchgear
CIGRE Report 23-07:1991, Adaptation of substations to their environment both in urban
and rural areas, including noise problems and oil pollution of subsoil
CIGRE Technical Brochure 44, Earthing of GIS - An Application Guide, Dec. 1993
CIGRE Technical Brochure 72-1992, Guidelines for the evaluation of dielectric strength of
external insulation
CIGRE Technical Brochure 105:04/1996, Mechanical effects of short-circuit currents in
open air substations
CIGRE Technical Brochure 213, The mechanical effects of short-circuit currents in open
air substations. Part II. Companion brochure to No. 105 2002
CIGRE Technical Brochure 535, EMC within Power Plants and Substations 2013
CIGRE Technical Brochure 537, Guide for transformer fire safety practices
ENA EG-0, Power System Earthing, Part 1: Management Principles’, May 2010
ENA EG-1, Substation Earthing Guide
ENA DOC 015 , National guidelines for prevention of unauthorised access to electricity
infrastructure
ENA NENS 03, National guidelines for safe access to electrical and mechanical apparatus
ENA DOC 018, Guideline for the Fire Protection of Electricity Substations
Factory Mutual Global Standard 3990, dated 06/1997: Less or non-combustible liquid
insulated transformers
FM Global Data Sheet 5-4, Transformers
ICNIRP (International Commission on Non-Ionising Radiation Protection) ‘Guideline for
Limiting Exposure to Time Varying Electric and Magnetic Fields (1 Hz to 100 kHz) 2010’.
(www.icnirp.de)
NCC National Construction Code, Australian Building Code Board
NFPA 850, Recommended Practice for Fire Protection for Electric Generating Plants and
High Voltage Direct Current Converter Stations
The following documents are not referenced in this Standard but are relevant to the subject
and may be referred to for additional information:
AS/NZS 4383, Preparation of documents used in electrotechnology (series)
AS/NZS 4871, Electrical equipment for underground coal mines (series)
HB 13, Electrical equipment for hazardous areas
HB 219, Earth potential rise—Protection of telecommunications network users, personnel
and plant—Worked examples for the application guide
IEC 60044-6, Instrument transformers, Part 6: Requirements for protective current
transformers for transient performance

AS 2067:2016
224
NOTES
Standards Australia
Standards Australia develops Australian Standards® and other documents of public benefit and national interest.
These Standards are developed through an open process of consultation and consensus, in which all interested
parties are invited to participate. Through a Memorandum of Understanding with the Commonwealth Government,
Standards Australia is recognized as Australia’s peak non-government national standards body. Standards Australia
also supports excellence in design and innovation through the Australian Design Awards.
For further information visit www.standards.org.au
Australian Standards®
Committees of experts from industry, governments, consumers and other relevant sectors prepare Australian
Standards. The requirements or recommendations contained in published Standards are a consensus of the views
of representative interests and also take account of comments received from other sources. They reflect the latest
scientific and industry experience. Australian Standards are kept under continuous review after publication and are
updated regularly to take account of changing technology.
International Involvement
Standards Australia is responsible for ensuring the Australian viewpoint is considered in the formulation of
International Standards and that the latest international experience is incorporated in national Standards. This role is
vital in assisting local industry to compete in international markets. Standards Australia represents Australia at both
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).
Sales and Distribution

Australian Standards®, Handbooks and other documents developed by Standards Australia are printed and
distributed under licence by SAI Global Limited.
For information regarding the development of Standards contact:

Standards Australia Limited
GPO Box 476
Sydney NSW 2001
Phone: 02 9237 6000
Fax: 02 9237 6010
Email: mail@standards.org.au
Internet: www.standards.org.au
For information regarding the sale and distribution of Standards contact:

SAI Global Limited
Phone: 13 12 42
Fax: 1300 65 49 49
Email: sales@saiglobal.com
ISBN 978 1 76035 559 3

As 2067-2016 Substations and High Voltage Installations Exceeding KV A.C.

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

As 2067-2016 Substations and High Voltage Installations Exceeding KV A.C.

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

LICENCE

Licensee: Mr apd admin

Date: Tuesday, 11 October 2016 4:54 PM

1. Definitions and Interpretations

Licence means the right to access and use the Product.

Licensee means the purchaser and user of the Product.

3.2. The Licensee isLearn

Substations and high voltage

The following are represented on Committee EL-043:

 Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

 Electrical Regulatory Authorities Council

This Standard was issued in draft form for comment as DR AS 2067:2014.

Keeping Standards up-to-date

Standards Australia welcomes suggestions for improvements, and encourages readers to

Substations and high voltage

SECTION 1 SCOPE AND GENERAL

SECTION 2 FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

2.5 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................... 30

SECTION 6 SAFETY MEASURES

SECTION 7 PROTECTION, CONTROL AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

7.4 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS ............................................................................. 101

SECTION 8 EARTHING SYSTEMS

8.6 COMMISSIONING AND ONGOING MONITORING ........................................... 122

SECTION 9 INSPECTION AND TESTING

SECTION 10 OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL .......................................... 128

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 220

www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

for which mining industry specific legislation sets other requirements.

1.3 NORMATIVE REFERENCES

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1905.1 Part 1: Fire-resistant doorsets

3600 Concrete structures

www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

60076 Power transformers

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1.4.2 Boundary clearance

www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

1.4.14 Earth electrode

(a) isolated neutral, the capacitive earth fault current;

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1.4.23 Electrical equipment

Resistivity of a typical sample of soil.

www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

1.4.34 High voltage (HV)

respect of its insulation.

Example: NERs and earthing transformers.

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1.4.46 Line (electric)

Conductor or conductive part intended to be energized in normal operation, including a

1.4.50 Low voltage (LV)

1.4.59 Non-flashover distance (N)

See Clause 1.4.11, Containment tank/system.

1.4.63 PEN conductor

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1.4.71 Protective barrier

may become live subject to a hazardous voltage.

operating conditions of a component, device, equipment, or system.

www.standards.org.au © Standards Australia

1.4.83 Short-circuit time constant of primary windings (primary time constant)

(e.g. the protective devices).

© Standards Australia www.standards.org.au

1.4.92 Voltage Range I

1.4.94 Working clearance