PASSAGE 1

Once upon a time, rural employment programmes in Orissa (or for that matter in much of India) were safely in the hands of private
contractors and their political masters. The game was roughly as follows. Private contractors were the direct recipients of "work
orders”, and of the corresponding funds. They made money by submitting fudged "muster rolls”, with inflated employment and
wage figures. A substantial part of the loot was recycled through the so-called "PC" (percentage) system, whereby various
functionaries received fixed percentages of the amounts released. The contractors also had to pay tribute to their political bosses,
for whom these funds came handy during election campaigns. This is the sort of situation that led P. Sainath to say that
"everybody loves a good drought" -the peak season for rural employment programmes. Labourers, for their part, worked hard and
earned a pittance.
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was supposed to bring about a radical change in this state of affairs.
Under NREGA, rural labourers have a legal entitlement not only to work on demand but also to minimum wages. To prevent
corruption, a wide range of transparency safeguards has been built into the Act. For instance, muster rolls are supposed to be kept
at the worksite, displayed at the Panchayat Bhawan, and read out in public at the time of wage payments. Employment and wage
details also have to be entered in the labourers' "Job Cards”, to enable them to verify the records for themselves. Contractors are
banned.
In some states, there is evidence of substantial progress in this transition towards a transparent and accountable system. In
Rajasthan, for instance, contractors have virtually disappeared from NREGA and mass fudging of muster rolls is a thing of the
past. Andhra Pradesh is also making rapid strides in this direction through strict record-keeping, institutionalized social audits and
the payment of wages through Post Offices.
However, the same transition is proving quite slow in some other States. A recent survey of NREGA in western Orissa, for
instance, suggests that the "contractor rat is alive (if not well) in this region. This survey, initiated by the G.B. Pant Social Science
Institute at Allahabad University, was conducted from 3-12 October 2007 by students of the Delhi University in collaboration
with local volunteers .• (a) Thirty randomly-selected gram panchayats, spread over three districts (Bolangir, Boudh and
Kalahandi), were studied .• (b) The survey included careful verification of "muster rolls" for one randomly-selected NREGA
work in each of these gram panchayats . • ( c) The breakdown of the transparency safeguards in areas covered by the survey is
well illustrated by the fate of the Job Card .• ( d) The main purpose of the Job Card is to enable NREGA labourers to verify their
own employment and wage details. In Orissa, however, this purpose has been defeated from the start due to the faulty design of
the Job Card. For instance, there is no column for "wages paid" in the card, making it impossible for workers to verify their wage
payments. Even the number of days worked is hard to verify, as the names of the labourer and worksite have been replaced by
numerical codes. To decipher a labourer's code, one has to refer to the first page of the Job Card, which is often in English! The
meaning of the worksite code, for its part, is anyone's guess. In this and other ways, the Job Card is virtually unreadable, even for
trained investigators-let alone semi-literate labourers.
The fate of muster rolls is not much better. In most of the sample gram panchayats, it was observed that various "adjustments" in
the muster rolls had become routine practice. For instance, a worker without a Job Card is often accommodated by "clubbing" his
or her wages with those of someone who has a Job Card under the latter's name. Similarly, team work performed under the piece-
rate system is often recorded under the name of the team leader alone. Sometimes, adjustments are also made to meet the
requirements of the online Monitoring and Information System (MIS). These and related practices, well-intentioned as they might
be in some cases, open the door to further "adjustments" that serve different purposes. In fact, the pressure to make adjustments in
some circumstances (e.g., meeting the requirements of the MIS) seems to have become a handy cover for fraudulent practices,
such as inflating the wage payments and pocketing the difference.

1. What could be a suitable title for the passage?

(a) Dismantling the Contractor Raj in Orissa
(b) NREGA: Breakdown of Transparency Safeguards in Orissa
(c) NREGA Implementation in Orissa: In a Terrible Shape
(d) Rajasthan and Orissa-A Study in Contrast in Implementation of NREGA

2. Which of the following were, according to the author, the commonly prevalent improprieties in implementation of rural
employment programs in Orissa.
I. Contractors submitted fudged "muster rolls:'
II. Contractors made claims for works that were never executed.
III. Contractors inflated employment and wage figures.
(a) I only (b) III only (c) I and II (d) I and III

3. Which of the following are the unique positive features of NREGA for the rural poor?
I. legal entitlement to work on demand II. wages adjusted to cost of living index
III. banning of contractors IV assurance of minimum wages
(a) I and II (b) I to III (c) I to IV (d) I, III and IV

4. The word fudged is equivalent in meaning to

(a) Fraudulently prepared (b) manufactured (c) invalid (d) incorrectly prepared
5. What is the author's purpose of quoting P. Sainath?
(a) To draw support for his thesis
(b) To suggest that P. Sainath was perceptive in his observation
(c) To lead to the implication of his observations, but in words of another thinker
(d) To concur with views of P. Sainath

PASSAGE 2
One aspect of our legal system that has amazed and dismayed the public is a lack of consistency in decision making. Our
Constitution is so structured as to ensure judicial consistency at all court levels except the highest. The subordinate courts in every
state are bound by the decisions of the high courts; each high court in turn is bound to follow the law declared by the Supreme
Court.
But the Supreme Court consists of individual Justices who don't all think alike, and are not averse to saying so. Emerson once
said, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds:' Even the fiercest critics of our highest court cannot accuse its
incumbent of having 'little minds: And that's where the trouble begins. How are twenty-six Justices drawn from different parts of
the country expected to be consistent-not merely with themselves, but with a continuing body of Justices whom they have never
known, and whose thoughts and aspirations they do not always share? The problem of judicial inconsistency is a human one,
much like the judicial process itself.

One of the difficulties about this matter of judging is that it bristles with human problems. It deals with events which are unsavory,
and with clashes of personality thrown up by some momentous decisions, such as the historic Kesavananda Bharti case of 1973; a
case which split the Court down the middle. It shook the institution as no other case had done-I believe the highest court has never
been the same since. In that somewhat confused but epochal decision rendered in 1973, almost every single judge spoke for
himself, and did not look kindly at his colleague who spoke differently. The case presented the sorry spectacle of a Bench of
thirteen Justices who could not agree, simply because they would not agree as to what the majority had said! The final order,
which is found reproduced on the last page of supplement of the Supreme Court Reporter of 1973 (and nowhere else!) was signed by
only nine judges out of the total of thirteen who heard the case. (The other four refused to subscribe to it!)

Sociologists have ascribed the reason for uncertainty in the law in the highest court of the land to (what they describe as) 'the
plumbed depths of judicial psychology', i.e., the tendency of apex court Justices to overrule! Judges of the highest court in almost
every country produce a recurrent proportion of successful appeals. The subconscious motivation is said to be role-justification. I
am not a sociologist, and dare not plumb the depths of 'judicial psychology: Suffice it to draw attention to a stark fact: that out of
the decisions of the high courts in the country which are admitted in the Supreme Court, either by way of a certificate granted by the
high courts under Articles 133 or 134 or by way of special leave granted by the Supreme Court itself under Article 136, a large
percentage are successful. This is also true elsewhere. That a final appellate court allows a substantial percentage of appeals-in
every country-reflects a truism: that judges are decision makers, and that law itself, notwithstanding the legal ethic of certainty, is
very often a matter of personal opinion. Uncertainty in the law is then a by-product of the law itself.

8. What could be a suitable title of the passage?

(a) Consistency: A Major Issue in Supreme Court Decisions
(b) Consistency of Decisions of the Supreme Court: A Major Public Concern
(c) Lack of consistency in Court Decisions-A Byproduct of Law
(d) Consistency or Justice-An Eternal Tension in Judicial Process

9. My implication the eminent author suggests that consistency of decisions is a problem for
(a) The Sub-divisional Courts (b) The District Courts
(c) The High Courts (d) The Supreme Court

11. According to the author, the source of the consistency problem lies in
I. the intellectual preeminence of justices of the supreme court.
II. Diversity of background and absence of shared goals and aspirations of the judges.
III. The urge to express individuality as being different from brother justices.
IV. Sometimes, the monumental nature of the Issues that come up for adjudication.
a. I to III only b. II to IV only c. II and III only d. I to IV

12. The author must have felt ________ about the chasm seen in the views of the Judges in Kesavananda Bharti case.
a. exhilaration b. angry c. anguish d. anxiety

PASSAGE 3
Road Accidents in India take a toll of as many as 15 persons every hour. And they keep rising at 8% annually. India tops the table
with 10% of world road crashes, causing a loss of Rs. 75,000 crore to the country's economy besides inflicting traumatic pain and
suffering to the kith and kin of the dead or injured. With increasing household incomes, a steady increase in motorized vehicle
ownership in India is a natural corollary. Concomitantly, the country's ambitious plan to upgrade and extend its road network will
mean more roads, yet more cars, motorbikes, buses and trucks. And more roads and better roads may not necessarily be safe
roads.
Road death and injury are preventable. Yet India continues to allow itself to be labeled as the country with the world's most
dangerous roads. There continues to be a lackadaisical approach. Bureaucracy festooned in red tape considers boards and
committees as a panacea for all ills, a time honoured stratagem for paying and deflecting uncomfortable attention. The
parliamentary standing committee on transport, tourism and culture faulted the National Roads Safety and Traffic Management
Board Bill, introduced in the Lok Sabha in May 2010, as an attempt to accommodate retired persons on the board and little else.
The purely advisory board's recommendations would apply only to national highways.
Not new boards or committees but what, in fact, is needed is a safe road traffic system that accommo dates and compensates for
human vulnerability and fallibility. It needs simple laws and rules, it certainly needs implementation, a quick disposal of cases, a
foolproof surveillance system to instantly check and initiate punitive as well as promotional measures against drunk-driving, over-
speeding, dangerous and reckless driving, and violation of traffic norms and rules. Wearing a proper quality helmet correctly is
seen to help reduce the risk of death by almost 40% and the risk of severe injury by over 70%, wearing a seatbelt reduces the risk
of a fatality among front-seat passengers by 40-50% and among rear seat occupants by 25-75%. If correctly installed and used,
child restraints reduce deaths among infants by about 70% and deaths of small children by 50-80% (WHO Global Status Report
on Road Safety).
Amidst chaotic growth in urban areas, roads in India typically carry a bewildering mix of traffic, myriad vehicles along with
pedestrians and animals competing for space along with a deafening cacophony of blaring horns and screaming curses. With
rapidly diminishing civic sense and rising netagiri and dadagiri, pavements and footpaths are encroached by cars and hawkers.
Rubble and remnants are left strewn on roads, during repairs, and repairs spots left unprotected. Potholed roads slow the traffic to
a crawl and pothole dodging leads to accidents.
Excessive speed is a major villain, the Single biggest cause of deaths on roads, a 5% increase in average speed leads to about 10%
rise in a road crashes that cause injuries and a 20% increase in fatal crashes; a 10% increase in speed leads to a 30% increase in
deaths (WHO). Pedestrians have a 90% chance of surviving a car crash at 30km/h or below, but less than a 50% chance of
surviving impacts of 45 km/h or above. Research on effective speed management indicates that speed limits on urban roads must
not exceed 50 km/h.

16. The main idea of paragraph 1 is:

(a) Road accidents in India is rising alarmingly.
(b) Road accidents are a cause of immense loss to the country's economy and human suffering.
(c) Road accidents can be minimized by regulating the number of vehicles on road.
(d) Increase in road accidents can be reduced by building better roads.

17. The main ideas of paragraph 3 may be summarized as:

I. Implementation of simple rules and regulations that check foibles of humans would prevent road accidents.
II. Death due to road accidents in India can be curtailed by ensuring that bikers wear helmets and front seat passengers wear
seat belts.
III. Accident toll can be reduced by penalizing those who take recourse to reckless driving, drunk-driving etc.
IV. Developing traffic sense in the Indian public would reduce accident intensity.
(a) I and II only (b) I and III only (c) I, II and III only (d) I to IV

18. Road accidents are rising in India at the rate of:

(a) 10% annually (b) 15% annually (c) 8% annually (d) 5% annually

19. The word bewildering in paragraph 4 is closest in meaning to

(a) Amazing (b) Complex (c) Confusing (d) Vexing

20. Which of the following is NOT a cause of road crashes according to the passage?
(a) Animals on road (b) Drunk-driving (c) Untrained drivers (d) Potholes

21. Had the author continued to write, the main idea of the next paragraph would be:
I. How enforcement of speed norms helped reduce the number of accidents in some countries.
II. Another major cause of road accidents and its mitigation.
III. Decrying the present government at its inability to control road accidents.
IV Plea to make more roads and thereby less crowded roads.
(a) I only (b) I and II only (c) I, II and III (d) I to IV

22. Which of the following could be a suitable title for the passage?
(a) Pathetic Condition of Indian Roads (b) Pathetic Saga of Road Safety
(c) Unsafe Roads: Thanks to Bureaucracy (d) Road Safety: A Major Challenge for Days to Come

23. How is the author's tone about executive functioning in regard to road safety?
(a) Hyper-critical (b) Derogatory (c) Satirical (d) Critical
 ANSWERS

16. b 17. c 18. b 19. c 20. c 21. a 22. c 23. c 24. b 25. b 26. d 27. c 28. b 29. c 30. c
31. c32. d