NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF

MATRIC NO: 2021609876

CLASS: MC2462A

LIM GUAN ENG

RUSLAN BIN KASSIM & ANOTHER APPEAL

(2021)

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA)

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO PARTIES INVOLVED

Plaintiff/Appellant:
Lim Guang Eng has been the Chief Minister of Penang, a Member of Parliament for Bagan, a
State Assemblyman for Air Puteh, as well as the Secretary General of said Malaysian
Democratic Action Party. Lim Guan Eng is a Malaysian politician and activist as Member of
Parliament representing Bagan, Member of Penang State Legislative Assembly for Air Putih
from March 2008, as well as National Chairman of such Democratic Action Party (DAP) as
of March 20, 2022.
Defendant/Respondent:
Ruslan Kasim is a Negeri Sembilan UMNO politician. When Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was
ousted from either the authorities on November 2, 1998, he remained fully behind him. He
was once a young activist of Negeri Sembilan UMNO and was sacked by the party.
Following that, he co-founded the People's Justice Party alongside Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim
(PKR). He has been the Chairman of the Negeri Sembilan Justice Relations (PKR) at the
local and state level.
2.0 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:
Most of these arguments challenged whether appellant/plaintiff, Lim Guan Eng, whose
endorsed a candidate or is just a government employee at the period, was barred from
pursuing a defamation case against the defendants in their official position. The disagreement
in between entities arose from the plaintiff's official travel to Singapore, the objective of
which was to establish investment alternatives and encourage health tourism. Having
followed the said encounter, the 1st defendant, Ruslan Kassim, in his capabilities as Chief
Information Officer of the 3rd defendant, Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa Malaysia, approved a
statement to the press wherein he indicated, inter alia, among other things, that such plaintiff

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

decided to attend a secret meeting among political entities or individuals in Singapore; but
also that the entire Malaysia was obligated to interrogate the plaintiff's dedication. The High
Court granted the plaintiff's defamation suit against with the defendants. Nevertheless, on
appeals, the Court of Appeal rejected the High Court's finding on the grounds that such
plaintiff lacked locus standi to bring a defamation case in his official role. As a result, the
questions to be determined were also if the plaintiff entitled locus standi to file this matter, or
even if the plaintiff, as just a government employee, entitled pursue a defamation case
pertaining to the performance of his official duties.
3.0 ILAC REPORT SUMMARY
3.1 ISSUE
The issue of the cases consist of several issues on Defamation Act as asserted below for the
report summary:
1. Whether Lim Guang Eng, the appellant, entitled sue for defamation in the official role rather
than his private capacity. The appellant suggested that he would have sued in their official
role as Penang's Chief Minister.
2. It is a factual question whether the appellant sued in his professional or private capacity.
3. Whether the Court of Appeal's decision that the appellant did sued in their official role was
unequivocal.
4. The Government Proceedings Act 1956 ("the GPA") considers whether the appellant sued in
his private or official capacities.
5. Whether or not a fiat even by Attorney General or perhaps the State Legal Advisor is required
for legal assistance by a private arbitration professional.
3.2 LAW
3.2.1 Referred legislations:
Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 mentioned that the provided under Section 3 of the
Government Proceedings Act 1956 ("GPA 1956") and Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956
("CLA 1956"), as well as the nonattendance of a restrictive allocation in the Defamation Act
1957, might not have deterred the plaintiff from bringing her action. It was also argued that
there is no one common law source that substantially limits the plaintiff's capabilities in
initiating a defamation case in his own or official role. The opposite is true.

Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Section 96 mentioned that it will completely contradict the
objective of Section 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, which necessitates obtaining

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

leave beforehand. Because the appellant opted to prosecute his appeal on the basis that he
sued in his official position by maintaining the leaving question despite possessing the option
to change it, I do not believe it is permitted for this court to go beyond the question's
boundaries.

Defamation Act 2005 (NSW), Section 9 mentioned that it was passed in order to establish
consistent defamation laws in Australia Whatever the stance chosen in common law nations,
the notions of "honour," "dignity," "good name," "integrity," and "character" abound in
judicial judgements, reflecting the different aspects of the unique human self that are worthy
of safeguarding under the wide idea of repute.

Federal Constitution, art 10(1)(a) mentioned that it is worth noting that several of the
jurisdictions from which the preceding rulings have emanated have constitutional rights that
are quite close to our own constitutional protections of freedom of expression as entrenched
in Art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution. The following tends to be incontrovertible from
the spread of judgements on the question of defamation actions brought by government
entities or government personnel.

Government Proceedings Act 1956, ss 2(2) 3, 24(2)(a), 24(3), 25(1) mentioned that the
appellant cannot be compelled to contend that the clause does not apply in the circumstances
of the current appeal. Accepting the argument could render section 24(2)(a) of the GPA
utterly unnecessary and meaningless.

Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, s 17A mentioned that "A construct which would
encourage the aim or aim underpinning the Act (whether such a goal or object is specifically
expressed in the Act or not) should be favoured to an interpretation which would not foster
that aim or objective in the construction of a provisions of an Act." It is common knowledge
that Parliament somehow doesn't legislation in vain. As a result, it is mentioned in Section
17A of the Interpretation Acts of 1948 and 1967.

Legal Profession Act 1976, ss 35(1), (2)(a), (b), (ba), (c), 38 mentioned that for the intention
of permitting law officials and government officers to attend court in place of attorneys and
solicitors Under Section 35 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("LPA 1976"), an advocate and
solicitor have the sole right to present and plead in all Malaysian Courts of Justice, while
other legal professionals could also present (see 35(2)(a)(b)(ba)(c) LPA 1976). Section 38 of
the LPA 1976 also specifies who can function as an advocate and solicitor, which comprises

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General, as well as every other personnel involved

under their jurisdiction.

Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia Act 1979, s 35 mentioned that in order to

determine whether the plaintiff might retain private lawyers to work for it in civil
proceedings, the court had to interpret a provision identical to the one in the current case, §
35 of the Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia Act 1979.

Rules of Court 2012, O 18 r 19 The High Court denied a motion to throw out the plaintiff's
complaint under O 18 and 19 of the Rules of Court 2012. The plaintiff in Adnan Yaakob was
the Menteri Besar of the State of Pahang. The defendant publication published a defamatory
story about him. The same panel considering the current Court of Case appeal granted the
appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's action. This judgement was later reversed by this court.
The case has been remanded to the High Court for a full trial. We are told that the High Court
issue was finally resolved diplomatically by the litigants.

3.2.2 Referred case:

1. Chong Chieng Jen v The State Government of Sarawak [2019] 1 CLJ 329
2. Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v Chong Chieng Jen [2016] 5 CLJ 169
3. Noor Azman Azami v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik [2019] 3 CLJ 295
4. Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia v DW Margaret David Wilson [2010] 5 CLJ
899
5. Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu & Ors v Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors [2013]
1 CLJ 107; ; [2012] MLRHU 1003
4.0 APPLICATION
4.1 Since the appellant opted to seek his appeal on the basis that he sued in its official
position by maintaining the leave issue despite possessing the option to change it, I do
not believe it is permitted for this court to go beyond the question's boundaries. That
would completely contradict the objective of Section 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act
1964, that necessitates obtaining leave beforehand.
Referred Cases: It is entirely in agreement that an administration officer could perhaps sue
for defamatory in his official sense, with the exception of paragraphs [86], [116], [117], and
[118] of the judgement, which recommend, albeit obliquely, that the authority cannot in law
resumption claim for damages against the residents. However, this court decided contrary in
Chong Chieng Jen v The State Government of Sarawak [2019] 1 CLJ 329 (Chong

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

Chieng Jen). No reason to reconsider the choice because the factual foundation of the leave
issue would be that the appellant filed in his official position, the question must be answered
affirmatively, i.e., the judgement of this court in Chong Chieng Jen permits a public official
to sue over defamation with his or her official role.
4.2 As the Court of Appeal determined, the appellant sued in his official capacity as the Chief
Minister of Penang, as indicated by his Statement of Claim, his possess confession in the
leave issue, his Witness Statement, his Notice of Appeal, and Memorandum of Appeal,
as well as the legislation compelled him to be depicted by a government legal officer
rather than a private law practitioner of his preference. This is hardly as far an issue of
whether or if an authorized government officer must represent them. It is a provision of
GPA section 24(2)(a).
Referred Cases: The Notice of Appeal and Amended Memorandum of Appeal had both
been submitted after Chong Chieng Jen. It is fair to suppose that by that time, the attorney
who submitted the two documents in support of the appellant must be informed of the
judgement in that case (thus the leave issue), particularly the following obiter statement by
the judgment. Thus, when the appellant submitted the leave request, appellant might have
expected the court to rule in his behalf upon that leave issue. That is most likely and yet no
effort has been made during the session before others to change or replace the leave inquiry
with another one. It was intended to use Chong Chieng Jen to the appellant's benefit because
the ruling in that case offers a clear yes response to the question.The appellant would also be
aware that within Chong Chieng Jen, this court did not disagree with the Court of Appeal's
views (Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v Chong Chieng Jen [2016] 5 CLJ
169), wherein the appeal stemmed.
4.3 In this case, the appellant did not file an appeal against this decision. As a result, he must
be assumed to acknowledge the findings as true and is barred from expressing otherwise.
Referred Cases: As a substance of broad core proposition, in the latest instance of Noor
Azman Azami v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik [2019] 3 CLJ 295, a party is not barred from
bringing up a challenging situation in an appeal since there government has the power and
discernment to allow a party to make an argument a ground that fall under the scope of the
inquiry on which leave to appeal was granted in order to prevent a travesty of justice.
Nevertheless, in order to attain the purposes of justice, discretion must be applied cautiously
and selectively, and then only in very restricted circumstances. It must be carried out with
care, safeguarding the interests among all relevant parties." As a result, this appeal should be

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

considered purely on the ground which the appellant filed in his official role as Penang's
Chief Minister, not within his individual account as a private individual.
4.4 A governmental official that tried to sue or is accused in the official stance could only be
defended by a governmental legal consultant, except if the claim is for a personal
decision, where such instance the officer could be defended by any private law
practitioner of the choosing. Throughout this instance, the appellant was concerned that
its defamatory allegations had harmed his character as the Chief Minister of Penang,
which official post he held at the time, rather than his personal image as a private entity.
Referred Cases: In Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia v DW Margaret David
Wilson [2010] 5 CLJ 899, a case involving a body corporate (rather than a public officer)
attempting to sue a private citizen, the court referred to section 35(2) of the LPA and stated
on page 912: "Section 35(2) LPA 1976 seems to be in consistence only with stipulation of s.
24 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956, that also leading up to the LPA 1976 also
facilitated certain Furthermore, in civil actions, when lawfully hired by the Attorney General,
the advocates and counsel may intervene on behalf of the Nation of Malaysia."
4.5 It should be observed, however, that such a court had not been asked to decide the matter
in that instance. As a result, the case does not provide authority for the idea that no fiat is
required when a public officer seeks to be defended by a private law specialist of his
choosing.
Referred Cases: In Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu & Ors v Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad
Nawawi & Ors [2013] 1 CLJ 107; ; [2012] MLRHU 1003, The question before the High
Court would be whether the State Government of Terengganu might be managed by a private
practise firm of advocates and attorneys. Yeoh Wee Siam J (as she was then) decided,
properly in my opinion, that a corporate law firm could be authorised to serve the State
Government if it could show that it was duly engaged or granted a fiat by the Terengganu
State Legal Adviser.
5.0 CONCLUSION
As it turns forth, the Court of Appeal in the current case agreed that plaintiff/appellant were
suing in his official role as Chief Minister of the State of Penang, rather than in his individual
capacity. The final point to consider is the assessment of damages. The High Court ordered
common and punitive damages of RM550,000.00. This sum was divided among the
numerous defendant groups. The first through third defendants were sentenced to pay
RM150,000.00 out of the RM550,000.00. The ruling of the High Court was overturned on

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 NAME: MOHAMAD IRSYAD BIN SHARIF
MATRIC NO: 2021609876
CLASS: MC2462A

appeal to the Court of Appeal, as well as the court lowered the amount of damages for the
first to third defendants to RM50,000.00 as general damages. Finally, however for the
reasons stated, the leave question is answered throughout this manner. Whenever suing as an
independent, whether in their official nor personal capacity, a government officer is not
barred from launching a defamation lawsuit. In the end, the Court of Appeal was clearly
wrong when it determined that government figures are barred from commencing a
defamation case in their official position or in regard to concerns impacting their official
activities in the public interest.

6.0 REFERENCES
Defamation Act 2005 (NSW)
Civil Law Act 1956
Judicature Act 1964
Federal Constitution, art
Government Proceedings Act 1956
Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967
Legal Profession Act 1976
Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia Act 1979
Rules of Court 2012
Law Cases:
1. Chong Chieng Jen v The State Government of Sarawak [2019] 1 CLJ 329
2. Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v Chong Chieng Jen [2016] 5 CLJ 169
3. Noor Azman Azami v Zahida bt Mohamed Rafik [2019] 3 CLJ 295
4. Perbadanan Kemajuan Kraftangan Malaysia v DW Margaret David Wilson [2010] 5 CLJ
899
5. Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu & Ors v Dr Syed Azman Syed Ahmad Nawawi & Ors [2013]
1 CLJ 107; ; [2012] MLRHU 1003