Major Hazard Facilities

Hazard Identification
Overview

This seminar has been split into two sections

1. Hazard Identification
2. Major Accident Identification and Risk Assessment

The seminar has been developed to provide

• Context with MHF Regulations
• An overview of what is required
• An overview of the steps required
• Examples of hazards identified

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Some Abbreviations and Terms

• AFAP - As far as (reasonably) practicable

• DG - Dangerous goods
• Employer - Employer who has management control of the
facility
• Facility - any building or structure at which Schedule 1
materials are present or likely to be present for any purpose
• FMEA/FMECA - Failure modes and effects analysis/ Failure
modes and effects criticality analysis
• FTA - Fault tree analysis
• HAZID - Hazard identification
• HAZOP - Hazard and operability study
• HSR - Health and safety representative
• LOC - Loss of containment
• LOPA – Layers of protection analysis

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Some Abbreviations and Terms

• MHF - Major hazard facility

• MA - Major accident
• OHS - Occupational health & safety
• PFD – Process Flow Diagram
• P&ID – Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
• PSV – Pressure safety valve
• SMS - Safety management system

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Topics Covered In This Presentation

• Regulations
• Definition – Hazard
• Introduction
• HAZID Requirements
• HAZID Approach
• Consultation
• Conducting the HAZID
• Overview of HAZID techniques
• Review and Revision
• Sources of Additional Information

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Regulations

Basic outline
• Hazard identification (R9.43)
• Risk assessment (R9.44)
• Risk control (i.e. control measures) (R9.45, S9A 210)
• Safety Management System (R9.46)
• Safety report (R9.47, S9A 212, 213)
• Emergency plan (R9.53)
• Consultation

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Regulations

Regulation 9.43 (Hazard identification) states:

The employer must identify, in consultation with employees,
contractors (as far as is practicable) and HSRs:

a) All reasonably foreseeable hazards at the MHF that may cause

a major accident; and
b) The kinds of major accidents that may occur at the MHF, the
likelihood of a major accident occurring and the likely
consequences of a major accident.

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Definition

Hazard

Regulatory definition per Part 20 of the Occupational Health

and Safety (Safety Standards) Regulations 1994 :
“A hazard means the potential to cause injury or illness”

Interpreted: Any activity, procedure, plant, process, substance,

situation or other circumstance that has the potential to cause
harm.

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Introduction

• HAZID is critical to safety duties and the safety report

• Employer must identify all major accidents and their related
causes using a systematic and documented HAZID approach
• The process must be transparent
• HAZID results must be reflected in risk assessment, SMS,
adoption of control measures and safety report

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Introduction

An example - Gramercy Alumina Refinery, US Department of

Labor Report ID No. 16-00352, 5 July 1999 at 5am

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Introduction

Were the hazards identified?

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Introduction

• HAZID process must be ongoing to ensure existing hazards are

known, and
• New hazards recognised before they are introduced:
- Prior to modification of facility
- Prior to change in SMS or workforce
- Before and during abnormal operations, troubleshooting
- Plant condition monitoring, early warning signals
- Employee feedback from routine participation in work
- After an incident

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Introduction

• Information from accident investigations can be useful as input to

determine contributing causes

Emergency Preparation
7% 5%
2% Quality Assurance
4%
1% Other Training
12% Industry Guidance
5%
Incident Investigation
1%
Employee Participation
4%
Facility Siting
4% Internal Auditing and Oversight
8%
Safe Work Practices
Management of Change
7% Engineering Design & Review
4%
Maintenance Procedures
5% HAZCOM
8% Operator Training
Operating Procedures
13% Process Hazard Analysis
10%
Process Safety Information

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HAZID Requirements

• A systematic, transparent and comprehensive HAZID process

should be used based on a comprehensive and accurate
description of the facility
• MAs and the underlying hazards should not be disregarded
simply because:
- They appear to be very unlikely
- They have not happened previously
- They are considered to be adequately controlled by existing
measures

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HAZID Requirements
The risk diagram can be useful for illustrating this aspect, as
shown below

Increasing risk
Relative Frequency of Occurrence

Breakdowns
Public criticism
Safety Report Influence
High technology and high
Staff Protest pickets
complaints hazard system failures
Personal injury Class actions
Industrial Market collapse
stoppage Fatality (fatalities)
Fire &
Maintenance OH&S Catastrophic
Explosion

Consequence Severity

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HAZID Requirements

Exclusions
• The HAZID process (for MHF compliance) is not intended to
identify all personnel safety concerns
• Many industrial incidents are caused by personnel safety
breaches, such as the following:
- Person falls from height
- Electrocution
- Trips/slips
- Contact with moving machinery
- etc

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HAZID Requirements

Exclusions
• These are generally incidents that do not relate to the storage
or processing of Schedule 9 materials and are covered by
other parts of an Employer’s safety management system for a
facility such as:
- Permit to work
- Confined space entry and management
- Working at heights
- Work place safety assessments
- etc

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HAZID Approach

• What can go wrong?

• What incidents or scenarios could
arise as a result of things going
wrong?
• What could cause or could
contribute to these incidents?

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HAZID Approach

• Considers all operating modes of the facility, and all activities

that are expected to occur
• Human and system interfaces together with engineering issues
• Dynamic process to stay ahead of any changes in the facility
that could erode the safe operating envelope or could introduce
new hazards

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HAZID Approach

The HAZID approach is required to:

• Be team-based
• Use a a process that is systematic
• Be pro-active in searching for hazards
• Assess all hazards
• Analyse existing controls and barriers - preventative and
mitigative
• Consider size and complexity in selecting approach to use

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HAZID Approach

• Consideration needs to be given in selecting the HAZID

technique
• Some issues to take into account are:
- Life cycle phase of plant
- Complexity and size
- Type of Process or activity covering:
o Engineering or procedural
o Mechanical, process, or activity focussed

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 HAZID Approach

Life Cycle Phases of a Project

Concept • The HAZID approach can be used in

the first stages of the life cycle
phase of a project
Design • Prior to design phase, little
information will be available and the
HAZID approach will need to be
Construction undertaken on flow diagrams
• Assumptions will need to be
Commission transparent and documented

Production

Decommission

Disposal
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HAZID Approach

Complexity and Size

• The complexity and size of a facility includes the number of
activities or systems, the number of pieces of equipment, the
type of process, and the range of potential outcomes
• Some HAZID techniques may get bogged down when they are
applied to complex processes
• For example, event tree and fault tree analyses can become
time consuming and difficult to structure effectively
• However, simple techniques may not provide sufficient focus to
reach consensus, or confidence in the identification of hazards

 Conclusion: Start with simple techniques and build

in complexity as required

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HAZID Approach

Type of Process or Activity

• Where activities are procedural or human error is dominant
then task analysis may be appropriate (e.g. task analysis,
procedural HAZOP, etc)
• Where knowledge of the failure modes of equipment is critical
(e.g. control equipment, etc) then FMEA may be appropriate

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HAZID Approach

Type of Process or Activity

• Where the facility is readily shown on a process flow diagram
or a process and instrumentation diagram, then HAZOP may
be used
• Where multiple failures need to be combined to cause an
accident, or multiple outcomes are possible then fault tree
analysis and event tree analysis may be beneficial

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Consultation

• The MHF Regulations require Employers to consult with

employees in relation to:
- Identification of major hazards and potential major accidents
- Risk assessment
- Adoption of control measures
- Establishment and implementation of a safety management
system
- Development of the safety report

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Consultation

• Consultation is also required in relation to the roles that the

Employer defines for employees
• The adequacy of the consultation process is a key step in
decision-making with regards to the granting of licences
• A teamwork approach between the Employer, HSRs and
employees is strongly advocated for the safety report
development process as a whole

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Consultation

• Employees have a significant effect on the safety of

operations, as a result of their behaviour, attitude and
competence in the conduct of their safety-related roles
• The involvement of the employees in the identification of
hazards and control measures enhances:
- Their awareness of these issues
and
- Is critical to the achievement of safe operation in practice

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Conducting the HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

• The team selection for the area or plant is critical to the whole
hazard identification process
• Personnel with suitable skills and experience should be
available to cover all issues for discussion within the HAZID
process
• A well managed, formalised approach with appropriate
documentation is required
• Team selection and training in methodology used is to be
provided

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Conducting the HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

• Facilitated multi-disciplinary team based approach

• Suitably qualified and experienced independent person to
facilitate
• Suitably experienced and qualified personnel for the process,
operations and equipment involved

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Conducting the HAZID

HAZID Team Selection

• These employees MAY BE the HSRs but DO NOT HAVE TO BE

• However, the HSRs should be consulted in selection of
appropriate persons - this process must be documented and be
transparent
• No single person can conduct a HAZID
• A team approach will be most effective

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Conducting the HAZID

HAZID Study Team

The typical study team would comprise:

• Study facilitator
• Technical secretary
• Operations management
• HSR/Operations representative
• Project engineer or project design engineer for new projects
• Process engineer
• Maintenance representative
• Instrument electrical representative

Note: the above team make up is indicative only

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Conducting the HAZID

HAZID Planning

The following steps are required:

• Planning and preparation

• Defining the boundaries and provide system description
• Divide plant into logical groups
• Review P&IDs and process schematics to ensure accuracy
• Optimise HAZID process by means of preplanning work
involving relevant stakeholders (operations, maintenance,
technical and safety personnel)

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 Conducting the HAZID – Consider the Past, Present and Future

What has gone wrong in the past?

Root Cause
Historical Historical Records
conditions Process Experience
Near Misses

Identified
What could go wrong currently?
Hazards
HAZID Workshop
Existing HAZOP Study
conditions Scenario Definitions
Checklists

What could go wrong due to change?

Change Management unforeseeable
Future What-If Judgement
conditions Prediction

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Conducting the HAZID

It is tempting to disregard “Non-Credible” Scenarios BUT

• “Non-credible” scenarios have happened to others

• Worst cases are important to emergency planning

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It happened to someone else …

Aftermath of an explosion
(U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD, SIERRA
CHEMICAL COMPANY REPORT NO. 98-001-I-NV, January 1988)

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Conducting the HAZID

Issues for consideration

• Equipment can be off-line

• Safety devices can be disabled or fail to operate
• Several tasks may be concurrent
• Procedures are not always followed
• People are not always available
• How we act is not always how we plan to act
• Things can take twice as long as planned
• Abnormal conditions can cross section limits
– Power failure

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 Conducting the HAZID – HAZID Process

Define boundary System description

Divide system into sections

Analyse each section

• asset or equipment failure
• external events Existing studies
• process operational deviations
• hazards associated with all materials Selected methods
• human activities which could contribute to incidents
• interactions with other sections of the facility

Systematically record all hazards

Independent check

Hazard Register Revisit after risk assessment

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Conducting the HAZID

Meeting Venue

• Hold on site if possible

• Avoid interruptions if possible
• Schedule within the normal work pattern, or within the safety
report activities
• Meetings less than 3 hours are not effective
• Meetings that last all day are also not effective, however
practicalities may require all day meetings
• Don’t underestimate the time required

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Conducting the HAZID

Recording Detail
• The level of detail is important for:
- Clarity
- Transparency and
- Traceability
• A system (hazard register) is required for keeping track of the
process for each analysed section of the facility
• The items to be recorded are:
- Study team
- System being evaluated
- Identified hazard scenario
- Consequences of the hazard being realised
- Controls in place to prevent hazard being realised and their
adequacy
- Opportunity for additional controls

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HAZID Techniques - Overview

• Checklists - questions to assist in hazard identification

Increasing effort required

• Brainstorming - whatever anyone can think of

• What If Analysis - possible outcomes of change
• HAZOP - identifies “process plant” type incidents
• FMEA/FMECA - equipment failure causes
• Task Analysis – maintenance activities, procedures
• Fault Tree Analysis - combinations of failures

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Checklists

• Simple set of prompts or checklist questions to assist in hazard

identification
• Can be used in combination with any other techniques, such as
“What If”
• Can be developed progressively to capture corporate learning of
organisation
• Particularly useful in early analysis of change within projects

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Checklists

Initiating General Causes Initiating Causes

Events
Overfills And Improper Operating Error
Spills Operation Inadequate / Incorrect Procedure
Failure To Follow Procedure
Outside Operating Envelope
Inadequate Training

Vessel/Tanker Corrosion Wet H2S Cracking

Shell Failure General Process
Cooling Water
Steam / Condensate
Service Water
Mechanical Missiles
Impact Crane
Vehicles

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Checklists

Advantages
• Highly valuable as a cross check review tool following
application of other techniques
• Useful as a shop floor tool to review continued compliance
with SMS

Disadvantages
• Tends to stifle creative thinking
• Used alone introduces the potential of limiting study to
already known hazards - no new hazard types are identified
• Checklists on their own will rarely be able to satisfy regulatory
requirements

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Brainstorm

• Team based exercise

• Based on the principle that several experts with different
backgrounds can interact and identify more problems when
working together
• Can be applied with many other techniques to vary the
balance between free flowing thought and structure
• Can be effective at identifying obscure hazards which other
techniques may miss

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Brainstorm

Advantages
• Useful starting point for many HAZID techniques to focus a
group’s ideas, especially at the project’s concept phase
• Facilitates active participation and input
• Allows employees experience to surface readily
• Enables “thinking outside the square”
• Very useful at early stages of a project or study

Disadvantages
• Less rigorous and systematic than other techniques
• High risk of missing hazards unless combined with other tools
• Caution required to avoid overlooking the detail
• Relies on experience and competency of facilitator

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What If

• What if analysis is an early method of identifying hazards

• Brainstorming approach that uses broad, loosely structured
questioning to postulate potential upsets that may result in an
incident or system performance problems
• It can be used for almost every type of analysis situation,
especially those dominated by relatively simple failure
scenarios

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What If

• Normally the study leader will develop a list of questions to

consider at the study session
• This list needs to be developed before the study session
• Further questions may be considered during the session
• Checklists may be used to minimise the likelihood of omitting
some areas

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What If

Example of a What If report for a single assessed item

49
What If

Advantages
• Useful for hazard identification early in the process, such as
when only PFDs are available
• What If studies may also be more beneficial than HAZOPs
where the project being examined is not a typical steady state
process, though HAZOP methodologies do exist for batch and
sequence processes

Disadvantages
• Inability to identify pre-release conditions
• Apparent lack of rigour
• Checklists are used extensively which can provide tunnel
vision, thereby running the risk of overlooking possible
initiating events

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HAZOP

• A HAZOP study is a widely used method for the identification

of hazards
• A HAZOP is a rigorous and highly structured hazard
identification tool
• It is normally applied when PFDs and P&IDs are available
• The plant/process under investigation is split into study nodes
and lines and equipment are reviewed on a node by node
basis
• Guideword and deviation lists are applied to process
parameters to develop possible deviations from the design
intent

HAZOP results in a very a systematic assessment of hazards

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HAZOP

Example of a HAZOP report for a single assessed item

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HAZOP

Advantages
• Will identify hazards, and events leading to an accident,
release or other undesired event
• Systematic and rigorous process
• The systematic approach goes some way to ensuring all
hazards are considered

Disadvantages
• HAZOPs are most effective when conducted using P&IDs,
though they can be done with PFDs
• Requires significant resource commitment
• HAZOPs are time consuming
• The HAZOP process is quite monotonous and maintaining
participant interest can be a challenge

53
FMEA/FMECA

• Objective is to systematically address all possible failure

modes and the associated effects on a technical system
• The underlying equipment and components of the system are
analysed in order to eliminate, mitigate or reduce the failure
or the failure effect
• Best suited for mechanical and electrical hardware systems
evaluations

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FMEA/FMECA

Example of an FMEA/FMCEA report for a single assessed item

Potential Potential Potential Comments Recommendations

Failure Effects of Causes
Mode Failure of
Failure
Open Wrong Wear and Commissioning The integrity of the
indicator indication of tear and test position indicators for
switch failed valve back to procedures the Diverter system
control system must ensure equipment is critical to
causing that all diverter the logic of the control
possible equipment system.
incorrect indicators are It is recommended that
controller correctly wired the position indicators
action to be to the diverter are discretely function
taken control system tested prior to
commencement of each
program

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FMEA/FMECA

Advantages
• Generally applied to solve a specific problem or set of
problems
• FMEA/FMECA was primarily considered to be a tool or process
to assist in designing a technical system to a higher level of
reliability
• Designed correction or mitigation techniques can be
implemented so that failure possibilities can be eliminated or
minimized

Disadvantages
• It is very time consuming and needs specialist skills from
different backgrounds to obtain maximum effect
• Very hard to assess operational risks within an FMEA/FMECA
(like they can be within a HAZOP or What if study)

56
Task Analysis

• Technique which analyses human interactions with the tasks

they perform, the tools they use and the plant, process or
work environment
• Approach breaks down a task into individual steps and
analyses each step for the presence of potential hazards
• Used widely to manage known injury related tasks in
workplace
• Excellent tool for hazard identification related to human tasks

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Task Analysis

Disadvantages
• Does not address plant process deviations which are not related
to human interaction

Caution
• Relies on multi-disciplined input with specific input of person
who normally carries out the task
• Often assumed to be the only tool of hazard identification or
risk assessment, as it is used generally at the shop floor

58
Fault Tree Analysis

• Graphical technique approach

• Provides a systematic description of the combinations of
possible occurrences in a system which can result in an
identified undesirable outcome (top event)
• This method combines hardware failures and human failures
• Uses logic gates to define modes of interaction (ANDs/ ORs)

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Fault Tree Analysis

Process
vessel over
pressured

AND

Pressure PSV does not

rises relieve

AND OR

Process Control Set point

pressure fails high Fouling inlet too high
rises or outlet
PSV too PSV stuck
small closed

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Fault Tree Analysis

Advantages
• Quantitative - defines probabilities to each event which can be
used to calculate the probability of the top event
• Easy to read and understand hazard profile
• Easily expanded to bow tie diagram by addition of event tree

Disadvantages
• Need to have identified the top event first
• More difficult than other techniques to document
• Fault trees can become rather complex
• Time consuming approach
• Quantitative data needed to perform properly

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Review and Revision
The following are examples of when a HAZID revision should occur

Organizational
changes

New
projects
Process or
HAZID condition
Revision monitoring
changes
Incident
investigation
results

Abnormal conditions
through design envelope
changes

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Sources of Additional Information

• Loss Prevention In The Process Industries, Second Edition, Reed

Educational and Professional Publishing, F. P Lees,1996
• Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper No.6, NSW Department of Planning, June 1992
• HAZOP and HAZANs, Notes on the Identification and Assessment
of Hazards, Second Edition, Trevor Kletz, The Institution of
Chemical Engineers, 1986

63
Sources of Additional Information

• Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Second Edition,

Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 1992
• Layer of Protection Analysis, Simplified Process Risk Assessment,
Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 2001
• Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, Geoff Wells, The
Institution of Chemical Engineers, 19.
• MIL-STD-1629A, 1980
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, J. Moubray, RCM II, 2000

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Questions?

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