An Introduction to Lévinasian

Ethics
Jesus N. Matias, OFS
Emmanuel Lévinas
Emmanuel Lévinas (1905 – 1995)
was a Lithuanian-born French
moral philosopher known for his
thought on the ethical
responsibility for “the Other” and
his critique of the prevalence of
ontological and epistemological
questions in the scene of Western
philosophy in his time.
Overview
The works of Lévinas may have reawakened a consciousness for a social morality slowly
disappearing in the nihilistic current of post-modernist thought.
His phenomenological project which began with the question as to why a person can and wills to be
violent towards another, is an inquiry emanating from his enduring criticism of seemingly endless
philosophical probes into the nature of existence and the soundness of knowledge.
His criticism of the tradition from the Cartesian cogito to the Heideggerian Dasein which culminated
in the notions of Erschlossenheit and Unverborgenheit pointing to a constant unraveling that ‘allows
beings to be’, is founded on the comprehension that this which ultimately ‘allows beings to be’ may
serve as a convenient justification for the rational “I” to do violence against an undefined or
unrecognized “other”.
Simply said, it is in our desire as rational human beings, to know and understand realities, that we
treat realities as “objects” and therefore providing the convenient excuse as well as sustaining the
mindset to “use them as needed.”
Overview
His main proposal therefore argues for the
shifting of the ultimate to the recognition of the
“other” and the awareness of the ethical “I”.
The first philosophy is ethics which precedes
ontology and epistemology: I am only possible in
relation to my consciousness of and to my
responsibility towards the irreducibly different
“Other”.
First Point
Speaking of Spinoza’s connatus essendi – “that every being by its very being desires
to remain, desires to conserve itself, in its being, to persevere in being” – Lévinas
identifies the act of self-preservation as defining the ‘being’ of being. Hence, the
rational “I” tends to a centering towards itself, a “centripetal movement” which
essentially constitutes our intrinsic attitude towards the undefined or unrecognized
“other”.
Lévinas describes the goal of the “centripetal movement” as “enjoyment”: “Our
goal is one of enjoyment and what characterizes enjoyment precisely, is the
intensification of the centripetal movement.” Our thoughts and actions desire for
enjoyment to satiate the self. Self-centered preservation is thus a complex dynamic
rooted in the uneasiness for our inadequacies which are actively covered for in
eventual gratification.
First Point
All human activities characterized by their existential “everyday-ness”
such as ‘work’ – with its references to the ‘fulfillment of one’s dignity’ –
also has the “centripetal movement”. Even noble undertakings such as
‘the desire to know’, consist of processes of attempting to situate an
object – that can also be an “other” – within certain categories or pre-
conceptualizations.
By this ‘knowing’, the “different-ness” or the “otherness” of the “other”
is reduced, and it becomes simply ‘an object that I know’; by this
‘knowing’, by this act of “totalizing”, the “centripetal movement” is also
satisfied.
First Point
Simply said, human activities
are naturally directed towards
self-preservation for the
purpose of “enjoyment”; this
becomes the underlying
reason why humans tend to
reduce all “others” as
“objects”.
Second Point
Lévinas experienced what he called the “banal fact of conversation”: The
experience of “speaking to” a person is very different from “speaking about” the
same person.
It is in the “speaking to …” that we realize the “different-ness” of the “other” which
cannot be reduced to the “speaking about …”, “we have or can have the experience
of the other as other – the experience of the radical alterity or otherness of the
other, where the other is not reduced, not transformed to an object.”
Simply said, the experience is about a sudden realization that the “other” is no
longer an object for my enjoyment, nor an object of my work, nor an object
evoking my disgust, but is simply an “other”. Since it is our intrinsic attitude to do
otherwise, letting the “other” be “other” is a decision to be made.
Second Point
This experience is also explained more notably in Lévinas’ “encounter
of the face”. The “face” is a “metonymy” or a representation of the
whole person. The “speaking to …” is similar to the “encounter of the
face” which results in seeing the “other” as “other”, or what he
describes as an “epiphany”. This word for Lévinas emphasizes the
suddenness of the “encounter”, which disables us from ‘knowing” and
consequently, from reducing the “other” as ‘an object that I can know’.
There will always be a mystery of or a strangeness behind the “other”
defying our ‘desire to know’. Instead of trying to fit the “other” into
pre-conceived classifications, “… at a certain point it can happen that
the person becomes for us ‘someone’”.
Second Point
The experience may also be an embarrassing one, when while
looking at an “other” as an object for my enjoyment, an object of my
work, or an object evoking my disgust, it looks back at the centered
“I”. The “epiphany” becomes for the “I”, a sudden de-centering
which calls for a moral decision not just to let the “other” be “other”,
but to listen and to respond to its commandment, “You shall not
kill!”
This commandment is also a “metonymy”, representing a “whole
range of moral imperatives which command respect for the other, for
the life of the Other, which commands care for the Other.” The
‘knowing’, the “totalizing” is preceded by the letting of the “other”
be “other” and the listening as well as responding to its
commandment.
Second Point
Simply said, at certain times in the
“encounter of the face”, letting
the “other” be the “other” is a
decision that must be made,
because it may happen that an
experience with the “other” will
suddenly compel us not to treat or
exploit it as an “object”.
This is the most important
consideration for all human
activity.
Second Point
Lévinas also attempts to illustrate an asymmetry in the “epiphany of the
Other” in which the “face” appears in both ascendant and descendant
positions: the “Other” demands respect and obedience to the moral
imperatives, but from a humble footing of voicelessness, powerlessness and
hopelessness.
Quoting from Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov – “Each one is responsible
for all and before all, and I more than any other” – Lévinas also elaborates
that the response commanded by the “Other” will always be insufficient,
hence concluding that we will always have an “infinite” responsibility for the
“Other”.
Simply said, it is in the reduced position of the “other” as an “object” that it
has an apparently weak yet actually strong command to require or demand
responsibility for it.
The first word of the face is the “Thou shalt not
kill.” It is an order. There is a commandment in the
appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to
me. However, at the same time, the face of the
Other is destitute; it is the poor for whom I can do
all and to whom I owe all.
Emmanuel Lévinas
Third Point
Let us now expand on aspects of this “infinite” responsibility for the “Other”, first
through an enumeration of two metaphorical phrases: Me voici!” which means
“Here I am!”; and “Après vous.” which means “After you, please.”
The “Here I am!” indicates the uncompromising availability of the response
commanded by the “Other”, the willingness to respond or at least, to accompany
the “Other” in the absence of a practical or effective response: I am here for you,
you are not alone. I may or may not have a solution for your problem, but I am
here as a companion.
The “After you, please.” indicates the respectful humility of the response
commanded by the “Other”, the willingness to respond for the “Other” first before
the de-centered ethical “I”: You are more important than me, you first before me.
Third Point
Such notions may render the idea of selfless sacrifice as possible.
“Infinite” responsibility for the “Other” must not only consist of the
ability and willingness to respond, but of the response itself.
“Infinite” responsibility is also unconditional and non-transactional:
What matters only is my responsibility for the “Other” regardless of the
responsibility of the “Other” for me. And “infinite” responsibility may
even come to the “point of substitution”, “being responsible for an
Other goes to the point of taking upon myself even the pain and the
suffering that the Other deserves.”
Is this not the way parents are responsible for their children?
Third Point
In the Lévinasian sense, ‘being
responsible’ is less a ‘checking and
balancing’ action to ‘being free’,
than it is an action that
completely precedes it: I am
responsible not so much because I
want to be free, than because I
wish you to be freer than me, or
to be free first before me.