San Beda College Alabang School of Law

Centralized Bar Operations

Frequently Asked Questions

SYLLABUS FOR THE 2021 BAR EXAMINATIONS

POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

Centralized Bar Operations 2021

 1

SAN BEDA COLLEGE ALABANG

CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Dr. Ulpiano P. Sarmiento III

Dean and Adviser

Atty. Anna Marie Melanie B. Trinidad

Vice Dean

Atty. Carlo D. Busmente

Prefect of Student Affairs

Centralized Bar Operations 2021

 2

2021 CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS

Christian Boy Benedict R. Tiangco
Overall Chairperson

Maria Angela Alexandria Albotra

Chairperson for Operations

Fiona Criscelle Federico

Chairperson for Academics

Angelica Felise Manalo

Jolykha Toa L. Sanchez
Deputy for Academics

Joseph Librojo
Chairperson for Academics Operation

Ma. Veronica Malabanan

Chairperson for Secretariat

Maria Concepcion Bañas

Chairperson for Finance

Kate Capulong
Chairperson for Logistics

Marie Czel Ongtangco

Chairperson for Recruitment and Membership

John Argie Mortel

Chairperson for Electronic Data Processing

Kurt Jairus Tañada

Chairperson for Communications

Anna Akiko Abad

Chairperson for Bar Mentoring Program

Louie Ann Someros

Chairperson for Bar Matters

Centralized Bar Operations 2021

 3

2021 POLITICAL LAW TEAM 2020 POLITICAL LAW TEAM

John Roland P. Mabbun Carlo Antipuesto

Subject Head Subject Head

Antonio Luis C. Duran Gabby Bangkil

Assistant Subject Head Rhaymund Gratela
Assistant Subject Heads

Members Members
Alamarez, Adrian Bangkil, Maria Gabrielle
Bryan P. Francesca T.
Atencia, Alannah T. Cortez, Charisse Iva R.
Campang, Crystalline R.
Daniel, Zen Deane Danielle S.
Co, Darryl John L.
Dela Rosa, Francis Malig-on, Ma. Clarissa S.
Albert V. Marcaida, Angela
Gonzales, Phillip Emmanuelle S.
Joshua D. Napiza, Jose Miguel M.
Lidasan Settie Hajohrea I Pagdanganan, Stephanie
Mercado, Kaye Ann G.
Alexandhra M.
Pangilinan, Miguel Carlos P.
Nadayag, Loruel Kyle V.
Panopio, Alain Terencio, William Jay L
Jerome A.
Romano, Gian Loudes B.
Sambat, Ezekiel
Dwight G.
Whigan, Eunice Joy S.

Centralized Bar Operations 2021


I. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
A. Amendments and Revisions
QUESTION:
A proposal to change a provision of the
1987 Constitution has been put forth as
follows:
Original Text: "The Philippines is a
democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from
them"
Proposed Text: "The Philippines is a
democratic and socialist State.
Sovereignty resides in the party and all
government authority emanates from it.”
(A) Is this an amendment or a revision?
Explain. (2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is a revision. The qualitative test is used to
determine this. When using the qualitative
test, it can be found that the proposal will
accomplish such far reaching changes in
the nature of the basic governmental plan
as to amount to a revision, and a change
in the nature of the basic governmental
plan also includes changes that
jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and
balances. (Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No.
174153, October 25, 2006)
QUESTION:
(B) Briefly explain the process to revise the
1987 Constitution. (2019 Bar Question)
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
4
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are two basic steps in this process:
(1) Proposal - A revision of the Constitution
may be proposed by:
(a) the Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members; or
(b) a constitutional convention. The
Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit to the electorate the
question of calling such a convention;
and
(2) Ratification - the revision shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
days after the approval of such
amendment or revision. (Article XVII,
Sections 1, 3 & 4, 1987 Constitution)
QUESTION:
True or False. An amendment to the
Constitution shall be valid upon a vote of
three-fourths of all the Members of the
Congress. (2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. Two requirements must be met
before an amendment to the Constitution
is considered valid:
(1) An amendment proposed by Congress
must be approved upon a vote of three-

fourths of all its Members; (Article XVII,
Section 1[1], 1987 Constitution)
(2) Such amendment must be ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
which is held not earlier than sixty (60) days
nor later than ninety (90) days after the
approval of the amendment. (Article XVII,
Section 4, 1987 Constitution)
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. Declaration of Principles and State
Policies
QUESTION:
The Philippines has become a member of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
resultantly agreed that it "shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements." This is assailed as
unconstitutional because this undertaking
unduly limits, restricts and impairs
Philippine sovereignty and means among
others that Congress could not pass
legislation that will be good for our
national interest and general welfare if
such legislation will not conform with the
WTO Agreements. Refute this argument.
(2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sovereignty, while traditionally been
deemed and all-encompassing on the
domestic level, is still subject to restrictions
and limitations voluntarily agreed to by
the Philippines, either expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
5
nations. The 1987 Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the
country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the 1987 Constitution "adopts the
generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
and amity, with all nations." By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles
of international law, which are considered
to be automatically part of our own laws.
Pacta sunt servanda, which means
"international agreements must be
performed in good faith," emphasizes that
a treaty is not merely a moral obligation
but rather a binding obligation between
parties. (Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No.
118295, May 2, 1997)
QUESTION:
Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
expresses, in part, that the "Armed Forces
of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and (of) the State." Describe briefly
what this provision means. Is the Philippine
National Police covered by the same
mandate? (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
means that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines should not serve the interest of
the President but of the people and
should not commit abuses against the
people. (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. V, p. 133.)

This provision is specifically addressed to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
not to the Philippine National Police,
because the latter is separate and distinct
from the former. (Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 296;
Manalo v. Sistoza. 312 SCRA 239 [1999].)
B. State Immunity
QUESTION:
(A) Under the doctrine of immunity from
suit, the State cannot be sued without its
consent. How may the consent be given
by the State? Explain your answer. (2017
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are two (2) forms of consent, the
express consent and implied consent.
Express consent may be manifested
through a general law or a special law. It
must be embodied in a duly enacted
statute and may not be given by mere
counsel of the government. (United States
of America, et al. v. Guinto, G.R. No.
76607, February 26, 1990).
There is implied consent when the state
itself commences litigation by which the
State must be asking for affirmative relief,
when it enters into a contract which must
be entered into in its proprietary function,
or when the State enters into a business
operation and such is not merely
incidental to the performance of a
governmental function.
QUESTION:
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
6
(B) The doctrine of immunity from suit in
favor of the State extends to public
officials in the performance of their official
duties. May such officials be sued
nonetheless to prevent or to undo their
oppressive or illegal acts, or to compel
them to act? Explain your answer. (2017
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, they may be sued to prevent or to
undo their oppressive or illegal acts. Suing
a public officer when they are acting in
the discharge of their official functions is in
effect an indirect suit against the state by
which the immunity may be applied.
Some exceptions to state immunity are:
(1) when compelling a public officer to do
an obligation; (2) when prohibiting a
public officer from enforcing an
unconstitutional law; (3) when compelling
a public officer to comply with a
judgment that he may satisfy himself
without the government itself having to do
a positive act to assist him; and (4) when
ordering the public official to undo an
oppressive or illegal act.
QUESTION:
(C) Do government owned or controlled
corporations also enjoy the immunity of
the State from suit? Explain your answer.
(2017 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) are
incorporated agencies which are created
either through a legislative charter or
under the Corporation Code.

If the legislative charter provides that the
GOCC can sue and be sued, then the suit
will lie, including one for tort. The provision
in the charter constitutes express consent
in the part of the State to be sued.
A GOCC incorporated under the
Corporation Code is suable, regardless of
the function discharged. (Sec. 35(a),
Revised Corporation Code)
QUESTION:
Annika sued the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of
the Bureau of Plant Industry, and asked for
the revocation of a deed of donation
executed by her in favor of said Bureau.
She alleged that, contrary to the terms of
the donation, the donee failed to install
lighting facilities and a water system on
the property donated, and to build an
office building and parking lot thereon,
which should have been constructed and
made ready for occupancy on or before
the date fixed in the deed of donation.
The Republic invoked state immunity and
moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that it had not consented to be
sued. Should the Republic’s motion be
granted? (2018 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the motion should be denied. Article
XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “the State may not be sued
without its consent.” This provision admits
of exceptions, one of which is the case at
bar. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
7
a citizen. A donor, with the Republic or
any of its agency being the donee, is
entitled to go to court in case of an
alleged breach of the conditions of such
donation. He has the right to be heard.
Under the circumstances, the
fundamental postulate of non-suability
cannot stand in the way. (Santiago vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-48214, December 19,
1978)
C. Separation of Powers
QUESTION:
Congress enacted an appropriation law
containing a provision that gives
individual legislators the discretion to
determine, post-enactment, how much
funds would go to a specific project or
beneficiary which they themselves also
determine. Consequently, disbursements
were made in the interim pursuant thereto.
Eventually, Mr. Z filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of the
statutory provision on the ground that it
violates the separation of powers
principle. On the other hand, certain
Congressmen argued that there was
nothing wrong with the provision because,
after all, the power to appropriate belongs
to Congress. Rule on the arguments of the
parties. (2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Mr. Z's contention is correct. The case at
bar is similar to the pork barrel system
which the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional. Insofar as it has allowed
legislators to wield, in varying gradations,
non-oversight, post-enactment authority
in vital areas of budget execution, the

system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has
conferred unto legislators the power of
appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are
able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly
violated the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power; insofar as it has
created a system of budgeting wherein
items are not textualized into the
appropriations bill, it has flouted the
prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process, denied the President
the power to veto items; insofar as it has
diluted the effectiveness of congressional
oversight by giving legislators a stake in
the affairs of budget execution, an aspect
of governance which they may be called
to monitor and scrutinize, the system has
equally impaired public accountability;
insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs
of purely local nature, despite the
existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local
autonomy; and again, insofar as it has
conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other
purposes he may deem fit as well as other
public funds under the broad
classification of "priority infrastructure
development projects," it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-
delegability. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr, G.R.
No. 208566, November 19, 2013)
D. Fundamental Powers of the State:
Police Power
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
8
QUESTION:
The City of San Rafael passed an
ordinance authorizing the City Mayor,
assisted by the police, to remove all
advertising signs displayed or exposed to
public view in the main city street, for
being offensive to sight or otherwise a
nuisance. AM, whose advertising agency
owns and rents out many of the billboards
ordered removed by the City Mayor,
claims that the City should pay for the
destroyed billboards at their current
market value since the City has
appropriated them for the public purpose
of city beautification. The Mayor refuses to
pay, so AM is suing the City and the Mayor
for damages arising from the taking of his
property without due process nor just
compensation. Will AM’s suit prosper?
Reason briefly. (2004 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the suit of AM will not prosper. The
power of eminent domain involves a
property which is wholesome and
intended for a public use, while property
condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose.
The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of
property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the
owner.
In the case of Churchill v. Rafferty (G.R.
No. L-10572, December 21, 1915), the
Supreme Court stated that the removal of
the billboards is not an exercise of the
power of eminent domain but of police
power. As well as under the case of

Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989), the
abatement of a nuisance in the exercise
of police power does not constitute taking
of property and does not entitle the owner
of the property involved to compensation.
QUESTION:
To address the pervasive problem of
gambling, Congress is considering the
following options: (1) prohibit all forms of
gambling; (2) allow gambling only on
Sundays; (3) allow gambling only in
government-owned casinos; and (4)
remove all prohibition against gambling
but impose a tax equivalent to 30% on all
winnings.
(A) If Congress chooses the first option and
passes the corresponding law absolutely
prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the
law be validly attacked on the ground that
it is an invalid exercise of police power?
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the law can be validly attacked as an
invalid exercise of police power. While it is
true that Congress may enact law to
interfere with personal liberty and
property, such power must be exercised in
accordance with the two tests of a valid
exercise of police power, which are the
lawful subject and lawful means test. As
held in the case of Southern Luzon Drug
Corporation v. DSWD (G.R. No. 199669,
April 25, 2017), they require that: 1) the
interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of particular
class, requires its exercise; and 2) the
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
9
means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In the case at bar, the total
prohibition of gambling is an invalid
exercise of police power for the total
prohibition on gambling is unduly
oppressive. Hence, the law can be validly
attacked as an invalid exercise of police
power.
QUESTION:
(B) If Congress chooses the last option and
passes the corresponding law imposing a
30% tax on all winnings and prizes won
from gambling, would the law comply with
the constitutional limitations on the
exercise of the power of taxation? Explain.
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the law does not comply with the
constitutional limitation on the exercise of
the power of taxation. It is a settled rule
that taxes may be imposed to attain the
objective of police powers (Lutz v.
Araneta, G.R. No. L-7859, December 22,
1955), but is inevitably subject to certain
limitations. One of such limitations is that
the means must be lawful. In the instant
case, the 30% tax on all winnings and
prizes won from gambling does not
comply with the lawful means test as such
method unduly oppresses the individuals.
Therefore, the law does not comply with
the constitutional limitations on the
exercise of the power of taxation.
E. Fundamental Powers of the State:
Eminent Domain

QUESTION:
Congress passed a law authorizing the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to
expropriate or acquire private property for
the redevelopment of slum areas, as well
as to lease or resell the property to private
developers to carry out the
redevelopment plan. Pursuant to the law,
the NHA acquired all properties within a
targeted badly blighted area in San
Nicolas, Manila except a well-maintained
drug and convenience store that poses no
blight or health problem itself. Thereafter,
NHA initiated expropriation proceedings
against the store owner who protested that
this property could not be taken because
it is not residential or slum housing. He also
contended that his property is being
condemned for a private purpose, not a
public one, noting the NHA’s sale of the
entire area except his property to a
private party. If you were the judge, how
would you decide the case? (2008 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I would rule in favor of
the store owner. The power of
expropriation cannot be used to benefit
private parties (Pascual vs. Secretary, G.R.
No. L-10405, Dec. 29, 1960). In this case,
the main beneficiary would be the private
realty company. The taking of private
property and then transferring it to private
persons under the guise of public use is not
within the power of eminent domain and
exceeds the delegated power of the
NHA. (Heirs of Moreno vs. Mactan Airport,
G.R. No.156273, August 9, 2005). The
power of the NHA is strictly construed
against its holder and is limited to the
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
10
public purpose of redevelopment of slum
areas.
QUESTION:
Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a
local manufacturer of computers and
computer parts, owns a sprawling plant in
a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To
remedy the city’s acute housing shortage,
compounded by a burgeoning
population, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
authorized the City Mayor to negotiate for
the purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian
intends to subdivide the property into
small residential lots to be distributed at
cost to qualified city residents but the FCC
refused to sell the lot. Hard pressed to find
a suitable property to house its homeless
residents, the City filed a complaint for
eminent domain against FCC.
(A) If the FCC hires you as lawyer, what
defenses would you set up in order to resist
the expropriation of the property? Explain.
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer, I would set up the
defense that there was no prior valid and
definite offer made. It is a settled rule
under Section 19 of the Local Government
Code that before an LGU would be able
to exercise the power of eminent domain,
there must first be a valid and definite offer
previously made to the owner of the
property to be expropriated, and that
such offer was refused. In the case at bar,
since no offer was first given, the
complaint is premature. Furthermore, I
would also raise the defense that under
Section 9 of R.A. 7279, private properties

are the last in the order of properties to be
expropriated for socialized housing. The
government must first prove that there
were no other lands to expropriate, thus
resorting to the private property. Lastly, I
would also raise the defense that under
Section 10 of R.A. 7279, expropriation shall
only be resorted to when the other modes
of land acquisition have been exhausted.
QUESTION:
(B) If the court grants the City’s prayer for
expropriation, but the City delays
payment the amount determined by the
court to adjust compensation, can the
FCC recover the property from Pasig city?
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the FCC cannot recover the property
from Pasig City. It is settled in the case of
Reyes v. National Housing Authority (G.R.
No. 147511, January 20, 2003) that non-
payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots. In the
case at bar, although the City did fail to
pay the just compensation, it does not
warrant recovery of the property. Thus,
FCC cannot recover the property from
Pasig City.
QUESTION:
(C) Suppose the expropriation succeeds,
but the city decides to abandon its plan to
subdivide the property for residential
purposes having found a much bigger lot,
can FCC legally demand that it be
allowed to repurchase the property from
the city of Pasig? Why or why not? (2009
Bar Question)
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
11
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, FCC can legally demand repurchase
of the property. It was held in the case of
Vda. de Ouano v. Republic (G.R. No.
168770, February 9, 2011) that a
condemner should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in
the petition for expropriation. In case of
failure to do so, it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemner to return the
said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires. In the given case, as the
property expropriated was abandoned,
and there being no new petition for it to
be devoted to another public use, FCC
can thus legally demand that it be
allowed to repurchase the property.
III. NATIONAL TERITORY
QUESTION:
Under the archipelago doctrine, the
waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago form part of
the territorial sea of the archipelagic state.
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. It is provided in Article I of the 1987
Constitution that "the waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of
the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the
internal waters of the Philippines."
However, under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea,
archipelagic waters consist mainly of the
“waters around, between, and

connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of breadth or
dimension.” (Article 49, Section 1). It is thus
not considered as part of the territorial
sea.
IV. CITIZENSHIP
A. Modes of Acquiring Citizenship
QUESTION:
Atty. Richard Chua was born in 1964. He is
a legitimate son of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. His father became a
naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty.
Chua was still a minor. Eventually, he
studied law and was allowed by the
Supreme Court to take the bar
examinations, subject to his submission to
the Supreme Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship. Although he never complied
with such requirements, Atty. Chua
practiced law for many years until one
Noel Eugenio filed with the Supreme Court
a complaint for disbarment against him on
the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen.
He then filed with the Bureau of
Immigration an affidavit electing
Philippine citizenship. Noel contested it
claiming it was filed many years after Atty.
Chua reached the age of majority. Will
Atty. Chua be disbarred? Explain. (2006
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Atty. Richard Chua will not be
disbarred. There is no need for him to file
an affidavit electing Filipino citizenship. As
held in the case of Co v. HRET (G.R. Nos.
92191-92, July 30,1991), an election of
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
12
Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
person electing is an alien. In this case,
however, Atty. Richard Chua is already a
Filipino citizen as his father became a
naturalized Filipino citizen when Atty.
Richard Chua was still a minor. This means
that Atty. Richard Chua has already
become a Filipino before the age of
majority. Therefore, he will not be
disbarred.
QUESTION:
Atty. Emily Go, a legitimate daughter of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, was
born in 1945. At 21, she elected Philippine
citizenship and studied law. She passed
the bar examinations and engaged in
private practice for many years. The
Judicial and Bar Council nominated her as
a candidate for the position of Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. But her
nomination is being contested by Atty.
Juris Castillo, also an aspirant to the
position. She claims that Atty. Emily Go is
not a natural-born citizen, hence, not
qualified to be appointed to the Supreme
Court. Is this contention correct? (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention is incorrect. It is
provided under Article IV, Section 1(3) of
the 1987 Constitution, Filipino citizens
included those who are born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority. In the case at bar,
Atty. Emily Go was born to a Filipino
mother in 1945 and she elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of 21. In
addition, Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987

Constitution states that "x x x those who
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizens."
Applying the law, Atty. Emily Go is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, and therefore,
qualified to be appointed to the Supreme
Court.
B. Modes of Losing and Reacquiring
Citizenship
QUESTION:
Juan Cruz was born of Filipino parents in
1960 in Pampanga. In 1985, he enlisted in
the U.S. Marine Corps and took an oath of
allegiance to the United States of
America. In 1990, he was naturalized as an
American citizen. In 1994, he was
repatriated under Republic Act No. 2430.
During the 1998 National Elections, he ran
for and was elected representative of the
First District of Pampanga where he
resided since his repatriation. Was he
qualified to run for the position? Explain.
(2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Juan Cruz is qualified to run for the
position. Since his parents were Filipino
citizens, he was a natural-born citizen.
Similar to the ruling of Bengson III v. HRET,
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, despite
becoming a naturalized American citizen,
by virtue of his repatriation, Cruz was
restored to his original status as a natural-
born Filipino.
QUESTION:
TCA, a Filipina medical technologist, left in
1975 to work in ZOZ State. In 1988 she
married ODH, a citizen of ZOZ. Pursuant to
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
13
ZOZ's law, by taking an oath of allegiance,
she acquired her husband's citizenship.
ODH died in 2001, leaving her financially
secured. She returned home in 2002 and
sought elective office in 2004 by running
for Mayor of APP, her hometown. Her
opponent sought to have her disqualified
because of her ZOZ citizenship. She
replied that although she acquired ZOZ's
citizenship because of marriage, she did
not lose her Filipino citizenship. Both her
parents, she said, are Filipino citizens. Is
TCA qualified to run for Mayor? (2004 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, she is not qualified to run for mayor.
Due to the assumption that TCA took an
oath of allegiance to ZOZ to acquire the
citizenship of her husband. Under Section
1 [3], Commonwealth Act No. 63, she did
not become a citizen of ZOZ merely by
virtue of her marriage, she also took an
oath of allegiance to ZOZ. By this act, she
lost her Philippine citizenship
QUESTION:
In 1990, Agripina migrated to Canada and
acquired Canadian citizenship. In 2008,
Agripina retired and returned to the
Philippines to permanently reside in her
hometown of Angeles, Pampanga. A
month after returning to the Philippines,
Agripina took her oath of allegiance and
executed a sworn renunciation of her
Canadian citizenship in accordance with
R.A. No. 9225.
In 2009, Agripina filed her certificate of
candidacy for Congress for the 2010
elections. Agripina’s political rivals lost no

time in causing the filing of various actions
to question her candidacy. They
questioned her eligibility to run as a
member of Congress. Since Agripina had
to take an oath under RA No. 9225, it
meant that she needed to perform an act
to perfect her Philippine citizenship. They
claimed, therefore, that Agripina could
not be considered a natural-born citizen.
Agripina raised the defense that, having
complied with the requirements of RA No.
9225, she had reacquired, and was
deemed never to have lost her Philippine
citizenship.
Is Agripina disqualified to run for Congress
for failing to meet the citizenship
requirement? (2018 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Agripina is not disqualified to run for
Congress. Rather, she is eligible to run for
Congress due to the reacquisition of her
Filipino citizenship under RA No. 9225.
Repatriation results in the recovery of a
person’s original nationality. This means
that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a Filipino citizen. If she were originally a
natural-born citizen before she lost her
Philippine citizenship, she would be
restored to her former status as a natural-
born Filipino. (Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No.
142840, May 7, 2001). In the case at bar,
Agripina was originally a natural-born
Filipino citizen before she acquired
Canadian citizenship. By complying with
the requirements of RA No. 9225,
Agripina’s status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen was restored. Hence, being a
natural-born Filipino citizen, she is eligible
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
14
to run for Congress.
C. Dual Citizenship and Dual
Allegiance
QUESTION:
The 2016 mayoralty race in the City of
Ardania included Arnaldo and Anacleto
as contenders. Arnaldo filed a petition
with the Comelec to cancel Anacleto’s
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
misrepresenting himself as a Filipno
citizen. Arnaldo presented as evidence a
copy of Anacleto’s Spanish passport and
a certification from the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) showing that Anacleto
used the same passport several times to
travel to and from Manila and Madrid or
Barcelona. In his Comment, Anacleto
claimed that, a year prior to filing his CoC,
he had complied with all the requirements
of R.A. No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition of Act of 2003) to reacquire
his Philippine citizenship by taking an oath
of allegiance and executing a sworn
renunciation of his Spanish citizenship. He
defended the use of his Spanish passport
subsequent to taking his oath of
allegiance to the Philippines as a practical
necessity since he had yet to obtain his
Philippine passport despite reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship. Even after he
secured his Philippine passport, he said he
had to wait for the issuance of a Schengen
visa to allow him to travel to Spain to visit
his wife and minor children.
Based on the allegations of the parties, is
there sufficient ground to cancel
Anacleto’s CoC (2018 Bar Question)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there is sufficient ground to cancel
Anacleto’s CoC. As held in the case of
Maquiling v. Comelec (G.R. No. 195649,
April 16, 2013), “the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act
of representation as to one’s nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an election
position.” In the case at bar, Anacleto’s
use of his Spanish passport does not divest
him of his Filipino citizenship which he
acquired by repatriation. However, by
using such foreign passport, he is
representing himself as a Spanish citizen,
thereby voluntarily and effectively
reverting Anacleto of his status as a dual
citizen. By being a dual citizen, he is
therefore disqualified to run for an elective
position. Hence, there is sufficient ground
to cancel Anacleto’s CoC.
V. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A. Legislative Power: Scope and
Limitations
QUESTION:
In 1963, Congress passed a law creating a
government-owned corporation named
Manila War Memorial Commission
(MWMC), with the primary function of
overseeing the construction of a massive
memorial in the heart of Manila to
commemorate victims of the 1945 Battle
of Manila. The MWMC charter provided an
initial appropriation of P1,000,000
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
15
empowered the corporation to raise funds
in its own name and set aside a parcel of
land in Malate for the memorial site. The
charter set the corporate life of MWMC at
50 years with a proviso that Congress may
not abolish MWMC until after the
completion of the memorial. Forty-five
(45) years later, the memorial was only 1/3
complete, and the memorial site itself had
long been overrun by squatters. Congress
enacted a law abolishing the MWMC and
requiring that the funds raised by it be
remitted to the National Treasury. The
MWMC challenged the validity of the law
arguing that under its charter its mandate
is to complete the memorial no matter
how long it takes. Decide with reasons.
(2008 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The law abolishing the MWMC is valid.
Under its plenary powers, Congress can
create, as well as destroy what is created
after determining that its purpose could
no longer be attained by subsequent
circumstances. The power to create also
carries with it the power to destroy so long
as it was done in good faith and consistent
with the purpose of promoting the general
welfare. (CAAP-EU v. CAAP, G.R. No.
190120, November 11, 2014)
QUESTION:
Congress enacted a law exempting
certain government institutions providing
social services from the payment of court
fees. Atty. Kristopher Timoteo challenged
the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that only the Supreme Court has
the power to fix and exempt said entities
from the payment of court fees.

Congress, on the other hand, argues that
the law is constitutional as it has the power
to enact said law for it was through
legislative fiat that the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for Judges and Justices (SAJJ),
the funding of which are sourced from the
fees collected by the courts, were
created. Thus, Congress further argues
that if it can enact a law utilizing court fees
to fund the JDF and SAJJ, a fortiori it can
enact a law exempting the payment of
court fees.
Discuss the constitutionality of the said
law, taking into account the arguments of
both parties? (2014 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of
Court. The 1987 Constitution recognized
the authority of the Supreme Court to levy,
assess and collect fees (Article VIII, Section
3). Congress, therefore, cannot amend
the rules promulgated by the Supreme
Court. In this case, Congress cannot enact
a law amending the rules for the payment
of legal fees. (In re Petition for Recognition
of Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of
Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February
11, 2010)
B. House of Representatives: Party-list
System
QUESTION:
Greenpeas is an ideology-based political
party fighting for environmental causes. It
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
16
decided to participate under the party-list
system. When the election results came in,
it only obtained 1.99 percent of the votes
cast under the party -list system.
Bluebean, a political observer, claimed
that Greenpeas is not entitled to any seat
since it failed to obtain at least 2% of the
votes. Moreover, since it does not
represent any of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors of society,
Greenpeas is not entitled to participate
under the party-list system. How valid are
the observations of Bluebean? (2014 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Bluebean's observations are incorrect. The
additional seats, that is, the remaining
seats after allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list
organizations including those that
received less than two percent of the total
votes. (Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency vs
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 & 179295, July
8, 2009). This means, in the case at bar,
Greenpeas may still be entitled to a seat
after the allocation of the guaranteed
seats. Secondly, it has been already made
clear that in cases of sectoral parties or
organizations, "it is enough that their
principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector."
Sectoral parties or organizations may
either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." (Atong
Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766,
April 2, 2013)
QUESTION:

The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang
Pilipino (PMP) is a major political party
which has participated in every election
since the enactment of the 1987
Constitution. It has fielded candidates
mostly for legislative district elections. In
fact, a number of its members were
elected, and are actually serving, in the
House of Representatives. In the coming
2016 elections, the PMP leadership intends
to join the party-list system.
Can PMP join the party-list system without
violating the Constitution and Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7941? (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ASNWER:
Yes, the PMP can join the party-list system.
Political parties can participate in party-list
elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party and is
linked to a political party through a
coalition. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 203766, 02 April 2013)
C. Discipline of Members
QUESTION:
Senator Fleur De Lis is charged with
plunder before the Sandiganbayan. After
finding the existence of probable cause,
the court issues a warrant for the Senator's
arrest. The prosecution files a motion to
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
17
suspend the Senator relying on Section 5
of the Plunder Law. According to the
prosecution, the suspension should last
until the termination of the case. Senator
Lis vigorously opposes the motion
contending that only the Senate can
discipline its members; and that to allow
his suspension by the Court would violate
the principle of separation of powers. Is
Senator Lis's contention tenable? Explain.
(2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Senator’s contention is not
tenable. In the case of Santiago v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 128055, April 18,
2001), it was ruled that the order of
suspension prescribed by R.A. No 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks. The Plunder Law
does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress. Hence, in this case,
there is no violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
D. Electoral tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments
QUESTION:
Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen,
ran for Congressman for the Lone District
of Batanes. After a close electoral contest,
he won by a slim margin of 500 votes. His
sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest
before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), claiming that X should be
disqualified to run for said position
because he is not a natural-born citizen.
While the case was pending, X was
proclaimed by the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Batanes as the duly elected

Congressman of the province.
Did X's proclamation divest the COMELEC
of its jurisdiction to decide the case and
vest the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction to
hear the case? Explain. (2019 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are several errors in this question
which may confuse the examinee.
First, an election protest or a quo warranto
can only be filed AFTER proclamation,
within 10 days therefrom. In this case, it
was filed before proclamation.
Second, ineligibility such as in citizenship is
a ground for a petition for quo warranto or
a petition for the denial of due course to
or cancellation of certificate of
candidacy (COC). It is not a proper
ground for an election protest.
Third, the issue involves eligibility of a
candidate and the case was filed before
proclamation, the case must have
referred to a petition for the denial of due
course to or cancellation of COC. This is
filed within five (5) days from the last day
for filing of COC, but not later than twenty-
five (25) days from the time of filing of the
COC subject of the petition.
In the given set of facts, it appears that the
case was filed way after the prescribed
period or after the election but before
proclamation. If the case is an election
protest filed within 10 days from
proclamation, then there will be no issue
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
18
and the Comelec retains its jurisdiction
until it decides the case. The same goes
with a petition for quo warranto. But if the
case filed was for the denial of due course
to or cancellation of COC, proclamation
would ipso jure divest the Comelec of its
jurisdiction in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal
provided the winner, aside from
proclamation, has taken the proper oath,
and assumed the office. Otherwise, the
Comelec may still continue in hearing and
deciding the case (Reyes v. Comelec,
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013).
E. Electoral tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments:
Powers
QUESTION:
Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were the
leading candidates in the vice-
presidential elections. After elections,
Yellow emerged as the winner by a slim
margin of 100,000 votes. Undaunted,
Orange filed a protest with the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). After due
consideration of the facts and the issues,
the PET ruled that Orange was the real
winner of the elections and ordered his
immediate proclamation.
(A) Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari
challenging the decision of the PET
alleging grave abuse of discretion. Does
the Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
Explain. (2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Supreme Court does not have
jurisdiction. The Presidential Electoral

Tribunal (PET) is intended to be an
institution that is independent, but not
separate from the judicial department.
The PET is neither inferior nor superior to the
Supreme Court since it is the same Court
although the functions peculiar to said
Tribunal are more limited in scope than
those of the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its ordinary functions. It merely imposes
additional duties upon the Members of
the Supreme Court. Hence, the Supreme
Court does not have jurisdiction.
(Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23,
2010)
QUESTION:
(B) Would the answer in (a.) be the same if
Yellow and Orange were contending for a
senatorial slot and it was the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) who issued the
challenged ruling? (2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, in this case, the Supreme Court would
have jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution
provides that the Senate Electoral Tribunal
is the “sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members” (Article VI,
Section 17). It is only when the Tribunal
acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
can the Supreme Court exercise its
jurisdiction over the Tribunal’s decision
and orders. (Locsin v. HRET and
Lagdameo, G.R. No. 204123, March 19,
2013)
F. Initiative and Referendum
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
19
QUESTION:
Is the concept of People Power
recognized in the Constitution? Discuss
briefly. (2000 & 2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is recognized in the 1987
Constitution, specifically in Article VI,
Section 32, Article XIII, Section 16, and
Article XVII, Section 2.
Article VI, Section 32 states that the system
of initiative and referendum is one where
"the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or
law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by
at least ten per centum (10%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof."
Article XIII, Section 16 provides for the right
of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making which shall not be
abridged.
Lastly, Article XVII, Section 2 states that
amendments to the 1987 Constitution
may be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon "a petition of at
least twelve per centum (12%) of the total
number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein.”

Hence, while not directly indicated as
"people power," the 1987 Constitution
recognizes the same in its provisions.
VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
A. President’s Power of appointment:
In general
QUESTION:
Margie has been in the judiciary for a long
time, starting from the lowest court. Twenty
(20) years from her first year in the
judiciary, she was nominated as a Justice
in the Court of Appeals. Margie also
happens to be a first-degree cousin of the
President. The Judicial and Bar Council
included her in the short-list submitted to
the President whose term of office was
about to end – it was a month before the
next presidential elections. Can the
President still make appointments to the
judiciary during the so-called midnight
appointment ban period? Assuming that
he can still make appointments, could he
appoint Margie, his cousin? (2014 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the President can still make
appointments to the judiciary during the
midnight appointment ban period. The
ban on presidential appointments during
the period stated in Article VII, Section 15
of the 1987 Constitution does not include
appointments to the judiciary as it was not
expressly enumerated thereto.
Likewise, the President can still appoint
Maggie, his cousin. Article VII, Section 13
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
20
of the 1987 Constitution provides that “the
spouse and relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office
of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.” The said provision does
not include appointments to the judiciary.
Had it been the intention to include such
appointments, the framers of the 1987
Constitution would have expressly done so
from the beginning.
B. Power of Control and Supervision:
Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency
QUESTION:
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 402 provided
health services for the employees of
Philippine Institute for Development
Studies (PIDS). Despite this, PIDS, with the
approval of The DOH, PhilHealth,
Department of Budget and Management,
and the Office of The President through the
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary,
executed an agreement with PhilamCare
for hospitalization and out-patient
emergency services for 54 employees in
2005. The CoA through its Adjudication
Office-Corporate issued a Notice of
Disallowance for said agreement, stating
that it violates Resolution 2005-001 and PD
402. PIDS counter argues that it is exempt
from strict compliance with PD 402 for they
had the approval of the Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary. Is PIDS exempt from

strict compliance from PD 402 by virtue of
the doctrine of qualified political agency
for their agreement was approved by the
executive secretary?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Executive Secretary does not carry
the power to exempt from strict
compliance with a PD, let alone the Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary. The authority
to issue an exemption must be done upon
the express designation and delegation
by the president through a presidential or
executive issuance. The doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency lays down the
principle that each head of a department
is, and must be, the President's alter ego in
the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise
authority. Never has it been stated that
executive secretaries have their own alter
egos. While the Court has at times
expanded the application of the doctrine
of qualified political agency, the doctrine
remains limited to the President's
executive secretary and other Cabinet
secretaries. It does not extend to deputy
executive secretaries or assistant deputy
secretaries. (Philippine Institute for
Development Studies v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 212022, August 20, 2019)
C. Executive Clemency: Nature and
Limitations
QUESTION:
(A) Distinguish the President's authority to
declare a state of rebellion from the
authority to proclaim a state of national
emergency. (2015 Bar Question)
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
21
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the case of David v. Arroyo (G.R. No.
171409, May 3, 2006), it was stated that the
President’s authority to declare a “state of
rebellion” emanates from the President’s
power as Chief Executive which is allowed
under Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987. It is
merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest. On
the other hand, in declaring a state of
national emergency, the relevant
provisions are: (1) Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution in which the AFP are
called to prevent and suppress lawless
violence, invasion, and rebellion; and (2)
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution
which states that the State has extra
ordinary power to take over privately-
owned public utility and business affected
with public interest.
QUESTION:
(B) What are the limitations, if any, to the
pardoning power of the President? (2015
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following are the limitations to the
pardoning power of the President:
(a) Cannot be granted for
impeachment. (Article VII, Section
19, 1987 Constitution)
(b) Cannot be granted in cases of
violation of election laws without the
favorable recommendation of the
COMELEC. (Article IX-C, Section 5,
1987 Constitution)
(c) Can be granted only after
conviction by final judgment (People
 22

v. Salle, G.R. No. 103567, December corporations with or without independent

4, 1995) charters are not exempt from the
(d) Cannot absolve the convict of civil payment of legal fees. In a case decided
liability. (People v. Nacional, G.R. by the Supreme Court, it was held that
Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995) since the payment of legal fees is a vital
(e) Cannot be granted to cases of component of the rules promulgated by
legislative contempt or civil this Court concerning pleading, practice,
contempt. and procedure, it cannot be validly
(f) Cannot restore public offices annulled, changed, or modified by
forfeited, even if pardon restores the Congress (A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13,
eligibility for said offices. (Monsanto 2012). Hence, R.A. 14344 impairs the
v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and
9, 1989) erodes its independence.

VII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A. Judicial Power
QUESTION:
Congress enacted R.A. No. 14344 creating
the City of Masuwerte which took effect on
September 25, 2014. Section 23 of the law
specifically exempts the City of
Masuwerte from the payment of legal fees
in the cases that it would file and/or
prosecute in the courts of law. In two (2)
cases that it filed, the City of Masuwerte
was assessed legal fees by the clerk of
court pursuant to Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of
the Rules of Court. The City of Masuwerte
questions the assessment claiming that it
is exempt from paying legal fees under
Section 23 of its charter. Is the claim of
exemption tenable? Explain. (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the claim is not tenable. Under Rule
141, Sec. 21 ROC, local government and
government-owned or controlled
QUESTION:
Congress enacted a law providing for trial
by jury for those charged with crimes or
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment. The law provides for
the qualifications of members of the jury,
the guidelines for the bar and bench for
their selection, the manner a trial by jury
shall operate, and the procedures to be
followed.
Is the law constitutional? (2013 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the law is unconstitutional. The law
would be contrary to the judicial power
which includes the “duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies which
are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
(Article VIII, Section1[2], 1987 Constitution).
A trial by jury would divest the courts of its

Centralized Bar Operations 2021


judicial power as it would transfer the duty
of settling actual controversies to the jury.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. Composition and Qualifications of
Members
QUESTION:
State whether or not the following acts are
constitutional:
The designation by the president of an
acting Associate Commissioner of the
Civil Service Commission. (2018 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Unconstitutional. It is provided under the
1987 Constitution that “no person shall be
appointed or designated in any of the
constitutional commissions in a temporary
or acting capacity.” (Articles IX-B, Section
1(2), IX-C, Section 2 and IX-D, Section 2)
B. Commission on Audit
QUESTION:
Towards the end of the year, the
Commission on Audit (COA) sought the
remainder of its appropriation from the
Department of Budge t and Management
(DBM). However, the DBM refused
because the COA had not yet submitted a
report on the expenditures relative to the
earlier amount released to it. And,
pursuant to the "no report, no release"
policy of the DBM, COA is not entitled to
any further releases in the meantime. COA
counters that such a policy contravenes
the guaranty of fiscal autonomy granted
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
23
by the Constitution. Is COA entitled to
receive the rest of its appropriations even
without complying with the DBM policy?
(2014 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the Commission on Audit is entitled to
receive the rest of its appropriations even
without complying with the Department of
Budget and Management’s policy. The
approved annual appropriations of
Constitutional Commissions shall be
automatically and regularly released.
(Article IX-A, Section 5, 1987 Constitution)
By parity of construction, "automatic
release" of approved annual
appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested
with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to
fund releases to it may be imposed. (Civil
Service Commission v. Department of
Budget and Management, G.R. No.
158791, July 22, 2005)
IX. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Right Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures: Warrantless
Searches
QUESTION:
Around 12:00 midnight, a team of police
officers was on routine patrol in Barangay
Makatarungan when it noticed an open
delivery van neatly covered with banana
leaves. Believing that the van was loaded
with contraband, the team leader flagged
down the vehicle which was driven by
Hades. He inquired from Hades what was

loaded on the van. Hades just gave the
police officer a blank stare and started to
perspire profusely. The police officers then
told Hades that they will look inside the
vehicle. Hades did not make any reply.
The police officers then lifted the banana
leaves and saw several boxes. They
opened the boxes and discovered several
kilos of shabu inside. Hades was charged
with illegal possession of illegal drugs.
After due proceedings, he was convicted
by the trial court. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction.
In his final bid for exoneration, Hades went
to the Supreme Court claiming that his
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures was violated when
the police officers searched his vehicle
without a warrant; that the shabu
confiscated from him is thus inadmissible
in evidence; and that there being no
evidence against him, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
For its part, the People of the Philippines
maintains that the case of Hades involved
a consented warrantless search which is
legally recognized. The People adverts to
the fact that Hades did not offer any
protest when the police officers asked him
if they could look inside the vehicle. Thus,
any evidence obtained in the course
thereof is admissible in evidence.
Whose claim is correct? Explain. (2015 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The claim of Hades is correct. In a similar
case, the Supreme Court held that when
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
24
a vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be
covered with leaves, it does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant. It
cannot likewise be said that the
contraband found in the petitioner's
vehicle were in plain view, making its
warrantless seizure valid. Neither can
petitioner's passive submission be
construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search. (Caballes v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 136292, January 15,
2002)
In this case, the police officers have no
probable cause to justify an extensive
search of petitioner’s vehicle without his
consent and without the benefit of a
search warrant. Thus, the seized boxes of
shabu must inadmissible as evidence
being obtained as the product of an
unreasonable search and seizure. There
being no other evidence against the
accused, he is entitled to an acquittal.
QUESTION:
A witnessed two hooded men with
baseball bats enter the house of their next
door neighbor B. after a few seconds, he
heard B shouting, “Huwag Pilo babayaran
kita agad.” Then A saw the two hooded
men hitting B until the latter fell lifeless. The
assailants escaped using a yellow
motorcycle with a fireball sticker on it
toward the direction of an exclusive
village nearby. A reported the incident to
PO1 Nuval. The following day, PO1 Nuval
saw the motorcycle parked in the garage
of a house at Sta. Ines Street inside the
exclusive village. He inquired with the

caretaker as to who owned the
motorcycle. The caretaker named the
brothers Pilo and Ramon Maradona who
were then outside the country. PO1 Nuval
insisted on getting inside the garage. Out
of fear, the caretaker allowed him. PO1
Nuval took 2 ski masks and 2 bats beside
the motorcycle. Was the search valid?
What about the seizure? Decide with
reasons. (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, both the warrantless search and
seizure were not valid for three reasons.
First, according to People v. Baula (G.R.
No. 132671, November 15, 2000), the
search and seizure were not made as an
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Second, as held in People v. Damaso
(G.R. No. 93516, August 12, 1992), the
caretaker had no authority to waive the
right of the brothers Pilo and Ramon
Maradona against unreasonable search
and seizure. Lastly, as held in the case of
People v. Bolasa (G.R. No. 125754,
December 22, 1999), the warrantless
seizure of the ski masks and bats cannot
be justified under the plain view doctrine
because they were seized after invalid
intrusion into the house.
B. Right Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures: Warrantless
Arrests and Detention
QUESTION:
Crack agents of the Manila Police Anti-
Narcotics unit were on surveillance of a
cemetery where the sale and use of
prohibited drugs were rumored to be
rampant. The team saw a man with
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
25
reddish and glassy eyes walking
unsteadily towards them, but he
immediately veered away upon seeing
the policemen. The team approached the
man, introduced themselves as peace
officers, then asked what he had in his
clenched fist. Because the man refused to
answer, a policeman pried the fist open
and saw a plastic sachet with crystalline
substance. The team then took the man
into custody and submitted the contents of
the sachet to forensic examination. The
Crystalline substance in the sachet turned
out to be shabu. The man was accordingly
charged in court. During the trial, the
accused: (Decide with reasons)
(A) Challenged the validity of his arrest;
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the arrest is valid. Under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a valid warrantless arrest may
be effected by a peace officer or private
person when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. In the case at bar, the man was
caught by the peace officers in possession
of shabu, pursuant to a valid stop-and-frisk
search, given the suspicious
circumstances such as the fact that they
were somewhere the use and sale of
drugs were rampant, the fact that the
accused had glassy, red eyes, and lastly,
the fact that the accused veered away
upon seeing the policemen. Possession of
shabu is a crime under R.A. 9165. Thus, the
arrest is valid.
QUESTION:

(B) Objected to the admission in evidence
of the prohibited drug, claiming that it was
obtained in an illegal search and seizure.
(2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The objection should be overruled. It has
been settled in the case of Manalili v.
Court of Appeals (G.R No. 113447,
October 9, 1997) that warrantless
searches and seizures may be validly
made with probable cause alone. In the
case at bar, the peace officer observed
that the accused had red eyes and was
walking unsteadily towards them in the
cemetery which was a popular hangout
of drug addicts. All these taken together
would raise a reasonable ground of
suspicion that the accused was under the
influence of drugs. The policemen
therefore had a valid reason to
investigate the accused. There being a
valid warrantless search, the objection
should therefore be denied.
QUESTION:
Two police teams monitored the payment
of ransom in a kidnapping case.
The bag containing the ransom money
was placed inside an unlocked trunk of a
car which was parked at the Angola
Commercial Center in Mandaluyong City.
The first police team, stationed in an area
near where the car was parked, witnessed
the retrieval by the kidnappers on the bag
from the unlocked trunk. The kidnappers
thereafter boarded their car and
proceeded towards the direction of
Amorsolo St. in Makati City where the
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
26
second police team was waiting.
Upon confirmation by radio report from
the first police team that the kidnappers
were heading towards their direction, the
second police team proceeded to
conduct surveillance on the car of the
kidnappers, eventually saw it enter Ayala
Commercial Center in Makati City, and
the police team finally blocked it when it
slowed down. The members of the second
police team approached the vehicle and
proceeded to arrest the kidnappers.
Is the warrantless arrest of the kidnappers
by the second police team lawful? (2018
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the warrantless arrest is lawful. Before
a warrantless arrest can be effected, two
requisites must be present: (1) an offense
has just been committed, and (2) the
person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
(Rule 113, Section 5 [b], Rules of Court). In
the instant case, both requisites are
present. The first police team was able to
witness the retrieval of the bag containing
the ransom money by the kidnappers.
Next, the second police team, who made
the arrest, has personal knowledge as
they are informed by the first police team
of the fact that the kidnappers’ car was
headed toward their direction. They had
enough time to conduct surveillance on
the car of the kidnappers before making
the arrest. Hence, the warrantless arrest is
lawful.

C. Privacy of Communications and
Correspondence: Intrusions, When
and How Allowed
QUESTION:
In criminal prosecution for murder, the
prosecution presented, as witness, an
employee of the Manila Hotel who
produced in court a videotape recording
showing the heated exchange between
the accused and the victim that took
place at the lobby of the hotel barely 30
minutes before the killing. The accused
objects to the admission of the videotape
recording on the ground that it was taken
without his knowledge or consent, in
violation of his right to privacy and the
Anti-Wire Tapping law. Resolve the
objection with reasons. (2009 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The objection should be overruled. The
Anti-Wire Tapping Law prohibits the
overhearing, intercepting and recording
of private communication. In the case at
bar, the exchange of the heated word is
not private, as it took place in a hotel
lobby which is considered a public area.
Therefore, its videotape recording is not
prohibited by law and is not a violation of
his privacy. (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999)
D. Freedom of Speech and
Expression: Content-based and
Content-neutral
QUESTION:
Define content-based regulations and
content-neutral regulations.
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
27
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Content-based restraint or censorship
refers to restrictions "based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech."
Content-based regulation bears a heavy
presumption of invalidity, and this court
has used the clear and present danger
rule as measure. In contrast, content-
neutral regulation includes controls merely
on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.
(Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
E. Freedom of Speech and
Expression: Freedom of Assembly
QUESTION:
Batas Pambansa 880, the Public Assembly
Law of 1985, regulates the conduct of all
protest rallies in the Philippines.
Salakay, Bayan! held a protest rally and
planned to march from Quezon City to
Luneta in Manila. They received a permit
from the Mayor of Quezon City, but not
from the Mayor of Manila. They were able
to march in Quezon City and up to the
boundary separating it from the City of
Manila. Three meters after crossing the
boundary, the Manila Police stopped
them for posing a danger to public safety.
Was this a valid exercise of police power?
(2007 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power.
The Manila Police has the power to stop
the marchers who do not possess a permit.
However, the mere exercise of the right to

peaceful assembly is not considered as
danger to public safety. (Bayan v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169848, April 25, 2006).
QUESTION:
The Samahan ng mga Mahihirap (SM) filed
with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila
an application for permit to hold a rally on
Mendiola Street on September 5, 2006
from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. to protest the
political killings of journalists. However, the
City Mayor denied their application on the
ground that a rally at the time and place
applied for will block the traffic in the San
Miguel and Quiapo Districts. He suggested
the Liwasang Bonifacio, which has been
designated a Freedom Park, as venue for
the rally.
(A) Does the SM have a remedy to contest
the denial of its application for a permit?
(2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, SM has a remedy. Under the Public
Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 880), the applicant may contest the
decision in an appropriate court of law in
the event of the application’s denial,
wherein the court must decide within
twenty-four (24) hours from the date of
filing. Such decision may also be
appealed to the appropriate court within
forty-eight (48) hours after the receipt of
the decision. Lastly, these may also be
appealed to the Supreme Court. (Bayan
Muna v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169838, April 25,
2006)
QUESTION:
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
28
(B) Does the availability of a Freedom Park
justify the denial of SM's application for a
permit? (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it does not justify the denial of SM’s
application for a permit. A denial may
only be justified if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public
assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety,
public convenience, public moral or
public health. (Bayan Muna v. Ermita, G.R.
No. 169838, April 25, 2006). The availability
of another venue to hold the public
assembly will not justify the denial of the
permit.
QUESTION:
(C) Is the requirement to apply for a permit
to hold a rally a prior restraint on freedom
of speech and assembly? (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The requirement to apply for a permit to
hold a rally is not a prior restraint on the
freedom of speech and assembly. The
regulation of time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies are subject of
the permit requirement. The contents of
the speech in public assemblies are not
the subject of the permit requirement.
Thus, there is no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to
the regulation. (Bayan Muna v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006)
QUESTION:
(D) Assuming that despite the denial of
SM's application for a permit, its members

hold a rally, prompting the police to arrest
them. Are the arrests without judicial
warrants lawful? (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the arrests without judicial warrants
are unlawful. What B.P. Blg. 880 prohibits is
"the holding of any public assembly as
defined in this Act by any leader or
organizer without having first secured that
written permit where a permit is required
from the office concerned…xxx Provided,
however, that no person can be punished
or held criminally liable for participating in
or attending an otherwise peaceful
assembly." (Sections 13[a] and 14[a])
Hence, it is only the leader or organizer of
the rally without a permit may be arrested
without a warrant. The members,
however, may not be arrested nor may
they be punished or held criminally liable
for attending the rally.
However, B.P. Blg. 880 also provides that in
the event a public assembly is held
without a permit, when it is required, the
said assembly may be peacefully
dispersed. (Section 12)
F. Freedom of Religion: Free Exercise
Clause
QUESTION:
Children who are members of a religious
sect have been expelled from their
respective public schools for refusing, on
account of their religious beliefs, to take
part in the flag ceremony which includes
playing by a band or singing the national
anthem, saluting the Philippine flag and
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
29
reciting the patriotic pledge. The students
and their parents assail the expulsion on
the ground that the school authorities
have acted in violation of their right to free
public education, freedom of speech, and
religious freedom and worship. Decide the
case. (2003 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The students cannot be expelled from
school. As held in Ebralinag v. The Division
Superintendent of Schools of Cebu (G.R.
No. 95770, March 1, 1993), to compel
students to take part in the flag ceremony
when it is against their religious beliefs will
violate their religious freedom. Their
expulsion also violates the duty of the
State under Article XIV, Section 1 of the
Constitution to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education
and make such education accessible to
all. (UP Law Center)
G. Liberty of Abode and Freedom of
Movement: Scope and Limitations
QUESTION:
Juan Casanova contracted Hansen's
disease (leprosy) with open lesions. A law
requires that lepers be isolated upon
petition of the City Health Officer. The wife
of Juan Casanova wrote a letter to the City
Health Officer to have her formerly
philandering husband confined in some
isolated leprosarium. Juan Casanova
challenged the constitutionality of the law
as violating his liberty of abode. Will the
suit prosper? (1998 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, the suit will not prosper. The liberty of
abode is subject to the police power of
the State. Requiring the segregation of
lepers is a valid exercise of police power.
In Lorenzo v. Director of Health (G.R. No.
27484, September 1, 1927), the Supreme
Court held that "judicial notice will be
taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly
believed to be an infectious disease
tending to cause one afflicted with it to be
shunned and excluded from soci-ety, and
that compulsory segregation of lepers as
a means of preventing the spread of the
disease is supported by high scientific
authority."
H. Rights against Self-Incrimination:
Scope and Coverage
QUESTION:
An accused’s right against self-
incrimination is violated in the following
cases:
a. When he is ordered by the trial
court to undergo a paraffin test to
prove he is guilty of murder;
b. When he is compelled to
produce his bankbooks to be used
as evidence against his father
charged with plunder;
c. When he is ordered to produce a
sample of his handwriting to be
used as evidence that he is the
author of a letter wherein he
agreed to kill the victim;
d. When the president of a
corporation is subpoenaed to
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
30
produce certain documents as
proofs he is guilty of illegal
recruitment. (2006 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The best answer is (c). It is provided under
Article III, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, “no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against
himself.” The said provision prohibits
compulsory testimonial incrimination;
therefore, it includes both oral and written
testimonies. Writing is not a purely
mechanical act as it requires the
application of intellectual faculties.
Ordering the accused to produce a
sample of his handwriting is akin to
furnishing missing evidence necessary for
the accused conviction, which is
prohibited by the said right under the 1987
Constitution.
QUESTION:
PO1 Adrian Andal is known to have taken
bribes from apprehended motorists who
have violated traffic rules. The National
Bureau of Investigation conducted an
entrapment operation where PO1 Adrian
was caught red-handed demanding and
taking PhP500.00 from a motorist who
supposedly beat a red light.
After he was apprehended, PO1 Adrian
was required to submit a sample of his
urine. The drug test showed that he was
positive for dangerous drugs. Hence, PO1
Adrian was charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of RA No. 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

PO1 Adrian argues against the
admissibility of the urine test results and
seeks its exclusion. He claims that the
mandatory drug test under RA No. 9165 is
a violation of the accused’s right to
privacy and against self-incrimination.
Are PO1 Adrian’s contentions correct?
(2018 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, PO1 Adrian Andal's contentions are
correct. His rights to privacy and against
self-incrimination have been violated.
Republic Act No. 9165 expressly provides
that a drug test can be made upon
persons who are apprehended or
arrested for unlawful acts listed under
Article II of the law. In the case at bar, PO1
Adrian Andal's unlawful act, which is
extortion, is not among those enumerated
under the law. Hence, the drug test was a
violation of PO1 Adrian Andal's right to
privacy and right against self-
incrimination. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R.
No. 200748, July 23, 2014)
I. Rights of Persons under Custodial
Investigation
QUESTION:
Mrs. W supplies the Philippine National
Police (PNP) with uniforms every year. Last
month, he and two (2) other officers of the
PNP conspired to execute a "ghost
purchase', covered by five (5) checks
amounting to P200,000.00 each, or a total
of P1,000,000.00. An investigating
committee within the PNP, which was
constituted to look into it, invited Mrs. W,
among others, for an inquiry regarding the
anomalous transaction. Mrs. W accepted
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
31
the invitation but during the committee
hearing, she stated that she will not answer
any question unless she be provided with
the assistance of a counsel. The PNP
officials denied her request; hence, she no
longer participated in the investigation.
What is a custodial investigation? Under
the 1987 Constitution, what are the rights
of a person during custodial investigation?
(2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Custodial investogation is the stage where
an investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime; the
direction is then aimed upon a particular
suspect who has been taken into custody
and to whom the police would then direct
interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements (People v. Dela
Cruz, G.R. No. 118866-68, September 17,
1997). Custodial investigation also
includes the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated
in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed. This is
without prejudice to the liability of the
"inviting" officer for any violation of law
(Republic Act No. 7438).
A person under custodial investigation has
the following rights: (1) to remain silent; (2)
to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice and
if he cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one; (3) to be
informed of such rights; (4) waiver of these
rights not allowed except in writing and in
the presence of counsel; (5) no torture,
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any

other means which vitiate the free will can
be used against him; (6) secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited;
and (7) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of these rights are
inadmissible in evidence against him.
QUESTION:
On October 1, 1985, Ramos was arrested
by a security guard because he appeared
to be "suspicious" and brought to a police
precinct where in the course of the
investigation he admitted he was the killer
in an unsolved homicide committed a
week earlier. The proceedings of his
investigation were put in writing and dated
October 1, 1985, and the only
participation of counsel assigned to him
was his mere presence and signature on
the statement. The admissibility of the
statement of Ramos was placed in issue
but the prosecution claims that the
confession was taken on October 1, 1985
and the 1987 Constitution providing for the
right to counsel of choice and opportunity
to retain, took effect only on February 2,
1987 and cannot be given retroactive
effect. Rule on this. (2000 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ramos' confession is inadmissible as his
assigned counsel failed to advise him of
his rights. It is immaterial that the
confession was taken before the 1987
Constitution took effect. The Supreme
Court, in the case of People v. Galit (G.R.
No. L-51770, March 20, 1985), already laid
down strict rules on the waiver of the rights
during investigation. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
32
valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid
down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence. (Morales v.
Ponce Enrile, G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107,
April 26, 1983)
J. Rights of the Accused: Bail
QUESTION:
State whether or not the law is
constitutional.
Explain briefly.
A law denying persons charged with
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua
or death the right to bail. (2006 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The law is unconstitutional. Article III,
Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that "all persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt
is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be
provided by law." An accused cannot be
deprived of his constitutional right to bail
even if he is charged with crime a
punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, where the evidence of guilt is not
strong.
K. Rights of the Accused: Assistance
of Counsel
QUESTION:

Mr. Brown, a cigarette vendor, was invited
by PO1 White to a nearby police station.
Upon arriving at the police station, Brown
was asked to stand side-by-side with five
(5) other cigarette vendors in a police line-
up. PO1 White informed them that they
were looking for a certain cigarette
vendor who snatched the purse of a
passer-by and the line-up was to allow the
victim to point at the vendor who
snatched her purse. No questions were to
be asked from the vendors.
(A) Brown, afraid of a "set up" against him,
demanded that he be allowed to secure
his lawyer and for him to be present during
the police line-up. Is Brown entitled to
counsel? Explain (2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mr. Brown is not entitled to counsel.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial
investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. (People of
the Philippines v. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471,
January 12, 2016)
(B) Would the answer in (A) be the same if
Brown was specifically invited by White
because an eyewitness to the crime
identified him as the perpetrator? Explain.
(2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, in this case, Mr. Brown is entitled to the
assistance of counsel. Brown was invited
with the premise that he was identified to
be the perpetrator and thus, was treated
as a suspect. At this point, Mr. Brown is
entitled to the rights accorded by both
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
33
fundamental and statutory laws to
persons suspected of having committed a
crime. (People of the Philippines v.
Legaspi, G.R. No. 117802, April 27,
2000)
(C) Briefly enumerate the so-called
"Miranda Rights". (2012 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a)
any person under custodial investigation
has the right to remain silent; (b) anything
he says can and will be used against him
in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk
to an attorney before being questioned
and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and (d) if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be provided
before any questioning if he so desires.
(People of the Philippines v. Cabanda,
G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017)
L. Rights to Speedy Disposition of
Cases
QUESTION:
On February 10, 2003, The Office of the
Ombudsman received an anonymous
complaint alleging that certain public
officials committed graft and corruption.
Several years later, an information was
filed against the petitioner regarding the
complaint. Petitioner now contends that
the inordinate delay of 7 years in the filing
of information violated his constitutional
rights to due process and to speedy
disposition of cases. Decide the case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Petitioner’s rights to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases were not
violated. When an anonymous complaint
is filed or the Ombudsman conducts a
motu proprio fact-finding investigation,
the proceedings are not yet adversarial.
With respect to fact-finding at the level of
the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman must
provide for reasonable periods based
upon its experience with specific types of
cases, compounded with the number of
accused and the complexity of the
evidence required. Delay is not
determined through mere mathematical
reckoning but through the examination of
the facts and circumstances surrounding
each case. Courts should appraise a
reasonable period from the point of view
of how much time a competent and
independent public officer would need in
relation to the complexity of a given case.
Also, while there was delay, petitioner has
not shown that he asserted his rights
during this period, choosing instead to
wait until the information was filed against
him with the Sandiganbayan. (Cagang v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458
& 210141-42, July 21, 2018)
M. Right Against Double Jeopardy:
Requisites and Scope
QUESTION:
(A) Discuss the right of every accused
against double jeopardy? (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rule of double jeopardy means that
when a person was charged with an
offense and the case was terminated by
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
34
acquittal or conviction or in any other
manner without his consent, he cannot
again be charged with the same or
identical offense. (Melo v. People, G.R.
No. L-3580, March 22, 1950)
QUESTION:
(B) What are the requisites of double
jeopardy? 1999 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To raise the defense of double jeopardy,
three requisites must be shown: (1) a first
jeopardy has attached prior to the
second; (2) the first must have terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that of the first. (The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, Bernas, S.J.
2009)
QUESTION:
(C) On October 21, 1986, 17 year old
Virginia Sagrado brought a complaint
against Martin Geralde for consented
abduction. With the accused pleading not
guilty upon ar-raignment, trial ensued.
After trial, a judgment of convic-tion was
rendered against Geralde. When the case
was ap-pealed to it, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the Trial Court,
ratiocinating and ruling as follows: “This is
not to say that the appellant did nothing
wrong...she was seduced by the appellant
with promises (of marriage) just to
accomplish his lewd designs.” Years later,
Virginia brought another complaint for
Qualified Seduction. Geralde presented a
Motion to Quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, which motion and his
subsequent motion for reconsideration

were denied: Question: May Geralde
validly invoke double jeop-ardy in
questioning the institution of the case for
Qualified Seduction? He placed reliance
principally on the “same evi­dence” test
to support his stance. He asserted that the
offenses with which he was charged arose
from the same set of facts. Furthermore, he
averted that the complaint for Qualified
Seduction is barred by waiver and
estoppel on the part of the complainant,
she having opted to consider the case as
consented abduction. Finally, he argued
that her delay of more than eight (8) years
before filing the second case against him
constituted pardon on the part of the
of-fended party. How would you resolve
Gerald’s contentions? Explain. (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Martin Geralde cannot invoke double
jeopardy. According to Perez v. Court of
Appeals, 168 SCRA 236, there is no identity
between consented abduction and
qualified seduction. Consented
abduction requires that the taking away
of the offended party must be with her
consent, after solicitation or cajolery from
the offender, and the taking away of the
offended party must be with lewd
de-signs. On the other hand, qualified
seduction requires that the crime be
committed by abuse of authority,
confidence or relationship and the
offender had sexual intercourse with the
woman.
The delay in filing the second case does
not consti-tute a pardon, according to
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, to
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
35
be valid the pardon of the offender by the
offended party must be expressly given.
(UP Law Center)
QUESTION:
An Information for Estafa was filed against
the accused, Mr. D. During the course of
the trial, Mr. D filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to prosecute the case for a
reasonable length of time. Opposing the
motion, the prosecution argued that its
failure to present its witnesses was due to
circumstances beyond its control.
Eventually, the trial court dismissed the
case with finality on the ground that Mr. D's
right to speedy trial was violated. A month
after, the same criminal case for Estafa
was refiled against Mr. D, prompting him to
file a motion to dismiss invoking his right
against double jeopardy. The prosecution
opposed the motion, arguing that the first
criminal case for Estafa was dismissed with
the express consent of the accused as it
was, in fact, upon his own motion.
Moreover, it was already able to secure
the commitments of its witnesses to
appear; hence, it would be prejudicial for
the State if the case were to be dismissed
without trial.
(A) For double jeopardy to attach, what
requisites must exist? (2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To raise the defense of double jeopardy,
three requisites must be present: (1) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same
offense as that in the first. In relation to this,
the first jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a

valid complaint or information, (b) before
a competent court, (c) after arraignment
and a valid plea has been entered; and
(d) the accused was previously acquitted,
convicted or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent. (Dimayacyac v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 136264, May 28, 2004).
QUESTION:
(B) Rule on Mr. D's present motion. (2019
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted.
The rule that the right against double
jeopardy cannot be invoked if the
dismissal of the original case was with the
express consent of the accused admits of
two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of
evidence and denial of the right to
speedy trial (Philippine Savings Bank v.
Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26,
2005). Hence, Mr. D may invoke his right
against double jeopardy.
QUESTION:
AAA alleges that Udang raped her while
she was drinking with the latter’s child. The
same incident happened a year later
where AAA drank with Udang himself and
his child. As AAA got sleepy, she went into
one of the rooms to sleep but Udang
followed her and successfully raped her.
Four months later, AAA had herself
examined by Dr. Revelo who found out
that AAA had hymenal lacerations and
reddish superficial scratched marks in her
genital area, which were already healed.
Two informations for child abuse under RA
7610 were filed against Udang, in relation
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
36
to rape under the Revised Penal Code.
However, the trial court convicted Udang
under 266-A of the RPC instead of sexual
abuse under RA 7610. It ratiocinated that
while the allegations in the first and
second informations satisfied the elements
of rape under the first and third
paragraphs of Article 266-A, respectively,
the charges can only be one (1) for rape
under the first paragraph of Article 266-A
because an accused cannot be
prosecuted twice for a single criminal act.
Was the Trial Court correct in saying that
conviction of Udang of rape precludes his
prosecution for sexual abuse under RA
7610?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, a single act may give rise to multiple
offenses. Thus, charging an accused with
rape, under the Revised Penal Code, and
with sexual abuse, under Republic Act No.
7610, in case the offended party is a child
12 years old and above, will not violate
the right of the accused against double
jeopardy. Double jeopardy will not attach
when a single act constitutes multiple
crimes or offenses. The Bill of Rights under
our Constitution states that “No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.” The first sentence of the
provision speaks of "the same offense,"
which the SC has interpreted to mean
offenses having identical essential
elements. Rape and Sexual abuse have
different elements. They are two distinct

and separate crimes with distinct
elements. Rape is a felony, and Sexual
Abuse is an offense under a special law.
(People v. Udang, Sr., G.R. No. 210161,
January 10, 2018)
X. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
A. Modes and Kinds of Appointment
QUESTION:
While Congress was in session, the
President appointed eight acting
Secretaries. A group of Senators from the
minority bloc questioned the validity of the
appointments in a petition before the
Supreme Court on the ground that while
Congress is in session, no appointment
that requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, can be
made without the latter's consent, and that
an undersecretary should instead be
designated as Acting Secretary.
Should the petition be granted? (2013 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition should not be granted. It
was held in the case of Sarmiento III v.
Mison (G.R. No. 79974, December 17,
1987) that in the 1987 Constitution, the
clear and expressed intent of its framers
was to exclude presidential appointments
from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to
offices expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII. In the case
at bar, the appointment of acting
secretaries is not expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII of
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
37
the 1987 Constitution. Therefore, it is not
subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
B. Accountability of Public Officers:
The Ombudsman and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor
QUESTION:
Director WOW failed the lifestyle check
conducted by the Ombudsman’s Office
because WOW’S assets were grossly
disproportionate to his salary and
allowances. Moreover, some assets were
not included in his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities. He was charged with graft and
corrupt practices and pending the
completion of investigations, he was
suspended from office for six months.
Aggrieved, WOW petitioned the Court of
Appeals to annul the preventive
suspension order on the ground that the
Ombudsman could only recommend but
not impose the suspension. Moreover,
according to WOW, the suspension was
imposed without any notice or hearing, in
violation of due process. Is the petitioner’s
contention meritorious? (2004 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of Director WOW is not
meritorious. The suspension meted out to
him is preventive and not punitive. As
provided under Section 24 of Republic Act
No. 6770 which grants the Ombudsman
the power to impose preventive
suspension up to six months. Under the
case of Garcia v. Mojica (G.R. No. 139043,
September 10, 1999), a preventive
suspension may be imposed without any

notice or hearing. It is merely a preliminary
step in an administrative investigation and
is not the final determination of the guilt of
the officer concerned.
QUESTION:
Who are the impeachable officers under
the 1987 Constitution? Briefly explain the
process of impeaching them thereunder.
(2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following are the impeachable
officers under the 1987 Constitution (1)
President (2) the Vice-President (3) the
Members of the Supreme Court (4) the
Members of the Constitutional
Commissions (5) and the Ombudsman
(Article XI, Section 2, 1987 Constitution).
The process of impeachment is laid down
in Article XI, Section 3, of the 1987
Constitution.
STEP ONE: Any Member of the House of
Representatives of any citizen upon a
resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, may file a verified
complaint for impeachment which shall
be included in the Order of Business within
ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. After hearing, the
Committee, and by a majority vote of all
its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall then be
calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt
thereof;
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
38
STEP TWO: A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of
each Member shall be recorded
STEP THREE: In case the verified complaint
or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the
Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed; and
STEP FOUR: The Senate shall have the sole
power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that
purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. But when the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
C. Impeachment
QUESTION:
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
What constitutes initiation of
impeachment proceedings under the
provision? (2017 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:

An impeachment proceeding is initiated
when a verified complaint for
impeachment is filed and referred to the
Committee on Justice for Action.
(Francisco v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
XI. ELECTION LAW
A. Candidacy: Effect of Filing
QUESTION:
H, a naturalized American citizen who
later became a dual citizen under
Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act),
decided to run for Congress and thus, filed
a certificate of candidacy (COC). A
citizen argued that H is ineligible for the
position because of his status as a dual
citizen. H responded that his act of filing a
COC amounted to his renunciation of
foreign citizenship, rendering him eligible
for the position.
(A) Was H's filing of a COC sufficient to
renounce foreign citizenship? Explain.
(2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is not sufficient. RA No. 9225,
enacted August 29, 2003, provided for the
additional condition of a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship
for those who desire to run for elective
public office in The Philippines. This law
supersedes the Supreme Court’s previous
declaration that the filing done by a
person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy is enough.
(Sobejana-Condon v. Comelec, G.R. No.
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
39
198742, August 10, 2012)
QUESTION:
(B) Assuming that H is a dual citizen
because his parents are Filipino citizens
and he was born in California, USA, was
filing of a COC sufficient to renounce his
foreign citizenship? Explain. (2019 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is sufficient. In this case, a COC
which states that he renounces any and
all foreign citizenship suffices. A dual
citizen from birth seeking public office in
The Philippines does not need to execute
a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship. This is because a
candidate who has Filipino parents and
later becomes a citizen of a foreign state
due to the principle of jus soli has not
taken an oath of allegiance to said
foreign state. In this case, H’s dual
citizenship is from birth, and he didn’t
need to perform any other act such as
swearing allegiance. (Cordora v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 176947, February 19,
2009; Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000,
August 9, 2000)
XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
A. Municipal Corporations: Requisites
for Creation, Conversion, Division,
Merger or Dissolution
QUESTION:
From an existing province, Wideland,
Congress created a new province,
Hundred Isles, consisting of several

islands, with an aggregate area of 500
square kilometers. The law creating
Hundred Isles was duly approved in a
plebiscite called for that purpose. Juan, a
taxpayer and a resident of Wideland,
assailed the creation of Hundred Isles
claiming that it did not comply with the
area requirement as set out in the Local
Government Code, i.e., an area of at least
2,000 square kilometers. The proponents
justified the creation, however, pointing
out that the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government
Code states that "the land area
requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one
(1) or more islands." Accordingly, since
the new province consists of several
islands, the area requirement need not be
satisfied. How tenable is the position of the
proponents? (2014 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it is tenable. When a province is
composed of one or more islands, its
creation need not comply with the
required 2,000 square kilometer
contiguous territory under the Local
Government Code (LGC). Article 9 (2) of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Local Government Code (LGC-IRR)
provided the exemption. Sections 442 and
450 of the Local Government Code
exempted municipalities and component
cities from the area requirement if they
consist of one or more islands. In the case
at bar, there is no reason to not apply the
exemption. The bill that eventually
became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and
favorably voted upon in both Chambers
of Congress. Such acts of both Chambers
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
40
of Congress definitively show the clear
legislative intent to incorporate into the
LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement, with respect to the creation
of a province when it consists of one or
more islands, as expressly provided only in
the LGC-IRR. Thereby, and by necessity,
the LGC was amended by way of the
enactment of R.A. No. 9355. (Navarro v.
Ermita, G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011)
B. Boundary Dispute
QUESTION:
Boundary disputes between and among
municipalities in the same province may
be filed immediately with the RTC. (2010
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the statement is false. Boundary
disputes involving two (2) or more
municipalities within the same province
shall be referred for settlement to the
sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(Section 118[b], Republic Act No. 7160)
C. Powers of Local Government Units:
Taxing Power
QUESTION:
In 2005, the Province of Benguet enacted
a provincial tax ordinance which levied a
10% amusement tax on gross receipts
from admissions to "resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
spots." Pelizloy, owner of Palm Grove
Resort located in Tube, Benguet,
questioned the amusement tax for
violating the limitations of the taxing
powers of LGUs under the LGC.

Can the Province of Benguet impose such
amusement tax?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, a province may only impose an
amusement tax to be collected from the
“proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and other places of
amusement.” However, resorts, swimming
pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist
spots are not among those places
expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the
LGC as being subject to amusement
taxes, nor are they to be included in the
phrase “other places of amusement.” The
LGC itself defines amusement places as to
include theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances. Considering these, it is
clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath
houses, hot springs and tourist spots
cannot be considered venues primarily
"where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances.” Thus, they cannot be
subject to an amusement tax. (Pelizloy
Realty Corporation v. The Province of
Benguet, G.R. No. 183137, April 10, 2013)
QUESTION:
Is the rule that local government units
cannot levy any taxes, fees, or charges of
any kind on the national government or its
agencies and instrumentalities absolute?
If no, what are its exceptions?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
41
No, it is not absolute. It is a general rule
that local government units cannot levy
any taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on
the national government or its agencies
and instrumentalities. The provision,
however, also provides for an exception:
"unless otherwise provided herein." The
implication, therefore, is that while a
government agency or instrumentality is
generally tax-exempt, the Local
Government Code may provide for
instances when it could be taxable.
(Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System v. Local Government of Quezon
City, G.R No. 194388, November 7, 2018)
D. Powers of Local Government Units:
Term Limits
QUESTION:
Atty. G ran for Governor of the Province of
Pampanga, while his close friend, Atty. M,
ran for Mayor of the Municipality of
Guagua, Pampanga. They both won
convincingly. Eventually, the losing
candidates timely filed election protests.
The losing gubernatorial candidate, Mr. A,
filed his protest before the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga (RTC), whereas the
losing mayoralty candidate, Mr. B, filed his
protest before the Municipal Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga (MTC).
What are the term limits for the positions of
Atty. G and Atty. M? (2019 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As provided by Section 43 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, all local
elective officials shall only have a term of
office of three years, starting from the
noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may

be provided by law. Further, no local
elective official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms in the same
position.
QUESTION:
In the May 1992 elections, Manuel Manalo
and Segundo Parate were elected as
Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively.
Upon the death of Manalo as incumbent
municipal mayor, Vice Mayor Segundo
Parate succeeded as mayor and served
for the remaining portion of the term of
office. In the May 1995 election, Segundo
Parate ran for and won as mayor and then
served for the full term. In the May 1998
elections, Parate ran for reelection as
Mayor and won again. In the May 2001
election, Segundo Parate filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same
position of mayor, but his rival mayoralty
candidate sought his disqualification
alleging violation of the three-term limit for
local elective officials provided for in the
Constitution and in the Local Government
Code.
Decide whether the disqualification case
will prosper or not. (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The case will not prosper. When a
permanent vacancy occurs in an elective
position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the Local Government
Code, then his service for the unexpired
portion of the term of the replaced official
cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject
constitutional and statutory provision that
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
42
service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit. If the official
runs again for the same position he held
prior to his assumption of the higher office,
then his succession to said position is by
operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption.
(Abundo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716,
January 8, 2013). In the case at bar,
Segundo Parate's service for the
unexpired portion of Manuel Manalo's
term shall not be counted as one full term
and should be considered an involuntary
severance or interruption. Hence, by only
serving the mayoral position for only two
full terms, the three-term limit shall not
apply and therefore, the disqualification
case will not prosper.
XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND
PATRIMONY
A. Acquisition, Ownership, and
Transfer of Public and Private Lands
QUESTION:
A, a Filipino citizen, and his wife B, a
Japanese national, bought a five-hectare
agricultural land from X, a Filipino citizen.
The couple later executed a deed of
donation over the same land in favor of
their only child C. A year later, however, C
died in a vehicular accident without
leaving a last will and testament.
Now, X brought suit to recover the land on
the ground that B, being an alien, was not
qualified to buy the land when B and A
jointly bought the land from him and that,
upon the death of C, the land was
inherited by his parents but B cannot

legally acquire and/or inherit it.
How should the case be decided? If X filed
the suit against C when the latter was still
alive, would your answer be the same?
Why? (2002 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
X cannot recover the land whether from C
or A and B. Under Article IV, Section 1(2) of
the Constitution, C is a Filipino citizen since
his father is a Filipino. When A and B
donated the land to C, it became
property of a Filipino citizen. As held in
Halili v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 113539,
March 12, 1998), the sale of land to an
alien can no longer be annulled if it has
been conveyed to a Filipino citizen. Since
C left no will and his parents are his heirs,
in accordance with Article XII, Section 7 of
the Constitution, B can acquire the land
by hereditary succession. (UP Law Center)
XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
A. Academic Freedom
QUESTION:
Bobby, an incoming third year college
student, was denied admission by his
university, a premiere educational
institution in Manila, after he failed in three
(3) major subjects in his sophomore year.
The denial of admission was based on the
university's rules and admission policies.
Unable to cope with the depression that
his non-admission triggered, Bobby
committed suicide. His family sued the
school for damages, citing the school's
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
43
grossly unreasonable rules that resulted in
the denial of admission. They argued that
these rules violated Bobby's human rights
and the priority consideration that the
Constitution gives to the education of the
youth.
You are counsel for the university. Explain
your arguments in support of the
university's case. (2013 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The arguments of Bobby's parents have no
merit. Academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
(Article XIV, Section 5[2], 1987
Constitution). From the standpoint of the
educational institution, the university has
the freedom to determine “who may
teach; what may be taught, how it shall
be taught; and who may be admitted to
study” (Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234).
QUESTION:
The 1987 Constitution has increased the
scope of academic freedom recognized
under the previous Constitution. (2007 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False, the 1987 did not increase the scope
of academic freedom. Academic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions
of higher learning. (Article XIV, Section
5[2], 1987 Constitution). The said provision
is nothing new. The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution likewise provided for
academic freedom or, more precisely, for
the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning. (U.P.

Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 134629, August 31, 1999)
B. Academic Freedom: Concept
QUESTION:
What is Academic Freedom? Discuss the
extent of Academic Freedom enjoyed by
institutions of higher learning. (1999 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
According to Reyes v. Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. 94961, February 25, 1991),
academic freedom is the freedom of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his
particular specialty and thereafter to
make known or publish the result of his
endeavors without fear that retribution
would be visited on him in the event that
his conclusions are found distasteful or
objectionable by the powers that be,
whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments.
In Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee
(G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975) , it
was held that the academic freedom of
an institution of higher learning includes
the freedom to determine who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.
Because of academic freedom, an
institution of higher learning can refuse to
re-enroll a student who is academically
deficient or who has violated the rules of
discipline. Academic freedom grants
institutions of higher learning the discretion
to formulate rules for the granting of
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
44
honors. Likewise, because of academic
freedom, an institution of higher learning
can close a school. (UP Law Center)
XV. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Diplomatic and Consular Law:
Diplomatic Immunity
QUESTION:
Under Section 6 of Article V (on Criminal
Jurisdiction) of the Visiting Forces
Agreement, (VFA), the custody of a United
States (US) personnel who becomes
subject to criminal prosecution before a
Philippine court shall be with the US
military authorities, if the latter so requests.
The custody shall begin from the
commission of the offense until the
completion of all judicial proceedings.
When requested, the US military
authorities, however, shall make the US
personnel available to Philippine
authorities for any investigative or judicial
proceedings relating to the offense which
the person has been charged with. In the
event that the Philippine judicial
proceedings are not completed within
one year, the US shall be relieved of any
obligation under Section 6.
The constitutionality of Section 6, Article V
of the VFA is challenged on two grounds:
(1) it nullifies the exclusive power of the
Supreme Court to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines;
and (2) it violates the equal protection
clause to the extent that it allows the
transfer of the custody of an accused to a
foreign power as providing a different rule
of procedure for that accused. Rule on the

challenge. (2018 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The challenge is without merit. Firstly, it
does not nullify the exclusive power of the
Supreme Court to adopt rules of
procedure for all courts in the Philippines.
The rule in international law is that foreign
armed forces allowed to enter one’s
territory is immune from local jurisdiction,
except to the extent agreed upon. As a
result, the situation involved is not one in
which the power of this Court to adopt
rules of procedure is curtailed or violated,
but rather one in which, as is normally
encountered around the world, the laws
(including rules of procedure) of one State
do not extend or apply – except to the
extent agreed upon – to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of
extraterritorial immunity given to such
bodies as visiting foreign armed forces.
There is nothing in the 1987 Constitution
that prohibits agreements which
recognize immunity from jurisdiction or
some aspects of jurisdiction. Secondly, the
equal protection clause is also not
violated as there is a substantial basis for a
different treatment of foreign military
armed forces allowed to enter our territory
and all other accused. (Nicolas v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009).
QUESTION:
Dr. Velen, an official of the World Health
Organization (WHO) assigned in the
Philippines, arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport with his personal
effects contained in twelve crates as
unaccompanied baggage. As such, his
personal effects were allowed free entry
from duties and taxes, and were directly
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
45
stored at Arshaine Corporation's
warehouse at Makati, pending Dr. Velen's
relocation to his permanent quarters.
At the instance of police authorities, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati issued
a warrant for the search and seizure of Dr.
Velen's personal effects in view of an
alleged violation of the Tariff and Custom's
Code. According to the police, the crates
contained contraband items. Upon protest
of WHO officials, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs formally advised the RTC as to Dr.
Velen's immunity. The Solicitor General
likewise joined Dr. Velen's plea of
immunity and motion to quash the search
warrant. The RTC denied the motion.
Is the denial of the motion to quash
proper? (2001 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the denial of the motion to quash is
improper. It is a recognized principle of
international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of
the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and
affirmed by the executive branch of the
government, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity
upon appropriate suggestion by the
principal law officer of the government,
the Solicitor General in this case, or other
officer acting under his direction. (World
Health Organization v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-
35131, November 29, 1972). In the case at
bar, both the Secretary of Foreign Affairs

and the Solicitor General recognized and
affirmed the diplomatic immunity of Dr.
Velen. Therefore, the RTC should have not
denied the motion to quash the search
warrant.
B. Executive Agreements
QUESTION:
The Philippines and the Republic of Kroi
Sha established diplomatic relations and
immediately their respective Presidents
signed the following: (1) Executive
Agreement allowing the Republic of Kroi
Sha to establish its embassy and consular
offices within Metro Manila; and (2)
Executive Agreement allowing the
Republic of Kroi Sha to bring to the
Philippines its military complement,
warships, and armaments from time to
time for a period not exceeding one
month for the purpose of training exercises
with the Philippine military forces and
exempting from Philippine criminal
jurisdiction acts committed in the line of
duty by foreign military personnel, and
from paying custom duties on all the
goods brought by said foreign forces into
Philippine territory in connection with the
holding of the activities authorized under
the said Executive Agreement.
Senator Maagap questioned the
constitutionality of the said Executive
Agreements and demanded that the
Executive Agreements be submitted to the
Senate for ratification pursuant to the
Philippine Constitution. Is Senator Maagap
correct? Explain. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
46
Senator Maagap is incorrect insofar as the
first Executive Agreement is concerned.
The Executive Agreement regarding the
establishment of the embassy of Kroi Sha
need not be submitted to the Senate for
its concurrence. In a landmark case
decided by the Supreme Court, it was
held that the right of the executive to
enter into binding agreements without the
necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long
usage (Commissioner of Customs v.
Eastern Sea Trading, G.R. No. L-14279,
October 31, 1961)
As to the second Executive Agreement,
Senator Maagap is correct. International
agreements involving political issues or
changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements
of a permanent character usually take the
form of treaties. In such cases, it must be
concurred by the Senate. (Article VI,
Section 21, 1987 Constitution). In the case
at bar, the second Executive Agreement
involved political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving
international arrangements of a
permanent character, and thus
should be deemed as a treaty. Hence,
there is a need for the Senate to ratify the
same.
C. Law of the Sea: Convention on the
Law of the Sea
QUESTION:
(A) A bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives in order to implement
faithfully the provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Congressman Pat Rio Tek
questioned the constitutionality of the bill
on the ground that the provisions of
UNCLOS are violative of the provisions of
the Constitution defining the Philippine
internal waters and territorial sea. Do you
agree or not with the said objection?
Explain. (2015 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the objection has no merit. The
provisions of UNCLOS have nothing to do
with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is
a multilateral treaty regulating, among
others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No.
187167, August 16, 2011). It, therefore,
does not redefine the internal waters and
territorial sea of the Philippines.
(B) Describe the following maritime
regimes under UNCLOS: (2015 Bar
Question)
(a) Territorial sea
(b) Contiguous zone
(c) Exclusive economic zone
(d) Continental shelf
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The territorial sea is a belt of sea
outwards from the baseline and up to
12 nautical miles beyond. (Articles 2
[1] and 3, United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea [herein referred
to as UNCLOS)
(b) The contiguous zone is an area of
water not exceeding 24 nautical miles
from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is
Centralized Bar Operations 2021
47
measured. The coastal state
exercises authority over that area to
the extent necessary to prevent
infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitation authority
over its territorial waters or territory
and to punish such infringement.
(Article 33 [1] and [2], UNCLOS)
(c) The exclusive economic zone is an
area beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea, subject to the specific
legal regime established in this Part,
under which the rights and jurisdiction
of the coastal State and the rights and
freedoms of other States are
governed by the relevant provisions
of this Convention. (Article 55,
UNCLOS)
(d) The continental shelf of a coastal
State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation
of its land territory to the outer edge
of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend
up to that distance. (Article 76 [1],
UNCLOS)