Frontiers - From Wide Cognition To Mechanisms - A Silent Revolution - Psychology

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Introduction
Wide Accounts of Cognition

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HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY article

Front. Psychol., 06 December 2018
| https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02393 (https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02393)
From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent

Revolution
Marcin Miłkowski (https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/71891)1, Robert Clowes
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/357060)2, Zuzanna Rucińska
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/132281)1, Aleksandra Przegalińska
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/597347) ,3
Tadeusz Zawidzki
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/613279)4, Joel Krueger
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/45619)5, Adam Gies6, Marek McGann
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/55794) ,
7
Łukasz Afeltowicz
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/642730)8, Witold Wachowski
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/467976) ,9
Fredrik Stjernberg
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/597481)10, Victor Loughlin
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/617874)11 and Mateusz Hohol
(https://www.frontiersin.org/people/u/390766)1,12*
1
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland
2
Faculty of Human and Social Sciences, New University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
3
Department of International Management, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland
4
Department of Philosophy, The George Washington University, Washington, DC, United States
5
Department of Sociology, Philosophy and Anthropology, University of Exeter, Exeter, United Kingdom
6
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, United States
7
Department of Psychology, Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland
8
Institute of Sociology, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń, Poland
9
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
10
Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden
11
Department of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
12
Copernicus Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland
In this
TABLE paper, we
OF CONTENTS argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded,
extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these
Abstract
wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already
Introduction
progressed beyond these proposed perspectives toward building integrated explanations of the
mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others,
groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. Wide perspectives are essentially research
Mechanisms
heuristics for building mechanistic explanations. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent
Wide Mechanisms of
developments in
Mindshaping
the study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We argue that the current
practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has
Emotions and Their
turned from initial
Expressions binary oppositions and abstract proposals toward the integration of wide
perspectives
Possible with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences.
Objections
Summary

Introduction
(https://w
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Traditionally, Statementscience has been methodologically individualist and has treated cognition as the capacity
of individuals. Usually, it has framed intelligent behavior in terms of the processing of internal representations of
Acknowledgments
individual minds and explained it in terms of functional analyses of mental capacities. The epitome of such
Footnotes
methodology can be found in the important milestone both for cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience,
References
David Marr’s Vision (Marr, 1982).
Recently, embodied cognition, embedded cognition, the extended mind, enactivism, as well as distributed
cognition, have offered challenges to the traditional approach in different ways. Broadly speaking, what connects
these positions is that they account for cognition in terms of embodied interactions supported and extended by
actively built cognitive niches. This variety of approaches, which we dub “wide cognition,” offer a new picture of
cognition. Cognition is no longer understood in an extremely modular fashion, for example as opposed to
perception, action, or emotion, and is situated in social and cultural contexts.
Yet by the same token, the controversies over these wide perspectives have become outdated. Distributed
cognitive processing is no longer usefully understood in terms of embodied cognition, extended cognition,
enactivism, or distributed cognition alone, and our claim is that these views, in essence, offer mainly abstract
heuristics that cannot do much explanatory work in isolation. In this paper, we propose that they are more useful
in offering guidance for building multifaceted models of causal mechanisms responsible for cognition. Indeed, by
going mechanistic, wide approaches can become non-trivial and integrated explanatory proposals, and we believe
that this is what is happening right now.
In this paper, we first concisely characterize the contribution of several of the wide perspectives that were
essential to the mechanistic turn in the study of cognition, which we shortly summarize. Next, by relying on case
studies, we show that none of these perspectives alone offers the whole explanatory framework for cognition.
Instead, they offer heuristic guidance for the study of mechanisms involved.

By wide cognition we mean an approach to cognition that cites wide factors, i.e., factors that go beyond
intracranial processes. These include embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, and distributed cognition, which
are related but distinct concepts. These research approaches are also inspired by earlier wide accounts of cognitive
processes that include ecological psychology (Gibson, 1986), biosemiotics (Favareau, 2010), and sociocultural
psychology (Leont’ev, 1974; Vygotsky, 1986).
In contradistinction to traditional frameworks of cognitive science, these approaches do not explain cognitive
phenomena solely (or at all) in terms of the intra-neural manipulation of (language-like) internal representations
but stress the fact that (a) minds can extend into or rely heavily on the environment; (b) embodiment is essential
to cognition; (c) cognition is enacted, or constructed, in an active fashion; (d) cognitive phenomena are always
constituted by interactions with the environment; (e) and cognitive acts are not always but sometimes
paradigmatically distributed among multiple agents. However, theoretical presentations of these approaches
remain fairly abstract and focused on deciding yes–no questions rather than building unified models of cognitive
phenomena.
In other words, the accounts of wide approaches follow the steps of “trying to play 20 questions with nature and
TABLE OF CONTENTS
win,” as Newell (1973) has put it. Newell observed that cognitive psychologists had their tasks of choice that they
Abstract
treated as indicative of grand issues in psychology, but their theorizing remained bizarrely tied both to details of
Introduction
single tasks and to grand issues at the same time, without painting any broader picture of cognition. These grand
issues
Wide were stated
Accounts in an extremely abstract fashion: nature vs. nurture, continuous vs. all-or-none learning, serial
of Cognition
vs. parallel
From processing,
Wide Perspectives to analog vs. digital, conscious vs. unconscious, grammars vs. associations for language, etc.
Similarly,
Mechanisms in the debates over wide cognitive approaches, instead of explaining how cognition works by describing
underlying
Wide andofinteracting mechanisms, at least some researchers attempt to win the debate by showing that the
Mechanisms
bodily, the environmental, or the interactive aspect is most essential in cognitive functioning. This did not work in
Mindshaping
the 1970s
Emotions and(as Newell rightly noted) and remains unproductive today. Grand issues in the study of cognition cannot
Their
be fruitfully understood in terms of a series of simple dichotomies.
Expressions
Possible
However,Objections
wide approaches also inspired researchers to search for more integrated explanations, just like abstract
questions paired with cherry-picked experimental phenomena that earlier (negatively) inspired Newell to propose
Summary
the study of unified architectures of cognition. Simply, Newell thought that an integrative theory was lacking in 
(https://w
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Conflict of Interest
cognitive Statement
psychology (Newell, 1973, 1990). As we argue, mechanistic explanations are used to the same effect
today: to offer an integrated view on cognition, but in a piecemeal fashion, unlike Newell who promoted the idea
Acknowledgments
of sketching a general blueprint for all cognitive systems.
Footnotes
References
Embodied and Grounded Cognition
The claim of embodied cognition (EC) is that the physical body of an agent is relevant to cognition; in other
words, cognitive processing includes, in a non-trivial fashion, not only processes that occur in the brain but also
processes that occur outside the brain, in the body of the agent.1 Cognition thus depends deeply on the features of
the physical body (Varela et al., 1991; Clark, 1997; Damasio, 2000; Gallagher, 2005; Byrge et al., 2014; Shapiro,
2018).
EC has become increasingly widespread in all areas of cognitive science—from neuroscience and cognitive
psychology to cognitive linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and robotics. Over the past decades, this has led
to an impressive burst of experimental evidence for the role of the body in cognition, in particular within
psychology and neuroscience (Willems and Hagoort, 2007; Barsalou, 2008; Fischer and Zwaan, 2008; Toni et al.,
2008; Jirak et al., 2010; Pulvermüller, 2013; Costello and Bloesch, 2017; Varga and Heck, 2017). The shared
aspect of EC theories is their opposition to classical, propositional views, which hold that cognition boils down to
the manipulation of amodal, abstract, and arbitrary codes (cf. Shapiro, 2014). In contrast, according to EC
theorists, cognition is constrained and enabled by the specific characteristics of our own brain-body system.
Embedded and Situated Cognition

The embedded and situated approach to cognition holds that cognition should be framed in terms of the (usually
time-pressured) interaction of the agent and its immediate surroundings. The extra-bodily context constrains and
enables cognition (Agre and Chapman, 1987; Suchman, 1987; Norman, 1993).
Many lines of inquiry offer support to the embedded mind (and by extension, situated cognition). For example,
behavior-based robotics, as pioneered by Brooks (1991), arguably supports the claims made by embedded
cognition and situated cognition. Brooks demonstrated that it was possible to build robots capable of performing
simple tasks despite those robots having no detailed, internal knowledge of the environments in which they were
operating. Such robots were designed to be “set up to be set off” by certain features of their local surroundings,
bypassing the need for complex, internal cognitive machinery. The work of Brooks, and many others, has shown
that basic cognitive functions could be causally dependent on movement and structures in the local environment
(Steels and Brooks, 1995).
Extended Mind
The extended mind is the idea that an agent’s mind is not necessarily brain-bound and can incorporate external
resources such as tools, language, and external systems to enhance or augment cognitive processes (Clark and
Chalmers, 1998). This idea may be understood narrowly to mean that that some elements of the agent’s
surrounding are its proper cognitive parts, while according to a broader account, a hybrid system is constituted by
coupling
TABLE the agent’s
OF CONTENTS cognitive processing with its environment (Clark, 2008b; see also Hutchins, 2014).
The difference between this approach and embedded cognition lies in the claim, endorsed by the extended mind
Abstract
theorists but rejected by embedded cognition theorists, that at least some parts of what was traditionally
Introduction
considered as ‘the environment’ may be properly understood as literal parts of the agent’s mind.
The practical implications of the extended mind turn on exactly how and under what circumstances external
resources might integrate with internal or biological ones. What properties of cognitive artifacts might make them
Mechanisms
prone to integration? Theorists differ in how they answer this question (Sterelny, 2010). Some have endorsed an
Wide Mechanisms of
extended functionalist approach (Clark, 2008b; Sprevak, 2009; Wheeler, 2017), whereby it is the functional (i.e.,
Mindshaping
causal) role of the technology that makes it part of someone’s mind. Others insist that it is the bodily manipulation
Emotions and Their
of such technologies that integrates them into a cognitive routine (Menary, 2010b). A related but importantly
Expressions
distinct approach is the complementarity framework (Sutton, 2006; Menary, 2010a), which proposes that we tend
Possible Objections
to integrate tools and artifacts into our cognitive processes when they provide resources which complement our
Summary
existing biological systems. Menary’s idea of cognitive integration comes, in fact, very close to the idea of 
multiscale and multilevel causal explanations as required by mechanistic explanation. (https://w
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Enactive Cognition
Acknowledgments
Footnotes
The enactive approach to cognition recognizes a crucial inter-dependency between an autonomous agent and the
world it inhabits. Cognitive activity is wholly determined neither by the agents nor by their environment, but
References
rather it emerges from the inter-dependency between the two.
This observation lies at the heart of the enactive approach. It forms the basis for the mode of analysis and
understanding central to enactive thinking (Thompson, 2007; McGann et al., 2013). However, one can distinguish
at least four quite distinct flavors of the enactivist framework: sensorimotor enactivism, which deems action as
essential to perception and cognition (O’Regan and Noë, 2001); autopoietic (or classical) enactivism, which
grounds cognition in autonomous organization of biological entities (Varela, 1979, 1997; Weber and Varela,
2002); participatory sense-making enactivism, which understands cognition as relying on interactions between
autonomous agents (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; Thompson and Stapleton, 2009; Di Paolo and De Jaegher,
2012); and radical enactivism, which denies the role of mental representation in explanations of cognition (Hutto
and Myin, 2013). Just because the sensorimotor flavor is conceptually close to embodied cognition, it may be
considered as an action-oriented version of embodied cognition. The empirical consequences of radical enactivism
are still a matter of some dispute. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, below, we focus on the classical autopoietic
version of enactivism and its later extension, participatory sense-making enactivism.
For enactivists who build on the work of Varela et al. (1991), cognition is a process of sense-making, a continuous
process of adaptive coping by an agent to the vagaries of being a living being embedded in a complex world
(Thompson and Stapleton, 2009). In this sense, cognition is directly continuous with the biological processes of
staying alive in what is sometimes called a “life-mind continuity” (Thompson, 2007). An organism makes sense of
its world through the process of integrating the environment effectively into its own processes of self-production.
In the domain of chemistry and biological cells, this process of self-production is called “autopoiesis” (Maturana
and Varela, 1980; Weber and Varela, 2002; Froese and Stewart, 2010), and this capacity for continued self-
production provides a ground-level value to the activity of the system. But the same dynamics, if different
processes, apply at other levels of analysis, such as the production of identities within social groups. These
different levels of description are never wholly independent of one another, because all cognitive activity is bodily,
and so values that arise within the social domain are always contextualized and coupled (even if loosely) to values
within the biological (Di Paolo et al., 2017).
Social interaction is a special case of such engagement with the environment, in which the agent’s activity is not
simply coordinated with a physical world but with another agent. Sense-making in such situations is not simply
coordinated but negotiated, a process termed participatory sense-making (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007).
Where effective social coordination is achieved, participatory sense-making produces meaning and cognitive
activity that is shared across the participants. This sense-making must be understood as much in terms of the
conversation or interaction as a whole as through the combined activities of the individuals involved.
Distributed Cognition
The distributed cognition (DC) approach expands the classical focus on cognition as a property of an individual
organism/agent
TABLE OF CONTENTStoward the components and operations of larger cognitive systems, which may encompass
multiple individual agents and artifacts.
Abstract
This distinguishes DC from other approaches labeled here as ‘wide cognition,’ which usually treat an individual
Introduction
organism as the main unit of analysis, describing, for example, the way an individual is embedded, connected to
his/her environment or how his/her body matters from the perspective of cognitive processes. In the case of DC,
the focus is on heterogeneous elements (e.g., biological, material, discursive), which take part in sequential or
Mechanisms
simultaneous processes of generation, transmission and transformation of representational states. DC identifies
Wide Mechanisms of
such processes with cognition (Hutchins, 1995a). Moreover, in DC, representational states are not understood as
Mindshaping
mental states or other inner states of any individual agent. Examples of representational states can instead
Emotions and Their
include meaningful gestures or poses of agents, written or spoken information, visualizations displayed on
Expressions
screens, lines drawn on a navigational chart and the chart itself, but also non-symbolic cues which modify the
Possible Objections
behavior of agents (Zhang and Norman, 1994). Representatives of DC stress that a larger cognitive system works
Summary
in a different manner and has different properties than individual agents who may be part of the system. Unlike

the extended mind approach, the agent’s mind need not be the center of such a cognitive system: “some systems
(https://w
have a clear center while other systems have multiple centers or no center at all” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 37).
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However,of Interest Statement
according to the pioneer and leading theoretician of the approach, Edwin Hutchins, DC is not a kind or
a special case of cognition, but a perspective on all of cognition; therefore, “all instances of cognition can be seen
Acknowledgments
as emerging from distributed processes” (Hutchins, 2014, p. 36), which is especially useful in studying a particular
Footnotes
type of systems mentioned above. Thus, the difference between the extended mind approach and DC is not a
References
difference of type, but a difference of the level of the analysis.
From Wide Perspectives to Mechanisms

Even if one can analytically distinguish embodied, embedded, extended, enacted, and distributed views, they are
not always mutually exclusive,2 and a large body of research exhibits properties specific to many of the above
approaches. This is not a coincidence. They are not poised to be complete and exclusive accounts of cognition.
They are not theories in the sense of providing complete predictions or explanations of phenomena in question.
For this, they are too abstract. There is no particular novel prediction that the embodied perspective may offer
when applied, for example, to group decision making in a faculty meeting. In this, these perspectives are not
different from grand research traditions of cognitive science.
Providing Guiding Heuristics

Wide approaches are research traditions, and research traditions are not to be conflated with complete theories.
To illustrate this, take computationalism, which is another grand research tradition in cognitive science
(Miłkowski, 2018). As such, however, computationalism does not offer any predictions for group decision making
either. What they do instead is provide certain guiding heuristics. A proponent of traditional computational
modeling would ask what the overall task is and why solving it is appropriate; what the algorithms and
representations involved are; and how they are physically implemented. The embodied cognition paradigm asks
how this task is related to bodily, in particular to sensorimotor, features of decision makers. The embedded
approach points out that there may be important environmental factors, and the extended mind may alert us to
the fact that there might be important cognitive artifacts in operation. Finally, the enactive perspective (at least in
its non-classical version) points to participatory negotiation of how the activity is perceived by various agents
involved, and the distributed perspective hints that the phenomenon may involve not only human agents but also
external representations and instruments. Note that even if the phenomenon is only slightly influenced by bodily
features, for example, it need not mean that embodied cognition is thereby falsified. Heuristics are fallible, after
all.
We claim that instead of asking yes/no questions to nature, at least some researchers involved in the study of
cognition from wide perspectives are more and more interested in building models of cognitive mechanisms. This
kind of explanatory practice goes beyond mere binary oppositions that state that the role of the environment is
crucial or not, or that the environment has been appropriated by the cognitive system as its proper part. Instead,
these researchers treat—or at least should treat—cognitive systems as organized spatiotemporal systems,
comprised of entities and activities that are jointly responsible for their phenomena of interest, which is evidenced
by attempts to integrate, for example, embodied and extended approaches (Clark, 2008b; Borghi and Cimatti,
2010; Borghi et al., 2013; Walter, 2014). Differences between approaches matter only for expository purposes but
not really
TABLE for their
OF CONTENTS practice, which involves mechanistic modeling of cognition.
Abstract
Relying on Mechanisms
Introduction
As proponents
Wide of so-called new mechanism stress, many fields of science already appeal to mechanisms to explain
Accounts of Cognition
theirWide
From phenomena of to
Perspectives interest (Machamer et al., 2000; Glennan, 2017). This is true of life sciences but also cognitive
Mechanisms
(neuro)science (Thagard and Kroon, 2006; Waskan, 2006; Bechtel, 2008; Miłkowski, 2013; Piccinini, 2015) and
social
Wide sciences of
Mechanisms (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). While the philosophical analyses of the notion of mechanism differ
Mindshaping
(Glennan and Illari, 2017; for a review, see Illari and Williamson, 2011), in a nutshell, the idea is the following: A
mechanism
Emotions is an organized spatiotemporal structure responsible for the occurrence of at least one phenomenon to
and Their
Expressions
be explained. The orchestrated causal interaction of the mechanism’s component parts and operations explains
the phenomenon
Possible Objections at hand. In a certain sense, the new mechanistic account is extremely lean, leaving out
practically all physical details of what mechanisms as such might be. They are only causally organized
Summary
spatiotemporal structures. 
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According to theStatement
mechanistic account of explanation, there are no mechanisms per se, only mechanisms of some
phenomena; mechanisms should not be confused with organized spatiotemporal systems, processes or structures.
Acknowledgments
Mechanisms are wholes comprised of component parts and operations but they are delineated by the phenomena
Footnotes
they are responsible for, and phenomena are not to be conflated with observable features of a given
References
spatiotemporal system; to understand the nature of a phenomenon, extensive theoretical considerations may be
required (Bogen and Woodward, 1988).3 For example, it is widely agreed that human beings are capable of
producing a potentially unbounded number of linguistic utterances (Chomsky, 1959). Obviously, it is physically
impossible to observe anyone producing literally an infinite series of utterances because people are mortal. But
there are theoretical reasons to specify the phenomenon of linguistic productivity in such an idealizing fashion.
Constitutive Explanations
Mechanistic explanations that elucidate how a given phenomenon occurs by referring to component parts and
operations of a mechanism are called constitutive explanations. Explanatory texts of this kind cite the internal
causal and part-whole organization of the mechanism as responsible for the phenomenon at hand. For example,
to explain the phenomenon of how one cuts a piece of rope with scissors, we can describe the scissors as composed
of two metal blades with handles connected so that the sharpened edges slide against each other when handles are
closed. In other words, there are components (blades with handles, a screw that joints the blades) and operations
(bringing together the blades) organized in such a way that cutting occurs.
Given the importance of the study of components and operations, it is not surprising that mechanistic
explanations are guided by two important heuristics: localization and decomposition (Bechtel and Richardson,
2010). By localizing where operations happen and breaking down the whole system into its component parts,
researchers discover the internal structure of the mechanism. Importantly, a larger mechanism may comprise a
number of individual mechanisms organized together; while the circulatory system is a mechanism responsible
for blood circulation, its component mechanism, the heart, is also a mechanism, which is a proper part of the
circulatory system. The goal of mechanistic modeling is to be able to conceptually recompose the mechanism from
its component parts and operations. Recomposing is only possible when the explanatory text is complete, that is,
when it satisfies the completeness norm. This norm requires that the explanatory text represent “all and only the
relevant portions of the causal structure of the world” (Craver, 2007b, p. 27). This is not to say that mechanistic
explanations are supposed to give every possible detail about the mechanism; no, only explanatorily relevant
detail counts (Baetu, 2015; Craver and Kaplan, 2018).
Localization and decomposition are merely heuristics; they may fail without making mechanistic explanation
impossible. Bechtel and Richardson stress that while “decomposability may be a natural and fruitful starting
point, it may be no more than that” (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p. 32). Fully decomposable systems are an
extreme case, in which the sum is nothing more than its parts. As Bechtel and Richardson stress, it is much more
likely that biological systems are near decomposable (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010, p. 26). The notion of near
decomposability was introduced by Herbert A. Simon, who stressed that the behavior of near decomposable
component systems in the short run is approximately independent from the behaviors of other systems, and in the
long run, it depends only in an aggregate way on the behavior of the other components (Simon, 1962).4 Some
biological systems may be more highly integrated, which does not make them resistant to mechanistic
TABLE OF CONTENTS
explanations, as some critics claim (Anderson, 2015). This is because mechanisms may include a highly complex
organization of their internal component parts and operations. Such mechanisms, however, may be much more
Abstract
difficult to study and could require the use of specific mathematical techniques developed for research on complex
Introduction
systems.
In particular, the dynamic approach to cognition may stress systemic interactions in cognitive systems, but they
need not exclude the possibility of providing dynamical and mechanical explanations. As many have argued
Mechanisms
(Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011; Zednik, 2011; Kaplan, 2015; Lyre, 2017), some phenomena require the use of
Wide Mechanisms of
mathematical methods typical of dynamical systems to build complete mechanistic causal explanations.
Mindshaping
Emotions and Their

Expressions
Role of the Environment for Mechanisms
Possible Objections
Part-whole relationships and the causal structure of the mechanism are usually not sufficient to wholly explain the
Summary
phenomenon at hand: the explanation must include crucial environmental modulation. Only in some very special

circumstances, where the whole dynamics of the phenomenon depends merely on the underlying mechanism, can
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one ignore the environmental modulation (as Craver (2007a) does). In the case of scissors, one has to include
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Conflict
fingersofthat
Interest
are Statement
required to move the blades if one is to give a complete explanation of cutting. However, fingers
are not parts of scissors because they are not constitutively relevant to cutting. As Carl Craver has argued, a good
Acknowledgments
criterion of what counts as a component x of a mechanism S is its constitutive relevance in the operation of S (for
Footnotes
example, cutting a piece of rope is an operation of scissors). A component x of S is constitutively relevant for S if
References
and only if there is a relationship of mutual manipulability between x and S:
(i) x is part of S; (ii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some change to X’s φ-ing
that changes S’s ψ-ing; and (iii) in the conditions relevant to the request for explanation there is some change to
S’s ψ-ing that changes X’s φ-ing. (Craver, 2007b, p. 153).
Even if we consider fingers to be spatiotemporal parts of whatever cuts the rope, they normally do not fulfill
condition (iii): even if moving fingers does change how scissors’ blades move, blades themselves do not change
fingers (or at least, not much; the application of the physical force will of course impact fingers as well). Note: it is,
in principle, possible to build mechanisms that would work this way (some kind of self-organizing scissors with
robotic fingers attached, for example); it just doesn’t work this way in our simple case, in which we count fingers
as environmental modulators. In other words, mechanisms are not conceived as exclusively responsible for their
phenomena.5 On the contrary, mechanistic explanations routinely include the environment and interactions with
other mechanisms.
Mechanistic explanatory strategies have been nicely summarized by Bechtel in his metaphor of looking down,
around and up:
Accounts of mechanistic explanation have emphasized the importance of looking down—decomposing a

mechanism into its parts and operations. (…) But once multiple components of a mechanism have been
identified, researchers also need to figure out how it is organized—they must look around and determine how to
recompose the mechanism. (…) Researchers also need to look up—situate a mechanism in its context, which
may be a larger mechanism that modulates its behavior. When looking down is combined with looking around
and up, mechanistic research results in an integrated, multi-level perspective (Bechtel, 2009, p. 543).
What we stress in this paper is that mechanistic approaches do not focus narrowly on the internal structure of
cognitive agents; these approaches require “going wide” to include causally relevant parts of the environment and
interactions with other cognitive agents. In fact, the accounts of explanation defended by new mechanists are
already wide. Although it may seem that, to explain something mechanistically is to elucidate only its internal
mechanism, it is not correct in cases where recomposition of the phenomenon requires additional explanatory
factors. Quite naturally, this happens in most biological and cognitive cases. For this reason, wide mechanistic
explanations can be used by all researchers interested in the interaction of cognitive systems with their
environments, as embedded cognition would have it. Mechanistic explanations can be also applied to study the
cases of extended cognition and analyze the boundaries of cognitive systems (Kaplan, 2012), as we will show in
Section “Applying a Mechanistic Approach to Mindshaping.”
Bottoming Out: The Basic Level of Mechanistic Explanations

To add more explanatory depth to our toy example, one could inquire why the blades are made of metal rather
than, say, paper or polypropylene. In this case, the physical structure of blades has to be included in the
TABLE OF CONTENTS
explanation. The constitutive explanation bottoms out at the level that is considered sufficiently well understood
to elucidate how a whole mechanism operates. In a certain sense, therefore, mechanistic constitutive explanations
Abstract
are reductionist (Hensel, 2013) because they appeal to the internal causal structure of mechanisms to explain the
Introduction
phenomena at hand. However, they are not reductionist as they do not screen off complex interactions inside the
mechanism and environmental modulations. In other words, the whole mechanism is not replaced in a
constitutive explanation by an appeal to general laws of constituents of the mechanism. Moreover, the level at
Mechanisms
which an explanation bottoms out is decided largely pragmatically by the research community. Thus, the new
Wide Mechanisms of
mechanistic approach is reductionist only to a moderate extent and in a very extended sense, in which any denial
Mindshaping
of the absolute autonomy of psychology from neuroscience or from social science counts as reductionism. It is at
Emotions and Their
the same time non-reductionist because it usually situates a given mechanism in a larger context (Wright, 2007).
Expressions
In cognitive
Possible science, mechanistic explanations will therefore routinely involve interaction with the environment,
Objections
cognitive performance as well as the neural underpinnings of this performance. Current cognitive science, in
Summary
contrast to the evidential standards of the 1960s or 1970s, requires bottoming out at a level studied with 
neuroscientific methods (Boone and Piccinini, 2016); right now, it is not required to cite molecular or cellular data (https://w
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explanation Statement
plausible. The norms that govern where explanations bottom out are not, however, legislated a priori
by philosophers in their armchairs, but are assumed as valid in research practices in various fields of inquiry,
Acknowledgments
which may (sometimes implicitly) set their own differing standards. Note also that the detail added to bottom out
Footnotes
the explanation has to be still explanatorily relevant; otherwise, it would violate the completeness norm. So, any
References
detail that does not bring any further value has to be discarded.
The mechanistic approach is also natural in the study of relations between the physical body of an agent and its
neural systems, which is the focus of embodied cognition. Although proponents of enactivism usually appeal to
dynamical explanations (but see also Abramova and Slors, 2018), these explanations can be typically recast in
mechanistic terms (Zednik, 2011). In addition, distributed cognition can be easily framed in terms of mechanistic
explanations; the cognitive systems composed of cognitive agents and artifacts can be naturally understood as
mechanisms comprising component parts and operations on external representations. In the next subsection, we
describe distributed cognition as mechanistic more fully.
Airplane Cockpit as Exemplar Cognitive Mechanism

The mechanistic approach can be illustrated with an example of a study about how the structure of the cockpit in
an airplane supports complex, distributed cognitive processes. Edwin Hutchins studied in particular the use of
physical devices to remember the speed of the aircraft:
The cockpit system remembers its speeds, and the memory process emerges from the activity of the pilots. The
memory of the cockpit, however, is not made primarily of pilot memory. A complete theory of individual human
memory would not be sufficient to understand that which we wish to understand because so much of the
memory function takes place outside the individual. In some sense, what the theory of individual human
memory explains is not how this system works, but why this system must contain so many components that are
functionally implicated in cockpit memory, yet are external to the pilots themselves (Hutchins, 1995b, p. 286).
The process is distributed and includes two pilots as its component submechanisms, one responsible for flying
and navigating the plane, and another responsible for communication and other tasks. But the distributed
approach may well appeal to heuristics preferred by other wide approaches to the study of cognition (see Figure
1).
FIGURE 1
(https://www.frontiersin.org/files/Articles/385414/fpsyg-09-02393-HTML/image_m/fpsyg-09-02393-g001.jpg)
Figure 1. Wide approaches to the study of cognition.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
This can lead to the discovery of all sorts of crucial mechanisms. First, the embodied perspective will hypothesize
that the design of control devices is adapted to sensorimotor characteristics of a human being, and may study the
Introduction
quality
Wide of design
Accounts in terms of how easily it can be operated, for example, by seeing whether surfaces become
of Cognition
slippery, buttons difficult to press and confusing, etc. The situated perspective will insist that the cognitive
artifacts in the cockpit all constrain, and help to determine the plane weight, etc., which is crucial to land the
Mechanisms
aircraft. Alternatively, the extended view may study how well the minds of individuals mesh with multiple devices
Wide Mechanisms of
on board. Lastly, the enactive perspective will stress the importance of dynamic coordination between pilots and
Mindshaping
consider how the environment is structured in terms of various affordances. At the same time, the distributed
Emotions and Their
approach does not screen off the study of representational devices; on the contrary, as Hutchins stresses:
Expressions
Possible
ThisObjections
article presents a theoretical framework that takes a socio-technical system, rather than an individual
mind, as its primary unit of analysis. This theory is explicitly cognitive in the sense that it is concerned with how
Summary
information is represented and how representations are transformed and propagated through the system. Such 
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can provide a bridge between the information processing properties of individuals and the information
processing properties of a larger system, such as an airplane cockpit (Hutchins, 1995b, pp. 286–287).
Acknowledgments
This example shows how wide cognition, with its different theoretical component approaches that can cluster
Footnotes
together, is poised to study phenomena related to cognitive processing. This suggests that specific wide
References
perspectives are not particularly attractive in isolation. Instead, they can be further developed and integrated to
form a larger mechanistic framework (cf. Abramova and Slors, 2018; Wachowski, 2018).
Silent Mechanistic Revolution

The mechanistic revolution in cognitive science is silent insofar as it need not involve any widespread theoretical
controversies. Contra to an opinion made popular by Kuhn (1962), a significant portion of the Scientific
Revolution happened without much controversy (Wootton, 2015). Mechanistic explanation, as the underlying
methodological framework, is not universally accepted in psychology, or at least in philosophy of psychology
(Shapiro, 2016; Weiskopf, 2016). Most of the time, however, it goes unnoticed, just like references to mechanisms
in papers and textbooks in cognitive science (for example, see how frequently Gardner (1985) mentions biological,
cognitive, psychological, and information-processing mechanisms).
To further show that wide cognition is studied already in a mechanistic fashion, even if the notion of mechanism
itself is not used prominently, we will describe two cases in some depth: we will look at explanatory accounts of
mind-reading and emotion that go beyond a single ‘wide’ account of cognitive processes. We will show that in both
of these cases, they can be understood as wide mechanistic explanations. They capture the essence of wide
cognition.
Wide Mechanisms of Mindshaping

In this section, we describe mind-reading as a multi-faceted phenomenon. One of the ways to frame mind-reading
is to understand it in terms of mindshaping (Zawidzki, 2013), which has both institutional and biological
underpinnings. The proposed explanation is best understood, we claim, in mechanistic terms, and cannot be
accounted for as exemplifying a merely an embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, or even distributed
perspective on cognition.
Previous Models: Mindreading

In philosophy, as well as in developmental and comparative psychology, social cognition has traditionally been
understood in terms of mind-reading. This is a technical term that is often (although not always) used
interchangeably with “mentalizing” and “theory of mind.”
The guiding concept behind the notions of mind-reading, mentalizing, and theory of mind is that an individual’s
success at predicting the behavior of and coordinating with her con-specifics depends on understanding the
unseen psychological causes responsible for their behavior. There are two classic competing accounts of mind-
reading: theory theory (Perner, 1991; Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997) and simulation theory (Harris, 2000; Goldman,
2006). According to theory theory, mind-reading relies on a body of implicit knowledge, represented as general
TABLE OF CONTENTS
rules or underwritten by innate modular mechanisms. In contrast, simulation theory holds that understanding
Abstract
others does not depend on inferential processes relying on rules or modular mechanisms but on mental modeling,
pretending or imagining oneself to be in the other’s situation. In spite of this difference, the two competing
Introduction
accounts
Wide share
Accounts one important feature: on these orthodox conceptions of human social cognition, differences in the
of Cognition
sophistication of social interaction, e.g., cooperation and coordination, across phylogenetic and ontogenetic time,
can be traced to the sophistication of interactants’ theories of mind. For example, whereas non-human primates
Mechanisms
are restricted to an understanding of con-specifics’ goals, perceptions, emotional states, and behavioral
Wide Mechanisms of
dispositions, adult humans can also attribute beliefs, intentions, and other propositional attitudes, arranged in
Mindshaping
rational plans causally responsible for their interactants’ behaviors.
Emotions and Their
Expressions
However, this orthodox understanding of social cognition remains under considerable pressure. For example,
Dennett
Possible (1971, 1987) argues that a non-human animal, a human infant, and even a typical human adult operates
Objections
with a form of social cognition that does not depend on their understanding of the unseen psychological causes of
Summary
each other’s behavior via sophisticated theories of mind. Rather, he argues, most social cognition involves an 
understanding of perspectives—an ability to track relations between whole organisms and features of the (https://w
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salient to these organisms—what Dennett calls an “intentional stance” (cf. Zawidzki, 2012).
Understanding of hidden psychological causes, especially propositional attitudes, depends on prior enculturation
Acknowledgments
in culturally specific practices (Køster, 2017), and is useful only in making sense of deviations from or exceptions
Footnotes
to typical behavioral patterns.
References
It is widely recognized that propositional attitudes, like belief and desire, bear very tenuous relations to
observable circumstances and behavior. The reason is holism: even on orthodox views, particular propositional
attitudes lead to behavior only against a background of indefinitely many other propositional attitudes
(Bermúdez, 1995). For example, a belief that it is raining will issue in umbrella retrieval only when conjoined with
a desire to stay dry that is stronger than competing desires, appropriate beliefs about the location of an umbrella
and the relative costs of retrieving it, etc. This feature of propositional attitudes raises significant problems for the
orthodox conception of social cognition as being dependent on mind-reading, and especially for the widely held
assumption that successful navigation of the social world requires attributing propositional attitudes. This is
because it raises issues of computational tractability. Most successful social interactions take place seamlessly and
dynamically at relatively short time scales. It seems unlikely that successful interpreters search the immense space
of propositional attitude attributions compatible with brief, observed bouts of behavior, in time to arrive at
attributions accurate enough to support successful interaction (for a more detailed computational analysis, see
Zeppi and Blokpoel, 2017). For this reason, a number of theorists have recently raised worries about the orthodox
conception.
Applying a Mechanistic Approach to Mindshaping

Zawidzki (2013) argues that human populations are distinguished from our closest non-human relatives by an
array of effective “mindshaping” techniques, aimed at making potential interactants more alike, and hence easier
to interpret, which is a clear example of “looking around” internal cognitive mechanisms, or adopting the situated
perspective in the study of cognition. For example, only humans engage in “over-imitation” (Nielsen and
Tomaselli, 2010), that is, copying each other’s fine-grained, apparently non-functional behaviors. Only humans
engage in constant and pervasive pedagogy. Only humans set up elaborate normative regimes, and linguistic,
narrative constructs, and then pressure each other to conform to them. Such practices tend to make human
populations easier to interpret.
In addition, Zawidzki argues that the attribution of full-blown propositional attitudes evolved to play a
justificatory, rather than a predictive, function. That is, rather than help predict the behavior of potential
interactants, attribution of full-blown propositional attitudes evolved as a tool for situating interactants in a
normative space—as committed and entitled to various discursive and non-discursive moves, given prior such
moves. Inspired by Brandom’s (1994) theory of discursive practice, this idea finds some support in social
psychology as well. Bruner (1990) points out that many everyday uses of propositional attitude attributions are
triggered by behavior that deviates from a canonical cultural pattern, and function to excuse or at least make
sense of the behavior, e.g., when a person appears to break some norm, as when one fails to fulfill a promise,
sanctions can be mitigated if one can provide an excuse in terms of what one was thinking. There is some
empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis: Malle et al. (2007) showed that, when explaining behavior, adults
are much more likely to appeal to reason explanations, i.e., propositional attitudes, when they are motivated to
TABLE OF CONTENTS
make the behavior look good. Without such motivation, they are more likely to explain behavior in terms of causal
history.
Abstract
Introduction
Incorporating Culture Into a Wide Mechanism

The Wide
From mind-shaping
Perspectiveshypothesis,
to and the role of propositional attitude attribution in justifying apparently counter-
Mechanisms
normative behavior to one’s interactants, suggest a very precise sense in which human social cognition is “wide”:
much
Wide of the work
Mechanisms of required to predict our fellows involves not intracranial socio-cognitive resources, like so-called
Mindshaping
“theory of mind,” but rather, external cultural practices aimed at making our likely interactants more familiar and
Emotions
easier toand Their
anticipate. Culture seems to function as a classic example of “epistemic action” (Kirsh, 1996; Clark,
Expressions
1997). Rather than tackle the seemingly computationally intractable task of predicting our con-specifics by
Possible
buildingObjections
ever more complex, intracranial computational capacity, natural selection seems to have developed
systematic means of structuring the social environment in ways that make it easier to predict using relatively
Summary
simple intracranial resources. The variety of mind-shaping techniques employed by a given culture—over- 
imitation, pedagogy, norm construction and enforcement, the use of linguistic narrative, e.g., myths, to construct (https://w
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for all to imitate—can all be seen as forms of wide social cognition, aimed at regimenting the
potentially unruly and intractable social environment. If this hypothesis is on the right track, then it suggests that
Acknowledgments
the study of culture and its effects on cognition must play a central role in the sciences of social cognition.
Footnotes
What this hypothesis suggests, therefore, is that a wide array of factors—factors that go beyond properties of
References
single individuals—have to be included in the explanation. But one cannot simply produce this explanation by
referring merely to embodiment, embeddedness, cognitive extension or enaction, or even distributed cognition.
These perspectives offer limited guidance for the case at hand. Instead, the focus on cultural and social factors is
much more salient.
In fact, over the past 15 years there have been many new research programs exploring the impact of culture on the
development of human cognitive structures. Areas of knowledge that deal with this subject are cross-cultural
psychology, neuroanthropology and cultural neuroscience. What unites the above-mentioned disciplines is the
emphasis put on socio-cultural aspects of human cognitive abilities. This position is sometimes known as bio-
cultural constructivism (Baltes et al., 2006) and it states “that brain and culture are in a continuous,
interdependent, co-productive transaction and reciprocal determination” (Baltes et al., 2006). The basic
assumption is that the structure of the human brain is not programmed a priori, but rather is co-shaped by the
environmental stimulation in a broad sense: the socio-cultural experience of the entity, its environment, etc.
Generalizing, the process of ontogenetic development is stimulated genetically, environmentally and culturally.
Consequently, this leads to the abandonment of radical genetic, neuronal, cultural determinism, or
environmentalism and highlights the simultaneous impact of all the above factors on human ontogeny and
evolution. This, in turn, means that researchers produce explanatory texts that mention complex mechanisms,
whose causal organization may lead to observed cognitive performance.
Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach

At the same time, the mindshaping hypothesis is right now not fully developed in terms of a complete mechanistic
explanation. In particular, the entities and operations responsible for the cultural and social constraints on human
behavior are not fully understood in terms of neurocognitive mechanisms. For this reason, this explanation
remains highly schematic and so, according to the mechanistic view, requires further development. But this
development clearly requires integrative efforts, which is what researchers studying mindreading usually
presuppose. For example, it is most likely that separate mechanisms underlie the various forms of mindshaping,
i.e., overimitation, pedagogy, norm institution and enforcement, and self-constitution in terms of roles in
narratives expressed in public language. These mechanisms may be, in turn, involved either in attributing
unobservable entities such as beliefs, or in mere tracking relational properties of bouts of behavior. The
mindshaping hypothesis suggests the latter may be the case for a number of them (Fenici and Zawidzki, 2017).
Decomposing the dense web of interrelationships between these mechanisms is also a difficult ongoing research
task.
In other words, just like most mechanistic explanations in life and cognitive sciences, this explanation is far from
the ideal; nevertheless, mechanistic norms of completeness may drive further study of the phenomena in
question. From our point of view, it is crucial to stress that a wide perspective on mind-reading naturally fosters
the development of mechanistic explanations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Emotions and Their Expressions
Introduction
In this
Wide section,
Accounts we show how the mechanistic view offers methodological advice and goes beyond idle debates over
of Cognition
the role
From Wideof the environment
Perspectives to in emotional expression.
Mechanisms
Previous Models of Emotion

Wide Mechanisms of
Mindshaping
Dominant theories of emotion tend to adopt an individualistic perspective. Whether modeled as evaluative
Emotions and Their
judgments, appraisal processes, physiological states of bodily arousal, or something else, emotions are commonly
Expressions
thought of as private states individuated by their neurobiology, cognitive content, behavioral expression, or
Possible Objections
phenomenal character (Damasio, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001; Prinz, 2004; Laird, 2007; Russell, 2009; Panksepp,
Summary
2014). From this perspective, the social and cultural environment is of secondary interest for understanding the 
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inner (i.e., Statement mechanisms that are the real heart of emotions. However, the mechanistic approach to
agent-centric)
explanation does not conform to this kind of individualism, even if bodily aspects of emotion are usually
Acknowledgments
understood as individual.
Footnotes
References
Role of Embodiment for Emotion
One can argue that the embodied character of emotions is a necessary condition on their being social. The
embodied account of emotion claims that the brain alone is not sufficient to generate emotional experience.
Rather, the rest of the (non-neural) body, in all its biological, physiological, morphological, and kinematic details,
makes a non-trivial contribution to the realization of some emotions. For example, many studies appear to
indicate a reciprocal relation between an emotional experience and its behavioral expression. Subjects induced to
adopt an emotion-specific facial expression or posture report experiencing the corresponding emotion (Edelman,
1984; Duclos and Laird, 2001; Laird, 2007; Winkielman, 2010; Marzoli et al., 2013; Davis et al., 2015).
Conversely, inhibiting the expression (e.g., suppressing the facial signature of anger or happiness) diminishes the
associated experience (Strack et al., 1988; de Gelder, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007; Oberman et al., 2007; Niedenthal
et al., 2009; see however Wagenmakers et al., 2016 for the results of replication of Strack et al., 1988). Individuals
who suffer severe spinal cord injuries and lose the capacity to behaviorally express emotions report less-intense
feelings of high-arousal emotions like fear and anger (Chwalisz et al., 1988; Laird, 2007; see Bermond et al., 1991).
Still other studies have found that inhibited facial expressiveness—e.g., following Botox injections (Davis et al.,
2010; Havas et al., 2010) or due to congenital facial paralysis (Cole and Spalding, 2008) — results in diminished
emotional phenomenology.
Embodied approaches to emotion thus emphasize the extent to which emotions depend upon extra-neural factors
and feedback (Winkielman et al., 2015). Moreover, if the physical expression of anger, say, is literally a part of the
anger itself—that is, part of its physical realization—some emotions, in virtue of their embodied character, can be
said to have a social face. They are partially constituted by world-directed features perceptually available to other
agents (Krueger, 2012). But this embodied perspective remains a fairly conservative way of thinking about the
social character of emotions because the environment does not enter into this characterization in any substantive
manner.
Incorporating Sociality Into Wide Mechanism of Emotion

A wide mechanistic perspective on emotions, by contrast, urges that emotions are fundamentally social
phenomena: they are scaffolded and shaped by features of the agent’s social niche, as well as the various ways the
individual—along with other emotional agents—actively modifies and negotiates this shared niche (Fischer and
Manstead, 2005; Krueger, 2013; Slaby, 2014; Colombetti and Roberts, 2015; Krueger and Szanto, 2016;
Colombetti, 2017). Accordingly, the role of the environment is seen not merely as providing stimulus inputs and
serving as an arena for behavioral outputs. Rather, the environment—understood broadly to include not only
material features of the agent’s niche, but also sociocultural and interpersonal aspects as well—plays an active role
in shaping emotions on multiple time scales (Parkinson et al., 2005), including both the moment-to-moment
character of emotional episodes, as well as the long-term development of an individual’s emotional repertoire
(Griffiths and Scarantino, 2008). While not entirely jettisoning a consideration of internal mechanisms, a wide
TABLE OF CONTENTS
perspective on emotions thus argues that the larger bodily, social, and interactive context in which emotions are
Abstract
situated needs to be part of the target explanandum. This also follows naturally from the mechanistic perspective,
which provides no privileged explanatory position for the biological agent. For mechanists, the set of all and only
Introduction
causally
Wide relevant
Accounts factors relevant to a given phenomenon counts as explanatorily relevant.
of Cognition
To aWide
From largePerspectives
extent, proponents
to of embodied or extended accounts of emotion are not that radical in claiming that
Mechanisms
emotions cannot be understood exclusively as properties of individuals. From the evolutionary point of view, the
expression
Wide of emotion
Mechanisms of plays primarily a communicative role (Darwin, 1872), and to understand the causal
Mindshaping
structure of the communication process, one cannot limit the explanation to the agent that experiences one
Emotions
emotion. and Their
Moreover, because they play communicative roles across various species, there is a strong selection
Expressions
pressure to develop at least a limited number of universal expressions of emotions, a point widely appreciated
Possible
nowadaysObjections
(Ekman, 2016; but see Barrett L.F., 2016 for a different view). For example, it has been elaborated in
experiments that look at multiple sources of feedback that may modulate the felt emotion itself.
Summary
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Considerof Interest
the workStatement
on audience effects, which indicates that emotional responses differ, depending on whether
there is an audience or not. For example, ten-pin bowlers smile significantly more after producing a positive event
Acknowledgments
(e.g., bowling a strike or a spare) when they turn to face their friends than when they are still facing the pin (Kraut
Footnotes
and Johnston, 1979). A similar effect has been observed in Spanish soccer fans who issue authentic (i.e.,
References
“Duchenne”) smiles (Ekman et al., 1990) in response to goals only when facing another person (Fernández-Dols et
al., 1997), as well as in Olympic gold-medal winners who smile almost exclusively when receiving their gold medal
(and not when they are alone prior to the ceremony) (Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda, 1995). Audience effects
have even been observed in young infants (Jones et al., 1991). Other work in developmental psychology
demonstrates how the repertoire of physical strategies caregivers use to engage with infants—facial expressions,
postural adjustments, exaggerated gestures and vocalizations, gaze manipulation, etc.—function as real-time
scaffolding supporting the emergence, regulation, and performance of many basic emotions from the beginning of
life (Tronick et al., 1978; Posner and Rothbart, 1998; Rochat, 2009; Reddy, 2010; Hobson, 2011). This research
supports the thesis that certain emotions depend crucially upon the ongoing (i.e., synchronic) feedback and
support of the social-communicative context in which they are situated.
Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach

A mechanistic explanation of emotional phenomena need not deny the importance of the brain or individual
mechanisms, and most emotions do not need to be actually perceived by some other agent to be felt. But it should
avoid incomplete explanations, which by being excessively narrow in selecting causally relevant factors and
abstracting emotions away from the broader bodily, social, and cultural contexts, violates an important
mechanistic explanatory norm, namely completeness (Craver, 2007b). The modulating effects of emotional
expression and feedback, however, cannot support the radical view that emotion itself extends into the physical
environment. One way to justify this point is to appeal to methodological principles of what counts the part of a
given mechanism (see Role of the Environment for Mechanisms above), which state that only what is
constitutively relevant to the phenomenon to be explained is part of the mechanism.
Consider now the case of an Olympic medal winner. The environment, for example, seats on the Olympic stadium,
would be constitutively relevant to the emotion as long as their removal would change the emotion, and if the
change of the emotion of winners would influence the seats. This is definitely not the case; only the emotions felt
by agents who perceive emotional expressions change. Moreover, a perception of the expressed emotion may
trigger this (or another) emotion. Nonetheless, the mechanistic approach, while not without its own problems,6
can help to clarify the issues in the debate over the “wide” nature of emotions. The only candidate components for
“extended emotional mechanisms,” beyond one’s own bodily and neural processes, are the bodily and neural
processes of other agents, not arbitrary physical things in the environment.
Further, the explanatory advantage of assuming the extended mind or extended emotion, over the embedded
account thereof, is rather doubtful.7 While it is certainly possible to adopt a view on emotional or cognitive
phenomena that would make certain non-neural and non-bodily processes components of emotional or cognitive
mechanisms, as long as the completeness norm is followed, this move makes no explanatory difference vis-à-vis
considering the same phenomena more narrowly construed, this time just modulated by environmental triggers.8
Mechanistic criteria of constitutive relevance decide what is a component of a mechanism but not what a given
TABLE OF CONTENTS
mechanism is a mechanism of. This is up to a theorist. It’s a large oversimplification to say that the mechanism is
Abstract
question in the first case is just an “emotional mechanism”; it’s rather a mechanism of reciprocal influence of
emotional expression, which may include a number of agents. In such a case, not only do both the embedded and
Introduction
extended
Wide view
Accounts appeal to the same causal networks, while insisting that the boundaries of what they consider to be
of Cognition
emotional mechanisms are different. But it would be mildly confusing to call these mechanisms simply
“emotional” because their function can be specified more precisely and is context-bound. The debate based on
Mechanisms
oversimplification is thus idle; from the mechanistic point of view, both parties are wrong because the phenomena
Wide Mechanisms of
to be explained are not just emotions. Nevertheless, the mechanistic approach to explanation does not decide
Mindshaping
where the mind or emotion starts or ends.
Emotions and Their
Expressions
To sum up, in this section, we have argued that the wide perspective on emotions requires more conceptual
clarity,Objections
Possible and this is what the mechanistic approach offers. It can resolve some conundrums by dissolving
explanatorily idle debates. While further research on emotions as relying on non-individual factors is required by
Summary
mechanistic norms of explanation, in particular to fully link social factors with mechanisms studied by affective 
neuroscience, the mechanistic approach aptly describes current integrative efforts in the study of emotion. (https://w
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Possible Objections
Acknowledgments
Footnotes
In this section, we briefly review possible objections to the claim that there is an ongoing mechanistic revolution
References
in wide approaches in cognitive (neuro)science.
Dynamical, Not Mechanistic

One way to argue against the claim that mechanisms underlie the ongoing scientific practice in cognitive
(neuro)science, in particular inspired by wide perspectives, is to say that dynamical explanation is more
frequently appealed to by its proponents. Indeed, Menary (2007), in proposing his framework of cognitive
integration, which takes inspiration from the extended and situated perspectives, stresses the importance of
dynamical explanation:
it is based on the idea of multiple cognitive layers where neural, bodily, and environmental processes all
conspire to complete cognitive tasks. Although the framework is unified by a dynamical systems description of
the evolution of processing in the hybrid and multi-layered system, it recognizes the novel contributions of the
distinct processing profiles of the brain, body, and environment (Menary, 2015, p. 2).
There are two possible lines of reply to this argument. The first one is to stress that mere dynamical explanations
are actually explanatorily unsatisfactory (Kaplan and Craver, 2011). In fact, dynamical explanation at its core
relies on the received view of explanation, which requires appeal to universal laws (Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948, 1953). When a dynamical explanation is not equivalent to a mechanistic one, it is, according to Craver and
Kaplan, simply deficient because it is open to well-known objections put forward against the received view (cf.
Craver, 2007b). Dynamical regularities referred to in cognitive explanations are usually not universal
generalizations and remain invariant in an extremely limited number of contexts. Although one could in principle
re-describe a mechanism by appealing to regularities, these regularities will be true of entities and activities whose
organization is jointly responsible for a given phenomenon. It is extremely difficult to find dynamical explanations
that do not appeal to causally organized systems; and this is what makes purported dynamical explanations
equivalent to mechanistic explanations (Walmsley, 2008; Zednik, 2011). In other words, as far as explanations
involved in Menary’s cognitive integration framework are genuine, they are, despite appearances, mechanistic.
Another but related reply is to stress the role of activities or processes, which makes dynamical explanations part
and parcel of a particular kind of explanations, namely dynamical mechanistic explanations (Bechtel, 2015). In
other words, the mechanistic approach to explanation sometimes has to appeal to dynamical models, in particular
when time-related phenomena are in question.
To wit, the proponent of dynamicism has the burden of proving that mechanistic explanations are somehow
deficient. But this is extremely difficult. All successful dynamical explanations can be exploited for building
mechanistic explanatory models, while rejecting dynamical attempts that violate mechanistic norms (for example,
they abstract away from the rich internal structure of mechanisms when it is causally relevant). By way of reply,
the dynamicist could claim that these purported non-mechanical dynamical explanations are crucial in cognitive
science by systematically reviewing the most significant empirical results achieved in the last 50 years and
showing
TABLE that they
OF CONTENTS cannot be properly understood in either functionalist or mechanistic manner. Still, until the
dynamicist does this, both of the aforementioned responses are available to the mechanist.
Abstract
Introduction
Functionalist Alternative
Opponents of mechanistic explanation may further object that mechanisms are not the sole focus of cognitive
science; in particular, they may claim that functional explanations are genuinely explanatory (Shapiro, 2016).
Mechanisms
However, one may counter that mere functional analyses are no longer accepted in cognitive science as
Wide Mechanisms of
satisfactory and are in fact treated as mere mechanism sketches, or essentially incomplete explanations (Piccinini
Mindshaping
and Craver, 2011). Nonetheless, mechanistic explanations in cognitive science are in one respect close to the
Emotions and Their
functional approach in that they deal with mechanisms that have biological or psychological functions (Garson,
Expressions
2013), but in fact wide perspectives are incompatible with the autonomy of psychology presupposed by functional
Possible Objections
explanation traditionally understood. Functional autonomy was sometimes spelled out in extreme terms and this
Summary
extreme appeal to autonomy is what the mechanistic approach rejects. For example, autonomy was defended by 
saying that we could be made of Swiss cheese, and it wouldn’t matter (Putnam, 1975, p. 291). It would; we (https://w
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wouldn’tof Interest
be humanStatement
cognitive agents anymore, just inert blobs of cheese. The causal organization of an agent
cannot be duplicated in just any physical substrate. Similarly, scientists no longer accept abstract box-and-arrows
Acknowledgments
diagrams as satisfactory explanations.
Footnotes
One major difference between functionalist box-and-arrows diagrams and mechanistic explanations is that most
References
defenders of functionalism required only that the posited functional organization be sufficient for the capacity to
be present (Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 13; Cummins, 1975). For example, according to defenders of sufficiency
analysis, one could produce a computer simulation of translation that would behave similar as human translators,
and such simulation would be explanatory. However, critics point out that the same behavior could be produced
in different ways and that genuinely explanatory models have to be constrained by what is known to be not only
sufficient but also actually causally relevant (Miłkowski, 2013, p. 119). In the case of machine translation,
statistical and neural-network methods might produce similar outputs but the first one is not even remotely
biologically plausible (Koehn, 2010). This is why abstract diagrams of systems sufficient to perform some activity
are no longer considered explanatory in contemporary cognitive research.
To prove this point, one can point out that the currently influential predictive processing account of cognition,
which remains largely sketchy and devoid of detailed models of the causal dynamics of the nervous system, strives
for mechanistic evidence (Gordon et al., 2017). Were neuroscientific evidence not useful, the effort in producing it
would be a symptom of irrationality among researchers, and defenders would not take pride in showing this kind
of evidence. Contrarily, it is exactly the fact that the evidence about entities and activities is required to
substantiate functional analyses that makes it also a mechanistic sketch. These are current evidential standards in
cognitive (neuro)science (Boone and Piccinini, 2016).
Second, as soon as one adopts an embodied and situated perspective, autonomy claims and functionalism cease to
be attractive. As proponents of embodiment should be aware, autonomy claims were not successfully established
by recourse to multiple realization, or the (purported) fact that some capacities may be realized by any system
with the same functional organization but sufficiently different causal structure (cf. Aizawa and Gillett, 2011;
Polger and Shapiro, 2016). It is simply much more natural to adopt a mechanistic perspective and to argue for
embodiment than to adopt functionalism and argue for embodiment, even if many proponents of embodied
cognition adopted a functionalist perspective (Clark, 2008a). If bodily features could be multiply realized by just
any functional structure, are they actually bodily features? For example, it seems highly dubious that a
computational simulation of a body might replace the physical bodily interaction in any biological agent without
loss, and the stress on the role of the physical body is at the core of a strong embodiment thesis (Dempsey and
Shani, 2013).
A related objection may be connected to the fairly abstract and sketchy nature of some proposed wide
explanations. For example, the notion of affordance, which has become popular among wide approaches, is
usually introduced in terms of agent-environment interaction, without positing internal mechanisms at all. But
cognitive neuroscientists do not consider it absurd to inquire into neurocognitive mechanisms of affordance
perception; in fact, there is already some work consistent with a mechanistic approach (Young, 2006; Cisek,
2007).
In other words, it seems that the overarching assumption in cognitive science today is that one cannot simply
point to mere functional analysis. Mere functional analysis is essentially incomplete because it need not contain
TABLE OF CONTENTS
any relevant causal detail: sufficiency analysis may produce structures that have no causal relevance for the
Abstract
phenomenon, as in the case of traditional statistical machine translation, which is wildly disparate from how
people translate even if its results may fairly coincide.
Introduction
Anti-representationalism and Anti-computationalism

Mechanisms
In some discussions about wide approaches to cognition, it is presupposed that they exclude representationalism
Wide Mechanisms of
or computationalism (Barrett L., 2016), which have been traditional assumptions of mainstream cognitive
Mindshaping
science. But things are perhaps not so simple. Computationalism is certainly compatible with wide approaches, in
Emotions and Their
particular when paired with the mechanistic account of physical computation (Miłkowski, 2013; Villalobos and
Expressions
Dewhurst, 2017), but the issue of representation is more complex. While proponents of radical enactivism remain
Possible Objections
highly critical of the notion of mental content (Hutto and Myin, 2013), their criticism, from the methodological
Summary
point of view, is mostly motivated by parsimony arguments. In fact, in some cases it may indeed be worthwhile to

see whether
Author full-blown mental content is required for explanations instead of reliance on affordances in the
Contributions
(https://w
environment, without deciding a priori that unobservable entities are not admissible in science, which admittedly
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would ofbeInterest Statement
an extreme interpretation of radical enactivism (Clowes and Mendonça, 2016; Gärtner and Clowes,
2017). Other proponents of wide approaches, particularly in the case of the perceptual symbol systems, remain
Acknowledgments
strongly motivated by representationalism (Barsalou, 1999); many stress that wide approaches cannot and should
Footnotes
not reject representationalism (Schlosser, 2017; Wheeler, 2017).
References
If wide approaches are understood as only offering generic heuristic advice, as we claim, then such approaches are
not decisive when it comes to determining the status of computations or representations. Nonetheless, wide
approaches can lead us to be careful when positing such processes, which is exactly what mechanistic explanation
requires, namely that we need additional causal evidence from lower levels of mechanistic organization in order to
talk of computation and representation.
Summary
Wide approaches to cognition cannot be applied to the study of cognition in isolation. Methodological and
sometimes ideological controversies around embodiment and situatedness, for example, look outdated when we
focus on current explanatory practice in cognitive science. Researchers appeal to wide factors merely as discovery
heuristics. In essence, the mechanistic turn that is beginning to pervade wide approaches in cognitive
(neuro)science is the natural next step of the mechanistic revolution already prevalent in cognitive (neuro)science
(Boone and Piccinini, 2016).
Wide perspectives on cognition, we claim, are fruitful when applied together in the practice of building
mechanistic models, which can be further constrained, for example, by available psychopathological,
neurophysiological, psychophysiological, or psychological evidence. Taken in isolation, they offer very little
theoretical advice.
A wide mechanistic perspective should not deny the significance of the brain or individual mechanisms, or it will
prematurely advise against testing hypotheses about potentially relevant causal factors. If cognition is not only the
result of individual innate cognitive processes but also of culturally-afforded competence acquired by individuals
and groups alike, it is only natural to assume that mechanistic explanations will include a fair number of wide
causal factors. Wide cognition is therefore not a grand theory of everything that could supply all possible detailed
hypotheses about cognitive phenomena. Instead, it merely helps reject self-imposed and unnecessary restrictions
in the study of their mechanisms. We claim that the silent mechanistic revolution ongoing in cognitive
(neuro)science helps to bring the insights from these wide perspectives together by showing their role as research
heuristics.
MMi, RC, ZR, AP, TZ, JK, AG, MMc, ŁA, WW, FS, VL, and MH reviewed the literature, developed the theoretical
stance, wrote the manuscript, and reviewed and accepted its final version.
Funding
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preparation of the manuscript was supported by the European Network for Social Intelligence, SINTELNET (FET
Open Coordinated Action FP7-ICT-2009-C Project No. 286370). The contribution of MMi, MH, ZR, and WW was
Abstract
financed by the research grant “Cognitive Science in Search of Unity: Unification and Integration of
Introduction
Interdisciplinary Research” (2014/14/E/HS1/00803; PI: MMi) funded by the National Science Centre, Poland.
The research of RC was supported by the Portuguese FCT funding grants SFRH/BPD/70440/2010 and
PTDC/FER-HFC/30665/2017. The study of VL was supported by the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO),
Mechanisms
project 12O9616N, “Removing the Mind from the Head: A Wittgensteinian Perspective.” The following
Wide Mechanisms of
institutions financed the contribution of the listed authors: MMc: Mary Immaculate College, Limerick; JK:
Mindshaping
University of Exeter; AP: Kozminski University, Warsaw; ŁA: Nicolaus Copernicus University, Toruń.
Emotions and Their
Expressions

Possible Objections
Summary
The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships 
that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. (https://w
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Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Footnotes
This manuscript is partly based on the unpublished report of The European Network for Social Intelligence,
References
SINTELNET (FET Open Coordinated Action FP7-ICT-2009-C Project No. 286370). The authors declare that they
hold the copyright of the SINTELNET report and that no further permission is required for the use of this
material. They also would like to thank David Pearce for the coordination of SINTELNET and proofreading of the
previous version of the manuscript.
Footnotes
1. ^Some authors (Barsalou, 2008, 2016; Pezzulo et al., 2011) reduce the stress put on the role of the body, and prefer to use the more
general term “grounded cognition” in order to emphasize the fact that cognition is grounded, not only in bodily states, but also in
situations, situated simulations, and so forth.
2. ^The embedded view may be considered inconsistent with the extended mind as far as these views do not agree what is the part of a
cognitive system and what is not; a smartphone is not part of a cognitive system for a theorist of situated cognition, while it is literally
part of one’s mind according to the extended mind thesis. But these frameworks are explanatorily equivalent from the mechanistic point
of view, as we argue below. Here, we focus on their explanatory virtues.
3. ^Note that while theorists are free to specify phenomena according to their interest, they may also be wrong (Craver, 2009). For
example, in the 19th century, American psychiatrists would diagnose “drapetomania,” or the desire to break free, as a psychiatric
condition in slaves, while this phenomenon is not a psychiatric condition at all. It was simply a racist construct and causal models of
drapetomania would fail to distinguish the purportedly pathological behavior from rational action because fleeing is rational for anyone
kept in slavery (Pöyhönen, 2013).
4. ^Some analyze the notion of modularity in terms of near-decomposable systems (cf. Callebaut et al., 2005). Note however, that such
notion is much more liberal than Fodor’s (1983) notion of modularity. Fodor’s account is geared towards cognitive phenomena and relies
on such notions as domain specificity, which have no direct counterpart in mechanistic decomposability. Moreover, large-scale brain
networks, partially overlapping and partially dissociable, may exhibit near decomposability to some extent, without being fully modular
in Fodor’s sense. Thus, mechanistic explanation does not imply modularity in Fodor’s sense.
5. ^Moreover, a similar phenomenon may be produced in a different way, for example, using a knife to cut the rope. In complex biological
cases, there may be even several compensatory mechanisms that evolved to produce similar phenomena in the case of damage of a basic
mechanism. However, because a mechanism is specified by its phenomena from the mechanistic point of view, different ways of
achieving even a very similar end would count as different mechanisms. We thank one of the reviewers for requiring more clarity about
this point.
6. ^The issue of delineating boundaries of mechanisms in all possible cases goes far beyond the scope of this paper.
7. ^For further discussion of the explanatory equivalence of both accounts, see (Barker, 2010; Sprevak, 2010). It is argued that there is no
matter of fact that could adjudicate between the two hypotheses.
8. ^If the phenomenon to be explained is considered “the reciprocal influence of agents’ emotional expression,” then one must include all
and only mechanisms relevant for this process, which will include at least two agents. However, if one is interested only in the other
agent’s felt emotions, then the first agent can be treated as the environmental trigger. The causal networks in both cases are different and
depend (partially) on one’s explanatory interest. This is not to say that causation is not objective. What depends on our cognitive
interests is how we specify the phenomena to be explained. Note, however, that some phenomena can be specified falsely, and some
specifications can lead to overly complex or intractable models. There is no mechanism of telekinesis, for example.
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Keywords: embodied cognition, grounded cognition, extended mind, scaffolded mind, enactivism, distributed cognition, mechanistic explanation, wide
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Citation: Miłkowski M, Clowes R, Rucińska Z, Przegalińska A, Zawidzki T, Krueger J, Gies A, McGann M, Afeltowicz Ł, Wachowski W, Stjernberg F,
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Received:and Their
17 April 2018; Accepted: 13 November 2018;
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Published: 06 December 2018.
Possible Objections
Edited by:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Introduction

Mechanisms
Wide Mechanisms of
Mindshaping
Emotions and Their

Expressions
Possible Objections
Summary
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Frontiers - From Wide Cognition To Mechanisms - A Silent Revolution - Psychology

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Frontiers - From Wide Cognition To Mechanisms - A Silent Revolution - Psychology

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Footnotes More on impact ›

Wide Accounts of Cognition

Emotions and Their 

(https://www.frontiersin.org) TOTAL VIEWS

HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY article

From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent

Wide Accounts of Cognition

Embedded and Situated Cognition

From Wide Perspectives to Mechanisms

Providing Guiding Heuristics

Emotions and Their

Accounts of mechanistic explanation have emphasized the importance of looking down—decomposing a

Bottoming Out: The Basic Level of Mechanistic Explanations

Airplane Cockpit as Exemplar Cognitive Mechanism

Silent Mechanistic Revolution

Wide Mechanisms of Mindshaping

Previous Models: Mindreading

Applying a Mechanistic Approach to Mindshaping

Incorporating Culture Into a Wide Mechanism

Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach

Previous Models of Emotion

Incorporating Sociality Into Wide Mechanism of Emotion

Relevance of the Mechanistic Approach

Dynamical, Not Mechanistic

Wide Accounts of Cognition

Anti-representationalism and Anti-computationalism

Conflict of Interest Statement

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