LARGE DISTURBANCE IN CROATIAN
POWER SYSTEM RESULTING IN
TRANSIENT INSTABILITY AND OUTAGES
OF THREE MAJOR THERMAL UNITS
M.Stojsavljević*, D. Nemec*, Š. Radić**, Z.
Čerina**, R. Rubeša**, N. Cvjetković**
*Energy Institute, Croatia
**HEP - Croatian Electricity Utility, Croatia
1. INTRODUCTION
Large disturbances in power systems are usually
triggered by some initial fault and then spread
over the system due to combined effect of many
reasons such as malfunctioning or improper
operation of equipment, human faults, lack of
appropriate information, etc. It is duty of power
system analysts to identify, based on disturbance
analysis results, such weaknesses in power
system operation and to suggest measures to be
taken.
Quality of the disturbance evaluation largely
depends on quality of available records of the
event. Traditionally, the main sources of
information were sequence-of-events records
from data loggers installed at various plants in the
system, complemented with information collected
from operating personnel and records from chart
recorders. Nowadays there is another valuable
source: digital fault recorders, i.e. devices
designed to automatically record various
waveforms (usually instantaneous values of
voltages and currents) and binary signals from the
plant where they are installed. Due to advance of
numerical technology fault recorders are now
widely used and have become a standard feature
of modern numerical protection equipment.
Recorded signals are easily transferred to
standard computers for further analysis.
However, it must be kept in mind that these
devices are primarily intended for recording of
locally measured quantities, during several
seconds or less, and not for the system-wide
monitoring. Also, they are not necessarily time-
synchronised and coordinated so that great care
should be exercised if they are used in
reconstructing sequence-of-events. Having said
that, it must be stressed that fault recorders
generally are great aid and have brought a new
quality to evaluation of disturbances.
Further step in this direction is introducing system-
wide integrated and coordinated monitoring and
protections schemes.
Simulation analysis can be of great help in
understanding development of disturbance under
examination. Sequence of events could be much
easier reconstruced if the system behaviour
before and during the disturbance could be
reproduced by means of a simulation model,
capable of representing at least most important
aspects of the event. Good dynamic simulation
models are prerequisite for succesful simulation
analysis. Matching simulation results against
recordings from the real system is practically the
best way to validate the models. Very often it
appears that some additional fine tuning of
models is necessary. In any case model
limitations should be carefully considered in
judging the credibility of simulation results.
This paper deals with the large disturbance in
Croatian power system that occured on 20th
September 2002 at 00:19:02. The disturbance
was triggered by a three-phase short circuit on a
220 kV transmission line and resulted in transient
instability and tripping of three large thermal units
in the region of Istria and Northern Adriatic. The
process of disturbance evaluation and analysis is
outlined, indicating difficulties encountered and
possible improvements, and the simulation model
is described. Simulation results are compared with
records from the real system, showing how
information from fault recorders enhanced our
understanding of phenomena involved. In
conclusion, some possible improvements and
actions to be taken in order to reduce the
probability of such events are discussed.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF DISTURBANCE
As already mentioned, the disturbance started on
September, 20th 2002 at 00:19:02. According to
the snapshot obtained from the DAM (Dispatcher
Network Analysis System) at the National
Dispatching Centre in Zagreb, the steady state of
Croatian power system at 00:17:28, i.e.
immediately before the disturbance, was as
shown in Fig. 1. Croatian power system is
operating as a part of UCTE interconnection.
Three thermal units were in operation in the Istria
and Northern Adriatic area of Croatian power
system: TPP Rijeka (with 202 MW or 63% of the
unit's rated active power), TPP Plomin 1 (with 108
MW or 90% of its rated MW) and TPP Plomin 2
(with 195 MW or 94% of the unit's rated active
power). Total production of those three units was
505 MW or 53% of total generation in Croatian
system.
Connection of the three above mentioned thermal
units to the power system is shown in Fig. 2.
 FORMIN
CIRKOVCE GENERATION, CONSUMPTION,
UCTE LOSSES AND EXCHANGE
2
Import from SLOVENIA KRŠKO 10
HUNGARY
UCTE
HEVIZ
978.4 MW 22
5 ŠIKLOŠ BiH
75.8 Mvar DIVAČA MRACLIN
20
111 111 735 3 Import from BiH
Export to UCTE 20 125
IL.BIST 20
572.2 MW 124 381 ÐAKOVO 0 MW
6 15 10 Mvar
132.2 Mvar 36
2 4
Exchange Export to BiH
8 3
KOPAR ORAŠJE 94.2 MW
406.3 MW 1 K.VAKUF
-56.4 Mvar 24 24.2 Mvar
GRADAČAC
1 BOSNIA AND Exchange
HERZEGOVINA
(BiH)
-94.2 MW
CROATIA 44 -23.2 Mvar
Generation + Import = Consumption + Losses 11
KONJSKO
958.1 MW 312.1 MW 1234.4 MW 35.4 MW 22 MOSTAR
-79.6 Mvar 269.5 Mvar -296.0 Mvar
11
53.0 Mvar
ZAKUČAC

Figure 1 Totals and tie-line power flows of Croatian power system on 20th September 2002 at
00:17:28, i.e. immediately before the disturbance

TUMBRI 400
ITALY SLOVENIA DIVACA 400
TRIESTE S/S MELINA
DIVACA 220 400kV/220kV / 110 kV
KOPER110 I.BISTRI110
S/S PEHLIN MELINA400
VELEBIT 400
PEHLIN110 MELINA220
LINE 1

CROATIA
LINE 2

BUJE110 MELINA110
MATULJI110

RIJEKA
Istria OPATIJA
LOVRAN110
PAZIN110
POREC110

Europe

TPP PLOMIN 2 TPP RIJEKA

ROVINJ110 1x247 MVA 1x376.5 MVA
RASA110

TPP PLOMIN 1
1x150 MVA
SIJANA110

DOLINKA110

Adriatic Sea

Figure 2 Connection of three thermal units in the Istria and Norhern Adriatic to the power system
During the night of 20th September there was a
heavy thunderstorm that caused many transient
faults on transmission lines in this area and
consequently many repeated operations of distant
protections followed by single-phase automatic
reclosures. Protection operations due to single
line-to-ground were registered also in each of
three phases at transmission lines TPP Rijeka –
S/S Melina 1 and 2 (see Fig.2). At one moment,
due to some unknown reason, the 220 kV line
TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 2 was suddenly
disconnected at the S/S Melina end and the line
remained energized from TPP Rijeka. In such
conditions, and with insulation strength of the air
already reduced because of previous ionisation, a
three-phase short circuit occured on the line, most
probably caused by yet another stroke of
lightning. It should be noticed that the three-phase
fault developed exceptionally quickly as can be
seen from the instantaneous values of currents
and voltages recorded by REL 521 numerical line
protection relay at TPP Rijeka (see fig A-2 in
Appendix). Total fault impedance seen from the
busbars at TPP Rijeka was approximately 2.5
Ohms. The very short transmission line TPP
Rijeka – Melina 2 (6 km) was protected on both
ends by solid-state distance protection relays
(type RAZOA – ASEA) with usual settings of 90%
of the line length (1.705 Ohm) in the first zone.
Since the total fault impedance was greater than
its first-zone setting the relay could not have
operated in the first zone. Also there was no
communication signal sent because the relay at
the opposite end could not detect the fault since
the respective circuit breaker was open and echo
logic is not supported by this type of relay. The
fault was therefore cleared by the operation of
distance protection in the second zone with time
delay of 500 ms so that the total duration of the
fault amounted to 640 ms. That was very severe
disturbance for the system and especially for
nearby generators. All three thermal units in this
area had lost transient stability and went into out-
of-step operation (as detected by means of
simulation). The unit at TPP Plomin 1 was tripped
first (at 1.469 seconds after inception of the fault)
but it could not have been determined which one
of its protections actually caused tripping. Soon
after that (at 1.661 seconds after the occurrence
of the fault) the unit at TPP Rijeka was
disconnected by its loss-of-excitation protection.
Surprisingly, no electrical protections of the TPP
Plomin 2 generator operated and the unit
remained connected and running in out-of-step
condition until it was tripped (at 9.232 seconds
after the inception of the fault) by the protection
against low cooling oil pressure of the coal mill
reductor (as a consequence of lowered voltage at
the unit auxiliaries busbars during the
disturbance).
Due to the fact that the Croatian system was in
parallel operation with the UCTE interconnection
and well connected to it, the system was able to
achieve a new stable steady state in spite of
sudden loss of the three large units with total
production of 505 MW. Unbalance that occurred in
the Croatian power system was at

FORMIN
CIRKOVCE GENERATION, CONSUMPTION,
UCTE LOSSES AND EXCHANGE
3
Import from KRŠKO 10
UCTE SLOVENIA HUNGARY
HEVIZ
1094.4 MW 7
6 ŠIKLOŠ BiH
90.2 Mvar DIVAČA MRACLIN
20
137 137 782 3 Import from BiH
Export to UCTE 30 147
IL.BIST 30
296.1 MW 0 271 ÐAKOVO 0 MW
20 18 0 Mvar
190.0 Mvar 18
9 4
Exchange Export to BiH
14 3
KOPAR ORAŠJE 85.8 MW
798.3 MW 9 K.VAKUF
-99.8 Mvar 21 25.5 Mvar
BOSNIA AND GRADAČAC
0 HERZEGOVINA Exchange
(BiH)

-85.6 MW
CROATIA 41 -25.5 Mvar
Generation + Import = Consumption + Losses 11
KONJSKO
495.2 MW 712.5 MW 1171.5 MW 36.6 MW 20 MOSTAR
11
94.1 Mvar -125.3 Mvar 229.9 Mvar -261.1 Mvar
ZAKUČAC

Figure 3 Totals and tie-line power flows of Croatian power system after loss of three thermal
units with total generation of 505 MW (on 20th September 2002 at 00:30:05)
first moment covered mainly by drawing the
primary regulation reserve from UCTE. During
next couple of minutes several hydro units in the
southern part of the system were started which
helped to restore the balance of Croatian system.
Totals and tie-line interchanges of the Croatian
system at the steady state immediately following
the tripping of the generating units at TPP Rijeka,
TPP Plomin 1 and TPP Plomin 2 are shown in fig
3 (system snapshot was taken by DAM on 20th
September at 00:30:05). At that moment the
Croatian system was still being importing
approximately 400 MW of unscheduled
(emergency) power from the UCTE.
3. ANALYSIS OF DATA RECORDS
The following sources of information were used as
a basis for evaluation of disturbances:
• system configuration and steady state
snapshots taken by DAM at the National
Dispatching Centre in Zagreb
• sequence-of-events lists from TPP Rijeka, TPP
Plomin 1, TPP Plomin 2 and the area control
centre Pehlin
• instantaneous values of currents and voltages
recorded by the following numerical line
protections:
− REL 521 at TPP Rijeka, 220 kV line TPP
Rijeka – Melina 1 (recording only)
− REL 521 at TPP Rijeka, 220 kV line TPP
Rijeka – Melina 2 (recording only)
− REL 531 at TPP Plomin, 220 kV line TPP
Plomin – Melina (recording and protection)
− REL 531 at TPP Plomin, 220 kV line TPP
Plomin – Pehlin (recording and protection)
• report on the disturbance, prepared by Relay
Protection Department, Transmission Area
Opatija,
• distance protection test sheets from Relay
Protection Department, Transmission Area
Opatija,
• report on the disturbance from TPP Rijeka
• relay protection test sheets from TPP Rijeka
• report on the disturbance, prepared by TPP
Plomin 1 and TPP Plomin 2 staff
• relay protection test sheets from TPP Plomin 1
and TPP Plomin 2
• information collected from operating personnel
The sources were compared and analysed in
order to:
1. establish the physical background and
reconstruct the development of the entire
disturbance
2. identify the initial fault
3. determine the nature and estimate severity of
the disturbance
4. determine what aspects of power system
security were endangered / lost
5. review the electrical protection performance
6. review the behaviour of generating units and
their associated control and protection
systems
Unfortunately, the sequence-of-events record
from S/S Melina, the one that would be of great
importance for the analysis, was not available
because of failure of the data logger installed at
that substation. At the start of the analysis it was
even not evident that the line TPP Rijeka – S/S
Melina 2 had been open at the side of S/S Melina
just prior the three-phase fault.
In the course of analysis it became clear that the
further analysis would rely heavily on information
extracted from instantaneous values of currents
and voltages recorded by numerical line
protections. Those records are shown in the
Appendix (fig. A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4) of this
paper. However, use of the records for the
purpose of analysis was not quite straightforward
as will be shown in the further discussion.
Fault disturbance facilities of line protections are
designed for recording of power frequency
transients and not for power swings and similar
slower phenomena. The whole time span of the
disturbance which in this case lasted for nearly 10
seconds (i.e. till tripping of the last generator) was
not recorded by relays as contiguous waveforms.
It was necessary to „patch“ the records in order to
reconstruct the entire period of observation. This
was not easy because the relays were not
synchronised with a common time base. First the
proper time relationship between consecutive
records ("segments“) had to be established for
data recorded by each individual relay. When this
was done for all relays, the completed
("reconstructed") records from different relays
could be time-aligned. The just described
reconstruction process is illustrated by
waveforms recorded by relays in the 220 kV lines
TPP Plomin – S/S Pehlin (two segments, see
App. fig. A-3) and TPP Plomin – S/S Melina (three
segments, see App. fig. A-4).
Once the records were reconstructed and
synchronised the characteristic events such as
occurrence of the fault, clearing the fault and
tripping of the generating units could be marked
on the time axis. Close inspection of current and
voltage waveforms recorded by the relay in the
220 kV line TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 2 shows that
the three-phase short circuit on that line occurred
practically instantaneously in all three phases (see
App. Fig. A-2). Recorded waveforms clearly show
the dynamics of currents and voltages during fault
while their envelopes in the post-fault period
reflect the power swings in the system caused by
pole slips of the generators during their out-of- excitation control systems and turbine governors
step operation. (except large equivalents in the UCTE /
In conclusion, in spite of the aforementioned CENTREL part of the model). The simulation
difficulties the recordings made by numerical line package used for the analysis did not allow
protections were of greatest importance not only representation of protective relaying. Switching
for evaluation of current-voltage relationships actions caused by protection operation were
during the fault but also for the analysis of modelled as forced switchings in the simulation
subsequent power system dynamics. scenario, at exact times of real events taken from
the synchronised sequence-of-event lists.
4. SIMULATION ANALYSIS Initial steady state was first adjusted so as to
The best way to confirm strong indications that the approximately match the pre-fault conditions
observed dynamic behaviour of the system was retrieved from the DAM system at the National
actually caused by out-of-step operation of large Control Centre in Zagreb (output of the state
machines was to simulate the disturbance estimator was used for that purpose). Three-
scenario using a suitable dynamic model and then phase fault at the open end of the 220 kV line
to compare the obtained simulation results with TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 2 was simulated. Fault
recorded quantities from the real system. impedance was determined as the difference
between the total impedance seen during fault by
Simulation analysis was performed using a the numerical line protection in the line bay
standard non-linear multimachine dynamic model
"Melina 2" at TPP Rijeka, and the known line
for stability analysis. The model comprises a impedance.
detailed model of power systems of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina at 400, 220 and 110 kV Some minor corrections of the model needed to
levels, models of power systems of Slovenia, be done after trial simulation runs. After that a
Hungary, Austria, northern Italy at 400 and 220 kV rather good accordance between simulation
levels and an equivalent representation of the results and available recordings from the system
UCTE / CENTREL interconnection also at 400 has been achieved. This comparison helped to
and 220 kV levels. Synchronous machines are finally conclude that the three thermal units had
generally modelled at subtransient level with lost synchronism.

D:\RN\KVAR_2~1\PRE53K1 28-10-2002 08:45:42

150
UPLO 220 (kV)

100
50 mjerenje
measurement
simulacija
simulation
0

1000
IPLO M E (A)

500 mjerenje
measurement
simulacija
simulation
0
2000
measurement
mjerenje
IPLO PE (A)

simulation
simulacija
1000

0
15000
IRIM EL1 (A)

mjerenje
measurement
10000 simulacija
simulation
5000
0
150
URI220 (kV)

100
50 mjerenje
measurement
simulacija
simulation
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
200
sim ul.kut (∞)

T-PL013A
T-PL013B
0
T-RI020A

-200
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
3ph
n a stashort circuit
n a k 3p KS IS K.
3ph 3p KS
fault cleared TPP
IS K.Plomin
T -P L O M1
INtripped
1 TPP
IS K. Rijeka 1 tripped
T -RIJEKA
00:19:02.362 00:19:03.002 timevrijem
(s) e (s) 00:19:03.858 00:19:04.023
t= 0.000 s t= 0.640 s t= 1.496 s t= 1.661 s

Figure 4 Comparison of simulated and recorded characteristic quantities during disturbance

of 20th September 2002, with rotor angle dynamics from the simulation
(T-PL013A=TPP Plomin 1; T-PL013B=TPP Plomin 2; T-RI020A=TPP Rijeka)
 TPP RIJEKA
TE-RIJEKA TPP PLOMIN
TE-PLOMIN 2 2 TPP PLOMIN
TE-PLOMIN 1 1

1 1 1
Ug (pu)

Ug (pu)

Ug (pu)
0.5 0.5 0.5

0 0 0
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
4 4 4
Ig (pu)

Ig (pu)

Ig (pu)
2 2 2

0 0 0
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Ifd (pu)

Ifd (pu)

Ifd (pu)
5 5 5

0 0 0
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
6 6 6
Ufd (pu)

Ufd (pu)

Ufd (pu)
4 4 4
2 2 2
0 0 0
-2 -2 -2
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
2 2 2
1 1 1
Pg (pu)

Pg (pu)

Pg (pu)
0 0 0
-1 -1 -1
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
1 1 1
Qg (pu)

Qg (pu)

Qg (pu)
0 0 0

-1 -1 -1
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
200 200 200
delta (∞)

delta (∞)

0 0 delta (∞) 0

-200 -200 -200

0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
time (s)(s)
vrijeme time (s)(s)
vrijeme time (s)(s)
vrijeme

Figure 5 Variables of generating units at TPP Rijeka, TPP Plomin 1 and TPP Plomin 2
during the disturbance disturbance of 20th September 2002 (simulation results)

A comparison of simulation results with to the synchronous reference axis). Rotor angles
measurements (RMS values) is shown in Fig. 4. clearly shows that the units at TPP Rijeka, TPP
(shown quantities are designated as follows: Plomin 1 and TPP Plomin 2 lost transient stability.
UPLO220 – 220 kV voltage at TPP Plomin; Phase voltages at the 220 kV buses Plomin and
IPLOME – current in the 220 kV line TPP Plomin TPP Rijeka indicate that voltage stability was also
– S/S Melina; IPLOPE – current in the 220 kV line endangered.
TPP Plomin – S/S Pehlin; IRIMEL1 – current in
the 220 kV line TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 1; As can be seen in fig. 4 the units at TPP Rijeka
URI220 – 220 kV voltage at TPP Rijeka). Since and TPP Plomin 1 were disconnected after two
the match between simulation and measurements pole slips while the TPP Plomin 2 unit remained in
was pretty good it allowed us to use simulation asynchronous operation for nearly 9 seconds
model results to estimate response of other (note that only first three seconds are shown in
quantities that had not been recorded, such as Fig. 5). Operation of loss-of-excitation protection
rotor angle of the generatos (Fig. 4 at the bottom) RAGPC (ASEA) at TPP Rijeka was correct and in
or representative variables for all three generators accordance with its settings. The unit at TPP
shown in Fig. 4 (Ug – generator voltage; Pg – Rijeka is not equipped with a separate out-of-step
generator active power; Qg – generator reactive protection but the loss-of-excitation protection is
power; Ig – generator current; Ifd – field current; supposed to detect out-of-step conditions.
Ufd – field voltage, delta – rotor angle with respect
 D:\RN\KVAR_2~1\PRE53K1 28-10-2002 08:45:42: Tk3=640 ms D:\RN\KVAR_2~1\PRE53K4 28-10-2002 11:36:10: Tk=150 ms
200 50

40
150 TPP RIJEKA
30
(°)

TPP PLOMIN 2

rotor angle deviations (°)

100
deviations

20
TPP PLOMIN 1

odstupanje kutova (∞)

50
10
odst.kuta (∞)

0 0
rotor angle

-10
-50
-20
-100
-30
-150
-40

-200 -50
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
time (s) (s)
vrijeme time (s) (s)
vrijeme

Figure 6 Rotor angle deviations w.r.t. synchronous axis for the case of simulated real fault with duration
of 640 ms (left), and for the same type of fault but with duration of 150 ms (right)

D:\RN\KVAR_2~1\PRE53K2 28-10-2002 09:34:07 D:\RN\KVAR_2~1\PRE53K5 28-10-2002 11:33:14

350 350

300 300
rotor angle deviations (°)

rotor angle deviations (°)

250 250
odstupanja kutova (∞)

odstupanja kutova (∞)

200 200
TPP RIJEKA
TPP RIJEKA
150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0

-50 -50

-100 -100

-150 -150

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

vrijeme (s) vrijeme (s)

time (s) time (s)

Figure 7 Rotor angle deviations w.r.t. synchronous axis for critical clearing time of three-phase short
circuit for the same initial steady state, type and location of fault as during disturbance of 20th
September 2002

Once validated, the simulation model could be time (CCT) equal to 445 ms is shown in fig. 7
used for simulation of alternative scenarios. First (left), while for the fault clearing time of 450 ms
of them to be simulated was the scenario with the unit at TPP Rijeka becomes unstable (fig. 7,
distance protection on the line TPP Rijeka – S/S right) and, by definition, transient stability of
Melina 2 operating in the first zone. Total fault Croatian system is not preserved. It follows that
duration in this case was set to 150 ms. In the for this specific case the second-zone time delay
sequel the critical clearing time was determined of the distance protection should have been
for the pre-fault configuration and steady state of reduced from 500 to 300 ms in order to avoid
Croatian system. transient instability. But requirement for time
coordination with circuit breaker failure protection
Rotor angle dynamics for all generators in the
(1st step: 150 ms; 2nd step: 300 ms) inhibits
model is comparatively shown for the fault
reducing second zone time delay of the distance
duration of 150 ms (fig. 6 on the right) and for the
protection to 300 ms. Other way to solve the
fault duration of 640 ms (fig. 6 on the left). As
problem is to protect these short transmission
expected, transient stability would have been
lines with line differential protection and this was
preserved had the distance protection operated in
chosen as final solution.
the first zone with assumed clearing time of 150
ms.
The next step was to determine the critical
clearing time (CCT) for the case of three-phase
fault and given initial power system conditions.
Rotor angles dynamics for the critical clearing
 existing data loggers and fault recorders are
5. CONCLUSION further issues to be addressed in the future.
Simulation models are powerful tools that could
In the large disturbance described in this paper greatly enhance our understanding of complex
Croatian power system lost transient stability and system behaviour but they need to be
was endangered from the voltage stability point of premanently improved. Feedback from field
view. measurements and recordings of system events
After disconnection of generators that had lost should be more extensively used for validation
stability the system fortunately attained a new and refinment of models.
stable state. This was possible mostly due to the
fact that this area is well connected to the rest of
Croatian power system and Croatian system itself
was operating as a part of the large UCTE
interconnection with which it was also well
connected.
Although no loss of supply occurred it should be
stressed again that this disturbance was very
severe one for the system and extremely stressful
to nearby generating units. The initial fault itself
was practically ideal three-phase short circuit
caused by atmospheric discharge. This case
shows that even very unlikely faults may
sometimes happen.
From the point of view of operational security of
the system, the critical three-phase fault lasted
much too long. Strictly speaking, the distance
protection on the faulted line operated correctly
but it is obviously inadequate for protection of
such a short line. Reducing its second-zone time
delay perhaps would have prevented loss of
stability in this particular case but should not be
done without careful assesment of potentially
detrimental effects. Finally, it was recommended
to install longitudinal differential protection in
those two short lines. This was done within next
few months and the differential protection is now
installed and is in test operation mode.
This case has clearly shown that additional care
should be put into protection coordination,
particularly when lines connecting generating
units to the system are concerned. Performance
of the unit protection at TPP Plomin 2 was
unsatisfactory from both unit's and system points
of view and should be thoroughly revised,
particularly regarding coordination with network
protections. In addition, on basis of this
disturbance analysis it was recommended that
out-of-step protection and disturbance recorders
should be installed at all three generating units
(TPP Rijeka, TPP Plomin 1 and TPP Plomin 2).
Another conclusion is that high quality records of
transients in the system are prerequisite for high
quality of disturbance evaluation. Wider use of
recording facilities in numerical protections is
already an important step in that direction but the
aim should be development of a coordinated and
integrated system-wide monitoring scheme, based
on dedicated disturbance recorders strategically
placed at power plants and major substations.
Security of supply and time synchronisation of
APPENDIX Current and voltage waveforms recorded by numerical line protections
(instantaneous values, coordinated and time-aligned)

Trenutne
Phase currents vrijednosti
and voltages faznih
recorded by velicina iz REL
the protection REL521
521 DV I TE
in the line Rijeka-Melina
TPP Rijeka – Melina 1
200
UR (kV)

0
-200

20000
IR (A)

0
-20000

200
US (kV)

0
-200

20000
IS (A)

0
-20000

200
UT (kV)

0
-200

20000
IT (A)

0
-20000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
nasshort
3ph tanak circuit
3pKS I SK.
3ph 3pKS
fault cleared time (s)
vrijeme (s) I SK. Plomin
TPP T-PLO MI
1N 1
tripped I SK. Rijeka
TPP T-R I J EKA
1 tripped
00: 19:02. 362 00: 19:03. 002 00:19: 03.858 00: 19:04. 023

Figure A-1 Current and voltage waveforms recorded by the line protection at 220 kV transmission line
TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 1 (at TPP Rijeka)

Phase currents and voltages

Trenutne recorded
vrijednosti by the
faznih protection
velicina iz REL REL 521II in
521 DV TEthe line TPP Rijeka – Melina 2
Rijeka-Melina
200
UR (kV)

0
-200
x 104
2
IR (A)

0
-2

200
US (kV)

0
-200
x 104
2
IS (A)

0
-2

200
UT (kV)

0
-200

20000
IT (A)

0
-20000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
3ph short circuit
nas tanak 3pKS time (s)(s)
vrijeme I SK.fault
3ph 3pKS cleared
00: 19: 02.362 00: 19: 03.002

Figure A-2 Current and voltage waveforms recorded by the line protection at 220 kV transmission line
TPP Rijeka – S/S Melina 2 (at TPP Rijeka)
 Phase currents and voltages
Trenutnerecorded
vrijednostiby the protection
faznih REL531
veli“ ina iz REL 531 atPlomin-Pehlin
DV the line TPP Plomin – Pehlin
200

UR (kV)
0
-200
2000
IR (A)

0
-2000
200
US (kV)

0
-200
2000
IS (A)

0
-2000
200
UT (kV)

0
-200
2000
IT (A)

0
-2000
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
ISK.
3ph 3pKS
fault cleared ISK.Plomin
TPP T-PLOMIN
1 trip1 TPP
ISK.Rijeka
T-RIJEKA
1 tripped time (s) (s)
vrijeme
00:19:03.002 00:19:03.858 00:19:04.023

Figure A-3 Current and voltage waveforms recorded by line protection at 220 kV transmission line
TPP Plomin – S/S Pehlin (at TPP Plomin)

Phase currents and voltages

Trenutnerecorded byfaznih
vrijednosti the protection
veli“ ina izREL
REL531
531atDV
thePlom
line in-M
TPPelina
Plomin – Melina
200
UR (kV)

0
-200
2000
IR (A)

-2000
200
US (kV)

0
-200
2000
IS (A)

-2000
200
UT (kV)

0
-200

2000
IT (A)

-2000
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
nas tanak
3ph 3pKS
short circuit ISK.
3ph 3pKS
fault cleared ISK.Plomin
TPP T-PLOMIN
1 trip1 TPP
ISK.Rijeka
T-R IJ 1
EKA
tripped vrijeme (s)
time (s)
00:19:02.362 00:19:03.002 00:19:03.858 00:19:04.023

Figure A-4 Current and voltage waveforms recorded by line protection at 220 kV transmission line
TPP Plomin – S/S Melina (at TPP Plomin)