REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: PROSPECT FOR CLOSER COOPERATION

BETWEEN WEST, EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA•

By

Victor A.O. Adetula, PhD

Centre for Development Studies
University of Jos
PMB 2084,
Jos,
NIGERIA.

•
Paper presented at the meeting of IDASA/FREDSKORPSET Research Exchange Programme -
Governance and Democracy, holding at Parktonian Hotel 120 De Korte Street, Braamfontein,
Johannesburg, South Africa, May 2 - 4, 2004.
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: PROSPECT FOR CLOSER COOPERATION
BETWEEN WEST, EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

Introduction

During the struggle for political independence in many African countries continental unity and
regional cooperation was acknowledged as a strategy for combating foreign dependence and
underdevelopment. In post colonial Africa, motives for regional cooperation include broad
economic, social and political interests, and the need for greater international bargaining power.
Today it is very rare to find one Africa country that has not shown overt interest in at least one of
the several existing regional cooperation schemes on the continent. It is significant to note that
Africa alone, within the past four decades, has experimented with about 200 inter-governmental
organizations; most of them claim to have responsibility for promoting regional cooperation.
(See Table 1). The practical results, however, have been very disappointing. But African
governments have continued to promote the ideals of regional cooperation which they justified
on the claim that regional cooperation is a strategy for self-reliance and development. In this
paper l undertake a descriptive analysis of the paths taken by countries in sub-Sahara Africa to
bring about regional integration, examine critically the theoretical foundation and historical
context of the various efforts at regional integration, and also briefly examine some recent
initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development and the African Union (AU) to
determine the prospect for closer cooperation between West, East and Southern Africa.
Conceptually, l take the process of regional integration as a dialectical unity of social,
economic and political processes (see Cocks, 1980), and argue that the Pan-African
consciousness which spread across the continent in the 1950s provided the necessary background
condition for the evolution of modern regional integration process in Africa. African integration
process however suffered a setback in the 1960s due to a betrayal of Pan-Africanism by the
power elites. As a result many African countries abandoned regional integration to pursue
development as fragmented national projects, and this has made regional integration very
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difficult in the region. I conclude that regional integration is still very relevant to the
developmental needs of the peoples of Africa. However, regional integration has to be re-defined
with serious consideration to reviving Pan-African consciousness and broad involvement of the
African peoples in the processes of regional integration.

Conceptual and Theoretical Foundation of Regional Integration

The term ‘rregion’ can be used to describe any international grouping which is less than global in
scope, and which is characterized by some mutual relevance among members. Such mutual
relevance can be based upon frequency of contacts and transactions, common aims or attributes,
economic complementarity, etc. Used in this sense, the Alliance of Seventy-Seven and the
African, Pacific and Caribbean Group (ACP), are both qualified for a description as regional
groupings, even though both have membership that span more than one geographical regions.
The experience of the North (especially Europe) at integration process for long concealed
the limitations of the traditional approaches to regional integration. On the other hand the evident
failure of integration efforts in the South is has provoked a rethinking among integration scholars
on a number of highly restrictive assumptions in some of the theories of regional integration. For
example, some of the formulations by the dependency theorists on regional integration are now
known to be having limited bearing on the evaluation of gains from integration in the less
developed societies. These developments call for in-depth theoretical treatment of the evolution
and dynamics of regional integration initiatives in Africa.
The concept of integration is elusive to define. In a simple sense it means bringing parts
or units together to form a whole or creating interdependence. It could also represent a situation
in which states becomes interdependent in whatever aspects of their relations they desire.
Nonetheless, integration can be said to exist when units join together in order to satisfy
objectives which they cannot meet autonomously. In this way, integration can be a process which
hastens up the achievement of certain objectives in the interest of a larger body. Such a process
would involve the shifting of loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and

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larger centre whose institutions and processes demand some justification over those of the
national states. The extent of such a transfer of loyalties and jurisdiction enjoyed by the new
centre would depend on the level and goals of integration schemes as well as the socio-economic
and political ramifications which the implementations of integrative policies generate within and
between the integrating units.
Another level of classification is possible; the one which considers the specific meanings
of ‘integration’ from the perspectives of different disciplines. Thus there can be political
integration, social integration, and economic integration. Although, the concept of economic
integration has dominated the discourse on African regional integration yet it is often wrongly
conceptualized. For instance, economic integration has often been defined in terms of
liberalization or absence of economic discrimination among economic units. This can be
misleading especially for the less developed regions. The conception of economic integration as
the progressive elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders shows it
as a state of affairs and a process. And upon this restrictive notion of regional integration, many
self-styled common markets, federations, unions and communities have emerged without
promoting regional integration among members or even showing the potentials to do so. In all
these, there is unanimity among scholars of economic integration on one question: that
integration can be regarded as processes or as a state of affairs reached by that process.
According to Fritz Machlup, the question as to whether that state has to be the terminal point or
intermediate point in the process can be taken care of by distinguishing between ‘complete’ and
‘incomplete’ integration. The more difficult question, according to the author is: what is that to
be integrated; people, geographical areas, markets, production, goods, resources, policies, or
what? (Machlup, 1976, 63).
Although ‘integration’ and ‘cooperation’ have been used interchangeably by integration
scholars, there is a fundamental difference between the two. The difference is both in qualitative
and quantitative contexts. While ‘cooperation’ may be employed to identify loose forms of
interstate activity designed to meet some commonly experienced needs, ‘integration’ refers to a

4
much more formal arrangement that involves some political and economic sacrifices as well as
commitments, concessions, processes and political will to redefine participation in the
international economy (see Axline, 1977; Ihonvbere, 1981). In this regard regional cooperation
may be a phase in the process of regional integration.
In the context of less developed areas, regional integration is an extremely complicated
and varied phenomenon which is conditioned by socio-economic and political dynamics
different from what obtain in the North. The following questions have therefore become
prominent in the discourse about regional integration in Africa: what are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for successful unions among states? Should regional political unions be
approached gradually and indirectly by functionalist strategy or is federation likely to be more
effective? Are customs unions preferable? As many as there are such questions are types of
regional integration in Africa whose philosophical guide derives mostly from the experience of
the industrial societies. It is to be noted however that each of these forms of integration
arrangements has its own regularities, class content, and mechanism of operation.
The concepts of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘south-south cooperation’, with the obvious policy
corollary of regional integration and cooperation have featured prominently in the analyses of
less developed societies, including the African continent. A common assumption especially
among dependency theorists is that the potentials of the less developed countries for autonomous
development are limited, more by externally infused dependency profiles, rather than internal
processes. It thus follows logically that, autocentric development can be realized through
disengagement from the global system. This prescription would result in some dislocation of the
national economy since trade, aid and investment relations with the metropolis are expected to be
reviewed. The impact of these dislocations is assumed to be too much for individual economies
to bear, hence the need for a collective action to “ameliorate the effects of the national
disengagement process by replacing North-South vertical relations with South-South horizontal
relations among UDCs” (Abutudu, 1988, 38). In this way collective self-reliance represents a
strategy against dependence on external resources aimed at promoting the principles of

5
autonomous development. This is the context in which CSR and regional integration among less
developed countries is seen in some circles as one and the same. However, the argument about
regional economic cooperation as a form of collective-reliance cannot be carried too far.
According to Musa Abutudu (1988) , “When the integration process is itself shaped and
conditioned by relations of dependence and underdevelopment, what ensures might in fact create
a gap between economic integration and CSR” (Ibid, 1988, 38).
The problem with the prescription of the apologists of CSR is its failure to give serious
systemic attention to the relationship between CSR and integration schemes in the less developed
regions. The focus of analysis is on relations between systems while its neglects the internal
processes of class formation that shape historical developments. For instance, when adopted as
framework for analyzing crisis of development in Africa, it becomes more difficult to understand
the causes of underdevelopment beyond the effects of Europe’s predatory needs. In terms of
policy prescription, self-reliance is to be pursued through the policies of import-substitution,
export-substitution, export promotion, favourable balance of payment-strategies that do not in
any way address the structural problems of underdevelopment and dependency. In this way what
apologists of CSR have suggested, through its advocacy of mere reforms within the global
capitalist system expressed in some forms of ‘dependent’ regional integration, amounts to
nothing but autarky, and definitely not ‘delinking’ in the form of subordinating external
relations to the logic of internal development.
The United Nations Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) and the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) exerted greater influence on the evolution of many integration schemes in
Africa. Both had advocated for collective self-reliance which unfortunately did not transcend
strategies that was only able to promote dependent regionalism in Africa. From the Lagos Plan
of Action (LPA) to the Abuja Treaty the consensus of African leaders on collective self-reliance
is easily revealed. However, the consequence of pursuing collective self-reliance within the
framework of ECA/OAU propositions was the proliferation of several inter-governmental
organizations, which have the mandate to promote collective self-reliance but could not deliver

6
on the same objective. The existing OAU/ECA economic groupings to date have not
demonstrated the unity of processes of economic, political and social integration that is required
for the promotion of regional integration. Many have pursued regional integration as strictly
‘economic agenda’ or ‘tariff matter’ which leaves out some critical issues such as the
commitment of the African peoples (as distinct from the elites) in the various social
organizations, the role of the civil society (as distinct from the state), the crucial role of the state
in realizing the goals of integration, especially with regard to initiating policies, and
implementing them effectively and efficiently, and the direction of social struggles at national,
sub-regional, regional, and global levels.
Also, it is important to note the historical context of regional integration in Africa. This
consideration must reveal the nature and contact between Africa and imperialism, the
consequences of this contact, neo-colonial alignment and re-alignment of social forces, the state,
and the structural integration of the continent into metropolitan dominated world capitalist
system. It is in this regard that regional integration can be appreciated as an effective political
weapon. In addition, the strategy for promoting regional integration must necessarily consider
reviving Pan-Africanist consciousness on the continent through which the larger community of
African peoples in their different social categories and their social institutions can be mobilize
for support.

Pan-Africanism, African Unity and Regional Integration

Speaking at the First Pan-African Conference on Reparations, held in Abuja, Nigeria,
Ambassador Dudley Thompson of Jamaica admitted that:
It is very difficult, if at all possible to give a clear and exact definition of Pan-
Africanism. It means different things to different people. To some it should be
confined to the continent; to others, it is a hazy emotional dream embodying
resentment against those institutions of inequality which exist; yet to others it is a
cry of racial pride emphasizing negritude, but in all its complexity, one can
discern a hard core which is a common factor. This hard core includes the
intellectual, political and economic cooperation that should lead to the political

7
 unity of all Africa. In short, it stands for the economic, technological, social and
political advancement and modernization of Africa and the diaspora, and rejects
all forms of racial prejudice against black people (1993).

The merit of the debate about “a clear and exact” definition of Pan-Africanism is far less
important to the discussion here than the fact that there are dimensions of Pan-Africanism, and
also that Pan-Africanism has passed through many phases before its present phase or where it is
being celebrated as ‘the reparation movement’. Ali Mazrui, a leading Africanist scholar, has
identified five dimensions or levels of Pan-Africanism – sub-Saharan, trans-Saharan, trans-
Atlantic, West Hemispheric and global (1977, 68). Three phases of Pan-Africanism in Africa is
noted here for the purpose of analysis: the colonial phase up to 1957; the independence phase
from 1957 to the 1960s, and the post - independence phase, which is the period since the1970s to
date. However, for the concern in this paper, the dimension or level of Pan-Africanism that is
most relevant is that which seeks and emphasises the unity and solidarity of Africans and African
countries. It has been suggested that this dimension of Pan-Africanism has great potentials for
economic rewards (Mazrui, 1977,75) and overall development of the continent of Africa . Take
for example, the establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC) raised some hope
within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) circles about the prospect of an African
common market. Also, the inauguration of the African Union has been celebrated in many circles
as a new dawn and a programme of re-disrecovery for Africa. Regrettably, however, the pursuit
of Pan-Africanism as an integrative force either at continental or sub-regional level has been less
successful. Why? The West African sub-region is an early beneficiary of the influence of trans-
Atlantic Pan-Africanism as a movement of ideas and emotions. Much in this regard can be
attributed to the efforts of black Pan-Africanists in Diaspora. The experience of West Africa
provides some useful insights about the early pan-African consciousness on the continent.
As early as 1920s in West Africa some semblance of Pan-African consciousness was
discernible. Some movements had emerged in West Africa, whose activities were promoting the
ideals of Pan-Africanism. The period witnessed the formation of a British West African

8
University, a West African Press Union and a British West African Co-operative Association. It
was also during this period that the West African Student Union was formed. It was a matter of
historical fact that these movements showed overt commitment to the ideals of Pan-Africanism
and African unity. However, these were most popular for their anti-colonial dispositions, and
which, of course, were pursued as part of the quest for pan-African unity.
The pursuit of Pan-Africanism as a movement of liberation in the 1950s helped in
promoting awareness about the essence of ‘African unity’. Among all African leaders there was
consensus on the need to promote the unity of African countries towards the total liberation of
Africa. However, the movement towards African unity was evidently characterized by
differences among African leaders. Although there were disagreements on such issues as the
recognition of Algeria and the Congo crisis, only on the matter of the right approach to African
unity were the views of African power elite irreconcilable. Radical leaders like Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana and Sekou Toure of Guinea advocated for political unification of the African
continent as a strategic variable, in the struggle for the cultural and social development of the
African peoples. The Pan-Africanist stand of Kwame Nkrumah constituted a serious reproach to
the zeal of the more moderate leaders in the continent, whose vision of African unity was largely
influenced by functionalist assumptions and propositions; that the unity of African states could
only be achieved through a gradual and functional integration of the continent which must start
at sub-regional levels. The victory of the ‘moderates' at Addis Ababa in May 1963, when the
Charter of the Organization of African unity (OAU) was signed, was seen by the ‘radicals' as a
retreat for pan-African consciousness.

The establishment of the OAU in 1963 represents the consolidation of the gradualist
approach to African unity as well as the broad issue of African development. The role of the
Economic Commission of Africa in the promotion of regional integration in Africa is well
documented in the literature on African development, and therefore should not detain us here. It
is however worthy of note that many African countries that favoured the OAU’s gradualist
approach to African unity easily became disciples of the ECA, especially on the latter’s gospel of
9
self-reliance and autonomous growth through the formation of sub-regional economic groupings.
The debate on the convergence or gap between the OAU‘s gradualist strategy for African unity
and the ECA’s prescriptions for African development is outside the scope of this paper. It is
however sufficient to point out that both institution found enough reasons to want to work
together towards promoting African development.

The ECA indeed invested so much in educating African leaders about the need for
effective economic grouping. It sponsored series of meetings throughout Africa to raise
enthusiasm for the building of viable economic groupings in each of the four sub-region of
Africa. In the West Africa, the movement toward ‘West African Unity’ as well as its institutional
expression in the formation of an all-embracing and broad based West African Community was
soon replaced by movements for the formation of regional and inter-state groupings. Historically
one would have expected the West African sub-region because of the early exposure of its elite
to the ideal of Pan-Africanism would emerge as a model for other sub-regions in the continent.
The assumption here is that successful sub-regional integration schemes will serve as the
building blocks for continental integration. But with the retreat of pan-African consciousness
among African power elites just before the establishment of the OAU, the integrative component
of Pan-Africanism suffered. The concern for national development within their individual
borders seized most of the newly independent states and the pursuit of separate development
plans and fragmented projects became more fashionable. Even though there are today many sub-
regional integration schemes in Africa, their visions and missions are still restricted to the pursuit
of goals of national development. As expected this has continued to generate conflicts among
members of sub-regional groupings, especially over gains and rewards.

Overview of Sub-Regional Groupings in Africa

The Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) is the earliest apostle of regional cooperation in
Africa. The ECA had perceived the internal markets in Africa as generally too small and
10
therefore a constraint on industrialization and development. Consequently, the creation of an
effective regional market was strongly advocated. The ECA had its understanding of the
problems of economic development in the region. Right from its inception, the ECA considered
the fragramented political geography of Africa as a serious impediment to the realization of its
development goals. Therefore economic cooperation and regional integration among African
states was encouraged. Within this context African countries were expected to establish or
strengthen their multi-national institutional machinery to facilitate discussions and decisions on
common policies and projects. However, the idea of an immediate regional market, embracing
all African countries that care to belong was considered impractical. Thus, promoting economic
cooperation on sub-continental scale became an essential element of the ECA’s approach. Until
the 1960s, the ECA concentrated on the establishment of sub-regional institutional arrangements.
However, by the end of the 1960s the ECA for Africa had shifted emphasis toward providing
direct assistance to the existing economic groupings in Africa.
The idea of building economic links among African countries was equally accorded some
prominence by the OAU. For instance, a proposal for a continental common market featured at
the African Heads of State Meeting in Addis Ababa in May, 1963. The Secretariat of the ECA
was quite forthcoming, providing the OAU with necessary technical details (see Background
Paper on the Establishment of an African Common Market, ECN.14/STC/20, 1963 and Intra-
African Trade, E/CN.14/STC/20. Add.1). The collaboration between the OAU and ECA
especially from the late 1970s ushered in a new phase of regional cooperation in Africa. This
phase witnessed the adoption of the Monrovia Colloquium in 1979, and the Lagos Plan of Act
(LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FLA) in 1980. These processes culminated in the signing of
the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community in 1991. In all these initiatives the need
for the development of sub-regional economic groupings was acknowledged usually in very
colourful language.
The Lagos Plan o f Action is easily a point of departure in the discourse on responses to
the crisis of African development in general. The LPA and FAL were adopted as blue-prints for

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the economic and political development of Africa by the Assembly of Head of State and
Government of the OAU in April 1980. The Plan envisaged the formation of an African
common market by the year 2000 which was to be achieved in stages: first the formation of free
trade areas, and then later a common market and an economic union. The same process was to be
followed in the three sub-regions identified by the Plan: Eastern and Southern Africa, Central
Africa, and West Africa. It was possible that the Plan led to the establishment of the Preferential
Trade Area (PTA) in Eastern and Southern Africa, transformed to the Common Market of
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1993. In the West Africa sub-region the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) predated the Plan; it has been in existence since
1975. The LPA has been referred to as “the first comprehensive continent-wide formulation and
articulation of the preferred long-term economic and development objectives of Africa
countries” (Browne and Cummings, 1984, 7).
In its examination of the continent’s economic problems, the LPA attributed Africa’s
underdevelopment to close integration of African economies into the highly unstable capitalist
system (OAU, 1981). The essence of the Plan was its commitment to collective self-reliance and
self-sustaining development through the strengthening of sectoral integration at the national, sub
regional and regional levels, particularly in the fields of agriculture, transport and
communications, industry and energy (OAU, 1981). Although the Plan and Final Act of Lagos
were applauded as efforts of African leaders at reassessing Africa’s location and role in the
world system, the basic assumptions in the documents raise some questions on the efficacy of the
prescribed solutions. Firstly, within the framework of the Plan, the goal of collective self-
reliance was to be pursued within prevalent domestic and international social relations of
production and mode of production: the self-reliant growth and development desired within the
context of the plan posed no threat to both the socio-economic institutions and structures in the
various African countries and also in the international system. However, it was observed that it
would be “impossible to build self-reliance, meet basic human needs and effectively replace
dependence with interdependence without first of all dismantle all the oppressive and

12
exploitative structures within African states” (Ihonvbere, 1989,20). As expected, the goal of self-
reliance would be elusive as long as the strategies recommended in the Plan and Final Act were
silent on the issues of waste, corruption, mismanagement and the long standing habit of reliance
on foreign aid which till today are characterizing features of African economies.
The second point against the Plan relates to the deliberate silence on the issues of politics
in the society. Since the Plan was predominantly protective of the interests of the dominant social
forces in Africa, therefore it logically could not raise questions about inequalities in the
distribution of incomes and services. Also, the assumption that all Africans have equal
commitment to self-reliance and option of disengagement from the international capitalist system
was misleading. In actual fact the logic behind State policies in many African countries has
always emphasised further incorporation into global capitalism. Also, the PLA’s
recommendation that member states should cultivate the habit of self-reliance without explaining
how Africa’s reliance on massive transfer of resource from the industrialised countries could be
effectively reduced was at best a misguide. Given the depth of these contradictions, it was
difficult to expect the Plan to attain the goal of transforming African economies through
increased regional economic cooperation.
The catalogue of problems of regional integration in Africa in spite of the Plan is a matter
of concern here. Some cases are worth noting. By 1979, the East African Community (EAC I)
had disintegrated. Its reconstituting and revival led to EAC II. The East African Community has
its roots in a colonial-era administrative federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It is worth
knowing that regionalism has been a stronger force in East African politics than in many other
parts of Africa. Political integration is now among EAC II stated goals and its institutions
include a regional high court and parliament. The Common Market of Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) began as preferential trade area in 1981. It was reorganized in 1994 to
provide phased-in free trade and uniform commercial law. COMESA also sponsors a
development bank, banking and insurance institutions, and a court of justice that (unlike many
other African regional courts) has actually adjudicated cases.

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 It the establishment of a rival regional scheme – Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC) - was alleged to be the cause of diversions of attention and
resources from COMESA. The proposal for a merger plan between PTA and SADCC delayed
and was never realized due to politics rather than economic priorities and necessities (see West
Africa 1-7 March, 1993, p. 333). The South African Development Community (SADC) consists
of fourteen Southern African states. Until 1994 when South Africa became a member following
its first multi-racial elections, the original ten member states that made up its membership were
committed to regional cooperation as a way of reducing their collective and individual
dependence on South Africa. However, the major shortcoming of SADC is its confidence in the
goodwill of the West as well as its dependence on Euro-American capital. For instance, at the
2002 Annual Summit of SADC, the foreign ministers of member-states still called on the
international community to assist with emergency relief in the form of foodstuffs, debt
cancellation, and fairer trade and market access for developing countries.
The Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC) was founded in 1981. It
was not fully operational until 1998 due to lack of funds. The CEEAC countries are approaching
regional integration in phases, beginning with an attempt at promoting free trade among
members. They have also created a number of technical and development institutions. The
Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CENSAD), created in 1998, consists of 18 countries in
the Maghreb, the Sahel and the horn of Africa. Its membership includes Nigeria and Egypt, and
originally there was such thinking that CENSAD is a potential bridge between sub-Saharan
Africa and the Middle East. However, in practice, the most influential members like Egypt and
Nigeria have not shown much interest as active participants.
Most of the sub-regional integration schemes in Africa accord special prominence to
trade liberalization. But achievement in this area is still very modest as foreign capital often
reaps the gains arising from liberalising trade. Andrew Axline reminds us that transnational
corporations (TNCs) are capable under dependent regional schemes of serving as mechanism to
polarise the effects of the gains within the regions and also to “transfer the benefits out of the

14
region to the metropolitan economy through the channel of their vertical integration with the
parent company” (1979, 24). Also S. K. B Asante posits that TNCs “have used the markets
created under inter-governmental economic groups…, as a means of promoting the
merchandising of their international brands and other products which sometimes result in a
negative impact on the socio-development process” (1984).
The Economic Community of West Africa (Communuate Economicque de l’ Afrique de
l’ Oust, CEAO) was established in 1973. It was an exclusively francophone economic grouping
made up of Coted’Ivoire, Senegal, Niger, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali and Maitania. The
formation of CEAO was partly French- inspired, borne out of the desire to check Nigeria’s
growing influence in West Africa, especially the attempt toward organizing a pan-West African
economic community of Anglophone and francophone countries. It was not impossible that
Nigeria had political motivation for floating a much broader regional scheme. But it was
doubtful if CEAO had prospect for successful regional cooperation in West Africa than all-
embracing arrange as ECOWAS represents. Peter Robson indeed argued that CEAO was too
small to wield much influence or even to “exercise any considerable bargaining power in the
international sphere” (Also, the combined domestic market of CEAO countries was “far too
small to permit low-cost production in a large number of industrial activities” (1983, 36). On the
other hand, compared to ECOWAS, CEAO was reported to had faired better in the area of trade
cooperation (World Bank, 1989, 149). Notwithstanding, the operations of CEAO revealed the
dangerous effects of dependence on international finance capital. Most of the large and medium
enterprises in the CEAO countries were affiliated to foreign corporations. (Asante, 1984). Also,
besides dominating the manufacturing sector in CEAO countries, distribution and other services
had witnessed the dominance of foreign-owned enterprises whose activities were hardly
restricted in the community (Robson, 1983, 41).
The capacity of the TNCs to ensure inequitable distribution of costs and benefits of
interaction among member states of integration scheme is evident in UDEAC. Asante indeed,
also observed that transnational linkages exist between foreign capital and local political and

15
economic elites and which are to the detriment of the majority of the people (Asante, 1984).
Whereas the claim that the “unconstructive” and “disintegrative” activities of the TNCs impede
industrial development in the region is valid, nevertheless the main problem derives from the
failure of the member states of UDEAC to agree on programmes of planned regional
specialization. In this way the TNCs are merely responding opportunistically to this lack of a
coherent regional industrialization strategy (Robson, 1983, 36).
The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) is large. Its sixteen
member countries1 include seven countries, which belonged to the CEAO, and three countries,
which are in the Mano River Union. In 1994 the Union Economic Monetaire Ouest Africain was
formed (UEMOA) to replace CEAO. Modeled as a custom union, ECOWAS Treaty and
Protocol provide a plethora of integrative instruments in form of several monetary, fiscal,
administrative, institutional and legal measures. However, these integrative instruments are not
functioning effectively due largely to some structural constraints. It is sufficient to say that most
of ECOWAS problems are traceable to its internal contradictions, structures, rivalries and mutual
distrust. These have continued to divert attention from such fundamental issues as ensuring that
provisions of the Treaty and protocols are implemented. The proliferation of sub-regional
groupings in Africa has not helped matters. Adebayo Adedeji says the spirit of the Final Act of
Lagos has been permanently breached. His words:
The raison d' etre for its stage-by-stage approach beginning with subregional
economic groupings is to nurse the emergence of one major subregional RIA in
each subregion around which all the others will be rationalised. The proliferation
of RIAs, which developed in the 1960s has remained unabated. No doubt, the
situation is worse in West Africa than elsewhere but proliferation has crept in
everywhere (2002).

1
Until recently when Mauritania quit ECOWAS, there were sixteen member-states of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

16
At one stage there were efforts to rationalize some of the groupings in the West African sub-
region and have ECOWAS as the only RIA (regional integration arrangement) in West Africa -
thus absorbing CEAO and MRU. The new revised treaty makes provision for ECOWAS to
become the only economic community organization for West Africa. But this dream is still far
from being realized. The CEAO was dissolved in March 1994 and UMOA was immediately
transformed into UEMOA. This has not made the process of regional integration any way easy in
West Africa. ECOWAS is not alone in its experience. Proliferation also exists in Central Africa,
and Eastern and Southern Africa. In this connection, the influence of external forces cannot be
ignored, especially their antagonistic effects on the operations of ECOWAS.
With its intervention Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOWAS has come to be associated with
regional security with testimonies of its new role in Liberia and Sierra Leone. This model is also
seen in the Southern Africa. The member states of SADC recently approved a treaty establishing
a standby peacekeeping force, and the organization has recorded some success in mediating
conflicts in the Comoros and the Democratic Republic of Congo. It should be noted that SADC
had a security function that dated back to the apartheid era in South Africa: At the time it was
founded in July 1979, apartheid South Africa was a participant in a number of regional conflicts,
and the aim of SADCC was to provide collective security as well as reducing economic
dependence on South Africa. Since the end of the apartheid era, SADC has undergone a radical
realignment, with South Africa becoming its de facto leader rather than its primary target. As in
the case of Nigeria in ECOWAS/ECOMOG, having South Africa on board has contributed to the
effectiveness of SADC's security and economic functions.

Hope for the Future: AEC, African Union and NEPAD

The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Treaty (Abuja Treaty) was signed in June 1991 in
Abuja by the OAU Heads of State and Government. The aim of the AEC specified in the Treaty
is to promote economic, social and cultural development as well as African economic integration
in order to increase self-sufficiency and endogenous development and to create a framework for

17
development, mobilization of human resources and material. The AEC further aims to promote
cooperation and development in all aspects of human activity with a view to raising that standard
of life of Africa’s people, maintaining economic stability and establishing a close and peaceful
relationship between member states. The AEC Treaty provides for the African Economic
Community to be set up through a gradual process, which would be achieved by coordination,
harmonization and progressive integration of the activities of existing and future sub-regional
economic communities (RECs) in Africa. The RECs are regarded as the building blocks of the
AEC. The existing RECs are : The Arab Mangreb Union (AMU), Economic Community of
central African States (ECCAS), Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic community of West African
States (ECOWAS).
The implementation of the AEC Treaty and the establishment of the AEC are through
six-stage process lasting 34 years. It starts with strengthening of existing RECs and creating new
ones where needed (5 years); through stabilization of tariff and other barriers to regional trade
and the strengthening of sectoral integration (8 years); establishment of free trade area and a
custom union at the level of each REC (10 years); coordination and harmonization of tariffs
systems among RECs, with the view to establishing an African Common market and the
adoption of common policies (4 years); and integration of all sectors, establishment of an African
Central Bank and a single African currency, setting up of an African Economic and Monetary
Union and creating and electing the first Pan-African Parliament (5 years). The operational
provisions of the AEC Treaty accord much importance to the building up of sub-regional
integration though as a necessary precondition for continental integration. It was in this regard
that Protocol on Relations between the AEC and the RECs was concluded and signed in
February 1998.
The African Union (AU) is the latest of Africa’s broad regional cooperation scheme. By
the close of the 1970s it had become evident that the OAU Charter needed some amendments to
enable the Organization cope accurately with the challenges and the realities of the changing

18
world. Consequently, in 1979 the Committee on the Review of the Charter was established, but
the Committee was not able to formulate substantial amendments. However, for the OAU to
continue to be relevant, the Charter was “amended” and augmented essentially through some ad
hoc decisions of the Summit. Such include the Cairo Declaration Establishing the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, etc. Even at that, it was increasingly
necessary for the Organization to work towards greater efficiency. Considering some provisions
of the AEC, there was urgent need to integrate the political activities of the OAU with the
provisions of the AEC Treaty on economic and development issues to avoid duplications. Thus
the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU held in Sirte, Libya on 9 September 1999 called for the
establishment of an African Union in conformity with the ultimate objectives of the OAU
Charter and the provisions of the AEC Treaty. Following this, the Consultative Act of the African
Union was adopted during the Lome Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000.
At the 5th Extraordinary OAU/AEC Summit held in Sirte, Libya from 1st to 2nd March
2001, a decision declaring the establishment of the African Union, based on the unanimous will
of members States was adopted. In the decision, Heads of State and Government specified that
the legal requirements for the union would have been completed upon the deposit of the 36th
instrument of ratification of the Consultative Act of the African Union. The Summit reaffirmed
that the Consultative Act will enter into force thirty days after the deposit of the instruments of
ratification by two-third of the member States of the OAU. It was further decided that the 37th
OAU/AEC Summit to be held in Lusaka from 9th to 11 July 2001 would take further necessary
decisions pertaining to the transformation of the OAU into the African Union. According to the
immediate timetable agreed at the 5th Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya in March, the
African Union came to into being at the 2002 OAU Summit, which took place in South Africa.
The objectives of the African Union strengthen the founding principles of the OAU
Charter, but are more comprehensive in acknowledging the multi-faceted challenges confronting
the continent, especially in the areas of peace and security, and socio-economic development and
integration. The Union is intended to, among other things: accelerate political and socio-

19
economic integration; promote common Africa positions; promote democratic institutions,
popular participation and good governance; protect human rights; promote sustainable
development and the integration of African economies; work to eradicate preventable diseases
and promote god health. The organs of the African Union include an Assembly and Executive
Council, the Pan-African Parliament, Court of Justice and a number of financial institutions.
Hear what President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda said to justify the need for African
Union: “What we actually need is to amalgamate the present 53 states of Africa into either one
African Union or, at least, seven or so more viable states: West African Union, Congo, the East
African Union, the Southern African Union, the Horn of Africa Union, the Mahgreb Union with
Egypt and Sudan” (Museveni, 2001, 12).
The most recent African plan for economic development is the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that is based on the New African Initiative (NAI), a merger of
the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the Omega Plan.
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development has been described as “Africa’s strategy for
achieving sustainable development in the 21st century” (Anyang’Nyong’o et al, 2002, vi).
Again regional and sub-regional approaches to development are the key element through which
many of the expected results are to be accomplished.

Prospect for Closer Cooperation between West, East and Southern Africa
There is no any controversy about the desirability of greater regional cooperation and integration
among African countries. However, the limited success of attempts at regional cooperation and
integration in Africa raises questions on what is being pursued as the goals of regional
integration. Most of the existing regional integration efforts in Africa including the African
Union to some extent hold theoretical allegiance to the European process of integration and the
customs union theory. It has been observed that there are defects in the application of most
Western theoretical constructs on economic integration to the African setting. For instance, there
are political factors which are critical to the evolution and operation of African integration, and

20
which the customs union theory conceals, in the bid to neutralize the political and ideological
aspects of regional integration process. Such political considerations include the question of
power relations (national and regional), the dominant ideology in the region, and the domestic
politics in member states. All these are essential in determining the outcome of integrative and
cooperative initiatives in Africa.
The reduction of regional integration goals to strictly economic matters defeats the
purpose of regional integration. Take for example, in West Africa, the Lagos Treaty (1975)
which established ECOWAS was to guide trade relations among member-states of ECOWAS.
Whereas integration represents a much broader and detailed arrangements which require states to
make certain political and economic sacrifices and commitment as well as concessions, and
demonstrate political will towards a redefinition of their individual and collective participation in
the international economy, the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) represents a case of deliberate
abstraction of ‘politics’ from the process of integration. The ECOWAS example is representative
of most sub-regional groupings in Africa. With regional integration conceived strictly in terms of
economic relations among the states involved , the role of regional schemes in most cases are not
more than creating some infrastructures where commodities can be exchanged at a reasonable
cost. In this regard, exchange and markets are set up to facilitate movements of goods and
people, and special attention is also paid to tariff matters! Adebayo Adedeji’s remark on
priorities has brightly captured this:
It is now clear that the economism of regional cooperation is principally
responsible for the slow progress made during the past forty years. By focusing
virtually exclusively on economic cooperation and integration while making -the
heroic ceteris paribus assumption as far as political and social factors are
concerned, has contributed significantly to the lack of progress in the actualisation
of the vision (Adedeji, 2002).

On the one hand, one can argue with some conviction that the prospects for closer
cooperation and regional integration among countries in Africa are bright. Recent trends and
developments show many of the countries to be on the side of increased commitment to regional

21
cooperation and integration. Given the untiring efforts of these countries as well as the renewed
interest of the political elites in Pan-Africanism which culminated first in the establishment of
the AEC and recently the inauguration of AU, one can conclude that efforts in this direction will
continue into the future. Of course, this resurgence of interest in closer cooperation and regional
among African countries and regional integration in Africa has been largely influenced by
developments at national, regional and global levels. At the global level, the external
environment has become less friendly to African economies. International economic
environment has become increasingly characterized by depressed world commodity market,
discriminatory protection, debt crisis, and the continuing distortions by TNCs. On the positive
side, there is a new global consensus on the validity of the basic principles of regionalism. The
dominant idea, which is rooted in contemporary political economy thoughts, is that regional
cooperation is still a very effective means of promoting the goals of self-reliance and economic
development. This arguably is underscored by the fact that the most powerful and wealthiest
countries in the world – in Europe, North America and South East Asia – now pursue prosperity
through regional economic cooperation. As expected, many African countries are already
responding to the new global realities that have made regional cooperation very imperative.
At the level of national politics, some progress has been recorded with respect to political
reforms in many African countries. This in turn is enhancing the capacity of African countries
for regional integration in Africa. Noticeably, many African countries are democratizing; and the
democratic space in many countries has been expanded and politics has become increasingly
inclusive. In Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and recently in South Africa multi-party elections were held
successfully. In the particular case of Nigeria, by mid-1990s due largely to political and
economic crises that began in the 1980s, Nigeria became more or else "The Open Sore of a
Continent". But since coming to power the administration of President Obasanjo has initiated
policies aimed at re-vitalizing the economy in order to create an enabling environment for
investment and economic growth. These policy initiatives, coupled with Nigeria's teeming
population and natural resources, is already providing the base for Nigeria's involvement with

22
most of the initiatives on the agenda of the AU and the NEPAD. The present civilian
administration in Nigeria is wielding more influence in Africa against the background of a broad-
based national government that is representative of wider spectrum of the Nigeria. The resolve
by the administration of President Obasanjo to transcend the official circles to include the
ordinary people in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals is likely to enhance its role in the AU
and other African development programmes notably the NEPAD. Alhaji Sule Lamido, former
Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the essence of Nigeria's Afro-centric
mindset is "to give the African focus of our foreign policy dynamism by getting direct to the
people instead of remaining at a government to government only level" (cited in Washington
Times, September 30, 1999). It should be acknowledge that the involvement of the civil society
in the development process is one of concern of the AU. For example, some of the organs and
institutions in AU, such as a common parliament, are expected to give ordinary African a greater
say in their continental leadership.
The increased commitment of core African states such as Nigeria and South Africa to the
goals of African unity and regional integration through the African Union is enjoying strong
domestic support in their respective countries. Take for example, such domestic support was
demonstrated in many African countries by the quick response to the ratification of the
Constitutive Act of the African Union. In the case of Nigeria, both the Federal Executive Council
and the National Assembly (the Parliament) acted promptly on the matter. The Executive gave
its approval and the national Assembly passed the Bill in no time, and the support of the general
public has not been lacking. Given this level of commitment to procedures that facilitated the
ratification of the Constitutive Act by Nigeria, it is expected that future participation the AU
programmes and activities would continue to receive support across all the segments of the
Nigerian society.
Nigeria has the capacity to play active role in the AU. But it must be borne in mind that
Nigeria is likely to continue its support for sub-regional economic groupings such as the
ECOWAS, especially given its commitment to the building and strengthening of sub-regional

23
organizations’ capacities for both economic development and regional security. This does not in
any way contradict the objectives and principles of the AU. It is the best course of action for
Nigeria to continue to work within the AU to convince the region to develop the various existing
sub-regional groupings and also ensure their operations within the framework of the AU. Nigeria
on her part has always favoured regional grouping, which in effect does not contradict a more
encompassing African union, but is far less ambitious, in terms of mission and objectives.
Nigeria's investment in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is in
support of its commitment to regional cooperation within the framework of functionalist sub-
regional groupings that are already underway in all the sub-regions. It is the view of Nigerian
government that "Africa's integration arrangement must focus primarily on trade promotion
through trade liberalisation schemes based on the creation of Free Trade Area" President
Obasanjos' statement at a seminar on the African Union (cited in Africa Today, June 2001, p.11).
True to its words Nigeria is serving as one of the core-states for the development of the
ECOWAS, bearing its burden with smiles. The influence of Nigeria in West Africa and her
commitment to the development of sub-regional groupings as building blocks for continental
wide regional integration should be a plus for AU.
It is interesting to note that Nigeria has also earned the companionship of South Africa,
which also enjoys leadership role in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Both Nigeria and South Africa are playing leadership role in their respective sub-regions
especially in promoting peace and economic opportunities. Nigeria's effort in promoting regional
security is its loudest accomplishment in West Africa. This it has done essentially through the
ECOWAS. It is the conviction of the government in Nigeria to work toward "cooperation in
building and strengthening subregional capacities for the prevention, management and resolution
of conflicts" (cited in Washington Times, September 30, 1999). Speaking to the 19th anniversary
of the SADC in Mozambique, President Obasanjo called for the integration of SADC with
ECOWAS as a step toward a unified African economic community. There is the sense in which
one can say that the statement was a fall out of near common interpretations and approaches of

24
Nigeria and South Africa to African integration; that recognizes the critical roles of the regional
economic communities (RECs) as the building blocks for the establishment of AEC. It was in
this regard that a protocol on Relations between the AEC and RECs was concluded and signed in
February 1998. The protocol serves as an instrument and framework for close cooperation,
programme harmonization and coordination, as well as integration among the RECs on the one
hand (horizontal) and between the AEC and the RECs on the other (vertical).
No doubt that the close bilateral relationship between Nigeria and South has potential for
positive influence on the future of AU as well as greater integration in Africa. For South Africa,
what later crystallized in the African Union share its vision of ‘African Renaissance’. Both
Nigeria and South Africa are supporters and promoters of the New African Initiative as well as
its immediate antecedent, the Millennium Partnership for the Recovery Programme (MAP)
which was a joint initiative of Presidents Obasanjo and Mbeki. It is worth to note that Nigeria
hosted a number of African Heads of Government in Abuja to harmonize the New African
Initiatives, the Omega Plan and the Map into a 'Marshall Plan' for the continent. Cooperation
between the two countries in the area of trade, investment and lately defence has improved
significantly, since Nigeria’s return to civilian rule in 1999, to the mutual benefits of Nigeria and
South Africa. The on-going privatization programme in Nigeria is attractive to investors from
South Africa. Businessmen from both countries are various levels of partnership. Also, a joint
venture between Nigeria Airways and South African Airways is facilitating direct flight from
Lagos to New York which further shows improvement in the relationship between Nigeria, the
US and South Africa. Relationship between Nigeria and South Africa is being extended to
incorporate cooperation between their armed forces, especially in the areas of training,
maintenance and repairs of warships, and the conduct of joint military excises. The Guardian, in
an editorial, opines that "This is timely and cheering news, not only because of the political and
economic clout of the two countries but also in view of the wider implications of such bilateral
co-operation and imperatives of regional integration" (The Guardian, November 26, 2001, p.14)

25
 Some development initiatives on the continent have received the joint support and
sponsorship of the Nigeria and South Africa. Sometimes other influential African countries have
collaborated with the two as we see in the case of the Millennium Partnership for the Recovery
Programe, MAP, more recently described as the New African Initiatives. Also, the increasingly
close bilateral relation between Nigeria and South Africa played a significant role in
harmonizing the reactions of the two countries on the initial proposal by Al-Gaddafi for "African
Union". It worth mentioning here that since the civilian administration of president Olusegun
Obasanjo, Nigeria's relation with the South Africa has improved significantly. President
Obasanjo and Mbeki have been playing pivotal roles in Africa, promoting regional peace, and as
well seeking international support to address the myriad problems wracking the continent,
including the AIDS pandemic, protracted wars, and crushing foreign debt. This made it possible
for the two countries to work towards a modified version of Al-Gaddafi's initiative in the form of
an EU-style organization, which in the words of the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
represents "realism" necessary for Africa. Thus on July 12, 2001 36 African leaders signed a
draft treaty of the African Union.
Apart from the opportunity that the improved Nigeria-South Africa bilateral relationship
provided, the new impetus within the OAU/AEC helped to reconcile the views of African
countries. This eventually led to the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union can be
explained in terms of the increasing understanding that came with the series of meetings that
were held to addressed problems common to virtually all countries in the continent. The
Ouagadougou Declaration is significant in that unlike previous summit that were characterized
by strong focus on political issues, the Declaration dealt with economic and development issues.
It is worth recalling here that the Ouagadougou Declaration of 10 June 1998 resolved to work
towards the establishment and consolidation of effective democratic systems by involving all
actors of civil society. This was a significant change of attitude in the AEC/OAU circles, where
the NGOs, academic institutions and other civil society organizations had either been ignored in
the schemes of things. This change is also reflected in the The Sirte Declaration, which refers to

26
"…our peoples and their grassroots organisations…" The 1999 OAU/AEC Summit in Algiers
was epochal in that it was characterized by a new sense of urgency to create within the
Organization a framework that cope with the challenges of the new Millennium. The Algiers
Summit addressed two themes: 'Collective Security and Problem of Conflicts in Africa' which
was presented by president Obasanjo of Nigeria; and 'The Challenges of Globalisation and the
Establishment of the African Economic Community which was presented by President Mbeki.
The Algiers Declaration has been hailed as a demonstration of Africa's conceited action to
confront the challenges of the new Millennium.
On the other hand, dominant social forces within and outside the African continent also
demonstrate lack of interest in closer cooperation and greater regional integration in Africa. The
continued adherence to discarded models of development and administration, lack of initiatives
and readiness to undertake the necessary internal socio-economic restructuring and the dominant
pattern of accumulation which enriches a few at the expense of the majority have combined with
other contradictions arising from the misuse of state power, wastefulness and misplacement of
priorities to make national governments incapable of making their economies become more
interlinked in an integration framework. The lack of regime continuity which is a dominant
feature of African politics and governance, and the manipulative and technological power of
TNCs also constitute impediment towards the pursuit of serious integrative processes in Africa.
Moreover, the class configuration within Africa, particularly the domination and control of state
power and societal resources by a largely unproductive dominant class has often led to
isolationist and pseudo-nationalist policies which promote regional integration.

Conclusions, policy recommendations, and research priorities

Based on the above, three phases of regional integration are conceivable. These may be referred
to as the ‘national’, ‘regional’ and ‘global’. First and most important, individual African
countries need a new ‘national’ development programme for reversing underdevelopment. This
implies embarking on internal changes in areas of political mobilization and participation,

27
popular access to opportunities for majority, the overhaul of inherited socio-economic and
political institutions, and the redefinition of relations with transnational corporations and other
external forces.
The extension of structural changes made at the national level initially to sub-regional
and later regional level constitutes the second phase of the effectual African regionalism being
prescribed. The strategy here should encourage and seek means of facilitating increase in intra-
regional trade, the improvement of transportation and communication system, the erection of
political institutions that would assist in the improvement of political relations and understanding
and also, the effort to re-define the role of the region in the international division of labour.
Policies are to be initiated towards the promotion and coordination of efforts to control the
activities of TNCs within the region, promote industrialization as a means of checking constant
vulnerability to changes in global economy and the stimulation of the regional market and
specialization.
The third phase requires a restructuring of the global economic system This implies a
collective regional effort that seek for the re-definition of the existing unequal exchange and
power relations between the continent and the metropolitan economies; the terms of trade with
the metropole, the role and power of international financial institutions and TNCs, the debt
problem and the brain drain problem.
These are prescriptions with several political ramifications demanding complex
institutions and structures, and extensive political will, as well as unity of objectives and
commitment. It is good to note that some of the propositions presented above depend largely on
sufficient participation of civil society; the people and their representatives in associations,
professional societies, farmers’ group, women’s groups and so on, as well as political parties.
Without sufficient of these groups either in the political process where decisions relating to
regional cooperation and integration programmes are taken or through adequate consultation,
efforts and initiatives stand the risk of becoming easy prey for sabotage.

28
 Finally, some of the propositions above would definitely require further research, to
identify and define issues more precisely. Therefore efforts at promoting regional integration
should necessarily consider the importance of scientific research which entails data and
information gathering, analysis and re-analysis. For example, Africa is the most balkanized
regions of the world. Countries in the region are at varying levels of development. Also, there are
wide differences in the historical and political backgrounds, the administrative and legal systems
and monetary regimes. There is need to generate a lot of information to determine the
characteristics of the countries and their economies. Research programmes would be needed to
generate reliable and regular flow of data on the countries in the region. Also, lack of
democratization is a major constraint towards effective regional integration. In this regard, the
relationship between regional integration and democratic governance in Africa requires scholarly
attention. How do regional schemes such as ECOWAS and SADC promote good governance in
national affairs? What are the models that are needed to be designed for regional schemes to
monitor the compliance of African governments with the democratic principles and values in
some of the new regional initiatives such as NEPAD? What is expected to happen to the
‘sovereignty’ of states in view of some of the radical elements and initiatives in NEPAD and AU
such as the peer review? What type of early warning system is required to identify sources of
instability in the region? Other issues for in-depth include the role of the external environment on
the direction of regional integration, the potential and actual capacity of the domestic forces such
as the civil society to promote regional integration, the prospect of transnational civil society and
cross-border social and economic networking, and the idea of mainstreaming of gender into
regional integration programmes.

29

Major Regional Integration Arrangements in Africa
Grouping
Central Africa Customs and Economic Union
(UDEAC). Replaced in 1998 by the Central
African Monetary and Economic Community
(CEMAC)
East Africa Community (EAC) I
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
Mano River Union (MRU)
West African Economic Community (CEAO).
In 1994 it was replaced with West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAMU)
Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
Economic Community of the Great Lakes
countries (CEPGL)
Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC).
Preferential Trade Area (PTA)
Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS)
African Economic Community (AEC)
Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA). This is expected to replace
the PTA.
TABLE 1
Year of Est. Member States
1966 Cameroon, Central African Rep. Chad, Congo, Equatorial
Guinea and Gabon
1967 Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. In 1999 East African
Community II was launched.
1969 Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa.
1973 Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Guinea.
1973 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal
1975 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, The
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania (until 2001), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra-
Leone, Togo
1976 Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire
1980 SADC was established in August 1992 in Windhoek,
Namibia, to replace the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC). It currently groups 14
member states; Angola, Botswana, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. A free trade
protocol was signed by the SADC countries in 1996.
1981 Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
1984 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep., Chad, Congo,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe
and Zaire.
1991 All members of the OAU
1993 15 Countries attended the PTA Summit in Kampala in 1993
and later signed the Treaty, which established COMESA.
They are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Malawi,
Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, and Mauritius.
30
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