tek2ubpIcFNleT7 MGkEguaVpn84KG6iRL KpI8wako

3.
5(c)
Latin America
3.5(c)
ReviewC
1 June 1984
ALA LAR 84-010

1 June 1984
Copy 390
Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030
3.5(c)

3.5(c)
l,atin America
Review L _ l_ _ _ _j
3.5(c)
1 June 1984
NR
1
Argentina: RadicaR Party Politic§ g 3.5(c) 7
Economic and política! problems have exaccrbated longstanding

ideological rifts within the ruling party, causing President Alfonsin
to tcmper government policy in an effori to maintain a balancC"-e_ __
between competing factions and thereby preserve party unity. 3.5(c)
~--_j
1-
NR
~
ALA LAR 84-0 JO
1 June 1984

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

3.5(c)
Argentina: Radical Party PoliticsD
Economic and political problems have exacerbated

Radical Party Factions
longstanding ideological rifts within President
Alfonsin's ruling Radical Civic Union Party. These 3.3(b)(1)
diffcrences have affected govcrnment policy on a even befare
rangc of issucs as Alfonsin has tried to maintain a Alfonsin 's election, leftists within his Renovation and
balance betwecn competing factions to preserve party Change factionformed the "Coordinating Group."
unity. Recently, however, the President seems to be Moderate leftists formed the rival Popular
moderating his aggressive policy positions in an effort Intransigence !action headed by a key Radical
to improve rclations with Argentina's traditional legislator, Ruben Rabanal. More politically
power brokers--thc military and Pcronists. Although conservative Radicals had no formal organization,
the Radicals' interna! difficulties are manageable, but they gravitated around Julio Saguier, mayor of
severa! factors could decpcn splits, erode Alfonsin's Buenos Aires and a clase A/fonsin con.fidant. In 3. 3(b )( 1)
ability to govern, and encourage the opposition. [ ] April, this group allied
3.5(c) with Popular Intransigence to!orm the Intransigent
Alfonsin and his left-of-ct~nter Renovation and Renovation, a label underscoring their adherence to
Change faction gained control of the Radical Party in Alfonsin 's programs~and aimed at containing the
mid-1983 after a 10-year struggle with the more party's le!t wing. Smaller factions include the
modera te National Line faction, which had moderate "Cardaba Clique," centered in Argentina's
dominated the party since the 1940s. Alfonsin formed second-largest city, from which Alfonsin selected his
his group in the early 1970s to move the party toward Vice Presiden!, Victor M artinez. The party also has a
more progressive stances that could broaden its appeal small group of hardline nationalists, including
beyond its traditional middle-class following.Q regional bank presiden! and well-known economist
3. 5( C )Aldo Ferrer and legislator Luis Lean. 3.5(c)
Aftcr securing the presidcntial nomination, Alfonsin
set out to expand the party's historie 25-percent share
of the electora te. He pledged to reactivate the projections after a slight dip in January. Human
cconomy, curb the power of the military and the rights advocates in the party were miffed by the
Pcronist-dominated tradc union movement, defend President's decision to prosecute only former regime
human rights, and foster open government. Alfonsin leaders instead of allmilitary officers accused of
won 52 pcrcent of the votes cast last October and took excesses. Peronist successes in blocking the labor
office in December with plans to use his mandate to reform bill in late March and in provoking sporadic
implement his programs swiftly.D 3.5(c) labor unrest exacerbated the Radicals' squabbling.O
Cracks in the Facade In general, the party left has pushed for a tough line 3.5(c)
The magnitude of Alfonsin's victory at first obscured in dealing with the Peronists, the military, and the
thc existence of factionalism within the Radical IMF and commerciallenders. Moreover, according to
Party, but the problem has grown since the President US Embassy reporting L __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~
took office and is manifested in disputes on a range of L _ __

leftists have pressed for a more Third World-
__j
critica! issues. According to press and other reporting,

therc was considerable interna! party debate on 3.3(b)(1)
economic policy as inflation far outstripped official
7 -iee¡ct--
ALA LAR 84-010
1 June 1984

.
3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1)
oriented foreign policy.l wing was important, but he planned to take steps to
1 the left has 1 limit its influence in Congress, in his Cabinet, and 3.3(b)(1)
pressed for expaoded ties with Cuba and Nicaragua among his clase advisers
~----~~~~~--~~
and support for opposition groups in neighboring Alfonsin is also trying to distance himself from the
countries. Party moderates generally agree with these left by dealing with them through intermediaries.
policy objectives but, according to 1 1 3.5(c)
[]us Embassy reporting, are more w!llmg to
compromise with Argentina's traditional power The President has made sorne staffing changes that
brokers and are more realistic in dealing with foreign reflect his more moderate orientation. The most
lenders. They are also more moderate on foreign visible was the replacement of his combative labor
policy issues. For their part, Radical hardline minister in April with a modera te who has clase tiesto
nationalists have focused primarily on debt both majar party factions and is acceptable to the
negotiations and the Beagle Channel and Falklands Peronists. Moreover, one Argentine política! observer
disputes-in which they oppose any accommodation. has pointed out that Alfonsin has allowed other
1 1 3.5(c) moderates among his clase advisers to assume a larger
3.3(b)(1) role in policymaking. Even befare the shift in the
Alfonsin's Response labor portfolio, for example, Alfonsin had appointed a
The President's initial vacillation in response to the moderate union leader as his personal representative
factional pressures conveyed the impression- to smooth over differences with the Peronists. In
especially to the military-that he was indecisive. economic policy, Raul Prebisch has emerged as a
L __ _~~------~--------~~--~~--~
he voice of moderation to counter the often shrill
armed forces saw him as susceptible to leftist criticism of foreign lenders by party and
pressures and unable to put together coherent policies. administration spokesmen. Moderate Angel Robledo,
Until about mid-March, according to US Embassy one of the few prominent Peronists to serve in the
and press reporting, Alfonsin allowed party leftists to administration, is an adviser on military affairs.D 3.5(c)
hold sway in the administration.
they were: Further, according to press reports, Alfonsin has
resisted pressures to call a party convention to elect a
• Behind the early aggressive moves against the new leadership. Like other Radicals elected to office,
military. 3.3(b)(1) he is bound by tradition to relinquish his post as party
leader to avoid conflicts of interest and provide the
• Behind the decision to push the labor reform bill party with full-time leadership. We agree with sorne
through Congress without consulting the Peronists political observers who believe that Alfonsin wants to
or other legislative blocs, thereby antagonizing retain control at least until the congressional election
potential supporters and assuring the bill's defeat in in 198 5 to help keep the lid on poten tia! divisiveness.
the Senate. 3.5(c)
• Among the strongest advocates of a tougher stand Outlook for the Party
against the US bankers' insistence on a March Although the splits apparently are still manageable,
deadline for the payment of interest arrearages on they will almost certainly be aggravated by inept
the externa! debt. 3. 5( e) presidential performance, further economic setbacks,
or Peronist successes. This disunity will complicate
In the wake of key legislative defeats and continuing policymaking and diminish Alfonsin's ability to hold
economic setbacks and in anticipation of budget his electoral coalition intact. Moreover, persistent rifts
debates and debt negotiations, however, Alfonsin has could dash the Radicals' hopes of capturing control of
moved gradually toward party moderates. the Senate in the congressional elections.D
the 3.3(b)(1) 3 .S(c)
"P"r_e_st~.d'e-n-:-t'b-e"li-ev_e_d.---c-ith-e--co-n--:t~in_u_e_d.---su_p_p_o_r~tof the left

In his efforts to maintain party unity, the President

faces his greatest challenge from party leftists.
Failure to curb thcm would almost certainly seriously
hamper efforts to placate the military and reach an
accommodation with opposition labor and political
leaders. It would also tend to substitute opposition
charges that Alfonsin is an ineffective leader, unable
to keep even his own house in order, Jet alone deal
with Argentina's cconomic and political problemsD 3.5(c)
3.5(c)

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

NR

tek2ubpIcFNleT7 MGkEguaVpn84KG6iRL KpI8wako

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

tek2ubpIcFNleT7 MGkEguaVpn84KG6iRL KpI8wako

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

3.

ALA LAR 84-010

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Economic and política! problems have exaccrbated longstanding

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Economic and political problems have exacerbated

took office and is manifested in disputes on a range of L _ __

critica! issues. According to press and other reporting,

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

In his efforts to maintain party unity, the President

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

Approved for Release: 2018/10/01 C05509030

You might also like