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18.April 1951
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. Copy No. C1- - 'i
3.5(c)

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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• OOCUMENTNO.
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DATE: bf1S. :-'' ·;;~ /.'c.l

3.5(c)
• 3.5(c)

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Office of Current Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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3.5(c)
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SUMMARY

FAR EAST
lists in Nor th Viet -
1. Pro -Fre nch fact ion purg es opp osit ion nati ona
nam (page 3).

NEAR EAS T - AFRICA

ent cris is (page 3).
, 2. Iran ian Shah plan s stro ng mea sure s in curr
can rela tion s (page 4)o
3. Com men t on repo rt of crit ical Fren ch-M oroc

EASTERN EUROPE

4. Com men t on Yugoslav prep arat ions for a

brea k in rela tion s with
Hungary (page 5).

5. Soviet con trol s tigh tene d in Albania (page 6).

LATIN AMERICA

6. Com mm t on poli tica l tens ion in Boli via (pag

e 6).

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FAR EAST \· -

1. Pro-F rench factio n purge s oppos ition nation alists in North Vietn am: 3.3(h)(2)
Under the vigoro us direct ion of Nguyen Van
Tam, Police Chief and close assoc iate of
Prem ier Tran Van Huu, drasti c perso nnel
chang es have been made in the region al ad-
minis tratio n of North Vietna m. The Ust of expel led office -hold ers in-
t
clude s both memb ers of the nation alist Dai Viet party and indep enden
nation alists who have oppos ed, or been suspe cted of oppos ing, the
polici es of Prem ier Huu.
Comm ent; The reorg aniza tion of the North
ign
Vietn am admin istrati on began with Prem ier Huu's succe ssful campa
to remov e the able and intens ely nation alistic Gover nor of North Viet-
nam, Nguyen Huu Tri. In late March , Tri was replac ed by an offici
al
of meag er ability whose amena bility to the polici es of the Huu cabin et
has been demo nstrat ed by his subm issive ness to the purge tactic s of
Police Chief Tamo The curre nt ascen dancy of Huu and Tam·, both of
whom are natura lized Frenc h citize ns and pro,.. Frenc h in sentim ent,
has under mined the effect ive North Vietn am admin istrati on that had
been built up under the leade rship ot ex=go verno r Tri and has dis-
coura ged Vietn amese nation alists who oppos e both Comm unism and
contin ued Frenc h domin ation of Vietn am.

NEAR EAST - AFRIC A

2o Irania n Shah plans strong meas ures in curre nt crisis : 3.3(h)(,_,2)

U.&A mbass ador Grady in Tehra n repor ted on

16 April that stg·ni ficant politi cal chang es in
Iran are antici pated in the very near future .
Accor ding to Grady , the intern al situat ion is
becom ing increa singly omino us -- with con-
tinued diffic ulties in the Isfaha n textile indus -
try and the gener al strike in Abada n - - and the
Shah, almos t in despe ration , may look to Seyyi d
Zia Ed-Di n Tabat abai as a succe ssor to Prime Minis ter Ala. {"..rady

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sugges ts that the US shoulq consid er its positio n in this eventu ality, for
if the US.sup ports Se.yyid Z.ia, it will be stigma tized as identif ied with
British intere sts in Iran. On the other hand, if the US fails to suppor t
him, Seyyid Zia .wilLbe depriv ed of an elemen t of streng th that he will
need if he is to bring about stabili ty at this time. The Ambas sador con-
cludes that suppor t of Seyyid Zia is t.o be prefer red, despite the atten-
dant risks. ,--------~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 3.3(h)(2)
I Shah
[ the
-is prepar ed to install Seyyid Zia as prime minist er wittun the next few
days and to have the Majlis dissolv ed as soon as it has confirm ed this
appoin tment. This move is to be follow ed by decree rule and widesp read
arrest s, which should render impote nt the Nation al Front and the variou s
subver sive elemen ts in the country~ At this time, Iran will abando n its
neutra lity policy and come out openly on the side of the West.
Comm ent: While Prime Minist er Ala has appre-
ciably streng thened his positio n in the last weeks and while the London
press states that Ala has n·ow receiv ed a vote of confide nce from both
houses of Parlia ment, ~eyfid Zia and Qavam are continu ing to maneu ver
politic ally to succee d Ala.. : The Shah's p1an to install Seyyid Zia as a
strong man, a plan consis tently bac):{ed by the UK as the most feasibl e
method of revers ing Parlia ment's recent approv al of the nation alizati on
of Irants oil, presen ts many difficu ltieso The oil issue is so contro -
versia l that the appoin tment of Seyyid Zia, . with his report ed UK con-
nection s, and dissolu tion of the Majlis witp.out a firm commi tment to
hold new electio ns promp tly would probab ly be follow ed by widesp read
popula r disapp roval and by increa sed intern al disord er.

3. Comm ent on report of critica l French -Moro ccan relatio ns;

Accord ing to a specia l dispatc h to the: New York-
Times , Reside!}t Gener al Juin has been engage d in emerg ency consul -
tations with th~~ govern ment regard ing the deterio rating relatio ns betwee n
France and the Moroc can nation alists, includi ng the Sultan. Juin is re-
ported to have claime d that his presen ce is requir ed in the Protec torate
until at least 1 Decem ber to ensure order.
Jutn had been slated to assum e the comma nd of
the armed forces in the centra l sector of the Europe an Army on 1 June.
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The New York Times article may have bee:n "inspired" by the French
because of (a) General Juin9 s. dissatisf acUol!1l with the importance of his
post in SHAPE, (b) .his fear that altlly successor might yield to some of
the Moroccan nationalist demandsll (c) his beUef that North Africa is
more important to French defense than Europell and (d) his suspicions
regarding US activities in Morocco.
It is co:nsidered Ulllllikely that the Moroccan
situation has deteriorated to the extelllt implied in the article. Although
the Moroccan nationalist parties have itormed an. alliance, no effective
campaign in the near future is possible~ iin view of the restrictions im-
posed on nationalist activity as well as the pressure of a French army
in Morocco large enough to put down. :native disorders.

EASTERN EUROPE

4. Gomment on Yugoslav preparaticms for a break in relations with Hungary:

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The Yugoslav Government has announced that

the Swiss Government has bee:n asked and has agreed to protect Yugo-
slav interests in Hungary in the event of a rupture of relations between
Yugoslavia and Hungary. According to a governme:nt spokesman, this
action was taken because of the obvious intem.t of the Hungarian Govern-
ment to worsen relations between. the two countries.

In 1949 the Cominform States and Yugoslavia

began to withdraw their chiefs of misRinns arnd gradually reduce their
diplomatic representations to token staff's. In November 19.50 Yugoslavia
suspended relations with Albania and closed the Albanian Legation i:n
Belgrade. With this exceptionll tlie Yugoslav acUo:n with respect to Hun-
gary marks the first time that a!T!Y cou:ntry on either side of the quarrel
has prepared for a complete severance of relations. The Yugoslav
initiative may be an attempt to stre!llgthe:n Yugoslavia's propaganda posi-
tion in the Weat _and, at the same time)) forestall an actual break in re-
lations by placing Hungary i:n a disadvan11tageous propaganda position.

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5. Soviet controls tightened in. Albania:
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According to the Albanian radio, pro-Soviet 3.3(h)(2)
Minister of Interior Mehmet Shehu has been
appointed. interim Minister of State Control
by decree of the Presidium of the Albanian
People's Assembly. Former Minister .of .State Control Manush Myftiu
. has been appointed Vice Premier. · ~ - - - - - - - - - ~ - ~ 3 . 3 ( h ) ( 2 )
D in addition to harsh control measures previously instituted by the
Stalinist hierarchy under Shehu, all privately owned radio sets have been
seized and persons guilty of violating the current regulations concerning
radios will be s~verely punished. Since the bomb explosion at the Soviet
Legation on 19 February, all persons. are reportedly searched before
being permitted to enter any governmen t office, "Spe.cial Police" units
have now returned to their various headquarte rs and have resumed
"normal activity," an action that may be a forewarnin g of mass arrests
of nationalist suspects.
i
Comment; The appointmen t of Moscow-fa vored
Shehu as Minister of State Control is a further indication of additional
Soviet controls over Albanian internal affairs. Reports in recent weeks
have revealed intensified Soviet efforts to maintain its_ domination in
Albania in the face of a marked growth· in-resi:stan ceictivtty.

LA TIN AMERICA

6. Comment on political tension in Bolivia:

A situation potentially dangerous to the stability
of the governmen t has developed in Bolivia, where the administra tion
has thus far refused to allow the presidentia l candidate of the Nationalist
Revolution ary Movement, Paz Estenssoro , to return from exile. Politi-
cal tension has been mounting and there have been large-scale demon-
strations by Paz supporters .
The Bolivian Minister of Governmen t has stated
that the administra tion does not intend to impose a state of seige or
postpone the 6 May presidentia l elections. However, if it appears that
Paz will be prevented from running in the elections --- e·tther because he

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is not permit ted to return to Bolivi a or becaus e his legal status as a

candidate is not clarifi ed-,.. the Nation alist Revolu tionary ;Movement
may resort to revolu tionary activit y. The govern ment's ability to
contro l a revolu tionary situati on will depend in large part upon the
loyalty of the army.

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