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1 May 1951
3.5 c)
Copy No. CJ, 1

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DATE. __lli,tMREV!EWEP..~--~:>1 3.5(c)

3.5(c).

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1\J~ET 3.5(c)

GENERAL

1. Western delegates consider Soviet agreement at Foreign Ministers

Conference unlikely (page 2}.

FAR EAST

2. Current lack of Communist aggressiveness in Korea deceptive

(page 2).

3. Communists may be saving air arm for strategic r~asons (page 3).

4. Comment on Chinese Communists' seizure of British Asiatic

Petroleum Company Properties (page 3).

NEAR EAST

5. Shah of Iran appoints new Prime Minister (page 4).

EASTERN EUROP:E
3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE
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GENERAL
1. Weste rn de.!egates consi der Soviet agree ment at Fore i~ Minis ters Confe
rence _\ 1

unlikely: · _ (h)( ) IA
33 2 s?
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The three Weste rn deleg ates at the Deputy Forei gn Ii :, ' ,~-'It-... ,._j (41

Minis ters' Conference have expre ssed their perso nal Vfn;,'
i' i
views that the Soviet perfo rmanc e in Paris rende rs
unlikely agree ment with the USSR at a Forei gn
Minis ters' meeti ng, should one be held. Frenc h delega te Parod i believ es
all the USSR sees in a meeti ng now is its propa ganda value and the oppor that
it prese nts to "split " the West, upset plans for a Germ an milita ry contri tunity
hinde r Weste rn rearm amen t, and preve nt any Italo- Yugo slav settle ment bution ,
of thE,
Tries te question. Parod i sugge sts that under prese nt circum stanc es a Forei
Minis ters' meeti ng might be dange rous. Britis h delega te Davie s questi ons gn
wheth er the USSR still wants a Forei gn Minis ters' meeti ng excep t for propa
purpo ses, since the USSR now knows that it cannot stop a Germ an milita ganda
tribut ion and the rearm amen t of the West. The Britis h delega te sugge sts ry con ...
the USSR may be using Four Powe r negot iation s to determ ine wheth er to that
to a full war economy and to play for time while awaiting the possib le effect shift
the Korea n offensive. and the politi cal situat ion in the UK and Franc e. Davies of
adds that the UK definitely wants a Forei gn Minis ters' meeti ng, since Britis s
public opinion insist s that a meeti ng be held and becau se the UK believ es h
is a faint chance of agree ment with the USSR at such a meeting. The qeleg there
have tentat ively discu ssed a direc t appro ach to Moscow in an attem pt to ates
agree ment on a Foreig n Minis ters' agenda. The US delega te add~, tbe Comm reach
propa ganda indica tes a possib le Soviet propo sal for a Five Powd t confe
1 unist
rence.

FAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)
The Intelli gence Staff of the US Far Easte rn Command,
in an estim ate of the enem y's capab ilities , warns that
the enemyt s "quie scent attitud e" of the past 48 hours
"mus t not be const rued as an indica tion he has spent

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3.3(h)(2)
his offensive effort." The estimate adds that all evi-
dence points to an early resumption ·of the offensive
and cites the extremely heavy southwaild movement of
vehicles in the enemy's rear (over 2, 800 during the
night of 29-30 April) as an indication of such intentions.

3. Communis ts may be saving air arm for strategic reasons:

CINCFE Telecon The Intelligence Staff of the US Far Eastern Command,

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speculating on the enemy's "surprising failure to
utilize his air arm in coordinatio n with the current
ground offensive, "believes that, while Jntensive UN
bombing of North Korean airfields and adverse weather condition,; may have in-
fluenced the enemy's decision, the present enemy air inactivity over.~Kore a
could be a "deliberate stand-down for mechanical preparatio n." If this be the
case, the enemy may be readying his air arm for "commitme nt when the forward
drive of his present ground offensive fails" or for employmen t "in defense of
supply lines as they are automatica lly extended, thus co1,1ntering what in the past
has prover his foremost vulne,rability.l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ . 3 ( h ) ( 2 )
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Qmment: Less than 50 Soviet-type MIG jet aircraft

were encountere d orer northweste rn Korea during the perjod of the current
Communist offensive.
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4. Comment on Chinese Communistsv seizure of British Asiatic Petroleum
Company Properties :
1,.:,':·

The wording of- Peiping's announcement requi4,itioning

the properties in China of the British Asiatic Petroleum Company indicates that
the Communis ts are retaliating :ig.ainst the British for their seizure of the tanker

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Yung Hao in Hong Kong on 7 April.

Thi.s 15, 000..ton tanker, after being repaired in Hong

Kong for the Chinese Nationalists, was taken over by a Communist crew.
British authorities seized the vessel with great reluctance and only after strong
US representations that the tanker would be militarily useful to the Communists.
With Hong Kong businessmen and officials already nettled as a result of US
controls on trade with the colony 1 the present consequences of yielding to
pressure in the Yung Hao case may further embitter feeling in Hong Kong toward
the US. Hong Kong -is also concerned over the future consequences of its action
in a parallel case;--~he disputed ownership of 71 formerly Nationalist aircraft now v

claimed by the Chinese Communists. The vigor of Peiping's reaction to the

Yung Hao seizure may weaken the effect of US pressure on Hong Kong to deny
the aircraft to the Communists•.

NEAR EAST
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5. Shah of Iran appoints new Prime Min!st~ 3.3(h)(2)
The Shah has appointed Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq
Prime Minister following the recommendation of the
Senate and Lower House. Mossadeq, leader of the
National Front, has crusaded for nattpt1alization of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and his appointment came immediately after the
Majlis (Lower House) had voted for the company's expropriation. He has
started to form a cabinet and draft a party program, and has instructed police
to permit May Day demonstrations.

Comment: The appointment of Dr. Mossadeq, the

chami;ntm. of oil nationalization, to be Iran's next Prime Minister illustrates
the strength which the desire to nationalize Iran's oil has attained in Iran.
Prime Minister Mossadeq gives little promise of bringing stability to Iran, even
though he is apparently the only candidate who can obtain sufficient support from
the Majlis at this time. The Shah was virtually forced to appoint him, and the
Majlis, which is normally disunited, will probably not continue to support him for
long. Mossadeq, an idealist~ is devoted to the principle of non-intervention by
foreigners in Iran and to freedom of expression.

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