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- 6 March 1951
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• 3.5(c)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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DOCUMENTNO. _ _ _ _ _ _ __
3.5(c)
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J;EXT REV!l:W OATE:
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• DATE/ z. ,r . ,, nEv,Ewrn:J,__ _ L 3.5(c)
• Office of Current Intelligence

• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)

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SUMMARY
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GENE RAL

1. Turki sh Amba ssado r fears USSR may raise Strait s questi on

• (page 3) .

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FAR EAST
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2. Disea se contin ues proble m in North Korea (page 3) .
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• NEAR EAST

3, Britis h milita ry planni ng altern ative for Suez base (page 4)"

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WESTERN EURO PE

• 4. Frenc h want voice in Spain 's defen se role (page 5) .

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LATIN AMERICA
• 5. Split in Venez uelan Gover nmen t rumo red (page 5) .

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GENERAL
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tion:
1. Turk ish Amb assad or fears USSR may raise Strai ts ques
• Turk ish Amb assad or Goke r in Moscow
has infor meq US Amb assad or Kirk that
• he belie ves the Sovi ets may raise the
ques tion of the Dard anell es and the Mon t-
sters meet -
• reux Convention at the prop osed Coun cil of Fore ign Mini
to Turk ey
ing. Goke r state d that the USSR had made no appr oach es the Sovi et
conc ernin g the Strai ts since 1946. How ever, he rega rded
• note of mid- Febr uary prote sting the alleg ed Turk ish shell . To
ing of a
Sovi et tank er as a poss ible initia l move to reop en the issue The
st.
date the Turk ish Gove rnme nt has not repli ed to the prote
• Turk ish Amb assad or cons iders that comp lete silen ce of
the Sovi et
the incid ent
pres s on the incid ent indic ates a Sovi et desi re to utiliz e
agan da .
• for diplo mati c purp oses rathe r than imm ediat e prop

•
rentl y stem
• ~~~ __J\ The Turk ish Amb assa dor's appr ehen sions appa 3.3(h)(2)
poss ible
from the fact that the Mon treux Convention come s up for only the
revis ion this year . It is notew orthy , howe ver, that to date
Coun cil of
• Wes tern powe rs have soug ht to broa den the agen da of a
ect to the
Fore ign Mini sters . Sovi et prop agan da silen ce with resp Sovi ets
Pam ir incid ent may not be unus ually signi fican t, since the
• frequ ently treat explo sive incid ents with cauti on.

FAR EAST
•
2. Dise ase conti nues prob lem in Nort h Kore a:
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. 3.3(h)(2)

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3.3(h)(2)

• Comment: Typhus, typhoid and smallpox

are reported to have reached near-epidemic proportions among
• Communist troops in Korea, and there are indications that severe
measures have been taken to revent the further s read of dissase
among troops and civilians .
•
• 3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST
• 3. British military planning alternative for Suez base:
• According to US Embassy Cairo, a new
plan of the British Chiefs of Staff for the
3.3(h)(2)
• future defense of the Suez Canal Zone in-
cludes the following features: (a) a phased
evacuation of the Suez Canal zone, beginning immediately and to be
• completed by 1956, with "civilian" technicians replacing the military
specialists; (b) the leasing by the UK of the Suez base after 1956,
with administrative control in British hands but with Egyptian "parti-
• cipation" and with the Egyptians responsible for policing the base;
and (c) the possible creation of a "temporary" base in Israel. The
• British Embassy in Cairo has sha:rply criticized certain details in
this plan, and believes that to sell the Egyptians on any "joint de-
fense" arrangement for the area, the UK must first demonstrate
• faith in Egyptian military capabilities by resuming the suspended
arms shipments,
• Comment: This is the first specific evi-
dence that the British military has accepted the Foreign Office's
• thesis that the main body of British troops will have to be located
outside the Canal Zone. Both the military and the Foreign Office
seem convinced that British forces must have access to the Canal
• Zone itself in time of war.

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3.5(c)

WESTERN EUROPE
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4. French want voice in Spain's defense role:
• A French Foreign Office official has indi-
v;> ,., n,_;-J, '.:.-.
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cated to US Embassy officials in London
• that the French Governmen t "wished to be 3.3(h)(2)
able to convince themselves " of the mili-
II tary necessity of including Spain in the West's defense efforL He
implied that this could be done only if the French assist from the
. beginning in determinin g how Spain can participate .

if the US is in- 3.3(h)(2)

L__-=--~-------=------=----------:----~--------:'
terested primarily in ·Spain's military facilities, a bilateral relation-
• ship between the US and Spain may offer the best solution. However,
if the emphasis is on the use of Spain's manpower, then the inclusion
of Spain in NATO will be necessary- -a step that would entail great
• difficulties , particularl y in Britain and France.

• Comment: This is a plausible report of the

French Governmen t's current attitude and possibly reflects its sin-
cere desire to avert later political difficulties in France over the
• handling of the Spanish question. Last summer Foreign Minister
Schuman stated that the admission of Spain to NATO was the only way
• to solve the question of the strategic utilization of that country .

•
LATIN AMERICA

• 5. Split in Venezuelan Governmen t rumored:

/., •,.,. ,.- .-- •' ·~-- ( ;;'.'.,

• Strong rumors of a split in the top level of .,., '·

the Venezuelan Governmen t have resulted
.,, from an alleged protest, if not an ultimatum,
to the governing Junta by the reactionary 3.3(h)(2)
Grupo Urilante, which includes leading army
officers and high governmen t officials headed
• by Junta Secretary Miguel Moreno. This
group reportedly objects strongly to provisions of the draft electoral
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3.5(c)

- law, to the prospect s of early elections , and especiall y to the recent

• action of the Labor Ministry permittin g the negotiatio n of a labor
contract for petroleum workers by a committe e including leaders of
dissolved radical elements . Reports indicate that some comprom ise
• has been reached, but the situation will probably remain delicateo
Meanwhi le, a former presiden t of Costa Rica has stated that a revolu-
• tion in Venezuel a is planned for some time this month .

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Commen t: A split in the army, which the
reported protest of the Grupo Urilante may well represen t, would pro-
vide the e.ssential condition for a revolutio nary attempt by Accion
Democra tica. However , the current internal dissensio n, which
appears to involve a continuat ion of the reported disagree ment between
Moreno and Provisio nal Presiden t Suarez Flameric h, can probably be
• settled through the intervent ion of Junta member and Defense Minister
Perez Jimenez, who has the support of the Grupo Urilante and who
was chiefly responsib le for the appointm ent of Suarez· as Provisio nal
• Presiden t .

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