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4 April 1951

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3.5(c)

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• DOCUMCNTNO. - - , . ! C , , , - - - - _ ; ,
MO CHNJGE IN CLASS. ___
I : l•::CLASSIF!ED
cu,::s. CHANGEO TO: TS Ml)C,~
• f~E;-<r R[\'iE'N DATE: _ __J~---~-f+--
AUTH· Hf-l 7~-2 ,

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UATEt1-!'i-~EVIEWER:L___ __ 3.5(c)
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~ Office of Current Intelligence

• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY
• FAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
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2. Cal;>inet discussions continue in I n d ~ (page 3) .
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• NEAR EAST
3.3(h)(2)
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• ~. Current Egyptian position on the Anglo-Egyptian treaty issue less
extreme (page 4). ·
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• EASTERN EURO.PE

- 3.3(h)(2)

- WE;STERN EUROPE

• 6. Italian Communists µiight modify their public stand against NATO

(pag~ 6) .
• "1. Mad;rtd students protest streetcar fare policy (page 7) .

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• 3.3(h)(2)

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Cabinet discussions continue inlnuOIUIBia:

, \k
f,

•
Premier-designate Sartono of the Indones~~_(h)(2)
• National Party is continuing discussions
with the Masjumi (a Moslem Party and the
major element in the former government)
• and with the other part~es that supported the former government in an
attempt to discover a basis on which to form a coalition cabinet. The
question at issue is whether the Indonesian Nationalist Party will modify'
• certain of its leftist policies with a view to enabling.· the Masjumi, the
majority party in Parliament, to agree to participate in a new govern-
• ment, If these two parties cannot reach an agreement, the Indonesian
Nationalist Party may fall back on 'a cabinet based on a broad party
grouping, excluding the Socialist and Communist parties and the Masjumi.
•
Comment: A cabinet formed by the Indo- 0

nesian Nationalist Party without the relatively conservative influence of

• the Masjumi may lead to either a highly unstable or a leftist government
in Indonesia. Responsible Masjumi leaders are aware of this danger,
• however, and are therefore believed to be willing to make considerable
concessions to the Indonesian Nationalists .
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- NEAR EAST

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4. Curren t Egypti an positio n on the Anglo- Egypti an treaty issue less extreme,:
. .)
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In a recent discus sion with Assist ant Sec- 3.3(h)( 2 )
• retary of State McGhee in Cairo, Egypti an
Forei p Minist er Salahe ddin review ed
Egypt s positio n regard ing the Anglo-
• Egypti an treaty issue. In the cleare st exposi tion to date of the Egypti an
side of the contro versy, Salahe ddin stated that (a) Egypt would admit
. -Britis h forces in wartim e but not in peacet ime, (b) the evacua tion of
• British troops from the Suez Canal base should take place with a year

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J:o eight een mon~owb/fflirt'l}cft Ae ramm g o , -20,0
Egyp tian co~b at troop s and 400 pilots to take over the defen se 00
- the UK, and (c) the UK shoul d evacu ate the Sudan :in two or three
job from
since the Sudan issue is inext ricab ly tied to the quest ion of Briti
years J
sh
evacu ation of Egyp t. Salah eddin also conte nded that the Middle
• Easte
coun tries sho:uld have the first word regar ding the defen se of their rn
own
territ ories " He asser ted that Egyp t would main tain the Suez base
until
• it was neede d by the UK in warti me and that the final resul t would
pend to a large exten t upon· the amou nt of milit ary and econo mic de,,

- Middle Easte rn coun tries.

Comm ent: An Egyp tian posit ion

aid given

lined above by Salah eddin with no furth er conce ssion s reduc es as out-
• the
pect for succe ss in the Angl o-Egy ptian treat y discu ssion s. Two pros-
of the Egyp tian posit ion ,_ which is held both by the gove rnme aspec ts
nt and the
• gene raf popu lace -- are unrea lisUc : (a) Egyp t canno t adequ ately
the Suez Cana l base, and (b) the majo rity of th•:: Suda nese politi main tain

- while wishi ng for indep enden ce, oppo se any kind of assoc iation
Egyp tian Crow n. ,~{ rvi, -ik.,,. ~;>11.~i-,
cal parti es,
unde r the

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3.3(h)(2)

- WESTERN EUROPE
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• 6. Itali an Com mun ists mig ht ~od ify thei r pub
lic stan d agai nst NATO: ".\

3.3(h)(2)
In a rece nt stat eme nt, Piet ro Nenni, lead er
• of the phil o-C omm unis t Itali an Soc ialis ts)
v
term ed the Atla ntic Tre aty ''a nec essi ty
und er pres ent cond ition s u and plea ded mer ely
• part icip atio n" in the trea ty orga niza tion . Nen
for ';mo re caut ious Itali an
ni's
war d the NATO is rega rded in som e qua rter s as chan ged attit ude to-
part of a new Com mun ist
• "pe ace n offe nsiv e that will be furt her elab orat
ed at the Com mun ist Part y
con gres s open ing in Rom (3 Apr il.
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• Com men t: This is the firs t indi caN catio n
that the Itali an extr eme left may be con side ring
an abat eme nt of its atta cks
• agai nst NAT O. Such a dev elop men t,1coul d be part
tact ic of conf usin g and divi ding pro- Wes tern forc of the Com mun ist v
es in Italy , On the othe r
hand , the <;om mun ists may real ize that thei r poli
• has faile d to hind er effeGtive Itali an part icip atio cy of opp os~ " NATO
plan ning . Italj an Com mun ist atte mpt s to stag e n in Wes tern efen se v
poli tica l st.ri es in the
past , for exam ple, in conn ectio n with Eise nho wer
• we.re not part icul arly succ essf ul, 's rece nt visi t to Italy ,.

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. --rwr ~.l!a\..,n.l!, l ·
:L . ·Mad_!Jd students er_otest streetcar fare poli'--~:- - - - -
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Some 1,000 University of Madrid students '~/~
are reported to have attempted to march
/\ I

• ' to the City Hall on 2 April ostensibly in

order to protest against restrictions on the
use of their streetcar passes. Some of the 3.3(h)(2)
• 1
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demonstrators voiced their discontent with
the high cost of living, Following the arrest
• • ; of three leaders, the students dispersed
quietly and no serious injuries were reported.

• 3.3(h)(2)

- Comment~ On ~;:) and 24 February, a simi-

• lar protest by University of Barcelona-students heralded the city-wide
streetcar boycott and gen2ral strJke which had Barcelona in a turmoil
during the first two weeks of March. At this time, it was predicted that
• the success of the Barcelona demonstrations and the apparently concilia 0

tory attitude of the government might encourage Spaniards elsewhere to

voice their discontent against increasing economic hardships. The
• calling of a cabinet meeting to consider the cost of living problem reveals
the government's growing apprehem~ion that such incidents might spread .
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