.,,,.. .

, ___ •
~-· ,7
·-
.i••

31 March 1951
3.5(c) ..
Copy No. t'.J. . . 1

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• DOCUMENT NO i,+ f ·---.-~
NO CHANGE IN °CLASS~

• I o:~cu.~-;:::tFIED / -
A
CLASS CHANGED TO:
NEXT REV1[W DATE. ___
AUTH· HR_ ~ - 0
TS
3 f
"CJt:J
~ATEJ-1,lf'fi ti'1EVicWEn. 3.5(c)

3.5(c)
lllil

0 ffice of Current Intelligence

• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

•
3.5(c)
•

-
-
-
-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 co2733110
., ... ,/

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02733110

T~ ! w . T ~ I - - - ~
3.5(c)

- SUMMARY
•
GENERAL
•
1. Soviet attitude toward Foreign Ministers' meeting (page 3) o

• 2. US delegation's reactions to new Soviet CFM agenda proposals (page 3).

• 3.3(h)(2)

-. 4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Japanese treaty

draft (page 4) . ·

- FAR EAST

5. Lull in Indochina broken by"heavy';.-Vi~t Minh attac}{ in Tonkin (page 5)o

•
• EASTERN EUROPE

6. Yugoslavs opposed to any attempt to unseat Hoxha now (page 6) .

•
• SCANDINAVIA

• 7, Soviet official in Norway interested in Norwegian molybdenum deposits

(page 7) .
• 3.5(c)
•
- 2 =
•

-
-
- 3.5(c)

-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02733110
-. T~ . t t ~ - r
_,-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C027331107

I~--~~
3.5(c)

• GENERAL

• 1. ~Y,,i~!.Jutitude toward Foreign Minister~..m~ell!}g~

3.3(h)(2)
By way of pointing out that major Western
Ill
concessions on' preparing a Foreign Min-
isters' agenda could only result in Soviet
advantage, US Embassy Moscow presents
• possible alternative Soviet attitudes toward holding a Foreign Minis~-

-
•
. te:rb--s) meeting. The Embassy believes that the US~R still puts con--
sidetable store by CFM meetings, at least for dis:ruptive tacficsQ It
·is also possible that in the face of a firmly united Western opinion,
the USSR would desire a Ministers' meeting to compromise on the sub-
stance of some of the issues at stake, and thus attempt to diminish
the impetus of the Western defense drive. If this is the case, the Em-
• bassy feels that Gromyko will, if necessary, accept a neutral agenda,
The Embassy points out that if Gromyko will not yield, as Britain and
France fear, it would be evident that the USSR feels no real compulsion
• at this time to contribute materially to any serious efforts to alleviate
European tensions and at most is interested in a Ministers' meeting
solely as a forum for propaganda .
•
• 2. US delegation's reactions to new Soviet CFM agenda proposals~

• Ambassador Jessup, in commenting on the3.3(h)(2)

new Soviet proposals of 28 March for a
Foreign Ministers' agenda, expresses a
• belief that-Moscow ordered this concession
to be made at least partly in order to arrive at agreement within a
• reasonable time. The chiefs of the French and UK clelegations clearly
consider the new Soviet proposals to be a basis for reaching rapid
agreement with the USSR on an agenda, and Jessup anticipated a "seri-
• ous problem" in the tripartite meeting scheduled for 29 March. Jessup
regards the latest Soviet proposals as uthe first formal and serious
break in the Russian position on anything of major importance," and
• reports that it was not possible to prevent the Western press from pre-
senting the Soviet move as a concession,
•
•
-
- 3.5(c)

-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02733110
-. .T ---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C027331107
~\.,;n.l!.1 I~--~~
3.5(c)

- Comment~ The new Soviet proposals

can be expected to strengthen public and official determination, in
both France and the UK, to press for a Foreign Ministers' conference.
• The Soviet concessions indicate that the USSR may compromise fur-
ther if necessary for the sake of achieving a Foreign Ministers'
meeting .
• 3.3(h)(2)
L
•
•
•

-
•
•
•
•
•
•

- 4. US Embassy Moscow estimates Soviet reaction to Japanese treaty

draft:
\
,,,c' "rJ '
3.3(h)(2)
• US Embassy Moscow expects a sharp
Soviet reaction to the Japanese peace
treaty drafto The USSR's tactics would
• be designed (a) to prevent the conclusion
of the treaty on a multilateral basis, (b) to dissuade other countlt"ies,
•

-
- 3.5(c)

-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02733110
- .;
. Tr
~
--
~ ~ o r Release: 2019/03/14 C02733 110]
u.a.;,L;.tt.t!. 1
I
3.5(c)

-
~ - - - - - _ J

particu larly in Asia, from signing itlie treaty, and (c)_to disi:_upt the op-
eration of the treaty. In additio n, the USSR would attemp t to portra y
• Japan as a US colony and a base for US aggres sion in Asia and also
to capital ize on Asian countr ies' fear of :renewed Japane se imperi aliSmo
China may be expect ed to advanc e the most violen t opposi tion to the
• treaty.

- The Embas sy anticip ates that Soviet

opposi tion to the draft treaty is capabl e of limitin g achiev ement of
US object ives in Asia, even though a numbe r of states sign the treaty o
• The USSR would consid er that it had gained an advant age if, by its
opposi tion, severa l indepe ndent Asian states did not sign the treaty,
. and if Comm unist denunc iation of the treaty crysta llized Asian dis-
trust of US motive s and fear of Japano

ill
Comment~ The USSR has alread y utilize d
almost all politic al and propag anda means at its dispos al for opposi ng
a "separ ate" Japane se peace treaty. Howev er, if the USSR refuse s
• to sign the draft treaty, it will thereb y gain a useful lever for exertin g
pi'essu re on the Japane se Gover nment in the course of bilater al deal-
ings and later treaty negoti ations -~, since technic ally a state of war
betwee n the USSR and Japan would still .exist. If Comm unist China
ii

does not sign the draft, it will posses s compa rable advantageso It
• - is concei vable that India, in particu lar, might not be willing to sign
a treaty which was unacce ptable to both the USSR and Comm unist China,
.
FAR EAST
• I
/\ 1·
\j

5. Lull in Indoch ina broken by "heavy " Viet Minh attack in Tonkin:
• The US Milita ry Attach e in Hanoi states 3.3(h)(2)
. that Viet Minh forces have be·gun a heavy
attack at Mao Khe, 30 kilome ters north=
northw est of Haiphong. The attack , which
I began during the night and was resum ed at dayligh t, had been in pro-
• gress for eleven hours at the time of the AUach e's report , The Viet
. Minh push is directe d agains t one of the weake st and most vital areas
of the French -defen ded delta perim eter,
3.3(h)(2)
•
-
- 3.5(c)

-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C0273311 0
-. 3.5(c)

-. The Mao Khe area, hard

to defend becau se of its positi on at the oothil ls of Viet Minh- held
3.3(h)(2)

moun tains, lies close to the road and railro ad which conne ct Hanoi
with its supply port of Haiphong. Repor ts indica te that the weath er
• in Tonkin contin ues extrem ely unfav orable for both air opera tions and
groun d obser vation .

•
EASTERN EUROPE
•
6. Yugos lavs oppos ed to any attem pt to unsea t Hoxha now~
• In a 29 March articl e in the Yugos lav news3.3(h)(2)
paper Borba , Vladi mir Dedij er, secre tary
• of the Yugos lav Parlia menta ry Comm ittee
on Forei gn Affair s, expre ssed the fear· that curre nt intern al strife in
Alban ia may furnis h the USSR with an excus e for armed interv ention
• in the Balka ns. Accor ding to Dedij er, a purge of indivi dual leade rs
in Alba11ia has been followed by collec tive purge s of party organ
izatio ns,
• which have result ed in an intens ificati on of terro r throug hout the coun-
try. This situat ion is being explo ited by certai n eleme nts in Greec e
and by Alban ian emigr e group s in Italy, who are parac huting armed
• men and dropp ing propa ganda leafle ts into Alban ia. Dedij er pointe d
out that Sovie t propa ganda has been accus ing Yugos lavia of prepa ring
• aggre ssive action again st Alban ia. He added that the action s of the
emigr es could provid e the USSR with a pretex t to interv ene in "de-
fense of a small socia list count ry,'' and might be used as an excus e
• to launc;h an attack on Yugos lavia,
Comm ent The Tito gover nmen t has
• consis tently oppos ed any extern al interv ention in Alban ia on the groun
armed aggre ssion
ds
that the USSR might use such action as a pretex t for
• again st Yugos lavia. Anoth er factor bearin g on the Yugos lav attitud e
may be an estim ate of its inabil ity to take advan tage of unsett led con-
dition s to establ ish a ro-Ti to re ime in Alban ia .
• I
~~~~~~~~~~~~1 3.3(h)(2)
•
- - 6 -

-
- 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C0273311 o

 ~

l Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C0273311 o 3.5(c)

- ,'I ......

T~ L ; l t ~ l
- SCANDINAVIA
n moly bden um depo sits:
• 7, Sovi et offic ial in Norw ay inte reste d in Norw egia
3.3(h)(2)
1

•
.
• Com men t: Norway succ eede d in elim inati ng
1950 trad e agre e-
moly bden um (which is on the US 1-.A list) from its
• Nor way 's sole
men t with the USSR by pers uadi ng the Russ ians that for tech nica l rea-
moly bden um mine (at Knaben) had ceas ed oper atio ns
fact that, late
• sons . The .pre sent Sovi et inte rest may stem from the
in 1949, a Norw egia n busi ness man info rmed the
Sovi ets that addi tiona l
. Although the Kna -
moly bden um depo sits exis ted and coul d be expl oited
known to have rais ed
• ben mine is now back in oper ation , the USSR is not
the ques tion of moly bden um agai n with Norw ay,
.
•
•

.
-•
-
- - 7 -

- 3.5(c)

-
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C0273311 o