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. 10 April 1951

Copy No.c1=" _q
3.5(c)

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II 3.5(c)

. 3.5(c)

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• Office of Current Intelligence

• CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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3.5(c)

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~°tCn.El'03/14 C02733113 3.5(c)

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- SUMMARY

- GENER AL

1. Embass y Moscow sees possibi lity of indirec t Soviet inter-

- vention in Korea under cover of Mongol ian "volunteer~~ assis-

tance (page 3).

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- FAR EAST

2. Chinese Commu nists sponsor ing a "Kachin Statejljl (page 4),

- WESTE RN EUROP E

3, US Ambass ador pessim istic about Spainjls defense capabil ities

• (page 4).

• 4. Militan cy waning in Italian Commu nist Party (page 5) .

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3.5(c)
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- GENERAL
:·
- 1. Embas sy Moscow sees possib ility of indirec t Soviet interve ntion
. in Korea under cover of Mongolian nvolun teern assista nce:
¼:
JO:,,
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• Embas sy Moscow believ es that the USSR3.3(h)(2)

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may attemp t to bolste r the Chines e Com-
munis ts and still avoid direct Soviet involv e-
ment in the Korean war throug h the de-

- i vice of provid ing "volun teer~' assista nce from the Mongo lian Peo-
ple's Repub lic to the North Korean and Chines e Comm unist forces .
Such an interventi::m would merely be a mecha nism cloakin g actual
Soviet partici pation in the Korean · war, since the ostens ibly Mongo lian
• units could in fact consis t of Soviet army or air force units contain ing
nation als of variou s yellow races in the Soviet Far East and Centra l
-. Asia. This interve ntion \V:Juld be welcom ed by the Chines e and could
allevia te critici sm of the USSR which has undoubtedly develo ped with-
in the Chines e Comm unist Party and among the Chines e people in
view of the heavy losses in Korea caused by Soviet failure to pro-
vide suffici ent planes and equipm ent.
In the Embas sy~s opinion, inauguratinn.
of effecti ve Comm unist air interve ntion. lrom across the border
• should be recogn ized on the one hand ·as ''final and total abando n-
ment by the Chines e People~s Repub lic of willing ness for a nego-
tiated settlem ent/' and on the other hand as an "unequ ivocal act
• of war agains t the UN. j'
Comm ent: In respon se to questio ns
• concer ning the alleged Soviet plans to utilize a ''volun teer army"
includi ng Mongo lians in Korea , the Depart ment of the Army has
Ill comme nted that (a) the Mongolian People 's Repub lic has an army
of about 30,000, with some token mecha nized elemen ts and an air
arm of sorts; (b) this force could be increa sed to a streng th of
100,000 by utilizin g other Mongo lian person nel; and (c) it is doubt-
ful that more than five well-t rained divisio ns of Soviet Mongo lians
• could be formed at this time, No all-Mo ngolia n units are known
to exist in the Soviet armed forces , and few of the Soviet Mongoloid
nation alities would be trained in techni cal skills (which the Chi-
nese Comm unists also lack).

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- FAR EAST

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2. ,Chinese Com mun ists sponsorw.,g a ''Ka chin State

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Com men t: The Peip ing regi me may be 3.3(h)(2)
ous area n
• cont emp latin g the esta blish men t of a Kach in "aut onom
inall y auto no-
in Chin ese terr itor y adjo ining Burm a, simi lar to nom st Chin a .
. mou s area s esta blish ed for othe r min oriti es in sout
-Rec ent Chin ese Com mun ist prop agan da dire cted
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them
hwe
at th.e Kac hins in
e; furth erm ore,
Chin a has been stre ssin g the "sep arat e state
it is known that the Chin ese Com mun ists are indo
ctrin ating , train -
• in rebe l
ing and equi ppin g the follo wers of Naw Seng, the Kach mum visi-
. lead er from Burm a. A Kach in State in Chin a, with
ble Com mun ist cont rols , would appe al to Kach ins resid
mini
ing in Burm a
Com mun ist
and Assa m, and coul d be expl oited to furth er Chin eseInfo rmat ion
imp eria list amb ition s with resp ect to thes e area s.
• ces indic ating
has been stea dily accu mula ting from num erou s sour ion in Burm a .
vent
Chin ese Com mun ist prep arat ions for limi ted inter
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• WESTERN EUROPE y(t\
capahj]jtjes~
~- US Amb assa dor pess imis tic about Spai n s defense
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The US Amb assa dor in Mad rid has for-3.3(h)(2)
ward ed the following state men ts from a
• repo rt of his Air Atta che: "Th e Span ish
Air Forc e poss esse s only two rada r sets .
flying equi pme nt
• Ant i-air craf t exis ts only in proj ect form . Pres ent

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C02733113 3.5(c)

- would last only a few days. The majority of the Spanish Air Force

- have never seen a jet.n In the Ambassa doris opinion, a compara ble
.situation exists in the Spanish Navy and, to a slightly lesser degree,
in the Army. He comment s that it is becoming increasin gly obvious
that Spain will be incapable of def ending the Pyrenees or any other
• line unless it is given military equipmen t and assistanc e.

. Commen t: The US Ambassa dor))s com-

·ments are believed to be complete ly accurate . For more than a
year·; service attaches in Madrid have emphasiz ed that Spain could
• · only briefly delay an attack by a strong, modern military force. In
March 1951, US Army Intelligen ce estimate d that Spanish forces could
llfil
delay a ground attack through the Pyrenees for a maximum of two
weeks .

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4. Militancy waning in Italian Commun ist Party:

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Italian Commun ist leader Secchia ad-
mitted at the party congress on 5 April 3 3 2
that insufficie nt zeal and a devotion to . (h)( )
sectarian ism or opportun ism on the part
of even the most active Italian Commun ist militants were hindering
.the active developm ent both of the party and of Commun ist-domin ated

- "fr one)) organizat ion~ such as the Gene~al Labor Confeder ation and
the Partisan s of Peace. He also admitted that the party might have
. to send militants from Commun ist strongho lds in North Italy to the
southern districts in order to- build up party prestige in those areas .
...-- ·

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The US Embassy in Rome comment s that
• Secchia))s admissio ns confirm its belief that the Italian Commun ist
Party has lost much of its momentu m and that the decline in enthu-

- siasm among the masses and even among party militants may pre-
vent the Commun ists from enlisting the support of the majority of
. Italians in their campaign against the Atlantic Pact .
• Comment.~ Secchia))s statemen ts confirm

- the increasin g lack of interest in Commun ist Party activities pre-

viously reported as prevalen t among provincia l elements of the

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party. Party discipline, however, will probably ensure that these

elements, de.spite their lack of zeal, vote "correctly~j at the forth ...
• coming municipal elections. The Communists will probably not be
able to remedy the lack of militancy confronting the party unless
economic conditions deteriorate .
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