Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

\.,·rut' o.t!itttr..-r

2 June 1951
3.5(c)
I I
Copy No. C J.-- ~ q

CURRENT INTELLIGiNCE ;BULLETlN·

DOCUMENT NO. 4'.) ·.,.

..,,,,..,~--"'-~'''':''J'!'
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ~ -·-- • ~
I i DECLASS!FIED F1' ~-
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C

tO·~
NEXTREVIEWDATE: _ _
AUT~ HR
,.,.._~1___
__.,,_y_
DATE\ 1,.-l - FlEVIEVVER: 3.5 c)

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c)

.'

TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065
 A. pproved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065=·

.TC>lf SECRET I
~ - - - - - _ _ J
3.5(c)

SUMMARY

FAR EAST

L mdonesfa. reluctarnt to classify rubber as strategic (page 3}.

SOUTH ASIA

2. India exp!"f)Sses co:ncerru over Sirno=Tibetan agreemerut (page 3)o

NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE

3.3(h)(2)

5. WesterIDl diplomats consider immiimenfc h.ostHUies, agai[llsit Yugosl:avli.a

ul!llU.keJly (pag·e 6).

WESTERN EUROP.E
• • 6. ;Dispute over Saar~s status subsides- (page 7}.
7. FreIDJ.eh eledio:n picture appears somewhat b:righter (page 7}o

****

3.5(c)

-2-

TOP SECRET 3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

 I

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

I
3.5 c)
TEM' SECRET I ~ - - - - - - ~

FAR EAST
r.
1. Indonesia reluctant to classify rubber as strategic:
The Indonesian Ambassador to the US, 3.3(h)(2)
presently in Djakarta: has admitted. to
US Ambassador -Cochran that Indonesian
officials are reluctant to include rubber
on the list of strategic materi.als qow being drawn... up i.n connection with
the UN embargo on shipments to Communist Chi.na. He pointed out
that other countries might classify rubber as non-strategic, and
that he 1 in any case~ was under the impression that the US would be
satJJ.sfied ''if Indonesia adhered to its "historic pattern" in foreign
traoo., The US Ambassadov notes that Indonesia is unlikely to commit
itself publicly to a full embargo on rubber so long as there is reason
to doubt that the Bri.tish will g,o that far.

C.ommei,.t~ Jndonesi.an officials have

pointed out that the I:ndonesian economy i.s highly dependent upon the
income de:r-ived from rubber exports and that, in any event, Indonesia
has not shipped rubber directly to the Soviet Orbit in the past The
bulk of Indonesian rubber has gone to Malaya for re=export; figures
are not available on the amount of Indonesian rubber included in
Malayan exports to China and the USSR.

SOUTH ASIA

2. I:ndtb: expcysses co:ncern over Sino=•Tibetan agreemevit~

I
The US Miri!.i.ster Counselor in. New 3.3(h)(2)
Delhi, in discussing the recent Sin.o-
Tiootan agre~ment w:Uh thE.J; Secretary- l- ,✓
General of the Indian Mirllistry of External Affairs:,
Affairs, received the impression that the Irndi'fflll 'Government (a) was
disappoint-ed over the Tibetan fai.lure to secure better termsl' but
(b) felt helpless i.n the face of developments and is Ukely to ac~ept
the agreement without protest" When pressed~ the Secretary-Gen eral

3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065
 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065--~ . . ' ,.,, .., ',.. ,,.,,,,.... ,. ' ...... 1
3.5.c)
T<>-P SECRET I~ - - - - - ~ 1

admitted that the agreement had far-reaching implications for his

government. He added that a governmeIJ.tal committee, appointed
to sarvey the problem of defending India's northeastern and eastern
borders following the Communist Chinese invasion of Tibet last .
autumn, had recommended strengthelfin.g::the:J:2.order _post~, ~,tmprov.mg
communications and raising the conditions and morale of the in-
habitants of the area who had always been neglected. He added that
India was not a military power and there were definite limits to
what it could do. 3.3(h)(2) _

NE~ EAST 3.3(h)(2)

4 ..

T()P SECRET 3.5(cf

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065 _ _
3.5(c)
Te,f' SECRET

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE

-5-

3.5(c)
'!'OP .SECRET ~ - - - - ~

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

-- . .
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065
3.5(c)
Te,f' SECRE T!~~~~7~ 3.3(h)(2)

5. Western cii.plomats consider imminent hostilities against Yugoslavia

unlikely; 3.3(h)(2)
Accordi.ng to the US Legation i:n Bucharest,
Western diplomats in Ru.mania agree that
an attack on. Yugoslavia this summer appears
unlikely 9 although the situation is always
explosive. The Legation acknowledges that more reports 9 largely
unconf.irmed, of Ruma.nian and Sovi.et troop movements are n.ow cir-
culating than at any time since last springj but points out that move-
men:ts into critical areas such as Western. Ruma:nia are customary
duriftg spring maneuvers. Thus~ the departure of Rumaniav s only
armored divisi.on from Bucharest in early May is i.n itself not
considered alarming. The fact that there are no mounted anti-
aircra;ft guns and no air raid directives in Bucharest. 'is cited in
support of the Western diplomats~ estimate.

Comment: For over a year travel

restrictions have limited the personal observations of Western
diplemats to the i.mmedi.a.te vicinity of Bucharest. In additi.on,
numerous arrests and trials of Rumanians on "espionage" charges
because of their contacts wU:h Western mi.ssions have drastically
curtailed sources of imormatJlo:n available to Western diplomats.. These
factors tend to weaken the factual basis of any Western diplomatic
esthnate of military act!vity in the comitry. The fact that military
maneuvers in the spri:ng are tradltional i:n the Balkan countries could
fur11i.sh ,convenient cover for any military activity, but there is :no
firijn indication of an :imminent attack against Tito.
i
l

3.5(c)
TOP SECRE'f
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065
 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

rc,p SECRET IL-- ~~~ 3.5(c)

WESTERN EUROPE

6. Dispute over Saar 1 s status subsides~

Schuman Plan author Monnet has told t11J- 3 (h)( 2 )

US Embassy in Paris that he believes (a)
a dangerou s situation has been created i!1l
the Saar by the banning of the Saar Democra tic
Party, and (b) further actions of this sort
could cause difficulti es for Adenauer whose
j

political position is depe:ndent on Franco-

German friendshi p. On the other hand~
French Foreign Office officials claim they would have been "placed on
the skids" if they had failed to act against the Saar Democra tic Party.
They add that they anti.cipate no additiona l steps in the matter.

Meanwhi le, in the six-hour debate on the

Saar i.n the West German Bundesta g on 30 May, a temperat e atmosphe re
prevailed , due chiefly to the mild tone of the addresse s by both
Chancell or Adenaue r and Socialist oppositio n spokesm an Carlo Schmid~

Commen t: The• Saar Democra tic Party, a small

group favoring the retur:n of the Saar to Germany , was ba:imed on the
grounds that it was unconstit utional. The Bonn Governm ent wants to
support a Saar party working for union with Germany , but feels it cannot
baclr the Saar's Socialist s, many of whom favor such a union, because
in West Germany the Socialist Party constitut es the chief oppositio n
to the governm ent. Unfortun ately for Bonn, the Saar Democra tic Party
is reported ly exhibitin g neo-f ascist tendenci es andi furtherm ore9 tn March
of this year· sent represen tatives to the first meeting of the German Co:ngress?
an organiza tion attemptin g to coordina te the activities of groups opposlng
German remilitar ization.

7. French election picture appears somewha t brighter:

Proportio nal represen tation, which the 3.3(h)(2)
new French electoral law was designed
to reduce in the 17 June national elections~
ls expected to obtain in about two-third s

-7-

3.5(c)
TOP SECRET L _ __ _ _ _ _ ~

Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065

 Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065 I
3.5 c)
T<YP SECRET I
~ - - - - - ~
~
of the electoral CO!]tests of Franceo This is largely due to De Gauue~s
unwillingness to form electoral alliances with the other lillOIDl-CommulTI!.ist
partieso Because of his trntra:nsigencej the :newly organized Ri.ghU.st-
oriented "Fourth Force" has beelill obliged to form numerous electoral
alliances with the middle-of-the=road "Thi.rd Force"» which had
managed tf.> maintain a government despite the opposHio:n of both extremes
in the last Assembly. This developme:nt further reduces the chances for
a Gaullist landslide and makes U somewhat less likely that the Gaul.lists
and the Commlllillists can obtain a majority between fuemo It 'is probable»
however, that the comblned Communist and Gaullist. represe:ntatton will
be larger than the 210 seats held in the last Assembly.

Comme:nt; If all 111on~Commurni.st parties

united for the elect1o:ns:i they would obtain majorities i:n most districts
and Communi.st representation i:n the National Assembly would be almost
wiped out. De Gauuevs strategy is calculated to reduce the strefillgtll of
the middle-of=the~road parUes by scaring the electorate linto voting
for his party as the only effective opposition to the CommW1ists. This
strategy will, however~ also encourage thoso leftist voters seekin.g to
counterbalance De Ga.uuev s strength to vote for Commun.i.st caimdidates.
While the number of electoral alliances among Third and Fourth Force
parties now indicates that a mi.ddle-of--the-road majority ls sun
possible~ this does not guarantee that a workable government will result.

-8-

'.
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/14 C02003065