‘THE ESSENCE AND VARIETIES OF LAW ESSENCE As rational beings, we have free will. Through our capacity for reason, we are aj to jucige between possibilities and to choose to direct our actions in one way or the oth Our actions are directed toward attaining ends or goods that we desire. We work ory 4 project to complete it. We study In areler to learn, My mothor bakes In order to came wp with some cookies. Maybe my brather practices playing his guitar in order to get better 31 It. It can also be as simple as the fact that | play basketball because | enjoy doing $0. The are geods, and we act In a certain way to pursue them, so goods are sometimes referred to as the ends of actions. There are many possible desirable ends or goods, and we act in stuch ways as 10 pursue them, However, just because we think that a certain end {s good and Is therefore desirable does not necessarily mean it is indeed good. It is possible to first suppose that something is good only to realize later that doing sowasa mistake. This iswhy itis important for reason to always be part of the process. Acts are rightly ditected toward thelr ents by reason.'* But this does not simply mean that through reason we can figure out how to Pursue something that we already had thoughtlessly supposed to be good for ws: what is necessary is to think carefully of what really isn fact good for us. In thinking about what is good for us, Its also quite possible that we end up thinking exclusively of our own good. Aquinas reminds us that this will not de; we cannot simply act In pursult of our own ends or goed without any regard for ather people's encts oF goad We are not isalated beings, but beings who belong to a community. Since we belong toa community, we have to consider what [s good far the community as well as aur own gad This can be called the commen goed!” What exactly the common good Is might not always be easy to determine as there are many variables to.consider, such as the particular community weare thinking of or the particular ends that the community is pursuing, But that need not occupy us right now Whaat Is of greater significance for us here isthe recognition that, since we must consider not Just our own good but also that of athers, we cannot actin just any which way; there wouls have to be some kind of measure to aur acts. It s good for us to not simply be free to act in whatever way we like, We should recognize the proper measure or the limits In our actions that would allow us to direct our acts in such a way that we can pursue ends, bath our asin and also thot of others, together. The determination of the proper measure of our be referred toas law. Using a simple example, we can think of traffic tules. A motorist cannot Just drive In any way he likes, but must respect traffic rules. These rules seem to measure or places limit on his driving, for example, by placing a maximum speed he can travel ana particu” 54 _eahice:Foundations of Moral valuationEternal law refers to what God wills for creation, how each participant in it Intended to return to Him. Given our limitations, we cannot grasp the fullness of the eterna) law. Nevertheless, it is not completely opaque to us. We must recognize that first, we are Part of the eternal law, and second, we participate in It ina special way. Allthings partake in the eternat law, meaning, all beings are already created by Gos Ina certain way Intended to return to Him. Thus, we can find in them the very imprint of the rule and measure of the acts by which they are guided. These can be determined in the very inclinations that they possess. directing their acts toward their proper ends”? “Therefore, irrational creatures (e.9., plants and animals) are participating in the eternal law, although we could hardly say that they are In any way “conscious” of this law. Aquinas notes that we cannot speak of them as obeying the lav, except by way o| similitude?? which is ta say that they do not think of the law or chose to obey it, but are simply, through the instinctual following of their nature, complying with the law that Goo hhas for them. More appropriately, these creatures are moved by divine providence. On the other hand, human being’s participatian is different. The human being, =: rational, participates more fully and perfectly in the law given the capacity for reazon. The unique imprint upon us, upon our human nature by God, is the capacity to think abour vehatis good and what Is evil, and to choose and direct ourselves appropriately. So Aquinas writes:"Wherefore It has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby It has a natural inclination tats proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rattonal creature s ‘called the naturat law: Therefore, by looking at our human nature, at the natural inclinations by God, we can determine the rule and measure that should be directing our acts. These are the precepts of the natural law, which we will study more closely in the next section However, let us mentian first two more kinds of avy provided by Aquinas. Aquinas points out that while reflecting on our human nature will provide us the Precepts of the natural lav, these are quite general and would have to be made moie specific, and at the same time more concrete in the actual operation of human acts. For this reason, there is also human low. Human law refers toall instances wherein human beings construct and enforce lai in their communities. Given the larger picture of Aquinas's view, one would have a basis fo assessing the validity or invalidity of a human law: whether or not it conforms to the natu! law. Insofar as a human law goes against what nature inclines us toward, It ie nat properly speaking a laws—in the ideal sense of directing us ta the common gaod—but instead i unjust and can be called a matter af vielence.” Finally, Aquinas asks us to recall that there is 2 certain form of hapiplness that proportionate to our human nature, which viecan obtain by meansof our natural prin However, there also ls another, more complete, happiness that surpasses human's nature.? 56 __eahies: Foundations of Maralvatuatinsupernatural happiness that can be obtained through the power of God alone. To direct us toward our supernatural end, we had been given further inctructions in the form of divine Faw.3? This term, often confused with eterallaw,rofers specifically to the insta have precepts or instructions that come from is handed down to us in the sacred Scriptures (e.g., the Ten Commandments Exodus in the Old Testament or Jesus's injunction te lave one’s neighbor in the Goxpels) While this is necessary for Aquinas ashe sees our end as the blessed return te God, it is not our concern here insofar as, given that our concem is ethics, one need not rely on the ine law in order to be moral. Of interest then about this natural law theary of Aquinas ts that while it Is clearly rooted in a Christian vision, it grounds a sense of morality not on that faith but on human nature, Aquinas wrltes:"So then noone can know the eternal lave, as itis itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it ints reflection, greater or fess.... Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural lawn." ces where! jine revelation. For exaeple, we have wehot the boot. ‘The statement Is. @ remarkable claim: anyone, coming from any religious tradition, Just by looking at the nature that she shares with her fellow, human beings, would be able to determine what Is ethical. The complication ane may have over an overtly presentation Is dispelled when we recognize the universal scope that Aquinas « gious NATURAL LAW We may now turn to the specifics concerning the natural lav. “The Natural Law Summa Theologiae 1-2, Question 94, Article 2» Thomas Aquinas Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of 2 contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently 2s objects of pursuit, and their contrariesas evil, and objects af avoidance. Wherefore according, to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law Beeause In man there Is first of all an Inclinahon to good in accordance with the nature which he has in cormmon with all substances: inasmuch as every substan secks the preservation of Its own being, according to its nature and by t this inclination, whatever ts a means of preserving human hi of vrardtings off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in 1 incheanion to: things that pertain te him more specially, according to th fo wibvicls Ine a in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are ald to belong to the natural law, “whieh nature has taught to al sexual intercourse, education of offspring and co ferth. Third there ie in nan anTe Inclination te good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature Is proper to him: thus man has a natural Inclination ta know the truth about God, and te live In society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this Inclination belongs to the ‘natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom ‘one has te live, and other such things regarding the above Inclination, In Common with Other Beings In reading Aquinas, we have to consider how we, human beings, are both unique and at the same time participating Inthe community of the rest of creation. Our presence in the rest of creation does not anly mean that we interact with creatures that are not human, but that there is also in our nature something that shares in the nature of other beings. Aquinas thus identifies first that thereisin ournature, common with all other beings, a desire to preserve one’s own being. A makohiya leaf folds inward and protects itself when touched. A.cat cowers and then tries to run away when it feels threatened. Similarly, human, beings have that natural inclination to preserve thelr being, For this reason, Aquinas tells us that it Is according to the natural faw to preserve human life, We can thus say that it would be a violation of the natural law, and therefore unethical to take the life of another. Murder, for instance, would be a clear example of a vialation of the natural law. Qn a mars controversial note, it seems that taking one’s own life would be unacceptable, even in the form of physician-assisted suicide, On a more positive note, we can confidently pasit that acts that promote the continuation of life are to belaudedas ethical because they are in line with the natural faw. In Common with Other Animals Aquinas then goes on to say that there is in our human nature, common with other animals, a desire that has to do with sexual intercourse and the care of one’s offspring. As 2 matter of fact, animals periodically engage in sexuat intercourse at a specific time of “heat” and this could result in offspring. In human beings, too, that natural inclination ta-engage in the sexual act and to reproduce exists. ‘The intrinsic connection between the sexual actand fecundity givesriseto a number of notions of what Is acceptable and unacceptable in varying degrees of contentiousness An ethical issue that is hotly contested in some parts of the world Is whether abortion is acceptable. From the stance of the natural law, the act of preventing the emergence of nev fife would be considered unacceptable. Not so controversial, perhaps, would be the claims that we could more easily make about how it is good to care for the young, to make sure that they are properly fed, sheltered, and educated. On the other hand, it is bad to abuse ‘the young, to force children Into hard labor or to deprive them of basic needs or otherwise abuse them in a physical or emotional way. 5B __cthies: Foundations of Moralvaluationith regard to the sexual act, the moral judgments get more volatile. Thisargument seems to provide ground for rejecting various forms of contraception since these allow for the sexual act to take place, but inhibit procreation. This also seems to justify the claim that any form of the sexual act that could not lead to offspring must be considered deviant. One of these is the homosexual act. To explain, Thomas writes:":..certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime” The question can be raised as towhether all animals “naturally” engage in heterosexual (rather than unisexual or homosexual”) Intercourse as Aquinas (with the much more rudimentary scientific knowledge of his time) whether there must be a necessary connection between the believed. Another question act af sexual intercourse and procreation. UNIQUELY HUMAN ‘After the first two inclinations, Aquinas presents a third reason which states that we have an inclination to good according to the nature of our reason. With this, we have a natural inclination to know the truth about Ged and to live in society. tis of interest that this Is followed by matters of both an epistemic and a social concer. The examples given to us of what would be in line with this inclination are to shun ignorance and to avoid offending those people with wham one lives. We could surmise an this basis that acts of decep: , This, as mentioned, is surmise because thi fraud would be unacceptable to Aquin: something we are told directly by Thomas. In fact, a characteristic of the text which may be frustrating to anyone trying toread Aquinas is that he does not go into great detail here enumerating what specific acts would be clearly ethical or unethical. Instead, he gave certain general quideposts: the epistemic concern, which is that we know we pursue the truth, and the social concern, which is that we know we live in relation to others. The question of what particular acts would be in fine with these or not Is something that we have {o determine for ourselves through the use of reason. Let us elaborate on this further. First, we hac been presented with these three inclinations as bases for moral valuation. In light of this, we know that preserving the self is good. Contrary to common misconception. the sexual inclination and the sexual act are considered geod things, not something to be deplored or dismissed, However, reason is not only another inclination that ‘we have in par with the ethers. Instead, reason is the defining part of human nature. Thomas ‘ells us that there Isa priority among the powers of our soul, with the intellectual directing and commanding our sensitive and nutritive capacities. What this amount to isthe need to recognize that while our ether inclinations are geod, a: they are in our nature, what it means to be human is, precisely to exercise our reason in our consideration of haw the whole self should be comported toward the good. cannot simply say, "Sex is natural? iFwhat Imean bythat is that I could just engage in the act in any way ! ike without thought or care. Instead, we are enjoined to make full use of our reason and determine when the performance of o natural inclinations is appropriate. Second, recognizing how being rational is what is proper to man the apparent vagueness of the third inclination that Aquinas mentions Is counterbalanced by the recognition that he Is not interested in providing precepts that one would simply, unthinkingly, follow: To say that the human being Is rational Is to recognize that we should take up the burden of thinking carefully how'a particular act may or may not be a violation of our nature. It is to take the trouble to think carefully about how aur acts would eth contribute to, or detract from, the commen good. - For this reason, in making human laws, additions that are not at all prablematic for the natural law are possible. At first glance, it may seem like there is nothing “natural” abou ‘obeying traffic rules of paying taxes. However, if it has been decided that these contribute to the common good, then they could, in fact, be proper extensions of the natural lav. As Aquinas puts it, nothing hinders a change in the natural law by way of addition,” since our reason has found and can find many things that benefit individual and communal human life. SUMMARY In this chapter, we have seen how the natural law theory Is instrumental to an ethics that is rooted in the Christian faith. In elaborating this, we explored how Aquinas had synthesized concepts of the ancient Greeks to put forward an intellectual grounding that can overcome the limitations of a simplistic divine command theory. Instead, we are provided an objective basis for ethics: our own natural inclinations. Since these are given by ‘God, they provide us the path toward our perfection. Our natural inclinations as enumerated by Aquinas include the desire to preserve aur being, the sexual act and its fecundity, anc our use of reason. KEY WORDS + Idea of the Good + Formal Cause + Material Cause + Efficient Cause + Final Cause + Act + Potency + Eternal Law + Human Law + Divine Lave = Natural Law 60 _extucs:Foundations of Moralvalustion.