Professional Documents
Culture Documents
TITLE I:
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
POINTS TO REMEMBER
• The crimes under this title can be prosecuted even if the criminal act or acts were
committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction.
• However, prosecution can proceed only if the offender is within Philippine territory
or brought to the Philippines pursuant to an extradition treaty.
• Crimes against national security (treason, conspiracy and proposal to commit
treason, misprision of treason, espionage) can be tried only in the Philippines, as
there is a need to bring the offender here before he can be made to suffer the
consequences of the law.
• When we say national security, it should be interpreted as including rebellion,
sedition and subversion.
• The acts against national security may be committed abroad and still be
punishable under our law, but it cannot be tried under foreign law.
• In the case of crimes against the law of nations, the offender can be prosecuted
whenever he may be found because the crimes are regarded as committed
against humanity in general.
• Almost all of these are crimes committed in times of war, except the following,
which can be committed in times of peace:
1) Espionage, under Article
2) Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals- this can be
committed even if the Philippines is not a participant.
3) Violation of Neutrality- the Philippines is not a party to a war
but there is a war going on.
4) Mutiny and piracy
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CRIMINAL LAW II
Elements
1. Offender is a Filipino or resident alien;
2. There is a war in which the Philippines is
involved;
3. Offender either –
a. LEVIES war against the government
OR
b. ADHERES to the enemies, giving
them AID or COMFORT within the
Philippines or elsewhere
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TREASON REBELLION
The purpose is merely to
The purpose of levying war is to help substitute the government with
the enemy. the rebels’ own form of
government
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• If actual acts of treason are committed after the conspiracy or after the proposal is
accepted, what crime is committed?
The crime of treason is already consummated the moment the
proposal or conspiracy to commit treason is accepted. The
conspiracy or proposal is then considered merely as means in the
commission thereof.
Elements
1. Offender owes allegiance to the government,
and not a foreigner;
2. He has knowledge of conspiracy to commit
treason against the government;
3. He conceals or does not disclose and make
known the same as soon as possible to the
governor or fiscal of the province in which he
resides, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in
which he resides.
• Misprision of treason is a crime that may be committed only by citizens of the Philippines.
• The essence of the crime is that there are persons who conspire to commit treason and
the offender knew this and failed to make the necessary report to the government within
the earliest possible time. What is required is to report it as soon as possible.
• The criminal liability arises if the treasonous activity was still at the conspiratorial stage.
• Blood relationship is always subservient to national security. Article 20, accessories
exempt from criminal liability, does not apply here.
• Under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of misprision of rebellion.
• X, a Filipino citizen, has knowledge of treason committed by someone and does not
report its commission to the proper authorities. Can he be held liable for Misprision of
Treason?
No. Art. 116 does not apply when the crime of treason is already
committed. This is so because Art. 116 speaks of “knowledge of
any conspiracy against” the Government of the Philippines, not
knowledge of treason actually committed by another. Misprision of
treason contemplates the failure of a citizen to report any such
conspiracy to commit treason.
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Elements
1. Offender performs unlawful or unauthorized
acts;
2. The acts provoke or give occasion for –
a. a war involving or liable to involve the
Philippines; or
b. exposure of Filipino citizens to
reprisals on their persons or property.
• What is reprisal?
ü It is any kind of forcible or coercive measure whereby one State seeks to
exercise a deterrent effect or to obtain redress or satisfaction, directly or
indirectly, for consequences of the illegal acts of another State which has
refused to make amends for such illegal conduct.
ü Reprisal is resorted to for the purpose of settling a dispute or redressing a
grievance without going to war.
ü Intention of the offender is immaterial. A: It is committed in time of peace.
ü In inciting to war, the offender is any person. If the offender is a public
officer, the penalty is higher.
• What is the extent of reprisals?
Reprisals are not limited to military action. It could be economic reprisals
or denial of entry into their country.
Example:
a. The raising, without sufficient authorization, of troops within
the Philippines for the service of a foreign nation against
another nation.
b. The public destruction of the flag or seal of a foreign state
or the public manifestations of hostility to the head or
ambassador of another state.
• Committed in times of peace
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Elements
1. There is a war in which the Philippines is not
involved;
2. There is a regulation issued by a competent
authority to enforce neutrality;
3. Offender violates the regulation.
• Neutrality.
ü A nation or power which takes no part in a contest of arms going on between
other countries.
ü A condition of a nation that, in times of war, takes no part in the dispute but
continues peaceful dealings with the belligerents.
ü It is a status created under international law, by means of a stand on the part
of a State not to side with any of the parties at war.
• Who has the authority to issue a regulation for the enforcement of neutrality?
The regulation must be issued by competent authority like the President
of the Philippines or the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, during a war between different countries in which the
Philippines is not taking sides.
Art. 120. Correspondence with hostile country. — Any person who in time of war, shall have
correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be
punished:
1. By prision correccional, if the correspondence has been prohibited by the Government;
2. By prision mayor, if such correspondence be carried on in ciphers or conventional
signs; and
3. By reclusion temporal, if notice or information be given thereby which might be useful
to the enemy. If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or
information, he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to death.
Elements
1. It is in time of war in which the Philippines is
involved;
2. Offender makes correspondence with an
enemy country or territory occupied by enemy
troops;
3. The correspondence is either –
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CRIMINAL LAW II
• What is correspondence?
It is communication by means of letters or it may refer to the letters which
pass between those who have friendly or business relations.
• What does correspondence to hostile country contemplate?
It contemplates correspondence to officials of the enemy country, not
correspondence with private individuals in the enemy country.
• Note: Even if the correspondence contains innocent matters, if the correspondence is
prohibited by the government, it is punishable because of the possibility that the
information useful to the enemy might be revealed unwittingly.
• What are ciphers?
ü Secret message or code.
ü If ciphers were used, there is no need for prohibition by the
Government to consummate the crime. If ciphers were not
used, there is need for prohibition.
• What are the circumstances qualifying the crime of correspondence to hostile country?
ü That the:
1. Notice or information might be useful to the enemy
2. Offender intended to aid the enemy.
ü Note: Both must concur.
• X, with intent to aid the enemy, gave the latter notice and information. Is he liable under
Art.120?
If the offender intended to aid the enemy by giving such notice or
information, the crime amounts to treason; hence, the penalty is the same
as that for treason.
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CRIMINAL LAW II
Elements
1. There is a war in which the Philippines is
involved
2. Offender must be owing allegiance to the
government
3. Offender attempts to flee or go to enemy
country
4. Going to the enemy country is prohibited by
competent authority
Piracy and Mutiny on the High Seas or in Philippine Waters and Qualified Piracy
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Elements
1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine
waters;
2. Offenders are neither members of its
complement nor passengers of the vessel;
3. Offenders either –
a. attack or seize a vessel on the high
seas or in Philippine waters; or
b. seize in the vessel while on the high
seas or in Philippine waters the whole
or part of its cargo, its equipment or
personal belongings of its
complement or passengers;
c. There is intent to gain
• What is piracy?
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation in the high seas, without lawful
authority and done with animo furandi (with intent to steal) and in the spirit
and intention of universal hostility. [People vs. Lol-lo]
• In general, what is the nature of the crime of piracy?
Piracy is a crime against all mankind. Pirates are in law, hostis humani
generis.
• Modes in committing piracy
1. Attacking or seizing a vessel on the high seas or in Philippine waters;
2. Seizing in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or
part of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.
• Piracy cannot co-exist with the crime of robbery. Robbery, therefore, cannot be
committed on board a vessel. But if the taking is without violence or intimidation on
persons of force upon things, the crime of piracy cannot be committed, but only theft.
• What is the meaning of high seas?
High seas mean any waters on the sea coast which are without the
boundaries of the low water mark although such waters may be in the
jurisdictional limits of a foreign government, parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive zone, in the territorial seas, or in the internal
waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.
(UNCLOS)
• What are the kinds of piracy under Art. 122, as amended by R.A. 7659?
Piracy in high seas and piracy in Philippine waters.
• Which court has jurisdiction over piracy committed in the high seas?
Jurisdiction is with any court where offenders are found or
arrested. The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all
other crimes, has no territorial limit.
• Which court has jurisdiction over piracy committed in Philippine waters?
Jurisdiction is vested with Philippine courts.
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• If piracy was committed outside the Philippine waters, will the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the offense?
Yes, for piracy falls under Title I Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies even if the offenders were charged, not
with a violation of qualified piracy under the Code but under a
special law, P.D. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997])
• How is piracy distinguished from robbery on the high seas?
PIRACY ROBBERY ON THE HIGH SEAS
The offender is a member of the
The offender is an outsider. complement or a passenger of the
vessel.
• What is mutiny?
ü It is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer or the raising of
commotions and disturbances on board a ship against the
authority of its commander.
ü Mutiny is punished in Article 122.Mutiny is usually committed by
the other members of the complement and may be committed by
the passengers of the vessel.
• Abbeting piracy
In Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532, the act of aiding
pirates or abetting piracy is penalized as a crime distinct from
piracy.
Said section penalizes any person who knowingly and in any
manner aids or protects pirates, such as giving them
information about the movement of the police or other peace
officers of the government, or acquires or receives property
taken by such pirates, or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or who directly or indirectly abets the commission
of piracy.
Also, it is expressly provided in the same section that the
offender shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
offenders and punished in accordance with the Revised Penal
Code.
This provision of PD No. 532 with respect to piracy in
Philippine waters has not been incorporated into the RPC.
Neither may it be considered repealed by RA 7659 since there
is nothing in the amendatory law which is inconsistent with
said section.
Apparently, there is still the crime of abetting piracy in
Philippine waters under PD No. 532.
RA 9372
A person who commits an act punishable as piracy and
mutiny under Article 122 thereby sowing and creating a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace, in order to coerce the government to
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Elements
1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine
waters;
2. Offenders are either members of its
complement, or passengers of the vessel;
3. Offenders either –
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People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw (G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922)
Facts:
2 boats of Dutch possession left matuta. In 1 of the boats was 1 individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat 11 men, women, and children, subjects of Holland. The 2nd boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by 6 vintas manned by 24 Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but
once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and
brutally violated 2 of the women. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, except the 2 young
women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge.
The Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. 2 of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo,
who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the 2 women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with
the crime of piracy
Issue: WON Julo’s CFI has Jurisdiction over the case given the fact that it is beyond the
Philippine territory
Held:
CFI of Sulu has jurisdiction.
All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation
on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
• Pirates are in law hostes humani generis.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be
punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits.
• As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was
committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat.,
184.)
Piracy was committed with offense against chastity and abandonment of persons without
apparent means of saving themselves. There are three aggravating circumstances – the wrong
done was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission,
advantage was taken of superior strength and ignominy. There is one mitigating circumstance
of lack of instruction. But due to the horrible nature of the crime committed, the penalty
imposed is the capital punishment.
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People vs Catalan
Facts: At 3:00 o’clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and
Juan, Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea around 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon,
Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. They were later identified as the accused
Emiliano Catantan and Jose Ursal alias “Bimbo”. They boarded the pumpboat of the Pilapils
and pointed his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone
and ordered him and Juan, Jr. to “dapa.” They hogtied Eugene and covered him up with
tarpaulin, stepped on him and ordered Juan to ferry them to Daan Tabogon using their
pumpboat. However, as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stopped running.
And as they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. This was operated by
Juanito and its engine was new. Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat
cautioning them not to say anything.
On a pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded Juanito’s pumpboat. And ordered
him to take them to Mungaz. Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his
net and harvest his catch, but Catalan threatened to kill him. As Ursal was transferring to the
Juanito’s pumpboat, the Pilapil brothers got the chance to escape.
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose
Macven Ursal alias “Bimbo” guilty of violating of PD No. 532 otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974. They were charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Of the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
He contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved only
constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under
PD No. 532.
Issue: Whether or not Emiliano Catalan violated PD No. 532 or Anti-Piracy and Highway
Robbery Law
Held: The court held that there was no reversible error in the decision appealed. They
convicted EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No.
532 and sentenced him accordingly to reclusion perpetua. The costs against accused-
appellant.
There was piracy, not grave coercion, where, as part of the act of seizing their boat, the
occupants of the vessel were forced to go elsewhere other than their place of destination.
Grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely
within the concept of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan, Jr. were compelled
to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was part of the act of
seizing their boat.
Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. To
impede the livelihood of small fishermen would be to deprive them of their very survival, and
the likes of the accused within the purview of P.D. No. 532 are the obstacle to the “economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people.”
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Elements
1. The vessel is on the high seas or Philippine
waters;
2. Offenders may or may not be members of its
complement, or passengers of the vessel;
3. Offenders either –
a. Attack or seize the vessel; or
b. seize the whole or part of the cargo, its
equipment., or personal belongings of
the crew or passengers;
4. The precedings were committed under any of
the following circumstances:
a. whenever they have seized a vessel by
boarding or firing upon the same;
b. whenever the pirates have abandoned
their victims without means of saving
themselves; or
c. whenever the crime is accompanied by
murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape.
• If any of the circumstances in Article 123 is present, piracy is qualified.
Qualified piracy has been categorized as a heinous crime.
• Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere circumstances
qualifying piracy and cannot be punished as separate crimes, nor can
they be complexed with piracy.
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PUNISHABLE ACTS
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as
herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder
or homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders
abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is
accomplished by firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period
shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed during or on the
occasion of the commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for
ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has
performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
• What is the distinction between Art. 122 and P.D. 532, with respect to
piracy committed in Philippine waters?
Art 122 PD 532
No qualification as to the criminal, No qualification as to the
hence, offender may be a crew, a criminal, hence, offender may
passenger or a stranger. be a crew, a passenger or a
stranger.
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TITLE II:
CRIMES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE
124 Arbitrary detention
125 Delay in the delivery of detained persons to
the proper judicial
authorities
126 Delaying release
127 Expulsion
128 Violation of domicile
129 Search warrants maliciously
obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained
130 Searching domicile without
witnesses
131 Prohibition, interruption, and
dissolution of peaceful meetings
132 Interruption of religious worship
133 Offending the religious feelings
POINTS TO REMEMBER
• All offenses in this Title are required to be committed by public officers, except offending
the religious feelings.
• What are the classes of arbitrary detention? A:
1. Detaining a person without legal ground
2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper authorities
3. Delaying release
• All offenses under this title can only be committed by public officers except offending the
religious feelings under Article 133.
• The primary offender in ARTICLES 124-132 is a public officer acting under supposed
exercise of official functions, albeit illegally.
• A private person may be liable under these articles ONLY WHEN he:
1. Conspires with a public officer; OR
2. He becomes an accomplice or accessory to said crimes
• ARTICLE 133 can be committed by EITHER a public officer OR a private person.
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detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen
days but not more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds
for the detention of any person.
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He detains a person
3. Detention is without legal grounds.
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enclosure?
Yes. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the
curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the
victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear
in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with
the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intent and purposes, detained
against his will. (Benito Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, Oct. 1, 2003)
• When is detention said to be without legal grounds?
The detention of a person is without legal ground:
1. When he has not committed any crime or, at least, there is
no reasonable ground for suspicion that he has committed
a crime.
XPN: A valid warrantless arrest (Sec.5, Rule 113,
Revised Rules of Court).
2. When he is not suffering from violent insanity or any other
ailment requiring compulsory confinement in a hospital.
• Can private individuals be held liable for arbitrary detention?
Yes, if they conspired with such public officers.
• What are the legal grounds for the detention of persons without which a public officer
may be held liable?
1. Commission of a crime
2. Violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory
confinement of the patient in a hospital
3. When the person to be arrested is an escaping prisoner
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• Distinctions
• If the public officer who effected the arrest has no such authority to detain a person, what
crime can he be made liable for?
If the offender does not have the authority to detain a person or to
make such arrest, the crime committed by him is illegal detention.
A public officer who is acting outside the scope of his official duties
is no better than a private citizen.
• Note: The crime of unlawful arrest is, however, absorbed in the crime of arbitrary
detention.
• X, a police officer, falsely imputes a crime against A to be able to arrest him but he
appears to be not determined to file a charge against him. What crime, if any, did X
commit?
The crime is arbitrary detention through unlawful arrest. (Boado, 2008)
• Suppose X planted evidence to effect the arrest, what crime, if any, is committed?
It is arbitrary detention through incriminating innocent persons.
• Continuing crime is different from a continuous crime
Ramos v. Enrile: Rebels later on retire. According to the SC, once you have
committed rebellion and have not been punished or amnestied,
then the rebels continue to engage in rebellion, unless the rebels
renounce his affiliation. Arrest can be made without a warrant
because this is a continuing crime.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Astorga committed arbitrary detention even if such does not involve
physical restraint?
HELD: The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment
of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. If the
acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient
to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and
movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents
and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute the elements of said crime and that the proofs adduced at the
investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently, averring that accused-
respondent was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent
Judge Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain, can be liable for the crime of
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Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain
or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and
mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. A perusal of the
powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio
captain except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain
or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest
of petitioner Valdez.
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25,
1987, respectively).
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee;
2. He detains a person for some legal ground;
3. He fails to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within –
a. 12 hours for light penalties;
b. 18 hours for correctional penalties; and
c. 36 hours for afflictive or capital penalties
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not. (Upon delivery, judge or court acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of
commitment of prisoner.) [Sayo v. Chief of Police (1948)]
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SAYO VS. CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA80 PHIL 859 (1948) Case digest
FACTS: Upon complaint of one Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested
the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office
of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city
fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper court of justice.
Held:
a. Whether or not petitioners had been illegally restrained of their liberty?
Yes. Petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered
unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “the penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any
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person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours.” Without making any pronouncement as to the
responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the
policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the
matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the
fact that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a
complaint against them with the city fiscal, The court holds that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now
detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice.
b. Whether or not the city fiscal of manila is a judicial authority within the meaning of the
provisions of article 125 of the RPC?
The surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a
peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge
or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge,
whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the
prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and the latter does not
assume the physical custody of the person arrested. The judicial authority mentioned in
section 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of
Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested
without warrant. For the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a
person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation
proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with
offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere
investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information
against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if
the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant
of arrest of the defendant.
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People v. Tan
G.R. No. 117321 February 11, 1998
FACTS:
Tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, a to inform her that he will drive
Lito Amido and appellant Herson Tan to Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie
was seen alive. His body was later found sprawled on a diversion road with fourteen stab
wounds.
Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant
in connection with the instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in
Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what
actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were
responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover,
he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of Barrio Summit,
Muntinlupa. With the help of appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a
team to retrieve the same.
Tan and Amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery with murder
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their headquarters,
he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a
suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly committed
in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely conversing inside the police station, he
admitted that he did not inform appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to writing.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the appellant, given before a police investigator upon
invitation and without the benefit of counsel, is admissible in evidence against him.
HELD: No.
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tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the
investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must
correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the
accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would
thus not suffice.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be
in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the assistance
of counsel."
SUMMARY: Mayor Sanchez was accused of being involved in the crimes of rape and killing.
An invitation to the preliminary investigation was served on him, and it is by virtue of that
invitation that he was taken to Camp Vicente Lim for questioning, and it was found out that he
was the perpetrator of the act. Formal charges were subsequently filed. Petitioner assails
validity of arrest in the form of invitation. Court held that original arrest (invitation) was illegal,
but subsequent issuance of warrant cures its defect.
ISSUE/S:
WON the arrest of Mayor Sanchez was valid – YES
RULING/RATIO:
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August 13, 1993 illegal detention (invitation constituted an invalid arrest) was cured by
subsequent issuance of a valid warrant of arrest.
Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court defines arrest as the taking of a person into custody
in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. Under Section 2
of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other
and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. “Invitation” came from a high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Command or an order of arrest
that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the
"invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers
who had come to fetch him. Note that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial
investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for
questioning.
Petitioner was right when he contended that such arrest was not under those included in valid
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court because only the
testimonies were relied upon regarding the identification of petitioner, so that arresting officer
had no personal knowledge nor were present during the commission of the crime. Neither it
has just been committed because arrest took place 46 days after the crime was perpetrated.
However, even if the original arrest was illegal, the RTC later on acquired jurisdiction on his
person by virtue of the warrant issued to him and co-accused. Even on the assumption that
no warrant was issued at all, the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner. Filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest,
against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him
the right to be released because of such defect.
Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for the issuance of a detention
order resulting in the actual detention of the accused under the abovementioned
circumstances.
Yes. The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue the
questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the judge are
defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the absence of the
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judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving applications, petitions,
inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and notices that follow as a matter of course
under these rules, and may also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts
of executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to
them, or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships,
trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to
the judge, together with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to
make findings and include the same in his report.
Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of detention, as
such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to rule that a clerk of court,
unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the commitment of a person charged with a
penal offense.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge is not available,
the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the maximum hours for
detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code had already expired. Failure
to cause the release may result in an offense under the Code, to wit:
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and his
relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such detention
order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused. Because of the
unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty
without due process of law for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on
January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal
judge on March 25, 1999.
Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by the
respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Underscoring ours)
Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank,
should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility. Their conduct at all times must
not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else must be in accordance
with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of court, such as herein respondent, is a ranking and
essential officer in the judicial system. His office is the hub of activities. He performs delicate
administrative functions essential to the prompt and proper administration of justice.
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the dispensation of justice, one
of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the land. His defense that he is not a
lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the legal implications of his detention
order, deserves scant consideration. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
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therewith, especially a clerk of court who ought to know better than an ordinary layman.
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to undermine the
faith and trust of the people in the judiciary. The Court cannot countenance any act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norms
of public accountability and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.
The respondent’s issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of liberty, it
also considerably diminished the people’s faith in the judiciary. For the very officer of the court
on whom they depended to safeguard their human and constitutional rights was also the one
who violated these rights. Respondent should be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a ranking
officer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights are protected.
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is liable as charged
administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that respondent be merely meted
out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly the actions of the respondent for he has
admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the past. The implication of his action
as an official of the court is not only disturbing but shocking, for it involves no less than a
violation of the constitutional right to liberty. We hold that respondent’s unauthorized issuance
of the detention order and his failure to inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute
not merely gross neglect of duty but outright grave misconduct.
• Be informed, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel
• Be assisted by counsel at all times
ü Preferably of his own choice
1. If the person arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation cannot
afford the services of counsel, the investigating officer must provide him
with one.
2. Counsel shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
• Be visited by or have conferences with:
ü Any member of his immediate family, which INCLUDES
1. Spouse
2. fiancé or fiancée
3. parent or child
4. brother or sister,
5. grandparent or grandchild, o uncle or aunt,
6. nephew or niece, AND o guardian or ward
ü Any medical doctor OR priest OR religious minister
Chosen by him, or by any member of his immediate family, or by
his counsel
ü Any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission
on Human Rights or the Office of the President.
• The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the
investigating officer.
ü Its contents shall be read and adequately explained by the counsel
to the person arrested or detained BEFORE he signs or puts his
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thumbmark thereto.
ü Otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
• Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing.
ü It shall be signed by the person in the presence of his counsel.
ü In the absence of counsel AND upon a valid waiver, in the presence of any of the
following:
1. Parents;
2. Elder brothers and sisters;
3. Spouse;
4. Municipal mayor, judge, school
supervisor; OR
5. Priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by the person
ü Otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any
proceeding.
• Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel.
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. There is a:
a. Judicial or executive order for the release
of a prisoner or detention prisoner, OR
b. A proceeding upon a petition for the
liberation of such person
3. Offender without good reason delays –
a. The service of the notice of such order to
the prisoner
b. The performance of such judicial or
executive order for the release of the
prisoner; OR
c. The proceedings upon a petition for the
release of such person
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3. Unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such
person.
• Note: The prisoners could be prisoners by final judgment or detention prisoners. Wardens
and jailers are the officers most likely to violate this provision.
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He either–
a. Expels any person from the Philippines;
OR
b. Compels a person to change residence
c. Offender is not authorized to do so by
law.
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Villacicencio Vs Lukban
G.R. No. L-14639
FACTS: One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night,
without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the
case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was
deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their
secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by
the respondents.
ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.
HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban
committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against
their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law
punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any
person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the
Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen.
Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like
Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to
isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their
belongings or, worse, without even consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this,
Lukban etal must be severely punished.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines?
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Ruling: The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance national interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the peace. The
president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to destabilize the
country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this time would only exacerbate and
intensify the violence directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become
serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return
to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Violation of domicile
• Qualifying circumstances:
1. Night time
2. Papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not
returned immediately after the search made by the offender.
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• Acts punished:
1. Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof
In the plain view doctrine, public officer should be legally entitled
to be in the place where the effects were found. If he entered the
place illegally and he saw the effects, doctrine inapplicable; thus,
he is liable for violation of domicile.
2. Searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of
such owner, OR
Public officer who enters with consent searches for paper and
effects without the consent of the owner. Even if he is welcome in
the dwelling, it does not mean he has permission to search.
3. Refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling
and after having been required to leave the same
The act punished is not the entry but the refusal to leave. If the
offender upon being directed to leave, followed and left, there is
no crime of violation of domicile. Entry must be done
surreptitiously; without this, crime may be unjust vexation. But if
entering was done against the will of the occupant of the house,
meaning there was express or implied prohibition from entering the
same, even if the occupant does not direct him to leave, the crime
of violation of domicile is already committed because it would fall
in number 1.
• How is the crime of violation of domicile committed?
Violation of domicile is committed by a public officer authorized to
implement a search warrant or warrant of arrest but at the time of incident,
he is not armed with warrant.
• Suppose the public officer is not authorized to execute search warrants and warrants of
arrests, what crime can he be liable for?
Qualified trespass to dwelling (Art. 280, RPC).
• Suppose the punishable acts under Art. 128 are committed by a private person, what
crime did he commit?
Trespass to dwelling
• If a public officer searches a person outside his dwelling, not armed with a search warrant
or a warrant of arrest, are the provisions of Art. 128 applicable?
No, because the papers and other effects mentioned in Art. 128 must be
found in dwelling. The crime committed is grave coercion, if violence and
intimidation are used (Art. 286), or unjust vexation, if there is no violence
or intimidation (Art. 287).
• Are the provisions under Art. 128 applicable if the occupant of the premises is not the
owner?
Yes, it would be sufficient if the inhabitant is lawful occupant using the
premises as his dwelling, although he is not the property owner.
• What is the meaning of against the will of the owner?
It presupposes opposition or prohibition by the owner, whether express or
implied, and not merely the absence of consent.
If the surreptitious entry had been made through an opening
not intended to that purpose, the offender would be liable
under the first mode since it is entry over the implied
objection of the inhabitant.
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• RULE 113 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT: a public officer, who breaks into the
premises, incurs no liability WHEN a person to be arrested enters said premises and
closes it thereafter, provided that the officer first gives a notice of arrest.
• The public officer should have first given notice of an arrest.
• According to People vs. Doria (1999) and People vs. Elamparo (2000), the following are
the accepted exceptions to the warrant requirement:
1. Search incidental to an arrest;
2. Search of moving vehicles;
3. Evidence in plain view;
4. Stop and frisk;
5. Customs searches; AND
6. Consented warrantless search.
• Mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk.”
• A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.
• Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
1. The general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in
an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible
criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
2. The more pressing interest of safety and self- preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer. [Malacat v. CA (1997)]
• In order to commit this crime, the entry must be against the will of the owner. If the entry
is only without the consent of the owner, the crime of violation of domicile is not
committed.
• The prohibition may be expressed or implied. If the signs “Do not enter” and “Strangers
keep out” are posted in front of the house or dwelling, then the prohibition is express. If
the door is locked, or even if it is open but these are barriers to indicate the manifest
intention of the owner to bar strangers from entering, there is implied prohibition.
• The primary object of the law is to preserve the privacy of abode of the o ended party.
Hence, if the privacy is already lost, as when the o ender has been allowed by the owner
to enter the dwelling together with other persons, any subsequent change of attitude will
not restore the privacy which was already lost. When privacy is waived, trespass to
dwelling or violation of domicile cannot be committed.
• There are only three recognized instances when search without a warrant is considered
valid, and, therefore, the seizure of any evidence done is also valid. Outside of these,
search would be invalid and the objects seized would not be admissible in evidence.
1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest;
2. Where the search was made on a moving vehicle or vessel such that the exigency
of the situation prevents the searching officer from securing a search warrant;
3. When the article seized is within plain view of the officer making the seizure
without making a search therefore.
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People v. Doria
FACTS
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one “ Jun” [Doria] was
engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust
operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and
upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so
he led the police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. “ Jun” identified her as
“Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit
looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit
noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and inside it
was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him
by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He
peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1
Badua recovered the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were
examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425
[Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC
convicted them.
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the
alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing
that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home
and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.
“ Plain view ”
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.
Requisites
1. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
3. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
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An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises
when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it
contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box
were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana
because it had the same plastic wrapping as the “buy-bust marijuana.” Each of the ten bricks
of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic
bags– white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that
the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what
the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not
immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it
was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of
the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded
and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao ’s house
Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof
that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the
drug as evidence in court.
Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold
and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale
of said drug
Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person, when
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
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Facts: Joel Elamparo (D) has been convicted with Illegal Possession of Drugs and penalized
with reclusion perpetua. The case was raised for automatic review.
Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a report from an informant that
"some people are selling shabu and marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City."
Thus, Baldonado organized a buy-bust team and deployed at a known "market" for buyers of
marijuana. Thereafter, a runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The runner
then left and returned with the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy-bust team
member, then handed over the marked money and arrested the runner who freed himself and
ran.
The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type house with steel gate.
Having trapped the runner inside the house, the police officers frisked him and recovered the
marked money. The police officers likewise found Joel Elamparo (D) repacking five bricks of
"marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table inside the house. Elamparo (D)
was then arrested.
Ruling: Yes. Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and
seizures have been judicially formulated:
1. search incidental to a lawful arrest,
2. search of moving vehicles,
3. seizure in plain view,
4. customs searches, and
5. waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure.
This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine. In People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 710-
711 (1999), the Court held that—
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur
a. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
b. the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
c. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position
from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open
to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.
When the runner wrenched himself free from the grasp of Gaviola, he instinctively ran towards
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the house of Elamparo (D). The members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after
him and entering the house without a search warrant for they were pursuing a fleeing criminal.
Once inside the house, the police officers cornered the runner and recovered the buy-bust
money from him. They also caught Elamparo (D) in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana
bricks which were in full view on tap of a table.
MALACAT vs. CA
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession a hand grenade after he was
searched by a group of policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously when he was
hanging around Plaza Miranda with his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking
men. When the policemen approached the group of men, they scattered in all directions which
prompted the police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended and a search was
made on his person.
He was then convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. Hence, the present petition wherein
petitioner contended that the lower court erred in holding that the search made on him and
the seizure of the hand grenade from him was an appropriate incident to his arrest and that it
erred in admitting the hand grenade as evidence since it was admissible because it was a
product of an unreasonable and illegal search.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32
subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described
as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
1. customs searches;
2. search of moving vehicles;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consent searches;
5. a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. a "stop and frisk.’
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of
a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms
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of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable
scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may
search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon
or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the
commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or
which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
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Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense,
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured
the same, shall exceed his
authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
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same name was found but in a different address. The occupant resisted
but the public officer insisted on the search. Drugs were found and seized
and occupant was prosecuted and convicted by the trial court. The
Supreme Court acquitted him because the public officers are required to
follow the search warrant to the letter. They have no discretion on the
matter. Plain view doctrine is inapplicable since it presupposes that the
officer was legally entitled to be in the place where the effects where
found. Since the entry was illegal, plain view doctrine does not apply.
• Malicious warrant. Example.
ü X was a respondent of a search warrant for illegal possession of firearms. A return
was made. The gun did not belong to X and the witness had no personal
knowledge that there is a gun in that place.
• Abuse examples:
ü X owner was handcuffed while search was going-on.
ü Tank was used to ram gate prior to announcement that a search will be made The
search warrant is not a license to commit destruction.
ü Persons who were not respondents were searched
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or
employee
2. He is armed with search warrant
legally procured
3. He searches the domicile, papers
or other belongings of any person
4. The owner, or any members of his
family, or two
5. witnesses residing in the same
locality are not present.
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• There are searches and seizures which are authorized by law and which can be done
without the attendance of witnesses. For instance, the Tari and Customs Code
authorizes persons with police authority under Sec. 2203, to enter; pass through or
search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being used as a dwelling
house; and to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft, and any trunk, package,
box or envelope, or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law.
Prohibition, interruption
and dissolution of peaceful meetings
Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or employee
2. He performs any of the following acts:
a. Prohibiting or interrupting,
without legal ground, the holding
of a peaceful meeting, or by
dissolving the same
b. Hindering any person from joining
any lawful association, or from
attending any of its meetings
c. Prohibiting or hindering any
person from addressing, either
alone or together with others, any
petition to the authorities for the
correction of abuses or redress of
grievances
• The government has a right to require a permit before any gathering can be made.
HOWEVER, the government only has regulatory, NOT PROHIBITORY, powers with
regard to such requirement.
• The permit should state the day, time, and place of the gathering.
• If the permit is denied arbitrarily, OR the officer dictates the place where
the meeting is to be held, this article is VIOLATED.
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• If in the course of the assembly, which started out peacefully, the participants committed
illegal acts like oral defamation or inciting to sedition, a public officer or law enforcer can
stop or dissolve the meeting.
• Two criteria to determine whether this article would be violated:
1. Dangerous tendency rule – applied during times of national
unrest such as to prevent coup d’etat.
2. Clear and present danger rule – applied during times of peace.
Stricter rule.
• To be held liable under Art. 131, is it necessary that the offender be a stranger, not a
participant of a meeting that has been interrupted and dissolved?
Yes. If the offender is a participant of the meeting, he is liable for
unjust vexation
• Note: Interrupting and dissolving the meeting of municipal council by a public officer is a
crime against a legislative body not punished under Art. 131, but under Art . 143 (Acts
Tending to Prevent the Meeting of the Assembly and Similar bodies) and Art. 144
(Disturbance of Proceedings). If the offender is a private individual, the crime is
disturbance of public order under Art. 153.
• Is the right to peaceful assembly absolute?
The right to peaceful assembly is not absolute. It may be regulated in order
that it may not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal
rights, nor injurious to the right of the community or society.
• In requiring a permit before any meeting or assembly is held, can it be construed as
preventing peaceful assemblies?
No, the permit requirement shall be in exercise only of the government’s
regulatory powers and not really to prevent peaceful assemblies. This
requirement is legal as long as it is not being exercised as a prohibitory
power.
• If the application for the permit to peaceably assemble is arbitrarily denied, what crime is
committed?
If the permit is denied arbitrarily, Article 131 is violated. If the officer would
not give the permit unless the meeting is held in a particular place which
he dictates defeats the exercise of the right to peaceably assemble, Article
131 is violated. The crime committed is prohibition to peaceably assemble
in accordance with Art. 131.
• Suppose, the officer would not give the permit unless the meeting is held in particular
place which he dictates and such place defeats the exercise of the rights to peaceably
assemble, is Art. 131 violated?
Yes.
Meeting must be peaceful and there must be no ground for
prohibiting, dissolving, or interrupting that meeting.
• Offender must be a stranger, not a participant, in the peaceful meeting; otherwise, it’s
unjust vexation
• Interrupting and dissolving a meeting of the municipal council by a public officer is a
crime against the legislative body, not punishable under this article
• The person talking on a prohibited subject at a public meeting contrary to agreement that
no speaker should touch on politics may be stopped
• But stopping the speaker who was attacking certain churches in public
meeting is a violation of this article
• Prohibition must be without lawful cause or without lawful authority
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Elements
1. Offender is a public officer or
employee;
2. Religious ceremonies or
manifestations of any religious are
about to take place or are going on;
3. Offender prevents or disturbs the
same.
Elements
1. Acts complained of were
performed in a place devoted to
religious worship, OR during the
celebration of any religious
ceremony;
2. The acts must be notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the
faithful.
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• What are the religious ceremonies covered by Arts. 132 and 133?
Religious ceremonies covered are those religious acts performed
outside of a church, such as procession and special prayers for
burying person.
• If in a place devoted to religious purpose, there is no need for an ongoing religious
ceremony
• Example of religious ceremony (acts performed outside the church).
Processions and special prayers for burying dead persons
but NOT prayer rallies
• Acts must be directed against religious practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of
ridicule, as mocking or scoffing or attempting to damage an object of religious veneration
• There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful, mere arrogance or
rudeness is not enough
• People v. Baes (1939)
An act is NOTORIOUSLY OFFENSIVE to the religious feelings when a person:
1. ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a
religious dogma
2. works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious
ceremonies
3. plays with or damages or destroys any object or
veneration by the faithful
WON an act is offensive to the religious feelings, is a question of fact which must
be adjudged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other
faithful ones.
What happened in this case was that a Catholic priest complained against a group
that passed by the churchyard as they were holding the funeral rites of a Church
of Christ member.
Laurel Dissent: The determination should NOT be made to depend upon more or
less broad or narrow conception of any given religion. Facts and circumstances
should be viewed through an unbiased judicial criterion.
This later became the majority decision in People v. Tengson.
• People v. Nanoy
The crime is only UNJUST VEXATION when the act is NOT directed to the
religious belief itself and there is no intention of causing so serious a
disturbance as to interrupt a religious ceremony.
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HELD: The facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article
133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts
and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established, the
court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that of
trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is
a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholic and not
those of other faithful ones.
Laurel dissent: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or
less broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion, but should be gauged having
in view the nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstance
which should be viewed through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the
gravity or leniency of the offense would hinge on the subjective characterization of the act
from the point of view of a given religious denomination or sect, and in such a case, the
application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal, dangerous, especially in a country
said to be "once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution.”
People v. Tengson
Burial rights performed inside a Roman Catholic Cemetery.
For an act to be notoriously offensive to religious feelings it must be directed against a religious
practice or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule. The act of performing burial rites inside
a Roman Cathoilic Cemetery, in accordance with the rules of practices of the sect Christ is the
Answer by reading passages from the bible, etc is not notoriously offensive to the feelings of
religious persons, provided there was no intent to mock, scoff at or to desecrate any religious
act or object venerated by people of a particular religion.
People vs Nanoy
FACTS:
While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon services in its chapel,
accused Epifanio Nanoy, who was drunk, entered with uplifted hands, approached Levita
Lapura, the song leader, and attempted to grab her. Levita Lepura ran away from Nanoy.
Romeo Zafra, also a member of said congregation, held the accused and led him outside the
church. The other members of the sect also ran out of the church and the religious services
were discontinued.
Accused was charged with the crime of offending religious feelings penalized under Art. 133
of the RPC. The complaint alleged that he had the intention of stopping the said rite in an
unholy manner.
Trial court found Nanoy guilty of disturbance or interruption of a religious ceremony, penalized
under A153 of the RPC and sentenced him to 10 months and 21 days of imprisonment, plus
a fine of Php50 with subsidiary imprisonment in the case of insolvency. Accused appealed,
arguing that the offense, if any is unjust vexation.
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ISSUE/S
1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy of disturbance or interruption of a religious
ceremony.
2. WON the offense was unjust vexation.
RULES
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a place
devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony, shall perform
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. There must be deliberate intent to hurt
the feelings of the faithful.
ANALYSIS
1. YES. The appellant did NOT perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the
faithful. Neither did he cause such a serious disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the
services of the said congregation. That he had no intention of interrupting the services
was shown by the fact that appellant allowed himself to be led outside the church by
Zomeo Zafra.
CONCLUSION/HELD/DISPOSITIVE:
Decision MODIFIED. Accused-appellant guilty of only unjust vexation and sentenced to pay a
fine of Php100 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The accused is only guilty of unjust vexation penalized by 287 (2). He did not perform acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. Neither did he cause such serious
disturbance as to interrupt or disturb the services of the congregation.
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TITLE III:
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People vs Geronimo
G.R. No. L-8936
Facts:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal
alias Tony, alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny Abundio Romagosa
alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli,
alias Noli Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias Tagle, Rosendo
Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias
Eddy, Santiago Rotas alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo
Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias Maclang, alias Berto, alias
Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny, Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera
alias Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez, Pedro Anino alias
Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe alias
Cmdr. Berion, alias Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping committed.
In Camarines Sur, the above-named accused being then ranking officers and/or members of,
or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter
being the armed force of said Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an
agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and therefore, conspiring together
and confederating among themselves with all of the thirty-one accused.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants committed the crime of rebellion?
Held:
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the information. When the case
was called for trial on October 12, 1954, however, he asked the permission of the court to
substitute his original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea. On the basis
of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed
upon the accused, his voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the penalty imposable upon the accused
was only prision mayor, for the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the crimes of murders robberies,
and kidnapping being the natural consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged
against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On October 18, 1954, the
trial court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons killed, as listed
in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceedings. From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole
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question of whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of rebellion with
murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple rebellion.
However, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple
(non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the
crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-
Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to
pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal
Code) for the rebellion; and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18
years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000;
and to pay the costs.
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REBELLION SEDITION
REBELLION
TREASON
The uprising is against the
The levying of war is done to aid the enemy.
government.
The purpose is to substitute the The purpose is to deliver the government to the
existing government with another. enemy.
REBELLION
SUBVERSION
• On May 5, 1992, at about 6:00 a.m., while Governor Alegre of Laguna was on board his
car traveling along the National Highway of Laguna. Joselito and Vicente shot him on the
head resulting in his instant death. At that time, Joselito and Vicente were members of
liquidation squad of the New People’s Army and they killed the governor upon orders of
their senior officer Commander Tiago. According to Joselito and Vicente, they were
ordered to kill Governor Alegre because of his corrupt practices. If you were
the prosecutor, what crime will you charge Joselito and Vicente?
If I were the prosecutor, I would charge Joselito and
Vicente with the crime of rebellion, considering that
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the killers were members of the liquidation squad of the NPA and
the killing was upon orders of their commander; hence, politically‐
motivated. This was the ruling in People v. Avila, SCRA 1568,
involving identical facts which is a movement taken judicial notice
of as engaged in rebellion against the Government.
• Note: Crimes done for private purposes without political motivation should be separately
punished.
• Rebellion is a continuing crime along with the crime of conspiracy or proposal to commit
rebellion.
• In rebellion, it is not a defense that the accused never took the oath of allegiance, or that
they never recognized the government. Allegiance is a generic term which includes
loyalty, civil obedience and civil service. The law on rebellion however, does not speak
only of allegiance or loss of territory. It also includes the e orts of the rebel to deprive the
President of the Philippines of the exercise of his power to enforce the law, to exact
obedience of laws and regulations duly enacted and promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities.
• Note: The use of unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the crime of rebellion if used in
furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of attempted coup d’etat.
• What is the essence of the crime of coup d’etat?
The essence of the crime is a swift attack upon the facilities of the
Philippine government, military camps and installations, communication
networks, public utilities and facilities essential to the continued
possession of governmental powers.
• What is the objective of coup d’etat?
The objective of coup d’etat is to destabilize or paralyze the government
through the seizure of facilities and utilities essential to the continued
possession and exercise of governmental powers.
• How is coup d’etat carried out?
It may be carried by force or violence or
through, stealth, threat, or strategy.
• Who are the principal offenders of coup d’etat?
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COUP D’ETAT
REBELLION
Essence Essence is a swift attack against the
government, its military camp or Essence of the crime is
installations, communication network public uprising and
and public facilities and utilities essential taking up arms against
to the continued exercise of the government.
governmental powers.
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Coup d’etat
Rebellion (134)
Treason (114) (134-A) Sedition (139)
Nature Crime
Crime against Public
of Crime against against Crime against
Order
Crime National Security Public Order Public Order
Rising publicly or
levying war against tumultuously
the gov’t; OR Public uprising AND (caused by more
Overt
adherence and Taking up arms See article. than 3 armed
acts
giving aid or comfort against the gov’t men or provided
to enemies with means of
violence)
Purpos
e of Seizing or
Deliver the gov’t to See article. See enumeration
objectiv diminishing
enemy during war in article.
e state power.
Crime Committed:
Rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies
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Ruling:
The court ruled that “murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredient of the crime of
rebellion as means “necessary” for the perpetration of the offense. Such common offense is
absorbed or inherent of the crime of rebellion. Inasmuch as the acts specified in Article 135
constitutes, one single crime it follows that said acts offer no occasion for the application of
Article 48 which requires therefore the commission of at least two crimes.
Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
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There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond
flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the Hernandez ruling.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge
of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – the intention of the prosecution was
to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum.
The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes
such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed
hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus
was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken
was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other
efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other crimes
committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there
may be a need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the essence of rebellion has been
lost and that it is being used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
HELD: Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied bail although ordinarily a charge
of rebellion would entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged against him however is
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murders – theintention of the prosecution was
to make rebellion in its most serious form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum.
The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. What Enrile et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion because other crimes
such as murder or all those that may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is absorbed
hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC however noted that a petition for habeas corpus
was not the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step that should have been taken
was for Enrile to file a petition to be admitted for bail. He should have exhausted all other
efforts before petitioning for habeas corpus. The SC further notes that there is a need to
restructure the law on rebellion as it is being used apparently by others as a tool to disrupt the
peace and espouse violence. The SC can only act w/in the bounds of the law. Thus SC said
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“There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty
therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed
thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret
the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter, which is
properly within its province.”
Enrile vs Salazar
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor
Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the
arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising from an
offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second
clause of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two
crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties
would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not
exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for
the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article
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48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the
prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the
statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be
complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does
indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code:
simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's
reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary
corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct
proposition. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a
petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue
for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was
for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a
right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that
remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the
questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco
and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are
entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners.
Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond
flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
People vs Dasig
G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993
Facts:
Appellants Rodrigo Dasig, Edwin Nuñez and 6 others were charged together of shooting
Redempto Manatad, a police officer, as he died while performing duties. Upon arraignment,
appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of "not guilty." However, after the prosecution had
presented its first witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." Hence,
the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a judgment against said accused until
the prosecution had finished presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died
on March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
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At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight (8) persons, one of whom
he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions
to two of the men to approach Pfc. Manatad. On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers
were tasked to conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the sparrow
unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig
and Edwin Nuñes trying to escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and ammunitions, while the group of Sgt.
Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig, who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left
upper arm and subsequently apprehended while a .38 caliber revolver with 17 live
ammunitions were confiscated from him. Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for
treatment, while Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation. Dasig confessed
that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc. Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and
Nuñes were members of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively.
The extra-judicial confession of appellant was signed by him on every page thereof with the
first page containing a certification likewise signed by him. However, Dasig contends that the
procedure by which his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and contrary
to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that assuming he conspired in the killing of
Pfc. Manatad, he should be convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct
assault. Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while he was still very
sick and consequently, he could not have fully appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a
serious offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is liable for extra-judicial killing of the deceased and
participated in the act of rebellion?
Held:
Yes. Accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of participating in an act of rebellion beyond
reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to
persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor
General. Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion.
However, in the case at bar, there is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the
crime committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by Pfc. Catamora as
the person giving instructions to the group which attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed the command of an
unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
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years of prision mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs
of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity.
PEOPLE vs LOVEDIORO
Rebellion
FACTS: That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Albay, Elias Lovedioro together with
Gilberto Longasa, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present unknown and
remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common
purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO,
a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
The trial court found the accused guilty. The accused appealed contesting the ruling
of him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion. He further claims that in the testimony
of the witness, he is a member of the NPA. Additionally, he contends that because the killing
of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends," said killing should have been
deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the
liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the
commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the Revised Penal
Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder and not rebellion.
HELD: YES. The accused of guilty of murder.
RATIO: The RTC was correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder because overt
act and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, which either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from
the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. No political motive is established
and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In
cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization
dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution
to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the
victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
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HELD/RATIO:
The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since
subversion is a form of a continuing crime – together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed
prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.
DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The “confidential information” was nothing but hearsay. The
searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not
caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing
expeditions.
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Art. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection.
The conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat shall be punished by prision mayor in
minimum period and a fine which shall not exceed eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00).
The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished
respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine
not exceeding two thousand pesos (P2,000.00). (As amended by R.A. 6968, approved October
24, 1990).
• Organizing a group of
soldiers, soliciting membership in, and soliciting funds for the organization show
conspiracy to overthrow the gov’t
• The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism would not make
the accused guilty of conspiracy if there’s no evidence that the hearers then and there
agreed to rise up in arms against the gov’t
• Conspiracy must be immediately prior to rebellion. If it is during the rebellion, then it is
already taking part in it.
• When is there conspiracy to commit rebellion?
There is conspiracy to commit rebellion when two or more persons come
to an agreement to rise publicly and take arms against the government for
any of the purposes of rebellion and decide to commit it.
• When can there be proposal to commit rebellion?
There is proposal to commit rebellion when the person who has decided
to rise publicly and take arms against the government for any of the
purposes of rebellion proposes its execution to some other person or
persons.
• Is advocacy to communism tantamount to conspiracy to commit rebellion?
No, because mere advocacy of theory or principle is
insufficient to constitute conspiracy to commit rebellion
unless the advocacy is converted into action.
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• Note: The mere fact of giving and rendering speeches favoring communism would not
make the accused guilty of conspiracy, if there is no evidence that the hearers then and
there agreed to rise up in arms against the government.
Elements
1. Failing to resist a rebellion by all means in their
power
2. Continuing to discharge the duties of their
office under the control of the rebels
3. Accepting appointment to office under the
rebels.
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Elements
1. That the offender does not take arms or is not in
open hostility against the government
2. That he incites others to the execution of any of the
acts of rebellion
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, banners or other
representations tending to the same end
• Intentionally
calculated to seduce others to rebellion
• There must be uprising to take up arms and rise publicly for the purposes indicated
in Art 134
• Can only be committed by civilians who do not take part therein.
• One who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion and who act at the same time
incites or influences others to join him in his war efforts against the duly constituted
government cannot be held criminally liable for the crime of inciting to rebellion
because, as the principal to the crime of rebellion, the act of inciting to commit a
rebellion is inherent to the graver crime of rebellion.
• INCITING TO REBELLION PROPOSAL TO
COMMITREBELLION
The person who proposes
It is not required that the offender has
has decided to commit
decided to commit rebellion.
rebellion.
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• NOTE: In both, the crime of rebellion should not be actually committed by the persons
to whom it is proposed or who are incited; otherwise, they become principals by
inducement in the crime of rebellion.
Elements
1. Offender rise
a. Publicly, and
b. Tumultuously
2. They employ force, intimidation or other means
outside of legal methods
3. Offenders employ any of those means to attain any
of the following objects to:
a. Prevent the promulgation or execution of
any law or the holding of any popular
election
b. Prevent the national government, or any
public officer from freely exercising its or his
functions, or prevent the execution of any
administrative order
c. Inflicting any act of hate or revenge of any
person or property of any public officer or
employee
d. Commit, for any political or social end, any
act of hate or revenge against private
persons or any social cases
e. Despoil, for any political or social end any
person, municipality or province, or the
National Government of all its property or
any part thereof
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• Sedition
ü It is the raising of commotion or disturbances in the State. Its ultimate object is a
violation of the public peace or at least such measures that evidently engenders
it.
ü The crime of sedition is committed by rising publicly and tumultuously. The two
elements must concur.
ü The crime of sedition does not contemplate the taking up of arms against the
government because the purpose of this crime is not the overthrow of the
government. Notice from the purpose of the crime of sedition that the offenders
rise publicly and create commotion and disturbance by way of protest to express
their dissent and disobedience to the government or to the authorities concerned.
This is like the so-called civil disobedience except that the means employed,
which is violence, is illegal.
ü in sedition – offender may be a private or public person (Ex. Soldier)
ü Public uprising and the object of sedition must concur
• Difference from rebellion – object or purpose of the uprising. For sedition it is sufficient
that uprising is tumultuous. In rebellion, there must be taking up of arms against the
government. The purpose of sedition may either be political or social. In rebellion, it is
always political.
• “Tumultuous”
ü is a situation wherein the disturbance or confusion is caused by at least four
persons. There is no requirement that the offenders should be armed.
ü Preventing public officers from freely exercising their functions
• Are common crimes absorbed in sedition?
In P v. Umali, SC held that NO. Crimes committed in that
case were independent of each other.
• Persons liable for sedition:
a. leader of the sedition, and
b. other persons participating in the sedition
• The objective of the law in criminalizing sedition is to put a limit to the freedom of
expression or the right of the people to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievance.
• The demonstrations conducted or held by the citizenry to protest certain policies of the
government is not a crime. But when the protest in manifested in the form of rallies where
the participants, in order to attain their objective of overcoming the will of the government,
resort to force or violence, the mantle of protection guaranteed under the Constitution to
express their dissent peacefully, shall cease to exist, as in the meantime, the participants
have encroached or stayed in the domain or realm of criminal law.
• What is the crime committed if there is no public uprising?
If the purpose of the offenders is to attain the objects of rebellion or
sedition by force or violence, but there is no public uprising, the crime
committed is direct assault.
• In sedition, it is immaterial if the object be completely attained.
• Suppose murder is committed in the course of sedition, can murder be absorbed in the
crime of sedition?
No. Murder cannot be absorbed in sedition. If murder is committed,
it shall be treated as a separate crime.
Ratio: Murder is not an object of sedition.
Note: There is no complex crime of sedition with murder.
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In the evening of the same, Pasumbal reported to Umali about his conference with
Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and even outlined
the manner of attack. After waiting for some time, Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty,
armed with garlands and cabines, arrived. Congressman Umali, holding a revolver, was seen
in the company of Huks Commander Torio and about 30 armed men. Then shots were heard.
Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the
railroad tracks.
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The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of
sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute
sedition, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or
other representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter
seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government (of the United States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines,
or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any
lawful officer in executing the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal
and meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly
conceal such evil practices. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Elements
1. That the offender does not take a direct part in the
crime of sedition
2. That he incites others to the accomplishment of any
of the acts which constitute sedition (134)
3. That the inciting is done by means of speeches,
proclamations, writing, emblems, cartoons,
banners, or other representations tending to the
same end (purpose: cause commotion not exactly
against the government; actual disturbance not
necessary)
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4. when they lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the government
• The mere meeting for the purpose of discussing hatred against the government is
inciting to sedition. Lambasting government officials to discredit the government is
Inciting to sedition. But if the objective of such preparatory actions is the overthrow of
the government, the crime is inciting to rebellion.
• Is there a crime of proposal to commit sedition?
None. Only conspiracy is punished and not proposal to
commit sedition.
To be liable, there must be an agreement and determination
to rise publicly and tumultuously to attain any of the objects
specified in Art. 139.
• What are the two rules relative to seditious words?
1. Clear and present danger rule – words must be of such nature that by
uttering them there is a danger of public uprising and that such danger
should be both clear and imminent
2. Dangerous tendency rule – if words used tend to create a danger of public
uprising, then those words could properly be subject of penal clause
• Which of the above rules is adopted in the Philippine jurisdiction?
It is the dangerous tendency rule that is generally adopted
in the Philippines with respect to sedition cases. It is
enough that the words used may tend to create danger of
public uprising.
• What are some instances of inciting to sedition?
1. Meeting for the purpose of discussing hatred against the government
2. Lambasting government officials to discredit the government.
• Suppose the objective of abovementioned acts is to overthrow the government, what is
the crime committed?
The crime would be inciting to rebellion.
• US vs Tolentino
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time,
place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred
and enmity against the American people and the Government of the US in
the Philippines.
US vs TOLENTINO
Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an information charging him
with the crime of "uttering seditious words and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, committed as follows: That said Aurelio Tolentino, on or about the 14th day
of May, 1903, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter seditious words and
speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the
lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands in the
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execution of their offices, and which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and riots, and which
tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace of the
community and the safety and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words and speeches are false and
inflammatory, and tend to incite and move the people to hatred and dislike of the government
established by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and persuade great
numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches
of the public peace; which said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and scurrilous libels
are in Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio Tolentino, and which was
presented by him and others on the said 14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas' (Yesterday, To-day,
and To-morrow). An exact translation of the said drama is included in the information, and
various parts thereof are specially assigned, which, in the opinion of the prosecution, were
more especially in violation of the statute in such cases made and provided.
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time, place, and manner of its
presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against the American people and
the Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are satisfied that the principal
object and intent of its author was to incite the people of the Philippine Islands to open and
armed resistance to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire together for
the secret organization of armed forces, to be used when the opportunity presented itself, for
the purpose of overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its stead.
The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a time and under such
conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it was merely or even principally a literary or
artistic production, and the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent remoteness,
past and future, of the events portrayed, could not and in fact were not intended to leave the
audience in doubt as to its present and immediate application, nor should they blind this court
to the true purpose and intent of the author and director of the play.
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CHAPTER 2:
Elements
1. That there be a projected or actual meeting of
Congress or any of its committees or
subcommittees, constitutional commissions or
committees or division thereof, or of any provincial
board or city or municipal council or board
2. That the offender who may be any persons
prevents such meeting by force or fraud
• The crime is against popular representation because it is directed against officers whose
primary function is to meet and enact laws. When these legislative bodies are prevented
from meeting and performing their duties, the system of government is disturbed. The
three branches of government must continue to exist and perform their duties.
• Note: The chief of police and mayor who prevented the meeting of the municipal council
are under Art. 143, when the defect of the meeting is not manifest and requires an
investigation before its existence can be determined.
• Under P.D. 1829, any person who disturbs the proceedings in the fiscal’s office, in
Tanodbayan, or in the courts while in the prosecution of criminal cases, may be held
liable for violation of the said decree.
Elements
1. That there be a meeting of Congress or any of its
committees, constitutional commissions or
committees or divisions thereof, or of any provincial
board or city or municipal council or board
2. That the offender does any of the following acts:
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• The disturbance can be in the form of utterances, speeches or any form of expressing
dissent which is not done peacefully but implemented in such a way that it substantially
interrupts the meeting of the assembly or adversely affects the respect due to the
assembly of its members.
• Complaint must be filed by member of the Legislative body. Accused may also be
punished for contempt.
• Disturbance created by a participant in the meeting is not covered by Art. 144.
Art. 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force,
intimidation, threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly (Congress of
the Philippines) from attending the meetings of the Assembly (Congress) or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof,
from expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall
be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly (Congress) is
in regular or special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision
mayor.
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee
2. That he arrests or searches any member of
Congress
3. That Congress, at the time of arrest or search, is in
a regular or special session
4. That the member searched has not committed a
crime punishable under the code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor (1987 constitution:
privilege from arrest while congress in session in all
offenses punishable by not more than 6 years
imprisonment).
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• In the first form of illegal assembly, armed men attend the gathering with the purpose of
committing any of the crimes punishable under RPC. The presence of armed men during
the gathering brings about the crime of illegal assembly.
• Not all persons at the meeting of the first form of illegal assembly need to be armed.
• If none of the persons present in the meeting are armed, there is no crime. E.g. Persons
unarmed conspiring in a meeting to commit qualified theft is not punishable.
• Note: In this second form of illegal assembly, armed men may or may not attend the
meeting but persons in the meeting are incited to commit treason, rebellion or
insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority.
• When the illegal purpose of the gathering is to incite people to commit the crimes
mentioned above, the presence of armed men is unnecessary. The mere gathering for
the purpose is sufficient to bring about the crime already.
• A person invited to give speech in an illegal assembly or meeting and incites the members
of such assembly is guilty of inciting to sedition only and not punishable under illegal
assembly.
• What is the gravamen of illegal assembly?
The gravamen of illegal assembly is mere assembly of or gathering of
people for illegal purpose punishable by the RPC. Without gathering, there
is no illegal assembly.
• Who are persons liable for illegal assembly?
The persons liable are:
1. Organizers or leaders of the meeting
2. Persons merely present at the meeting
• If the presence of a person is out of curiosity, is he liable?
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No, since he does not have intent to commit felony of illegal assembly.
• Suppose the illegal purpose for the gathering is for the commission of a crime punishable
under special laws (i.e. the gathering of drug lords to facilitate drug trafficking), is illegal
assembly committed?
No. If the unlawful purpose is a crime under a special law, there is
no illegal assembly. The crime committed would be illegal
association.
• Distinction between illegal assembly and illegal association
In illegal assembly, the basis of liability is the gathering for an illegal
purpose which constitutes a crime under the Revised Penal Code.
In illegal association, the basis is the formation of or organization
of an association to engage in an unlawful purpose which is not
limited to a violation of the Revised Penal Code. It includes a
violation of a special law or those against public morals. Meaning
of public morals: inimical to public welfare; it has nothing to do with
decency, not acts of obscenity.
Art. 147. Illegal associations
The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon the founders, directors, and presidents of
associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes
punishable under this Code or for some purpose contrary to public morals. Mere members of
said associations shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor. (Reinstated by E.O. No. 187).
Elements
1. Organized totally or partially for the purpose of
committing any of the crimes in RPC Or
2. For some purpose contrary to public morals
• PERSONS LIABLE:
1. founders, directors and president of the association
2. mere members of the association
• What are illegal associations?
1. Associations totally or partially organized for the purpose of
committing any of the crimes punishable under the RPC.
2. Associations totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary
to public morals.
• What are public morals?
Public morals refer to matters which affect the interest of society
and public inconvenience and are not limited to good customs. It
refers to acts that are in accordance with natural and positive laws.
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ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY
ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION
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• Note: In the second form, there is a need to distinguish a situation where a person in
authority or his agent was attacked while performing official functions.
• If attack was done during the exercise of official functions, the crime is always direct
assault.
• It is also important to distinguish whether the person is a person in authority or merely an
agent of the latter.
Illustration:
When the accused, with his hand or fist, hit a policeman who
was in the performance of his duty, in the breast and nothing
more, no direct assault is committed because the victim is
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fight. A approached B and admonished him to keep quiet and not to disturb the dance
and peace of the occasion. B, instead of heeding the advice of A, stabbed the latter at
his back twice when A turned his back to proceed to the microphone to continue his
speech. A fell to the ground and died. At the time of the incident A was not armed. What
crime was committed? Explain.
The complex crime of direct assault with murder was committed.
A, as a Barangay Captain, is a person in authority and was acting
in an official capacity when he tried to maintain peace and order
during the public dance in the Barangay by admonishing B to keep
quiet and not to disturb the dance and peace of the occasion.
When B, instead of heeding A’s advice, attacked the latter, B acted
in contempt and lawless defiance of authority constituting the
crime of direct assault, which characterized the stabbing of A. And
since A was stabbed at the back when he was not in a position to
defend himself nor retaliate, there was treachery in the stabbing.
Hence, the death caused by such stabbing was murder and having
been committed with direct assault, a complex crime of direct
assault in murder was committed by B. (2000 Bar Question)
• Evidence of motive of the offender is important when the person in authority or his agent
who is attacked or seriously intimidated is not in the performance of his official duty.
• Direct assault cannot be committed during rebellion. Crime of slight physical injuries is
absorbed by direct assault if committed against an agent of a person in authority. If
committed against a person in authority, it will be considered as separate crime.
• The crime of direct assault is not committed when the person in authority or his agent is
suspended or under suspension when he is attacked.
• Direct assault absorbs light felony because light felony is the means of committing direct
assault.
• Agent: is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection
and security of life and property. (Example. Barrio councilman and any person who comes
to the aid of the person in authority, policeman, municipal treasurer, postmaster, sheriff,
agents of the BIR, Malacañang confidential agent)
• Even when the person in authority or the agent agrees to fight, still direct assault. When
the person in authority or the agent provoked/attacked first, innocent party is entitled to
defend himself and cannot be held liable for assault or resistance nor for physical injuries,
because he acts in legitimate self-defense
• The offended party in assault must not be the aggressor. If there is unlawful aggression
employed by the public o cer, any form of resistance which may be in the nature of force
against him will be considered as an act of legitimate defense. (People vs. Hernandez,
59 Phil. 343)
• There can be no assault upon or disobedience to one authority by another when they
both contend that they were in the exercise of their respective duties.
• The offender and the offended party are both public officers. The Supreme Court said
that assault may still be committed, as in fact the o ender is even subjected to a greater
penalty (U.S. vs. Vallejo, 11 Phil. 193).
• If the crime of direct assault is committed with the use of force and it
resulted in the infliction of slight physical injuries, the latter shall not be
considered as a separate offense. It shall be absorbed by the greater crime
of direct assault. (People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614)
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Elements
1. Person in authority or his agent is the victim of the
forms of direct assault
2. A person comes to the aid of such authority or his
agent
3. Offender makes use of force or intimidation upon
such person coming to the aid of the authority or
his agent
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shall restrain another from attending as a witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a
summon or refusal to be sworn by any such body or official.
• ACTS PUNISHABLE:
1. refusing without legal excuse to obey summons
2. refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation
3. refusing to answer any legal inquiry to produce books, records etc.
4. restraining another from attending as witness in such body
5. inducing disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn
• The testimony of a person summoned must be upon matters into which the legislature
has jurisdiction to inquire.
• Persons liable under Art. 150? A:
1. Any person who commits any of the above acts
2. Any person who:
a. Restrains another from attending as a witness
b. Induces him to disobey a summons
c. Induces him to refuse to be sworn to such body
• Note: Any of the acts enumerated may also constitute contempt of Congress and could
be punished as such independent of the criminal prosecution.
• Congress’ power to cite a witness in contempt is considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power.
• The testimony of a person summoned must be upon matters into which the legislature
has jurisdiction to inquire.
• The act punished is refusal, without legal excuse, to obey summons issued by the House
of Representatives or the Senate. If a Constitutional Commission is created, it shall enjoy
the same privilege.
• The exercise by the legislature of its contempt power is a matter of self- preservation,
independent of the judicial branch. The contempt power of the legislature is inherent and
sui generis.
• The power to punish is not extended to the local executive bodies. The reason given is
that local legislative bodies are but a creation of law and therefore, for them to exercise
the power of contempt, there must be an express grant of the same.
Arnault v. Nazareno
Petition for habeas corpus to relieve petitioner Jean Arnault from confinement in the New
Bilibid prison. Denied.
FACTS: In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P
500,000 to the second sum both to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his two
attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates
respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the original owner of the estate. He bought the
first from San Juan de Dios hospital and the second from the Philippine trust company. In both
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instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of money to complete his payments.
As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the
Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an abolute deed of sale in
consideration of the sum of P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary
of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the money was
borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949,
as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special
committee to investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee
created by the resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most important
of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve
was the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government’s paying to Burt the
total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to
determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of
the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to
him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in
the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two
checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies,
Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he
himself cashed.
It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000
that gave rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the
senate then approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which
brought him to jail and is being contested in this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. WON the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. WON the privilege against self incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
HELD:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-
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incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. The materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.
The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to
the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its
proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper
limitations are disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.
3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is
the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His
insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would
incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or
evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a
refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to the witness himself the
transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance
with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.
Art. 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall resist or
seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of such person, while engaged in the
performance of official duties.
When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to P100 pesos shall be imposed upon the
offender.
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• In Resistance and Serious Disobedience, the accused must have knowledge that the person
giving the order is a peace officer [US vs. Bautista]. The disobedience contemplated
consist in the failure or refusal to obey a direct order from the authority or his agent.
• In simple disobedience, the offended party must be only an agent of a person in authority.
The order must be lawful. The disobedience should not be of a serious nature.
Resistance or serious
Direct assault
disobedience
Person in authority or his agent
Person in authority or his agent must
must be engaged in the
be in actual performance of his
performance of official duties or that
duties.
he is assaulted by reason thereof.
Committed in four ways By:
1. Attacking.
Committed only by resisting or
2. Employing force
seriously disobeying a person in
3. Seriously intimidating
authority or his agent.
4. Seriously resisting a
person in authority or his agent
The attack or employment of force
The use of force is not so serious, as
which give rise to the crime of direct
there is no manifest intention to defy
assault must be serious and
the law and the officers enforcing it.
deliberate.
• What is the crime committed if the person who was resisted is a person in authority and the
offender used force in such resistance?
The use of any kind or degree of force will give rise to direct assault.
• Suppose the offender did not use any force in resisting a person in authority, what crime is
committed?
The crime committed is resistance or serious disobedience.
• Note: Art. 151 covers failure to comply with orders directly issued by authorities in the
exercise of their official duties, and not with judicial decisions merely declaratory of rights or
obligations (E.g. decision rendered in a civil case).
• The disobedience contemplated consists in the failure or refusal to obey a
direct and lawful order from the authority or his agent, otherwise resistance is
justified.
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• Disobedience in the 2nd par. must not be serious, otherwise it will fall under the 1st par.
• US vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183
The Supreme Court held that: “the violation does not refer
to resistance or disobedience to the legal provisions of the
law, nor to judicial decisions defining or declaring the rights
and obligations of the parties for the same give reliefs only
in the form of civil actions. Rather, the disobedience or
resistance is to the orders directly issued by the authorities
in the exercise of their official duties.”
• In both resistance against an agent of a person in authority and direct assault by resisting
an agent of a person in authority, there is force employed, but the use of force in
resistance is not so serious, as there is no manifest intention to defy the law and the
officers enforcing it.
• The attack or employment of force which gives rise to the crime of direct assault must be
serious and deliberate; otherwise, even a case of simple resistance to an arrest, which
always requires the use of force of some kind, would constitute direct assault and the
lesser offense of resistance or disobedience in Article 151 would entirely disappear.
• But when the one resisted is a person in authority, the use of any kind or degree of force
will give rise to direct assault.
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority; Who shall be deemed
as such
In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or
governmental corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A
barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of
life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in
authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by PD No.
299, Sept. 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
• Persons in Authority – any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or
commission.
1. Barangay captain
2. Barangay chairman
3. Teachers
4. Professors
5. Persons charged with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and universities
6. Lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties
or on the occasion of such performance
• Agent of Person in Authority – any person who, by direct provision of law
or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with
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the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.
1. Barrio councilman
2. Barrio policeman
3. Barangay leader
4. Any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority
• Section 388 of the Local Gov’t Code provides that
for purposes of the RPC, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed
as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by
law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of
public order, protection and the security of life, property, or
the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment,
and any barangay member who comes to the aid of
persons in authority shall be deemed AGENT of persons in
authority.
• When the o ended party is a person in authority and while being assaulted, a private
individual comes to his rescue, such private individual, by operation of law, mutates
mutandis becomes an agent of a person in authority. Any assault committed against such
person is direct assault, and not indirect assault. But if the person assaulted is an agent
of a person in authority, and a private individual comes to his rescue and is himself
assaulted while giving the assistance, as earlier discussed, the crime committed is
indirect assault.
PUBLIC DISORDERS
Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbance of public orders; Tumultuous disturbance or
interruption liable to cause disturbance
The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period
and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause any
serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included
in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any disturbance or
interruption of a tumultuous character.
The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more than three
persons who are armed or provided with means of violence.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting,
association, or public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in
such place shall display placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.
The penalty of arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos shall be imposed upon
these persons who in violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall
bury with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.
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People vs Bacolod
This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double
jeopardy.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948. Ladislao Bacolod pleaded
guilty to an informations charging him the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence committed on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was
arraigned in another case for having caused a public disturbance on the same date, the
second information alleging.
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused with deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis
court in connection with the town fiesta, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded
one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the
said dance who ran and scampered in all directions.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by
reason of the first information which for convenience is quoted:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, then
a member of the PC patrol, by reckless imprudence and without taking due care and
precautions to avoid damage and injury to the life and property of other persons, did then
and there fire a shoot of the sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back
of right side of her body which physical injury required or will require medical attendance for
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more than 30 days but less than 90, and incapacitated or will incapacitate her from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time.
The motion to quash was granted, and the people appealed in due time.
It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant's having
fired a sub-machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on
Consorcia Pasinio thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second information
accuses him of having deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the
festivity or gathering, thereby producing panic among the people present therein. The two
informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other
is an offense against public peace and order.1
The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article
153 referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof
establishing the first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the
willful discharge of firearm, that there was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the
town fiesta, and that the people in attendance became panicky and terrified. The offenses
are not the same although they arose from same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently
conviction for the first does not bar trial for the second.
A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot is
distinct from the offense of assault and battery.
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an
offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an
additional fact which, the other does not an acquittal or conviction under one does not a bar
prosecution under the other.
It is true that section 9 of Rule 113 prohibits prosecution for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged, in the former, informations. But it
may not be held that the second offense in this case necessarily included the first, physical
injuries is included in a charge of murder. Neither may it be maintained that every crime of
physical injuries necessarily produces such public disorder as is contemplated by section
153 of the Revised Penal Code. Note especially that the first information did not describe the
festal celebration in which the injuries were inflicted.
From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing
the second information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is
remanded for further proceedings. So ordered.
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Elements
1. That there is a person confined in a jail or penal
establishment.
2. That the offender removes therefor such person,
or helps the escape of such person (if the escapee
is serving final judgement, he is guilty of evasion
of sentence).
3. Offender is a private individual
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• If the prisoner who escapes is only a detention prisoner, he does not incur liability from
escaping if he does not know of the plan to remove him from jail. But if such prisoner
knows of the plot to remove him from jail and cooperates therein by escaping, he himself
becomes liable for delivering prisoners from jail as a principal by indispensable
cooperation.
• If the prisoner removed or whose escape is made possible by the commission of the
crime of delivering prisoner from jail is a detention prisoner, such prisoner is not criminally
liable. A prisoner is criminally liable for leaving the penal institution only when there is
evasion of the service of his sentence, which can only be committed only by a convict by
final judgment.
• Offender is usually an outsider. The violation of Article 156 is committed by a public officer
when he is not the custodian of the prisoner at the time the prisoner was made to escape.
If the offender is a public officer who had the prisoner in his custody or charge, he is liable
for infidelity in the custody of a prisoner under Article 223.
• If three persons are involved – a stranger, the custodian and the prisoner – three crimes
are committed:
1. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners [public officer-custodian];
2. Delivery of the prisoner from jail [stranger]; and
3. Evasion of service of sentence [prisoner].
• Cledera, as the governor, is the jailer of the Province. Esmeralda is the Assistant
Provincial Warden. As public officials who have the custody or charge of the prisoner,
they cannot be prosecuted under Art. 156.
Art 223 would have applied; however, there is no sufficient
evidence to warrant their prosecution for infidelity in the
custody of prisoner. It is necessary that the public officer
had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the
prisoner under his custody or charge. [Alberto v. Dela Cruz
(1980)]
• Illustration:
ü As long as the person who was assisted in his escape is a prisoner,
whatever means is employed by the person who removed him from jail, is
punishable under this law. If a twin brother of a prisoner helped the latter
escape by substituting himself, and because of theirery similar
appearance was not at once noticed by the guard, that twin brother is
liable.
ü Even if the prisoner returned to jail after several hours, the one who
removed him from jail is liable. So that if A, pretending to be an NBI agent,
asked the jailer of prisoner B to turn the latter over him on the pretext that
he (A) will investigate the prisoner, but after several hours of drinking liquor
with B in a store, returned the said prisoner to the jailer, A is criminally
liable under this article.
• Illustration:
ü So also a jail guard who, while he was off duty, brought a released prisoner
inside the jail to substitute for a detention prisoner whom he brought out
of jail, returning him inside the jail after five hours may be held liable under
this article. (People v. del Barrio, 4 C.A. Rep 337)
• Who may be the offender/s?
1. Usually, an outsider to the jail
2. It may also be:
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In both, the offender may be a public officer or a private citizen. In both crimes,
the person involved may be a convict or a mere detention prisoner.
• What is the liability of the convicted prisoner serving sentence who escaped?
He is liable for the crime of evasion of service under
Art. 157.
• Suppose the one who escaped is only a detention prisoner, what is his liability?
He does not incur liability from escaping if he does
not know of the plan to remove him from jail. If such
prisoner knows of his plot to remove him from jail
and cooperates therein by escaping, he himself
becomes liable for delivering prisoners from jail as a
principal by indispensable cooperation.
• What are the qualifying circumstance?
Use of violence, intimidation or bribery.
• What does the qualifying circumstance of bribery under this article
contemplate?
The offender’s act of employing
bribery as a means of removing or
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Elements
1. That the offender is a convict by final
judgment.
2. That he is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty (destierro
included)
3. That he evades the service of his sentence
by escaping during the term if his
sentence. (fact of return immaterial).
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Elements
1. That the offender is a convict by final judgement
who is confined in a penal institution.
2. That there is disorder, resulting from-
a. conflagration,
b. earthquake,
c. explosion, or
d. similar catastrophe, or
e. mutiny in which he has not participated.
3. That the offender evades the service of his
sentence by leaving the penal institution where he
is confined, on the occasion of such disorder or
during the mutiny.
4. That the offender fails to give himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours following the insurance
of a proclamation by the chief executive
announcing the passing away of such calamity
• The leaving from the penal establishment is not the basis of criminal liability. It is the
failure to return within 48 hours after the passing of the calamity, conflagration or mutiny
had been announced. Under Article 158, those who return within 48 hours are given credit
or deduction from the remaining period of their sentence equivalent to 1/5 of the original
term of the sentence. But if the prisoner fails to return within said 48 hours, an added
penalty, also 1/5, shall be imposed but the 1/5 penalty is based on the remaining period
of the sentence, not on the original sentence. In no case shall that penalty exceed six
months.
• For such event to be considered as a calamity, the President must declared
it to be so. He must issue a proclamation to the effect that the calamity is
over. Even if the events herein mentioned may be considered as calamity,
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there is a need for the Chief Executive to make such announcement. Absent such
declaration. Even if the prisoner will return to the penal institution where he was confined,
the same is of no moment as in the meantime he has committed a violation of the law,
not under the present article but for pure evasion of service of sentence under Article
157.
• Mutiny – organized unlawful resistance to a superior officer, a sedition, a revolt. The
mutiny referred to in the second form of evasion of service of sentence does not include
riot. The mutiny referred to here involves subordinate personnel rising against the
supervisor within the penal establishment. One who escapes during a riot will be subject
to Article 157, that is, simply leaving or escaping the penal establishment. Disarming the
guards is not mutiny. Mutiny is one of the causes which may authorize a convict serving
sentence in the penitentiary to leave the jail provided he has not taken part in the mutiny.
• If one partakes in mutiny, he will be liable for the offenses which he committed during the
mutiny whether or not he returns. (People v. Padilla, G. R. No. 121917, Mar. 12, 1997)
• Violation attributed to the accused is no longer referred to the court for judicial inquiry or
resolution. The law has provided suffcient guidelines for the jail warden to follow.
• This disquisition will not apply if the offender who escapes taking advantage of the
calamities enumerated herein is apprehended by the authorities after 48 hours from the
declaration that the calamity is over. It is only extended to one who returns but made
inside the 48 hours delimited by the proclamation. At this stage, the violation is not
substantive but administrative in nature.
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. Violation of conditional pardon
The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict
who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be
higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence.
Elements
1. That the offender was a convict.
2. That he was granted a conditional pardon by the
chief executive.
3. That he violated any of the conditions of such
pardon.
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conviction for the second offense. Otherwise, we could not say that there is a violation of
the condition of the pardon as he would be presumed to be innocent. Offender must be
found guilty of subsequent offense before he can be prosecuted under Article 159. It is a
substantive crime. For one to suffer the consequence of its violation, the prisoner must
be formally charged in court. He will be entitled to a full blown hearing, in full enjoyment
of his right to due process. [Torres vs. Gonzales]
• Note: However, under the Revised Administrative Code, no conviction is necessary. The
President has the power to arrest and reincarcerate the offender without trial.
• The court cannot require the convict to serve the unexpired portion of the original
sentence if it does not exceed six years, the remedy is left to the President who has the
authority to recommit him to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. The
period when convict was at liberty is not deducted in case he is recommitted.
• Violation of conditional pardon is a distinct crime. In violation of conditional pardon, as a
rule, the violation will amount to this crime only if the condition is violated during the
remaining period of the sentence.
• When can there be a violation of the conditional pardon?
When the condition is violated during the remaining period
of the sentence. If the condition of the pardon is violated
when the remaining unserved portion of the sentence has
already lapsed, there will be no criminal liability for the
violation. However, the convict maybe required to serve the
unserved portion of the sentence, that is, continue serving
original penalty.
• What is the difference between violation of conditional pardon and evasion of service
of sentence?
VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL
PARDON EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal / Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives (P.D. 1866, as
amended by R.A. 8294)
• Note: If the unlawful manufacture, sale, acquisition, disposition or possession of
firearms or ammunition or instruments used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of firearms or ammunition is in furtherance of or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as
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conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the
offense charged under this Act. (Sec. 49)
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another
offense; Penalty
Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after
having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law
for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence,
or when he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or
other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
Elements
1. That the offender was already convicted by final
judgement of one offense.
2. That he committed a new felony before beginning
to serve such sentence or while serving the same.
• Quasi-recidivism : a person after having been convicted by final judgement shall commit a
new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.
ü Second crimes must belong to the RPC, not special laws. First crime may
be either from the RPC or special laws
• Quasi-recidivism defined
It is a special aggravating circumstance where a person,
after having been convicted by final judgment, shall commit
a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same. He shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the
new felony.
The first crime for which the offender is serving sentence
need not be a felony. [People vs. Peralta]
• Reiteracion: offender shall have served out his sentence for the prior offense
• A quasi-recidivist may be pardoned at age 70. Except: Unworthy or Habitual Delinquent
• If new felony is evasion of sentence – offender is not a quasi-recidivist
• Penalty: maximum period of the penalty for the new felony should be imposed (mitigating
circumstance can only be appreciated if the maximum is divisible)
• Quasi-Recidivism may be offset by a special privileged mitigating circumstance (ex.
Minority)
• Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which directs the court to impose
the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The court will do
away or will ignore mitigating and aggravating circumstances in considering
the penalty to be imposed. There will be no occasion for the court to consider
imposing the minimum, medium or maximum period of the penalty. The
mandate is absolute and is justifed by the finding that the accused is suffering
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from some degree of moral perversity if not total incorrigibility. (People vs. Alicia, et al., 95
SCRA 227)
• Quasi-recidivism is an aggravating circumstance which cannot be offset by any mitigating
circumstance. To be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance, it must be alleged
in the information. (People vs. Bautista, 65 SCRA 460)
People vs Peralta
G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, Quasi Recidivism
Facts:
On February 16, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two known
warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to
attend a mass at 7 a.m. However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big
commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently assembled. The fight was quelled
and those involved where led away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were
ordered to return to their respective quarters.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO” members, Amadeo Peralta,
Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six
among the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder), are also convicts
confined in the said prisons by virtue of final judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided each other, with evident
premeditation and treachery, all armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego, Eugenio
Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing,
and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or
sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused
their deaths.
Issues
(a) Whether of not conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple murder?
Held:
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless
when the law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express or implied conspiracy is
proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s perpetrated
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in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of
all.
The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The
concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent
display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they
must be held solidarity liable. However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by
lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime,
or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy.
Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except
in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the
commission of the murders. To wit, although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the
court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the crime committed
by the accused was planned. First, all the deceased were Tagalogs and members of
sympathizers of “Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or Mindanao),
singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the
accused were all armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the
occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team work precision going from
one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the Carriego, Barbosa
and Cruz.
Accordingly, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each
pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced
to three death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of
the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; each will pay one-sixth of the costs.
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Acts of Counterfeiting
161 Counterfeiting the Great Seal of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, Forging the Signature or Stamp of the Chief
162 Using Forged Signature or Counterfeit Seal or Stamp
163 Making and Importing and Uttering
False Coins
164 Mutilation of Coins PD 247
165 Selling of False or Mutilated Coin,
Without Connivance
166 Forging Treasury or Bank Notes or Other Documents Payable to
Bearer; Importing and Uttering Such False or Forged Notes and
Documents
167 Counterfeiting, Importing, and
Uttering Instruments Not Payable to Bearer
Acts of Forgery
168 Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and
Other Instruments of Credit
169 How Forgery is Committed
Acts of Falsification
170 Falsification of Legislative Documents
171 Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary or
Ecclesiastical Minister
172 Falsification by Private Individual
and Use of Falsified Documents
173 Falsification of Wireless, Cable, Telegraph and Telephone
Messages, and Use of Said Falsified Messages
174 False Medical Certificates, False Certificates of Merits or Service,
etc.
175 Using False Certificates
176 Manufacturing and Possession of Instruments or Implements for
Falsification
Other Falsities
177 Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions
178 Using Fictitious and Concealing True Name
179 Illegal Use of Uniforms and Insignia
180 False Testimony Against a Defendant
181 False Testimony Favorable to the Defendant
182 False Testimony in Civil Cases
183 False Testimony in Other Cases and Perjury in Solemn
Affirmation
184 Offering False Testimony in Evidence
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Art. 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
forging the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive
The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any person who shall forge the
Great Seal of the Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief
Executive.
• What are the punishable acts?
1. Forging the great seal of the Government of the Philippines
2. Forging the signature of the President
3. Forging the stamp of the President of the Government of
the Philippines
• Note: When the President’s signature is forged, it is not falsification but forging of
signature of the Chief Executive under this article.
• Intent to use is necessary. Actual use, however, is not required, as long as the forger
intended to use it.
Art. 162. Using forged signature or counterfeit seal or stamp
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly make
use of the counterfeit seal or forged signature or stamp mentioned in the preceding article.
Elements
1. That the great seal of the republic was
counterfeited or the signature or stamp of the chief
executive was forged by another person.
2. That the offender knew of the counterfeiting or
forgery.
3. That he used the counterfeit seal or forged
signature or stamp.
• Offender under this article should not be the forger. Otherwise, he will be penalized
under Article 161. The participation of the offender is in effect that of an accessory.
• In using the forged signature or stamp of the President of forged seal, the
participation of the offender is in effect that of an accessory. Although the
general rule is that he should be punished by a penalty of two degrees
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lower, under Article 162 he is punished by a penalty only one degree lower.
Elements
1. That there be false or counterfeited coins (need
not be legal tender).
2. That the offender either made, imported or uttered
such coins.
3. That in case of uttering such false or counterfeited
coins, he connives with counterfeiters or
importers.
• What is counterfeiting?
Counterfeiting means to imitate a coin that is genuine. It
gives an appearance of one of legal tender. The coin is
counterfeit even if it has more intrinsic value than the coin
of legal tender.
• A person gave a copper cent the appearance of a silver piece, it being silver plated, and
attempted to pay with it a package of cigarettes which he bought at a store. What crime,
if any, was committed?
Such person is not liable for counterfeiting of coin, but for estafa
under Art. 318. (Reyes, 2008)
• What is the criterion used in determining whether a coin is a counterfeit or not?
The criterion is that the imitation must be such as to deceive an
ordinary person in believing it to be genuine. Consequently, if the
imitation is so imperfect that no one was deceived, the felony
cannot be consummated.
• Can former coins withdrawn from circulation be counterfeited under Art.163?
Yes. Art. 163 mentions “coin” without any qualifying words
such as “current.” The reason for punishing
the fabrication of coin withdrawn from
circulation is the possibility that the
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Elements
1. Coin mutilated is of legal tender;
2. Offender gains from the precious metal dust
3. abstracted from the coin;
4. It has to be a coin.
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• This has been repealed by PD 247. Under this PD, the acts punishable are:
1. willful defacement
2. mutilation
3. tearing
4. burning
5. destruction of Central Bank notes and coins
PD 247
WHEREAS, the Central Bank has the sole right and authority to issue currency within the
territory of the Philippines under its issue power, and pursuant to Section 54 of Republic Act
No. 265, otherwise known as the "Central Bank Act," as amended, by Presidential Decree No.
72 dated November 29, 1972, the notes and coins issued by the Central Bank shall be fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and shall be legal tender in
the Philippines for all debts, both public and private;
WHEREAS, Central Bank notes and coins are issued for circulation as medium of exchange
and to utilize them for other purposes does not speak well of the due respect and dignity
befitting our currency; and
WHEREAS, defacing, mutilating, tearing, or partially burning or destroying our currency by any
means renders it unfit for circulation, thereby unduly shortening its lifetime, and such acts
unfavorably reflect on the discipline of our people and create a bad image for our country;
1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn or destroy, in
any manner whatsoever, currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank of the
Philippines; and
2. That any person who shall violate this Decree shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine
of not more than twenty thousand pesos and/or by imprisonment of not more than five years.
• “Mutilation” means to take off part of the metal either by filling it or substituting it for
another metal of inferior quality.
• Since the coins before were made of silver and/or other precious metal, shaving the
metal from the coins became a practice. Hence, the coin’s intrinsic value is diminished.
• This is the only article that requires that the mutilated coin be legal tender. Coins of
foreign country not included.
• There is no expertise involved here. In mutilation of coins under the Revised Penal Code,
the offender does nothing but to scrape, pile or cut the coin and collect the dust and,
thus, diminishing the intrinsic value of the coin. Deliberate intent arises only when the
offender collects the precious metal dust from the mutilated coin.
• Mutilation of coins is a crime only if the coin mutilated is legal tender. If it
is not legal tender anymore, no one will accept it, so nobody will be
defrauded. But if the coin is of legal tender, and the offender minimizes
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or decreases the precious metal dust content of the coin, the crime of mutilation is
committed.
• The offender must deliberately reduce the precious metal in the coin. Deliberate intent
arises only when the offender collects the precious metal dust from the mutilated coin.
If the offender does not collect such dust, intent to mutilate is absent, but Presidential
Decree No. 247 will apply. Mutilation under the Revised Penal Code is true only to coins.
It cannot be a crime under the Revised Penal Code to mutilate paper bills because the
idea of mutilation under the code is collecting the precious metal dust. However, under
Presidential Decree No. 247, mutilation is not limited to coins.
QUESTION ANSWER
The people playing cara y cruz, Mutilation, under the Revised Penal Code, is not
before they throw the coin in the air committed because they do not collect the precious
would rub the money to the metal content that is being scraped from the coin.
sidewalk thereby diminishing the However, this will amount to violation of Presidential
intrinsic value of the coin. Is the Decree No. 247.
crime of mutilation committed?
When the image of Jose Rizal on a Yes. Presidential Decree No. 247 is violated by such
five-peso bill is transformed into act.
that of Randy Santiago, is there a
violation of Presidential Decree
No. 247?
An old woman who was a cigarette She was guilty of violating Presidential Decree No.
vendor in Quiapo refused to 247 because if no one ever picks up the coins, her
accept one- centavo coins for act would result in the diminution of the coin in
payment of the vendee of circulation.
cigarettes he purchased. Then
came the police who advised her
that she has no right to refuse
since the coins are of legal tender.
On this, the old woman accepted
in her hands the one-centavo coins
and then threw it to the face of the
vendee and the police. Was the old
woman guilty of violating
Presidential Decree No. 247?
A certain customer in a restaurant He was guilty of arrested for violating of Presidential
wanted to show off and used a P Decree No. 247. Anyone who is in possession of
20.00 bill to light his cigarette. Was defaced money is the one who is the violator of
he guilty of violating Presidential Presidential Decree No. 247. The intention of
Decree No. 247? Presidential Decree No. 247 is not to punish the act
of defrauding the public but what is being punished
is the act of destruction of money issued by the
Central Bank of the Philippines.
Note that persons making bracelets out of some
coins violate Presidential Decree No. 247.
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• Possession prohibited in this article is not only actual and physical possession, but also
that of a constructive one, or the subjection of the thing to one’s control. The possessor
should not be the counterfeiter, mutilator or importer of the coins.
• As long as the offender has knowledge that the coin is false or mutilated, there is no need
for him to connive with the counterfeiter or mutilator.
• In Art. 165, is it necessary that the counterfeited coin is a legal tender?
No. except when the coin is a mutilated coin, it must be a
legal tender. On counterfeiting coins, it is immaterial whether the
coin is legal tender or not because the intention of the law is to put
an end to the practice of imitating money and to discourage
anyone who might entertain the idea of imitating money (People
vs. Kong Leon).
• What if the false or mutilated coins are found in possession of the counterfeiters or
mutilators or importers?
Such possession does not constitute a separate
offense but is punished either under Art. 163 or 164.
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• Note: P.D. 427 punishes possession of silver or nickel coins in excess of P50.00. It is a
measure of national policy to protect the people from the conspiracy of those hoarding
silver or nickel coins and to preserve and maintain the economy.
No. Article 165 requires three things as regards to possession of false coins, namely:
1. Possession
2. Intent to utter
3. Knowledge that the coin is false
The fact that the chinaman received it in payment of his goods and placed it in his drawer
shows that he did not know that such coin was false.
Art. 166. Forging treasury or bank notes on other documents payable to bearer;
importing, and uttering such false or forged notes and documents
The forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations and
securities payable to bearer and the importation and uttering in connivance with forgers or
importers of such false or forged obligations or notes, shall be punished as follows:
1. By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000 pesos,
if the document which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered, is an obligations or
security of the United States or of the Philippines Islands.
The word ―obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine Islands‖ shall be
held to mean all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank notes, fractional notes,
certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money, drawn by or upon authorized officers
of the United States or of the Philippine Islands, and other representatives of value, of whatever
denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of the Congress of the United
States or of the Philippine Legislature.
2. By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the
falsified or altered document is a circulating note issued by any banking association
duly authorized by law to issue the same.
3. By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos, if the
falsified or counterfeited document was issued by a foreign government.
4. By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P2,000 pesos, when
the forged or altered document is a circulating note or bill issued by a foreign bank duly
authorized therefor.
• What are the punishable acts?
1. Forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or other documents
payable to bearer.
2. Importation of such false or forged obligations or notes.
Note: It means to bring them into the Philippines,
which presupposes that the obligations or notes are
forged or falsified in a foreign country.
3. Uttering obligations or note knowing them to be false or
forged, whether such offer is accepted or not, with a
representation.
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• “Forging”:
By giving any treasury or bank note, or any instrument
payable to bearer, or to order the appearance of a true and
genuine document.
• “Falsification”:
By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any
means, the figures, letters, words, or signs contained
therein.
ü falsifying lotto or sweepstakes ticket.
Attempted estafa through falsification of an
obligation or security of the Phil. People vs
Balmores
• The instrument is payable to bearer:
1. When expressed to be so payable
2. When payable to a person named therein or bearer
3. When payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and
such fact was known to the person making it so payable
4. When the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any
person
5. When the only or last endorsement is an
6. endorsement in blank.
Reason for this is that the forging tends to bring such documents into discredit and the
offense produces a lack of confidence on the part of the holders of said documents to
the prejudice of society and of the State.
• PNB checks not included here – it’s falsification of commercial document under Article
172 (falsification of commercial documents under Art. 172 in connection with Art. 171 of
the RPC.)
• Obligation or security includes:
1. bonds,
2. certificate of indebtedness,
3. bills,
4. national bank notes,
5. coupons,
6. treasury notes,
7. certificate of deposits,
8. checks, drafts for money,
9. sweepstakes money
• X pleaded guilty to the charge of having passed a P20 counterfeit bill in a store. Can he
be held guilty of violating Art. 166?
No. Uttering forged bill must be with connivance with the
authors of the forgery to constitute a violation of Art. 166.
(Reyes, 2008)
• Now that the Phils is independent of the US, does paragraph 1, forging
obligation under US, punishable?
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Issue:
Whether the accused-appellants are liable for the crime of illegal possession and use of false
treasury or bank notes under Art. 168?
Held:
It is clear from the provisions Art 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code that the possession
of genuine treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs
contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they
were used by petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised
Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785). Being in accordance
with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs
against petitioner Sergio del Rosario.
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removing the true and real unidentified number, substituting and writing in ink
at the bottom on the left side of the ticket the figure 074000, the winning number
in the June 29, 1947 draw for P359.55
ü Failed to perform all acts of execution that would have produced the crime of
estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some
causes other than his spontaneous desistance
ü Employee Bayani Miller discovered that ticket was falsified, so he called for a
policeman who apprehended Balmores
ü Sentenced to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of
reclusion temporal P100 plus costs
• Arguments of Balmores: no genuine 1/8 unit for that draw; issued only four ¼ units for
each ticket; information does not show that the ticket did not really have the winning
number; no falsification because 074000 was the true and real number of ticket
• Court’s responses:
ü If there’s no genuine 1/8 unit for that draw, then the ticket was spurious
ü If it had the winning number, there would have been no need to tear off the
bottom
• Recklessness and clumsiness of falsification did not make the crime impossible under
Par. 2, Art 4 in relation to Art. 59 of the RPC
ü Court could not say that it would have been impossible to commit the crime
had the clerk to whom the ticket was presented for payment had not exercised
due care (so even he hadn’t exercised due care, there’s still a chance of
completing the crime)
• Art. 166 imposes penalty for falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or
other obligations and securities
ü Complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or
security of the Philippines, hence penalty to be imposed in maximum period;
but there’s a mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and via the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in
its maximum period
ü TC’s penalty is correct
Art. 167. Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer
Any person who shall forge, import or utter, in connivance with the forgers or importers, any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding
P6,000 pesos.
Elements:
1. There be an instrument payable to order or other
document of credit not payable to bearer
2. Offender forged, imported or uttered such
instrument
3. In case of uttering, he connived with the forger or
importer
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Art. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments
of credit
Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles,
any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the
false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Elements:
1. That any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligation and security payable to bearer, or
any instrument payable to order or other
document of credit not payable to bearer is forged
or falsified by another person.
2. That the offender knows that any of those
instruments is forged or falsified.
3. That he performs any of these acts –
a. using any of such forged or falsified
instrument, or
b. possessing with intent to use any of
such forged or falsified instrument.
• Note: The act being punished under Art. 168 is knowingly possessing with intent to use
any such forged treasury or bank notes. The accused must have knowledge of the forged
character of the note. Intent to use is sufficient to consummate the crime when the
offender is in possession of false or falsified notes or obligations. [People vs.
Sendaydiego, (1978)]
• Is possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without intent to use a criminal offense
enough to consummate the crime?
No. But mere possession with intent to utter
consummates the crime of illegal possession
of false notes.
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• A person in possession of falsified document and who makes use of the same is
presumed to be the material author of falsification. The rule is that if a person had in his
possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and
profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
ü This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor mat be proven to
have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
forgers.
• Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone is not a criminal offense. The accused
has the burden to give satisfactory explanation of his possession of forged bills. It is
incumbent upon the person in possession thereof to satisfactorily explain his innocence
for said possession, it being a fact relied upon by him as a justification or excuse and which
lies peculiarly within his knowledge. (People vs Perez)
• Failure of the accuse to explain satisfactorily his possession means either:
1. He forged them himself
2. He knows who falsified it but does not want to divulge them
• In a case where the accused, instead of carrying out his intention, threw away the forged
note, it was held that he was not liable whatever might be his motive in getting rid of it,
for the law will not close the door of repentance on him, who, having set foot on the path
of crime, retraces his steps before it is too late. (People vs. Padilla)
• Where the accused in aiding his brother to utter a counterfeit bank note was not aware
of its counterfeit character, he was guilty of illegal possession and use of false bank notes.
(US vs De leon)
• Mark Clemente y Martinez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194367, June 15,
2011.
In this case, the Supreme Court, citingPeople v. Digoro, reversed and set aside the
findings of the lower courts and acquitted petitioner of the crime of Illegal possession
and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. In Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more,
is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the
possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. In the case at
bar, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly
gave the fake P500 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the
jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter
to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake P500 bill. In short, the jail
officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz to use
the P500 bill. Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal
knowledge.
• The conduct of the accused is considered to establish knowledge of forgery.
ü Buying eggs worth P0.30 at one instance, and making a purchase of P0.50 at
another instance, paying in each instance a false ten-peso bill, receiving on both
occasions the proper amount of change in lawful money, and when arrested and
asked by a policeman to explain the possession of the same, the
offender refused to make any explanation, stating he would know
what to say in court. In court, he failed to explain his possession of
the forged bank bills. (People vs. Co Pao, 58 Phil. 545)
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ü When somebody discovered that the P20-bill to be changed was forged, the
owner snatched it from the one who was examining it and tore it to pieces.
(People vs. Quinto, 60 Phil. 351)
ü The accused at first denied to the policeman who was conducting the search that
he had counterfeit five-peso bills in his possession and although he knew that the
policeman was after the forged bills as mentioned in the search warrant, he said
he had only a revolver without license to mislead the policeman. When the
policeman insisted in the further search, he delivered to him the package of
counterfeit bills concealed in a straw hat. (People vs. Vacani, 61 Phil. 796)
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Certain 1 peso, 10 peso, and 20 peso treasury notes were so made by pressing a genuine
treasury note against a coupon bond, saturated with chemicals. All the printed matter in the
treasury note is inversely reproduced in the coupon bond. Their appearance carries an inherent
impossibility for anyone to accept them as genuine money.
HELD: this case falls under the purview of Paragraph 2 Article 4 of the RPC in relation to Article
59. In impossible crimes, the act performed would have been an offense against persons or
property. Forging or falsification of treasury notes is neither an offense against persons nor an
offense against property.
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ü Forgery under the RPC applies to papers, which are in the form
of obligations and securities issued by the Philippine
Government as its own obligations, which are given the same
status as legal tender. E.g. Treasury and bank notes.
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QUESTION ANSWER
Instead of the peso sign (P), somebody No. Forgery was not committed. The forged
replaced it with a dollar sign ($). Was the crime instrument and currency note must be given
of forgery committed? the appearance of a true and genuine
document. The crime committed is a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 247.
Where the currency note, obligation or
security has been changed to make it appear
as one which it purports to be as genuine, the
crime is forgery. In checks or commercial
documents, this crime is committed when
the figures or words are changed which
materially alters the document.
An old man, in his desire to earn something, NO Because of the impossibility of deceiving
scraped a digit in a losing sweepstakes ticket, whoever would be the person to whom that
cut out a digit from another ticket and pasted ticket is presented, the Supreme Court ruled
it there to match the series of digits that what was committed was an impossible
corresponding to the winning sweepstakes crime. Note, however, that the decision has
ticket. He presented this ticket to the Philippine been criticized. In a case like this, the
Charity Sweepstakes Office. But the alteration Supreme Court of Spain ruled that the crime
is so crude that even a child can notice that the is frustrated. Where the alteration is such that
supposed digit is merely superimposed on the nobody would be deceived, one could easily
digit that was scraped. Was the old man guilty see that it is a forgery, the crime is frustrated
of forgery? because he has done all the acts of
execution which would bring about the
felonious consequence but nevertheless did
not result in a consummation for reasons
independent of his will.
A person has a twenty-peso bill. He applied The Supreme Court ruled that it was only
toothache drops on one side of the bill. He has frustrated forgery because although the
a mimeograph paper similar in texture to that offender has performed all the acts of
of the currency note and placed it on top of the execution, it is not possible because by
twenty-peso bill and put some weight on top simply looking at the forged document, it
of the paper. After sometime, he removed it could be seen that it is not genuine. It can
and the printing on the twenty-peso bill was only be a consummated forgery if the
reproduced on the mimeo paper. He took the document which purports to be genuine is
reverse side of the P20 bill, applied toothache given the appearance of a true and genuine
drops and reversed the mimeo paper and document. Otherwise, it is at most frustrated.
pressed it to the paper. After sometime, he
removed it and it was reproduced. He cut it
out, scraped it a little and went to a sari-sari
store trying to buy a cigarette with that bill.
What he overlooked was that, when he placed
the bill, the printing was inverted. He was
apprehended and was prosecuted and
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• Art 169
ü Paragrpah 1: By giving to a treasury or bank note the appearance of a true and
genuine document.
ü Paragraph 2: By erasing, or altering by any means the figures, letters, words, or
sign contained therein.
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The one-peso paper bill (Exhibit A) is a genuine pre-war treasury certificate "payable to the
bearer on demand" which has been, however, withdrawn from circulation. It is, however,
redeemable at its face value if presented to the Central Bank, pursuant to Republic Acts Nos.
17 and 199.
Held: The forgery here committed comes under this first paragraph of Article 169 of the Code
(By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned
therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document). We believe that this provision
contemplates not only the situations where a spurious, false or fake document, but also the
situations involving originally true and genuine documents which have been withdrawn or
demonetized, or have outlived their usefulness. The case under consideration could not come
within the second paragraph of the aforesaid article (By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or
altering by any means the figures, letters, works or signs contained therein), because no figure,
letter, word or sign contained in Exhibit A has been erased, substituted, counterfeited or altered.
The forgery consists in the addition of a word in an effort to give to the present document the
appearance of the true and genuine certificate that it used to have before it was withdrawn or
has outlived its usefulness.
Held: This is forgery, because when A wrote B's name on the back of the treasury warrant
which was originally made payable to B or his order, he converted, by such supposed
indorsement, the treasury warrant to one payable to bearer. It had the effect of erasing the
phrase "or his order" upon the face of the warrant. There was material alteration on a genuine
document.
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Elements:
1. That these be a bill, resolution or ordinance
enacted or approved or pending approval by the
national assembly or any provincial board or
municipal council.
2. That the offender (any person) alters the same.
3. That he has no proper authority therefor.
4. That the alteration has changed the meaning of
the document.
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a. Bills of exchange
b. Letters of Credit
c. Checks
d. Quedans
e. Drafts
f. Bills of lading
• Note: Under the Rules of Court, there are only two kinds of document private and public
document.
Public document is broader than the term official document.
Before a document may be considered official, it must first be
public document. To become an official document, there must be
a law which requires a public officer to issue or to render such
document.
E.g. A cashier is required to issue an official receipt
for the amount he receives. The official receipt is a
public document which is an official document.
• What are examples of writings that do not constitute documents?
1. A draft of a municipal payroll which is not yet approved by the
proper authority
2. Mere blank forms of official documents, the spaces of which
are not filled up
3. Pamphlets or books which are mere merchandise, not
evidencing any disposition or agreement
• How is document falsified?
A document is falsified by fabricating an inexistent document or by
changing the contents of an existing one through any of the 8 ways
enumerated under Art. 171.
• Note: R.A. 248 prohibits the reprinting, reproduction or republication of government
publications without proper authority.
• Accused must not be a public official entrusted with the custody or possession of such
document otherwise Art 171 applies. He must not be a person in authority.
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Elements:
1. That the offender is a public officer,
employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official
position.
3. That he falsifies a document by committing
any of the following acts:
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ü the payroll is merely a draft, because it has not been approved by the
proper authority, it can prove nothing and affirm nothing. (People vs.
Camacho, 44 Phil. 488)
• Note: In 1st, 2nd, 6th, 7th (2nd part), 8th mode of falsification, there must be genuine
document. In other paragraphs of 171, falsification may be committed by simulating or
fabricating a document.
• In falsification of a public document, the falsification need not be mad eon an official form.
It is sufficient that the document is given the appearance of, or made to appear similar
to, the official form
U.S. vs. Corral (15 Phil. 383)
Facts: To cause the arrest of his common-law wife who had left him and had gone to
Corregidor, taking with her a trunk and a diamond ring, the accused simulated a warrant of
arrest by making it appear that the same was signed and issued by the authority when in truth
and in fact it was not. The accused sent it to the municipal president of Corregidor and, by
virtue thereof, the woman was arrested. When prosecuted for falsification of a
public document, the accused contended that one can falsify only a genuine document and
that what he falsified was no document at all.
Held: It is not necessary that it be a real document, it is enough that it be given the appearance
of a genuine document.
ELEMENTS
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public.
2. That he takes advantage of his official position.
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
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PARAGRAPH 7
PARAGRAPH 8
• PARAGRAPH 1
Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
ü ELEMENTS:
1. That there be an intent to imitate, or an attempt to imitate
2. That the two signatures or handwritings, the genuine and the forged,
bear some resemblance, to each other
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• PARAGRAPH 2
Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate;
ü ELEMENTS
1. That the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person/s
participated in an act or a proceeding; and
2. That such person/s did not in fact so participate in the act or proceeding
ü People vs. Villanueva
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ü ELEMENTS
1. That a person or persons participated in an act or a proceeding;
2. That such person or persons made statements in that act or proceeding;
and
3. That the offender, in making a document, attributed to such person or
persons statements other than those in fact made by such person or
persons.
ü US vs Capule
Nicasio Capule, for the purpose of appropriating to himself a tract
of coconut land, without the knowledge or consent of the owners thereof,
prepared and drew up a document setting forth the sale in his favor of the said
land, pretending that it was made and executed by the said owners. It appears,
however, that the. owners of the land did not sell it to Nicasio Capule. What they
really did was that they conferred a power of attorney upon him so that he might
represent them in a suit they had with Maximino Reyes
• PARAGRAPH 4
Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
ü ELEMENTS
1. That the offender makes in a document statements in a narration of facts
2. That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by
him; (required by law to be done) and
3. That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
4. That the perversion or truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person
ü There must be narration of facts, not of conclusion of law.
When the accused certified she was eligible for the
position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law when she
declared that she was "eligible," she merely expressed her
belief that the 23 year requirement could be adequately met
if she reached 23 years upon assuming the councilorship.
ü Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of
the facts narrated.
ü The person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts
narrated by him.
ü The person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts
narrated by him that the men did his work only before 8 o'clock in the morning
but absented himself during the whole day and worked as a cook in the house of
the defendant during said period, it was held that the defendant was not liable for
falsification by making false statements although it was not for the whole day. The
rule is that if the statements are not altogether false, there being some colorable
truth in such statements, the crime of falsification is not deemed to have been
committed.
ü Legal obligation to disclose the truth, inherent in residence certificate. if a person
buying a residence certificate gave to the clerk of the treasurer's office false
information, he thereby committed falsification as principal by
induction in making false statement in the narration of fact. (People
vs. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913)
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ü The perversion of truth in the narration of facts must be made with the wrongful
intent of injuring a third person.
ü There is no falsification by one who acted in good faith. The statement in the
affidavit that the affiant was the owner of a banca which he had raised from the
bottom of the estero by virtue of a contract with the municipality and that it
remained unclaimed, is not falsification because he believed that he was entitled
to its ownership. (U.S. vs. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604)
ü Augustina filed a criminal complaint against Bernante for falsification of public
document because the latter allegedly falsified leave forms. It was alleged that
Bernante made it appear in his leave application that he was on forced leave and
on vacation leave on certain dates. In truth, Bernante was serving a 20‐day prison
term because of his conviction of the crime of slight physical injuries. Is Bernante
liable for the crime of falsification of documents?
No. Augustina failed to point to any law imposing
upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose
where he was going to spend his leave of absence.
“Legal obligation” means that there is a law
requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts
narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the
crime of falsification of public document by making
false statements in a narration of facts absent any
legal obligation to disclose where he would spend
his vacation leave and forced leave. (Enemecio v.
Office of the Ombudsman [Visayas] G.R. No.
146731, Jan. 13, 2004)
• PARAGRAPH 5
Altering true dates
ü There is falsification under this paragraph only when the date mentioned in the
document is essential which affects either the veracity of the document or the
effects thereof.
ü Example
a. The chief of police altered the dates in the police blotter so as to make
them show that S was arrested and gave bond on September 13, 1930.
The date altered by the accused in those documents was essential,
because the date, September 6, 1930, will show that there was a delay in
the preliminary investigation of the case.
b. When the auditor examined the book of receipts of the accused, it was
noticed that there were signs of alteration y making it appear that the
payment of the real estate tax in the amount of P109.26 was made on the
4th of August, when in truth and in fact it was made on the 30th of July.
Held: The accused is guilty of falsification. It is true that if the alteration of
a date does not affect the integrity of the document, it does not constitute
the crime of falsification, but the rule has no application when the act is
committed, not by ignorance or mistake but rather to prevent the
discovery of an illegal appropriation of public funds. People vs. Belgica
• PARAGRAPH 6
Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning;
ü ELEMENTS
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• Under this par., damage is not essential. It is presumed. the reason that, in
contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.
• The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the
falsified document is a public document.
• Lack of malice or criminal intent may be put up as a defense under this article, as when
it is with the authority of the heirs of a deceased in a deed of sale. Having been done by
the accused with the authority ofthe children ofthe deceased heir, is not a punishable act
of falsification, the accused not having acted with malice
• Cash disbursement vouchers or receipts evidencing payments are not commercial
documents.
• A mere blank form of an official document is not in itself a document.
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The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use
of it (uttered it) taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he
is the material author of the falsification. (People vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120)
• There are four kinds of documents:
1. Public document in the execution of which, a person in authority or notary
public has taken part;
2. Official document in the execution of which a public official takes part;
3. Commercial document or any document recognized by the Code of
Commerce or any commercial law; and
4. Private document in the execution of which only private individuals take part.
• Public and Private writings under the Rules of Court: The following are public documents:
1. Written official acts, or records, of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers
2. Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last will and
testaments
3. Public records kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered
4. therein.
All other writings are private.
• After an investigation, a group of public officers were caught and convicted of falsifying
cash vouchers. On appeal the SC held that cash vouchers are NOT commercial
documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate credit transactions nor they are defined and regulated by the Code
of Commerce or other commercial law. Rather, they are private documents which have
been defined as:
1. Deeds or instruments executed by a private person
2. Without the intervention of a public notary or of
other person legally authorize,
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offender profited or hoped to profit by the falsification. All that the law
requires is an intent to prejudice another person.
• The damage need not be material.
ü The law does not make any distinction between prejuicio and dano
(danyo)
• Falsification is not a continuing offense
ü The court where the falsification took place has jurisdiction to try the
case. To try the case I the curt where the subsequent damage took place,
it would be virtually admitting that when the initial step of falsification took
place, the intent to cause damage was not present.
• Falsification as a means to commit other crimes
ü It is already a crime when a public document is falsified. When such
falsified public document is used (again) to commit another crime, it
becomes a complex crime punishable under Article 48 of the RPC
In this case, the document being falsified when used
to commit estafa must be public, official, or
commercial because the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated. The
damage to another, as in the crime of falsification,
is a necessary means to commit estafa
1. Estafa through falsification of public
documents
2. Theft through falsification of public
documents
3. Estafa through falsification of commercial
documents by reckless imprudence
4. Malversation through falsification of public
documents.
ü When, on the other hand, a private document is falsified, there exist noe
crime. In the event that the private document is used with intent to
damage, the result is only one crime.
The intent to defraud in using the falsified private
document is part and parcel of the crime, and
cannot give rise of estafa, because the damage, if it
resulted, became the element of the crime of the
falsification of a private document
• There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document.
ü The reason is that the effects of falsification of private document is the
same as thatof estafa since the fraudulent gained obtained through
deceit in estafa is nothing more nor less than the very damage caused by
the falsification of such document.
ü Thus, if a private document id falsified to obtain from the offended party
the money or other personal property which the offender later
misappropriated, the crime committed is falsification of private document
only.
• Situation:
ü if the falsification of a private document was committed for the
purpose of concealing estafa, or estafa was already committed at
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the time of the falsification of the private document, the crime committed was
estafa.
ü When the private document was falsified before it become part of the official
record, the crime is falsification of private document only because at the time the
document was falsified, it was not yet part of the public or official record, nor was
it certified by a person authorized to certify public documents.
ü However, if it seems that the document is intended by law to be a part of the
public or official record, even if the falsification took place before the private
document becomes part of the public records, it is regarded as falsification of a
public document.
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• The user of the falsified document is deemed the author of falsification, if:
1. the use is so closely connected in time with the falsification
2. the user had the capacity of falsifying the document
• If a person used a falsified document what should be the proper charge against him?
Falsification of documents because of the legal principle
that when a person made use of falsified document, he is
deemed to be the falsifier.
• If the crime was use of falsified document, the nature of the document is not controlling.
In this crime, the purpose for knowingly using falsified document is essential. But if the
document is presented in court, even if rejected, the mere offer thereof is criminal.
(Boado, 2008)
• Is there such crime as attempted/ frustrated falsification?
None. Falsification is consummated the moment the
genuine document is altered of the moment the false
document is executed. It is immaterial that the offender did
not achieve his objectives. (Reyes, 2008)
Art. 173. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph and telephone messages, and use of
said falsified messages
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
officer or employee of the Government or of any private corporation or concern engaged in
the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable or telephone message who utters a fictitious
wireless, telegraph or telephone message of any system or falsifies the same.
Any person who shall use such falsified dispatch to the prejudice of a third party or with the
intent of cause such prejudice, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree.
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• The public officer to be liable must be engage in the service of sending or receiving
woreless, cable, telegraph, or telephone messages.
Art. 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc.
The penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection, with the practice of his profession, shall
issue a false certificate; and
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2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit of service, good conduct
or similar circumstances.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any private person who shall falsify a
certificate falling within the classes mentioned in the two preceding subdivisions.
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Case Ticklers
TREASON
That the accused claim that his allegiance as a Filipino citizen was suspended and that there was a change of
sovereignty over the Phil Islands:
• A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government of sovereign. The absolute
and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty
of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby the occupier.
• Just as treason may be committed against the Federal as well as against the State Govt, in the same
way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the sovereignty of the
US as weel as against the sovereignty of the Phil Commonwealth; and that the change of our gorm of
govt from commonwealth to republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of
treason committed during the commonwealth, bec it is an offense against the same govt and the same
sovereign people.
That the women were brought by the accused to the Japanese soldiers for sexual purposes:
• Commandeering of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainments
held in their honor was not reason even though the women and the entertainments helpted to make life
more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit.
• The law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse bet the
belligerent occupants of the invaded country and it inhabitants.
• two-witness rule: It is necessary that the two witnesses corroborate each other not only on the whole
overt act but on any part of it.
• Torture and atrocities as aggravating circumstances –the use hereof instead of the usual and less painful
method of execution will be taken into account to increase the penalty under art. 14(21).
• Plea of guilty to some counts: considered mitigating circumstance.
That the accused with a band, massacred a barangay and two 10-year old girls witnessed the crime:
• Makapili is not part of the Japanese Army but just an org of Filipino traitors, pure and simple.
• Defense of State: constitutional duty of citizen cannot be cast off in time of war. The citizen has a
constitutional duty to defend the State and cannot be cast off when his country is at war by the siple
expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country,
and an enemy country at that, or be accepting a commission in the military, naval or air service of such
country or by desserting from the Phil Army, Navy or Air Corp.
That the accused is a member of the Makapili and wore uniforms and that the two witnesses refer to different
acts on different days:
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• Makapili direct evidence of adherence and giving aid and comfort to enemy. Unless forced upon one
against his will, membership in the makapili org imports treasonable intent, considering the purpose for
which the organization was created, the members would shed blood and sacrifice their lives.
• Adherence, unlike overt act, need not be proved by the oaths of two witnesses.
• Makapili as an overt act: the membership must be established by the deposition of two witnesses.
• It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits
together of the overt act, but if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths.
ESPIONAGE
CA 616
PIRACY
That the accused are claiming that they do not belong to the Phil territory:
• Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi (with intent to steal) and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
• Piracy is a crime not against any particular State byt against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal or any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes had not territorial limits.
• PD 532 (Anti-Piracy Law) amended 134 and its effect was to create the crime of qualified piracy where
rape, murder or homicide is committed. No mitigating circumstance shall be appreciated regardless of
plea of guilt.
• Recall: crew members of the vessel committed crime
That the accused committed with triple murder and frustrated murder in piracy:
• Recall: There was a lone survivor Antonio De Guzman who was shot in the waters but was not killed.
• Number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy, not material; Piracy, a special complex crime
punishable by death—but the number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is not material. PD 532
considers qualified piracy as a special complex crime punishable by death. (not anymore-RP)
HIJACKING
RA 6235
ARBITRARY DETENTION
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• Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes and offenses committed in furtherance thereof of in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State are in the nature continuing crimes. Rolando Dural was arrested for being a
member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
People vs Burgos
• The case where the firearm was left to be buried to the ground and the wife pointed where the firearm
was.
• Warrant of arrest; personal knowledge required of an officer arresting a person who has just committed
is committing or is about to commit an offense-udner sec6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of
that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence.
• For arrests without warrant to be lawful, it is required that a crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. In arrests without warrant under Sec 6(b) it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually
have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is
not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committee. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
• The barrio captain who detained a person for 11 hours. His contention was that he is not a public officer.
• Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The
officer liable for Arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of
persons accused of a crime.
• PD 299 was signed into law, barrio captains or barangay captain were recognized as persons in authority.
EO 272
RA 7438
Rule 126
• Several judges issued 42 search warrants to seize all docs and papers showing all business transactions
of petitioners.
• Requisites for issuing search warrants-Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe the things
to be seized.
• Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records showing all the business
transactions of certain person, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene
the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described
and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
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• Probable cause for search: as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
• A search warrant against a publisher must particularize the alleged criminal or subversive material to be
seized. The application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with
particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or intending to publish.
• The case where the microphone was allegedly grabbed (but there was no sound when the accused
spoke).
• A religious meeting is an assemblage of people met for the purpose of performing acts of adoration to
the Supreme Being or to perform religious services in recognition of God as an object or worship, love
and obedience, it matters not the faith with respect to the Deity entertained by the persons so assembled.
• Mere saying of prayers and singing of hymns would render such place as place devoted to religious
worship.
• Notoriously offensive- must be direct against a dogma or ritual or upon an object of veneration. Mere
grabbing of mic might be punishable as public disturbance under 153.
• The case where the funeral passed thru the Catholic churchyard.
• The court held that WON the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a
question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of
other faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a
certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith.
• Laurel Dissenting: Offense to religious feelings should not be made to depend upon the more or less
broad or narrow conception of any given particular religion but should be gauged having in view the
nature of the acts committed and after scrutiny of all the facts and circumstances which should be viewed
through the mirror of an unbiased judicial criterion. Otherwise, the gravity of leniency of the offense
would hinge in the subjective characterization of the act from the point of view of a given religious
denomination or sect and in such a case, the application of the law would be partial and arbitrary, withal,
dangerous, especially in a country said to once the scene of religious intolerance and prosecution.
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RA 6968
• Honasan charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.
• Hernandez doctrine prohibits complexing of rebellion with any other offense. The rejection of both options
shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion.
• Gutierrez Jr Concurring: Rebellion consists of many acts; the crime of rebellion consists of many acts.
The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime. of rebellion. Neither should the
dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a
hundred or thousands of separate offenses. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military
facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
• As a continuing crime.
• Enrile was charged with rebellion complexed with murder and a violation under PD 1829 Sec. 1(c)
obstruction of justice bec he gave food and comfort to Honasan.
• Being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was fo no other
purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. It was
motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive.
• All crimes whether punishable under a special law or general law which are mere components or
ingredients or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot
be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. So whether punishable by RPC or a special
law, the Hernandez case still is the ruling that these common crimes are absorbed in rebellion.
People vs Dasig
• Case where the accused shot a police during a gun battle with other traffic enforcers.
• Appellant is liable for the crime of rebellion, not murder, not murder with direct assault upon a person
in authority.
• Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government, among other means. In this case,
appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with the sparrow unit but his killing of the
officer. The sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the duly
constituted govt.
• The ISLAW is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion. Crime of rebellion is penalized by prison
mayor and fine not exceeding 20K. (But this is now changed by RA 6968 as shown in 135).
•
People vs. Lovedioro
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• If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime
and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
SEDITION
People. Cabrera
• Phil Constabulary vs. the Manila police where the PC vowed revenge.
• Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State.
• The Phil Law on the subject makes all persons guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultously in
order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods any one of five objects, including that of inflicting
any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any official or agent of the Insular Govt or of
a provincial or municipal govt.
• It is not necessary that the offender should be a private citizen and the offended party a public
functionary.
• Conspiracies are generally proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which
vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. IF it be proved that the defendants pursued by their
acts the same object, one performing one part and another part of the same so as to complete it with a
view to the attainment of that same object one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged
in a conspiracy to effect that object.
INCITING TO SEDITION
US vs Tolentino
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• Martinez and Bautista were members of the Constitutional Convention. They were arrested for
falsification of docs-birthday and distribution of free food, drinks and cigs at 2 public meetings
• Sec 15, Art VI of the Constitution makes it clear that parliamentary immunity from arrest does not cover
any prosecution for treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
• American law: Bu common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest
on civil process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable
them to go to and return from the same. A prosecution for a criminal offense is thus excluded from this
grant of community.
RA 8294
• Case where a dance was held in a basketball court and Quijada kept on pestering Iroy’s sister and Quijada
killed the brother.
• He was convicted of two separate offenses of murder and illegal use of firearm aggravated with illegal
use of firearm.
• The unequivocal intent of the second par of section 1. of PD 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or
murder as a distinct offense penalized under the RPC and to increasae the penalty for illegal possession
of firearm where such a firearm is used in killing a person.
• Its clear language yields no intention of the lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and
249 of the RPC in such a way that if an unlicensed fiream is used in the commission of homicide or
murder, either of these crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and would not anymore be separately punished.
• The words of the subject provision are palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes
of homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the RPC is obliterated as such and reduced as a
mere aggravating circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the unlicensed firearm is used
in killing a person.
• The only purpose of the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in 1st par of sec 1—reclusion
temporal in its max to reclusion perpetua to death.
• Accused played with an armalite and shot Sotto who was playing with friends after their drink.
• Under RA 8294, the offeses of murder and illegal use or possession of firearm are integrated into a single
offense. In the recent case of People vs. Molino, gave retroactive application to RA No. 8294 considering
that under the new law, the offenses of murder and illegal use or possession of firearm are integrated
into a single offense.
• With the amendments introduced by RA 8294 to PD 1866, the use of unlicensed firearm in killing the
victim is no longer considered as a separate offense, instead, it is considered as an aggravating
circumstance. Liable for murder and the use of firearm is only an aggravating circumstance.
• There was a report of missing carabaos, pigs, and goats. Police chanced upon the gang of appellants.
There was a volley of gunfire and a policeman was killed. The trial court convicted the accused illegal
use of firearm in its aggravated form.
• The second element of illegal possession of firearms can be proven by the testimony or the certification
of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused was not a license of the
firearm in question.—As to proof that appellants had no license or permit to possess the firearm in
question, we have held that the second element of illegal possession of firearms can be proven by the
testitmony or the certification of a representative of the PNP Firearm and Explosives Unit that the accused
was not a licensee of the firearm in question.
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DIRECT ASSAULT
• The case where the accused brandished a knife challenging anyone to fight with him when the brgy.
Captain was giving a speech.
• Barangay captain was killed while in the performance of his duties. The records showed that the barangay
captain was in the act of trying to pacify the accused who was making trouble in the dance hall when he
was stabbed to death.
• Case where the accused was summoned at the house of the governor to fix the fence.
• In order to be guilty under 223 (connivance) and 224 (negligence), it is necessary that the public officer
had consented to, or connived in, the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an
essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithfulness in the custody of the prisoner. If the
public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not
violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.
• Negligence in the custody of a prisoner under 224 of the RPC punishable if it is definitely and deliberately
committed.
• Accused was convicted with slander but she didn’t serve her sentence.
• The elements are that the offender is a convict by final judgment; he is serving the sentence of
deprivation of liberty and he evades the service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.
• The prescription commence from date when culprit should evade the service of his sentence.
• The accused was convicted of estafa but then he was granted a conditional pardon provided he would
not violate any penal laws. He was charged 20 counts of estafa but he was not yet convicted of final
judgment.
• A convict granted conditional pardon who is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment
of a court of the subsequent crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for
such subsequent offense can be imposed upon. The parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated
the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment before he can be
made to suffer the penalty under 159.
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QUASI-RECIDIVISM
COUNTERFEITING
• The Spanish Penal Code from which the law punishing the fabrication and uttering of counterfeit coins is
evidently derived, the fabrication of a local coin withdrawn from circulation is punishable, it stands to
reason that the counterfeiting of foreign coin, even if withdrawn from circulation in the foreign country
of its origin, should also be punishable, because the reason for punishing the fabrication of a local coin
withdrawn from circulation is not alone the harm caused to the public by the fact that it may go into
circulation, but the danger that a counterfeiter produces by his stay in the country, and the possibility
that he may later apply his trade to making of coins in actually circulation.
• The law of the US on its currency became a part of the general law which our courts of justice are bound
to apply and enforce.
MUTILATION OF COINS
PD 247
FORGERY
• Erasure and alteration of figures in genuine treasury notes-The possession of genuine treasury notes of
the Philippines any of the “figures, letters, words or signs contained” in which had been erased and/or
altered, with knowledge of such erasure and alteration, and with the intent to use such notes in enticing
another to advance funds for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of counterfeit treasury
notes of the Philippines, is punishable.
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FALSIFICATION
• Case of Bar Exam where the scores of a certain Mabunay were changed.
• The contention that the papers which defendant ER altered were not public or official documents is
untenable because the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial function. The
alterations made in such papers, under the circumstances proven in this case, of the grades given to
them by the correctors, constitute the crime of falsification of public documents.
Beradio vs. CA
• The accused was the Chief of Office, Office of Election registrar who was accused as having falsified her
daily time record.
• Where non-faithful statement of daily hours of work in time record has not caused damages to the Govt,
no crime of falsification can accrue. While it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not
criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to the
government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest affecting the
public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary for
the safeguard and protection of that general interest.
Luague vs. CA
• Case where the wife signed the payroll warrant after her husband died.
• Absence of criminal intent by petitioner wife when she signed her husband’s name as payee. Absence of
damage an element to be considered to determine presence of criminal intent. Govt did not sustain
financial loss due to encashment of checks by the wife.
• While it is not meant to imply that if there is no damage there can be no falsification, but that the absence
of damage is an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent. (Damage
is not necessary in falsification but is intent necessary?)
• Case of lost treasury bills and that on the Securities Delivery Receipt, he crossed out with a red ink the
said doc and notated “for adjustment”.
• There is no falsification if the correction was made to speak the truth. It is a settled doctrine that in
falsification byu an employee under par no 4 of Art 171 which reads by making untruthful statements in
the narration of facts, the ff elements must concur:
a. offender makes in a doc untruthful satatments in a narration of facts
b. that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him
c. the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false
d. that the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third
person
• In the absence of a legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth, accused cannot be convicted of
falsification. The practice was for his own convenience and also for reference purposes.
• Case where Samson made vouchers for the alleged construction of a bridge but there wasn’t really any
construction. The vouchers were encashed at Sandaydiego’s office and not at the Cashier’s.
• A person in possession of falsified document and made us of it is presumed to be material author of
falsification.
• If falsification was resorted to hide malversation, falsification and malversation are separate offenses,
not complex crimes. Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime and falsification of each voucher
constitutes one offense. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the
malversation, the falsication and maversation are separate offenses. The falsification of six vouchers
constitutes six separate or distinct offenses and each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial
voucher constitutes a separate offense. The six misappropriations evidenced by the six vouchers
constitute six distinct offenses. ( As compared to Villalon, Dava and Cortez case?)
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• Mayor appointed one woman as clerk but there were no funds available and no special ordinance creating
said position.
• The existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document
is a public document.
• Case where a document of mortgage was falsified by the accused alleging that he has obtained the
signatures of the De Guzman brothers.
• The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of
public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa,
not by falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document
is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.
• In the crime of falsification of a public document, the prescriptive period commences from the time the
offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
• Case where Dava acquired a falsified driver’s license after his previous license was confiscated due to a
felony he committed.
• Driver’s license a public document.
• The driver’s license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another
person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial.
• In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.
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