Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chapter 2: Partnerships
o INTRO TO PARTNERSHIP
Uniform Partnership Act (1914) (UPA)
Not legally binding unless enacted by a state
Default rules vs. contract clauses
There are very few mandatory rules
Many rules can be altered by contract by the parties
Default rules = the statutory rule that the court will automatically apply unless the partis have made
agreements otherwise in a contract
o As long as this agreement doesn’t go against a mandatory rule in the statute, isn’t illegal, or
doesn’t go against public policy, courts typically uphold such contract provisions
o Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission
The characteristics of partnerships
Facts
Fenwick operated a beauty shop where Chesire was employed
C demanded an increase in her weekly wage and employer, F, countered with an offer to make her a
partner, which she accepted
The parties signed a partnership agreement
Later on, she decided to quit her job and sought unemployment compensation
What was Chesire’s position before the Partnership Agreement was signed?
She was a receptionist and cashier
How did her position change after the Partnership Agreement was signed?
They did not change
She continued to perform the same job functions
Her compensation did change
In addition to salary, she was entitled to receive a 20% profit bonus if the business warranted it
What were the terms of the Partnership Agreement?
That the parties associate themselves into a partnership to commence January 1, 1939
That the business shall be the operation of the beauty shop
That the name shall be United Beauty Shoppe
That no capital investment shall be made by Mrs. Chesire
That the control and management of the business shall be vested in Fenwick
That Mrs. Chesire is to act as cashier and reception clerk at a salary of $15 per week and a bonus at
the end of the year of 20% of the net profits, if the business warrants it
That as between the partners Fenwick alone is to be liable for debts of the partnership
That both parties shall devote all their time to the shop
That the books are to be open for inspection of each party
That the salary of Fenwick is to be $50 per week and at the end of the year he is to receive 80% of
the profits
That the partnership shall continue until either party gives ten days’ notice of termination
What was the legal issue addressed by the court?
Whether Chesire was in fact a partner or whether she continued to be an employee, even after the
date the partnership agreement was signed
Why was the question of partnership relevant to the dispute?
If she was an employee, she would have been the 8th employee which would make a difference in
determining whether F was an employer required to pay into the unemployment compensation fund
Lower court’s decision
The commission held that she was an employee
Then the court said she was a partner because of the existence of the partnership agreement
What is the holding?
The appeals court said that she was an employee, not a partner
Even though there was a partnership agreement, the court viewed it as not controlling
Instead, it looked at the nature and substance of the relationship
What was the court’s reasoning?
The court looked to the definition of partnership
They said the agreement was nothing more than one to provide a method of compensating the girl
for the work she had been performing as an employee
She had no authority or control in operating the business, she was not subject to losses, and she was
not held out as a partner
Existence of Partnership - Judicial Factors used in Fenwick v. Unemployment Commission
Intention
o Here, the court states that the reason C was entitled to receive 20% share of profits was
because F wanted to retain C as an employee
Sharing of Profits
o Big focus of courts
o She did have the right to share of profits (20%) but this was not conclusive
o The court referred to UPA 7(4) which talks about sharing profits and said that this doesn’t
apply if the profits represent the wages of the employee
o This was a type of bonus agreement, the court said
Sharing of Losses
o C didn’t share losses, as stated in the agreement
Contribution of Capital and Share in Capital Upon Dissolution
o C didn’t contribute capital and she was not entitled to receive any share of capital, according
to the agreement
Control of Business
o Big focus of courts
o C played no management role
o F had all control rights
Language in Agreement
o Although the agreement referred to both parties as partners, the actual terms of the
agreement didn’t give C the ordinary rights of a partner
Conduct towards Third Parties
o The parties only held themselves out as partners for income tax purposes and for
unemployment payment purposes but not to other 3rd parties
NOTE:
o These are judicially created factors
o PARTNERSHIP – DEFINITION
UPA, §6(1)
An association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit
o Equal Sharing of Profits and Losses
UPA, §18(a)
Partners share equally in profits and losses
o Sharing of Profits
UPA, §7(4)
Share of profits is prima facie evidence of partnership but not if received as wages of an employee or
as interest on a loan (see other exceptions)
o Equal Control Rights of Partners
UPA, §18(e)
All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business
F
o LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
DIFFERENCES FROM GENERAL PARTNERSHIP
Formalities: Need to file certificate of limited partnership
o This is on top of the fact that a partnership agreement is needed
Two categories of partners: General Partners and Limited Partners
o Upon formation, a limited partnership must have at least one general partner and one limited
partner and must have at least 2 partners
o Generally, general partners run the business and have unlimited liability and limited
partners’ management abilities are either non-existence or limited and limited partners
usually have little to no liability
Personal liability: Limited liability for Limited Partners; Unlimited for General Partners
o General partners are personally liable
o Limited partners are generally not liable except in some circumstances
Management in General Partners; Limited Partners are passive investors
o Day to day management and the power to bind a limited partnership are reserved to the
general partners
o Limited partners have governance rights only as to a few matters
Profit and Loss Sharing: Limited Partners share in profits and losses based on their contributions
o Based on capital contributions
o This is the general rule unless otherwise stated in the partnership agreement
Dissolution: Dissociation of Limited Partner does not dissolve the partnership
o This is true unless otherwise stated in the partnership agreement
o Dissociation of a general partner threatens the partnership of dissolution
Name requirement: Must signify status as limited partnership.
o Some statutes require the phrase limited partnership
o Others require this or an abbreviation
ULPA (2001, 2013) §303(a):
(a) A debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited partnership is not the debt, obligation, or other
liability of a limited partner. A limited partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way
of contribution or otherwise, for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the partnership solely by
reason of being or acting as a limited partner, even if the limited partner participates in the
management and control of the limited partnership. This subsection applies regardless of the
dissolution of the partnership.
o Holzman v. De Escamilla
Limited partnership and liability
Parties
Company = Hacienda Farms Limited Partnership
o Limited partners
Russell
Andrews
o General partner
De Escamilla
Facts
Russell and Andrews formed a limited partnership with De Escamilla as the general partner
The firm was a farming partnership and it went into bankruptcy
Creditors sought to hold Russell and Andrews liable as if they were general partners
Trial court found all defendants liable for the debts of the partnership as general partners
What is the legal issue?
Whether Russell and Andrews, who were under the partnership agreement limited partners, are
liable to the creditors as if they were general partners
General rule
Limited partners do not have joint and several liability for debts and obligations of the limited
partnership that exceed the assets of the limited partnership, that are beyond the partnership’s ability
to pay
The general partner has unlimited personal liability for such debts and obligations, but not the
limited partners under ordinary circumstances
This case is about an exception to this general rule
What is the trustee’s legal argument supporting its claim that Russell and Andrews should be liable to
creditors?
The limited partners took control of the partnership through their actions and the consequence is that
they loss their limited liability
What evidence supports this legal argument?
The court notes that the parties consulted with the general partner about what crops should be
planted and the general partner was typically overruled by the limited partners if there was a
disagreement
The limited partners forced the resignation of the general partner and replaced him at a point
Any two partners were allowed to sign checks on behalf of the partnership and the limited partners
had signed many of these checks. All of the other checks were signed by the general partner and one
of the limited partners (the power to control the spending of money in a business is control over the
business)
This indicates that the limited partners participated in management
What is the holding?
The court found that Russell and Andrews, although named as limited partners in the partnership
agreement, were liable to the creditors as if they were general partners
What is the court’s rationale?
The court relied on the CA Civil Code provision below
If they exercised control over the business is what the court looked at
California Civil Code §2483
A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner, unless in addition to the exercise of
his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes control of the business.
How is this provision used by the court to decide this case?
The court looked at the unless and said that the limited partners exercised control over the business
to be found liable
o LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
RULPA §303
(a) Limited partner is NOT LIABLE FOR OBLIGATIONS of limited partnership unless
o Limited partner is also a general partner OR
o Limited partner takes part in the control of the business
In this case, limited partner is liable to a third party who transacts business with the
limited partnership and who reasonably believes based on the limited partner’s
conduct, that she is a general partner
(b) Limited partner does not participate in control solely by consulting/advising with general partner
on partnership business
NOTE:
There is NO uniformity among the states on this topic so you have to make sure to check the specific
state’s statute to know the rule they apply in this situation
o Hypothetical #P1
Assume that RULPA §303(a) is in effect in the jurisdiction. A creditor of Hacienda Farms, who had
delivered fertilizer to the farm on de Escamilla’s order, saw and heard Andrews and Russell engaging in the
conversations about which de Escamilla testified.
Would Andrews and Russell be liable to the creditor?
What if, in addition, the creditor had in the past received payment by checks that bore the signatures
of Andrews and Russell?
o Meinhard v. Salmon
Fiduciary duty of partners
Parties
Louisa Gerry
o Owned Hotel Bristol
o Leased to Salmon
Walter J. Salmon
o Lessee
o He renovated the hotel and had a silent partner
o Manager of the building (as agreed upon by S and M)
Mr. Meinhard
o Silent partner who provided money for renovations to the hotel
o He was a wool merchant
o He had no expertise in management or running the hotel business
Eldridge Gerry
o Son of Louisa who became the owner of the property by the end of the term of the lease
o He decided he wanted to replace the building for a larger project involving additional land
Facts
S & M agreed that S would be the manager of the hotel
They would split the profits 60-40 where S would get 60 and M would get 40, for the first 5 years of
the lease
Then after the first 5 years, they would split 50/50 for the remainder of the lease
E talked to S about investing in the new project
E did not talk to M because it seems that E did not know about M since S’s name was on the lease
and he was the manager of the project
S took the new lease and M found out and sued
NOTE
The case refers to the parties’ relationship as being a joint venture
A joint venture under state law is a separate kind of business relationship than a partnership
However, the fiduciary duty principals apply the same to general partnerships
Why did Meinhard sue Salmon?
Because he was cut out of the new deal that was offered from E to S at the end of the first lease
What relief was Meinhard seeking?
He wanted to be included in the new lease
What were the terms of the 1902 lease?
This covered the Hotel Bristol site only
It was for 20 years
Involved an equal investment between M and S for purposes of the renovation, management, and
operation of the building
The cost was $200K to add shops and offices
There was profit sharing of at first 60/40 and then 50/50 after 5 years
There was equal sharing of losses and S was granted sole power of management and other rights
Lease payments were about $55K and there were preemptive rights for each party in the contingency
of death
What were the terms of the 1922 lease?
This was a lease for a much larger parcel of property
It covered the Hotel and neighboring property with considerable value
The plan was to knock down the buildings and construct a new building in its place
The lease was between E and Midpoint Realty, which was owned and controlled by S
It was for a 20-year term but there was a possibility to extend for 80 years
No change for 7 years and after this time they are to be torn down
A new building costing $3M was to replace the old buildings
Lease payments were between $350K and $475K
S personally guaranteed the performance by the lease of the covenants of the new lease until such
time as the new building had been completed and fully paid for
How did Justice Cardozo decide the case?
He found in favor of M
What relief did he award?
He awarded M an equitable interest in half of the value of the entire lease
This meant that S must hold the lease for the benefit to the tune of 50% of M
But S was also awarded voting control if the two disagreed about the property
What was Cardozo’s reasoning? How did Justice Cardozo view the terms of the joint venture?
S breached a fiduciary duty of loyalty to M
Joint ventures, like co-partners, owe to one another the duty of the finest loyalty
This was not the morals of the marketplace but a rule of undivided loyalty
It was a duty that involved not honesty alone but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive
standard of behavior. It is unbending and inveterate, it is uncompromisingly rigid
The standard here is especially high here because S was not just involved in a joint venture, he was
also serving as the manager
He viewed the joint venture as covering this opportunity because the keystone of the project was
Hotel Bristol
S was approached because the owner didn’t know of the existence of M
E would have approached both parties had he known of M
S took the lease in a breach of his duty to M
According to Cardozo, how should Salmon have handled the 1922 lease?
S took the opportunity for the new lease in silence so he excluded M for the chance to compete for
this opportunity
S should have disclosed the opportunity to M and given him the chance to compete for it
How did Justice Andrews (dissent) view the terms of the joint venture?
He viewed it as a joint venture that had in view a limited object and was to end at a limited time
there was no intent to expand it into a far greater undertaking lasting for many years
He believes that the joint venture ended when the first lease ended and whatever was left in value
was reverted to S. any equity which M possessed was in the particular lease itself, not in any
possibility of renewal
Did Andrews believe that Salmon acted wrongfully?
He believed the term of the joint venture only lasted 20 years and only extended to Hotel Bristol
Because of this, he believes that S didn’t act wrongfully
However, if this had been a general partnership, the majority decision would have been correct!!
o This is because a general partnership is viewed as having a broad arrange of activities that
are associated with it whereas a joint venture typically focuses on a particular project
o Partnership – Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
UPA, §21
A partner must account/hold as trustee (disgorgement)
Profits or benefits derived from any transaction connected with partnership or use of its property
NOTE:
o The language about accounting and holding as trustee means that the remedy for breaching
the fiduciary duty of loyalty is disgorgement of those profits
RUPA, §409(b) – Duty of Loyalty
Duty of loyalty is to account and hold as trustee profits/benefits derived from a use of partnership
property including partnership opportunity
The duty of loyalty includes
o Refraining from conflict of interest transactions and
o Refraining from competing before dissolution of the partnership
o Hypothetical #P2
If you were Salmon’s lawyer at the time he entered into the initial lease, what type of deal with Meinhard
would you have recommended?
If you were representing Meinhard, what would you have recommended?
o Hypothetical #P3 – Duty of Loyalty
(A) Michael is a partner in a business consulting firm with a national clientele. While on a skiing vacation in
Colorado, Michael meets Dorothy, who seeks some business advice. Michael at first declines, explaining,
I’m on vacation. He suggests that Dorothy use the services of another partner and offers to call his office and
arrange matters. Dorothy, however, insists on Michael’s services and offers to pay double his usual charges.
Michael finally agrees. He takes a day out of his vacation, provides Dorothy the advice she needs and
pockets a large fee.
May Michael keep the fee?
o Likely no
o Because by doing so, he would be acting in competition with the firm for which he serves as
a partner
o This is an example of competing with the business in the same line of business
(B) Alice, a partner in a biotechnology partnership, knows that the partnership is looking to rent new office
and laboratory space. She happens to know of a building, in the ideal location, suitable to house the firm’s
special equipment. She learns that the owner is willing either to lease or to sell. Alice decides that the
building would make a fine personal investment, so she buys it for herself. She leases the building to a
company that does not compete with the partnership, and later she resells the building at a profit.
May Alice keep the profit?
o Likely no
o This is taking profit from a business opportunity that should have been offered to the
partnership
(C) Alex is a partner in a landscaping company that works exclusively on commercial projects. On
weekends, without the permission of his copartners, Alex uses company equipment to do landscaping at
private homes.
May Alex keep the money earned from these jobs?
o Likely no
o This is using partnership property for personal gain
(D) Alice is a partner in a biotechnology partnership that is looking to rent new laboratory space. Alice
happens to own a building, in the ideal location, suitable to house the firm’s special equipment. Alice
contracts with the partnership to sells the building to it at a good price.
May Alice close on the deal?
o This depends on factors such as whether other partners would approve the transaction
o This involves a conflict of interest
o She is on both sides of the transaction
o She is acting on her own behalf as owner of the building and acting as a partner in the
partnership and having a fiduciary duty
o Hypothetical #P4
If RUPA §409(b) had been the law when Meinhard v. Salmon was decided, would the result have been the
same or different?
Likely that the result would have been the same
Why?
Partnership would apply in that situation
o Partnership – Fiduciary Duty of Care
RUPA, §409(c) – Duty of Care
Partner must not act in a manner that is grossly negligent or reckless or engage in intentional
misconduct or knowing violation of the law
NOTE
o The duty of care is a responsibility that partners have to act in a diligent and careful way
when conducting business on behalf of the partnership
o Hypothetical #P5
What would Judge Cardozo think about RUPA §409(c)? Is it in line with his idea of fiduciary duty as
expressed in Meinhard v. Salmon?
He would have required liability for simple negligence, not the conduct described in 409(c)
There is a distinction between these two forms of fiduciary duty
o Partnership – Information
UPA, §20
Partners shall provide on demand true and full information of all things affecting the partnership to
any partner
NOTE:
o This duty is often referred to as the duty of candor or the duty of disclosure
UPA, §19
Partners may inspect and copy partnership’s books
NOTE:
o This means books and records about the partnership and other information about the
partnership
o This can also include financial and other information
RUPA, §403
Partners may inspect and copy books and records of the partnership
Partner entitled to information from other partners and partnership that is needed for exercise of
partner’s rights and duties without making demand
Partner entitled to other information upon demand
o Example (offer information without demand needed): Rachel and Sam are partners and
Rachel is considering selling her transferable interest to Sam. Sam learns of some
information suggesting the partnership is entering a boom period (make high profit and do
very well). Rachel is unaware of that information. He must disclose that information to
Rachel even though she has not made demand.
o Partnership – Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith in Expelling Partner
UPA, §31(d)
Dissolution is caused without violation of the partnership agreement by expulsion of any partner
from the business bona fide in accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between
the partners.
NOTE:
o There is a duty to use good faith when partners try to expel another partner from the
partnership
o Partnership – Financial Investment and Return
Partners contribute capital and/or labor
Financial return (UPA §18(a))
Partner has a right to repayment of contribution
Right to share equally in profits and surplus after payment of liabilities
Obligation to contribute to losses sustained by partnership according to such partner’s share in
profits
Right to indemnity against expenses and liabilities incurred in partnership business
UPA §18(b)
Indemnity = right to be made whole
o Hypothetical #P6
Huey, Dewey and Louie form a partnership to conduct a swimming pool maintenance business. Huey and
Dewey each contribute $10K and Louie contributes $5K. They do not discuss sharing of profits and losses.
At the end of the first year, the partnership has profits of $10K.
What is each one’s share of the profits?
o No partnership agreement on profit or loss sharing so this means the court will apply default
rule saying each is entitled to 1/3 of profits
o Hypothetical #P7
Huey, Dewey and Louie form a partnership to conduct a swimming pool maintenance business. Huey and
Dewey each contribute $10K and Louie contributes $5K. They agree to share any profits 40% for each of
Huey and Dewey and 20% for Louie. They do not discuss losses. At the end of the first year, the partnership
has a loss of $10K.
Who is responsible?
o Court will apply default rule because no agreement about losses
o Default rule says to apply as agreement of profits
o Partners are responsible for the losses as they would profits
o Putnam v. Shoaf
Property rights of partners in a partnership
What is the relationship among these parties?
Frog Jump Gin Company
o Company which partnership existed under
o Operating at a loss
Mrs. Putnam
o Original equal partner until her husband died and she inherited his share
o After his death she owned 50%
o Decided to sever and sold her partnership share
Mr. and Mrs. Charlton
o Original equal partner
o 50% share
Mr. and Mrs. Shoaf
o Took over Mrs. Putnam’s ½ partnership share
How was the partnership interest transferred?
Quit claim deed between P and S
Referred to all real and personal property
Released P from any liability
How did the dispute arise?
Original bookkeeper was embezzling funds so they sued and obtained a judgment which C was
entitled to half and the dispute is about the other half and who is entitled to it, P or S
P claimed she was entitled to half of the total recovery
What is Putnam’s claim based on?
She only transferred the items because the quit claim deed didn’t mention this specific situation so
she was entitled to the money since she didn’t convey this specific money
What does the court decide?
Finds against P
What is the court’s rationale?
Partners property interest in the partnership
UPA 24 (3 things that property rights of a partner consist of)
UPA 25 (nature of a partner’s right)
UPA 26 (nature of partner’s interest)
P can only have transferred her economic rights she had no rights in specific pieces of partnership
property
The partnership itself owned the assets
Because UPA says each partner are owners of specific partnership property, it doesn’t matter that the
claim against the bookkeeper wasn’t named as specific property when transferring
o PARTNERSHIP – Property Rights
UPA §24 EXTENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS OF A PARTNER
Property rights of a partner are
o (1) his rights in specific partnership property,
o (2) his interest in the partnership, and
o (3) his right to participate in the management.
UPA §25 NATURE OF PARTNER’S RIGHT IN SPECIFIC PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
UPA §25(1) Partner is co-owner with partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in
partnership.
UPA §25(2)(a) Partner has equal rights with his partners to possess specific partnership property for
partnership purposes (but not for other purposes unless other partners consent).
UPA §26 NATURE OF PARTNER’S INTEREST IN THE PARTNERSHIP
Partner’s interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus and is personal property.
UPA §27 ASSIGNMENT OF PARTNER’S INTEREST
Assignee may only receive profits of assignor, but may not participate in management of
partnership, or require information or account of partnership transactions, or inspect partnership
books unless there is an agreement with the other partners
o Partners may only assign their economic interests in the partnership
o Consistent with UPA §18(g): No person may become member of partnership without the
consent of all the partners.
o Hypothetical #P8
Suppose that after Mrs. Putnam conveyed her one-half interest to Shoaf, it was discovered to everyone’s
surprise that an underground stream had undercut the land on which the gin was located and it was necessary
to abandon the property.
Could the Shoafs recover their loss from Mrs. Putnam?
o No
o Because no specific interest in specific assets of the partnership
o Hypothetical #P9
Laura is a partner in XYZ Consultants. She applies for a personal loan to buy a sailboat from Second Street
Bank. The Bank asks her to assign her XYZ partnership interest as security for the loan. The security
agreement provides that if Laura defaults on repayment of the loan, Second Street Bank will exercise Laura’s
management rights in, and have the right to receive any income due to Laura from, XYZ. There is no
provision in the XYZ Partnership Agreement on assignment.
Can Laura enter into such an assignment?
o UPA 27
o No
o She cannot transfer her management rights, only her economic interest
o This could be changed by contract though
o Partnership – Default Voting Rules
Disagreements among partners are decided by a partnership vote
One partner = one vote, even if contributions are not equal (unless changed by contract)
Some matters are decided by majority vote (UPA §18h)
Ordinary business decisions
Other matters require unanimous consent (UPA §9(3), §18g, §18h)
Assign partnership property in trust to creditors/secure payment of debt
Dispose of good will of partnership
Do an act making it impossible to carry on partnership’s ordinary business
Confess a judgment against partnership
Submit a claim involving the partnership to arbitration
Admit new partners
Contravene any agreement of the partners
o This may include extraordinary matters that substantially change past practice e.g. entering
new lines of business
o National Biscuit Company v. Stroud
Parties
Stroud’s Food Center (general partnership)
o C.N. Stroud
Told plaintiff (bread co) that he would no longer be responsible for any additional
bread sold to the general partnership company
o Earl Freeman
National Biscuit Company
o Seller of bread
How did the dispute arise?
Disagreed about ordinary business manner
F wanted to order bread from N and S objected
How did Stroud try to resolve the dispute?
He went to N and said he would no longer be personally liable for any bread sold and delivered to
the general partnership
F ordered more bread and N delivered it
Now N is suing for payment trying to hold both the partnership and S liable
S objected
Was Stroud successful in his attempt to resolve the dispute? Explain why or why not.
No
Notice was not effective
UPA 18(e)
Equal rights
UPA 18(h)
Ordering bread is an ordinary business decision so majority vote was not enough and partnership
was not bound
UPA 9(1)
Each partner is viewed as a legit agent
UPA 15
Partnership is liable so S is liable
What should Stroud have done?
He could have only dissolved the partnership and then notified
This was the only way
o Partners – Management & Voting
All partners have equal rights in management
UPA §18(e)
Any difference arising as to ordinary business matters connected with the partnership business may be
decided by a majority of the partners
UPA §18(h)
o Partnership – Partners as Agents
Each partner is an agent for partnership and binds the partnership when apparently carrying on in the usual
way the business of the partnership
UPA §9(1)
o Exception = Partner has no authority to act for partnership in the matter and third party
knows that
Partners are jointly and severally liable for debts and obligations of partnership
UPA §15
o Hypothetical #P10
Suppose that Stroud and Freeman consulted you for legal advice before forming the partnership known as
Stroud’s Food Center. How would you have drafted the partnership agreement to avoid the problem that
arose in this case? (problem of deadline)
o Partnership – Changing Management Rights by Contract
Default rules are often changed in the following areas:
Delegating decision making to a managing partner or executive committee
o Common in larger partnerships
Weighting partnership voting to reflect pro rata contributions to capital
o Default rule is equal rights in management regardless of capital
Changing requirement of unanimous consent for certain important events
o Can slow down business decision making because it operates like a veto power
Requiring supermajority voting for important decisions where partners feel majority may not be
sufficient
Right to expel partners of a partnership
o Partnership – Dissolution
Definition of Dissolution = Dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused
by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding up of the
business.
UPA, §29
Dissolution versus Winding Up = Partnership is not terminated upon dissolution but continues until winding
up of business is completed.
UPA, §30
Dissolution is not the end of the partnership but it is the beginning of the process of winding off
which will eventually end the partnership
Causes of Dissolution (UPA §31) (without judicial stuff)
Without violation of partnership agreement: (note that there are negative consequences if a
dissolution occurs in violation of the partnership agreement) (AKA RIGHTFUL DISSOLUTION)
o At the end of a fixed term or with consent of all partners if partnership for a term
o By express will of any partner if partnership at will
o Upon expulsion of a partner under a clause in the partnership agreement
With violation of the partnership agreement, if dissolution not permitted by any other section, by
express will of any partner at any time (AKA WRONGFUL DISSOLUTION)
o Business becomes unlawful
o Death or bankruptcy of partner or bankruptcy of partnership
o Court decree under §32
Dissolution by Court Decree (UPA §32) (a partner may apply to a court for judicially decreed dissolution of
the partnership)
Upon application, court shall decree a dissolution whenever: (grounds for court’s discretion)
o If partner is insane or unable to meet requirements of partnership agreement
o If partner guilty of such conduct as prejudices carrying on the business
o Partner willfully or persistently breaches the agreement or makes it not reasonably
practicably to carry on business with him
o Business can only be carried on at a loss
Compare RUPA §801(5) (recent version)
Partnership is dissolved on application by a partner through judicial determination that
o Economic purpose of partnership is likely to be reasonably frustrated
o Another partner has engaged in conduct relating to the partnership business that makes it not
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with that partner OR
o It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership business in conformity
with the partnership agreement
How does this differ from the comparable rule under the UPA?
o Objective factors is more of a focus
Do you think the change is a good one?
o Less emotional language and more objective
Right to Require Liquidation, UPA §38(1) (in rightful dissolution of partnership)
If dissolution caused in any way except in breach of agreement, each partner may request liquidation
o Liquidation = the assets of the partnership would be gathered and sold and the proceeds
would be applied to pay off partnership liabilities. Any money left over is paid to the
partners in liquidation
Right to Damages and to Continue the Business UPA §38(2) (negative consequences resulting from
dissolution in violation of a partnership agreement mentioned above)
If dissolution in violation of partnership agreement occurs:
o Non-breaching partner may claim for damages against breaching partners and may continue
the business and possess the partnership property for that purpose
If business continued (meaning the non-breaching party decides to continue the business), breaching
partner entitled to receive value of her interest less damages but not including good will of the
partnership
Rules for Distribution – Payment of Liabilities, UPA §40(b) (how partners are to settle accounts after
dissolution) (in order from first to get paid to last)
Payment to creditors other than partners
Payment to partners other than for capital or profits
Payment to partners for capital
Payment to partners for profits
Rules for Distribution – UPA, §40(d)
Partners must contribute the amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities in §40(b)
o As provided in §18(a)
o Duration of Partnership (whether the dissolution is rightful or wrongful depends on what the parties have agreed to
be the duration of the partnership)
At will = no limitation on duration or length of the partnership;
This is the default rule
If the parties do not limit duration, it will be interpreted to be at will
Fixed term
Express term = Together for 5, 10, 15, etc. years; if parties agreed to stay together for a stated
number of years
Implied term (the court would need to see that there is strong evidence showing the following)
o Until certain sum of money earned
o One or more partners recoup investment
o Certain debts are paid
o Certain property disposed of on favorable terms
o Owen v. Cohen
Judicial dissolution
What was the relationship between Owen and Cohen?
Orally agreed to be partners in the operation of a bowling ally
O lent money to the partnership with the agreement that it was to be repaid out of business profits
How did the dispute arise?
C felt he was entitled to more and was rude to O
The parties disagreed about how much to charge for bowling and how much money C was taking out
of the business
O decided he didn’t want to do it anymore and filed an action seeking dissolution of partnership and
sale of partnership assets
Owen sues for judicial decree of dissolution
What are the business reasons for seeking dissolution?
o Not getting along with C because he was rude and they were fighting
o Whether gambling should be allowed and whether compensation should be at a certain level
What are the legal grounds for dissolution?
o UPA 32
o Court shall decree a dissolution whenever
A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect the carrying on of the
business
A partner willfully or persistency commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or
otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it
is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him
Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable
Was such a suit needed for dissolution? Note: Opinion states partners did not expressly fix duration
of partnership.
o It depends on what type of partnership this was considered to be
o In another part of the opinion the court discusses whether this was a partnership for an
implied term
o UPA 31
o If this was considered to be a partnership at will then it would not have been necessary to
file suit for dissolution. One partner could have simply given notice to the other partner and
that would be sufficient
o If there were an implied term, that would be a type of fixed term partnership agreement so
you would have to have dissolved at the end of the fixed term or if both parties agreed to
dissolve the partnership
It seems that it was in the middle of a term partnership and the parties would not
have agreed to the dissolution
o Without finding that the dissolution occurred not in violation of the partnership agreement, it
could fall under a violation, but with that it would carry additional negative consequences
What are the advantages of seeking judicial dissolution?
o If the court determined that there was an implied term and he wanted to avoid a decision of
wrongful dissolution, he could use an alternative route, which is what he did in bringing in
UPA 32
o There are benefits to judicial dissolution especially when there is fighting. In the event of a
judicial dissolution, the parties do not have to deal with one another directly, the court does
all the dirty work
What is the result?
o The court says that judicial dissolution was an appropriate remedy because of C’s
misconduct and disagreements which affected the carryon of the business
Owen seeks return of $6986.63 loan.
Why did he do so?
o He wanted his loan to be repaid in full before any distribution was made to him or the
partner on account of profits or return of capital
Why did Cohen object?
o He objected on the grounds that the parties agreed when making the partnership that the loan
was to be repaid out of profits of the business
o As the bowling alley brought in profits, that was the money that was to be used to repay the
loan
What is the result?
o C’s conduct is what caused the dissolution because he made it impossible to continue the
partnership which thereby made it impossible to repay the loan through the profits of the
partnership
o The court ordered that the loan be repaid first since C was at fault
o Page v. Page
Partnership dissolution; duration of a partnership; and the ability of one of the parties to dissolve the
partnership at will
Who are the parties?
Plaintiff (HB) and defendant (George) are partners in a linen supply business
Parties are brothers
Each invested the same amount of money ($43K)
Partnership’s main creditor is a corporation owned by plaintiff
How did the dispute arise?
The partnership was unprofitable for 8 years but then for 2 years there were small profits
Despite the small profit, plaintiff, who’s corporation was the partnership’s main creditor, wanted to
dissolve the partnership
What is the issue?
Whether HB (plaintiff) is entitled to dissolve the partnership by giving notice at this time
HB did not want to be found in violation of the partnership agreement
What needs to be answered is whether the partnership was at will or for fixed term
Which partner argues for term partnership?
Defendant (George) because he doesn’t want the partnership to dissolve
At will?
Plaintiff (HB) so he can freely terminate
What was the decision of trial court?
The trial court found for defendant stating this was a partnership for an implied term namely such
reasonable time as is necessary to enable said partnership to repay from partnership profits,
indebtedness incurred for the purchase of land, buildings, laundry and delivery equipment and linen
for the operation of such business
What evidence was introduced to show there was a term?
Related to earlier partnerships entered into by the brothers showing an implied term to remain in
partnership until the partnership pays for itself
Former partnership agreement in writing stated that profits were to be retained until all obligations
were paid
What does appeals court decide on this issue?
They reversed lower court decision and found this was an at will partnership
The evidence was not strong enough to imply the term
This showed only that the parties hoped to make a profit and be able to pay for expenses but the
testimony did not show that this was a partnership for a term
Why is bad faith raised as an issue in this case?
Defendant raised the issue saying plaintiff was dissolving the partnership in order to keep all future
gains for himself at the expense of defendant
Defendant felt he would get very little out of the dissolution of the partnership assets and he felt his
brother (plaintiff) wanted to take advantage of a new business opportunity of the opening of a new
air force base in the area
What result if bad faith were established?
The court said that there was nothing on the trial court record showing evidence of bad faith nor was
there evidence of any future profit or gain
However, the court did note that this was an action for declaratory judgment which will be the basis
for future action by the parties so defendant is protected by the fiduciary duties of good faith of co-
partners
Plaintiff must exercise this dissolution in good faith and if not, he must fully compensate brother for
his share in the lost opportunity
Takeaways:
How and when it is possible to imply a term from the agreements of the parties
Not every argument that a term should be implied will be found in court
There has to be strong evidence that the parties agreed to be together until a certain future point
Even though under UPA 31, it is possible to terminate an at will partnership by one partner giving
notice to the other, that right must be exercised in good faith and not with the intent to get rid of the
other partner for that partner’s gain
o Liquidation or Continuation?
Default rule is that upon dissolution caused in any way (except in breach of partnership agreement) any
partner may request liquidation.
In practice, partners often agree to continue the business because liquidation will not produce maximum
value to partners.
Partners may agree to continue the partnership rather than liquidate and pay out the partners in cash.
Example:
Andrew, Barry and Chris formed a partnership (ABC) to sell used casebooks to law students. They
have no written partnership agreement and no agreed term.
o Andrew decides to accept full time employment as a casebook editor and talks to the others
about resigning.
o David expresses an interest in joining the business. After discussions among the four of
them, A, B, C & D agree that David will buy out Andrew’s interest.
o Andrew starts his new job and David joins the business.
o B, C & D continue to sell used casebooks through a successor partnership (BCD).
o Andrew’s withdrawal has dissolved the old ABC partnership, but A, B & C have each
agreed not to compel liquidation.
o Parties negotiated the terms of the exit and entrance of parties
o Hypothetical #P11
Returning to the facts of Page v. Page: (based on court’s discussion, what is required of plaintiff)
Suppose plaintiff wishes to buy out his brother and continue with a new partner (who will take over
as manager and have a 25% interest) CONTINUATION
o How should plaintiff proceed?
Suppose plaintiff wants to force liquidation (shut down business and sell off physical assets).
LIQUIDATION He wants to bid for the better accounts of the business.
o How should plaintiff proceed?
o BUY-SELL AGREEMENT (negotiated and contracted for at the beginning of the partnership)
Purpose: Allows partners to part ways based on negotiated terms agreed to upon formation of partnership
What are common terms in such agreements?
Trigger events = under what circumstances is there an opportunity for someone to sell their
partnership interest
Obligation versus option to buy
Price
Method of Payment (whether it is immediate cash or over a term)
Protection against partnership liability for debts
Procedure for offering to buy or sell
o Distribution following Dissolution
Partnerships establish capital accounts for each partner where the following are recorded:
Additions: initial capital contributions and additional capital contributions, fair market value of
contributed assets at time of contribution, profits allocated to partners from ongoing activities
Subtractions: interim withdrawals of capital, losses allocated to partners from ongoing activities
Post-contribution appreciation or depreciation of contributed asset does not affect capital accounts.
In a rightful dissolution, where the partnership is liquidated, the assets are sold.
Out of the proceeds, partners receive value of their capital accounts after creditors and partner loans
are paid off.
Profits are what remains and that is divided according to the default rule of equal sharing or as
agreed by the partners.
In a wrongful dissolution, settling among partners is the same except breaching partner share is decreased
by damages under UPA §38(2)(a)(II)
EXAMPLE of how capital accounts might be kept in a partnership
A & B form partnership
Agree to share profits equally
A contributes $10K
B contributes value of his legal services in drafting partnership agreement (labor; aka services
partnership)
Capital Accounts upon formation
o A = $10K
o B=0
Interim Profits
o Partnership has profits of $10K after first year which are shared equally
o Capital Accounts
A = $15K
B = $5K
Interim Losses
o Partnership has losses of $2K after second year which are shared equally
o Capital Accounts
A = $14K
B = $4K
After a number of years, partnership decides to dissolve. At this point, it has assets with a fair market
value of $30K and owes $3K to outside creditors.
o HOW ARE ACCOUNTS SETTLED?
Assets of partnership = $30K
Less payment to creditors ($3K)
Less discharge of A’s capital account ($14K)
Less discharge of B’s capital account ($4K)
Amount remaining for distribution as profits = $9K
This amount is shared equally by A & B ($4.5K each)
o Jewel v. Boxer
Issues that arise in partnerships that provide services for fees (such as law firm partnership)
Partnership % in Jewel, Boxer & Elkind (old firm)
Howard Jewel (30%)
Stewart Boxer (27%)
Peter Elkind (27%)
Brian Leary (16%)
What were the relationships among the parties?
Old firm split into 2 separate firm
Jewel and Leary formed 1 firm and Boxer and Elkind formed the other firm
The old law firm dissolved into 2 new law firms
What led to the dispute?
There was a dispute over legal fees from matters from the old firm
What is the issue in this case?
How to allocate legal fees that are received after the date of dissolution by cases that began before
dissolution but weren’t resolved until after so payment didn’t come until after
Did the partners have an agreement about how to handle this issue?
No and there was no written partnership agreement at all (bad practice)
What was the result at the trial court level?
The trial court allocated the legal fees on a quantum merit basis
The trial court created a formula based on three factors:
o The time spent by each firm in the handling of each case
o The source of each case (which was always the old firm)
The court allocated 25% of the total fees to the old firm
o In the personal injury contingency fee cases, the result achieved by the new firm
J and L was determined to owe $115,041.16 to the old firm
B and E was determined to owe $291,718.60 to the old firm
Did the appeal court agree?
They did not agree and reversed the lower court decision
Why or why not?
The fees should not be allocated on this basis and should be allocated based on the partners’
respective interests in the old firm
This was regardless of whether the former partner in the old firm provided legal services in the case
after the date of dissolution
Legal fees were to be distributed based on the original percentages
Rationale for this was that the trial court method was inconsistent with UPA 18(f)
Jewel v. Boxer: Rule Against Extra Compensation
Under the UPA, a dissolved partnership continues until the winding up of unfinished partnership
business. No partner (except a surviving partner) is entitled to extra compensation for services
rendered in completing unfinished business. UPA §18(f)
What is the relevance of §18(f) to the result in this case?
o Because the partners had no agreement on how they were going to resolve disputes about
legal fees that came in after the date of dissolution
o In this case there was no surviving partner
What are the sound policy reasons for and against such application?
o The rule prevents partners from competing for the most remunerative cases during the life of
the partnership in anticipation that they might retain those cases should the partnership
dissolve
o It discourages former partners from soliciting a firm’s existing clients upon dissolution
Would there be an unfair result if rule applied?
o The allocation of fees according to each partner’s interest in the former partnership should
not work an undue hardship as to any partner where each partner completes work on the
partnership’s cases which are active upon its dissolution
o This unfair result is mitigated by fiduciary duties
How do fiduciary duties mitigate such undue hardship?
o Each former partner has a duty to wind up and complete the unfinished business of the
dissolved partnership (this would prevent a partner from refusing to furnish any work an
disposing this obligation totally on the other partners, thus unfairly benefiting from their
efforts while putting forth none of his or her own)
o No former partner may take any action with respect to unfinished business which leads to
purely personal gain
o Thus, the former partners are obligated to ensure that a disproportionate burden of
competing unfinished business does not fall on one partner or one group of former partners,
unless the former partners agree otherwise
How could this result have been avoided?
o Planning question
o The partners should have thought about this issue in advance when they entered into the
partnership at the beginning and they should have had an agreement about how to allocate
o They also should have had a written partnership agreement to begin with
o Partnership Review Question #3
What are Jane’s obligations to Michael?
Can she terminate the partnership at this point in time?
What does Jane owe Michael?
Module 2 Quizzes:
o Quiz 7: Formation of Partnerships; Partnership by Estoppel
In Fenwick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, the existence of a written partnership agreement
was considered conclusive evidence that Chesire and Fenwick were partners. (T/F)
False
What is the UPA test for determining if a partnership exists?
The parties are operating a business for profit under co-ownership
According to the court in Young v. Jones, the court found there was no partnership by estoppel because
investors did not rely on a representation of any Price Waterhouse-US partner about the existence of a
partnership with Price Waterhouse-Bahamas and investors did not extend credit to either Price Waterhouse-
US or Price Waterhouse-Bahamas. (T/F)
True
Which of the following is not required for a finding of partnership by estoppel?
The parties enter into a written partnership agreement
Under the UPA, partners may be jointly and severally liable for debts and obligations of the partnership.
(T/F)
True
o Quiz 8: Limited Partnerships; Partnership Fiduciary Duty
In a limited partnership, both general partners and limited partners are personally liable for all debts and
obligations of the partnership. (T/F)
False
Formation of a limited partnership requires the filing of a certificate with a state government official. (T/F)
True
In Meinhard v. Salmon, Justice Cardozo court determined that Salmon was not entitled to enter into a new
lease as sole lessee in 1922 because he was a fiduciary and should at least have disclosed the existence of the
new lease opportunity to Meinhard. (T/F)
True
Partnership duty of loyalty claims is an umbrella term. Which of the following is not included under the duty
of loyalty?
Duty not to act in a manner that is grossly negligent or reckless or involves intentional or willful
misconduct or a knowing violation of law in the conduct of partnership business
Which of the following states best describes Salmon’s wrongful conduct in Meinhard v. Salmon?
He violated the duty not to take an opportunity belonging to the business for himself
o Quiz 9: Partnership Property & Management
Under the UPA, Partners in a general partnership are entitled to receive a pro rata share of profits of the
business. (T/F)
False
Under the UPA, if partners in a general partnership do not have an agreement about sharing of losses, a court
will allocate any losses according to the formula for sharing of profits. (T/F)
True
Under the UPA, all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership business.
(T/F)
True
The court in Putnam v. Shoaf found that Mrs. Putnam was not entitled to any share of the recovered funds
because she had conveyed her entire interest in the partnership and retained no ownership rights in specific
items of partnership property. (T/F)
True
The court in National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) v. Stroud found that Stroud’s notice to Nabisco that he
would not be liable for future bread purchases by Freeman prevented Nabisco from collecting payment for
such bread from Stroud. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 10: Partnership Dissolution
In Owen v. Cohen, the court found that Owen was entitled to judicial dissolution and was entitled to be
repaid $6,986.63 he lent to the partnership before any other distribution was made to the partners. (T/F)
True
Which of the following statements about partnership dissolution under the UPA is NOT true?
A partner who dissolved a partnership in breach of the partnership agreement is entitled to request
liquidation of the business.
The court in Page v. Page found that a partner who dissolved a partnership at will must have done so in good
faith and may become liable for damages for breach of fiduciary duty if he did not. (T/F)
True
The court in Jewel v. Boxer found that former law firm partners must split legal fees pertaining to cases
pending on the date of dissolution but resolved after that date on a quantum meruit basis. (T/F)
False
Under the UPA, in the event of dissolution, the claims of third party creditors have priority over the claims
of the partners. (T/F)
True
MODULE THREE: INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATIONS (note that we are talking about general rules of corporations;
some business corporations (such as forming a bank) requires more stringent procedures and requirements)
o COMPARISON CORPORATIONS & PARTNERSHIPS
CORPORATION
Formalities required
o Such as gov filing of certificate of corporation and keeping a corporate record book
Limited liability
o Shareholders are not liable for debts of the corporation which exceed its ability to pay
o With limited exceptions
Free transferability
o Ownership interests can be traded freely
o Corporation continues to exist even when an owner transfers his interest
Continuity
o Most corporations have no defined duration
o They continue to exist until a government filing dissolves the corporation
o As long as they are in good standing with the state, they may stay a corporation, even if they
are inactive (payment of fees would have to continue even if inactive)
Centralized management
o Separation of ownership and control
o Owners and shareholders are not making the important business decisions
o Management is in the board of directors who delegate to officers of the corporation
Double taxation
o Corporate entity is subject to taxation on income and the shareholders are taxed on
distributions made to them
PARTNERSHIP
Informal
o No filing required and no other formalities required
Unlimited liability
Not freely transferable
o This is a default rule
o Partner’s exit leads to a dissolution of the partnership
At will
o Default rule
o At will unless parties agree to a specified term of years
Equal management rights
o Hands on control by owners
Single taxation
o No entity level tax
o Profits and losses go to owners
o STEPS IN SETTING UP A CORPORATION
Choice of corporate form
Advise clients of availability of different forms of business associations in respective states and
client will choose which is best
Choice of state of incorporation
Can choose any jurisdiction, even if that state is not where business has principal office
Internal affairs doctrine = conflict of laws principle that the law of the state of incorporation is
applied to resolve matters relating to internal governance of the business
Law of the place of operation will resolve all other matters such as employment, labor, contract, tort,
and property issues
Focus on Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
We’re in Missouri. Why are we studying the law of Delaware in this course?
o This is the most popular state of incorporation for large corporations because the code is
modern and up to date and favorable to management
o Because of this, there is a well-developed body of law in the courts which many other
jurisdictions look to for guidance
o Cases in the book are drawn from DE court decisions
Reserve corporate name
Name must be cleared with DE secretary of state office to avoid duplication
Name must be distinctive
Indicate corporate status in the name (such as Inc. or Corp.)
Draft, sign and file certificate of incorporation
File with DE secretary of state
Hold first meeting of directors
If directors named in certificate of incorporation, then they are required to hold a first meeting in
which certain important business will take place
If directors not named, hold meeting of incorporators
o Meeting is held by incorporators rather than directors
At first meeting of directors, directors adopt by-laws and take other action
Issue shares and accept paid in capital
Ownership interest in the business and the acceptance paid in capital
No min amount of money that must be paid into the corporation for a business to be a corporation
Stock can be issued with par value or without par value (par value of stock has no relation to its
market value)
o Par value of a share = the value stated in the corporate charter, below which shares of that
class cannot be sold upon initial offering. The issuing company of the shares promises not to
issue further shares below par value so investors can remain confident that no one else will
receive a more favorable issue price
o Par value = nominal value of a security which is determined by the issuing company to be
min price
Take steps to qualify as a foreign corporation in all states where corporation will be doing business
Necessary to file in the states where the corporation is doing business but is not incorporated with
sec of state as foreign corp and pay certain fees to the state
o CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
DGCL §102
Mandatory Provisions = must be included or else it will not be accepted
o Corporate name
Include the words Inc. or Corp.
Name must be pre-cleared with secretary of state
o Address
o Business/Purpose of corporation
Can be very broad
Such as any lawful business
o Capitalization structure
Capitalization = share structure of business
Common stock = most common
Shareholders have identical rights unless specified
o Incorporators’ names and addresses
o Directors’ names and addresses
If they are to be named in the certificate
Optional Provisions = can be included but isn’t required
o Provisions on management and provisions limiting powers of corporation, directors,
shareholders
However these are usually included in by-laws
o Preemptive shareholder rights (aka anti-delusion provisions)
Refers to contractual clause which gives shareholders the right to buy additional
shares in any future issue of the company’s common stock before the shares are
available to the general public for purchase
These people are usually early investors/owners who want to maintain the size of
their stake in the company if/when additional shares are offered
o Provisions changing the voting rules of DGCL
o Limit on duration of business
Not common
o Exceptions to limited liability of shareholders
If shareholders decided they wanted to be liable for debts and obligations of the
corporation
o Limits on monetary damages for director breach of fiduciary duty
Note that some fiduciary duties in the DGCL cannot be eliminated
o INCORPORATORS (people who are going to incorporate the business by filing the certificate of incorporation)
(they do not have to play a significant role in the business and they do not have to become shareholders, directors, or
officers) (they are often employees) (role is limited)
DGCL §101 = Any person may incorporate a corporation by filing certificate with Division of Corporations
of Secretary of State
DGCL §103 = Signed & dated, pay filing fees
DGCL §107 = If no directors named in certificate, incorporators will manage the business until directors are
elected
Distinguish roles of shareholders, directors, & officers in the corporation
Shareholders = the individuals who have an ownership interest in the business by owning equity
shares or stock shares in the corporation; they have voting rights; they typically do not have strong
control rights in the management of the corporation; delegate to directors; aka stockholders
Directors = individuals who make important policy and business decisions on behalf of corporation;
limited in number; cannot handle day-to-day operations; delegate to officers
Officers = take care of the day to day operations which the directors delegate to them
o FILING REQUIREMENT
DGCL §101(a) = File with Division of Corporations of the Secretary of State
This is not a difficult process. Secretary of state will simply make sure that the min requirements are
met in the statute and make sure the fee has been paid
File certificate of incorporation with the secretary of the state
Must be signed, dated, and filed
Filed documents are a matter of public record
Amendments permitted
DGCL §241 & §242
o COMMENCEMENT OF CORPORATE EXISTENCE
DGCL §106 = Corporation exists from the date of filing until dissolution
o REGISTERED OFFICE
DGCL §131 = Registered office required; may or may not be place of business of corporation
Corporations do not have to have their HQ/principle place of business in the state in which they are
incorporated in
Must appoint a registered office which is where the service of process can be delivered in the state
Receives service of process within the state
Must be a resident person or corporation
o BY-LAWS (longer document)
DGCL §108 = By-laws adopted at organization meeting of directors or incorporators
DGCL §109 = May contain provisions on conduct of affairs, rights or powers of shareholders, directors,
officers
May be amended by directors until payment of initial capital; after that, shareholders must vote to
amend
Not a matter of public record
Detailed provisions about the incorporation
Not filed with the Secretary of State
o DISSOLUTION
DGCL §275: Procedure for dissolution
(a) & (b) = Resolution to dissolve by majority of the old board + vote of majority of outstanding
stock entitled to vote, and filing of Certificate of Dissolution with Secretary of State,
OR
(c) = All shareholders consent to dissolution in writing and filing of Certificate of Dissolution with
Secretary of State
(d) = Certificate of Dissolution must be executed, acknowledged & filed in accordance with DGCL
§103;
(d) = Minimum contents:
o Name of corporation;
o Date dissolution authorized;
o Whether authorized under (a) and (b) or under (c);
o Names and addresses of directors and officers; and
o Filing date of original certificate of incorporation
(f) = Corporation will be dissolved upon certificate becoming effective in accordance with DGCL
§103
o PROMOTER’S LIABILITY (promoters are not mentioned in corporate law statutes and they have no clearly defined
or specified role in the business) (refers to someone who has an economic interest in setting up the enterprise and
who make take certain actions in setting up the business prior to the filing of the certificate of incorporation)
Fiduciary duties
Problem of self-dealing
Promoter has status akin to joint venturer or partner
Duties owed among promoters and to corporation to be formed
Therefore, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to act on behalf of interest of self instead of corporation
Liability for pre-incorporation contracts
If promoter forms corporation later:
o Can corporation become party to contract?
A corporation can become a party to the contract if the corporation adopts the
contract later
Can be done expressly through formal board resolution
Also can be done implicitly if the corporate directors or officers who have authority
to take action on behalf of the corporation knew about an acquest in the contract
Can also be done through later acts which are consistent with or in furtherance of
the contract such as making payments or accepting benefits
o Can promoter avoid liability?
Under principals of agency law, the promoter can become liable for pre-
incorporation contract
Restatement 2nd §326 = purported agent (promoter) acting for a non-existent
principal (corporation yet to be formed) can become a party to the contract so the
purported agent (promoter) can be liable unless otherwise agreed
Can be changed by contract provision
If corporation is never formed or if promoter forms a different corporation:
o Who is liable?
Defective incorporation
Theories recognize the existence of a corporation under certain circumstances even
if the incorporation process is incomplete and even if the a corporation other than
the original is formed
Corporation by estoppel
Would earn a windfall if allowed to evade liability based on absence of incorporation
Person acted as though he was dealing with a corporation
Test: were substantial rights affected by the fact that a corporation other than what was originally
contemplated was formed or no corporation was formed at all?
De Facto Corporation
Promoters tried in good faith to incorporate and
Had a legal right to do so and
Acted as a corporation
But somewhere along the line there was a defect and the corporation was never validly formed
o Example: the certificate of incorporation was formed but somebody in the office forgets to
file the certificate so the corporation is never formed
o Court may still acknowledge the existence of the corporation if these factors are met
o Walkovszky v. Carlton
Parties
Walkovszky
o Plaintiff
o He was injured when he was rundown by a taxi owned by defendant
Carlton
o Defendant
o Shareholder of 10 corporations, including Seon Cab Corp.
Marchese
o Defendant
o Operated the cab which hit plaintiff
Seon Cab Corporation
o Defendant
o Owned two cabs and no other assets
o Maintained minimum liability insurance required under New York State law
Nine other corporations with same assets and insurance
Procedure
Defendant C moved to dismiss the complaint saying it fails to state a cause of action
Trial court granted the motion
Appeals court reversed saying there was a cause of action
It is now on appeal to the highest court
What was the basis for Walkovszky’s complaint?
Personal injury
Theories for liability were:
o (1) he wanted all 10 corporations that were owned by C to be liable (enterprise liability)
Enterprise liability is premised on the notion that if the owner of the multiple
corporations doesn’t keep them separate, then the court shouldn’t respect that
corporate separation and all assets of all corporations should be available to
creditors
o (2) C and his associates, each individually, should be liable for the damages because they
were operating in a way that was wrongful and fraudulent (piercing the corporate veil)
According to the court’s opinion, did the complaint state a cause of action?
No, it did not state a cause of action on a piercing theory
Why or why not?
This was because there was no allegation that C was conducting business in his individual capacity
Piercing is based on agency concepts, not fraud
The undercapitalization is not sufficient to justify piercing
There is no fraud because each individual had the minimum required insurance and it is up to
legislature to provide for higher amount
What was the result in this case?
Appellate ruling that there was a cause of action is reversed with costs
Order of trial court should be reinstated
Plaintiff was able to file an amended complaint
What are the main points raised by the dissenting judge?
The very nature of the defendant’s business, operating a taxi business which essentially served to
provide transportation to the public, created a risk to the public and the defendant shouldn’t be able
to just hide behind the insurance statute minimums
The shareholders should be liable if there is insufficient capital to pay the claims of injured plaintiffs
There was no legislative acquiescence because the purpose of the statute was to provide minimum
insurance, not to shield shareholders from liability
The corporations should have carried more insurance and if not, the shareholders should be liable
o ENTERPRISE LIABILITY VS. PIERCING
Enterprise Liability
Treat all corporations as one single entity
All assets available to creditor
o Example: Assets of all ten corporations owned by Carlton available to satisfy judgment in
favor of Walkovszky
To succeed, plaintiff would have had to prove that C didn’t respect the separate
identities of the corporation (the corporations were not separately operated when it
came to the assignments of the cabs, use of bank accounts, ordering of supplies and
other similar matters)
Other examples include: common record keeping in place, central accounting
functions, one corporation pays employees of another corporation, using the same
business name, undocumented transfers, unclear allocation of profits and losses, and
having the same shareholders and officers in all corporations.
o NOTE: normally, corporate affiliates (corporations that are under common ownership) are
not responsible for the debts of other affiliates (so enterprise liability would be an exception
to the general rule)
Compare Piercing the Corporate Veil
Shareholder’s personal assets may be available to creditor who is seeking to recover from the
personal assets of a shareholder
o This is an exception to the general rule of limited liability which holds that the shareholder
cannot be held liable for debts and obligations of the business beyond its available assets
o You must allege that the shareholder has ignored the existence of the corporation
o NOTE: many states require that there also must be some proof of wrongdoing or injustice
that would result from allowing limited liability to stand under the circumstances
o Example: Carlton’s personal assets available to satisfy judgment in favor of Walkovszky
o HYPOTHETICAL #C1
How should Walkovszky draft his complaint:
To recover from Carlton individually?
o This would be piercing the corporate veil
o He should have alleged that Carlton ignored the existence of the corporation rather than
trying to use fraud to prove wrongdoing.
o He should have specifically alleged that Carlton was conducting the business in his
individual capacity and used evidence to support the theory
o He is transferring personal funds in and out of the corporation
To recover from the assets of the other cab corporations?
o This would be enterprise liability
o He should have alleged that Carlton didn’t respect the separate identities of the corporation
by claiming that the corporations were not separately owned
o He could have pointed to the fact that the assignment of taxis were not separately operated
and probably that the corporations have the same shareholders and officers
What facts would Walkovszky hope to discover and seek to prove in support of each theory?
He would hope to discover facts that would prove that all of the corporations are connected in a way.
He should look at bank accounts to see how funds are being transferred and how the members are
being paid
Look at records and see if they are all being kept in one place and if all accounting transactions are
being done together
o Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source
Parties
Sea-Land Services, Inc.
o Ocean carrier who shipped peppers on behalf of The Pepper Source
o Plaintiff in original action
Marchese (owner of the following business entitles) (all were solely owned by M except Tie-Net)
o The Pepper Source
Stiffed Sea-Land on the freight bill
Dissolved the corporation and was left with no assets
Defendant in original action
o Caribe Crown, Inc.
o Jamar Corp.
o Salescasters Distributors, Inc.
o Tie-Net International Inc.
M only owns half of this corporation
Facts
Sea Land shipped peppers for Pepper Source and Pepper Source never paid.
Sea Land sued and obtained a default judgement for the amount owed
At this time they found out that Pepper Source had dissolved and was nowhere to be found
Pepper Source had no assets
Sea Land then sued Marchese and the 5 corporations in which he owed shares in and wanted to hold
M liable individually for the debt and hold each corporation liable
Who is plaintiff suing and what is the cause of action?
Sea Land is suing to recover from individual shareholder M and all other businesses owned by him
What is plaintiff’s theory of liability?
Piercing the corporate vail where creditors of the corporation seek to go after the personal assets of
the shareholder
Plaintiff also mentioned reverse piercing but the court didn’t go much into this
o Reverse piercing = creditor seeks to recover debts owned by the corporation’s owner from
other corporations assets
What is the test under Illinois law? (when citing to this test, call it the Van Dorn test) (ON THE EXAM we
will use this 2 prong test and then mention the third prong of assumption of risk and go through that but
make sure to mention that this prong isn’t used in the majority of jurisdictions)
A corporate entity will be disregarded and the veil of limited liability pierced when two requirements
are met:
o (1) there must be such unity of interests and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual or other corporation no longer exist; and
NOTE: this prong of the test is called Unity of Interest or Alter Ego
o (2) circumstances must be such that the adherence to the fiction of separate corporate
existence would sanction a fraud or promote injustice
Under the first part of the test, factors considered include:
o (1) the failure to maintain adequate corporate records or to comply with corporate
formalities
Court says M never held a single corporate meeting, thereby meeting this prong and
no corporate documents
o (2) the commingling of funds or assets
Used the funds for his own use
o (3) undercapitalization and
o (4) one corporation treating the assets of another corporation as its own
Under the second part of the test, this requires sanctioning of fraud or promoting injustice if piercing
does not occur
o The court says unless piercing occurs, some wrong beyond a creditor’s inability to collect
would result such as the common sense rules of adverse possession would be undermined,
former partners would be permitted to skirt the legal rules concerning monetary obligations,
a party would be unjustly enriched, a parent corporation that caused a sub’s liabilities and its
inability to pay for them would escape those liabilities, or an intentional scheme to squirrel
assets into a liability-free corporations while heaping liabilities upon an asset-free
corporation would be successful.
Can plaintiff succeed on this theory?
The court says no
The court says that the first prong is met but the second prong is not
Plaintiff argued that the second prong was met because unless piercing were to occur, Sea Land,
creditor, would not be paid
The court said that this second prong needed more than a creditor’s inability to collect otherwise this
prong would be satisfied in every case because that is the basis of these lawsuits
What happened on remand?
The lower court found in favor of Sea Land and said that piercing was appropriate because there was
evidence showing M, if he were to avoid liability, there would be injustice
This evidence was tax fraud, paying personal expenses with corporate funds, and avoiding payment
of corporate debt
o PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Factors
Unity of interest (alter ego)
o Van Dorn test (Illinois):
Failure to maintain corporate formalities, commingling of assets/funds,
undercapitalization, one corporation treats assets of another as its own
Fraud or injustice
o Need more than creditor’s inability to collect
Undercapitalization as a factor in piercing
Definition = Shareholder siphoning of available corporate assets without disclosure to creditors, such
that corporation is deliberately made insolvent, justifies piercing in some cases.
This is because deliberate insolvency defeats creditor’s expectation that business will set aside
adequate reserves to pay corporate obligations when due.
o Example: Flemming was the sole shareholder of a fruit brokerage business in which he acted
as a middleman between growers and buyers. He collected the sales price from the buyers,
deducted his commission and the transportation charges, and sent the balance to the growers.
However, he also paid himself a salary from time to time that included the amount withheld
from the growers’ payment to take care of transportation charges. When truckers sued for
unpaid bills, he claimed insolvency. Court pierced and held Flemming personally liable.
De Witt Trucking v. Flemming (4th Cir. 1976)
Assumption of risk in contract cases
Some courts impose a third prong in contract cases: assumption of risk
o Did the creditor know of the risk of nonpayment? If so, creditor should have taken steps to
mitigate the risk.
o Even if the first 2 prongs are met in the piercing the corporate veil test, some courts may
now allow piercing if they find that the creditor assumed the risk of nonpayment
o Example: Shareholder set up a corporation with no assets solely to make payments under a
supply contract. Corporation defaulted. Court refused to pierce since supplier knew the facts
and was not misled. Supplier could have taken steps to protect itself, like demanding a
personal guarantee, but failed to do so. Supplier assumed the risk of loss.
Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman (2d Cir. 1979)
Judicially created exception to the legal rule of limited liability
NOTE: piercing is a judicially created exception
The legal rule for liability for shareholders is limited liability
Only used when individuals are the shareholders of corporations
Not used when large corporation has many shareholders
Does not do away with limited liability, it is simply an exception to the rule
o In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation
Parties
Injured female patients who had breast implant surgery with defective implants
o Plaintiffs
Mechanical Engineering Corporation (MEC)
o A major supplier of breast implants
o Subsidiary corporation
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
o Defendant who filed summary judgment
o Sole shareholder of M
o Never itself manufactured or distributed breast implants
o Parent corporation
The relationship among M and B is called a parent-subsidiary relationship
o Parent corporation owns all of the shares of subsidiary corporation
Which company manufactured the defective implants?
Mechanical Engineering
Which one was named as defendant?
Bristol-Myers
What legal theories tie defendant to manufacturer?
Piercing
Direct liability
What must plaintiffs show to succeed on each theory?
Piercing
o Substantial domination test
Direct liability
o Restatement 2nd of Torts §324A
How does court rule on motion?
It says that B is not entitled to summary judgment
What rationale?
There are material facts in dispute
Piercing:
o The court said there was evidence where someone could conclude that there was substantial
domination
Court looks to the fact that M is supposed to have a separate board of directors
separate from B but the court finds substantial ties between the two such as 2/3
directors on M’s board were also on B’s board
Evidence of common departments that were shared
B used M’s assets as its own
The court didn’t believe that M was operated as a separate business
o If fraud/injustice is necessary, the court says that this prong would be satisfied
Believes there is evidence of this because M was undercapitalized
No sufficient funds
B allowed its name to be used on M products to enhance sales
Because of this, it would be unjust to not make B liable because it was reasonable
for people to rely on the fact that their name was on the product
Direct liability:
o By allowing their name to be on the packaging, they held themselves out as supporting the
product to increase sales
o B also had press releases stating that the product was safe
o Because of the marketing and use of B name, cannot deny liability
Substantial Domination Test
Whether or not there is evidence that B controlled M so that M is not viewed as an independent
business
A second prong of fraud/injustice might also apply
Factors of Substantial Domination
Common directors & officers
Common business departments
File consolidated financial statements/tax returns
Parent formation & financing of subsidiary
Gross undercapitalization
Payment of salaries and other expenses
All business of subsidiary provided by parent
Parent uses property of subsidiary
Daily operations not separate
Failure of subsidiary to maintain corporate formalities
Direct liability (Restatement 2nd Torts, §324A)
One who undertakes to render services is subject to liability to third party for physical harm due to
failure to exercise reasonable care if:
o Failure to exercise reasonable care increased risk of harm
o Undertaken to perform duty owed by the other to third party
o Harm by third party suffered because of reliance
o HYPOTHETICAL #C2
How should plaintiffs draft their complaint to state a cause of action against Bristol-Myers Squibb:
On a piercing theory?
o Think about what is required for piercing when parent-subsidiary relationship
o The plaintiffs should look at the factors of substantial domination and allege that the
companies have common directors and officers, common business departments, the business
of M is provided by B and other factors like this.
On a direct liability theory?
o They could point to the negligence claim and say that B didn’t exercise reasonable care
because they promoted the product but maybe didn’t actually evaluate it enough
o By promoting the product and putting their name on the packaging, it can be argued that B
undertook to perform the duty owed
o It was definitely reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on the fact that B might have been
behind the product since they did promote it and say it was safe and their name was on the
packaging.
o CORPORATION REVIEW QUESTION #1
Clockstoppers, Inc.
Alfred
o Took earnings out in the form of salary
o Maintained a separate bank account for business
o Failed to hold directors’ and shareholders’ meetings
All Right Realty, Inc.
Can All Right Realty, Inc. collect the remaining lease payments from Alfred?
Discuss whether or not any of the case precedent discussed in this lecture is relevant to answering
the question
Think about the theories we talked about and the case law with individual shareholders and a parent-
subsidiary relationship
Which case if any is relevant here?
Look at the tests and theories used in the cases
Finding the tests, how do you apply the facts to the reasoning?
o Cohen v. Beneficial
Shareholder derivative lawsuit
Who is the plaintiff?
Shareholder, Cohen, who owned 100/2M outstanding shares of Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corporation
Petitioner’s decedent
Who were the defendants?
Corporation and certain beneficiaries
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation (DE corp; doing business in NJ)
What is the cause of action?
Plaintiff claimed there was mismanagement and fraud in the company over an 18 year period that led
to waste in corporate assets exceeding $100M
What is the legal issue?
Whether the court should apply a NJ statute for security against expenses in the shareholder
derivative suit
This raises a constitutional law issue
What is a derivative lawsuit?
One in which the shareholder is suing in the name and right of the corporation to redress wrongs that
are done to the corporation
Although managers of the corporation are supposed to handle all business for shareholders including
handling litigation matters involving the corporation in a derivative lawsuit scenario it is claimed
that the managers cannot act independently in the best interest of the corporation because they are
interested or biased
Gives standing to shareholders to go against managers who will not sue themselves or their friends
Why did it arise?
The shareholder demanded that corporate institute proceedings against defendants but by their
control, the individual defendants prevented it from doing so.
What is a strike suit?
Non-meritorious suits brought for their settlement value but they are unlikely to succeed on their
merits
These benefit lawyers but not shareholders
As a result, states pass statutes to eliminate these suits (aka nuisance suits)
Statutes impose barriers such as security against expenses suits (discussed here)
New Jersey Statute: In derivative actions, persons holding less than 5% or $50K in value must give security
for reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees
Why does plaintiff challenge the statute?
o Plaintiff doesn’t want to post the bond because that would require him to come up with
money to bring the suit
On what grounds?
o The statute is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
Who wins and why?
o Defendants win
o Statute doesn’t violate the constitution
o There is no due process violation because only security for reasonable expenses is required
under the statute
o There is no equal protection violation because the state is entitled to use a percentage of
ownership interest in a corporation as a measure of a plaintiffs good faith and responsibility
o Someone with such a small interest might not be acting in good faith so this is why the
legislature has this requirement
o This is not an unconstitutional classification
Is the NJ statute applicable here?
o Federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state substantive rules, but not state
procedural rules
o This court classifies the statute as substantive because it creates a new liability where none
existed before: plaintiff can become liable for expenses of defendant if plaintiff loses and
this is secured through the procedure of posting bond
o Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
This case discusses the distinction between direct and derivative lawsuits
This is important because certain procedural requirements only apply to derivative and not direct
lawsuits
Who are the parties?
Max Eisenberg
o Shareholder of The Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
o Plaintiff
o Suing on behalf of himself and all other shareholders of the corporation similarly situated
Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (air carrier) (DE corp; principle place of business in CA)
o Flying Tiger Corporation
Wholly owned DE subsidiary organized by parent Flying Tiger Line
o FTL Air Freight Corporation
Wholly owned DE subsidiary
Took over as owner
What was the corporate transaction described in this case?
Overturning a reorganization and merger
What was the purpose of the corporate transaction?
Defendants argue that the purpose was to diversify the company in order to get certain tax benefits
that would be available and they wanted to do so in accordance with the requirements of a regulator
Steps in the corporate reorganization and merger:
Before the reorganization and merger
o Max Eisenberg was a shareholder in Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
Step 1:
o Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (original) formed 2 subsidiaries:
Flying Tiger Corporation (first tier subsidiary)
FTL Air Freight Corporation (second tier subsidiary)
Step 2:
o Original company merged into second tier subsidiary and only the second tier survived
o Original company ceased to exist and second tier subsidiary took over ownership and
operation
o Shares of original company were converted into an identical number of shares for the first
tier corporation
Step 3:
o New second tier subsidiary changed its name to Flying Tiger Line, Inc. (same as original)
o They did this to avoid confusion
NOTE:
o By converting the shares to the first tier subsidiary instead of the second, which took over
operations, the shareholders now had shares in the holding company rather than the
operating company
Why is Mr. Eisenberg bringing this lawsuit?
Plaintiff claims that he and other minority shareholders were deprived of any vote or any influence
over the affairs of the newly spawned company
He claims that as a result of the merger, his voting rights were diluted
He wanted voting rights as a shareholder of an operating company, not voting rights as a shareholder
of a holding company
What rights did Mr. Eisenberg have before and after the reorganization?
Before the reorganization, he had the right to vote on fundamental changes to the parent company of
Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
After the reorganization, he still had voting rights, but they were voting rights with respect to the
holding company, not the operating company
Why is the distinction between shareholder derivative lawsuits and shareholder direct lawsuits relevant to
Eisenberg’s claim?
If the claim that he is bringing is viewed as derivative, he will be required to post bond under the NY
securities against expenses statute
If the court determines that the lawsuit is direct, then no bond is required
How does Eisenberg categorize his claim?
He says this is a direct lawsuit because he claims he lost the right to vote on the business of the
operating subsidiaries and he is directly injured by this
He can now only vote on the business of the holding company
He cannot vote on any mergers or sales of assets of the operating company
How does Flying Tiger categorize Eisenberg’s claim?
This is a derivative lawsuit because the corporation, which Eisenberg originally held shares, was the
party that was harmed when it was merged out of existence and shareholders were only indirectly
harmed
Defendants argue that the corporation would first have to be revived before the shareholders could
be helped
What test does the court use to determine whether this suit is derivative or direct?
If the complaint alleges injury to the corporation then the suit is derivative
If the injury is to the plaintiff as a shareholder, and to him individually and not the corporation, the
suit is direct because it is individual in nature
However the court finds this distinction not to be as helpful because this case was very borderline.
Defendants argued that the court should follow Gordon v. Elliman’s test which said:
o Whether the object of the lawsuit is to recover upon an action belonging directly to the
shareholders, or whether it is to compel the performance of corporate acts which good faith
requires the directors to take in order to perform a duty which they owe to the corporation,
and through it, to its shareholders
NOTE: this precedent has now been limited to its facts in other cases
Defendants argued that this applied to the case because if Flying Tiger Line’s directors had a duty
not to merge the corporation, that duty was owed to the corporation and only derivatively to its
shareholders.
o The court did not accept defendant’s argument
o Defendants interpretation of this case takes away the distinction between derivative and
direct actions
Instead, the court refers to Lazar v. Knolls, which says:
o If plaintiff does not challenge acts of the management on behalf of the corporation, but
instead claims the defendants are interfering with the plaintiff’s rights and privileges as
shareholders, security for costs should not be required
This is more what the case is alleging
The court said plaintiff’s strongest case was Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp
o This was a case he brought years ago which he claimed that the change in voting rights
deprived him of a voice in the operation of his company which would be run in the future by
the trustees of the voting trust
Who wins and why?
Eisenberg wins
This is because his suit is direct and shouldn’t have been dismissed because he failed to post security
bond against expenses of defendants
o DELAWARE SUPREME COURT TEST: DIRECT OR DERIVATIVE?
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc. (Del. 2004)
The law to be applied henceforth in determining whether a shareholder’s claim is derivative or direct
turns solely on the following questions:
o (1) who suffered the alleged harm (was it the corporation or the suing shareholder,
individually); and
o (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (would it be the
corporation or the shareholder, individually).
Would Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line be different if this test were to be applied?
No
This is because Eisenberg argued that the reorganization harmed them from a voice in corporate
affairs, not that the corporation was injured and because the remedy being sought was an injunction
on the merger, not monetary recovery by the corporation
o DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS
A derivative lawsuit is one in which a shareholder sues on behalf of corporation to enforce rights of
corporation
Two suits in one
o Sues corporation in equity
Corporation is a nominal defendant;
Alleged wrongdoers are directors and officers and are named as defendants
o Purpose is to bring an action to enforce corporate rights
Modern derivative suit is treated as one suit
Recovery, if shareholder is successful, runs directly to corporation
Involve allegations of mismanagement, waste, fraud by corporate officers and directors, breach of
fiduciary duty
Attorney’s fees
If suit is successful, the corporation will pay plaintiff’s fees and expenses.
Some state statutes mandate fee shifting to plaintiff if suit was brought without reasonable cause or
for an improper purpose.
Security for fees statutes are now uncommon.
o DIRECT LAWSUITS
Shareholder suit in personal capacity to enforce rights as an individual shareholder
Examples:
o Denial or dilution of voting rights;
o Compel payment of dividends declared but not distributed;
o Compel inspection of corporate books and records,
o Require holding of a shareholder meeting
o CLASS ACTIONS
Shareholder sues in his own capacity as well as on behalf of other shareholders similarly situated
Group of shareholders assert their individual direct claims through a representative
Procedural rules applicable to class actions such as plaintiff must be representative of other shareholder
interests and settlement must be approved by court
Some derivative suit procedural hurdles (like demand) may not apply to class actions but other procedural
hurdles may apply (like giving notice to class members)
o Grimes v. Donald (Delaware)
This case discusses the demand requirement that is built into state procedural law governing shareholder
derivative lawsuits
Shareholder Grimes is suing CEO Donald and Board of Directors of DSC Communications Corporation
What did the defendants allegedly do wrong?
o Plaintiff claims that the board has breached its fiduciary duties by abdicating its authority,
failing to exercise due care, and committing waste.
o Defendants entered into an employment agreement with CEO, Donald.
o This agreement, according to plaintiff shareholder, was one in which the board advocated its
responsibility to run the corporation and it constituted a waste of corporate assets and a
breach of fiduciary duty of care
Waste of corporate assets = suggests that a transaction approved has been so one-
sided that no reasonable board of directors could have approved the transaction;
there is no valid consideration and the board is throwing money out the window
What relief is Grimes seeking?
o He is seeking a declaration of the invalidity of the employment agreements between the
CEO, Donald, and the company
o He also seeks an award of damages against Donald and other members of the board for
breach of fiduciary duty of care and waste of corporate assets
Are his claims direct or derivative?
o The court divides the claims into two parts:
Abdication claim = direct claim because plaintiff isn’t trying to get a monetary
damage. Instead, he wants the court to invalidate the employment agreement
Waste & breach of fiduciary duty claims = derivative claims because the wrong that
has happened is to the corporation and the relief that is being sought is monetary
Abdication claim
How did the directors allegedly abdicate?
o This claim is based on a clause in the Constructive Termination Without Cause Clause in the
employment agreement
o Constructive Termination Without Cause
Donald can declare a constructive termination without cause by the company of his
employment as a result of inter alia unreasonable interference, in the good faith
judgment of Donald, by the board or a substantial shareholder of the company in
Donald’s carrying out duties & responsibilities under the employment agreement.
What argument does plaintiff construct to challenge this provision as an abdication of the board’s
responsibility to the corporation?
o Based on the duty of the board to run the corporation
o The board is supposed to have authority over corporate business
o Plaintiff claims that the potentially severe financial penalties which the company would
incur in the event that the board attempts to interfere in Donald’s management of the
company will inhibit and deter the board from exercising its duties under DGCL §141(a)
How does the provision in the contract challenge the power structure of the modern business
corporation under DGCL §141(a)?
o If there is a constructive termination without cause under this provision, the result is that the
corporation would have to pay a large amount of money in severance payments to Donald so
it would cost a lot of money if this provision was triggered
o Plaintiff argues that this provision suggests that Donald has the ultimate say, not the board.
If he believes that the board is interfering with the performance of his duties as he would
like to perform them, he can terminate his employment and get a large severance package
payable by the corporation
Does the court agree that the board abdicated?
o No, there was no abdication by the board under the agreement
o The court said the agreement doesn’t formally stop the board from exercising its statutory
powers and fulfilling its fiduciary duties
o The decision to delegate a task is within the board’s valid exercise of its business judgment
o Business decisions are not an abdication of directorial authority merely because they limit a
board’s freedom of future action
o This is an unusual contract with an unfortunate choice of language but it is not an abdication
of directorial duty
Derivative claims (waste, excessive compensation, breach of fiduciary duty)
Is demand required under Delaware law for derivative lawsuits?
o Yes
o It is built into procedural law in the state of Delaware
o Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1
o Quote from Chester County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. New Residential Investment
o Demand is required unless the plaintiff shareholder can show that the demand would be
futile which would in turn satisfy the demand requirement
o Failure to demand or otherwise show a demand would be futile results in the case being
dismissed
What is the purpose of the demand requirement?
o The demand requirement serves a salutary purpose:
First, by requiring exhaustion of intracorporate remedies, the demand requirement
invokes a species of alternative dispute resolution procedure which might avoid
litigation altogether
Second, if litigation is beneficial, the corporation can control the proceedings
Third, if demand is excused or wrongfully refused, the shareholder will normally
control the proceedings
The demand requirement protects corporate boards from harassment and
discourages strike suits (extra reason on slide)
When is demand excused under Delaware law?
o Plaintiff must be able to allege facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt regarding
board independence
o The basis for claiming excusal would normally be that:
(1) a majority of the board has a material financial or familial interest
(2) a majority of the board is incapable of acting independently for some other
reason such as domination or control or
(3) the underlying transaction is not the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment
o Board independence
A director is not supposed to appear on both sides of a transaction and it is not
expected to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing,
as opposed to a benefit which would fall upon the corporation or all of the
shareholders generally.
Independence in this context means the director's decision is based on the merits of
something that comes before the board for its approval rather than extraneous or
outside considerations or influences
In order to establish lack of board independence and therefore demand excusal or
demand futility you need to show one of the criteria that's articulated above.
o Valid business judgment
Requires a showing that there is a situation, a rare case, in which a transaction is so
egregious on its face that board approval cannot possibly meet the test of business
judgment and a substantial likelihood of director liability exists
A substantial likelihood of director liability exists when you can show with
particularized facts that it is difficult to conceive that a director could have
satisfied his or her fiduciary duties
Why might this standard be difficult to meet?
o No discovery will have taken place at this stage of the proceedings when the plaintiff
shareholder is asked to plead and prove demand futility
o Standard = particularized allegations, not conclusory allegations; so it would not be
sufficient in a complaint to say that demand should be excused because the board is not
independent or that their actions are not the product of a valid business judgment
o Must have particularized allegations of reasonable doubt regarding board independence
o Plaintiff has little to work with without discover. They are limited to using the tools at hand
such as publicly available government findings and press releases by the company
Why would a plaintiff try and use demand futility as an argument rather than making demand?
o Boards of directors, if they are confronted with demand or a shareholder derivative lawsuit,
will reject the demand and move to dismiss the lawsuit
o This is because it is the same people who are being sued that serve on the board of directors
o This is structural bias (when board members would rather not be sued or have their friends
be sued regarding shareholder derivative actions)
Was demand required in this case?
o Yes because of the Delaware Court Chancery Rule
o The court never gets to this issue because the plaintiff made demand
Did plaintiff make demand in this case?
o Yes
o It consisted of the letter that plaintiff sent to the board of directors when he found out about
the employment contract
o He demanded that the board abrogate the agreement
o The board refused the demand
Can plaintiff assert demand futility at this stage?
o The court says it is too late
o This is because the letter sent to the board covers all later theories of liability that he may
advance so the fact that he made a demand, and that demand was refused, means that he has
now waived his right to claim demand futility and to contest the independence of the board
What is wrongful refusal?
o This can be used by plaintiffs who make demands and are refused
o Under wrongful refusal, plaintiff in theory can challenge that refusal by alleging facts with
particularity that create a reasonable doubt that the board is entitled to the presumption of
the business judgment rule
o This can be done by alleging facts that the board acted independently or with due care in
responding to the demand
Once the board has made a decision, in most cases it is going to be protected by the
business judgment rule
This means that the courts defer to the reasoning and decision making powers of the
directors and they are not going to try and step into the shoes of the board and
second guess the board on business decisions
o This is a difficult burden for plaintiff shareholder to overcome (more difficult than demand
futility)
Does wrongful refusal apply in this case?
o No plaintiff doesn’t meet the standard because his complaint asserted only conclusory
allegations and what is required to succeed is to plead with particularity
What is the holding in this case?
First, an abdication claim can be stated by a shareholder as a direct claim, as distinct from a
derivative claim, but here the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Second, when a shareholder demands that the board of directors take action on a claim allegedly
belonging to the corporation and demand is refused, the shareholder may not thereafter assert that
demand is excused with respect to other legal theories in support of the same claim, although the
shareholder may have a remedy for wrongful refusal or may submit further demands which are not
repetitious
Plaintiff loses on both claims and the court affirmed the lower court’s decision
o ROLE OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a)
The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the board
of directors.
o DEMAND REQUIREMENT
Delaware Court of Chancery Rule 23.1
The complaint shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder and shall also allege with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making
the effort.
A shareholder plaintiff may satisfy the demand requirement by either making demand on the board to
undertake corrective action or demonstrating that any such demand would have been futile and therefore,
that demand is excused. Where the plaintiff fails to comply with the demand requirement and fails to plead
with particularity why a demand would be futile, the complaint will be dismissed.
Chester County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. New Residential Investment Corp. (Del. Ch. 2016)
Purpose
Allow dispute to be resolved by corporation outside of court
Allow corporation to take over the lawsuit if it is beneficial to corporation
If demand is excused or wrongfully refused, shareholder will be allowed to control proceedings
Protect corporate boards from harassment and discourage strike suits
o DEMAND FUTILITY
Delaware (Aronson v. Lewis)
Allege facts with particularity creating reasonable doubt regarding board independence
Either:
o Majority has material financial or familial interest, OR
o Majority is incapable of acting independently for another reason like domination or control,
OR
o Underlying transaction is not the product of a valid business judgment
No single approach to demand requirement
Contrast New York approach (Marx v. Akers)
Allege facts with particularity that either:
o Majority of the board is interested in the transaction, OR
o Directors failed to inform themselves as reasonably necessary about the transaction, OR
o Directors failed to exercise their business judgment in approving the transaction
Contrast universal demand requirement in some states
Universal demand requirement = does away with demand futility. In its place, there is a requirement
that there be a written demand upon the board in all cases and it prevents the shareholder from
bringing a lawsuit for a certain number of days after demand is made unless injury would result or
the board rejects the demand
o WRONGFUL REFUSAL
Delaware
Board decision on demand is protected by the business judgment rule
To overcome, plaintiff must allege facts with particularity creating reasonable doubt that board acted
independently or with due care
o HYPOTHETICAL #C3
Agricorp Corp. owns and operates farms
Five member board, including Alice (Chairman of Board and CEO)
Adams learns of a farm for sale in Indiana.
She and two other directors decide to buy it.
Assume this is self-dealing and is a breach of duty of loyalty.
Is this a direct or derivative lawsuit?
o Look at case-law distinctions
If this is considered a derivative action, is demand required?
Vary the facts so only Alice will buy the farm.
She discloses the opportunity to the other directors.
The other directors vote to have the corporation reject the opportunity and to approve Alice’s purchase.
If a derivative suit is brought, is demand required?
o Consider cases and statutes and consider exceptions
o BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a) = The business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed
by or under the direction of the board of directors.
This is the basis for judicially-created rebuttable presumption that directors and officers carry out
their functions in good faith, after sufficient investigation, and for valid business reasons
Protects most board decision-making
o SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEES
Board Committees (permits boards to take action through a committee structure) (allowing board
committees to be formed)
Permitted under DGCL §141(c)(2)
o The full board may designate one or more committees, each consisting of one or more
directors
o The board committee may exercise all the powers and authority of the full Board
A subgroup of board members can take action to bind the corporation without
having to get permission from the full board
Types of board committees commonly used in large corporations:
o Audit committee
o Compensation committee
o Nominating and governance committees
o Specialized committees
Healthcare and drug development
o Zapata v. Maldonado (Delaware)
Special litigation committee in the context of shareholder derivative litigation
An exception to the business judgment rule
Facts
Maldonado was a shareholder of Zapata and initiated a derivative suit alleging breach of fiduciary
duty against certain officers and all the directors of the corporation
The shareholder did not make demand, claiming demand futility because all directors were named as
defendants in the action
A few years after that action, 4 of the defendant-directors were no longer on the board and 2 new
directors were appointed
Why was a Special Litigation Committee (SLC) formed?
The independent investigation committee, which was composed of only the 2 new directors, was
formed to investigate M’s actions, as well as a similar derivative action then pending in TX, and to
determine whether the corporation should continue any or all of the litigation
It was formed to examine the claims of M in the suit where he alleged breach of fiduciary duty
Who served on the SLC and what powers did the SLC have?
The 2 new board members who joined after the alleged wrongdoing
Their determination was stated to be final and not subject to review by the board of directors and
thereby binding on the corporation
What action was recommended by the SLC?
The committee concluded that each action should be dismissed because their continued maintenance
is adverse to the company’s best interests
What action did the board take in response?
The board moved to dismiss the cases and filed for summary judgment
What was the legal issue in this case?
Whether the committee has the power to cause the present action to be dismissed
The lower courts never reached this issue because judge decided that M could maintain the action
o The lower court stated that the business judgment rule does not confer power to a corporate
board of directors to terminate a derivative suit
Whether, after an objective and thorough investigation of a derivative suit, an independent board
committee can cause its corporation to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss the derivative suit
How did the court decide this issue?
Even in demand futility, the board acting through its committee, can move to dismiss the derivative
lawsuit
Does the court give deference to the SLC decision?
The court does not give business judgment rule deference to that committee decision because the
board is alleged to be tainted and allegedly lacks the independence required to make a good decision
on behalf of the corporation with respect to M’s complaint
The court develops an intermediate approach
The court is seeking to balance the right of plaintiff shareholder to bring a derivative lawsuit in good
faith with the right of the corporation to move to dismiss litigation that would be detrimental to it
Conclusion
The court remands the case back to the lower courts for rehearing consistent with the discussions of
this opinion
What standard of review does the court adopt in this case? (holding)
The intermediate standard of review as a 2 part inquiry
(1) the court should inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases
supporting its conclusions.
o Limited discovery may be ordered to facilitate such inquiries
o The corporation should have the burden of proving independence, good faith, and a
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith, and
reasonableness.
o If the court determines either that the committee is not independent or has not shown
reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the court is not satisfied for other reasons relating
to the process, including but not limited to the good faith of the committee, the court shall
deny the corporation’s motion
o If, however, the court is satisfied under summary judgment standards that the committee was
independent and showed reasonable basis for good faith findings and recommendations, the
court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.
(2) the court should determine, applying its own independent business judgment, whether the motion
should be granted
o This means that instances could arise where a committee can establish its independence and
sound bases for its good faith decisions and still have the corporation’s motion denied
o This step is intended to thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of step 1,
but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply
prematurely terminate a shareholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the
corporation’s interest
o The court must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate interest in
dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit
o The court should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public
policy in addition to the corporation’s best interests
o If the court’s independent business judgment is satisfied, the court may proceed to grant the
motion, subject to any equitable terms or conditions the court finds necessary or desirable
What are the court’s reasons for using this standard?
The court notes that the corporation’s board still has the authority to control the business of the
corporation including to control litigation, even though the board is tainted
o Tainted = in the context of demand utility, it is premised on the notion that the board is
lacking independence
This does not deprive the board of managerial powers
Business judgment rule deference isn’t warranted because this is a demand utility case
The court is aware of structural bias on the parts of board of directors and decides to scrutinize
special litigation committees because it recognizes the right of shareholders to bring such actions and
it wants to protect against abuse of board power
o In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation (Delaware)
The meaning of independence in the context of a special litigation committee
Parties (aka trading defendants)
Ellison:
o Chairman, CEO, largest shareholder, founder
Henley:
o CFO, Executive VP, director
Lucas:
o Director; chair of executive committee and finance and audit committee
Boskin:
o Director, chair of compensation committee, member of finance and audit committees
What was the claim of wrongdoing by the defendants?
Alleged insider trading
o Insider trading = the use of material, non-public business information for an insider’s
personal and financial advantage
Plaintiffs allege that trading defendants above breached their duty of loyalty by misappropriating
inside information and using it as the basis for trading decisions
Plaintiffs also allege that, as to the other defendants who are members of the board who did not
trade, a Caremark violation in the sense that the board’s indifference to the deviation between the
company’s December guidance and reality was so extreme as to constitute subjective bad faith
In response to the filing of the complaint, Oracle formed a SLC.
Who served on the SLC and what powers did it have?
o 2 board members were named to the SLC and both of them joined the board more than 6
months after the disputed issue. They also both are tenured professors at Stanford University
They agreed to receive no special litigation committee-related compensation
because they wanted to make sure they were viewed as independent and impartial.
They agreed to return any compensation they received if that was needed to preserve
their independence
They claimed to have no material ties with Oracle
o The committee was to determine whether the corporation should press the claims raised by
the plaintiffs, settle the case, or terminate it
What steps did the SLC take to investigate?
o The committee also had legal counsel (Simon Thacher & Bartlett LLP) they had not
performed material amounts of legal work for the corporation or any of the individual
defendants before its engagement
o National Economic Research Advisors (NERA) was retained to perform some analytical
work
o They reviewed records
o Counsel interviewed 70 witnesses (some twice) this included the trade defendants
o They had 35 meetings among each other totaling 80+ hours
o One of the board members devoted even more time than this
o They produced a 1,100 page report at the end
What conclusion did the SLC reach?
o They concluded that the corporation should not pursue the plaintiffs’ claims against the
trading defendants or any of the other directors serving on the board
o They concluded that even a hypothetical Oracle executive who possessed all information
regarding the company’s performance in December and January would not have possessed
material, non-public information that the company would fail to meet the earnings and
revenue guidance it provided the market in December.
o Even though Ellison and Henley had the most access to inside information, they did not
possess material, non-public information
o Lucas and Boskin did not receive the weekly updates that allegedly showed a weakening in
the corporation’s performance during the time so there was even less of a basis to infer
wrongdoing on their part
What information was omitted from the SLC report?
o Any disclosure of several significant ties between the corporation or trading defendants and
Stanford University
Boskin ties:
T.M. Friedman Professor of Economics at Stanford University
Taught one of the board committee members (Grundfest) when he was a
PhD student
The two stayed in contact over the years and occasionally discussed public
policy
B & G are both senior fellows and steering committee members at the
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Both publish papers for this and the institute helps publicize their research
Lucas ties:
A Stanford alumni for both undergraduate and graduate degrees
He has made numerous financial contributions to Stanford and he is
affiliated with a family foundation
He is an important alumni and generous contributor to the law school and
the institute for economic research (mentioned above)
Ellison ties:
One of the wealthiest men in America
A major figure in the community in which Stanford is located
A major figure in technology industry
Makes major contributions to Stanford
What is the primary legal issue discussed in this case report?
About the independence of the special litigation committee
Defendant’s arguments?
The court should look to financial ties
The facts regarding the ties among Oracle, the trading defendants, Stanford, and the SLC members
do not impair the SLC’s independence
A director is not independent only if he is dominated and controlled by an interested party
Much of the law focuses on the bias inquiry on whether there are economically material ties between
the interested party and the director whose impartiality is questioned, treating the possible effect on
one’s personal wealth as the key to the independence inquiry
They cited to DE cases concluding that directors who are personal friends of an interested party were
not, by virtue of those personal ties, to be labeled non-independent
Plaintiff’s arguments?
They said the court should also look at personal ties
They claim the law should not ignore the social nature of humans and should take into consideration
the loss of independence that might be the consequence of close human ties like those involving the
trading defendants and those who served on the special litigation committee
Did the court uphold the decision of the special litigation committee and grant motion?
No it denied the motion to dismiss because they believe that the special litigation committee was not
truly independent
What test did the court use for judging the independence of the special litigation committee?
The question of independence turns on whether a director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of
making a decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind
o Focus is on impartiality and objectivity
o For any substantial reason = not just economic or financial ties, but also personal ties
They examined the question of whether the special litigation committee can independently make the
difficult decision entrusted to it: to determine whether the trading defendants should face suit for
insider trading-based allegations of breach of fiduciary duty
Who has the burden of proof?
The special litigation committee to establish the absence of a material dispute of fact about its
independence
The court says the facts raise a reasonable doubt that the committee was impartial in its assessment
and recommendation
It was the social ties that convinced the court that the committee was not independent even though
the committee attempted to disprove this and make itself look independence
o CORPORATION REVIEW QUESTION #3
Monster Seed Corporation (MSC) (Delaware)
Keynes, MSC shareholder
John Smith, CEO and Chairman of Board
Food for All (FFA)
Ricardo Smith, Founder (son of John Smith)
Loan from MSC to FFA in default and Keynes wants to force MSC to enforce collection
1. If Keynes files a lawsuit challenging board’s failure to enforce terms of loan agreement, what type
of lawsuit would that be? Direct or derivative?
2. Under Delaware law, would Keynes be required to make demand on MSC board before filing
such lawsuit?
3. Would you advise Keynes to make demand?
If not, what argument should he make regarding the demand requirement?
4. How will MSC respond to filing of lawsuit by Keynes?
5. If Keynes claims demand futility, MSC may decide to form a special litigation committee.
o Why would they form such a committee?
o If the committee recommends that complaint be dismissed, is court bound by that
recommendation?
o Smith v. Barlow
Corporate philanthropy & role and purposes of corporations
What was the transaction that led to the lawsuit?
Case involved charitable donation of $1.5K from AP Smith to Princeton University
It was approved by corporation’s board of directors
Why was the gift challenged as ultra vires?
Ultra vires = outside the power of the corporation to take part
What is the relevance of the plaintiff’s certificate of incorporation?
Shareholder objected that the donation was an ultra vires because the certificate of incorporation did
not explain or expressly authorize the contribution and under the common law the company did not
possess any implied or incidental power to make the donation
What is the relevance of the New Jersey statute?
This allowed corporations to make gifts as directors thought would contribute to protection of
corporate interests
However, gifts more than 1% of capital stock required notice and shareholder approval
The shareholders claimed that the statute could not be constitutionally applied to permit the gift
because the corporation was created before the statute was enacted
What is the relevance of the New Jersey constitution?
The court refers to the reserve power under the NJ constitution which allows corporate charters to be
altered in the discretion of the legislature when the change is in the public interest
Doctrine suggests that there cannot be a change of the charter which effects rights between
shareholders and corporations and among shareholders
Other cases in the state have recognized that where justified by the advancement of the public
interest the reserved power may be invoked to sustain later charter alterations even though they
affect contractual rights between the corporation and its shareholders and between shareholders
What arguments did Smith Manufacturing Company advance in favor of sustaining the gift?
They presented testimony that the gift was in the best interests of the corporation because:
o The public expects corporations to engage in philanthropy
o Corporation obtains good will in the community by doing so
o Charitable donations create a favorable environment for their business operations
o Recipient of gift might later train employees
o The importance of a liberal education
Does the court sustain the gift?
Yes the court allowed the gift
What are the legal grounds?
This was a lawful exercise which came within the express authority of the legislative statute
NJ constitution allows changes to corporate charters if compelling public interest and the court here
believed there was a compelling public interest at stake because corporate charitable giving advances
worthy causes in the community and alleviates the government from supporting such charities
through taxes
How has the view of the importance of charitable giving changed in recent history?
The view from the corporation has changed from the view of private profits and common law view
that no corporate gifts are permitted unless they would benefit the Corporation
Now courts take a more liberal view of such gifts and sustain them upon findings that the donations
tended reasonably to promote corporate objectives
Corporate gifts have increased and corporations are now expected to discharge social and private
responsibilities as members of the communities in which they operate
Are all corporate gifts to charity permissible?
No, there are limitations
Are there any limitations?
Yes
The gift has to not be made discriminately or to a pet charity of the corporate directors in furtherance
of personal rather than corporate ends
They must be reasonable in amount and within statutory limitations if there is a state statute
restricting amounts of such gifts
o Decided relative to profits and size of corporation
They must be voluntarily made in the reasonable belief that it would aid the public welfare and
advance the interests of the corporation and as part of the community in which it operates
o The corporate benefit can be general and doesn’t have to be quid pro quo
o HYPOTHETICAL #C4
What is elephant bumping?
CEOs who like to go to the places where other big CEOs are because it reaffirms the fact that when
they look around the room and they see all these other CEOs, they must be important because why
else would they be there
Should corporate management be allowed to make charitable donations to charity?
o HYPOTHETICAL #C5
You are counsel to public corporation manufacturing auto parts. Chief executive officer wants to make a
$100K donation to a friend’s charity. Corporate before tax earnings are $20M. CEO states that gift must be
anonymous to avoid ill will with other people who are soliciting donations for other charities.
Is this gift permissible:
o Under the rule of Smith v. Barlow?
o Under the statutes listed in the casebook?
o CORPORATE POWERS & ULTRA VIRES ACTS
Delaware General Corporation Code §102(A)(3): Purpose of a Corporation
Certificate of incorporation is required to set forth the nature of the business or purposes to be
conducted or promoted.
o Only a general statement is needed
May simply say any lawful act or activity
May contain restrictions
Delaware General Corporation Law §124: Ultra Vires Actions on Behalf of Corporation
No act or transfer of property shall be invalid because ultra vires but lack of capacity or power may
be asserted:
o Shareholder suit to enjoin corporation from entering into such act or transfer of property
o Corporate suit against directors and officers
o Suit by state attorney general
o CHARITABLE DONATIONS
Delaware General Corporation Law §122
Every corporation shall have the power to sue and be sued, acquire real or personal property and
dispose of same, conduct its business within or without this state, appoint officers, wind up and
dissolve, make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes,
make contracts and borrow/lend money, pay pensions, buy insurance for its benefit on life of
directors, officers, employees, or any shareholder.
o Underlined portion is what allows corporations to make donations
California Corporations Code §207(3):
Power to make donations regardless of specific corporate benefit for the public welfare, or for
community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes
o We aren’t sure what specific corporate benefits are
New York BCL §202(a)(12):
Make donations irrespective of corporate benefit for the public welfare or for community fund,
hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic or similar purposes, and in time of war or other
national emergency in aid thereof
Pennsylvania Code §102(d):
Directors may in considering the best interests of the corporation consider the effects of their actions
on any and all groups affected by such actions, including shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located
o Dodge v. Ford Motor Company
The business judgment rule and what would need to be shown to overcome the presumption of the business
judgment rule; also an expression of the role and purpose of the modern business corporation
Facts:
Dodge brothers were a minority shareholder in Ford Motor Company
Henry Ford held 58% and was on the board of directors
The company was very successful and made it a policy to issue huge dividends
At a point, Ford announced he would stop issuing the dividends and instead use that money to
reinvest in the business in building a new Ford production plant
Who initiated the lawsuit?
The Dodge brothers
Who did they sue?
Henry Ford
What relief were they seeking?
They wanted Ford to reinstitute the special dividend payments and they wanted the court to stop the
building of the new plant
What legal argument did the plaintiffs advance?
Their argument turned on abuse of discretion by the board of directors that had approved the
decision to terminate the dividends and build the new plant
Plaintiffs claimed that directors had changed the purpose of the company from a profit making
institution that was supposed to be generating returns for investors and instead turned it into a
charitable enterprise
What legal argument did the defendants advance?
There was an implied corporate power to engage in charitable works such as using corporate funds
for purposes other than paying dividends to investors, as long as they are incidental to the to the
main business of the corporation
What was the holding of the court?
The court decided that the payment of the dividends must be reinstituted
They did not agree that the construction of the plant should be enjoined and stopped
What reasoning did it use to justify its decision?
The court said the board did not act within its lawful powers with respect to the decision about the
dividends
The directors’ actions lacked good faith and they abused their business discretion
The court was not able to find a lack of good faith in the expansion of the business to build the plant
What is the relevance of Hunter v. Roberts?
Discussed in the case
Important because it talks about the extent to which courts will grant deference to business decision
making
Just because a business is profitable doesn’t mean the directors need to pay out a dividend
The provision also talks about when the court will not give business judgment deference to the
board’s decisions (underlined)
Payment of Dividends
Hunter v. Roberts (Michigan S.Ct):
o It is a well-recognized principle that directors alone have power to declare a dividend and
determine its amount. Courts of equity will not interfere in the management of the directors
unless they are guilty of fraud or misappropriation of the corporate funds, or refuse to
declare a dividend when the corporation has a surplus of net profits and when a refusal
would amount to abuse of discretion as would constitute fraud or breach of good faith.
DGCL §170(a):
o Directors may declare and pay dividends out of surplus or net profits, subject to restrictions
in certificate of incorporation.
What does this case tell us about the nature and purpose of the modern business corporation?
It stands for the proposition that in the normal course of business, a court will uphold a director’s
decision under the business judgment rule
They will not uphold such business judgment if there are exceptional circumstances such as fraud
and other bad faith
This doesn’t mean that directors can never take action to benefit constituents other than shareholders
such employees and customers
Was this case correctly decided?
Some say this case is short cited because the court is looking at short term problems rather than
looking at long term benefits to the corporation
The court may not have fully taken into account the conflict between Ford and Dodge at the time
Ford wanted to raise the wages of his employees. This was not for charitable donations and the court
did not take this into account
o Berle-Dodd Debate:
What is the nature and purpose of the modern business corporation?
Berle: Private Property (privacy view)
o Viewed the corporation as private property and viewed the directors as trustees for
shareholders who should act solely in their best interest
o He later went on to write a book about corporate governance where he articulated this view
Dodd: Social Institution (stakeholder view)
o Viewed the corporation as social institutions which had social responsibilities
o HYPOTHETICAL #C6
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance §2.01
Corporation’s objective is to conduct business with a view to enhancing corporate profits and
shareholder gain
Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not enhanced, corporation is obliged to act within
bounds of the law, may take into account ethical considerations appropriate to conduct of business,
may devote reasonable amount of resources to public welfare, humanitarian, educational and
philanthropic purposes
What view do the drafters of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance have about the purpose of the
modern business corporation?
Would they agree with Berle or with Dodd?
o THE NEW CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Corporate Social Responsibility = companies should voluntarily decide to respect and protect the interests of
a broad range of stakeholders and to contribute to a cleaner environment and better society through active
interaction with all
Corporate social responsibility goes beyond compliance with laws to capture voluntary initiatives to
do more than what is legally required
Supported by company level, industry level, and international codes of conduct
Developed by business, civil society, national governments and intergovernmental organizations
Areas of coverage
Core labor and employment standards
Green environmental standards
Reject bribery and corruption of government officials to facilitate business
Respect human rights
o TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE
John Elkington of SustainAbility (facilitates sustainable businesses)
Businesses should take into account finances as well as:
People
Planet
Profit
o CORPORATION REVIEW Q #2B
Is the lawsuit involving PI direct or derivative?
What is the test for direct v. derivative?
How would you apply the test to facts in problem?
o CORPORATION REVIEW Q #2A
Is the board decision protected by the Business Judgment Rule?
Module 3 Quizzes:
o Quiz 11: Incorporation Process
The internal affairs doctrine means that the law of the jurisdiction of incorporation governs all legal matters
involving the corporation. (T/F)
False
Under Delaware law, a corporation comes into existence as of the date and time the executed certificate of
incorporation has been filed with the secretary of state’s office. (T/F)
True
Under Delaware law, a corporation must maintain a registered office in such state, which is the same as its
principal place of business. (T/F)
False
Under Delaware law, which of the following is not required to be included in the certificate of incorporation?
A statement of the management structure of the corporation.
Which of the following is not a characteristic of a corporation?
Equity owners are liable for debts and obligations of the business that exceed its ability to pay.
o Quiz 12: Piercing the Corporate Veil
In the case of Walkovszky v. Carlton, the plaintiff’s complaint was adequate in pleading grounds for
piercing the corporate veil and holding the shareholder of Seon Corporation personally liable for damages
caused by the taxicab. (T/F)
False
Enterprise liability would allow a judgment creditor to collect from other corporations under common
ownership with the corporate debtor. (T/F)
True
In the case of Sea Land v. Pepper Source, the court applied Illinois law on piercing the corporate veil, which
required a finding of unity of interest between the corporation and the shareholder along with a
determination that failing to pierce would sanction fraud or promote injustice. (T/F)
True
In the case of Sea Land v. Pepper Source, the court stated that the inability of a creditor to collect on a debt
owed by a corporation out of such corporation’s assets was sufficient evidence of the fraud or injustice
needed for veil piercing. (T/F)
False
The test for veil piercing discussed by the court in the case of In Re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products
Liability Litigation required an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances and a showing that the
subsidiary substantially dominated the operations of the parent. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 13: Shareholder Derivative Litigation Part I
In a shareholder derivative lawsuit, a shareholder is suing in the name of the corporation alleging harm to the
corporation and seeking recovery for the benefit of the corporation. (T/F)
True
Which of the following claims would likely be brought as a derivative (rather than a direct) lawsuit?
Claims that corporate directors wasted corporate assets and breached fiduciary duties
In Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., Eisenberg claimed that his voting rights had been negatively
impacted by the reorganization and merger and the court categorized his lawsuit as direct. (T/F)
True
In Grimes v. Donald, the court categorized the abdication claim as derivative and categorized the
compensation claims as direct. (T/F)
False
Under Delaware law, which of the following is not a required element for demand futility?
All directors are named as defendants in the lawsuit
o Quiz 14: Shareholder Derivative Litigation Part II
In Zapata v. Maldonado, the court refused to grant business judgment deference to the decision of the special
litigation committee. (T/F)
True
In Zapata v. Maldonado, the court used a two part test for assessing the motion to dismiss by the special
litigation committee: whether the committee was independent and if so, whether the court agreed that the
lawsuit was not in the corporation’s best interest. (T/F)
True
In Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the court stated that only economic ties were relevant to determining
the independence of directors serving on the special litigation committee. (T/F)
False
A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative lawsuit who makes demand on the board of directors is entitled to
proceed with the lawsuit even if the board rejects demand. (T/F)
False
A plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action who makes demand on the board that is rejected may proceed
with the lawsuit if she pleads facts with particularity creating doubt that business judgment rule deference is
warranted. (T/F)
True
o Quiz 15: Role & Purpose of Corporation
In Smith v. Barlow, the court found that making the gift to charity was not within the powers of the
corporation. (T/F)
False
In Dodge v. Ford, the court found that the board was justified in discontinuing the special dividends because
declaring dividends falls within the board’s discretion. (T/F)
False
The business judgment rule is a judicial presumption that directors act in good faith and in the best interests
of the corporation. (T/F)
True
Courts will defer to board decision-making under the business judgment rule, except in cases involving
fraud, illegality, conflict of interest, lack of due care, or abuse of discretion amounting to bad faith. (T/F)
True
Corporate social responsibility means that corporations should do more than what is legally required and
take voluntary actions that benefit not just shareholders, but other corporate shareholders and society
generally. (T/F)
True
MODULE FOUR: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
o INTRODUCTION
Hybrid form of business association
Can combine best features of corporations with best features of partnerships
Can combine limited liability and flow through tax treatment
Created under state statutes enacted in all 50 states
Began in the 1990s
ULLCA provides rules for structure, governance, and operation of LLCs
ULLCA §108(a): LLC is a legal entity distinct from its members
IRS Tax Treatment
Corporate Characteristics
o Limited liability
o Free transferability
o Continuity of life
o Centralized management (versus member management)
Tax treatment:
Prior to 1997, LLC could only receive flow through tax treatment if it had 2 or fewer of the
following attributes:
o Limited liability
o Free transferability
o Continuity of life
o Centralized management
IRS 1997 Check the Box regulations simplify tax treatment of LLCs
o DOCUMENTS REQUIRED FOR FORMATION (how are LLCs formed?)
Filing of Articles of Organization with secretary of state in the relevant jurisdiction
Contents are dictated by statute
Execution by members of Operating Agreement
Not filed with the secretary of state and not publicly available
Much longer than the articles of organization
Often cover topics such as membership, governance, finance, dissolution
Flexible structure can be used to revise default rules subject to limits spelled out in ULLCA §105
o FORMATION – ARTICLES OF ORGANIZATION
ULLCA §201: One or more persons (organizers) may form LLC, consisting of one or more members, by
filing articles with secretary of state
The LLC comes into existence when the articles are filed with the secretary of state and at least one person
has become a member
Member = owner of the business
Limited liability is not available prior to filing the articles
ULLCA §201: Contents of Articles of Organization
REQUIRED
o Name of company: must comply with ULLCA §112
o Street and mailing address of principal office
o Name and address of company’s registered agent
OPTIONAL
o Other provisions can be added but must not be inconsistent with §105(c) and §(d)
ULLCA §202: Amendment of Articles of Organization
When filing an amendment, you must state the name of the company, date of filing of initial
certificate, and text of the amendment
Must be filed with the secretary of state
o Westec v. Lanham
This case is about filing of a certificate of formation and why it is important.
It is about the liability of an agent if the principle is not fully disclosed under agency law.
It is about the constructive notice provision of the LLC statute.
Suit for money due for services performed under contract.
Who were the parties to the contract?
Donald Lanham, manager and member of the Preferred Income Investors LLC, contracted with
Westec, a construction company, to perform engineering work
Who negotiated the contract?
Contract was negotiated by Larry Clark who was acting on behalf of Mr. Lanham
Who did Westec believe was its client?
No knowledge of any business entity
Only dealt with Clark and Lanham
Because W knew Clark was acting as L’s agent, it is clear that C isn’t liable
According to the trial court, who is liable on the debt?
Lanham and the PII LLC
The trial court dismissed Clark because he couldn’t be personally liable
Does the first appeals court (district court) agree with the trial court?
They reversed
Why or why not?
They relied on the notice provision of the LLC act
o This states that the filing of articles of organization serve as constructive notice of a
company’s status as a limited liability company
Business card given to Westec:
Name of Clark
Address of Lanham (also used as address for PII)
PII
o There is no mention of the fact that PII was a limited liability company.
o This could have easily been achieved if LLC was after PII
What is the legal issue addressed by the court?
Does LLC Act notice provision supplant the partially disclosed principal doctrine?
o Notice that the court is deciding whether the agency rule of liability of agent on contract
involving partially disclosed principal or the notice provision of the LLC Act should be
applied in this case.
Whether the members or managers of a limited liability company are excused from personal liability
on a contract where the other party to the contract did not have notice that the members or managers
were negotiating on behalf of a limited liability company at the time the contract was made
What is the argument of Westec (plaintiff)?
Law of partially disclosed principal not supplanted by LLC notice provision.
Notice provision applies only where third party seeks to impose liability on LLC members and
managers simply due to status as members or managers.
Under common law of agency, agent is liable on a contract entered into for a principal if principal is
not fully disclosed.
If both existence and identity of agent’s principal are full disclosed, agent does not become a party to
any contract he negotiates.
If the third party knows that the agent is acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal, agent is liable.
Liability of agent on a contract where principal is not fully disclosed
o If both the existence and identity of the agent’s principal are fully disclosed to the other
party, the agent does not become a party to any contract which he negotiates. But where the
principal is partially disclosed (the existence of a principal is known but his identity is not),
it is usually inferred that the agent is a party to the contract.
What is the argument of Lanham (defendant)?
Westec was on constructive notice that LLC had limited liability because of filing.
Constructive notice provision provides conclusive presumption that third party dealing with agent of
LLC always has constructive notice of existence of agent’s principal.
Notice Provision of LLC Act
o The fact that the articles of organization are on file in the office of the secretary of state is
notice that the limited liability company is a limited liability company and is notice of all
other facts set forth therein which are required to be set forth in the articles of organization.
Who wins this case and why?
Westec wins this case.
The court says that the LLC notice provision does not supplant the common law rule of agency on
Agent’s liability on contract involving a partially disclosed principal.
Court says that this notice provision means that managers and members won’t be liable simply due
to their status as managers or members.
It does not mean that a third party who deals with the agent of limited liability company always has
constructive notice of the existence of the agent’s principal.
What judicial analysis/reasoning underlies its holding?
Defendant’s argument exaggerates plain meaning of language of statute.
It would be necessary to name and state fact of existence as LLC for that to be known by the other
party in this case; it would be an invitation to fraud to apply the notice provision
Statutes in derogation of common law are strictly construed
Other sections of the LLC Act reinforce the conclusion that you need to use LLC designation and
observe formalities to get the protections of the Act.
How could the losing party have protected itself?
Losing party could have told Westec that PII was an LLC, as required by the LLC Act.
o Elf v. Jaffari
This is a case about the LLC operating agreement and what it may contain.
Derivative lawsuit on behalf of a Delaware LLC.
Who formed Malek LLC?
Elf Atochem North America, Inc. (PA corp.) contributed $1M in exchange for 30% ownership
interest in Malek LLC.
Malek Inc. (CA corp.) contributed its rights in water based maskants in exchange for 70% ownership
interest in Malek LLC.
o Jaffari is president of Malek Inc.
The purpose of the LLC was to manufacture and distribute chemical maskant is used in the
aerospace industry.
What documents were executed in connection with the formation and operation of the LLC?
Certification of Formation for Delaware LLC.
Operating Agreement: arbitration clause and forum selection. (The Agreement)
Exclusive Distributorship Agreement. Elf is named as exclusive distributor for Malek LLC.
Employment Agreement: Jaffari who is owner of Malek was employed as manager of Malek LLC.
Who filed suit and what were the allegations in the complaint?
Elf sued Jaffari and Malek LLC individually and derivatively on behalf of Malek LLC seeking
equitable remedies for breach of fiduciary duties to Malek LLC, pushing LLC to insolvency brink by
withdrawing funds for personal purposes, interfered with business opportunities, failure to disclose,
poor manufacturing and violation of environmental regulations
Why did the Court of Chancery grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss?
Court of Chancery dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
Contract governed the question of jurisdiction and only a court of law or arbitrator in California is
empowered to decide these claims.
What were the issues raised in the appeal?
Elf argued that the arbitration clause was unenforceable for various reasons.
(1) whether the LLC which did not itself execute the LLC agreement defining its governance and
operations (only the individual members signed but no one signed on behalf of the LLC itself) is
nevertheless bound by the Agreement and
(2) whether contractual provisions directing that all disputes be resolved exclusively by arbitration or
court proceedings in California are valid under the Act.
How does this court decide those issues?
The court held that the agreement is binding on the LLC as well as its members and since the Act
does not prohibit the members of an LLC from vesting exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in
arbitration proceedings or court enforcement of arbitration in California to resolve disputes, the
contractual forum selection provisions must govern.
What are the Delaware policies that support the court’s decision?
Delaware policies are to give maximum freedom of contract to parties forming an LLC and also
another policy favoring alternative dispute resolution.
In this case, the arbitration provision in the contract stripped the Court of Chancery of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Operating Agreement for Malek LLC
§13.8: Any controversy or dispute arising out of this Agreement, the interpretation of any of the
provisions hereof, or the action or inaction of any Member or Manager hereunder shall be submitted
to arbitration in San Francisco, California
o This first provision is an arbitration provision.
Arbitration is a private dispute settlement conducted outside of the government
judicial system. It is frequently used in a commercial context.
Some of the advantages of arbitration include the fact that the parties are better able
to control the proceedings, it is considered faster, and the results are typically kept
confidential.
Effect is to oust the jurisdiction of other courts and should be upheld by those other
courts where suit may be filed.
§13.8: No action based upon any claim arising out of or related to this Agreement shall be instituted
in any court by any Member except an action to compel an arbitration or an action to enforce an
arbitral award
o This second provision states that disputes may not be brought in courts unless such suits are
needed to force the parties to conduct arbitration or once an arbitration has concluded
o And if an award has been issued, to enforce that award.
§13.7: All Members consent to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and federal courts sitting in
California in any action on a claim arising out of, under or in connection with this Agreement or the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement provided such claim is not required to be arbitrated
pursuant to §13.8 and to personal jurisdiction in California.
o This third provision is a choice of forum provision that requires any court proceeding to be
brought in California courts as long as such claims are not subject to the arbitration clause
o FORMATION - OPERATING AGREEMENT (content)
ULLCA §105(a): Members of LLC may enter into Operating Agreement that governs:
Relations among members and between members of an LLC
Rights and duties of a person acting as manager of an LLC
Activities and affairs of LLC
Means and conditions for amendment
Unless changed by Operating Agreement, the default rules of the ULLCA apply per §105(b)
o NOTES:
This provision of the Uniform Limited liability Company act sets forth the scope,
function, and limitations of the operating agreement.
Note that unless changed by the operating agreement, the default provisions of the
uniform Limited Liability Company Act apply.
It is not possible to change provisions of the ULLCA specified in §105(c)
It is necessary to comply with limitations in §105(d)
NOTES:
o There are limitations on what may be included in the operating agreement.
o For example the operating agreement may not eliminate liability for conduct involving bad
faith, willful or intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law.
o Hypothetical #LLC1
In Elf v. Jaffari, Elf signed the Operating Agreement but later sued challenging the arbitration clause in that
agreement.
Why did Elf agree to include the arbitration clause in the Operating Agreement?
o One explanation might be that the lawyer for Malek Inc., which was a California
corporation, might have insisted on this provision. It is possible that the lawyers for elf
believed at the time of accepting the agreement that the portion would be unenforceable.
o Another possibility is that the parties did not contemplate the possibility of disputes arising
in the future.
Can we draw any lessons about how to draft such contracts?
o One lesson to be drawn, is that lawyers should carefully scrutinize such contract provisions
and consider the implications should disputes arise.
o Hypothetical #LLC2
The court in Elf v. Jaffari stated that the policy of the Delaware LLC statute was to give the maximum effect
to the freedom of contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements
Should there be any limits to the freedom of contract principle for LLCs?
o There are limitations set forth in the statute that the parties must abide by. §105(c)&(d)
o Courts will be unwilling to enforce provisions that they believe are contrary to public policy.
Suppose the parties had included the following provision in their LLC Operating Agreement:
Each member agrees that the other shall be relieved of and immune to liability for any act against the
other or against the LLC, whether in tort or contract or in law or equity, regardless of any allegation
of willfulness, intention, or gross negligence.
o Would a court uphold such a provision?
It seems unlikely that a court would enforce such provision. It would probably be
said to be in violation of public policy.
ULLCA §105(c)(8), for example, provides that an operating agreement may not
unreasonably reduce the duty of care.
This is designed to make the point that there are limits on freedom of contract and
that the court in the present case relied in part on the policy in favor of arbitration.
o Kaycee v. Flahive
This is a case about piercing the LLC veil of limited liability.
Facts
Flahive Oil & Gas is a Wyoming LLC with no assets.
Kaycee Land and Livestock entered into a contract with Flahive
Roger Flahive was the managing member of Flahive Oil & Gas.
Kaycee alleges that Flahive caused environmental contamination to its real property.
Kaycee is trying to pierce the LLC veil of Flahive Oil & Gas in order to hold Roger Flahive, its
managing member, personally liable for the contamination.
What was the issue addressed by the court in this case?
The certified question is whether piercing can be applied to LLCs.
Is a claim to pierce the limited liability entity veil or disregard the limited liability company entity in
the same manner as a court would pierce a corporate veil, an available remedy against a Wyoming
limited liability company?
What is the argument made by plaintiff?
Piercing is necessary to avoid an unjust result in this case because Flahive had no assets
Because piercing is allowed in the corporate context, it should also be allowed in the context of a
limited liability company
Argument made by defendant Flahive?
He compares two provisions of Wyoming statutory law:
o Wyoming Business Corporation Act
o Wyoming LLC Act
No language stating that member/manager can become personally liable
The difference in the statutory language is significant and concludes that Wyoming law provides for
piercing in the case of a corporation but not for LLCs
How does the court resolve the issue?
Piercing is an available remedy for LLCs.
The court stated that we can discern no reason, in either law or policy, to treat LLCs differently than
we treat corporations. If the members and officers of an LLC fail to treat it as a separate entity as
contemplated by statute, they should not enjoy immunity from individual liability for the LLC’s acts
that cause damage to third parties
The factors used in the context of an LLC may differ from those applied in the corporate context.
The court sent the case back to the district court stating that they must conduct a fact intensive
inquiry to determine whether piercing the corporate veil is appropriate under the circumstances of
this case
What is its reasoning?
Since piercing is an equitable doctrine, the paucity of statutory authority for LLC piercing should not
be considered a barrier to its application
Lack of explicit statutory language should not be considered an indication of the legislature’s desire
to make LLC members impermeable
Wyoming was the first state to enact LLC statutes and it is very unlikely that the legislature gave any
consideration to whether the common law doctrine of piercing the veil should apply to the liability
limitation granted by the statute
Other states who have allowed this have done so under the corporate standards
Wyoming Business Corporation Act:
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not
personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable
by reason of his own acts or conduct.
Wyoming LLC Act:
Neither the members of an LLC nor the managers of an LLC are liable under a judgment, decree or
order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation or liability of the LLC.
o Limited Liability in LLCs and Piercing the Veil
ULLCA §304
Debts, obligations, liabilities of LLC belong solely to the company
Members or managers are NOT personally liable for debts, obligations and liabilities of LLC,
whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise
Failure to observe formalities or requirements for exercise of powers or management are NOT a
ground for imposing personal liability
o Hypothetical #LLC3
Court in Kaycee v. Flahive stated that the various factors that would justify piercing the LLC veil would not
be identical to the corporate situation.
What rationale would support piercing in an LLC case?
o A rationale that would support piercing would be that the entity is not operated separately
from the owner and it would be unfair to allow limited liability to protect the owner.
What are the important differences between an LLC and a corporation that are relevant to piercing?
o Not spelled out in the case
o LLC can have direct management by members with no separation of ownership and control
and no board of directors. So neglect of formalities would not be the same level of
importance as in a corporation. Other formalities should not be ignored, like commingling
assets or bank accounts or signing in the name of an LLC and not in an individual name.
o The various factors to be applied must be determined by looking at the case law of the
relevant jurisdiction, just like in the case of corporate veil piercing.
o McConnell v. Hunt
This is a case about fiduciary duties in LLCs. It is also about management of LLCs
Suit for a declaratory judgment establishing McConnell’s legal right to take the Columbus NHL franchise.
Facts
Hunt and McConnell and business associates formed Columbus hockey Limited (CHL), an LLC, to
bring an NHL hockey franchise to Columbus, Ohio.
After they failed to get public financing (by a sales tax) to build an arena, Nationwide Insurance
offered to build an arena and lease it to CHL.
Hunt, purporting to act for CHL but without authority to do so, repeatedly rejected the lease offer.
McConnell was willing to accept the offer.
There was a meeting of the CHL members, at which Hunt and his followers persisted in the rejection
of the lease offer and McConnell and his associates expressed support.
McConnell and his associates signed the lease offer for themselves and got the franchise.
Hunt, failing to recognize that he had simply overplayed his hand and now wanting to be in on the
deal, made angry noises and threatened to sue, so McConnell and his associates sought a declaratory
judgment.
Hunt filed an answer and counterclaims on behalf of CHL and his firm.
Hunt also filed an action on behalf of CHL in a New York state court.
How did McConnell and Hunt wind up competing for the franchise?
They formed an LLC to bring the franchise to the city
When they couldn’t get public financing to build an arena, Nationwide offered to pay and lease it to
them but Hunt rejected the offer so McConnell accepted it
What did the Columbus Hockey Limited LLC Operating Agreement say about competition?
Columbus Hockey Limited LLC Operating Agreement
o §3.3: Members May Compete.
Members shall not in any way be prohibited from or restricted in engaging or
owning an interest in any other business venture of any nature, including any
venture which might be competitive with the business of the Company
Holding?
Hunt loses.
CHL operating agreement expressly allowed competition and there was no basis for finding breach
of fiduciary duty or tortious interference. Hunt wrongfully acted on behalf of CHL; under the
operating agreement, he needed approval from the other members and never even tried to get it. And
he acted willfully.
Directed verdict = no reasonable jury could find a decision to the contrary
Did McConnell group breach its fiduciary duties?
In general, there are fiduciary duties in the LLC context and normally there isn’t direct competition
allowed among members.
The members here have waived their fiduciary duty not to compete in the operating agreement so
therefore, there is no breach of fiduciary duty
Did it engage in the tort of interference with business relationships?
The court said no
It was a Hunt's own actions that caused the termination of any relationship with Nationwide and the
NHL, not the actions of McConnell.
McConnell agreed to take the deal only if Hunt did not.
Did Hunt breach the Operating Agreement?
The court said yes
Hunt acted like he was the manager but there is no evidence to bear this out. He was a member and
needed approval from the majority of members.
He breached the operating agreement when he filed suit without getting approval from the other
members. He needed a majority to act.
There was a directed verdict after trial in favor of McConnell on the claim that Hunt breached the
contract in rejecting the lease and usurping control
How was Columbus Hockey Limited LLC managed?
It was member managed.
Here is language from the Operating Agreement, §4.1:
o No member may take any action on behalf of the company unless such action is approved by
a majority of the units allocated.
We can read this to mean that no member of the LLC can act without the approval
of a majority of the other members
o FIDUCIARY DUTY
ULLCA §409(a): Standards of Conduct for Members and Managers Conduct
Members owes duty of loyalty and care to member managed company and its other members
o These standards apply to member managed LLCs aka LLC where all members have the right
to manage
ULLCA §409(b): Duty of loyalty includes the following duties:
Account and hold as trustee any profit from winding up, use of company property, appropriation of
company opportunity
Dealing as or on behalf of person with adverse interests
Competing with company before dissolution
o NOTE:
Duty of loyalty defined as accounting for profit from use of property of LLC and
appropriation of corporate opportunity, refrain from acting adversely to the LLCs
interests, refrain from competing with the company in the conduct of its business
before dissolution.
ULLCA §409(c)
Duty of care is to refrain from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, willful or
intentional conduct, or knowing violation of law
o Duty of care limited to not committing acts that are grossly negligent, reckless, intentional,
willful violation of law.
ULLCA §409(i): Manager in a manager managed company owes duties of loyalty and care to company and
members
Members who do not manage don’t owe such duties
Members must discharge duties and exercise rights under ULLCA and operating agreement
consistent with contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing
o NOTE:
These standards apply to member managed LLCs (defined as LLC where all
members do not have the right to manage but instead appoint one or more managers
to run the business)
Example:
AB Industries LLC has two members, Ann and Barb.
It is a manager managed company with Chris serving as nonmember manager.
Chris may not compete with ABC.
Ann and Barb may compete.
o Styles of LLC Management
There are two styles of LLC Management:
Member management and Manager management
ULLCA §407(a): An LLC is member-managed unless the operating agreement expressly provides that it will
be manager-managed
This indicates that member-management is the default rule and the parties who organize the LLC
must make a choice when organizing the business about which style to adopt
ULLCA §407(b): Member-managed LLC
Management is vested in members
Members have equal rights in management
Differences on ordinary business matters are decided by majority vote of members
Affirmative vote or consent of all members required for taking actions outside the ordinary course of
business or for amending the operating agreement
ULLCA §407(c): Manager-managed LLC
Matters related to activities or affairs of company are decided exclusively by the manager or, if there
is more than one manager, by a majority of the managers
If there is more than one manager, managers have equal rights in management
Affirmative vote or consent of all members required for taking actions outside the ordinary course of
business or for amending the operating agreement
Managers must be designated (appointed), removed, and replaced by a majority of Members
o No Agency of Members
ULLCA §301
A member is not an agent of LLC solely by reason of being a member of the LLC.
o Hypothetical #LLC4
Hunt, after getting approval of other members of CHL, negotiated with Nationwide for the arena and was
nearing an agreement. McConnell then made a better offer to Nationwide and won the right to lease the
arena and based on that fact, was awarded the franchise.
Would the result in McConnell v. Hunt be the same under the alternative set of facts?
o First part of opinion suggests that provision in operating agreement granting freedom to
compete would be dispositive and McConnell would win.
o Last part addressing fiduciary duty and tortious interference relies on Hunts rejection of
Nationwide deal and suggests result under either theory might have been different if Hunt
had not rejected the Nationwide proposal or if McConnell had acted in a sneaky or
contentious way.
o Hard to reconcile the two approaches.
o Hypothetical #LLC5
That court in McConnell v. Hunt stated:
We conclude that §3.3 is plain and unambiguous and allowed members of CHL to compete against
CHL for an NFL franchise
o Do you agree that language of §3.3 of the Operating Agreement was clear & unambiguous?
No. The language is boilerplate and could be read more than one way.
o If not, how would you redraft that clause to remove all possible doubt about its meaning in
this case?
Should have said including competition for award of hockey franchise for Columbus
o New Horizons v. Haack
This case deals with dissolutions
Suit for an unpaid debt.
Facts
Haack was one of the founders and members of Kickapoo Valley freight, LLC.
Kickapoo went out of business owing $1009.99 to New Horizons, on an account in name of LLC.
Haack had made representations that she was a partner and she would make payments on the bill.
When the LLC was dissolved (in a non-technical sense, with no formal procedures), some assets
were distributed to Haack (though there is some indication that these may have been used to pay off
creditors other than New Horizons).
New Horizons sued Haack on an alter ego theory.
The trial court held Haack liable on the alter ego theory, relying in large part of the fact that the LLC
was treated as a partnership for tax purposes. Haack appealed
What was the defendant’s defense?
She said the account opened with New Horizons was in the business name, that she was not
personally liable for debts of the LLC (because of the principal of limited liability), and that she had
not personally guaranteed the obligation
NOTE: Haack was not good about record keeping and didn’t follow formalities
The trial court denied the defense. What was the basis for its decision?
The trial court said Haack was liable because it was appropriate to pierce the veil and because the
company was treated as a partnership was evidence that she was liable because all partners are
jointly liable
There was some confusion in trial court’s opinion because they considered her as a partner but she
claims to have organized under an LLC
Holding of Appellate court
The judgment against Haack upheld but on a different theory.
Tax treatment is not conclusive as to alter ego, and Haack should prevail on that theory.
Since she did not follow proper procedures for dissolution and did not prove that the amounts
distributed to her on dissolution were less than the amount of the debt to New Horizons, she is liable.
Does this appellate court agree with the lower court’s decision?
The appellate court agrees that Haack is liable but it uses a different rationale.
This court said piercing does not make sense because there was no evidence that the LLC was
Haack’s alter ego.
Court states that lower court erroneously deemed Kickapoo’s treatment as a partnership for tax purposes to
be conclusive. Is such tax treatment relevant to the question of liability in this case?
Partnership tax treatment is not conclusive on the legal status of the entity under state law.
Those are two separate legal issues.
Partnership tax treatment does not mean that the entity is a partnership for state law purposes.
Does Haack’s statement to New Horizons that she would start paying $100 per month on the account suggest
another theory of liability that plaintiff could have used in this case?
She might have been issuing a guarantee with that statement
It could also be interpreted simply to mean she would use her best efforts to see that New Horizons
would be paid
Why did Kickapoo Valley Freight LLC fail to pay New Horizons’ bill?
It was dissolved and the only assets were a truck which was secured by the bank and some accounts
receivable that they were trying to collect.
There were insufficient assets left to pay the bill
Did Haack follow the statutory steps for dissolution?
NO she did not follow formalities.
She did not have articles of organization or an operating agreement but the court seems to have
accepted the existence of the company as an LLC.
She did not follow the statutory steps for dissolution.
What is the court’s holding and rationale?`
Appellate court agreed with the lower court but on different grounds
The court says that she should be held liable because she failed to establish that she took appropriate
steps to shield herself from liability for the company’s debts following its dissolution and the
distribution of its assets.
Court says that she did not establish at trial that the amount of New Horizon’s claim exceeded the
value of any liquidation distribution she may have received from the dissolved company.
In this regard the court agreed with the trial court's comments regarding the lack of evidence in the
record to show the Kickapoo Valley's affairs were properly wound up following its dissolution
occasioned by Robert Koch's dissociation from the enterprise.
o DISSOLUTION under ULLCA (statutory steps of dissolution)
§701 = Events of dissolution for an LLC
§702 = Winding up after dissolution has occurred
Includes filing of articles of termination
§704 = Disposing of known claims against LLC by giving notice to creditors
§705 = Disposing of other claims by publishing notice to creditors in a newspaper
Other claims are barred
ULLCA sets forth steps for formal dissolution of an LLC.
§707 = Creditors must be paid first
This includes paying members who have extended credit through the LLC
Members are entitled to the return of their contributions only after creditors have been paid off
§705(d)(2) = Member incurs liability to creditors only up to amount received in distribution from LLC
o Hypothetical #LLC6
How could Members of LLC protect themselves from personal liability in the context of a dissolution?
Follow procedure for notice to creditors and filing of claims by creditors. If they do this, a Member’s
total liability may not exceed the total value of assets distributed to the member in liquidation.
In this case of New Horizons v. Haack, there is nothing in the record showing the disposition of
other company assets such as cash and receivables.
Suppose that Haack had proved that she had invested $2K in the LLC and that she had paid off Kickapoo’s
debts and then pocketed $500 from what was left over.
What would be her liability to New Horizons?
o She would be liable for the amount of the distribution to her of $500.
o This is in spite of the fact she invested $2K and had already lost $1.5K at the time of
distribution after payment of liabilities from assets.
o Statute relieves her of liability for the excess of the amount of the debt over the amount
received in distribution, meaning that the creditors would take a loss of $509.99 in this case
o LLC REVIEW QUESTION #1
What legal issues does this fact pattern raise?
Can Markus bind BADS to the contracts with BUSA and HOMU even though he exceeded the financial
limits set in the discussions with Pierre and Jorge?
Look at info from Agency chapter
Unlikely he had actual authority to enter into these contracts
Maybe apparent authority
Did Markus breach his fiduciary duty by taking the $2K per event facility for his own use for the ping pong
events?
ULLCA §409(b)
Can BUSA and HOMU recover from Markus, Pierre and Jorge on a piercing theory or because of the
informal way that Pierre and Jorge dissolved the LLC?
We need more information
Courts do recognize piercing in LLC cases
Module 4 Quizzes
o Quiz 16: Limited Liability Companies I
Which of the following is not a feature of limited liability companies?
Double taxation
The organizational documents for limited liability companies consist of the Articles of Organization and the
Operating Agreement; both documents must be filed with the Secretary of State’s office. (T/F)
False
In Westec v. Lanham, the court decided that Lanham was not liable for the debt to Westec because the filing
of the Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State’s office served as constructive notice of the
existence of Preferred Income Investors as a limited liability company. (T/F)
False
In Elf v. Jaffari, the court stated that jurisdiction was lacking because the parties had included an arbitration
clause in the Operating Agreement and that provision was consistent with the state’s policies on freedom of
contract and alternative dispute resolution and should be upheld. (T/F)
True
In Kaycee v. Flahive, the court stated that piercing the veil was an available remedy for limited liability
company cases and also stated that courts should apply the same factors they would use for corporate veil
piercing. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 17: Limited Liability Companies II
In McConnell v. Hunt, the court found that the McConnell group breached its fiduciary duties to Columbus
Hockey Limited LLC because they bid for and were awarded the National Hockey League franchise. (T/F)
False
In a member-managed limited liability company, members owe duties of loyalty and care to the company
and its members. (T/F)
True
In a manager-managed limited liability company, matters relating to the activities and affairs of the company
are decided by the manager(s), subject to certain enumerated exceptions. (T/F)
True
In New Horizons v. Haack, the appellate court found that Allison was liable for the debt owed by Kickapoo
Valley Freight LLC based on the theory of piercing the veil of limited liability. (T/F)
False
Under the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, where statutory dissolution procedures are followed and
assets of the company have been distributed after dissolution, a member’s liability to creditors could be
limited to the amount received by the member in the distribution. (T/F)
True
MODULE FIVE: CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTY
o Kamin v. American Express Company
Derivative lawsuit brought by 2 minority shareholders of American Express Company against the board of
directors
Why did plaintiff shareholders sue defendant directors?
The complaint alleges that American Express acquired for investment 1,954,418 shares of common
stock of Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, Inc. at a cost of $29.9M with a market value of $4M
Shareholders are asking for a declaration that this dividend was a waste of corporate assets
They are asking defendants not to proceed with the distribution or in the alternative for monetary
damages
Defendants moved for an order dismissing the complaint or alternatively for summary judgment
What was the defendants’ view of what to do with the DLJ stock that had declined in value?
They decided it was in the best interest of the corporation to declare a special dividend to all
shareholders pursuant to which the shares of DLJ would be distributed in kind
How did plaintiff think the stock should have been handled?
They argued that American Express should have sold the shares on the market, sustained a capital
loss of $25M which could be offset against taxable capital gains on other American Express
investments resulting in projected tax savings of around $8M
What did the board identify as an offsetting benefit to the losses identified by the plaintiff?
Plaintiffs had argued that the board action meant that American Express would not receive the tax
saving benefits that would be available in the plaintiff’s option
However, the board argued that the projected loss of $25M would be reflected as a reduction of
American Express net income which would cause the stock price to fall
This loss would be a charge against earnings only in the event of a stock sale
Therefore, the defendants argued that the offsetting benefit was avoiding a fall in the stock price of
American Express by distributing the stock of DLJ as a dividend in kind
How did the plaintiff shareholders frame the alleged legal wrongdoing of the defendants in the complaint?
They alleged that board of directors engaged in waste of corporate assets and engaged in negligence
in their decision making in violation of their duty of care to preserve American Express assets in the
same manner as those directors would preserve their own personal assets
What is the standard adopted by the court for the duty of care of directors?
The court adopted a gross negligence standard saying that a simple error of judgment (aka simple
negligence) is not enough to overcome the protection of the business judgment rule
What must plaintiff shareholders allege to win a duty of care case?
In order to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule, it is necessary to allege
misconduct of a higher order of magnitude such as fraud, illegality, bad faith, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance
Did the defendant directors violate their duty of care?
The court says no
The directors held a special meeting where they carefully considered and unanimously rejected. The
minutes from the meeting indicate that directors were fully aware that a sale rather than a
distribution of the DLJ shares might result in the realization of a substantial income tax savings
The board rejected this due to countervailing considerations
They acted appropriately by meeting as a board and having a valid business decision for their reason
NOTE that the duty of care is process orientated. If a board in its decision making is fully informed
on an issue and if it deliberates fully and has a rational business purpose for its decision, it is likely
that the board’s actions will be upheld if challenged in the absence of gross negligence
What is the relevance of the court’s comments that 4 of 20 directors were officers and members of the
American Express Executive Incentive Compensation Plan?
Plaintiff shareholders had raised a highly speculative claim of self-dealing. The basis of this claim
was that the directors stood to profit from their decision to distribute the devalued stock because
their compensation was tied to net earnings
This in essence was a duty of loyalty claim which the court rejected
The court rejected it because only 4 of the 20 company directors were inside directors who might
have profited based on the claim and there was no evidence of domination or control of other board
members by those few who might have been impacted
Conclusion?
In this case it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have failed as a matter of law to make out an
actionable claim. Accordingly, the motion by the defendants for summary judgment and dismissal of
the complaint is granted
o Cash Out Merger
One type of corporate combination
In this transaction, an acquiring company pays shareholders of target company the value of their shares
Target company is merged out of existence and shareholders have no interest in any company that results
from the merger
Shareholders’ interests of the target company are, in principle, protected by fiduciary duties of directors
o Merger Approval Procedures (there are 2 separate levels of approval that are needed)
DGCL §251(b): BOARD APPROVAL
The board of each merging corporation shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger
and declaring its advisability
DGCL §251(c): SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL (even though shareholders have generally given up their
control rights, they are still able to have a vote when it comes to merger transactions)
The merger agreement shall be submitted to shareholders for approval if recommended by the board
Majority of shares entitled to vote must approve the merger
If approved by requisite number of shareholders, the merger agreement (or certificate of merger) is
then filed and the merger becomes effective
o Management by Board of Directors (steps needed for valid board voting)
DGCL §141(a): BOARD AUTHORITY
Business and affairs of corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors
DGCL §141(b): BOARD COMPOSITION & ACTION
A board is composed of one or more members
o This number is fixed in bylaws or certificate of incorporation
In order to have valid board action, there must first be a quorum at the meeting at which action is
considered and then taken by the board of directors
o Quorum = majority of total number of directors
This number can be reduced to 1/3 in the bylaws unless the certificate of
incorporation provides otherwise
o Valid board action consists of a vote of a majority of directors present at a meeting at which
a quorum present
It is possible to require supermajority (larger number) of directors to vote in favor of
the merger in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws
o Shareholder Voting (how do shareholders take action?)
DGCL §216
Majority of shares entitled to vote shall constitute a quorum at a shareholder meeting
o Can reduce to 1/3 if provided in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws
Vote of majority of those present or represented by proxy shall be the act of the shareholders
o Except for election of directors
o Directors can be elected by a plurality vote
o Corporate Voting Under DGCL and Model By-Laws
Recall the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.
What type of voting was necessary to approve the transaction discussed in that case?
o
Whose vote was required?
o
What type of meeting was convened?
o
What were the procedures for calling the meeting?
o
What were the requirements for time and place of meeting?
o
What number of votes was needed for valid action?
o
o Smith v. Van Gorkom
Duty of care case & cash out merger
Case about a merger transaction
Chronology of important events:
8/27/80 & 9/5/80: Senior management & Van Gorkom discuss sale/leveraged buyout of TransUnion;
CFO & COO ran the numbers at $50 & $60/share
o The transaction used as a basis for running these numbers was a completely different
transaction from what was approved by the board of directors of TransUnion
o Leveraged buyout = a purchase of a company (sometimes purchased by a group of insiders)
which is financed by a relatively small amount of equity and a large amount of debt, which
provides the leverage. Often other assets of the company will be sold to pay off these debts
o The number of $50-$60 a share had to do with whether or not the company could borrow
enough money to pay the existing shareholders that amount of stock in the leveraged buyout
9/13/80: Van Gorkom meets with Pritzker & offers him TransUnion at $55/share; the offer included
$17 premium per share over market price
o The current market price of TransUnion was $38/share
9/15/80-9/19/80: Pritzker expresses interest in the offer to sell TransUnion
o This was subject to conditions
o It was subject to his ability to get financing, to a lock-up option and to board approval by
TransUnion within 3 days
Lock-up option = it would be an agreement by TransUnion that would allow Mr.
Pritzker to buy 1M shares at $38 per share so assuming the shares would have been
sold to someone else for $55 a share it would lock the price for him of $17 premium
per share or a total of $17M
9/20/80: Van Gorkom felt under pressure to get board approval for the deal and convened meeting of
senior management at 11 AM where he discussed the proposed deal (many were not happy); this
meeting was followed by board meeting at noon
o At the board meeting, it was requested that the board members proposed to accept the
proposed merger and vote in favor
o They were given no documentation of a merger agreement or a letter of intent
Letter of intent = non-binding commitment
o No valuation study presented to board
This means there was no information presented to the board about the $55 per share
price that V had thrown out to Pritzker
o Board approved after 2 hour meeting subject to conditions:
Reserve right to accept better offer during market test period
Market test period = mechanism in which TransUnion would be given the
opportunity to solicit other bids and to compare them to the deal with
Pritzker
Retain the ability to share proprietary information about TransUnion with other
potential bidders
10/8/80: Board meeting convened and approved proposed amendments to Merger Agreement sight
unseen; Salomon Bros. Retained to solicit offers for 3 month market test period
o Amendment signed by Van Gorkom were not consistent with authority granted by the board
o Also no documentation on merger agreement
o No other viable offers were made
o The board approved the merger and approved the amendments to the merger
Remember that shareholder approval is also required for a merger to be effective
2/10/81: Shareholders approve Pritzker merger proposal
o They were sent information about the merger and asked to vote in favor of the merger
o Some shareholders weren’t happy with the deal because of the $55 per share price and sue
Shareholders now sue for rescission and damages against directors
After trial, court grants judgment for defendant directors
What is the issue on appeal?
Whether the actions of the board were subject to protection under the business judgement rule
This required the court to consider whether the board met the requisite standard of the fiduciary duty
of care
Whether the board fulfilled its fiduciary duty of care by adequately informing themselves prior to
making a business decision of all material information reasonably available to be afforded the
presumption of the business judgment rule
What presumption must the plaintiffs overcome to prevail on their claim?
The presumption of the business judgment rule
What is the standard for fiduciary duty of care articulated by the court?
A director has a duty under DGCL §251(b), along with his fellow directors, to act in an informed
and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting
the proposal to the shareholders. It must use all material information that is reasonably available
Does the action of the Board meet the standard for fiduciary duty of care?
The court analyzed this looking at 2 separate positions in time
Analysis of September 20 meeting: Was the approval process for the merger agreement used by the
Board acceptable?
o The court says no
o The merger process was not acceptable because the board did not act with due care and
therefore the decision was not protected by the business judgement rule
o The board did not reach an informed business decision to sell the company because the
directors didn’t adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom’s role in forcing the sale of
the company and in establishing the per share purchasing price
o The directors were uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the company
o Given these circumstances, the directors were, at a min, grossly negligent in approving the
sale of the company upon two hours of consideration, without prior notice, and without the
exigency of a crisis or emergency
o DEFECTS IN THE BOARD PROCESS:
No prior notice at the meeting
No written documentation of terms of merger agreement
No valuation study or an appraisal of the value of shares
Analysis of post-September 20 conduct: Was the merger agreement amended to allow for a market
test to occur?
o The court says no
o The merger agreement was not amended to allow for a market test to occur
o The market test period was actually reduced, not extended
o There was no evidence that the merger agreement had been effectively amended to give the
board freedom to put TransUnion up for public auction for a higher price
What was the holding?
The directors of TransUnion breached their fiduciary duty to their shareholders
o (1) by their failure to inform themselves of all information reasonably available to them and
relevant to their decision to recommend the Pritzker merger and
o (2) by their failure to disclose all material information such as a reasonable shareholder
would consider important in deciding whether to approve the Pritzker offer
On remand, the court of chancery shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the fair value of
the shares represented by the plaintiffs’ class, based on the intrinsic value of TransUnion on 9/20/80
Thereafter, an award of damages may be entered to the extent that the fair value of TransUnion
exceeds $55 per share
Shareholder Ratification
Shareholders voted to approve the transaction upon the recommendation of the Board and they did
approve the merger upon the vote
o 70% voted in favor and only 7% voted against; the rest didn’t vote
o Shareholder ratification is sometimes used to uphold a transaction that is under attack and
might otherwise be struck down by a court
What is the argument that this protects the transaction from attack based on a flawed Board
procedure?
o Because the overwhelming majority of shareholders liked the price of $55 per share,
transaction should therefore be upheld on a theory of shareholder ratification
o Even though there was flawed board procedure, this argument would try to save the
transaction from attack and uphold the transaction because the shareholders agreed with the
price
Does that argument work in this case to protect the merger?
o The court doesn’t accept this argument because it believed that even though the shareholders
voted in favor of the merger price, the vote shouldn’t be considered as valid ratification to
save the transaction because the shareholders didn’t receive full and fair disclosure of the
underlying facts which they were supposed to base their decision
How was this provision (DGCL §141(e)) used by the defendants in this case?
Defendants argued that they based their decision on reports of senior officers at the board meetings
and therefore they should be entitled to rely on this provision
They tried to say that they relied on the report given by Van Gorkom in the 9/20 meeting and on
other reports presented there
Can directors rely on this provision (DGCL §141(e))?
The court says no
There is no evidence on any report that the Pritzker proposal was presented to the board
The oral report was uninformed because VG hadn’t seen the agreement when he gave the report
The CEO’s statement was irrelevant because it didn’t purport to be a valuation study
What would qualify?
The court says that at a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred by DGCL §141(e), it
must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which a board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled
to good faith, not blind, reliance
What was the main point made by the dissenting judge?
He argued that the board was composed of experienced business people who knew the company well
and knew business well and their collective experience substituted for adequate information and
deliberation with regard to the merger approval decision
What happened after remand?
The case was ultimately settled for $23M which was approved by the trial court
$10M came from insurance covering the directors and almost $11M came from the Pritzkers. The
rest was paid by the directors but Van Gorkom paid substantially more than the 5 outside directors
Premium over Market Price = $17 share
Why were the plaintiffs unhappy with receiving a premium over market price?
o Fair price versus highest possible price
o Duty of directors to obtain highest possible price in sale of company
o Although the $55 per share price was higher than the market price, there was no valuation
study conducted so the premium over market price value could have been even higher had
this study been conducted
o The premium alone doesn’t provide an adequate basis of whether or not the price is fair
o The court criticized the board for failing to investigate how the price of $55 per share was
arrived at because the usual procedure used by companies is not to pull a number out or to
base it on an internal analysis for a completely different kind of corporate transaction
o The usual procedure is to obtain an evaluation study by outside experts and a fairness
opinion by those experts that will protect the shareholders to make sure they are receiving a
good price for their shares and it also protects the board of directors if they are sued
Contrast facts of Cinerama case
o Use of fairness opinion by outside expert to justify price
o The board approved a merger transaction without much consideration
o They were found to be in violation of fiduciary duty of due care
o However, despite the procedural defects, the price was found to be fair so there was no harm
and no cause of action
o Good Faith Reliance on Records and Reports
DGCL §141(e): In performing their duties, board members may rely in good faith on records of corporation
and on information, opinions, reports, statements presented to the corporation by corporation’s officers or
employees
o Limits on Director Liability
DGCL, §102(b)(7)
Certificate of incorporation may contain provision eliminating or limiting personal liability of
director for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty
EXCEPTIONS
o Duty of loyalty
o Lack of good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violation of law
o Violation of §174 on dividends
o Transactions in which director derived improper personal benefit
o Francis v. United Jersey Bank
An aspect of the duty of care which requires the board members to exercise oversight
Facts/Background
Pritchard & Baird was a reinsurance broker
o Reinsurance = business of spreading insurance risk
o Ceding company that has insured a risk assigns some or all of that risk to reinsurer along
with share of the premiums to the reinsurer
o Reinsurance broker acts as intermediary and receives funds from ceding company that are to
be paid to reinsurer
Pritchard & Baird went bankrupt
Lawsuit brought by trustee in bankruptcy on behalf of creditors of Pritchard & Baird seeking to
recover money that had been misappropriated by two if its directors (Charles Pritchard Jr. and
William Jr) against the estate of another director, Mrs. Pritchard
How did Mrs. Pritchard become a shareholder and director?
She inherited a 48% interest from her husband
He was the largest shareholder
She was then elected as a director
Her sons were also directors
How did the misappropriation of funds occur?
The sons withdrew large sums of money from the corporation in the form of loans and never repaid
them
In this context, misappropriated means that the funds were stolen by the sons
What type of fiduciary duty claim was asserted against Mrs. Pritchard’s estate?
Here, it was a breach of the fiduciary duty of care
She had a duty to protect the clients of the corporation against policies and practices that would
result in misappropriation of money in the corporation and she breached that duty
In most cases involving fiduciary duties of directors, the claim is made on behalf of the corporation
and its shareholders. Here trustee in bankruptcy is representing the interests of creditors.
What was the basis for claiming that fiduciary duties were owed to creditors in this case?
The reinsurance industry involves holding funds in trusts so there is an extra trust involved that the
directors will not sanction the conversion of funds
Certain directors owe duties to creditors even when the corporation is solvent
The directors of banking corporations owe duties to depositors who are creditors and the directors of
nonbanking corporations also owe duties when the corporation holds funds of others in trust
Financial institution directors have an enhanced fiduciary duty because they are holding funds for
customers
What is the applicable standard of care for someone in Mrs. Pritchard’s position?
Good faith and due care
The standard is the level of diligence that an ordinarily prudent director would exercise in the
management of his own affairs
The nature and extend of due care depends on the nature of the business, the size of the business, and
its financial resources
Bank directors are held to a heightened standard of care
What steps should Pritchard have taken to discharge her duty to corporation?
One duty was to acquire a rudimentary understanding of the business of the corporation
Another duty is a continued obligation to keep informed about the activities of the corporation and
stay current with corporate activities
They should attend meetings and read the board book and other information relevant about the
company
Directors must not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and then claim that because they did not
see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to look
Directors must maintain familiarity with the financial status of the corporation by a regular review of
financial statements
What did Mrs. Pritchard do in her capacity as a director of Pritchard & Baird?
She is a case study in what not to do when you are a director of a business
She essentially did nothing
She was passive and never went to meetings
She never looked at any of the financial statements. If she had done so, she might have noticed that
her sons were stealing from the company
She didn’t know the business and didn’t make any efforts to learn anything about it
She knew her sons were taking money but did nothing to prevent that from happening
Although she was in poor health and mainly bedridden, the court did not accept her condition as an
excuse to failing to meet her fiduciary duties as a director of the company
How did her behavior fall short of the expectations for directors under the duty of care?
She discharged none of her responsibilities
What should a director do if she discovers corporate misconduct, such as evidence of misappropriation in the
financial statements?
Directors have a duty to inquire further if they notice evidence of wrongdoing
They have a duty to object to such conduct and to take corrective action
And they have a duty to resign if the corporation decides to not do anything about the misconduct
Sometimes directors might have to seek legal advice to take reasonable steps to prevent the illegal
conduct by others within the corporation
Note discussion of proximate cause at the end of the case.
How can a director absolve herself of liability for corporate misconduct that she discovers?
o She should have informed other directors of the impropriety and voting for a proper course
of action
o A director who is present at a board meeting is presumed to concur in corporate action taken
at the meeting unless his dissent is entered in the minutes of the meeting or filed promptly
after adjournment
How did Mrs. Pritchard’s inaction lead to a loss in this case?
o She didn’t attend meetings
o She wasn’t familiar with the business
o She may have known that money was being taken out without being repaid but she failed to
take any action to stop it
The court says that by failing to take action, this constituted gross negligence
o To be liable, her negligence must be a proximate cause of the loss
o The court found that her passiveness, along with other factors, were in fact a proximate
cause of the company’s loss
o The fact that she was ill was no excuse
Corporate directors may usually rely on lawyers and accountants BUT
Must inquire further if financial statements disclosed problems on their face
Must object and take corrective action
May have to resign to avoid liability if misconduct continues
o In re Caremark Derivative Litigation
Duty of due care for corporate directors
Two lines of cases for duty of care
Liability for directorial decisions that are grossly negligent
o Duty to act in good faith and on a rational basis and a good process in decision making
Duty to monitor
o Requires boards to oversee the operations of the company and act to prevent illegal conduct
from occurring
o Corporate boards have affirmative duty to put corporation information and reporting system
in place to assure compliance with laws = COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
o Importance increased due to increased regulatory requirements and federal sentencing
guidelines
o The court said:
A director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system which the board concludes is adequate
exists
Failure to do so under some circumstances may in theory at least render a director
liable for losses caused by noncompliance with applicable legal standards
Two Settlements
United States lawsuit
o Basis for suit were alleged violations of Anti-Referral Payments Law (ARPL)
o Resulted in guilty plea and payments of fines
Shareholder lawsuit
o Breach of duty of care for failing to monitor and detect violation of ARPL
Facts
Caremark was involved in the sale of healthcare services and it collected much of its revenues from
insurance companies and the federal government
Under the ARPL it could not legally pay doctors to refer patients to it but it could legally hire
doctors under consulting agreements and because of research grants
To help ensure compliance with the ARPL, Caremark undertook internal audits published warnings
in its employee manual and conducted training sessions
In 1994 the federal government prosecuted Caremark for criminal violations of the ARPL and the
government argued that some of the consulting agreements and research grants with the doctors and
payments that were made as a result were disguised kickbacks for patient referrals
In 1995 Caremark settled this action eventually and paid $250M in fines
In 1995 several shareholders filed derivative suits against Caremark against its directors for fiduciary
duty breaches involving the ARPL they then negotiated a settlement under which the directors paid
nothing but Caremark promised to improve
The plaintiffs’ attorneys collected about $1M
This case is before the court for review of that proposed settlement
The question is whether or not the court should approve what the parties agreed to
How did Caremark allegedly violate the ARPL?
They had contracts with other physicians in the form of consulting agreements and research grants
and patient management agreements
These physicians recommended Caremark’s products and services to their patients
So the question is whether these fees or payments made to the physicians actually payments for
Medicare referrals in violation of the ARPL?
How did the Caremark directors allegedly violate their fiduciary duty of care?
They failed to adequately supervise the conduct of employees who were engaged in the kickback
arrangements and they failed to institute corrective measures thereby exposing the company to
lawsuits by the government
The directors allowed the situation to develop and continue which exposed the corporation to legal
liability and in doing so, they failed to be active monitors of the corporation’s performance
What were the steps taken by Board to comply with ARPL in response to HHS OIG investigation?
The launched an investigation
Discontinued management fees to doctors for services to Medicare and Medicaid patients
Internal audit plans and external audits were reviewed by the Board Ethics Committee
Employee ethics handbook
Ethics hotline
Local branch managers needed home office approval for disbursements involving healthcare
providers
The CFO became a compliance officer
What were the terms of the settlement?
Caremark will not pay compensation to third parties or split fees with physicians in exchange for
referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients
Board will discuss material changes in government health regulations semiannually
Caremark will remove personnel placed in medical facilities for purposes of providing remuneration
in exchange for patient referrals involving Medicare and Medicaid
What is the standard for review of the settlement agreement?
The issue before the court was whether the above settlement agreement should be approved
The standard for review is whether the settlement was fair and reasonable
It must protect the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders because they will be barred
from further litigation if the settlement is approved
The court must take into account the conduct of the directors in making its determination of whether
the settlement was fair and reasonable
Why did the court approve the settlement in this case?
Yes the court approved the settlement
They did so even though it involved a series of steps that were simply adding on to the compliance
steps that the company had taken earlier and did not involve any payment by the director's because
of their misconduct
This appears to have been a weak case on the merits and the court acknowledged that the
Corporation already had put a compliance program of some sort into place and the changes in
corporate practice that were a condition of the settlement were not very significant
But still the court felt that they were acceptable because the claims in the derivative lawsuit did not
find evidentiary support in the record
They were susceptible to a motion to dismiss meaning the case would likely not have gone forward
on the merits
The court mentioned a couple of points about monitoring and oversight and directed by Billy
o They stated that in order to find a violation of the duty of care by failure to control
employees
o It would be necessary to show that the directors knew of the violation of law and they took
no steps to prevent such loss and that there was proximate causation to the loss complained
of
o Here there is no evidence that the directors were involved in, or knew of, the misconduct
o The misconduct related to a specific regional office and the directors appear to have been
unaware of such misconduct
o On a failure to monitor claim, only a systematic failure to monitor can lead to liability
o Here there was no evidence that they failed to monitor systematically, so those compliance
program elements that they put into place essentially worked in favor of the directors
This case points out a couple of important things:
(1) the two branches of the duty of due care
o The duty not to make decisions in a grossly negligent manner
Directors must act in good faith in the decisions they make and they must have good
process and must review reasonably available information and must deliberate
before making a decision and they must have a rational business reason that explains
the decision
o The duty to monitor/the duty of oversight
To make sure illegal conduct is not occurring
(2) the value of the compliance program
o Discussed in the opinion
o Important because for a corporation to be a good corporate citizen, it must comply with the
law and there must be a system in place so the directors can oversee what is going on at all
levels of the business and make sure that such illegal conduct doesn’t occur
o Compliance programs can also be used defensively (as in this case)
o Bayer v. Beran
Fiduciary duty of loyalty and conflict of interest
Facts
This is a case about the corporate fiduciary duty of loyalty and involves a Corporation called
Celanese Corporation which launched a radio advertising campaign featuring classical music an
opera singers it was called the Celanese Hour
According to the plaintiff, why did the defendant directors act wrongfully?
The corporate directors were guilty of negligence, waste and improvidence for launching a $1M
advertisement campaign which was larger than previous ad campaigns
They also complained that the corporate directors were negligent in selecting the advertisement
campaign format (radio) and renewing the contract for that campaign
Plaintiffs also complained about the motivation of the board of directors stating that they were
motivated by noncorporate purpose in causing the radio program to be undertaken and in expending
large sums of money
o This noncorporate purpose was employing an opera singer who was married to the president
of the company who is also one of the directors
How did the defendant directors justify their actions?
They claimed that it was needed to distinguish their brand name product from ordinary brands being
produced by other manufacturers
So they needed to use a more expensive advertising platform as opposed to expanding advertisement
in print sources
NOTE: the FTC required that all Celanese products were to be designated and labeled rayon and the
name Celanese could not be used alone
Why did the Business Judgment Rule fail to shield the board decision from judicial scrutiny?
Normally launching an advertisement campaign would be considered an ordinary business decision
that falls under the protection of the business judgment rule
But here the court does not invoke the business judgment rule
This was because the plaintiffs, in their complaint, alleged a conflict of interest on the part of the
board due to the employment of the president’s wife
Question for the court?
Whether the advertisement campaign was adopted to benefit the corporation or to benefit the singing
career of the president’s wife
What standard does the court use for reviewing the transaction?
Where there is an alleged conflict of interest on the part of the board of directors, the business
judgment rule will not apply and the court will instead apply a different standard of review
Instead, the court will apply rigorous scrutiny
The court is scrutinizing the transaction to determine whether the action of directors was intended or
calculated to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company, and in
a manner inconsistent with its interests
Who has the burden of proof?
The burden is on the director not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its
inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein
What is the court’s holding about the alleged board misconduct?
There was no breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty
There was no evidence that the program was designed to promote the singer’s career or that she
received any special treatment
She received less than other artists, she had a standard form contract, and there was no special
attention given to her performance in the advertisement
The court concluded that this advertisement campaign was necessary to better distinguish the
company’s product from other competitors
Although there was some benefit to the singer, this was okay because there was also some benefit to
the corporation and the advertisement served a useful corporate purpose and the company received
the full benefit of the advertisement
What was the defect in the board procedure for reviewing the contract?
The alleged defect was that the board acted informally and it did not meet and pass a resolution
approving the advertisement campaign through normal corporate procedures and formal channels
This was alleged to make the transaction illegal because boards are required to follow corporate
formalities
Does it void the transaction?
The court says that this defect in the procedure does not void the transaction
The court states that the board was very closely connected and had acted informally in the past and
were successful in their business decision making on behalf of the corporation so there was no
problem with the informal procedure
This may not always be the case though
The board ratified the campaign and in doing so, this vote served as a proper ratification of all board
actions related to the advertisement campaign
o Conflict of Interest Transactions
NYBCL §713: Covers contracts between
(1) corporation and
(2) a director of that corporation or another corporation in which director has substantial financial
interest or is a director or officer (interested director transaction)
NYBCL §713: No contract or other transaction involving an interested director is void or voidable because
the interested director was present at a meeting and voted in favor if:
There was material fact disclosure of a contract or other transaction and valid board approval
without counting vote of interested director the contract can be upheld even though there was a
conflict of interest OR
Disclosure of material facts and approval of the contract by a valid vote of the shareholders OR
If it is not possible to get disclosure and valid board approval or disclosure and contract approval by
shareholders, then it is up to the parties to show that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the
corporation
NOTE:
o Interested director = between a corporation and one or more of its directors or between a
corporation in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers or between a
corporation and another corporation in which a director has a substantial financial interest
o Ratification
DGCL, §144(a): Interested director or officer transaction not void or voidable if
(1) material fact disclosure and disinterested director approval; OR
(2) material fact disclosure and shareholder approval; OR
(3) contract is fair to the corporation
o Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc.
Corporate opportunity doctrine which is considered a subcategory of the corporate fiduciary duty of loyalty
Cast of characters
Broz
o President and sole shareholder of RFBC
Has a financial interest in this company
o Also a board member of CIS
As a board member, owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation
When he learned about the sale from being the president of RFBC, he informally
approached the board of CIS about the potential sale
RFB Cellular Inc. (RFBC)
o Engaged in the business of providing cell phone service
o Owned Michigan 4 cellular license
o Competitor of CIS
Mackinac Cellular Corp. (Mackinac)
o Another cell phone service provider
o Interested in selling one of its cellular licenses
o Sought to divest Michigan 2 cellular license
o Used D&A/R to seek a buyer
Daniels & Associates/Rhodes (D&A/R) – broker
o Contacted RFBC about Michigan 2 license acquisition
o They did not contact CIS because CIS was having financial problems
Cellular Information Systems Inc. (CIS)
o Treibick, Bloch, Schiff rejected Michigan 2 cellular license
These were the 3 individuals who Broz contacted about the potential offer
They rejected because of the company’s financial issues
Broz made the assumption that CIS was not interested in the offer because of this
The court says that this was not Broz acting in bad faith and that it was not
necessary to have a formal presentation of the potential transaction presented to the
board and then rejected so he could go ahead and purchase the license on behalf of
his own corporation RFBC
o Competitor of RFBC
Pricellular: launched tender offer for CIS
o Tender offer = another kind of corporate transaction; it is an offer to buy shares of stock
from shareholders who are invited to tender (sell) their shares to the offeror for purchase at a
specified price within some specified period of time; often the completion of the transaction
is made contingent on the offeror receiving some specified number of shares, sufficient, for
example, to give it control of the target corporation
o Used as a way to take over, control, and ultimately merge the target company
o There was ultimately a bidding war and Broz outbid Pricellular and he is awarded the
license
o After Broz acquired the license, Pricellular was able to complete its tender offer of CIS
making it now the owner of that company
o The acquisition is being challenged as a violation of the corporate opportunity doctrine
What was the alleged wrongdoing in this case?
Broz was offered the license and he took that opportunity
What legal issue must the court address?
Whether there was an unlawful taking of a corporate opportunity by Broz when he acquired the
license
What is the legal standard for evaluating the alleged wrongful conduct?
The court used the holding described in Guth v. Loft
This stated that if there is presented to a corporate officer or director a business opportunity which
the corporation is financially able to undertake, is, from its nature, in the line of the corporation’s
business and is of practical advantage to it, is one in which the corporation has an interest or a
reasonable expectancy, and, by embracing the opportunity, the self-interest of the officer or director
will be brought into conflict with that of the corporation, the law will not permit him to seize the
opportunity for himself
4 factors:
o (1) Financial ability of the company to take the business opportunity
o (2) The business opportunity must be in the same line of business
o (3) The company must have an interest or expectancy in that opportunity and
o (4) Taking the opportunity by the corporate director would create a conflict between the self-
interest and the interest of the corporation
o If all factors are met, there is a corporate opportunity and the individual cannot take the
opportunity for himself
o Exception is if the corporation, realizing the opportunity is out there, has rejected the
opportunity
2 things need to happen:
There must be an analysis by the corporate officer or director who is offered
the opportunity as to whether the corporate opportunity even exists &
whether these 4 factors are met.
o If the answer is no, then the corporate officer or director is free to
go ahead to take the opportunity for him/herself
If there is a corporate opportunity, if that opportunity is presented to the
board and the board rejects it, then the corporate officer or director would be
fine to take the opportunity for himself
o The opportunity for the board to reject is a kind of ratification
What is the court’s conclusion?
Broz did not breach his fiduciary duties to CIS
What reasons support its conclusions?
Financial ability (no)
o CIS was not financially capable of exploiting the license opportunity
Same line of business (yes)
o It could be said that the opportunity was within the CIS line of business
Interest or expectancy (no)
o There was no interest in the license
o CIS was in the process of divesting its cellular license holdings
o CIS was not interested in the license
Taking opportunity would create conflict between self-interest and interest of corporation (no)
o There was no conflict
o Broz’s interest in acquiring and profiting from the license created no duties that were
inimical to his obligations to CIS
o He took care not to usurp any opportunity which CIS was willing and able to pursue
Was there an obligation to consider Pricellular post-acquisition plans for Cellular?
No
Broz was under no duty to consider the contingent and uncertain plans of Pricellular in reaching his
determination of how to proceed
He only needed to look at the situation at the time, not having to take into consideration what might
happen later on
By requiring him to do so would deprive Broz of his right to engage in business affairs outside of his
or her fiduciary capacity
o Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
Delaware Test (Guth v. Loft)
Financial ability
Same line of business
Interest or expectancy
Taking opportunity would create conflict between self-interest and interest of corporation
Persons covered by doctrine = corporate officer or director
Formal presentation to the board & rejection
Not required before individual can take opportunity
But may act as a safe harbor (process would have avoided an allegation that he violated some legal
principle, obligation, or requirement)
o In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation
Combining the corporate opportunity doctrine and duty of loyalty
Background
Shareholders of eBay filed derivative suits against directors and officers for usurping corporate
opportunities.
Named as defendants were 5 different officers and directors of eBay
Demand was excused as futile.
What was the business relationship between eBay and the investment banking firm of Goldman Sachs?
eBay had conducted a number of financial transactions using the investment Bank of Goldman Sachs
as its financial advisor
One important transaction was called an initial public offering in which eBay sold its shares to the
public for the first time
There were additional business relationships between these two companies including other offerings
of securities and an acquisition by eBay of PayPal
For these services eBay had paid Goldman Sachs over $8M in a series of transactions
In addition, another relationship between these two entities that involved a practice called spinning
o Spinning is now considered illegal and at the time it was a gray area of legality
o It is also viewed as being an unethical practice
o Spinning is a practice in which an investment bank (in this case it was Goldman Sachs)
authors shares of the company's initial public offering to senior executives of another
company (in this case it would be eBay) in exchange for future business directed to the
investment bank
o So in this case there were officers and directors of eBay who were named as defendants in
the lawsuit and those individuals had received allocations of initial public offering shares
from other companies
o This was in consideration of eBay's business to enhance Goldman Sach’s chance of future
eBay business
o This was considered a lucrative business opportunity from the perspective of the officers and
directors who receive these shares that had been issued in the initial public offering
o This is because initial public offering shares are often undervalued and underpriced because
there is a concern that if the public offering price is too high it will not lead to a successful
public offering
o Because of this, the shares that were offered are often lower than what the ultimate share
price will turn out to be so once the initial public offering shares have been sold then there is
trading in those shares in the secondary market
o In that secondary market trading the share price often pops up from the initial public
offering price so these transactions involving spinning
If you're able as an officer or director of eBay to obtain these shares through the spinning practice
then you can later resell those shares into the market at a higher price and receive a profit
This was allegedly why Goldman Sachs providing this opportunity to the select group of officers and
directors of eBay it was in the hopes that eBay would continue to hire Goldman Sachs to be its
financial advisor or what it's called what is called its under writer in connection with future offerings
of securities
What was the alleged corporate opportunity in this case?
The allocation of initial public offering shares of other companies to this select group of individuals
who were executives of eBay
How did the court analyze the corporate opportunity claim?
The court uses the same analysis as Broz and applies the Guth v. Loft factors
Financial ability
o Yes
Same line of business
o Yes
o eBay is an online auction platform but investing was also a line of business for eBay because
they have invested more than $550M in equity and debt securities
Interest or expectancy
o Yes
o The facts alleged suggest that investing was integral to eBay’s cash management strategies
and a significant part of its business
Taking opportunity would create conflict between self-interest and interest of corporation
o Yes
o This was a risky investment and eBay was never given the opportunity to turn down the
allocations as too risky
Based on this analysis, how should the defendants have acted when presented with the opportunity?
They should have offered the shares to eBay as a corporate entity itself rather than buying the shares
for their own accounts
How did the court respond to the defendants’ criticism that every advantageous investment that comes to an
officer or director will be considered a corporate opportunity?
The court rejects this argument by the defendants
The court says that this was a unique below-value investment opportunity that were offered by
Goldman Sachs to the insider defendants as financial inducements to maintain and secure corporate
business
This was not an instance where a broker offered advice to a director about an investment in the
marketable security
What alternative theory could also be used as a basis for liability of the defendants, according to the court?
The alternative theory would be to rely on the duty of loyalty of an agent
This is because there is a duty of an agent to account for profits obtained personally in connection
with transactions related to his or her company
The corporate opportunity doctrine is considered a sub branch of the duty of loyalty
o Corporation Review Q#4
George, VP Marketing for Zapco Inc., offered marketing opportunity for voice recognition system for PCs
while testing games at arcade. Hired as marketing consultant by software engineers who formed Wordco Inc.
Assume Zapco is incorporated in Delaware.
Has George violated the corporate opportunity doctrine?
Is there a corporate opportunity?
Did George act in a lawful manner?
If not, what should he have done?
o Sinclair v. Levien
Fiduciary duties of dominate shareholders
Cast of Characters
Sinclair Oil Corporation (Sinclair)
o In the oil business
o Operating as a holding company meaning operations are conducted through its subsidiaries
o Sinven and International are 2 of its subsidiaries
Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company (Sinven)
o Set up to develop Sinclair’s oil business
o 97% owned by Sinclair
o 3% owned by minority shareholders
Sinclair International Oil Company (International)
o Set up to coordinate Sinclair’s operations
o 100% owned by Sinclair
A contract was entered into by the 2 subsidiaries
o Under the contract, Sinven agreed to sell all of its crude and refined products to International
at specified prices with payment due on receipt
o The terms of the contract were subject to max and min quantities and prices
What were the alleged wrongful acts of defendant?
Plaintiff is seeking an accounting for damages because of 3 activities it alleges to be wrongful acts
(1) related to the payment of dividends by Sinven to its shareholders
o It was claimed that this payment of dividends was excessive and it prevented Sinven from
using the money that was paid out for other purposes such as expansion of the business
activities of the company
o It was excessive because they were in excess of Sinven’s earnings over a 6 year period
however they stayed within the legal limitations
DGCL §170 restricts payment of dividends out of surplus/net profits of the
corporation
o Plaintiff also claimed that these dividends were forced by Sinclair, the 97% owner, for
improper purposes with improper motive
(2) related to allocation of business opportunities by Sinclair among its various subsidiaries
o Sinclair had a business strategy in which it had operations in many different locations
around the world and it had a practice of allocating business opportunities based on where
those opportunities were located geographically
o Plaintiff claims that Sinven was denied business opportunities for expansion
o There were business opportunities that the minority shareholders thought should have been
allocated but weren’t
(3) related to breach of the contract between the two subsidiaries
o Plaintiff alleges a breach of contract in 2 respects
o First, although the contract called for payment on receipt, International’s payments lagged as
much as 30 days after receipt
o Second, the contract required International to purchase at least a fixed minimum amount of
crude and refined products from Sinven but International did not comply with this
requirement
Who is alleged to have breached fiduciary duties in this case?
Sinclair, the parent company, is alleged to have breached its fiduciary duties in the 3 wrongful acts
above
NOTE: Derivative suits usually involve claims of breach of fiduciary duty by directors.
Why is the parent deemed to owe fiduciary duties to its subsidiary in this case?
Why didn’t the minority shareholders go against the directors of Sinven claiming that they had
breached their fiduciary duties? (this would be the normal situation)
Normally it would be the directors that are required to protect Sinven against this alleged
wrongdoing because they are bound by fiduciary duties
But the court says that the directors of Sinven were not truly independent of Sinclair because it
appears that Sinclair placed the directors of Sinven into their position and all of the directors were
officers or directors or employees of Sinclair or some other Sinclair related company
Because of this domination, it is the parent company that owes Sinven fiduciary duties directly
What standard of review does the plaintiff urge upon the court?
The test of intrinsic fairness which involved a high degree of fairness
Where does the burden of proof fall?
The burden is on Sinclair to prove, subject to careful judicial scrutiny, that its transactions with
Sinven were objectively fair
This means that Sinclair must prove that each action was fair to the corporation as a whole, not just
to Sinclair. It must also be fair to the 3% minority shareholders
What standard of review does the defendant urge upon the court?
Business judgment rule under which the court will not interfere with the judgement of a board of
directors unless there is a showing of gross and palpable overreaching
Where does the burden of proof fall?
Burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the transaction should not be subject to the business judgment
rule standard because the transaction amounts to waste or some egregious action such as fraud
What standard of review does the court actually use to evaluate the claims?
The court decides to use an intrinsic fairness standard only in a situation where reviewing the facts
of the alleged wrongdoing, the court sees self-dealing on the part of the dominate shareholder
Self-dealing in this context would mean that Sinclair, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary,
causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that Sinclair receives something from the subsidiary to the
exclusion of the minority shareholders of the subsidiary
What is the holding?
Payment of dividends
o The court says that there was no problem because Sinven stayed within the requirements of
DGCL §170 and the court didn’t think there was self-dealing because the minority received
a proportionate share of the dividends that were paid out
o This means that Sinclair did not engage in self-dealing because they did not receive
something that the minority shareholders did not receive
Denial of business opportunities
o The court says that they cannot find anything in the facts brought by plaintiff to prove this
o They prove no business opportunities which came to Sinven independently and which
Sinclair either took to itself or denied to Sinven
o All of Sinven’s operations have been conducted in Venezuela, and Sinclair had a policy of
exploiting its oil properties located in different countries by subsidiaries located in the
particular countries
Breach of contract
o The court does believe there is self-dealing in this instance because Sinclair is the 97%
shareholder in Sinven and 100% shareholder of International so Sinclair got something
based on not enforcing the contract that the 3% minority shareholders did not get because
they have no shares in International
o As a result, the proper standard for the breach of contract claim is the intrinsic fairness
standard so the burden is on defendant to demonstrate that it was fair to Sinven that Sinclair
did not enforce the contract
o The court says that Sinclair is unable to bear its burden and therefore this is a breach of
fiduciary duty
Overall holding
o The court decides to reverse that part of the Chancellor’s order that requires Sinclair to
account to Sinven for damages sustained as a result of dividends paid between 1960 and
1966, and by reason of the denial to Sinven of expansion during that period.
o The court affirms the remaining portion of that order and remand the case for further
proceedings
Note after the case from Pepper v. Litton
A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominate or controlling shareholder or group of shareholders. Their
powers are in trust. Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where
any of their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director
or shareholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent
fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested therein
o Fliegler v. Lawrence
Ratification
Facts
This is a shareholder derivative action brought on behalf of Agua Mines against the officers and
directors of Agua Mines and US Antimony Corporation
Parties
Plaintiff: Agau Mines Inc. (Agau)
o President Lawrence acquired undeveloped antimony properties
o Lawrence offered to transfer properties to Agau, but board decided Agau could not acquire
the properties on an undeveloped basis due to legal and financial problems
Defendants: officers and directors of Agau, United States Antimony Corporation (USAC)
o USAC was formed to acquire antimony properties from Lawrence after the board of Agau
had rejected the opportunity and the majority stock was held by defendants;
o USAC developed the properties and sold to Agau under an Option Agreement
o The same individuals were directors, officers & shareholders of both Agau and USAC
Option Agreement between Agau & USAC
It was an option to purchase by Agau all of USAC including the antimony properties if the
shareholders approved
Upon shareholder approval, Agau was to deliver 800K shares of its own stock in exchange for all of
the shares of USAC and therefore Agau would become the owner of USAC
800K shares was calculated on the basis of reimbursement to USAC shareholders for the costs of the
acquisition value and the cost of developing properties to a point where they would become
commercially viable
Agau board passes a resolution saying they want to exercise the option under this agreement and
they put it to a shareholder vote. A majority of Agau shareholders approved
Once this happened, plaintiff filed this derivative lawsuit to recover the 800K and for an accounting
According to plaintiff, what did the directors do that was wrongful conduct?
The allegation was that the directors and officers of both corporations wrongfully usurped a
corporate opportunity belonging to Agau
Plaintiff also alleged that defendants wrongfully profited by causing Agau to exercise an option to
purchase that opportunity
According to defendants, how does DGCL §144 protect them from the allegations of the plaintiff?
They claim they do not have to prove that there was fairness by reason of shareholder ratification in
the agreement because of this provision
Defendants urge that the transaction is protected by DGCL §144(a)(2) which, they contend, does not
require that ratifying shareholders be disinterested or independent
They also argue that there is no warrant for reading such a requirement into the statute
What is the Gottlieb standard?
The court stated that if there is shareholder ratification of an interested transaction, although less
than unanimous, shifts the burden of proof to an objecting shareholder (plaintiff here) to demonstrate
that the terms are so unequal as to amount to a gift or waste of corporate assets
This standard freshens the atmosphere and a new set of rules are invoked where formal approval has
been given by a majority of independent, fully informed shareholders
Defendants argue:
o The vote of the shareholders were cast by defendants in their capacity as Agau shareholders
o So they were able to get a majority because the interested voters were the same people
named as defendants in the lawsuit
Does the Gottlieb standard apply in this case?
No the court says they don’t read the statute as providing the board immunity for which defendants
contend. It merely removes an interested director cloud when its terms are met and provides against
invalidation of an agreement solely because such a director or officer is involved.
Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness to Agau or removes the transaction from judicial scrutiny
In order to have valid shareholder ratification, you need to have a majority of independent
shareholders who are disinterested but here, only 1/3 of the disinterested shareholders actually voted
What is the burden of proof on the defendants here?
Burden is on defendants to show that the transaction was fair to Agau
Have the defendants met their burden?
Yes
They did prove intrinsic fairness
They entered into a transaction with Agau and Agau got its money’s worth and they got the value of
the property plus cost of development so there is fairness
According to the court, have the defendants acted wrongfully?
Because they are able to establish fairness, the defendants have not acted wrongfully in this case
o Ratification
DGCL §144(a): Interested director/officer transaction not void or voidable if
(1) material fact disclosure and disinterested director approval; or
(2) material fact disclosure and shareholder approval; or
(3) contract is fair
o Full language of DGCL §144(a)
(a) no contract or transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors or offices, or between a
corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which one or more
of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable
solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of
the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or their votes are
counted for such purpose, if:
(1) the material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are
disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in
good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the
disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) the material facts as his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed
or are known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is
specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) the contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved, or
ratified, by the board of directors, a committee, or the shareholders
o CORPORATIONS REVIEW QUESTION #5
Silver Screen Cinema Inc (SSCI)
Sam Golden: President, 30% SH, Director
Board: Golden, Robbins, Lanvin, Wolfe, Greenman
Cable TV Station
Majority owned by Robbins
Robbins Film Inc. (RFI)
Owned by Robbins
Has any SSCI director breached a fiduciary duty?
Did the SSCI directors act properly with respect to corporate procedures?
Alternate set of facts: Was the purchase of the film library properly ratified?
Module 5 Quizzes:
o Quiz 18: Corporate Duty of Care I
In Kamin v. American Express, the court stated that the standard for violation of the directors’ duty of care is
gross negligence. (T/F)
True
In Kamin v. American Express, the court found that the directors fulfilled their duty of care because they
were informed about the options concerning the stock transaction, met to discuss and engaged in
deliberation, and articulated a business reason for their decision. (T/F)
True
Under Delaware law, a merger transaction must be approved by a vote of both the board of directors and the
shareholders of the target corporation, conducted in accordance with the statutory requirements and the
organizational documents of the corporation. (T/F)
True
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the directors were entitled to rely on Van Gorkom’s oral presentation to the board
about the merger transaction in discharging their duty of care, as permitted by §141(e) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law. (T/F)
False
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the court found that the directors fulfilled their duty of care because they were
adequately informed about the intrinsic value of the corporation’s shares. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 19: Corporate Duty of Care II
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the court stated that directors who vote for or concur in corporate action
may become liable for injuries resulting from such action; to avoid liability, a director must dissent and such
objection must be entered in the minutes of the meeting. (T/F)
True
The traditional view is that fiduciary duties are owed by corporate directors to the corporation and its
shareholders; but in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, the court stated that corporate directors also may owe
duties to creditors if the corporation conducts a banking business or holds funds of others in trust. (T/F)
True
According to the court in Francis v. United Jersey Bank, which of the following is NOT required of
corporate directors in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty of care?
Conduct a complete audit of the corporate books and records
According to the court in the Caremark case, duty of care consists of two categories: those involving
potential liability for directorial decisions that are not the product of good faith and rational decision making
and those involving a failure to adequately monitor the activities of the corporation. (T/F)
True
The court in the Caremark case stated that the defendant directors were guilty of a sustained failure to
exercise their duty of oversight of the corporation. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 20: Duty of Loyalty Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
In Bayer v. Beran, the court stated that the advertising campaign was an ordinary business decision of the
board of directors and was therefore protected from judicial scrutiny by the business judgment rule (T/F)
False
Which of the following steps can be used to uphold a contract or transaction involving a director or officer
conflict of interest under statutory law in Delaware?
Any of the following steps:
o Disclosure of the conflict to the board and majority disinterested director approval of the
contract or transaction
o Disclosure of the conflict to the shareholders and shareholder approval of the contract or
transaction
o The contract or transaction is shown to be fair to the corporation as of the time it was
authorized, approved, or ratified
According to the court in Guth v. Loft, which of the following factors is needed for the corporate opportunity
doctrine to apply?
All of the factors are needed:
o The opportunity must be in the same line of business as the corporation
o The corporation must have the financial ability to take the opportunity
o The corporation must have an interest or expectancy in the opportunity
o There is a conflict between the corporate officer’s or director’s self-interest and the best
interests of the corporation
The court in Broz v. Cellular Information Systems held that Broz violated the corporate opportunity doctrine
because he did not formally present the cellular license opportunity to the board members of CIS and receive
their rejection in writing. (T/F)
False
The court in the eBay Shareholders Litigation case held that the corporate opportunity doctrine did not apply
to the allocation of initial public offering shares to eBay officers and directors because investing in
marketable securities was not in the same line of business as the company, which is engaged in running an
online auction platform for merchandise. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 21: Duty of Dominant Shareholders and Ratification
According to the court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, which of the following owed fiduciary duties to
Sinclair Venezuelan Oil Company and its shareholders?
Sinclair Oil Corporation
According to the court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, which of the following decisions relating to Sinclair
Venezuelan Oil Company was not protected by the business judgment rule?
Failure to enforce the terms of a defaulted contract
According to the court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, the intrinsic fairness standard should be used to
review challenged transactions when there is self-dealing involved. (T/F)
True
In Fliegler v. Lawrence, the court found that valid shareholder ratification under the Delaware statute could
not be found based on a majority vote of shareholders with a financial interest in the challenged transaction.
(T/F)
True
Under the Gottlieb standard, shareholder ratification of an interested transaction in Delaware shifts the
burden of proof to an objecting shareholder to demonstrate that the terms are so unequal as to amount to a
gift or waste of corporate assets. (T/F)
True
MODULE SIX: FEDERAL SECURITIES REGULATION ETC.
o REGULATORY SCHEME
Federal Securities Laws
Policy: protection of investors and integrity of markets
o Reform legislation
o There are also other securities statutes
Securities Act of 1933: primary market
o AKA the 1933 act
o Primary market = when a company seeking to raise capital issues investments called
securities into the public market (the issuer of the securities, such as the company that
created the securities, sells them to investors)
Example = initial public offering
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: secondary market
o AKA the 1934 act
o Secondary market = involves regulation of trading activities that take place on securities
exchanges (investors trade securities among themselves without any significant participation
by the original issuer)
Example = trading between investors on the floor of the NY Stock Exchange
Also governs the business of public companies
Public companies = those that meet certain definitions within the Federal
Securities Laws and are subject to periodic reporting requirements and
certain kinds of regulations that other companies are not subject to
Scope
o Disclosure provisions
An aspect to pursue the policies above using a disclosure-based approach
The Federal Securities Laws do not guarantee investors that they will be purchasing
safe or good investments
The purpose of the Federal Securities Regulations is to force disclosure to
participants in the primary and secondary markets
Role of the SEC = promulgate regulations and adjudicate disputes, but they are not
charged with enforcing and administering the Federal Securities Laws
The SEC will just make sure that a company has complied with the
disclosure requirements
o Anti-fraud provisions
Another aspect to pursue the policies above
This is a backstop against non-disclosure by companies
If there has been a violation of the disclosure provisions, the wrongdoing can be
covered under the anti-fraud provisions
o Regulation of markets and market professionals
o We will be focusing on the protection of the investors and the integrity of the markets
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Created under the 1934 Act
Executive agency of the federal government charged with administration & enforcement of statutes
Delegated authority by Congress to make rules and adjudicate matters arising under the statute
o They are binding to the same extent as if they were passed by congress
o They can bring enforcement proceedings involving any provision of the federal securities
laws
Headquartered in Washington DC with regional offices
o Closest one to STL is in Chicago
Blue sky laws
State level regulation of securities that predates federal securities laws
Statutes that protect investors from speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet
of blue sky
Regulated entities must comply with both federal and state law
Some overlap between the two regulatory schemes but they are separate levels of regulation which
are subject to federal preemption
Missouri securities regulation authority is in the Office of the Secretary of State
Regulates sales of securities and operations of broker-dealers & investment advisers and prosecutes
securities fraud
o Robinson v. Glynn
What is a Security & the reach of the Federal Securities Laws
The Federal Securities Laws apply only if there is an investment instrument called a security
If there is a security, then both the disclosure requirements and the anti-fraud provisions apply
If there is no security, then the Federal Securities Laws do not cover the transaction
NOTE: this is a common area of malpractice for lawyers especially in the failure of lawyers to
identify for their clients the existence of an investment opportunity that involves a security and
therefore involves a regulated transaction
Who was plaintiff, who were the defendants, what was the transaction that gave rise to the lawsuit?
James Robinson = plaintiff
o A businessman with no prior telecommunications experience who was recruited to be an
investor
o He agreed to make a $1M loan to GeoPhone in order to perform a field test of the GeoPhone
system and the CAMA technology
o GeoPhone’s treasurer and appointed to the board of managers and the executive committee
Thomas Glynn = defendant
o GeoPhone’s majority shareholder & chairman
Glynn Scientific, Inc. = defendant
GeoPhone Company LLC = defendant
Evidential documents
o Letter of Intent dated August 1995
Refers to an agreement in which Robinson pledged to invest up to $25M in
GeoPhone if the field test indicated that CAMA worked in the GeoPhone system
The $25M consisted of:
Initial $1M loan for the field test
Immediate $14M investment upon successful completion of the field test
A later $10M investment
o Agreement to Purchase membership Interests in GeoPhone (APMIG)
Robinson agreed to convert his $1M loan and his $14M investment into equity and
subsequently to invest the additional $10M
Equity = ownership interest
o Amended and Restated GeoPhone Operating Agreement (ARGOA)
Detailed the capital contribution, share ownership, and management structure of
GeoPhone
Robinson received 33,333 of GeoPhone’s 133,333 shares
Established the board
Vested management of GeoPhone in Robinson and Glynn based on each member’s
ownership share
o Share certificates with restrictive legend
The legend referred to the certificates as shares and securities
It specified that the certificates were exempt from registration under the Securities
Act of 1933 and stated that the certificates could not be transferred without proper
registration under the federal and state securities laws
Facts
o Glynn formed a company called GeoPhone with the intent of developing and marketing the
GeoPhone telecommunication systems using a type of technology referred to as the
Convolutional Ambiguity Multiple Access (CAMA) technology
o A field test was performed but it did not use the CAMA technology, which was a pre-
condition to Robinson’s agreement to be an investor
o Glynn still told Robinson that the field test had been successful & lied about using the
CAMA technology
o There was a 7 person board of managers that was authorized to manage GeoPhone’s affairs
2 of the managers were to be appointed by Robinson with the remaining 5 to be
appointed by Glynn and his brother
What was the alleged wrongful conduct?
Goes back to the field test and the failure to use the CAMA technology
Robinson did not learn about the misrepresentation until 1998
Failure to use the CAMA technology which was a precondition to his investments in the first place
What was the legal basis for the suit?
A violation of §10(b) of the 1934 Act
Also a violation of Rule 10b-5 (an SEC rule)
NOTE: these 2 rules are usually pleaded together in Securities laws litigation and they are the most
widely used anti-fraud provisions
The district court granted summary judgment to Glynn because it found that Robinson’s membership
interest in GeoPhone did not constitute a security under the federal securities laws
o If you don’t have a security, you cannot use the federal courts to allege you have been
defrauded in connection with an investment that you have made
What is the legal issue addressed in this appeal?
Whether or not the transaction is subject to the federal securities laws
Why is resolution of this issue in the plaintiff’s favor necessary for the lawsuit to proceed to the adjudication
of the alleged wrongdoing?
The question of what is a security is considered a threshold issue in federal securities law
Threshold issue = an issue that plaintiff must overcome in order to be able to proceed with the merits
of a claim, here being the alleged fraud
o So unless Robinson can convince the court that this was a security interest, the court will not
get to the merits of the claim and the case will be dismissed
Plaintiff’s arguments?
He had purchased an investment instrument that was covered by the federal securities law
His argument that he made relates to the definition of the word security in the federal securities laws
o Securities Act of 1933 §2(a)(1)
He argued that he had purchased either an investment contract or, in the alternative, he purchased
stock
Defendants’ arguments?
Robinson did not purchase a security
What he purchased was neither an investment contract nor a stock
What is meant by an investment contract?
Investment contract (Howey) (SCT 1946)
o Definition:
A contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party
o Elements (all of which must be satisfied; if one is missing, the claim fails)
Investment of money
In a common enterprise
With the expectation of profits
To come solely from the efforts of others
o What element of the test is at issue in this case?
The disagreement concerns whether Robinson expected profits solely from the
efforts of others, most notably Glynn
So it is the last element that is at issue
What is meant by stock?
Stock (Landreth Timber) (SCT 1985)
o The characteristics typically associated with common stock are:
The right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits
Negotiability
The ability to be pledged or hypothecated
The conferring of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned
The capacity to appreciate in value (aka Capital Appreciation)
Why can an item called stock be excluded from the definition of a security?
o Economic realities test = it is the economic reality of a particular instrument, rather than the
label attached to it, that ultimately determines whether it falls within the reach of the
securities laws
Looking at the nature of the transaction rather than the name that is used by parties
o The securities laws apply when an instrument is both called stock and bears stock’s usual
characteristics
How does the court rule on this issue? Why?
Investment contract
o There was no investment contract because Robinson was not relying solely on the efforts of
other people to get a profit on his investment
o He negotiated for control rights in the company so he was not a completely passive investor
o He served on the board of managers and had the right to appoint 2/7 members of the board
o He was also on the executive committee and served as treasurer and had access to a lot of
financial information about the company
o Because of the strong control rights, he cannot satisfy the test
o He did not purchase an investment contract because he was not relying solely on the efforts
of others
Stock
o The court concludes that the characteristics of stock are not satisfied by Robinson’s
ownership interest in the company.
o There was no sharing in profits in proportion to the number of their shares. Robinson was to
receive 100% of GeoPhone’s net profits up to a certain amount, only after which were funds
to be distributed pro rata to the members in proportion to their relative shares
o Robinson’s membership interests were not freely negotiable. Robinson could only transfer
his interests if he first offered other members the opportunity to purchase his interests on
similar terms
o Robinson could pledge his interest, but the pledgee would acquire only distribution rights
and not control rights
o From the very beginning, the parties viewed Robinson’s investment as a membership
interest and never as a stock. All of the investment documents termed Robinson’s
investment as a membership interest
o He did not purchase stock in the sense that it was defined in the Supreme Court case because
the characteristics of the membership interest do not correspond with the characteristics of
stock in the case
Why does the court decline to rule broadly?
The parties wanted the court to rule broadly in this case, asking that we generally classify interests in
LLCs as investment contracts (in Robinson’s view) or non-securities (in Glynn’s view)
The court declines to do this because it is very difficult to categorize LLCs under the federal
securities laws because state law statutes allow LLCs to be organized with different types of
management structures (member-managed LLC & manager-managed LLC)
Under state law there might be circumstances where it would be difficult to say whether or not
something is actually an investment contract because the last prong of the test would not be satisfied
There also could be different kinds of management structures other than what was in this case where
management decisions were in the hands of one or more managers rather than all of the members
managing equally. Under these circumstances it might be possible to say that the members who are
not managers were relying solely on the efforts of those managers to make profits
Does the court get around to adjudicating the merits of the dispute?
The merits would be whether or not Robinson had been defrauded by not using CAMA technology
The court never gets around to adjudicating the merits of the dispute
Why not?
Robinson was unable to get past the threshold issue of showing what he purchased was a security
§10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of rules and
regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 10b-5: (states what a manipulative or deceptive device consists of)
It shall be unlawful for any person
o (a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
o (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or material omission, or
o (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any person
Securities Act of 1933, §2(a)(1) – definition of security
Security means, unless the context otherwise requires, any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, investment contract or in general any interest or instrument
commonly known as a security
Implications of calling an investment opportunity a security
o Disclosure and antifraud provisions apply, including 1934 Act §10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5
o Robinson v. Glynn: Hypothetical
What result in this case if Geophone had been organized as: (can each of these be viewed as a security?)
A close corporation?
o A close corporation is a corporation that has a small number of shareholders. It is the
opposite of a public corporation which has shares that are held by the general public with
hundreds of thousands of shareholders
o Normally viewed as a family business
o As long as it has the common characteristics of stock then it could be classified as a
common security
A general partnership?
o Analyzed using the investment contract analysis
o Focus on the management rights of general partners which is equal rights in management of
all partners
o Usually this would not be a security because the final prong of the test would not be satisfied
because of equal rights in management default rule
A limited partnership?
o Analyzed using the investment contract analysis
o There is typically a general partner with unlimited liability and full control rights and limited
partners with no control rights and have limited liability
o These have been viewed to be securities because a limited partner can argue that they rely
solely on the efforts of the general partner to make a profit
o Types of Securities
Type of security
Common stock (equity)
o Cash flow rights = residual and discretionary dividend
o Liquidation rights = residual
o Voting rights = yes
Preferred stock (equity)
o Cash flow rights = fixed and discretionary dividends cumulate if not paid
o Liquidation rights = medium
o Voting rights = contingent
Bonds (debt)
o Cash flow rights = fixed and certain interest payments
o Liquidation rights = highest
o Voting rights = none
One other dimension along which the different securities differ:
Fiduciary duty obligation of corporate officers and directors
o Generally common shareholders are owed a fiduciary duty
o Preferred stock and bond holders must look to contractual rights for protection
Preferred shareholder contractual protections typically (but all this is negotiated) include:
Fixed interest payment (but at discretion of the board)
Dividends cumulate if not paid (and must be paid before common receives anything)
Liquidation preference over common
Voting rights if a specified number of quarters have based without a dividend payment
Conversion right into common stock
Debt holder contractual protections can include (again all negotiated):
Restrictions on dividends
Restrictions on sale of certain assets
Specified maximum debt-equity ratio.
o Doran v. Petroleum Management
Registration and Exemptions from Registration
Registration requirement under §5 of the 1933 Act
This states that a security cannot be offered for sale through the use of interstate commerce unless a
registration statement with a long and detailed disclosure document has been filed with the SEC
The securities themselves may not be sold until the registration statement has become effective
Also, the purchasers of the securities receive a prospectus
o A prospectus = a portion of the registration statement minus certain exhibits and opinions
that are typically not provided
Remedies for §5 violations are contained in §12 of the 1933 Act.
o Primary remedy is recission of the contract/deal
Who was the plaintiff, who were the defendants, and what was the alleged wrongful conduct?
William H. Doran, Jr. = plaintiff
o Has some familiarity with investments
o He purchased a limited partnership interest in PMC for $125K
o He was to put in $25K and for the rest of the investment, he agreed to assume the liability of
the limited partnership on a note owed to Mid-Continent
o He was obligated to pay this note as payments on the note became due
o He assumed he would be able to make these payments using his share of the production
payments he would receive from the oil wells
o He soon found out that PMC deliberately over-produced in violation of certain limits on
production allowances established by the WY Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
As a consequence, the wells were ordered sealed for 338 days
When production resumed, the wells yielded a production income level below that
obtained prior to the closure
o Because of the closure and decline in production, Doran defaulted on his note with Mid-
Continent and had judgement entered against him for $50,815
Petroleum Management Corporation (PMC) = defendant
o Engaged in drilling and operating oil wells
o Organized a CA limited partnership for the purpose of drilling and operating 4 wells in WY
Alleged wrongful conduct?
o Plaintiff alleges that there was conduct that violated a number of different legal rights that he
had and he alleged there was misrepresentations and omissions
o He claims he purchased a security that should have been registered but was not registered
What is plaintiff’s cause of action under the federal securities laws and what is the remedy for the alleged
violation?
Filed suit seeking damages for breach of contract, rescission of the contract based on violations of
the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, and a judgment declaring the defendants liable for payment of
the state judgment obtained by Mid-Continent
Plaintiff claims that he purchased a security which should have been registered but PMC failed to do
this to comply with §5
Remedy is rescission where he is back to the point he was at before purchasing the limited
partnership interest
What affirmative defense is advanced by the defendants?
Defendants raise an affirmative defense that the relevant transactions came within the exemption
from registration found in §4(2) of the 1933 Act, the private offering exemption or private placement
transaction
They contend that the offering of securities was not a public offering, it was a private placement
o This was because there was only a small number of people offered the opportunity and
plaintiff was the only one to accept
As a result, they claim they did not have to register the securities
What must the defendants prove to establish such defense?
Defendants must bear the burden of proving that the offering was private
First look to the Ralston Purina test!!
There are 4 factors the court describes:
o The number of offerees and their relationship to each other and the issuer
o The number of units offered
o The size of the offering
o The manner of the offering
The first factor is most important
o If the offerees had access to information in some way other than through a registration
statement, then that could be considered to be a private placement transaction
o If the offerees did not have access to information, then they would not fall within the private
placement transaction
Have the defendants met their burden of proof?
No they have not met their burden on the question of the private placement exemption
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that the offerees had access to information
What is the holding?
We hold that in the absence of findings of fact that each offeree had been furnished information
about the issuer that a registration statement would have disclosed o that each offeree had effective
access to such information, the district court erred in concluding that the offering was a private
placement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand
What must defendants show on remand?
They must show that all of the offerees had access to the same kind of information that would have
been provided in a registration statement given to the offeree if it had been filed with the SEC
This can be done by showing they were given a memo with such information or they had access to
files and records which would contain that information
The question that must be answered is whether the offerees knew or had a realistic opportunity to
learn facts essential to an investment judgment
Sophistication issue
Defendants raised the argument that it was okay to sell to plaintiff because he was a sophisticated
investor and therefore did not need the protection of full blown §5 registration
The court rejects this argument stating that evidence of a high degree of business or legal
sophistication on the part of all offerees does not suffice to bring the offering within the private
placement exemption
You still need access to information and investment sophistication
Sophistication itself is not sufficient
Ralston Purina test: Did the offerees need the protection of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act or
were they able to fend for themselves?
Lead case on the definition of a private placement transaction under §4(2)
Turns on access to information
o Whether or not there was access to information on behalf of the offeree
o If the offerees had access to information in some way other than through a registration
statement, then that could be considered to be a private placement transaction
o If the offerees did not have access to information, then they would not fall within the private
placement transaction
Access of information can turn on one of 2 things:
o Either the issuer (the company trying to sell the securities) has provided information
equivalent to the information provided in a registration statement filed with the SEC
o OR
o The offerees had access to information by having the ability to look at files and records of
the company that contained equivalent information
NOTE:
o In a private placement transaction, there is no requirement that a registration statement be
filed with the SEC. However, there is a requirement to provide access to information
This information is typically given in a memo containing disclosure
o THIS IS WHERE YOU WILL START IN YOUR ANALYSIS!!!
Four factors (5th Circuit)
Number of offerees and the relationship to each other and issuer
Number of units offered
Size of the offering
Manner of the offering
Securities Act of 1933, §5
Unlawful to sell or offer for sale securities in interstate commerce unless securities are registered
with the SEC
Issuer must provide disclosure in a prospectus
Remedy for selling unregistered securities is rescission
Securities Act of 1933, §4(2): (exemption defense raised by defendants)
The provisions of §5 shall not apply to transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering
o No definition of public offering in the Securities Act of 1933
Exemptions from registration
Certain types of securities
o Congress felt that purchasers/investors of certain types of securities did not need the
protection of the federal securities laws (disclosure requirements & anti-fraud provisions)
o Example = U.S. government securities
Certain types of transactions
o Exempt because of the manner in which they are sold to purchasers/investors
o Only applies to the specific sale of securities. It doesn’t apply to the securities going forward
o Example = private placement
Regulation D exemption
o Provides a series of safe-harbors that issuers can use to come within the private-placement
exemption and avoid or reduce their required disclosure
o More detailed in the requirements that must be met to satisfy the exemption
o It is a series of requirements that must be satisfied by the issuer to fall under the transaction
exemption
o Escott v. BarChris
§11 Fraud in Registration Statement
Securities fraud and insider trading and due diligence
Who were plaintiffs, who were defendants, what was the alleged wrongdoing?
Plaintiffs = investor purchasers of convertible subordinated 15 year debentures of BarChris
Construction Corporation suing on their own behalf and on behalf of all other present and former
holders of the debentures
o Debentures = a type of corporate debt
Defendants = BarChris, the persons who signed the registration statement, the underwriters, and
BarChris’s auditors
Alleged wrongdoing = false information on registration statements filed with the SEC
Facts:
BarChris built bowling allies and was in the business during the massive spike in popularity
Plaintiff purchased the debentures during a public offering
What is cause of action?
This action is brought under §11 of the Securities Act of 1933 alleging that the registration statement
with respect to the debentures filed with the SEC contained material false statements and material
omissions
§11 covers fraud in a registration statement
What are the legal issues?
(1) did the registration statement contain false statements of fact, or did it omit to state facts which
should have been stated in order to prevent it from being misleading?
(2) if so, were the facts which were falsely stated or omitted material within the meaning of the Act?
(3) if so, have defendants established their affirmative defenses?
How does the court rule on each issue?
Misstatement or omission in the registration statement
o The court says there was a misstatement or omission in 2 separate parts of the registration
statement which were material
o They find misstatements or omissions in 2 separate parts of the registration statement
o Misstatement of sales and earnings figures
Were the misstated or omitted facts material?
o The court says yes
What is the holding?
Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that there were material misstatements or omissions in
the registration statement
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied because they were unable to establish complete due
diligence defenses
Materiality
A threshold issue
Definition of materiality: information that an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be
informed about before purchasing the registered security
o The facts which tend to deter him from purchasing a security are facts which have an
important bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or its business
o This is an objective reasonable person standard
Were there material misstatements or omissions in the registration statement?
o Yes
Due diligence defense
What is the legal standard?
o It depends on where the omission or misstatement occurred and who the defendant is
regarding their position in the company and their expertise
o The first question you must ask is where does the alleged material misstatement or omission
appear in the registration statement? Is it in the expertised portion or the nonexpertised
portion?
Here, the expertised portion consisted of the audited financials
The court found material misstatements in both the expertised and nonexpertised
portions of the registration statement
o Then you ask is the defendant deemed to be an expert or a non-expert?
Here, the only expert is the Peat Marwick Accounting Firm
Must reasonably believe after reasonable investigation that the information
in the registration statement is true
Held to a professional standard
They have no liability as to the nonexpertised portion
The rest of the defendants are non-experts
Entitled to rely upon the audit and opinion letter issued by Peat Marwick
What is the effect of establishing the defense?
o If defendant meets its burden, it can avoid liability on a case by case basis
Did any of the defendants establish a defense?
BarChris
o The issuer cannot claim a due diligence defense
o Because of this, this defendant did not establish a defense
Vitolo President & Pugliese Vice President
o Unable to establish a defense
o They could not have believed that the registration statement was wholly true and that no
material facts had been omitted
o There is nothing to show that they made any investigation of anything which they may not
have known about or understood
o They were founders of the business and they were president and vice president
Kircher Treasurer & CFO
o Unable to establish a defense
o He withheld information from others and knowing the facts, he had reason to believe that the
expertised portion of the registration statement was partially incorrect
o He could not shut his eyes to the facts and rely on the experts
o Issue of credibility
Birnbaum In-House Lawyer & Secretary
o Unable to establish a defense except as to the original figures because he was only hired
after the first round and only signed the amendments, not the original
o He made no investigation and relied on the others to get it right
o He should have known he was required to make a reasonable investigation of the truth of all
the statements in the nonexpertised portion of the document which he signed
o Having failed to make such investigations, he did not have reasonable grounds to believe
that the statements were true
Auslander Outside Director (Chairman of Valley Stream Bank)
o Unable to establish a defense for the nonexpertised portions of the registration statement
except as to the original figures because he was only hired after the first round and only
signed the amendments, not the original
o He believed the expertised portion of the registration statement to be true because he had
confidence in Peat Marwick and had no reasonable ground to believe otherwise
o As to the nonexpertised portions, he incorrectly believed that Peat Marwick was responsible
for all portions
o He made no investigation of the accuracy and relied on the assurance of Vitolo and Russo
o A prudent man would not act in an important matter without any knowledge of the relevant
facts in sole reliance upon representations of strangers
o He is unable to get off the hook just because he is new to the business
o Entitled to a partial defense
Grant Outside Director (Law firm was counsel in offering)
o Unable to establish a defense for the nonexpertised portion except as to the original figures
because he was only hired after the first round and only signed the amendments, not the
original
o Held to a higher standard because of his legal expertise
o He was obligated to make a reasonable investigation and he did not do this
o He was entitled to rely on Peat Marwick for the expertised portion because he had no
reasonable grounds to believe them to be inaccurate
o He gets a partial defense
Peat Marwick Accountants
o Unable to establish a defense
o Considered an expert because they are the firm that audited the financial statements
o Asked questions, got answers which he considered satisfactory, and did nothing to verify
them
o Did not fulfill the professional standards for an accounting profession
o Only liable for the expertised portion of the registration statement
The Underwriters
o Unable to establish a defense
o They asked questions of the offices and relied on the answers without checking into the facts
o Asking questions without verifying answers is not sufficient
o §11 of the 1933 Act: Fraud in Registration Statement
Material misstatement or omission in a registration statement is actionable fraud
(1) there must be a misstatement or omission
(2) there must be materiality
(3) it must be contained in a registration statement
Person acquiring such security has standing to bring this express private right of action
Who can bring suit
Against any person who signed the registration statement, any director, any expert who prepared or certified
part of registration statement, underwriters
Who are the people who can be sued
Expert = accountant, engineer, appraiser, but not lawyer
Subject to defenses of loss causation and due diligence
Once plaintiff has met its burden of proof, the burden shifts to defendants to prove defenses
Loss causation defense = you as a defendant are able to show that the reason plaintiff suffered loss
was not due to the material misstatement or material omission in the registration statement but was
due to some other factor
Statute of limitations defense = contained in §13 of the 1933 Act
Remedy = damages
If plaintiff meets its burden and defendants cannot establish one of the defenses then the remedy is
damages equivalent to the difference between the price paid for the shares and the value of the
securities
Serves DETERRENCE function = intended to force directors and officers to do sufficient due diligence
before putting information out to the public
§11 reaches material misstatements or omissions in registration statement
§12 reaches material misstatements or omissions outside of a registration statement
§11 and §12 create express private rights of action
Compare implied private right of action (§10(b) of 1934 Act)
o Due Diligence Defense under §11 of the 1933 Act
Expertised Portion = a portion of the registration statement that contains a statement by an expert as defined
in the statute upon which investors would rely
EXPERT: Reasonably believes, after reasonable investigation, that the information contained in the
registration statement is true
o Experts are held to a professional standard
NON-EXPERT: No reason to believe that the information in the expertised portion is false
o They are entitled to rely upon the expert’s judgment
Nonexpertised Portion = everything else
EXPERT: No liability with respect to the nonexpertised portion
NON-EXPERT: Reasonably believes, after reasonable investigation, that the information in the
nonexpertised portion of the registration statement is true
o Corporation Review Q#6
US Way
Sales agents sell microwaves door to door
Keep 6% commission & forwards 94% to supervisor
Supervisor keeps 6% commission and sends 88% to headquarters
Wholesalers and officers are paid from 88%
Sales agents can become managers if they recruit other sales agents subject to 15% commission cap
Issue: Must stock be registered?
March: Scientists discover risk of cancer from use of product
April: USW issues stock without disclosing cancer risk
Issues:
If registration statement is materially misleading, will plaintiff recover from directors?
Does plaintiff need to read the registration statement?
What are the damages?
Is the accounting firm that audited financials liable?
o §10(b) of 1934 Act & SEC Rule 10b-5
A judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn
§10(b) of the 1934 Act is the most widely used anti-fraud provision in the federal securities laws
§10(b) of the 1934 Act:
In connection with the purchase or sale of securities, using jurisdictional means, it is unlawful to use
or employ manipulative or deceptive devices in violation of SEC rules
o Using jurisdictional means = involving interstate commerce
o Manipulative or deceptive device = explained in SEC Rule 10b-5
SEC Rule 10b-5:
In connection with the purchase or sale of securities, using jurisdictional means, it is unlawful to
employ any device to defraud, to make material misstatements and omissions, or to engage in any
act operating as a fraud or deceit
Types of Cases:
Defective corporate disclosure
o Corporate disclosure that is deemed to be materially misleading
o Can occur in the context of a required government filing or a voluntary statement
Insider trading
Fraud in dealings between broker-dealer & their customers
o Broker-dealer firms are the firms that are in the securities business and they buy and sell
securities for the accounting customers
§10(b) is considered to be an implied private right of action that is well-established by the courts
Elements of Private Right of Action:
o Material misrepresentation or omission
o Scienter
A knowing state of mind & you knew you were telling an untruth in connection with
the investment
o Reliance
The investor has to have heard the misleading statement and there has to be
affirmative proof that they relied on the misleading statement
o Causation
A relationship between the alleged misstatement and the loss that was caused
o Damages
o NOTE: there is a substantial burden on plaintiff
o SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
§10(b) Insider Trading Prohibition & defective corporate disclosure
Who was plaintiff, who were defendants, what transactions gave rise to the lawsuit?
Plaintiff = SEC
Defendants = Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) (a mining company)
o Vice president = Richard Mollison & Charles Fogarty
o Electrical Engineer = Richard Clayton
o President = Claude Stephens
o Director = Frances Coates
o Secretary = David Crawford
Transactions giving rise to suit:
o False press releases
o Individuals within the company purchasing shares of stock
Facts:
o They drilled into material with high mineral content suggesting that the property would be
commercially viable
o They bought the land where the drilling occurred along with the surrounding land for further
exploration
o There was also trading going on by individuals within the company through the purchasing
of shares because they had insider knowledge of this good news before it got to the public
What was the alleged fraud?
Defendant put out false and misleading press releases to the public stating there were rumors of their
find but then downplayed the finding and stated there was no information available to conclude this
This was a voluntary press release. It was not required
Insider trading
Court addresses the following issues:
Issue #1: Insider trading prohibition
Issue #2: Materiality of information
Issue #3: Interpretation of statutory language: in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
What legal principle does the court articulate on each point?
Issue #1: What is the disclose or abstain rule and who does it apply to? (insider trading issue)
o Those in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or
he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed
Issue #2: What standard of materiality does the court adopt?
o The reasonable investor standard refined to reflect the facts of this case
o An insider’s duty to disclose information or his duty to abstain from dealing in his
company’s securities arises only in those situations which are essentially extraordinary in
nature and which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of
the security if the extraordinary situation is disclosed
o The court uses the probability magnitude test which is used when talking about speculative
information
Speculative information = information that as of the point in making the decision on
whether to invest to disclose or not disclose, the future event is uncertain
o 2 factors should be looked at:
(1) the probability that the future event will occur
(2) the magnitude of impact on the company if the uncertain event does happen in
the future
o If high magnitude and high probability, the information would be considered to be material
Issue #3: How does the court’s interpretation of the in connection with requirement expand the
category of lawsuits that may be brought under §10(b)?
o It seems clear that Congress intended only the device employed, whatever it might be, be of
a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely and in connection therewith so relying
causes them to purchase or sell a corporation’s securities
o All that is needed to be shown is that the investor relied on the statements made by the
company in the press releases and that is what caused them to purchase or sell the securities
o Privity of contract is not necessary
o There is a broad scope of the use of this statute
What is the outcome in the lawsuit?
The court remanded the case back to the district court to determine the character of the press releases
in the light of the facts existing at the time of the release, by applying the standard of whether the
reasonable investor, in the exercise of due care, would have been misled by it
There was material inside information and the insiders should not have been trading
They should have first disclosed the true information about the samples to the public and only after
that would they be permitted to trade under the disclose or abstain rule
Because the district court did not use the proper standard of materiality, the case is being remanded
o Other Precedent on §10(b) Insider Trading Prohibition & the disclose or abstain rule
In re Cady Roberts Co. (SEC 1961)
SEC recognized common law duty of corporate insiders (includes officers, directors, and control
shareholders) to disclose inside information when dealing in securities
But it remained unclear who inherited these duties
Chiarella v. U.S. (SCOTUS 1980)
Facts
o An individual learned about inside information because of the work he was involved with
but the information didn’t actually say who the company was going to buy-out. However, he
figured it out by doing research in the financing journals.
o He ended up buying shares and when the tender offer was announced, the value of his shares
went way up so this tells us that the information was clearly material
o He ended up getting convicted for insider trading under SEC Rule 10b-5
Issue
o Whether or not his conviction under SEC Rule 10b-5 was proper and whether or not he had
violated Rule 10b-5
SEC said the conviction was proper because he acquired the information as an insider and therefore
should be subject to the disclose or abstain rule
o The Supreme Court said the conviction was not proper because in order to have a violation
of rule 10b-5 based on insider trading conduct, there has to be a relationship of trust and
confidence that exists
o Here, there was no violation because he was not an insider of the company and therefore had
no obligation of trust and confidence with respect to that information
In order for there to be fraud, there must be a breach of a duty of trust and confidence and taking that
information and trading on it for one’s own personal gain
o This rule applies to corporate insiders who do have this duty of trust and confidence
o It does not apply to a corporate outsider
Corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first
disclosed all material inside information known to him
Duty to abstain arises from this relationship of trust between a corporation’s shareholders and its
employees; duty does not arise from mere possession of material inside information
Holding:
o No liability because Chiarella did not have a relationship of trust with shareholders of
company in whose stock he traded
o Dirks v. SEC
§10(b) Insider Trading Prohibition & Tippee liability
Who was Dirks?
Dirks was an officer of a NY broker-dealer firm who specialized in providing investment analysis of
insurance company securities to institutional investors
He received information from Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America. He alleged
that the assets of Equity Funding, a diversified corporation primarily engaged in selling life
insurance and mutual funds, were vastly overstated as the result of fraudulent corporate practices
He urged Dirks to verify the accounting fraud and disclose it publicly
Why did the SEC start an enforcement proceeding against him?
Because although he did not own any shares of Equity Funding, his clients did and they began
selling their shares before the stock price crashed down
They claimed he violated the rules because he repeated the allegations of fraud to members of the
investment community who later sold their Equity Funding stock
Would the classic rule against insider trading apply to him?
The classic rule against insider trading would be the disclose or abstain rule
No this rule would not apply to him because he was not an insider of Equity Funding. He was a
broker who got information from a former insider
He owed no duty of trust and confidence because he was not an insider of the company
What theory did the SEC advance?
Anyone who gets information that is material and not public information from an insider inherits the
Cady Roberts duty to disclose or abstain
This says that for establishing a Rule 10b-5 violation, 2 elements must be met:
o (1) the existence of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and
o (2) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by
trading without disclosure
Did the Supreme Court accept or reject SEC’s argument?
They rejected the SEC’s theory because they had previously rejected this argument in the Chiarella
case and there is no requirement of equal information among traders
Only some people under some circumstances will be barred from trading while in possession of
material and nonpublic information
What rule does Supreme Court fashion to deal with potential liability of people like Dirks?
Tippee liability
A tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached its fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach
There must be a tipper who breached a fiduciary duty and a tippee who knew or should have known
of the tipper’s breach of fiduciary duty
A tippee assumes the duty to disclose or abstain not because they receive insider information, but
rather because it has been made available to them improperly
What does it mean to have received the tip improperly?
There must be a direct personal benefit that the tipper gets from passing along the information
This is what gives rise to the breach of fiduciary duty
Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to shareholders and absent a
breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach
Direct personal benefit examples:
o Punitary benefit/gain
o Reputational benefit
o Gift of confidential information
Was Dirks liable for a violation in this case?
No
Secrist didn’t breach a fiduciary duty because he did not receive a personal benefit when he passed
the information to Dirks
He was motivated to make the public aware of the fraud, without any personal benefit
What about Secrist, was he liable?
He also was not liable because he did not breach a fiduciary duty
The first part of the test was not met
Conclusion
We conclude that Dirks, in the circumstances of this case, had no duty to abstain from use of the
inside information that he obtained.
In the absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by
Dirks
TIPPEE LIABILITY
(1) Tipper breached a fiduciary duty
o Mere possession of material inside information does not give rise to a duty to disclose
o Existence of breach turns on receipt of direct personal benefit by tipper
o Temporary insider
Footnote 14: Underwriter, accountant, lawyer or consultant may become fiduciaries
of shareholders
The corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic
information confidential and the relationship at least must imply such a duty
(2) Tippee knew or should have known of breach
o Insider Trading Hypotheticals
Would Dirks have been liable under these alternative sets of facts:
If Dirks and Secrist had routinely exchanged stock tips?
o Yes he would have been liable
o This constitutes a personal benefit and thus there would have been a breach of fiduciary duty
If Secrist had disclosed the Equity Funding fraud in part because he had been fired over an unrelated
matter?
o No benefit
o Could fall under reputation benefit
o This one is unclear whether he would be liable or not
If Dirks overheard Secrist describing the fraud to another person in an elevator?
o No breach because no personal benefit
What if Secrist disclosed negative inside information (not involving fraud) because Dirks bribed
him. Dirks then advised his clients to sell their Equity Funding stock. Dirks would have violated
Rule 10b-5. Would his clients also have violated the rule?
o The clients in this case would be considered second-tier tippees and would apply the same
test as a normal tippee
o If the clients knew or should have known about the bribe then they would have been liable
o What COUNTS AS A PERSONAL BENEFIT UNDER DIRKS?
For tippee liability, Dirks requires, among other things, that the insider-tipper will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure.
This benefit test encompasses whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the
disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Dirks also tells us that: The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.
Questions that remain undecided after Dirks:
What must plaintiff show to demonstrate pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit in cases where the
insider-tipper makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend?
Does the plaintiff need to demonstrate evidence on top of the existence of the gift that the insider-
tipper’s goal in making the gift was to obtain a pecuniary or similar valuable nature, such as money,
property, or something of tangible value?
o These questions are answered in the next case
o Salman v. U.S.
Who was the defendant and what was the insider trading transaction he engaged in?
Petitioner Bassam Salman was convicted for conspiracy and insider trading
He received lucrative trading tips from an extended family member, Michael Kara, who had received
the information from Salman’s brother in law, Maher Kara, and Salman then traded on that
information
Who gave him material non-public information?
The original source was Maher
He received the information through his job because he worked as an investment banker in
Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group
What was the motivation for the tip?
Maher shared the information with his brother Michael to receive help understanding the scientific
concepts relevant to the job
Michael began trading on such information and at first Maher didn’t know about this but when he
learned of it, his motivation for allowing it to continue was to help his brother who was struggling
financially
What was the legal issue in the case?
Whether a gift to a family member of material nonpublic information counts as a personal benefit of
the tipper that would lead to a breach of fiduciary duty under the Dirks test
How did the Supreme Court answer the question presented?
The court says that disclosing information to one’s brother does count as a personal benefit to the
tipper under Dirks because Salman knew about this relationship between the brothers and knew
Maher was the source of the information
The gift from Maher to Michael fulfilled the personal benefit aspect of the test and Salman knew
about the relationship thereby fulfilling the second prong of the test
What was the Court’s reasoning?
Dirks requires a breach of fiduciary duty involving a personal benefit
A personal benefit can take the form of either a direct pecuniary payment or a quid pro quo
arrangement that benefits the tipper
But in the Dirks language, this also includes a gift of information to a trading relative or a friend
The gift alone is sufficient to constitute a breach. Nothing of value needs to actually be exchanged
What counts as a personal benefit after Salman?
Quid pro quo arrangement
Gift to a family member or a friend without an additional requirement of value
What is excluded?
The gift aspect does not apply to nonrelatives and nonfriends
The government tried arguing that a gift to anyone would count but the court rejected this argument
Conclusion
We reject Salman’s argument that Dirk’s gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague as applied
to this case. Dirks created a simple and clear guiding principle for determining tippee liability. At
most, Salman shows that in some circumstances assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult
o U.S. v. O’Hagan
§10(b) Outsider Trading Prohibition & the misappropriation theory
Who was O’Hagan and why did the U.S. start an enforcement proceeding against him?
James Herman O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney
The law firm was representing Grand Met regarding a potential tender offer for the common stock of
Pillsbury Company
During the representation, O’Hagan began purchasing call options for Pillsbury stock. Each option
gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of Pillsbury stock by a specified date
By the time the tender offer went public, O’Hagan owned more than 2,500 Pillsbury options which
was more than any other individual investor. He also purchased around 5,000 shares of Pillsbury
common stock
When the offer was announced, Pillsbury stock increased by $20 a share so O’Hagan sold his call
options and common stock making a profit of $4.3M. He used this money to conceal other illegal
activities he was engaged in such as embezzling client funds
He was convicted on 57 counts alleging that he defrauded his law firm and its client by using for his
own trading purposes material and nonpublic information regarding the planned tender offer
He was charged with 20 counts of mail fraud, 17 counts of securities fraud in violation of §10(b) of
the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, 17 counts of fraudulent trading in connection with a tender offer in
violation of §14(e) of the 1934 Act and Rule 14e-3(a), and 3 counts of violating federal money
laundering statutes
Would the classic rule against insider trading apply to him?
This is the disclose or abstain rule. This is violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities
of his corporation on the basis of material and nonpublic information
This would not have been applicable here because he was not an insider to the company he was
purchasing shares for
Would the rule governing tippee liability apply to him?
No because he was not tipped off and didn’t receive the information from an insider of Pillsbury
He instead received the information through his own employment
What theory of §10(b) liability did the U.S. government advance?
The misappropriation theory
This holds that a person commits fraud in connection with a securities transaction and thereby
violates §10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information
How would O’Hagan’s conduct be captured under such theory?
He took information provided in a business context and used it for his own personal trading
advantage thereby breaching a duty of confidentiality
Did the U.S. Supreme Court accept or reject that theory as a basis for liability on the §10(b) counts?
The court accepts this theory as a basis for liability
This theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate outsider in breach
of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information
Misappropriation involves a deceptive device or contrivance used in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities
The misappropriator deals in deception and a person who pretends loyalty to the principal while
secretly converting the principal’s information for personal gain, dupes or defrauds the principle
The in connection with element is satisfied because the fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when
the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he
uses the information to purchase or sell securities
What additional theory of insider trading did the U.S. government advance?
§14(e) which specifically addresses insider trading in tender offer transactions
How would O’Hagan’s conduct be captured under such theory?
This was a tender offer transaction and he received material and nonpublic information that was
obtained from the offeror
He is clearly falling within the rule
How did O’Hagan attack that count of his conviction?
He couldn’t say that it did not apply to him or there was a misapplication of the rule
Instead he attacked the validity of the whole rule saying that the Commission exceeded its
rulemaking authority under §14(e) when it adopted Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring a showing that
the trading at issue entailed a breach of fiduciary duty
How did the Supreme Court rule on that issue?
They held that the Commission, in this regard and to the extent relevant in this case, did not exceed
its authority
The court rejected O’Hagan’s argument on this point
They say they are not going to decide whether there is a difference between the Commission’s
authority under the rules because the rule itself is a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent
trading on material and nonpublic information in the tender offer context
The court uses Chevron Deference rule which says that you should give the expert executive agency
in charge with enforcement of a particular area of law deference when it is within their area of
expertise
The court upheld the convictions
o Misappropriation Theory
Outsider violates §10(b) and 10b-5 when he trades on material non-public information in breach of a duty
owed to the source of such information
Disclosure to source of information absolves breach
The purpose is to protect integrity of markets against abuses by outsiders who have access to confidential
info that will affect a company’s stock price but who owe no fiduciary duty to corporation’s shareholders
o §14(e) of 1934 Act & SEC Rule 14e-3(a): Insider Trading Prohibition in Tender Offers
§14(e): In connection with a tender offer, it shall be unlawful to make material misstatements or omission or
to engage in fraud, deception or manipulation
Rule 14e-3(a): If a tender offer has been commenced, it is unlawful to purchase or sell securities on the basis
of material inside information if trader knows info obtained from offeror, issuer or any officer, director,
partner, or employee to either offeror or issuer
Full language of §14(e) = it shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer. The SEC shall, for the purposes of this
subsection, by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
Full language of Rule 14e-3(a) = if any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has
commenced, a tender offer (the offering person), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative
act or practice within the meaning of §14(e) of the 1934 Act for any other person who is in possession of
material information relating to such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is
nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from:
(1) the offering person
(2) the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or
(3) any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering
person or such issuer,
To purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities
convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose
of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such
information and its source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise
o Outsider Trading Hypothetical
Court states that there would be no liability if O’Hagan had disclosed to the source of the information that he
planned to trade on the non-public information.
To whom should he have made disclosure?
o The source of the information
o This would likely include both his law firm and the client Grand Met
What is the effect of making such disclosure?
o By making such disclosure, he would have done away with the fiduciary duty breach and
cure fraud and liability
How does such disclosure solve the problem?
o Once a disloyal agent discloses his imminent breach of duty, his principal may seek
appropriate equitable relief under state law
o §16(b) of 1934 Act: Short-Swing Profits
§16(a) requires insiders of public companies to report to the SEC transactions in equity securities by insiders
of public companies (issuers)
Insiders are directors and officers of issuers and persons who directly or indirectly are the beneficial
owners of more than 10% of any class of equity security of issuers (covered persons)
§16(b): For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such
beneficial owner, director or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him
from any purchase and sale, any sale and purchase of any equity security of such issuer within any period of
less than six months shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer. This subsection shall not cover any
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale or the sale
and purchase of the securities involved
§16(b) was intended by Congress to be the primary avenue to address the problem of insider trading
Who is covered by the rule?
o Beneficial owners, directors, and officers
Beneficial owner = an entity/person who owns more than 10% of any class of equity
securities
What activity is covered?
o A matched purchase and sale or a matched sale and purchase within a 6-month time frame
What is the remedy if a covered person engages in a covered activity?
o Disgorgement of those profits
o Additional Notes on §16(b)
Issuers
§16(b) applies only to companies that register their stock under the 1934 Act
These include companies with stock traded on a national exchange, and companies with assets of at
least $10M and 500+ shareholders
Officers
§16(b) applies to trades by directors and officers who are at least 10% owners.
Officer = an issuer’s president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, any vice
president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function, and other officer
who performs a policy-making function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making
functions for the issuer
Stock classes and convertible debentures
To determine stock percentages under §16(b), courts consider classes of stock separately.
A shareholder who owns 10% of one class of stock is subject to §16(b), even if he or she does not
own 10% of another class, or 10% of the company’s total stock
That shareholder will be liable for the short-swing profits that he or she makes on any class of stock
§16(b) applies only to equity securities which covers convertible debt but not other bonds or
debentures
§16(b) Litigation
Although recovery under §16(b) accrues to the corporation, shareholders can enforce it derivatively
They generally obtain the information about the inside trades by scrutinizing the stock transaction
reports that the insiders must file with the SEC
Matching stock
To calculate a company’s recovery under §16(b), a court must match a defendant’s purchases with
her or his sales
The courts match stock sales and purchases in whatever way (within the confines of the rules)
maximizes the amount the company can recovery
They do not use any of the standard accounting tools or let shareholders identify specific shares of
stock
They match the lowest priced purchases and the highest priced sales
o Reliance Electric v. Emerson Electric (SCOTUS)
§16(b)
If there is a covered person who engages in a covered activity, then the remedy is disgorgement of
profits
Purchase of shares:
Emerson purchased 13.2% of Dodge in a tender offer
Tender offer did not result in a takeover
Dodge subsequently merged into Reliance
The purpose of this tender offer was for Emerson to gain control of Dodge but it failed to do so
Emerson ended up with a minority interest and now wants to sell the shares that it ended up with
Sale of shares:
Sale #1: Emerson sold 3.24% of Dodge
Sale #2: Emerson sold remaining 9.96% of Dodge
Issues: Liability under §16(b)
Is Emerson liable for profits on sale #1?
o Yes
o Emerson is a covered person under the statute
o Emerson held 13.2% of the shares, which is more than the statutory minimum of 10%
o Therefore, it falls within the covered persons definition within the statute
o So Emerson owes profits on the difference between the amount they purchased the shares
for and the amount they sold the shares for
Is Emerson liable for profits on sale #2?
o No
o They are not a covered person within the language of the statute
o They do not own more than 10% at this point
o They are not liable for profits on the second sale
Conclusion & Reasoning
As long as the 2 sales are not legally tied to each other and are made at different times to different
buyers, the splitting of the block is permissible
It cannot be part of a single plan but if it is 2 separate sales, this is acceptable
Reliance cannot recover profits derived from the second sale
Congress, when it enacted §16(b), intended to put into place a flat rule that would take the profits out
of a class of transactions in which congress believed there was a possibility of abuse
A 6-month trading window was considered to be evidence that the covered person who engaged in
the purchase and sale and then the sale and purchase was trading based on material nonpublic
information. However, if you are able to break it up and still stay within the statutory timeframe, as
Emerson did, this is not an issue
o This rule is under inclusive because it does not capture some instances of insider trading
If the purchase and sale took place not within a 6-month timeframe, but outside that,
it would not be covered by the rule even if the person did have access to material
nonpublic information and that motivated their trading
o The rule is also over inclusive
It can capture some transactions that are not based on the use of material nonpublic
information
As long as you fall within the requirements of the statute, it is covered and there is
no inquiry as to whether or not the trading person used material nonpublic
information
o Short-Swing Profits Example
Bill is CEO of SCLaw, Inc. (SCLI), a chain of proprietary law schools in southern California. SCLI stock is
registered under the 1934 Act, and 1M shares are outstanding. On January 1, Bill purchased 200K shares of
SCLI common stock for $10 per share. Determine his liability, if any, under §16(b) (is Bill required to
disgorge profits?)
If he sells all 200K shares on May 1 for $50 per share?
o Yes he is required to disgorge profits
o He is a covered person because he is the CEO which is included under the statute
o This is a covered transaction because he purchased on Jan 1 and sold on May 1 which is
within the 6-month timeframe of the statute
o He realized a profit
o Because he is a covered person engaged in a covered activity, the remedy is disgorgement of
profits in the amount of $40 per share x 200K shares (total = $8M)
If he sells all 110K shares on May 1 for $50 per share, and the remainder on May 2 at the same
price?
o Yes, he is liable to the same extent as the first question.
o The fact that after the first sale he may have become less than 10% shareholder is irrelevant
because he is still a covered person within the meaning of the statute at the time of both sales
o Both sales occur within a 6-month timeframe
o Therefore, the result is the same as directly above
If he sells 110K shares on May 1 for $50 per share, resigns from SCLI, and sells the remainder on
May 2 at the same price?
o Same result because he became liable as a covered person by virtue of being CEO and
officers and directors are covered persons under the statute
o They are subject to §16(b) if they were officers or directors either at the time of the purchase
or the sale transaction
NOTE:
o The language in the fact pattern about 1M outstanding shares is very important because in
order for §16(b) to be triggered, it has to be a company that is a public company whose stock
is registered under §12 of the 1934 Act
o Corporation Review Question #8
Missouri Cellular Corporation manufactures and sells cellular telephones to consumers.
Alfred is the CEO and Chairman of the Board.
January 3: Alfred is informed by Barbie, head of research and development, that field tests of new
technology have failed. Alfred files the information.
February 1: MCC raises capital by doing a public offering of common stock. No mention of failed field tests.
Alfred owns 5% of stock of MCC and purchases shares in public offering.
April 1: Alfred sells most of his stock and earns a profit.
April 2: MCC issues press release on failed field tests and discontinuation of development efforts.
Stock falls sharply.
Has any provision of the federal securities laws been violated?
o List possible areas and analyze.
o INDEMNIFICATION & INSURANCE DGCL §145
Most states have detailed statutory provisions covering the authority or obligation of a corporation to
indemnify officers and directors for any damages they might incur in connection with their corporate
activities, and for the expenses of defending themselves
There are several different situations that might give rise to liability
The risk of liability may be remote, but the amount of the damages can be large in relation to the
individual wealth of the officers and directors and there may be forms of relief other than monetary
damages
Corporations may be able to buy insurance to cover damages and expenses of defenses, but if they
are allowed to do that, the question arises, why not allow them to become self-insurers?
Officers and directors need to be concerned about the possibility that the corporation will be taken
over by people hostile to them which can affect the value of a right to reimbursement that is within
the discretion of the board
Delaware corporations have power to indemnify, grant advances and insure covered persons as specified.
Covered persons = any person who becomes a party to legal action by reason of service as director, officer,
employee or agent
Delaware’s protective provision = §102(b)(7)
This applies only to liability of a director to the corporation or its shareholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director
Indemnification permitted/allowed
Third party suits §145(a): allowed for expenses, fines, judgments; acted in good faith
Derivative suits §145(b): allowed only for expenses with judicial approval; acted in good faith
Indemnification required §145(c): expenses must be reimbursed if defendant was successful on the merits
Advances of expenses to officers and directors §145(e): corporation may grant advances with written
undertaking to repay if not entitled to indemnification
Advances = giving money payments to a covered person, such as officers and directors, to allow
them to pay their fees and legal expenses while a lawsuit is pending against them
This provision is optional, not mandatory
Additional rights may be granted by contract §145(f): this is of most interest to officers, directors, and other
employees; it expressly contemplates agreements that provide greater protection than does the statute itself
Insurance §145(g): corporation may insure covered persons against liability (directors and officers
insurance)
Most publicly held, and many privately held, corporations carry director & officer liability insurance
These are very expensive
o PROXIES: Introduction
Proxy = the agent appointed by a shareholder to attend a shareholder meeting and vote on their behalf; the
document by which the shareholder appoints the agent is also called the proxy
Form:
What is the purpose of the proxy?
o To get authorization from shareholders that these named individuals can vote the shares of
the shareholders at an annual meeting
What voting items does the proxy cover?
o Election or re-election of the board of directors
o Appointing an accounting firm as the accountant
o Shareholder proposals
o Approval/disapproval of a merger
o Whether to amend the articles of incorporation & limit director liability
o To liquidate the firm
o To sell all or substantially all of the assets
Uses:
Solicit shareholder votes needed to hold meetings and take valid shareholder action
o Note that an annual shareholder meeting is required and voting tends to occur during these.
Many people won’t want to physically travel to the location of the meeting so they appoint
proxies to attend and vote on their behalf
o The proxy is a process that is used to solicit shareholder votes that are needed in order to
hold a meeting in which a valid corporate decision by shareholders can be taken
Proxy fights to gain corporate control of the corporation
o These result when an insurgent group tries to oust incumbent managers by soliciting proxy
cards and electing its own representatives to the board
o Proxies: Regulation
State law general
Statutory:
o DGCL §212(b) permits use of proxies for shareholder voting
o Remember that §211(b) requires annual meetings of shareholders for election of directors
Case law on strategic use of proxies and cost reimbursement in proxy contests (2nd use)
State law on cost reimbursement
Annual meeting of shareholders with uncontested board election = incumbents may charge the firm
for proxy costs
o Courts will scrutinize
o Limits imposed by courts
Proxy contest: Incumbents may charge firms for proxy costs; Insurgents may be reimbursed if they
win and shareholders ratify
Federal law
§14(a) of 1934 Act requires proxy solicitations for reporting companies to comply with SEC rules
o This prohibits people from soliciting proxies in violation of the SEC rules
SEC rules require disclosure to accompany proxy solicitation, specify form of proxy card, require
prior filing and review of proxy statement and proxy card, prohibit false and misleading proxy
solicitations
SEC Rule 14a-8: Shareholder Proposals
Definition:
o Recommendation or requirement that company and/or the board of directors of that
company take action which you intend to present in the form of a resolution at meeting of
shareholders
Company must include information in proxy statement and identify it in form of proxy subject to
procedural limitations and the right to exclude
This is another opportunity for shareholders to put an item on the ballot to be voted on during an
annual shareholder meeting
Procedural limitations = limitations on who is a qualified shareholder to present a proposal for
voting at a meeting of shareholders
o Must own $2K or 1%
o May only submit one proposal per shareholder
o The proposal must not exceed 500 words
Management must include the shareholder proposal in the annual proxy solicitation unless the
management can meet burden of proof of showing proposal may be legitimately be excluded
o Management must notify shareholder that their proposal is being rejected and give them the
opportunity to correct the proposal and make it within the limitations of the rule
o Management must file reasons for rejection with the SEC
Shareholders typically don’t approve these proposals
SEC Rule 14a-7: Common Carrier Obligation
Management must mail shareholder materials or provide shareholder with a list of names and
addresses of other shareholders
This gives management a choice:
o They can either mail the insurgent group’s material to the shareholders directly and charge
the group for the cost
o OR
o They can give the group a copy of the shareholder list and let it distribute its own material.
o Levin v. MGM
What was the proxy fight about?
Corporate control of management
The fight was about use of corporate funds in connection with a proxy contest and whether it was
appropriate to use funds of the corporation by the incumbents to wage a proxy fight
Plaintiff included Levin, who is a director of MGM and all plaintiffs hold substantial blocks of
MGM common stock
He is joined by 5 other shareholders (known as the Levin group)
They would like to take over control of MGM because they are not happy with the existing
management so they are contesting the proxies that have been sent out by defendants
o Defendants are the incumbents
What is the basis for plaintiff’s complaint in this case?
The fact that the incumbents used corporate money and funds to wage a proxy fight and defend their
position in the proxy fight and they used the money for purposes that the Levin group claim was
wrongful
They used money for the proxy solicitation process and wrongfully committed the company to pay
for the services of specially retained attorneys, a public relations firm and proxy soliciting
organizations, and, in addition, have improperly used the offices and employees of MGM in proxy
solicitation and the good-will and business contracts of MGM to secure support for the present
management
What is the issue?
Whether there were unfair or illegal means used by the incumbents in connection with fighting off
the plaintiffs in the proxy contest
What is plaintiff seeking?
Plaintiffs pray for temporary and permanent injunctive relief against defendants’ continuing this
method of solicitation of proxies and against defendants’ voting the proxies so obtained at the annual
meeting
They also seek money damages of $2.5M on behalf of MGM from the individual defendants
Who wins and why?
Defendants win
The court says that it was appropriate for the incumbents to expend funds for the purposes of the
proxy fight because the shareholders have a right to be fully informed when it comes to a proxy
contest
What limitations does the court impose on costs incurred for proxy contests?
The court says that there were no illegal or unfair means of communication used
The court appears to include some limitations as well:
o The proxy fight must turn on the differences relating to policy regarding running the
company
o The amounts spent
o Violation of federal statute
Here, the fundamental policy differences between the groups concerned:
o The annual number of feature pictures MGM should produce
o Slow release of pictures to TV showing
o Build up cash funds available for productions by reducing dividends
o Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
Who is plaintiff and who is he suing?
Plaintiff is an attorney shareholder who owns 25 out of over 2.3M shares of Fairchild Engine
Plaintiff is suing the board of directors of the company through a shareholder’s derivative lawsuit
Basis for complaint?
Has to do with reimbursement of expenses in connection with a proxy contest
Plaintiff seeks to compel the return of $261,522 paid out of the corporate treasury to reimburse both
sides in a proxy contest for their expenses
This was a proxy contest where the incumbents were challenged by a new board and the new board
won the proxy contest and both parties were reimbursed for expenses
The new board was the ones that approved the payment reimbursement to the old board
What is a proxy contest?
2 competing proxy solicitations
o One sent out by incumbents (old board)
o One sent out by insurgents (new board)
The incumbents would be naming their own board of directors to be re-elected at the meeting
The insurgents would name different individuals who want to become part of the board of directors
So shareholders would receive 2 proxy cards and the shareholder needs to choose to return only one
of them
Who wins and why?
Defendants win
Because the proxy contest involved questions of corporate policy
The court distinguishes between expenses relating to corporate policy and expenses related to
matters of personal
Here, there were questions of corporate policy involved rather than personal control and the
expenses were reasonable
Who can be reimbursed for proxy contest expenses?
Incumbents have the right to be reimbursed in connection with a proxy contest because they have a
good faith right to defend their positions as long as certain things are true:
o This involved a contest over policy
o The amounts spent were reasonable and proper
o The actions of the incumbents were taken in the best interest of the shareholders
The shareholders of a corporation can reimburse successful contestants (the insurgents here) for
reasonable and good faith purchases
What are the limits for reimbursement?
Reasonable and proper in amount
Contest over policy and not trying to maintain power for one’s own self interest
Acting in good faith
Dissent
Mentions the fact that not all expenses that were incurred by incumbents were related to business
expenses and unrelated to policy
It was unclear whether this was a dispute about policy and not personal because there was a dispute
regarding an employment agreement involving a former officer and director
There was majority approval of the decision to reimburse but there should have been consent of all
shareholders given the circumstances of the case
o Corporation Review Q#9
Can Kane charge his expenses to Inquirer Corp.?
Can Geddes obtain reimbursement from the Inquirer Corp. if he wins?
If he loses?
o SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS
Definition:
The ability of shareholders to obtain shareholder list or other corporate records
o This is regulated by state law statutes rather than federal statutes
Compare the requests made by shareholders in Crane v. Anaconda and Pillsbury v. Honeywell
What records were sought?
o Crane v. Anaconda
Crane requested a copy of Anaconda’s list of shareholders
The second request was a written request to produce its stock book for inspection
With the second demand Crane accompanied it with an affidavit
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
He submitted 2 formal demands to Honeywell requesting that it produce its original
shareholder ledger, current shareholder ledger, and all corporate records dealing
with weapons and munitions manufacture
Honeywell refused
What was the reason for the request?
o Crane v. Anaconda
Crane claimed that Anaconda had a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to present
them with all the information pertinent to the pending tender offer
They wanted to contact the shareholders directly but Anaconda refused the request
Anaconda refused because at the time of the request, Crane owned no shares of
Anaconda stock
Crane then made a second request for the list after acquiring shares of Anaconda
Anaconda rejected this second demand as well but offered to mail Crane’s
documents to its shareholders at Crane’s expense
The request was made because they wanted to launch an exchange offer for the
common stock of Anaconda and they wanted to contact the shareholders to make
this offer
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
He wanted to give himself a voice in Honeywell’s affairs so he could persuade
Honeywell to cease producing munitions
He wanted to communicate with other shareholders in the hope of altering
Honeywell’s board of directors and thereby changing its policy
Was the request granted?
o Crane v. Anaconda
No they didn’t want to provide the information but they offered to mail the
information to the shareholders directly
Anaconda claims to have denied the second request because it was not a proper
purpose under the statute because it is not a proper purpose to contact the
shareholders to convince them to sell their shares and this did not involve the
business of the corporation
The court concluded that Crane was entitled to receive the shareholder list
Anaconda did not meet its burden of proving an improper purpose
This was a proper purpose because shareholders should know what affects
the future direction of the corporation and the shareholder’s own interest
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
Honeywell denied the demand
The court agrees with Honeywell and denies the shareholder’s request
The court looks at the meaning of proper purpose
It says that a proper purpose means a purpose that is economic in nature
when it comes to inspecting corporate records other than the shareholder list
His stated goal was a type of political goal, not anything concerned with
economic effects involving the company
Read and compare the governing statutes used in the two cases: NYBCL §1315 used in Crane and DGCL
§220 used in Pillsbury
NYBCL §1315 Record of Shareholders: from Crane v. Anaconda
o (a) any resident of this state who shall have been a shareholder of record, for at least 6
months immediately preceding his demand, of a foreign corporation doing business in this
state, or any resident of this state holding, or thereunto authorized in writing by the holders
of, at least 5% of any class of the outstanding shares, upon at least 5 days’ written demand
may require such foreign corporation to produce a record of its shareholders setting forth the
names and addresses of all shareholders, the number and class of shares held by each and the
dates when they respectively became the owners of record thereof and shall have the right to
examine the record of shareholders or an exact copy thereof certified as correct by the
corporate officer or agent responsible for keeping or producing such record and to make
extracts therefrom
o (b) an examination authorized by paragraph (a) may be denied to such shareholder or other
person upon his refusal to furnish to the foreign corporation an affidavit that such inspection
is not desired for a purpose which is in the interest of a business or object other than the
business of the foreign corporation and that such shareholder or other person has not within
5 years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders of any other corporation of any type
or kind, whether or not formed under the laws of this state, or abetted any person in
procuring any such record of shareholders for any such purpose
DGCL §220 Inspection of Books and Records: from Pillsbury v. Honeywell
o (b) any shareholder shall, upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have
the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any proper purpose
(1) the corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its shareholders, and
(2) its other books and records, and to make copies or extracts therefrom.
A proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person’s interest
as a shareholder
o (c) If the corporation refuses to permit an inspection sought by a shareholder pursuant to
subsection (b) or does not reply to the demand within 5 business days after the demand has
been made, the shareholder may apply to the Court of Chancery for an order to compel such
inspection. The Court may summarily order the corporation to permit the shareholder to
inspect the corporation’s stock ledger, an existing list of stockholders, and its other books
and records, and to make copies or extracts therefrom; or the Court may order the
corporation to furnish to the shareholder a list of its shareholders as of a specific date on
condition that the shareholder first pay to the corporation the reasonable cost of obtaining
and furnishing such list and on such other conditions as the Court deems appropriate. Where
the shareholder seeks to inspect the corporation’s books and records, other than its stock
ledger or list of stockholders, such stockholder shall first establish that:
(1) he has complied with this section respecting the form and manner of making
demand for inspection of such documents; and
(2) that the inspection he seeks is for a proper purpose.
o Where the shareholder seeks to inspect the corporation’s stock ledger or list of shareholders
and has complied with this section respecting the form and manner of making demand for
inspection of such documents, the burden of proof shall be upon the corporation to establish
that the inspection such shareholder seeks is for an improper purpose.
Type of shareholder that can request information from the corporation under the statute?
o Crane v. Anaconda
Holder of at least 5% of any class of the outstanding shares
At the time of the second request, Crane was Anaconda’s largest shareholder so it
went over the 5% requirement
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
Any shareholder
Type of books and records that may be requested under the statute?
o Crane v. Anaconda
The shareholder can request the shareholder list setting forth names and addresses of
shareholders, the number and class of shares held by each shareholder, and the dates
when they respectively became the owners of record
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
Any books and records
The statute says that you can request a corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its
shareholders, and its other books and records, and to make copies or extracts
Conditions to access for books and record?
o Crane v. Anaconda
The request must be made at least upon 5 days written notice and it must be
accompanied by an affidavit stating the inspection is not desired for a purpose which
is in the interest of a business or object other than the business of the corporation
and that such shareholder has not within 5 years sold or offered for sale any list of
shareholders of any other corporation of any type or kind
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
Inspection must be for any proper purpose
Shareholder must pay to the corporation the reasonable cost for obtaining and
furnishing the shareholder list
Burden of proof on proper purpose?
o Crane v. Anaconda
The burden of proof once the conditions have been met is on the corporation to
demonstrate that access is being requested for an improper purpose
o Pillsbury v. Honeywell
Plaintiff shareholder must establish a proper purpose to obtain books and records
other than the shareholder list
For the shareholder list, the burden is on the corporation to establish that the
inspection is for an improper purpose
o Corporation Review Question #2
2C: are the directors entitled to receive the advances?
2D: is the shareholder entitled to receive shareholder list and all books and records pertaining to audit of
overseas operations?
Module 6 Quizzes:
o Quiz 22: Definition of Security; Registration and Exemptions
The policy behind the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is to protect investors
and the integrity of the securities markets through a focus on disclosure and anti-fraud measures. (T/F)
True
According to the Supreme Court’s opinion in SEC v. Howey, which of the following characteristics are
needed for an investment contract within the meaning of the definition of security in the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?
All of the following:
o Investment of money
o In a common enterprise
o With the expectation of profit
o To come solely from the efforts of others
The court in Robinson v. Glynn stated that the labels used by the parties are binding in determining whether
the federal securities laws are applicable; if the parties call an investment a stock then the federal court must
accept that a security is involved. (T/F)
False
The Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina stated that the test for the existence of a private placement was
whether the offerees needed the protection of the federal securities laws or whether they were able to fend
for themselves because they had access to information equivalent to what they would receive in a registered
public offering. (T/F)
True
The court in Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp. stated that the defendant had established that its
securities offering was a private placement because there were a small number of offerees and plaintiff was a
sophisticated investor who did not need the protection of the federal securities laws. (T/F)
False
o Quiz 23: Securities, Fraud, and Insider Trading
§11 of the 1933 Act creates an express private right of action for any purchase or sale of securities alleged to
involve material misstatements or omissions. (T/F)
False
Which of the following is an available defense in a lawsuit brought under §11 of the 1933 Act?
All of the following:
o Defense based on running of the applicable statute of limitations
o Loss causation defense
o Due diligence defense
Which of the following defendants in Escott v. BarChris was able to establish a complete due diligence
defense?
None of the following:
o Peat Marwick
o BarChris
o Birnbaum
The court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur found that the individual defendants violated the disclose or abstain
rule because they purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur shares and call options using material non-public
information. (T/F)
True
The court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur stated that the results of the core drilling samples might have been
considered material by a reasonable investor assessing the possibility of an ore strike of a significant
magnitude on the operations of Texas Gulf Sulphur. (T/F)
True
o Quiz 24: Insider Trading
In Chiarella v. U.S., the Supreme Court stated that the duty to disclose or abstain from trading on material
inside information under §10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 arises from a relationship of trust
giving rise to a fiduciary duty; it does not arise from the mere possession of material inside information.
(T/F)
True
In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court stated that a person who receives material non-public information from
a corporate insider may not trade on that information if such insider breached a fiduciary duty in providing
such information and the recipient knew or should have known of the breach. (T/F)
True
In Salman v. US, the Supreme Court stated that a corporate insider’s gift to a family member of material
inside information is insufficient to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty by the insider required under the
Dirks rule; some additional pecuniary benefit to the corporate insider in exchange for the gift is needed.
(T/F)
False
In U.S. v. O’Hagan, which theory of insider trading liability under §10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule
10b-5 was upheld by the Supreme Court?
Outsider liability under the misappropriation theory
In U.S. v. O’Hagan, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of SEC Rule 14e-3(a) relating to insider trading
in connection with tender offers. (T/F)
True
o Quiz 25/26: §16(b); Proxies; Shareholder Inspection
Which of the following is not part of a cause of action under §16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934?
There must be evidence of use of inside information for the transactions
Which of the following statements about the result in Reliance Electric v. Emerson Electric is accurate?
Emerson was liable for trading profits on the first sale of 3.24% of its Dodge shares
In the case of Levin v. MGM, the court found that the incumbents were entitled to reimbursement of
expenses for the proxy fight because shareholders have a right to be fully informed about policy differences,
no illegal and unfair means were used, and the amounts expended were not excessive. (T/F)
True
In the case of Crane v. Anaconda, the court found that Crane was not entitled to the shareholder list because
it did not have a proper business purpose for requesting it. (T/F)
False
In the case of Pillsbury v. Honeywell, the burden of proof was on the shareholder to show a proper business
purpose because he was requesting books and records of the corporation. (T/F)
True
SUMMARY REVIEW: Agency
o Source of Law:
Common law
Restatement Second of Agency
o 1. Who is an agent
Definition = §1 creation of agency relationship test
Gordon v. Doty
Jensen v. Cargill
o Restatement distinguishes the agency relationship from other kinds of legal relationships
o Specifically talked about principal agent relationship v. credit debtor relationship
Debtor creditor relationship is not automatically considered to be an agency
relationship if it involves normal commercial dealings
If the creditor tries to assume control of the debtor’s business the creditor
may be deemed to be a principal and actions by the agent can be imputed to
the principal
Distinguish principal-agent from debtor-creditor and buyer-supplier = §14O, §14K
Buyer-supplier relationship can lead to a finding of principal agency
The restatement gives a test
o Test turns on whether supplier was acting primarily for the other person or whether it had an
independent business
o Topics covered:
Creation of an agency relationship
To what extent can an agent bind a principal in the context of contracts & then in the context of torts
Fiduciary duties
o 2.1 Liability of principal to third parties in contract for acts of an agent
Actual authority = §1, §26
Mill Street Church v. Hogan
o Actual authority can be either expressed or implied
o This case talks about implied actual authority
Agent has received instructions from the principal but the principal has not given
express instruction on a particular action but implied actual authority might exist if
what the agent does is incidental or reasonably necessary to accomplish a particular
transaction
Apparent authority = §8, §27
370 Leasing v. Ampex
o Apparent authority can be used when the agent is acting outside the scope of the instructions
from the principal and contrary to those instructions
o Turns on a manifestation from the principal that reaches a third party and causes a third
party to reasonably believe that the agent is authorized to act
Manifestation can consist of a direct communication from the principal to the third
party
Manifestation can also exist by virtue of someone’s title and other kinds of
manifestations shown in the restatement and slides from this chapter
o Also necessary to have a reasonable belief
Is it reasonable to assume that someone in a particular position with a particular title
has the authority to bind the principal?
Inherent authority = §8A, §194, §195
Watteau v. Fenwick
o Dying theory
o Can be difficult to distinguish inherent authority and apparent authority
o Inherent authority can be used if an agent is acting contrary to the instructions of the
principal
o Turns on what is customary for an agent in a particular position to be able to do
o It exists for the protection of third parties
o Some jurisdictions restrict this to situations where the principal is a general agent or chief
executive
CEO = general agent
o 2.2 Liability of principal to third parties in contract = Other principles of liability (do not turn on the existence of an
agency relationship)
Ratification = §82
Botticello v. Stefanovicz
o Ratification can be a viable theory if you have a party that although they did not initially
approve a transaction and there is some kind of affirmation through words or conduct or
sometimes silence that can be interpreted as consent
o There is also a requirement of intent on the part of that person who is approving and
affirming and they must have knowledge of all circumstances
Estoppel = §8B
Hoddeson v. Koos Bros
o Principal allowing someone to create the appearance of authority and not correcting that
misimpression, a reasonable belief by the third party, and a change in position
Reliance is very important
This is what distinguishes estoppel and ratification
o 2.3 Liability of principal to third parties in tort
Principle of liability
Doctrine of Respondeat superior = §219
Master-servant relationship versus independent contractor status = §2
o Application in retail gasoline outlet cases
Humble Oil v. Martin & Hoover v. Sun Oil
Liability turns on whether or not the employer controls the physical conduct
of the employee
Whether or not there is control over the day to day operations
Use of actual agency and apparent agency principles to establish liability in franchise cases
o Form of licensing agreement in which the franchisor licenses the use of its valuable property
including trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights in exchange for payments from a
franchisee
o
It is a condition of the contract that a franchisee maintain certain standards to uphold the
value of the property being licensed
o Holiday Inn & McDonalds cases
System-wide control does not automatically lead to principal agent relationship
Distinguishing system-wide control & day to day control
Day-to-day control can lead to liability
o Apparent agency came up in McDonalds & §267
Test is whether someone represents another as his servant or agent and causes a
third party to justifiably rely on the care or skill of such agent and as a result, that
first party who represents another as his agent can be liable for harm caused by lack
of skill
Exception to non-liability for torts of independent contractors
o Whether or not you can become liable for torts committed by someone who is your
independent contractor rather than your employee or servant
o The general rule is that if the independent contractor commits a tort and they are negligent
then you would not be liable for that
o But in Majestic Realty case, they give an exception to this general rule
If you are engaged in an inherently dangerous activity and your contractor does not
take normal commercial precautions against the risk of damage then you, as the
person who hired the independent contractor, could be liable
Scope of employment (Respondeat superior is limited to actions within one’s scope of employment)
Statement of doctrine = §228
Kind of Conduct within Scope of Employment = §229
o 3. Fiduciary duties of agents
Duties during agency
Duty of loyalty = §387
o Reading Case
Do not misuse assets of the employer or principal for personal advantage
o General Automotive v. Singer
Not competing with your employer in the same line of business during the course of
employment
Duty to account for profits = §388
Liability for use of assets = §404
Duties while leaving
Use of confidential information = §396
o Town and Country v. Newberry
Prohibition of using confidential information about employer’s business that you
learn during your course of business working with employer
Use of confidential information is a breach of fiduciary duty both during and after
employment relationship
Remedy is disgorgement
SUMMARY REVIEW: Partnership
o Source of Law:
Uniform Partnership Act (1914)
Case law
o Characteristics of partnerships
Individuals who have a preexisting relationship who want to have close control and management rights over
the business
Equal sharing in the management of the business
o Default rules versus mandatory rules
Default rules are the rules that a court would apply to the extent the parties have not already agreed
otherwise
There are very few mandatory rules
o Formation (general partnership)
Definition of actual partnership = §6
Association of 2 or more people
Indicators of partnership
§7 = profit sharing is prima facie evidence subject to exceptions
o Exception in Fenwick case was the exception for profit sharing which was seen as a bonus
for the employee
Factors used by courts in Fenwick case
o Whether partnership agreement actually led to the formation of a partnership
o 8 partnerships factors
o Most important:
Management/control of the business
Sharing of profits
Partnership distinguished from
o Employer-employee relationship
Partnership by estoppel = §16
When a party seeks to hold someone else liable
Based on principle that partners are jointly and severally liable for the debts and obligations of the
business
o Young v. Jones
Whether one accounting firm could be responsible for negligence caused by another
accounting firm. Both were separately organized
Court rejected actual partnership because separately organized
Introduced partnership by estoppel saying it can be applied if someone represents
another person as a partner or allows that person to represent itself as in partnership
with the first person and there is a third party who relies on that representation and
enters into a transaction on that reliance
o Fiduciary duties among partners
Classic statement of duty of loyalty in Meinhard case
Extension of lease covered the same property and some additional property and this was a business
opportunity that should have included the joint venturer
He breached a fiduciary duty by taking a business opportunity for himself
There should have been disclosure
UPA §21
RUPA §404
You cannot take a business opportunity for yourself if that opportunity belonged to the partnership
as a whole
Other duty of loyalty violations
Competing with the business
Using partnership property for personal gain rather than for partnership purposes
Conflict of interest on both sides of the transaction
o Property rights
Nature of property rights = §8, §26
Right to use partnership property for partnership business, to share in income stream from
partnership, to participate in management
o Putnam v. Shoaf
o No right to claim pieces of property for yourself
Sharing of profits and losses = §18(a)
Default rule is equal sharing of profits even if there is unequal contributions of capital
Can change default rule by contract
Losses are usually shared the same way as profits
o Management rights = §18(e)
Default rule is equal control rights
NIBCO case
o Each partner acts as an agent for the partnership
o This can be changed by contract
Use of management committees
Can change default rule by contract
o Dissolution
Causes of dissolution §31 & §32
Without judicial involvement
By judicial decree
With and without violation of the partnership agreement
o With violation of partnership agreement leads to additional consequences
At will versus term partnership
Term can be express or implied
o Express = partners agree they will be together for x years
o Implied = agreement that partners will stay together in business until they have paid off a
certain partnership debt
o No violation of partnership agreement if partnership is dissolved after the tern, whether
expressed or implied
May impact whether a dissolution is in violation of the partnership agreement or not
At will dissolution must be done in good faith
o This is from Page v. Page case
Negative consequence of dissolving a partnership in violation of the partnership agreement
Right of non-culpable party to damages for wrongful dissolution & right to continue the business
and possess partnership property = §38
Right of culpable partner to receive value of partnership interest (excluding good will) less damages
payable to non-culpable partners
Order of distribution of property = §40
o Limited Partnerships
Definition
Two categories of partners
o Unlimited liability for general partners
There must be at least one general partner
Right to control and run the business
Informal formation
o Limited liability for limited partners
Liable only up to the extent of their contribution to the partnership
No joint and several liability for debts exceeding partnership’s assets
Formal process
Must file with government
Limitation on limited partners’ right to manage
May result in losing limited liability if limited partner participates actively in management
SUMMARY REVIEW: Limited Liability Companies
o Source of Law:
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996)
Case Law
Articles of Organization
Operating Agreement
o Characteristics: hybrid form
Combines characteristics of partnerships and corporations
Requires government filing for formation
o Formation
Articles of Organization = §202, §203
Filed with the secretary of state in the state where the formation is going to happen
Operating Agreement = §103
Not filed or publicly available
More detailed information
o Piercing the LLC veil
General rule of limited liability = §303
Limited liability protects owners from paying for debts exceeding assets of the company
Piercing the veil is an exception to this general rule
Use of corporate piercing factors by state courts
The court touches on piercing factors
Factors are not identical to those from the corporate context
o Fiduciary duties of loyalty and care owed among members in member managed LLC = §409
Member managed and manager managed (LLC management structures)
Member managed = all members will be taking part in control of the business; fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care are owed among the members and to the LLC itself; equal control rights
Manager managed = control rights for day to day business operations have been delegated by the
members/owners to one or more managers; managers are the ones who owe fiduciary duties
Managers owe such duties in manager managed LLC
Can be waived by contract subject to limitations contained in ULLCA and fiduciary duties that conflict with
public policy considerations
o Management
Can designate either member-managed or manager-managed
§404 = Rules for management and voting in LLCs
o Dissolution
Articles of termination = §805
Procedure for settling claims = §807, §808
Orderly dissolution according to statutory procedures can limit liability to amount received in liquidation =
§808(d)(2)
SUMMARY REVIEW: Corporations
o Source of Law:
Delaware General Corporation Law
Case law
Articles of Incorporation
Filed with the secretary of state
Must be completed first
Names directors
By-laws
Contains more information than the articles
Detailed info about the governance structure
Info about directors and shareholders meetings and voting
o Characteristics:
Formation requires formalities
Filing of articles
Limited liability
Continuity of existence
Free transferability
Publicly traded or transferred through private transfers
Centralized management
Board of directors = charged under state corporation law statutes for running the business and setting
policies and exercising oversight functions
Officers of corporations = oversees day to day operations; gets authority from shareholders
Separation between ownership and control
Double taxation
Negative feature
The corporation is required to pay an income tax & distribution of dividends is also taxable by the
individual shareholders
o Formation
Articles of incorporation = §101, §102, §106
Preparing, executing and filing with the secretary of state office
Some features are mandatory; others are optional
Incorporators = §107
Individuals charged with executing and filing the articles
Doesn’t have to be people associated with the corporation
First meeting = §108
By-laws = §109
Registered office = §131
Required for service in litigation
Promoters & liability for pre-incorporation contracts
Promoters = someone who has the financial incentive to form the business; may later become a
shareholder, officer, or director
Could be interested in getting the business up and running but could be liable for pre-incorporation
contracts under the theories of agency
o Piercing the Corporate Veil
Legal rule of limited liability
Equitable exception fashioned by courts when it would be unjust to allow limited liability to stand
Tests
Closely held corporations
o Alter ego
First prong that must be satisfied
Business is not separate from individual
Courts use factors such as failure to follow corporate formalities
o Fraud or injustice
Most courts require a second prong
Sea Land Case
o Assumption of risk
Some courts add a third prong
Example in PowerPoints
Contract scenario
Sophisticated contract creditor had the opportunity to investigate the financial status
of the corporation and could have taken steps to mitigate nonpayment but failed to
do so, court might say even though the other prongs are satisfied, piercing isn’t
appropriate because you assumed the risk of loss by failing to take action to mitigate
the risk
Parent-subsidiary relationships
o Substantial domination
Bristol Myers case
Court touched on whether a second prong of fraud or injustice should be required
o Shareholder derivative lawsuits
Definition of derivative lawsuit
Plaintiff shareholder is suing in the name of the corporation and on behalf of the corporation
asserting damage to the business by management as a result of breach of fiduciary duty or by
asserting corporate waste
o Waste = no value given to the corporation in exchange for the transaction being conducted
Cohen case
Eisenberg case
Definition of direct lawsuit
Claim being asserted by an individual shareholder that she has been personally harmed as a result of
certain actions taken by the managers of the business
Eisenberg case
Reasons for development of derivative lawsuits
There is an issue with standing because the individual shareholders aren’t injured in a derivative
lawsuit so the court has to use its equitable powers to allow plaintiff shareholders to bring suit
Potential for abuse by shareholders:
Procedural restraints on use of derivative lawsuits like security for expenses statutes
States enacted statutes to place limitations on shareholders bringing these actions
Demand required actions:
Procedural requirement for shareholder plaintiff to proceed with action
Boards will likely move to dismiss if demand is made; shareholder cannot proceed with case
Wrongful refusal cases = shareholder will likely fail unless she can overcome the business judgment
rule
o Business judgment rule = strong presumption in favor of corporate management; presumes
good faith and that they are acting in the best interest of the corporation
Demand excused cases: demand futility & demand excusal
Demand futility
o Grimes v. Donald
Shareholder may proceed with the action if she can plead demand futility; courts may recognize
demand futility exception where can show lack of independence of board
Use of special board committees to dismiss derivative actions; examples of cases in which demand
was not made because futile
o Two step scrutiny by court
o Board is not supposed to be involved in making the decision because the plaintiff
successfully pled demand futility
o Role and purposes of the corporation
Power and purposes = §122, §121
Purpose of modern business corporation is to maximize shareholder value although some flexibility to
consider other constituencies
Dodge v. Ford
Charitable giving is a well-established power of corporations as long as there is some benefit to corporation
and within certain limits
Smith v. Barlow
The case also discusses limitations
Shareholders are nominal owners and officers should comply with law
o Role of shareholders, directors and officers
§141 = Corporation is run by the board of directors
Shareholders delegate their control right to the directors by electing them at the annual meeting
Board delegates day to day business decision making to officers
Business judgment rule shield for most management decision making
Control rights of shareholders are limited = electing directors, approving major corporate transactions such
as mergers
Access to corporate shareholder list and other corporate books and records is regulated by state law
Voting rules for shareholders and directors
Use of proxies is regulated by state and federal law
o Fiduciary duties of officers and directors
Duty of care
Decision making
o Cannon v. American Express
o Smith v. Van Gorgon
o Focus on following proper procedure
o Gross negligence standard
o Use of reasonably available information
o Due deliberation
Oversight
o Duties to become familiar with the business and to monitor activities & take action when
you become aware
Taking action = investigating, checking
Francis Case
o Value of compliance programs
Caremark Case
Used compliance program as a defense
Duty of loyalty = §102(b)(7)
Conflict of interest
o Identify the conflict of interest
Existence of the conflict must be shown
o How is the conflict resolved?
And the director took action to benefit themselves when they should have taken
action to benefit the corporation
There must be a corporate benefit
Judicial scrutiny to establish fairness
Bayer v. Baran
o Director or stockholder ratification of conflict of interest transactions under DGCL §144
Can substitute for proof of fairness to corporation with ratification
Ratification can be by the directors or the shareholders
o Full disclosure to the board and the majority of disinterested
directors approve or
o Full disclosure to the shareholders and majority of disinterested
shareholders approve or
Fliger v. Lawrence
o Prove fairness to the corporation
Corporate opportunity doctrine
o Guth v. Loft factors for existence of corporate opportunity
No corporate opportunity found:
May take corporate opportunity
No formal procedure for formal disclosure and rejection by corporation
required in Delaware but such procedure acts as safe harbor
o But other jurisdictions may require disclosure and rejection
Corporate opportunity found:
Must present to board and receive rejection before taking opportunity
This is mandatory
o Fiduciary duties of dominant shareholders in a parent-subsidiary context
Sinclair v. Levy
Use total fairness test if self-dealing
Self-dealing = parent company got something that the minority shareholder subsidiaries did not
receive
Otherwise use business judgment rule
SUMMARY REVIEW: Federal Securities Regulation
o Source of Law:
1933 and 1934 Acts
SEC Regulations
Case law
o Threshold Issues
Definition of security (threshold issue)
Statutory definition
Howey definition of investment contract
o Status of LLC interests as securities
o 4 part test
Definitions of materiality (threshold issue)
Reasonable investor test or total mix test (historical fact)
Probability/magnitude test (speculative information)
o Substantive information
Registration (disclosure)
1933 Act §5
Must register with SEC & file registration statement & provide prospectus to investors
Private Placement exemption from registration (disclosure)
1933 Act §4(2)
Not a public offering & access to information
Corporate disclosure fraud (antifraud provisions)
1933 Act §11
1934 Act §10(b)
SEC Rule 10b-5
Insider trading rules (breach of fiduciary duty)
1934 Act §10(b)
SEC Rule 10b-5
o Classic theory = disclose or abstain rule
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur
o Tippee liability = personal benefit or gifted benefit
2 cases
o Misappropriation theory
O’Hagan case
SEC Rule 14e-3(a)
o O’Hagan
o Insider trading rule for tender offers only
o No need for breach of fiduciary duty
Short swing profit rule of 1934 Act §16(b)
o Remedy is disgorgement of profits back to the corporation
Final Exam Information
o Tips for Objective Portion
Questions will be multiple choice and true/false including application of law to hypothetical facts.
There is only one correct answer.
There is no penalty for wrong answers.
o Tips for Essay Portion
Questions will be similar in format to the review questions discussed in class.
Answer all parts of all questions.
If possible, use IRAC and IRAC headings.
Most of your time should be spent on identifying and discussing relevant rules of law (R) and applying law
to facts in the hypothetical (A)
Only discuss law that is relevant to answering the question presented.
Not every rule of law discussed this semester will be relevant.
Avoid extended policy discussions.
Final exam questions are similar those on the bar exam. Try to answer the question presented using
black letter rules of law.
Cite to relevant authority. Do not set forth general principles of law without citation.
Cite to name of case or section number of statute or restatement or regulation that is the source of the
rule.
Do not write out statutes, regulations or sections of the restatement provisions. Only the words or
phrases on which you are relying should be written out.
Do not discuss the facts of cases you cite; only the principle of law that is relevant.