Forum
Role of the Forensic Process in
Investigating Structural Failure
Sean P. Brady, Ph.D., C.P.Eng.
Managing Director, Brady Heywood, Brisbane, Australia. E-mail: sbrady@
bradyheywood.com.au
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DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)CF.1943-5509.0000274
Introduction
The role of the forensic structural engineer is to identify and com-
municate the cause of structural failure, and in some situations, but
not all, provide expert opinion as part of dispute proceedings. Fail-
ure is not limited to catastrophic failure, such as the Minneapolis
bridge collapse, but includes any situation in which there is an
unacceptable difference between expected and observed structural
performance, such as cracking, corrosion, or excessive vibration.
The accurate identification and communication of the cause of
structural failure forms the basis of risk management and rectifica-
tion in noncatastrophic collapses, is a key requirement in legal dis-
putes, and plays a critical role in disseminating the lessons learned
from failure to the wider engineering profession.
Over the past four decades, a number of writers and industry
bodies have defined, explained, and promoted forensic engineer-
ing. Texts such as Forensic Engineering (Carper 2000), the Foren-
sic Structural Engineering Handbook (Ratay 2010), and Beyond
Failure: Forensic Case Studies for Civil Engineers (Delatte 2008)
provide excellent introductions to the specialty of forensics, and
ASCE’s Technical Council on Forensic Engineering (TCFE) has
organized numerous forensic engineering conferences and has
published the indispensible Guidelines for Forensic Engineering
Practice (Lewis 2003) and Journal of Performance of Constructed
Facilities (edited by Kenneth Carper). These efforts have been
instrumental in developing forensic structural engineering into a
distinct specialty within structural engineering.
Forensic engineers utilize a range of expertise to investigate
structural failure. For example, in the specific role of expert wit-
nesses in legal disputes, forensic engineers must possess expertise
that includes knowledge of legal requirements and processes, good
verbal and written communication skills, an ability to maintain
independence, and an ability to perform in the face of adver-
sarial cross examination. Technical expertise is also a critical
prerequisite. However, regardless of whether or not a structural fail-
ure is the subject of a legal dispute, a successful forensic investi-
gation requires specific expertise to identify and communicate the
cause of structural failure in a manner that is forensically sound—
expertise typically not encountered in engineering design. In
Forensic Engineering, Carper (2000) describes this expertise as
“detective skills,” and goes on to conclude that “the importance
of detective skills, as opposed to design skills, cannot be overem-
phasized. A good design professional is not necessarily a good
forensic expert.”1
This view typically surprises practicing design engineers, who
feel that engineers who design specific types of structures are the
ideal candidates to determine how such structures failed. To under-
stand why this may not be the case, it is first necessary to examine
the conventional design process and discuss why it is ill suited to
determining the cause of structural failure. Then the forensic
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process, which is essentially the application of detective skills,
can be introduced and its central role in investigations illustrated.
Finally, an examination of the reason the embedded nature of the
design process in an engineer’s psyche can be a significant impedi-
ment to the implementation of the forensic process is presented, and
practical steps are discussed that may assist in overcoming this
difficulty.
Failure Investigation and Design Process
Fundamentally, structural design requires “an ability to create a
cost-efficient load-bearing scheme in accordance with a set of
‘rules’ prescribed by building codes, for minimal design cost”
(Bell 2000a). The design process generally commences with the
designer considering a range of design concepts. Then, by using
simplifying performance assumptions and an iterative process, the
designer produces a single design—from what may be many viable
alternatives—that balances various competing factors such as
physical constraints, cost, and adequate performance.2
Design is, therefore, a process of synthesis (Bell 2000a), which
utilizes assumptions relating to probable loads, structural behavior,
and the capacity of material properties. These assumptions are
conservative and have been codified over the years to produce
efficient and generally safe structures. To design structures by at-
tempting to precisely predict the loads they will carry, how they will
behave, and their material properties would be hopelessly ineffi-
cient and time consuming. Further, actually attempting to predict
these factors to a high level of accuracy is of questionable value in
the design process, given the unknowns surrounding the structure’s
construction and the loads it will carry.3 Therefore, a key element in
the design process is the management of these unknowns, rather
than their investigation.
The role of this process in the design of new structures is self
evident, but the process also has a number of important roles to play
in the overall response to structural failure. For example, in non-
catastrophic failures, an engineering design solution may be
required to rectify the failure and restore the structure to its origi-
nally intended performance, regardless of whether legal proceed-
ings arise. Likewise, in legal disputes, the satisfactory settlement of
a dispute may depend on the details of a design engineer’s solution
to resolve the issue, or, when causation has been determined, expert
testimony may be required to ascertain whether the engineer that
originally designed the structure did so with the degree of reason-
able skill and care expected of a practicing engineer, a role for
which engineers that typically utilize the design process are excel-
lently placed because of their knowledge of standards and profes-
sional engineering practice.
Because of these attributes, an engineer that typically utilizes
the design process also appears the ideal candidate to determine
the cause of failure. However, an examination of a number of the
key aspects of the design process illustrates the reason difficulties
exist despite the fact that the engineer may have design experience
relevant to the structure under consideration.4
1. Design process objective: The objective of the design
process is to identify and develop engineering solutions, not
 to determine causation. Although it is not suggested that design
engineers approach the identification of causation with a view
to developing solutions, many are simply unfamiliar with the
forensic process, and, consequently, may find themselves fall-
ing back—generally unaware of the transition—on the process
that they typically utilize in their role as designers. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that engineers can gravitate toward provid-
ing solutions to rectify the failure,5 or rely on determining the
cause of failure in the form of “I wouldn’t have designed the
structure in this manner, so this must be related to the cause of
failure.”6
2. Simplifying performance assumptions and evidence: The de-
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sign process creates an appropriate design solution through
the application of simplifying assumptions, and, where appro-
priate, errs on the side of conservatism. In new or remedial
design, this is one of the design process’s chief strengths, but
in failure investigation, it is a critical weakness. In failure in-
vestigation, the investigator must determine the actual loads,
actual structural behavior, and actual material properties at
the time of failure, rather than relying on simplifying perfor-
mance assumptions. This issue can be further exacerbated by
the sometimes-significant differences between simplifying
performance assumptions and the performance of structures
in practice.7 Therefore, the accurate determination of the cause
of failure depends on verifiable evidence (e.g., a bolt’s
failure surface or the cracking patterns in concrete members),
and while the collection and analysis of verifiable evidence is
central to failure investigation, it is not an integral part of the
design process.
These limitations affect how an engineer that typically utilizes
the design process approaches causation investigations. Although
determining causation is a critical objective, the implicit nature of
the design process can naturally move the focus of the investiga-
tion to solution development. Likewise, the engineer may fail to
adequately collect and interpret physical evidence and instead rely
on simplifying assumptions. These factors typically combine to
frustrate the investigating engineer and increase the probability that
the failure’s cause may be identified incorrectly, potentially leading
to repeat failures, inappropriate rehabilitation strategies, legal chal-
lenges, and/or skewed dispute outcomes.
Forensic Process
The key to determining structural causation is the application of the
forensic process, which aims to objectively identify the technical
cause or causes of failure by using available evidence. Essentially,
it is the application of the scientific method to failure investigation.
Noon (2000), in his text Forensic Engineering Investigation, states
that “a forensic engineer relies mostly upon the actual physical evi-
dence found at the scene, verifiable facts related to the matter, and
well-proven scientific principles. The forensic engineer then ap-
plies accepted scientific methodologies and principles to interpret
the physical evidence and facts.”
The forensic process of collecting evidence, developing failure
hypotheses, testing each hypothesis against the collected evidence,
and determining the most likely cause of failure, is a process of
analysis, rather than synthesis. The application of the forensic pro-
cess is described by Noon (2000): “First, careful and detailed ob-
servations are made. Then, based upon the observations, a working
hypothesis is formulated to explain the observations. Experiments
or additional observations are then made to test the predictive abil-
ity of the working hypothesis.” Noon (2000) then goes on to say
that, “as more observations are collected and studied, it may be
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necessary to modify, amplify, or even discard the original hypoth-
esis in favor of a new one that can account for all the observations
and data. Unless the data or observations are proven to be inaccu-
rate, a hypothesis is not considered valid unless it accounts for all
the relevant observations and data.”
This process avoids many of the pitfalls of applying a design
process alone. The objective of the process is to identify the cause
of failure, and the process is driven by ruling in or out a failure
hypothesis on the basis of specific evidence and generally accepted
engineering principles, rather than simplifying assumptions. In
other words, the forensic process relies on understanding how
the structure actually behaved, rather than predicting how the struc-
ture would have behaved based on the design process.8 Finally, the
separation of evidence collection from the development of hypoth-
eses, in conjunction with the rigorous testing of each hypothesis
against the evidence, assists the investigator to conduct the inves-
tigation in a forensically sound manner, ensuring it will not only
stand up to the scrutiny of engineering peers, but also, if necessary,
to the exacting demands of the legal system.
Implementation of Forensic Process
Given the significant differences between the forensic and design
processes, it is clear that Carper can make the point that “a good
design professional is not necessarily a good forensic expert”
(2000). The accurate determination of causation will be very diffi-
cult unless the design engineer is able to put aside the traditional
design process and apply a forensic process. In practice, however,
the ability of a design engineer to make such a transition may be
highly questionable. Fundamentally, without experience in foren-
sics, the embedded nature of the design process in an engineer’s
psyche—sometimes subconsciously—makes it very difficult for
engineers that design on a regular basis to actually embrace the
new set of attitudes, approaches, and processes necessary to inves-
tigate causation satisfactorily.
Given the importance of design in engineering, this is not a sur-
prising issue. In Beyond Failure, Delatte (2008) describes the role
of engineers succinctly as “engineers design.” Further, this design
mentality is not limited to practicing design engineers, but runs
through the profession as a whole. Although many engineers in-
volved in construction and maintenance may not engage in design
on a regular basis, they typically approach problems using a design
process. Indeed, the engineer as designer is so fundamental to the
engineering profession that engineers rarely think of themselves as
designers, but rather as engineers with specific design experience
and technical competency. In essence, the design mind-set under-
pins what it is to be an engineer, is the basis of university training,
and cements the role of engineers as problem solvers.
Therefore, for the engineer wishing to pursue a career in foren-
sic engineering, recognizing and overcoming the embedded nature
of design is a key consideration.9 With this objective in mind, it is
first helpful to consider some of the aspects of the design process
that are diametrically opposed to the forensic process.
1. Problem solving and causation: The problem-solving aspect is
central to design, but distracts from the objective of forensic
investigation.
2. Evidence and assumption: Design requires putting trust in as-
sumptions that have served the profession well, but forensics
requires that each of these assumptions be rigorously tested
against verifiable evidence for the structural failure in question.
There is a real risk that the engineer who utilizes the design
process on a regular basis may be ill equipped to collect and
analyze this evidence, and/or may connect some parts of the
 logic with unverified assumption, potentially leading to incor-
rectly identified causes.
3. Dealing with unknowns: The design process manages un-
knowns through appropriate simplifications and conservatism,
but the forensic process requires the investigation of these un-
knowns, or, at the very least, an acknowledgment that these
unknowns exist.
4. A priori process: Design is an a priori process.10 The design
engineer creates a number of design concepts, makes assump-
tions about how each concept will perform, and undertakes de-
sign calculations to determine each concept’s appropriateness.
In other words, the designer begins the process with a precon-
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ceived idea of how the structure will perform. Although this
approach is appropriate for design, the forensic process re-
quires the investigator approach the investigation with an open
mind by considering many failure hypotheses, and by collect-
ing and analyzing all evidence as objectively as possible to
determine the correct failure hypothesis. Approaching the in-
vestigation with a preconceived idea of the cause of failure can
curtail the development and examination of a sufficient number
of failure theories and lead to confirmation bias, i.e., the inves-
tigator only tends to notice evidence that supports a certain
hypothesis (Noon 2009).
5. Synthesis and analysis: Design is a process of synthesis, and
there is generally no unique correct design—a number of al-
ternatives may be (almost) equally satisfactory. However, in
structural failure, there is only one correct sequence of events
that caused the failure, and this sequence of events cannot be
determined by a process of synthesis; it requires a forensic pro-
cess of analysis.
6. Ruling out and ruling in: As discussed previously, the design
process generally commences with the design engineer devel-
oping a range of reasonable concepts for a design solution.
The process continues with unsuitable concepts being dropped
in favor of more satisfactory concepts, to finally arrive at a sin-
gle design solution. In the same way, during an investigation,
the designer may be likely to discard hypotheses that are
considered less probable than others. However, for an investi-
gation to be considered forensically sound, this approach is
inappropriate—the investigator must rule out each of these
hypotheses on the basis of evidence. In other words, failing
to rule out potential causes of failure on the basis of evidence
is just as flawed as ruling in a cause of failure based solely on
assumption.
7. Nature of design process: The design process is heuristic in
nature.11 In other words, the engineer is not required to scien-
tifically prove the validity of the design, but is required to show
it is consistent with rules that produce structures that have gen-
erally worked in the past. Essentially, the designer asserts the
design is appropriate because it complies with a design code.
In forensics, however, simply asserting an opinion is insuffi-
cient because the investigator is required to demonstrate how
the opinion relies on specific evidence, scientific principles,
and scientific logic.
For structural engineers with a design background, there are a
number of important and useful steps that can be taken to improve
forensic expertise.
1. Awareness of the design process: An awareness and under-
standing of the design process and how it is ill suited to de-
termining causation is a key first step when approaching
forensic engineering.
2. The importance of the forensic process: Because of the impli-
cit nature of many aspects of the design process, constant
vigilance is required to not slip from a true forensic process
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back to a design process. Ultimately, the engineer should rely
on the forensic process of collecting evidence, developing fail-
ure hypotheses, testing each hypothesis against the collected
evidence, and determining the most likely cause of failure.
3. Forensic education: Experience in design alone is insufficient.
In the absence of experience in forensics, the engineer should
become familiar with case studies relating to previous failure
investigations. Bell (2000b) illustrates the benefits of such an
approach: “First, it provides further insight into the special
techniques for failure investigation. Second, and more impor-
tantly, it reveals patterns of modes and causes of failures. It is
an understanding of these patterns—how facilities really be-
have and why they fail—that separates the experienced inves-
tigator from the rest.”
4. Keep an open mind: This is a key quality for the forensic
engineer. It is critical not to reach a strong conclusion on
causation early on in the investigation. This task is further com-
plicated by the iterative nature of investigations, namely, the
investigator will see evidence, collect it, develop a number
of failure hypotheses, and look for evidence associated with
these hypotheses. As stated in the Guidelines for Forensic
Engineering Practice (Lewis 2003), “Do not approach data
gathering with an eye toward ‘how can I find evidence to sup-
port my sense that…?’ but rather ‘how can I find all of the
important evidence?”’ Rather than asking “What caused this
failure?” ask “What do I see?”
5. The site visit: Evidence and familiarity with the scene of the
failure is critical and should not be rushed. The quality and
completeness of evidence preservation, recording, and collec-
tion will play a critical role in the strength of an investigator’s
opinions.
6. Theoretical analysis: Beware of excessive theoretical analysis.
It is not unusual for the engineer to wish “to understand the
structure.” Typically, this will be undertaken by constructing
an analytical model or attempting to determine whether the
structure complies with the current design code. However, both
approaches rely on assumptions, and in failure investigation, it
is the examination of these very assumptions that is critical.
Attempting to “understand the structure” in this manner can
distract from the examination of the assumptions. As Cuoco
and Panariello (2010) point out, “Failure analysis is not the
same as analysis for the purpose of design.” “Failure analysis
must use the actual loads imposed on the structure and the real-
world capacity of the structural elements.”
7. Nature of the basis of opinions: It is critical for the engineer
to probe and understand the nature of the information relied
on to formulate opinions. Is it evidence that can be verified?
Is it an assumption that may be challenged as incorrect for the
structure in question? Or is it a generally accepted engineering
principle that is unlikely to be challenged? This will assist
the engineer in assessing the strength of the opinion, and can
assist in unearthing implicit assumptions. Equally, the engineer
should make sure to have a clear understanding of the infor-
mation relied on to deem all other failure hypotheses less
probable.
8. Noon’s “what makes a good hypothesis:” In testing the various
failure hypotheses, Noon (2009) provides a helpful summary
of the attributes of a good working hypothesis: “All the data
upon which it is based needs to be factually verifiable. It must
be consistent with all the relevant verifiable data, not just
selected data. The scientific principles upon which the hypoth-
esis relies must be verifiable and repeatable. The hypothesis
should provide some predictive value. The hypothesis must
be subjected to and withstand genuine falsification efforts.”12
 9. Reporting: Overcoming the heuristic nature of design and de-
monstrating rather than asserting an opinion are critical in the
communication and reporting of the cause of failure. Ensuring
that the report is logically set out, with each stage of the in-
vestigation clearly detailed, along with ensuring there is a clear
separation of evidence, assumption, and scientific principles, is
critical for clarity. The Guidelines for Forensic Engineering
Practice (Lewis 2003), published by ASCE, provides an
excellent guide for the disciplined management of this
separation.
Closure
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The importance of the forensic process, or detective skills, in de-
termining the cause of structural failure cannot be overstressed.
Successful forensic investigation requires investigating engineers
to put aside the traditional design process and apply a forensic
process. Experience, however, suggests that such a transition is dif-
ficult because of the embedded nature of the design process in the
engineering profession’s psyche.
For the engineer interested in practicing in forensics, a critical
step is to understand that experience of the design process can be a
significant impediment to actually embracing and implementing
the forensic process. Only then can steps be taken to overcome this
impediment.
Endnotes
1
Carper (2000) also highlights some of the practical differences between the
designer and forensic engineer: “The designer is more familiar with co-
des and standards intended to prevent failure, and with the process of
generating alternative concepts that respond to given constraints.” “The
forensic engineer, however, approaches the investigation of a failure
from the perspective of physical causation and the given object, as de-
signed and constructed. These two perspectives are very different and
require different skills and attitudes.”
2
Although the process utilizes simplifying assumptions, it is far from sim-
plistic, requiring careful and meticulous consideration of a range of re-
quirements and constraints. This process is efficient, well respected, and
has served the engineering profession well.
3 to investigate with an open mind and allow the evidence to lead the
It is little wonder that James Amrhein, quoted by Carper (2000), describes
structural engineering as “the art and science of molding Materials
we do not fully understand; into Shapes we cannot precisely analyze;
to resist Forces we cannot accurately predict; all in such a way that
the society at large is given no reason to suspect the extent of our
ignorance.”
4
At this point, a number of engineers may protest that they have success-
fully investigated failures in the past without the use of the forensic
process. In some situations, particularly those in which causation is
straightforward and obvious, engineers do appear to identify causation
successfully. But the process utilized typically involves the engineer
assuming the cause of failure and preparing a design solution to address
it—essentially demonstrating causation because the solution resolved
the issue. This is a trial-and-error approach to remediation, rather than
a forensically sound attempt to establish causation.
5
This issue is illustrated by Carper (2000) when he states that “The design-
orientated engineer may approach the investigation of a failure by sug-
gesting an alternative design solution.”
6
This method of identifying the cause of failure appears to be based on the
premise that the design approach is the obvious cause when it is differ-
ent than an approach the engineer has used successfully in the past.
Although such an approach may provide a clue to the cause of failure,
it is not forensically sound.
7 of a problem but is in the final analysis unjustified, incapable of justi-
Cuoco and Panariello (2010) highlight just how different design assump-
tions can be from the performance of structures in practice: “Failure
analysis must use the actual loads imposed on the structure and the
real-world capacity of the structural elements. Neither of these is par-
ticularly well represented by the code-prescribed values. Actual loads
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can vary greatly, and structural capacity at collapse is almost never
accurately predicted by code, being lower due to material, design or
construction defects, or higher due to post-limit capacity, enhanced
material properties, ductility and redundancy.”
8
A quotation from Simon (1996) illustrates this difference succinctly, if it is
assumed that forensic engineering is akin to natural science: “The natu-
ral sciences are concerned with how things are…design on the other
hand is concerned with how things ought to be.”
9
Interestingly, psychology may provide further insight into the reason over-
coming the embedded nature of the design process is so difficult. One
such example is that the embedded nature of the design process may be
similar to the phenomenon known as design fixation. Design fixation
is defined as a “blind adherence to a set of ideas or concepts limiting
the output of conceptual design” (Jansson and Smith 1991). With this
in mind, it is interesting to pose the question: Does the adherence to
simplifying design assumptions and the design process result in a form
of fixation in the engineer when applied to forensics? Further, is the
engineer aware that this design fixation is taking place? To date, no
experiments examining design fixation on forensic engineers have been
conducted, but there have been numerous experiments undertaken to
examine the affect of design fixation on designers, some of them en-
gineering professionals, such as Jansson and Smith (1991), Linsey et al.
(2010), Smith (1995, 2003), and Wiley (1998). Studies have concluded
that design fixation can be empirically verified in professional design
engineers, that most people are unaware fixation is occurring, and, when
they are made aware of it, it is still remarkably difficult to overcome.
Given that this issue exists within design itself, it is a reasonable hy-
pothesis that the same fixation occurs when the designer attempts to
investigate failure; for example, will such designers overcome design
fixation to challenge implicit assumptions, evaluate evidence objec-
tively, and put aside the traditional design process and apply a forensic
process? The writer’s experience suggests that the hypothesis merits
further investigation.
10
The term a priori is the “belief that the underlying causes for observed
effects are already known, or at least can be deduced from fundamental
principles” (Noon 2009). The forensic process is based on the scientific
method, and “the modern scientific method does not accept the a priori
method of inquiry. The modern scientific method allows evidence to
drive theories, rather than allowing theories to drive evidence” (Noon
2009). In essence, forensically sound investigations require the engineer
investigation. Noon (2009) further elaborates on this issue as the differ-
ence between empiricists and rationalists: “In short, empiricists accept
what is observed at face value and try to find order to explain it. Ratio-
nalists, on the other hand, propose up front what the order should be
and then sort their observations and facts to fit within that framework.”
The design process is more like the process undertaken by rationalists,
with design assumptions driving the investigation, whereas the forensic
process is more like the process utilized by empiricists, in which
observations and evidence are judged on their own merits. Further, with
respect to empiricism, Noon (2009) notes that “Fundamentally, empiri-
cism is the tenet that knowledge is derived from measurements,
verifiable facts, observations, and actual, as opposed to spiritual or
supernatural, experiences, feelings, or beliefs. Furthermore, as they are
collected, these measurements, verifiable facts, observations, and expe-
riences are to be reported and documented without being modified or
interpreted by preconceived notions.”
11
“The engineering method is the use of heuristics to cause the best change
in a poorly understood situation within the available resources,” from
Discussion of the Method: Conducting the Engineer’s Approach to
Problem Solving, by Koen (2003). Koen (2003) also notes that “a heu-
ristic is anything that provides a plausible aid or direction in the solution
fication, and potentially fallible.”
12
“Verification of a hypothesis occurs when observations, or experiments
and data that could show the hypothesis to be false fail to do so. This is
the principle of falsification” (Noon 2009).
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