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OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Runway Overrun
Protection and Warning
The Airbus answer to prevent runway excursion during landing

Presented by
Sourya KAHLOUL / Sr Flight Operations Engineer
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Contents

1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

2 How does the ROPS work?

3 Installation & certification

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Contents

1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

2 How does the ROPS work?

3 Installation & certification

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

Non-Stabilized
IATA Safety Report 2010 a pproaches
Breakdown per Accident Category
Derotation
Long Flare /Long

t l ow a ltitude
ift a
Wind sh

23% Runway Excursion Conta


minat
ed Runw
ays

Late selection of re
versers

u al br aking
Ma n
Late
Follow SOP No runway excursions

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

Proactive
Airport Operational
on-board
infrastructures technology procedures

2009‐2012
2009‐2012 1998
1998
Flight Safety
Foundation : Creation
Recommended ICAO of Approach & Landing
Runway End Safety Accident Reduction
Area (RESA) (ALAR) Toolkit

2010
2010

Takeoff & Landing


Performance
Assessment (TALPA)

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Contents

1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

2 How does the ROPS work?

3 Installation & certification

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

ROPS Principle

HELPS
CREW DECISION MAKING

WARNS
THE CREW IF RUNWAY TOO SHORT

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

ROPS Principle
V app

Lateral
Position

Landing
Configuration
Algorithm assuming :
-Operational Braking,
-Reversers : Ground Speed
IDLE on dry
MAX on wet
-15% margin…. Wind

Landing Distance computation on DRY & WET runways

Comparison with the runway length

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

ROPS Principle

9 Wind and /or Low visibility


9 AP engaged or not
9 Overweight Landing
9 With aircraft landing configuration

9 Contaminated runways not taken into


account
PFD: Visual ROPS alerts

LOUDSPEAKERS: Audio ROPS alerts

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

ROPS Principle

ROPS = ROW + ROP


Transition Point: Autobrake activation or
Ground Spoilers extension
ROPS automatically
armed at 500 ft

ROW ROP

Runway end Overrun Warning Runway end Overrun Protection


GO-AROUND STOP

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

How does ROW work?


Before the Transition point

Transition Point

PFD Audio Pilot Action


(Below 500 ft) (Below 200 ft) (Below 500 ft)

Go-Around Decision
If Runway Condition
None
is not DRY

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

How does ROW work?


Before the Transition point

Transition Point

PFD Audio Pilot Action


(Below 500 ft) (Below 200 ft) (Below 500 ft)

Go-Around
Decision
"RWY TOO SHORT !"
Whatever Runway
Condition

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

How does ROP work?


After the transition point

Transition Point

PFD Audio Pilot Action

“BRAKE…MAX BRAKING…MAX
BRAKING”
- If Max Braking applied and Max
Reverse not selected, Max Braking
"MAX REVERSE" Max Reverse
"KEEP MAX REVERSE"

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

ROPS failures

Failure INOP SYS STATUS Consequences

ROW & ROP lost

System failure ROW & ROP


affecting the available & do not
landing distance take into account
the failure

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Contents

1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority

2 How does the ROPS work?

3 Installation & certification

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

How to install ROPS - Certification

• ROPS retrofit
• Implementation through software change + one additional wiring
• Retrofit within one night stop

• Certification target dates:


• A320 family: 2nd quarter of 2013
• A330 & A340 family: 3rd quarter of 2013

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

Conclusion

Should become a ‘standard’


Recognised by Insurances &
Risk Management Community in the Aviation Industry

SAFETY ENHANCEMENT:
PREVENTS RUNWAY EXCURSION
RISK AT LANDING
SOP remains the primary means to
prevent runway excursion at landing

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the
delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be
used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting
grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

SA prerequisites
Modified Systems Role for ROPS
TAWS landing runway detection, A/C position computation, landing runway characteristics computation
EGPWS  P/N 965‐1676‐006 
FAC ROPS availability monitoring, “distance‐to‐stop” computation, detection of the risk of runway 
B621 overrun, ROPS alerts request and ROPS installed software pin program
FMGC ROPS messages and aural alerts management upon FAC request, “ROPS lost” signal management
S6C13, H2C13, S6I12, H2I12
DMC display of messages on PFD, transmission of the FMGC messages requests to DFDR
EIS1 V701 or EIS2 S10 

FWC emission of aural warnings, display on ECAM of “ROW/ROP LOST” message, ROW/ROP INOP SYS 


H2‐F6 message, transmission of “All reverses INOP” information to DMC and HUD, transmission of the 
reverse inoperative on engines 1 or 4 information to the FMGEC.
SDAC transmission of braking data (pedals position) to FWC
H2‐E3

DFDR OPTIONAL for retrofit
FS1 recording of messages and aural alerts requests received from DMC
HUD OPTIONAL
L5 (TBD) display of messages (consistent with PFD)

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.


OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning

LR prerequisites

Modified Systems Role for ROPS
TAWS landing runway detection, A/C position computation, landing runway characteristics 
EGPWS  P/N 965‐1676‐006  computation
FMGC ROPS availability monitoring, “distance‐to‐stop” computation, detection of the risk of 
HJ2 for A330 PW/RR, G2 for A330 GE, K3  runway overrun, ROPS messages and alerts request, “ROPS lost” signal management and 
for A3456 and F1 for A340 CFM ROPS installed software pin program
DMC display of messages on PFD, transmission of “A/Brake armed” information to FMGC via 
EIS1 V513X for A330‐200/300 discrete signal, transmission of the FMGC messages requests to DFDR
EIS1 V112X for A340‐200/300
EIS2 Std L8‐1 for all LR
FWC emission of aural alerts, display on ECAM of “ROW/ROP lost” message, transmission of 
T5‐0 for A330 and A3456 “Reverses INOP” information to DMC
L13‐0 for A3423
SDAC transmission of braking data (Auto Brakes modes, pedals position) to FWC and/or DMC 
C10‐0 and/or HUD
DFDR OPTIONAL for retrofit
FL1 recording of messages and aural alerts requests received from DMC
HUD OPTIONAL
L5 (TBC) display of messages (consistent with PFD)

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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

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