Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dr. Harleman
POLS 3000
19 September 2022
The impacts of climate change are complex and far-reaching; consequently, the variables
which play a part in determining citizens’ support – or lack thereof – for comprehensive climate
policy mirror such complexity. A large body of literature seeks to examine these variables. A lack
of understanding of climate science has been studied as a contributing factor in public opinion;
according to one paper, the sheer scope of the issue is too enormous for the average civilian to
comprehend on a deep enough level to compel the desire for policy initiatives (Weber & Stern,
2011). American political polarization another such factor; an analysis found that experts
characterize polarization as “the most significant obstacle to bringing about a social consensus on
climate change” (Guber, 2017). With such emphasis on party affiliation, Guber’s article left little
room for other explanations to emerge – while there is certainly a strong party divide on the subject,
this research is not causal. A similar study, published by the Review of Policy Research, presented
a similar issue; results indicated that liberal, ecologically minded respondents were significantly
more likely to support climate policy initiatives (Stoutenborough et al., 2014), with little discussion
socioeconomic status, are also broadly aligned with both parties; this may be a provide a more
accurate overview, as lesser-educated individuals may not possess the research skills to understand
what is and isn’t quality science, and those in a lower income bracket may simply be too
preoccupied with their own living to dedicate additional time and effort to climate activism, or
may worry that climate policies may increase taxes and jeopardize their financial situations.
This issue is more thoroughly discussed in a sociological study, which found that over a
quarter of variance in support for climate policy was accounted for by social characteristics (Dietz
et al., 2007). Researchers concluded that wealthier and younger individuals did tend to more
frequently support climate policy initiatives than their low-income or older counterparts.
Curiously, education level was not found to have a statistically significant effect on perceptions of
climate policy. Age was also found to play a key role in a study performed by the Pew Research
Center; 78% of participants in the Millennial generation or younger indicated support for climate
initiatives regarding clean energy, while only 61% of Generation X participants and 53% of those
in the Post-World War 2 generation or older did the same. This study also revealed that geographic
location affects an individual’s support for climate policy. Respondents in coastal areas were more
likely to support climate policy than those living further inland (Funk & Hefferson, 2019), which
is quite interesting considering that respondents who reported to be impacted by extreme heat tend
to live within the Midwest and Rocky Mountain regions, and reported to be, in broad terms, less
A subset of this literature has developed to answer questions pertaining to the specific
effects that extreme weather events have on public opinion of climate policy. The results of these
studies have differed widely. One study found that support for climate change adaptation policies
displayed a modest yet universal increase across all models after experiencing extreme weather
events within the timeframe of one month (Ray et al., 2017); it is prudent to note, however, that
this study was rather generous in its definition of “extreme weather”, including such phenomena
as dense or freezing fog and rip currents. While the occurrences of these conditions are certainly
affected by climate change, I would hesitate to classify them in the same category as such events
as hurricanes, coastal flooding, and excessive heat, which have much more pronounced impacts
on human life. I would be skeptical of the inclusion of these weather events, but the number of
respondents who experienced these events was relatively low compared to larger scale events and
Despite my critique, these findings are consistent with several other similar studies.
Another study reported a positive correlation between the degree of perceived harm suffered by
respondents in extreme weather events and support for climate policy, yet interestingly found no
statistically significant link between the overall ZIP code of the impacted areas and opinion of
climate policy (Zanocco et al., 2019). Researchers were careful to note that areas of great impact
often had higher population densities, which correlates to a larger percentage of Democrat
respondents, who are generally more likely than Republicans to express support for climate policy.
Still, after controlling for party orientation, these findings held true. To corroborate the hypothesis
connecting heightened extreme weather events with heightened policy support, a recent study from
the Harvard School of Public Health found a statistically significant difference between
respondents who did and did not experience extreme weather events and their engagement in civics
and politics in effort to limit climate change – 27% of those affected by extreme weather reported
between these two variables. An article found a limited positive correlation between extreme
weather and climate policy support but concluded that partisanship far outweighs the effect of the
weather events on an individual’s opinions (Konisky et al., 2015). This sentiment was echoed in a
different study, which attempted to find a link between extreme weather events and changes in
local climate policies, but recorded no such connection (Howe, 2021). An article published in the
Oxford University Press ended with a relatively inconclusive result, stating that the relationship
between weather and climate policy perceptions is “multidirectional” - researchers observed that
some skew existed in this study due to potential underreporting of extreme weather by climate
change skeptics (Borick & Rabe, 2016). Researchers offered the motivated reasoning theory as a
mechanism by which skeptics may inaccurately report weather conditions to fit a specific
study contended that 85% of Americans have experienced an extreme weather event of some type
A few researchers have put forth reasoning behind the disconnect between the experience
of extreme weather and continued indifference about climate change. In a 2020 study, it was
concluded that residents may not be aware of the impact that climate change has on increasingly
frequent and intense extreme weather, and thus would not express raised concerns (Motta). The
findings of a 2021 study, while contradicting Motta’s results, noted that extreme weather did
increase concerns for climate policy, but not enough to have an impact on local policies (Giodorno
et al.). In a previous study by Zanocco et al., performed in 2018, researchers found that only a
minority of participants were more concerned with climate policy post-event, even when responses
showed that they were personally affected by an extreme weather event (Zanocco et al.). This
research was geared towards only four case studies (two wildfires and two tornadoes), which
researchers pointed out as a potential obstacle to larger scope conditions. Each case study was
located in a different region, though, so findings are not exclusive to the specific sociopolitical
With such varied results in literature, my goal in performing this study is to provide more
detail on the particular effects of wildfires and hurricanes. Most studies of this nature have included
a broad variety of extreme weather; this could water down the stronger influences of the
aforementioned events, both large-scale and associated with high levels of property damage and
loss of life which may have a more pronounced impact on policy perceptions. As opposed to
conditions such as dense fog or rip currents, hurricanes and wildfires can result in calamitous
flooding, air pollution, and breakdown of normal life in evacuations or strandedness (among other
detriments), all of which leave a far greater psychological impact on those affected than a minor
inconvenience would. In this study, I will also examine the timeframe in which post-event climate
policy support is strongest, and if applicable, how quickly this support returns to normal as the
shock of the event fades. The findings of this research will help to shed light on the factors
surrounding public support for climate policy and open up new research avenues on how to
Borick, Christopher P., and Barry G. Rabe. 2017. “Personal Experience, Extreme Weather
Events, and Perceptions of Climate Change.”
https://oxfordre.com/climatescience/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.001.0001/acr
efore-9780190228620-e-311.
Dietz, Thomas, Amy Dan, and Rachel Shwom. 2007. “Support for Climate Change Policy:
Social Psychological and Social Structural Influences.” Rural Sociology 72(2): 185–214.
Funk, Cary, and Meg Hefferson. November 2. “U.S. Public Views on Climate and Energy.”
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/11/25/u-s-public-views-on-climate-and-
energy/ (September 21, 2022).
Giordono, Leanne, Alexander Gard-Murray, and Hillary Boudet. 2021. “From Peril to Promise?
Local Mitigation and Adaptation Policy Decisions after Extreme Weather.” Current
Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 52: 118–24.
Guber, Deborah Lynn. 2017. “Partisan Cueing and Polarization in Public Opinion About Climate
Change.”
Harvard University T. H. Chan School of Public Health. 2022. “The Impact of Extreme Weather
on Views About Climate Policy in the United States.” https://s3.us-west-
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Howe, Peter. 2021. “Extreme Weather Experience and Climate Change Opinion.” Current
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Konisky, David, Llewelyn Hughes, and Charles Kaylor. 2015. “Extreme Weather Events and
Climate Change Concerns.” Climactic Change 134: 533–47.
Motta, Matt. 2020. “Is Climate Change Changing Minds? Limited Effects of the Physical
Environment on Climate Policy Opinion in the United States.”
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3531194 (September 21, 2022).
Ray, Aaron, Llewelyn Hughes, David Konisky, and Charles Kaylor. 2017. “Extreme Weather
Exposure and Support for Climate Change Adaptation.” Global Environmental Change
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Shao, Wanyun. 2017. “Weather, Climate, Politics, or God? Determinants of American Public
Opinions toward Global Warming.” Environmental Politics 26(1): 71–96.
Stoutenborough, James W., Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, and Arnold Vedlitz. 2014. “Public
Support for Climate Change Policy: Consistency in the Influence of Values and Attitudes
Over Time and Across Specific Policy Alternatives.” Review of Policy Research 31(6):
555–83.
Weber, Elke, and Paul Stern. 2011. “Public Understanding of Climate Change in the United
States.” The American Psychologist 66(4): 315–28.
Yale University. 2013. Extreme Weather and Climate Change in the American Mind. Yale
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content/uploads/2016/02/2013_05_Extreme-Weather-and-Climate-Change-in-the-
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Zanocco, Chad et al. 2018. “Place, Proximity, and Perceived Harm: Extreme Weather Events and
Views about Climate Change.” Climactic Change 149(3–4).
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arm_extreme_weather_events_and_views_about_climate_change (September 21, 2022).
Zanocco, Chad, Hilary Boudet, Roberta Nilson, and June Flora. 2019. “Personal Harm and
Support for Climate Change Mitigation Policies: Evidence from 10 U.S. Communities
Impacted by Extreme Weather.” Global Environmental Change 59. https://s3.us-west-
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