Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Brenna Schauer
Professor Barcelo
Many remark the summer of 1988 as the catalyst for global warming awareness. Prior to,
in 1986, 39 percent of the public had knowledge of the greenhouse effect – this number only
skyrocketed following the drought and record summer heat of 1988, and as a result, in the early
1990s, nearly 90 percent had heard or read about global warming (Nisbet & Myers, 2007). Now,
in recent years, societal awareness of climate change has increased significantly due to
technological development and widespread media, and the consequential expansion to these
mediums are, for all purposes, intended to raise awareness. However, an “underlying
assumption” (Kellstedt et al., 2008, p. 114) remains: increased presentation of global warming
information will heighten global warming concern amongst the general population. This
assumption is promising, but ultimately unrealistic given the political atmosphere and
polarization of parties, and in turn, the effect it has on public risk perception and climate change
policies.
Starting in the late 1980s, the media began its infiltration into the climate change
discourse following the debate over the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Though the scientific
consensus, or the general opinion of scientists, was advertised on the majority of news stations,
certain media reports posed the Kyoto Protocol as that of a political confliction. Bolson and
In the news, statements were presented from leading Democrats supporting the treaty,
such as Clinton and Gore, as well as Republican leaders and other opponents. This
resulted in hundreds of newspaper, television, magazine, and radio news stories, as well
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as editorials, editorial cartoons, and letters to the editor. The debate [over ratification]
was further amplified in advertisements, paid for by business and other advocacy groups,
as well as radio talk shows and numerous World Wide Web sites. (Krosnick et al., 2000,
The politically charged atmosphere around global warming has only worsened in recent years,
driven by various events such as that of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) and failed pursuits of legislative action in order to control the amount of harmful
emissions that enter our atmosphere. In response to these affairs, the media has assigned “parity
between scientific evidence and the arguments of interest groups striving to generate uncertainty
to protect their interests and the policy status quo” (Bolson & Shapiro, 2018, pg. 152). Like
many other topics of discussion, such as abortion and gun control, individuals will scour to find
information that fits their own personal beliefs. As demonstrated by Nisbet (2009), “the rest of
the public either ignores the [news] coverage or reinterprets competing claims based on
partisanship or self-interest” (p. 14) – this increased media fragmentation leads to the
diminishment of quality news coverage, with only a small audience being properly informed,
While a plethora of factors exist influence public perceptions of climate change, a large
percentage of the misinformation presented to the population can be attributed to the media. As
mentioned by Kellstedt et al. (2008), the dominant theme plaguing the media is conflict, which
transcends beyond global warming – unfortunately, media can skew public opinion, solely
because the outlet source believes that the issue should be posed as a political issue. As
demonstrated in Figure 1 (Kellstedt et al., 2008), there is a multitude of variables that affect
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climate change perceptions including: demographic variables (income, gender, age, race, etc.),
identity and ideology variables (partisanship, political ideology, religiosity, etc.), trust and
confidence variables (media, interest groups, and scientists), and an informedness variable
(knowledge). And given these factors, Kellstedt and colleagues (2008), created a risk perception
model, which measures the perceived efficacy; this specific variable acts to assess the perceived
ability of an individual “to influence climate change outcomes, to induce others to behave in
ways that mitigate human sources of climate change, and whether the respondent accepts climate
change as a human responsibility” (Kellstedt et al., 2008, p. 118). As a result of their studies,
they came to several conclusions: respondents who feel they possess a substantially greater
amount of knowledge on the topic of global warming feel that they are less responsible for it.
This pattern also rings true with those who expressed trust within the government and scientists
regarding the issue. In a similar study, between 40 and 60 percent of respondents had expressed
that they currently/would take voluntary action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, given that it
would save the respondent money (ex: buying efficient appliances and adjusting one’s
thermostat) – however, this support for action wanes when it proves to be a difficult (ex:
installing solar panels), costly (ex: choosing an energy supplier that relies on renewable
resources), or it threatens one’s way of living (O’Connor et al., 2002, p. 11). Thus, one’s sense of
personal responsibility influences an individuals’ evaluation of the risks associated with global
Legislative Action
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Despite increased public awareness and concern for climate change in recent years,
climate change is consistently thought to be the lowest-priority issue among populations (Nisbet,
2009). In a December 2008 poll, surveys found that within the rating of:
bottom of the list, with just 30 percent of respondents naming it a “top priority” …These
findings are significant, since research concludes that opinion intensity is a central driver
or her elected official; discusses the issue with friends or coworkers; attends or speaks
This lack of public outcry can be traced back to a variety of factors: the media, personal risk
perception, trust in the validity of climate change, amongst many others. Scientists have long
tried to understand the complex relationship between public opinion and climate change – among
support for climate change policy, based on an array of variables including the amount of trust
one has in experts, trust in the media, political ideology, concern for climate change, ecological
values, and the influence of environmental efficiency. Among these variables, the study found
that ecological values, trust in experts, concern, and ideology were all important and reliable
predictors of policy support, regardless of the time period in which one attempts to gauge climate
concern (Stoutenborough et al., 2014). Now, regardless of this support, general feelings of
approval are less likely to be influential compared to strong attitudes towards policy issues (Key,
Conclusion
Despite the initial surge in 1988, where global warming awareness skyrocketed, the
assumption that increased awareness of climate change will lead to heightened concern for
global warming is promising. However, this notion is unrealistic given the vast number of
variables present in our modern society. Issues like media framing and political polarization
continue to shape public opinion, and thus, one’s perceived risk in relation to climate change –
however, we can continue to predict concern for global warming given one’s ecological values
and trust in experts well into the future. In order to address the issue that is climate change, we
must learn to navigate the complex dynamic between different mediums and the public’s opinion
– it is only through this understanding that we can begin to bridge the gap between climate
change awareness and action, and work towards creating solutions towards this global problem.
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References
Bolsen, T., & Shapiro, M. A. (2017). The US News Media, polarization on climate change, and
pathways to effective communication. Environmental Communication, 12(2), 149–163.
https://doi.org/10.1080/17524032.2017.1397039
Kellstedt, P. M., Zahran, S., & Vedlitz, A. (2008). Personal efficacy, the information
environment, and attitudes toward global warming and climate change in the United States.
Risk Analysis, 28(1), 113–126. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01010.x
Nisbet, M. C., & Myers, T. (2007). The polls trends: Twenty Years of public opinion about
global warming. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(3), 444–470.
https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfm031
Nisbet, Matthew C. (2009). Communicating climate change: Why frames matter for public
engagement. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 51(2), 12–23.
https://doi.org/10.3200/envt.51.2.12-23
O’Connor, R. E., Bord, R. J., Yarnal, B., & Wiefek, N. (2002). Who wants to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions? Social Science Quarterly, 83(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-
6237.00067
Stoutenborough, J. W., Bromley‐Trujillo, R., & Vedlitz, A. (2014). Public support for climate
change policy: Consistency in the influence of values and attitudes over time and across
specific policy alternatives. Review of Policy Research, 31(6), 555–583.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12104