Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This is a case involving a collision of a trolley and a truck. The driver of the
trolley was killed and his heirs are imputing negligence upon the truck driver.
The defendants presented a number of disinterested witnesses to show that
the deceased had contributory negligence in the incident. The court ruled that
the preponderance of evidence lies in favor of the defendant.
In this regard, the Court differentiated burden of proof and burden of evidence.
The burden of proof remains with the party asserting the affirmative issue. The
burden of proof never shifts and continues throughout the case. The burden of
going forward with the evidence, however, after a prima facie case has been
established may shift from the plaintiff to defendant. For this purpose, the
defendant need not produce evidence which outweighs the burden of evidence
of his adversary, it is sufficient that it is equal to establish equilibrium. Upon
establishment, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff.
The Court held that the agreements need not be proven. The documents
presented are sufficient to establish a prima facie case and to prove the
solidary liability of MICO and Lee.
A party who has the burden of proof may be aided by presumptions, or by the
probative value which the law assigns to specific set of facts. A presumption
may operate against his adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut the
presumption. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to
create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or
the prima facie case created thereby, and which if no proof to the contrary is
presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but
by the presumption the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being
from introducing evidence in support of his averment, because the presumption
stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
Perez v People Crime of malversation. The accused here was audited and was found to be in
deficit. Upon examination, he admitted that he used the money for his personal
expenses. He retracted that admission in trial and claimed that the deficit is an
oversight. He was convicted of malversation.
The Court held that an accountable public officer may be found guilty of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the
law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to
produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer
duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary.
In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to
rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or
control. Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of
the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against him.
Republic v De Borja A case initiated by the PCGG against Belasco and DE Borja. It was alleged
that certain commissions collected from vessels were never remitted to PNOC
but was sent to De Borja. To support the allegation, PCGG presented a
testimony of a witness who said that he was tasked to deliver envelopes to De
Borja. Demurrer was filed claiming among others that such testimony is not
sufficient for conviction.
The Court held that no. The Court defined burden of proof requires that a perty
establish the truth of a proposition by the quantum of evidence required by law.
In Civil Cases, the quantum required is preponderance of evidence.
Cariaga v Sapigao Petitioner here filed a case against respondents for Falsification of Public
Documents, Slander by Deed alleging that they made spurious entries in the
police blotter. The case was dismissed for lack of probable cause.
The issue is W/N the prosec erred in dismissing the case? No.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.
As aptly found by the ORSP, there was no improper motive on the part of
respondents in making the blotter entries as they were made in good faith. On
the other hand, Cariaga's insistence that the blotter entries were completely
false essentially rests on mere self-serving assertions that deserve no weight in
law.
The five accused in this case barged into the house of Modesto, hogtied him
and threatened his family to stay inside the house. After several days,
Modesto’s body was found. The accused were charged with murder via
conspiracy.
The issue raised was the fact that the conviction relied merely on circumstantial
evidence.The question is W/N the guilt beyond reasonable doubt was
established. YES.
The respondent contended their claim stating that the action indirectly
challenges their filiation and status as legitimate children of their parents.
The Court held that the Family Code creates a presumption of legitimacy on
children who were born in wedlock. Absent any proof of physical impossibility
of conception between certain days preceding the birth, filiation cannot
otherwise be attacked.
The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in
an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
This case involves a buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust, the accused
cried for help stating that the police officers will kill him. This prompted the
bystanders to help him thereby creating a commotion. Because of this, the
officers failed to mark the drugs in the vicinity and was only able to do so in a
barangay station.
The lower courts excused the non-compliance with the chain of custody rule
citing presumption of regularity.
The Court held that the police in this case does not enjoy the presumption.
Under the dangerous drugs act, the presumption of regularity will only arise
upon showing compliance with the chain of custody rule. Gaps in the chain of
custody cannot be filled in by the mere invocation of the presumption of
regularity.
Petitioner was a general clerk for Allied Bank. It was found that there were
fictitious payments in this case involving commercial documents. These
payments were credited to the account of Chua, which he withdrew on different
dates. During the height of the investigations, he flew overseas. He was
eventually found guilty.
On appeal, he raised that there is no direct proof that appellant was the author
of the falsification. He said that the accusation was a mere speculation
because he benefitted from them.
The absence of a direct proof that Chua was the author of the falsification is of
no moment for the rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession
falsified documents and "uttered" or used the same for his advantage and
benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises.
Certainly, the channeling of the subject payments via false remittances to his
savings account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his
unexplained flight at the height of the bank's inquiry into the matter more than
sufficiently establish Chua's involvement in the falsification.
The petitioners in this case took out a loan from respondents, secured with a
REM. They defaulted because the wife lost her job. HSBC sent demand letters
demanding full payment, but they accepted the periodic payment in arrears of
petitioners. Eventually, the bank tried to foreclose the mortgage.
The court held however that the bank is now estopped. Estoppel is a
conclusive presumption under the Rules of Court which prevents a party from
adopting a position that was inconsistent with their previous attitude or action to
the prejudice of those who relied to such representations in good faith.
Their act of accepting payment after the sending of default letter estopped
them from enforcing its right to foreclose.
The presumption that the possessor of a thing taken in the doing of an unlawful
act is the doer or taker of such is merely a disputable presumption.
Becker v Elsenstodt Botched Plastic Surgery. The defendant was presented as one of the
witnesses of the plaintiff. His testimony is limited to the fact that he
administered a used cotton containing cocaine in the nose implant and that he
inserted nothing else.
The issue is w/n the plaintiff may impeach the testimony of the defendant
despite presenting him as his own witness. YES.
The conditions with respect to the taking of the testimony of Mary Jane that
were laid down by the Indonesian Government support the allowance of written
interrogatories under Rule 23.
This is a property dispute. The plaintiff in this case had already delivered his
direct testimony and the cross-examination had begun. However, the
petitioners asked for multiple postponement. The plaintiff died and petitioners
moved to strike off the testimony of the plaintiff since they were not able to
conclude cross-examination.
The right to cross examine is waivable. In this case, the Court considered
Emilio et al to have waived the right to cross-examine the deceased Loreto as
they did not do so even though multiple postponements were granted to them.
Through their own fault, they lost their right to cross-examine Loreto.
Eventually, the default was overturned and the case was remanded granting
the respondents the right to cross-examine the witnesses. Only after a year
that the respondent moved that the case be set for hearing.
At this time, the witnesses of the petitioners had already either died or moved
overseas. Because of this, the respondents filed a motion to strike off these
witnesses’ testimony because they were not cross-examined.
From the records presented, it is manifest that private respondents had enough
opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and
Jose Fulgado before his migration to the United States.
Private respondents lost their standing in court during the time they were in
default, they were no longer in that situation when the Court of Appeals set
aside the default judgment. This was a positive signal for them to proceed with
the cross-examination, yet they still delayed the same.
In this case, the state witness was killed after he was discharged and after
giving his testimony. The accused filed a motion to strike off testimony since
they were not able to cross-examine.
It is to be noted in this case however, that the accused waived their right to
cross-examine the witness and to continue the same in the trial proper.
Here, respondents have to realize that their option to not ask for a continuance
and reserve the right to continue with their line of questioning for trial proper
instead carried inherent risks, including their present predicament. The
assumption of the risk, to Our mind, amounted to a waiver of any objection as
to the admissibility of Mendiola's testimony during the discharge hearing.
Respondents' constitutional rights were not violated since the fair hearing
envisaged by criminal due process had been complied with when the counsels
for the respondents conducted a rigorous and exhaustive cross- examination of
the deceased witness during the discharge hearing.
Neither is the apparent contradiction ufficient to discredit his testimony, for the
simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, to explain the
discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused.
The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read
to the witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for
impeaching his testimony.
Gaw v Chua *