Lugo, Kimberly Mae N.

Module 7: Legal Separation

1. Najera vs. Najera, G.R. No. 164817, July 3, 2009

Facts:

- Petitioner Digna filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage with Alternative Prayer for Legal Separation, with Application for Designation
as Administrator Pendente Lite of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains.

- Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the
marriage, and such incapacity became manifest only after marriage.

- Petitioner was repeatedly abused physically by respondent. Respondent never

returned home and stayed with his mother. Petitioner learned that he went abroad
again, but she no longer received any allotment from him.

- Petitioner contends that her evidence established the root cause of the psychological
incapacity of respondent which is his dysfunctional family background. With such
background, respondent could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
particularly the duty of complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

- RTC found petitioner Digna A. Najera and respondent Eduardo J. Najera entitled to
legal separation, but not annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

- CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the totality of petitioner's evidence was able to prove that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by
petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive conduct of respondent
toward petitioner and respondent's abandonment of petitioner without justifiable cause
for more than one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

2. Brigido Quiao vs. Rita Quiao, et. al., G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012

Facts:

- Respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein
petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).

- RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and
defendant-respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55. As such, the herein
parties shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall
not be severed.
- Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period provided
for under Section 17 (a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal Separation.
- Respondents filed a motion for execution which the trial court granted in its Order
dated December 16, 2005. On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the
petitioner paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00.

- On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the
Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC
to define the term "Net Profits Earned."

- To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an Order dated
August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase "NET PROFIT EARNED" denotes "the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each
[of the] spouse and the debts." The Order further held that after determining the
remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because
the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned,
pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

- Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration

Issue:

What is the meaning of the net profits earned by the Conjugal Partnership for
purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized under Article 63 of the Family Code?

Ruling:

First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law as to the
property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to the definition of "net
profits."

As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family Code applies as to the property
relations of the parties. In other words, the computation and the succession of events
will
follow the provisions under Article 129 of the said Code.

Moreover, as to the definition of "net profits," we cannot but refer to Article 102
(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly provides that for purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article
102 (4) applies.

In this provision, net profits "shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution." Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102
(4) applies to both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of
the Family Code, and to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article
129 of the Family Code.

Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the processes
used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the
Family Code, and in the processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

3. Pacete vs. Carriaga, GR No. 53880, March 17, 1994,231 SCRA 321
Facts:

- On 29 October 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed with the court below a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico L. Pacete
and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation (between Alanis and
Pacete), accounting and separation of property.

- Respondent Alanis and Pacete were married on 30 April 1938.

- Respondent Alanis averred that Pacete subsequently contracted (in 1948) a second
marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion; that she learned of such marriage only on 01
August 1979;

- That during her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired vast property consisting of
large
tracts of land, fishponds and several motor vehicles; that he fraudulently placed the
several pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his children
with Clarita and other "dummies;"

- That Pacete ignored overtures for an amicable settlement; and that reconciliation
between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living
with Clarita.

- The defendants were each served with summons on 15 November 1979. They filed a
motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from 30 November 1979 within which to file
an answer. The defendants repeatedly filed motion after motion until the court denied
this last motion on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given . . . as first
extension had expired.”

- Then, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) gravely
abused its discretion in denying petitioners' motion for extension of time to file their
answer in Civil Case No. 2518, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision of 17 March 1980 which, among other things, decreed the legal separation of
petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be
null and void ab initio the marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion.

Ruling:

Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates
that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition," obviously in order to provide the parties a
"cooling-off" period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further

underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:

"Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation.

— If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
 to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated."

The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of marriage to
possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's interest in the marriage
relation and its avowed intention not to leave the matter within the exclusive domain and
the vagaries of the parties to alone dictate.

It is clear that the petitioner did, in fact, specifically pray for legal separation. That
other remedies, whether principal or incidental, have likewise been sought in the same
action cannot dispense, nor excuse compliance, with any of the statutory requirements
aforequoted.

4. Sabalones vs. CA, et. al., GR No. 106169, Feb. 14, 1994, 48 SCAD 286

Facts:

- Petitioner Samson T. Sabalones left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios Gaviola-
Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal, properties for fifteen years.

- Sabalones retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines but not to
his wife and their children. Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to
sell a building and lot located at # 17 Eisenhower St., Greenhills, San Juan Metro,
Manila, belonging to the conjugal partnership. He claimed that he was sixty-eight years
old, very sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the proceeds of
the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment.

- The private respondent opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal
separation. She alleged that the house in Greenhills was being occupied by her and
their six children and that they were depending for their support on the rentals from
another conjugal property.

- Private respondent asked the court to grant the decree of legal separation and order
the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband's share therein
because of his adultery.

- The court thus decreed the legal separation of the spouses and the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share in the conjugal properties, declaring as well that he was not entitled to
support from his respondent wife.

- Pendente lite, the respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from interfering with the administration of
their properties in Greenhills and Forbes Park.

- The petitioner opposed this motion and filed his own motion to prevent his wife from
entering into a new contract of lease over the Forbes Park property with its present
tenant, or with future tenants, without his consent.

- After hearing, the Court of Appeals, in an order dated April 7, 1992, granted the
preliminary injunction prayed for by his wife.

- The petitioner now assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint
administration of the conjugal properties by the husband and wife, no injunctive relief
can be issued against one or the other because no right will be violated.

Issue:
 Whether the injunction has not permanently installed the respondent wife as the
administrator of the whole mass of conjugal assets.

Ruling:

We agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an

administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified
in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct, taking into
account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering
with his wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.

The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal
properties as clearly provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code.
However, Article 61, also above quoted, states that after a petition for legal separation
has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the
couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the

status quo of the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and
thus protect the rights of the plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of
the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may, before final judgment, do or continue doing the
act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain and thus make ineffectual the final
judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the plaintiff.

The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for
almost nineteen years now, apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner.
He has not alleged, much less shown, that her administration has caused prejudice to
the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease of the Forbes Park
property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of
the rentals.

The twin requirements of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its
actual or threatened violation. Regardless of the outcome of the appeal, it cannot be
denied that as the petitioner's legitimate wife (and the complainant and injured spouse
in the action for legal separation), the private respondent has a right to a share (if not
the whole) of the conjugal estate.

5. Arroyo, Jr. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 750

Facts:

- Dr. Jorge B. Neri filed a criminal complaint for adultery before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4, of Benguet against his wife, Ruby Vera Neri, and Eduardo Arroyo
committed on 2 November 1982.

- Petitioner Arroyo filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Petitioner Ruby Vera Neri also moved for reconsideration or a new trial, contending that
a pardon had been extended by her husband, private complainant Dr. Jorge B. Neri,
and that her husband had later contracted marriage with another woman with whom he
is presently cohabiting.

Issue:

Whether or not Dr. Neri's alleged extra-marital affair precludes him from filing the
criminal complaint on the ground of pari delicto
Ruling:

We turn to the contention that pari-delicto "is a valid defense to a prosecution for
adultery and concubinage and that in such a case “it would be only a hypocritical
pretense for such spouse to appear in court as the offended spouse.”

While there is a conceptual difference between consent and pardon in the sense
that consent is granted prior to the adulterous act while pardon is given after the illicit
affair, nevertheless, for either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint.

In the present case, the affidavit of desistance was executed only on 23

November 1988 while the compromise agreement was executed only on 16 February
1989, after the trial court had already rendered its decision dated 17 December 1987
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Dr. Neri's manifestation is both dated
and signed after issuance of our Resolution in G.R. No. 96602
on 24 April 1991.

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's
complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the control of the case passes to the
public prosecutor.

Enforcement of our law on adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a

matter of vindication of the private honor of the offended spouse; much less is it a
matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such enforcement relates, more
importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind.