ALTA VISTA GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, Petitioner,

vs.

THE CITY OF CEBU, HON. MAYOR TOMAS R. OSMEÑA, in his capacity as Mayor
of Cebu, and TERESITA C. CAMARILLO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer,
Respondents.

FACTS:

City of Cebu Municipality is collecting amusement tax from Alta Vista Golf and Country
Club pursuant to City Tax: Ordinance, otherwise known as the "Revised Omnibus Tax:
Ordinance of the City of Cebu". Section 42 of the said tax ordinance provides that there
shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees or operators
of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other similar places of entertainment,
an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%), golf courses and polo grounds at
the rate of twenty percent (20% ), of their gross receipts on entrance, playing green,
and/or admission fees;

But Alta refuses to pay on the contention that amusement tax is imposable only on
operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, or places where one seeks to entertain
himself by seeing or viewing a show or performance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 42 of such Ordinance is imposable on proprietors of golf

courses.

RULING:

NO. A golf course cannot be considered a place of amusement.

"Amusement places," as defined in Section 131(c) of the Local Government Code,

"include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performance."

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow
the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted
to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned."
The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give effect to both the particular and
general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as including all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by
the particular words. This is justified on the ground that if the lawmaking body intended
the general terms to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would have not made an
enumeration of particular subjects but would have used only general terms.
FLAVIO K. MACASAET & ASSOCIATES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT AND PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS

G.R 83748 , May 12, 1989

FACTS: On 15 Sept 1977, respondent PTA entered into a contract for “Project Design
and Management Services”
for the development of the proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club with the
petitioner.
Under the contract, PTA obligated itself to pay petitioner a professional fee
of 7% of the actual
construction cost. Upon completion of the project, PTA paid petitioner what it perceived
to be the balance of the
latter’s professional fees. After the completion of project, however, PTA paid the major
contractor the additional
sum of P3,148,198.26 representing the escalation cost due to increase of construction
materials.
Upon learning of this, the petitioner requested payment of P219,302.47 representing 7%
of the paid
amount.
FACTS:
Respondent Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) entered into a Contract for "Project
Design and Management Services for the development of the
proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club, Calarian, Zamboanga City" with petitioner
company, but originally with Flavio K. Macasaet alone (hereinafter referred to simply as
the "Contract").
IN A CONTRACT WITH PTA obligated itself to pay petitioner a professional fee of
seven (7%) of the actual construction cost. However, after the Construction, PTA paid
Supra Construction Company, the main contractor, the additional sum of
P3,148,198.26 representing the escalation cost of the contract price due to the increase
in the price of construction materials.
Upon learning of the price escalation, petitioner requested payment of
P219,302.47 additional professional fee representing seven (7%) percent of
P3,148,198.26, which the respondent denied payment on the ground that "the subject
price escalation referred to increased cost of construction materials and did not entail
additional work on the part of petitioner as to entitle it to additional compensation under
Article VI of the Contract."

ISSUE:
whether or not the price escalation should be included in the "final actual project cost”
thus entitles the petitioner to additional professional fee.
On 15 Sept 1977, respondent PTA entered into a contract for “Project Design and
Management Services”
for the development of the proposed Zamboanga Golf and Country Club with the
petitioner.

RULING:

 Flavio Macasaet is entitled to the seven (7%) percent of PTA’s payment to Supra
Construction Company amounting to P3,148,198.26 for escalation cost as included
under paragraph 5, Article V, the balance of the professional fee was to be computed on
the basis of “the final actual project cost.” The “final actual project cost” in the contract
between Macasaet and PTA covers the totality of all costs as actually and finally
determined, and logically includes the escalation cost of the contract price. 

The terminologies in the contract being clear, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, their literal meaning control (Article 1370, Civil Code). Therefore, the
final actual project cost includes the escalation cost and Philippines Tourism Authority is
hereby ordered to pay petitioner the additional amount of P219,392.47 to complete the
payment of its professional fee under their Contract for Project Design and Management
Services.

MON MARCELO D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner-appellant, 

vs.
GEN. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, and COLONEL EULOGIO BALAO, respondents-
appellees.

G.R. No. L-4221             August 30, 1952

FACTS:

The petitioner argued that the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpuswas void on the ground that it included sedition which is not a ground
provided for in the Constitution.

On 18 October 1950, Petitioner Maximino Montenegro was arrested for alleged

communistic activities (alleged sedition, rebellion, and insurrection). On 22 October
1950, then President Elpidio Quirino, through Proclamation No. 210, suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcelo Montenegro, father of Maximino, filed a
petition for habeas corpus for the release of his son. In the same petition, he questioned
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 210 as he alleged, among others, that the
Proclamation is a bill of attainder, hence prohibited by law, and that the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus was groundless as there is no state of invasion, insurrection,
rebellion or imminent danger at the time of its issuance. 
Respondent General Mariano Castañeda admitted custody over the person of
Maximino. Castañeda averred that the suspension of the writ is valid pursuant to the
ruling in a Barcelon vs. Baker.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation 210 is valid.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court considered the word "sedition" in said proclamation as a
mistake or surplasage but its inclusion in the proclamation does not invalidate the entire
proclamation.

NEG ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF

DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.

G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena Estate Inc. in
December 1941. The registration was interrupted by the war. In May 1945, he sought to
accomplish the said registration but was denied by the Register of Deeds of Manila on
the grounds that he is a foreigner and he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction.
Krivenko brought the case to the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a
land, being an alien. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land.

RULING:
No. Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect
to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But
this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves
who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent
this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
“Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.” 
Thi s consti tu ti onal  pro vision  clo ses  th e onl y remai ning  ave nue 
t h r o u g h   w h i c h agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would
certainly be futile to prohibit t h e a l i e n a t i o n o f p u b l i c a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d s t o
a l i e n s i f , a f t e r a l l , t h e y m a y b e f r e e l y s o alienated upon their becoming
private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino
citizens.U n d o u b t e d l y ,   a s   a b o v e   i n d i c a t e d ,   s e c t i o n   5   i s   i n t e n
d e d   t o   i n s u r e   t h e   p o l i c y   o f   nationalization contained in section 1. Both
sections must, therefore, be read together for t h e y h a v e t h e s a m e p u r p o s e a n d
t h e s a m e s u b j e c t m a t t e r . I t m u s t b e n o t i c e d t h a t t h e persons against
whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who
under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
theP h i l i p p i n e s . "   A n d   t h e   s u b j e c t   m a t t e r   o f   b o t h   s e c t i o n s   i s   t h e   s a m e ,  
n a m e l y ,   t h e   n o n - transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
"agricultural land" under section 1includes residential lots, the same
technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is
a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the
same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears."
RO V CASTAÑEDA
Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and
121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
ANTONIO D. DAYAO, ROLANDO P. RAMIREZ and ADELIO R. CAPCO, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 193643               January 29, 2013

FEDERATION OF PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, 

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LPG MARKETERS ASSOCIATION,
INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 193704

FACTS:

LPGMA sought accreditation from COMELEC for the purpose of participation in May 10,
2010 elections under HA No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. LPGMA claimed that it
has special interest in the LPG industry and other allied concerns. The Accreditation
was then approved without any opposition. However, months after FEDERATION OF
PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIES, INC filed a complaint for the cancellation of LPGMA’s
accreditation on the ground that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized
sector of the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not
marginalized or underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and
independent refillers of LPG that control the 45% of the national LPG retail market
and have significant ownership interest in various LPG refilling plants.

The complaint... proffered in essence that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized
sector of
the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and... independent re-fillers
of LPG
that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership
interests in
various LPG refilling plants
The complaint... proffered in essence that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized
sector of
the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens since they are actually marketers and... independent re-fillers
of LPG
that control 45% of the national LPG retail market and have significant ownership
interests in
various LPG refilling plants

The COMELEC dismissed the complaint since the ground for cancellation cited is not
among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of RA No. 7941 and the complaint is
actually a belated opposition to LPGMA's petition for registration which has long been
approved with finality. COMELEC denied the petitioners' motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'

complaints and motions for reconsideration respectively
RULING:

There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.
However, in
light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present petitions ought to
be
dismissed.
An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition precedent to the filing of a
complaint for cancellation.
Section 6, R.A. No. 7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of
party-list
accreditation
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

The Court ruled that there was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for
cancellation, However, in light of the COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012,
the present petition ought to be dismissed.

Section 6, RA No 7941 lays down the grounds for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation.

Section 6: Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration

The distinctiveness of the two powers is immediately apparent from their basic
definitions. To refuse is to decline or to turn down, 24 while to cancel is to annul or
remove.25 Adopting such meanings within the context of Section 6, refusal of registration
happens during the inceptive stage when an organization seeks admission into the
roster of COMELEC-registered party-list organizations through a petition for registration.
Cancellation on the other hand, takes place after the fact of registration when an inquiry
is done by the COMELEC, motu propio or upon a verified complaint, on whether a
registered party-list organization still holds the qualifications imposed by law. Refusal is
handed down to a petition for registration while cancellation is decreed on the
registration itself after the petition has been approved.

A resort to the rules of statutory construction yields a similar conclusion.

The legal meaning of the term "and/or" between "refusal" and "cancellation" should be
taken in its ordinary significance  "refusal and/or cancellation" means "refusal and
cancellation" or "refusal or cancellation". It has been held that the intention of the
legislature in using the term "and/or" is that the word "and" and the word "or" are to be
used interchangeably.26

The term "and/or" means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive "and" and the
disjunctive "or" or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the
other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the
whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the
disjunctive "or" alone will exclude the combination of several of the alternatives or by the
use of the conjunctive "and" will exclude the efficacy of any one of the alternatives
standing alone.27

Hence, effect shall be given to both "refusal and cancellation" and "refusal or
cancellation" according to how Section 6 intended them to be employed. The word
"and" is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union; it is pertinently defined as
meaning "together with", "joined with", "along or together with." 28 The use of "and" in
Section 6 was necessitated by the fact that refusal and cancellation of party-list
registration share similar grounds, manner of initiation and procedural due process
requirements of notice and hearing. With respect to the said matters, "refusal" and
"cancellation" must be taken together. The word "or", on the other hand, is a disjunctive
term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word.29 As such, "refusal or cancellation", consistent with their
disjunctive meanings, must be taken individually to mean that they are separate
instances when the COMELEC can exercise its power to screen the qualifications of
party-list organizations for purposes of participation in the party-list system of
representation.

That this is the clear intent of the law is bolstered by the use simply of the word "or" in
the first sentence of Section 6 that "the COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition."

Consequently, the COMELEC’s conclusion that the complaint for cancellation, filed four
(4) months after the petition was approved, is actually a belated opposition, obliterates
the distinction between the power to register/refuse and the power to cancel. Since an
opposition may only be sensibly interposed against a petition for registration, the
proceedings for which involve the COMELEC’s power to register, it is wrong to impose it
as a condition for the exercise of the COMELEC’s entirely separate power to cancel. As
such, the absence of an opposition to a petition for registration cannot serve to bar any
interested party from questioning, through a complaint for cancellation, the qualifications
of a party-list group