ASSIGNMENT

ON
(CVE 714)

TOPIC
SAFETY IN ENGINEERING AND
INTRODUCTION TO RISK ANALYSIS
PREPARED BY
ABDULRAUF ISMAIL BUSAYO
MATRIC PD2000019

POST GRADUATE DIPLOMA

YEAR ONE
SECOND SEMESTER (2020/2021 SESSION)

LADOKE AKINTOLA UNIVERSITY OF

TECHNOLOGY, OGBOMOSO
OYO STATE.
JANUARY 2021.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction and definitions
1.1 SAFETY
1.2 SAFETY ENGINEERING
1.3 OCCUPATION HEALTH AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT SERIES (OHSAS) 18001-2007
1.4 OHSAS DEFINTIONS.
1.5 STEPS TO SAFETY
1.6 SAFE PRODUCTION RULES
1.7 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFE PRODUCTION RULES.
1.8 WHY SAFETY ENGINEERING.
1.9 IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY ENGINEERING
1.10 ROLES OF SAFETY ENGINEERS
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 CORE PRINCIPLES OF SAFETY ENGINEERING AND THE CARDINAL RULES OF HAZARD
CONTROL
2.1 IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
2.2 HAZARD CONTROL:
2.3 BASICS OF SAFETY IN ENGINEERING
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 RISK ANALYSIS
3.1 RISK ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE
3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT / SAFETY ASSESSMENT
3.3 RISK MANAGEMENT
3.4 QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS TOOLBOX
3.5 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
4.6 RISK COMMUNICATION
4.7 RISK COMMUNICATION GOALS
APPENDIX

REFERENCES
CHAPTER ONE
1.0 Introduction and definitions
1.1 SAFETY
The term safety refers to a condition of being safe or protected. Safety in the context of
occupational health and safety means a state of been protected against physical,
psychological, occupational, mechanical failure, damage, accident, death, injury, or such highly
undesirable events. Safety can therefore be defined as the protection of people from physical
injury.
Health and safety are used together to indicate concern for the physical and mental well-being
of the individual at work.
Safety is also describe as a condition, where positive control of known hazards exists in an
effort to achieve an acceptable degree of calculated risk such as a permissible exposure limit.

1.2 SAFETY ENGINEERING

Safety engineering is an engineering discipline that assures that engineered systems provide
acceptable levels of safety. It is strongly related to systems engineering, industrial engineering
and the subset system safety engineering. Safety engineering assures that a life-critical system
behaves as needed, even when components fail.
Safety engineering is a field of engineering that deals with accident prevention, risk of human
error reduction and safety provided by the engineered systems and designs.
It is associated with industrial engineering and system engineering and applied to
manufacturing, public works and product designs to make safety an integral part of
operations.

1.3 OCCUPATION HEALTH AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT SERIES (OHSAS) 18001-2007

OHSAS 18001- Is an occupational health and safety management system standard which shall
be used to assess and certify safety management systems.

1.4 OHSAS DEFINTIONS.

 Safety- is freedom from acceptable risk or harm.
 Accident -is undesired event giving rise to death, ill health, injury, damage or other loss?
 Incident –work related event(s) in which injury or ill health (regardless of severity) or
fatality occurred, or could have occurred.
Note : an accident where no health, injury ,damage, other loss occurs is also referred to near
miss. The term near incident includes near miss.
 Risk –the combination of the likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure
and the severity of injury of the ill health that can be caused by event of the exposure.
 Imminent danger: The term “Imminent Danger” refers to any condition in the workplace
that poses an immediate harm of injury, illness, or death to an employee. For example, a
roof that is about to collapse may be considered an “imminent danger”, especially if it is
ready to give way at any moment
 Risk assessment-the process of evaluation the risk (S) arising from hazard, taking into
account the adequacy of existing controls, and deciding whether or not the risk is
acceptable.
 Non -conformity- this can be a deviation from work standards, practices, procedures,
regulations and legal requirements

1.5 STEPS TO SAFETY

Six steps to safety: these steps are short reminders for safe operation, years of experience
have shown them to be the safest way to perform your daily work.
1. Is this a hazardous situation?
2. Are the men or women doing something wrong?
3. Are the tools or equipment dangerous? If one yes
4. What am I going to do about it now?
5. Did it work?
6. Do an act of safety per day
Take two .........................for safety : this is a campaign designed to stimulate thinking and
conversation about safety in the work place and to further give practical meaning.
The programme uses the acronym T-A-K-E thus
Talk: have I talk with everyone involved with this job or task?
Action: do I know the proper actions I need to follow to do this job safely?
Knowledge: do I have the proper knowledge to do this job safely
Equipment: do I have the proper equipment including the PPE to do this job safely?
1.6 SAFE PRODUCTION RULES
Safe production rules are developed to reinforce the safety policy and to pursue the objective
of zero harm. They provide a basis for trying to eliminate fatal, serious accidents and
occupation health risk and were formulated through undertaking a historical review of fatal,
serious accidents and occupational hazard in the company.
If we cannot produce safely then we will not: means,
 Safety is the number one priority
 Every employee has the right and responsibility to understand the risk inherent in the task
to be performed by them
 Every employee has the right and the responsibility to withdraw from a dangerous
situation
 Every employee must be provided with the required training ,resources and personal
proactive equipment
 Every employee must be provided with the require information.

1.7 THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SAFE PRODUCTION RULES.

You must:
 Be trained ,competent and authorized to perform any task
 Fit for work and unaffected by fatigue, altitude ,drugs or alcohol
 Never tamper with any health and safety services
 Always withdraw from unsafe and / or unhealthy work places, or conditions and report it
 Always risk assess task before commencing work
 Always apply the stop, think, fix, and continue philosophy to any dangerous situation or
condition
 Know whom to contact and what to do in an emergency
 Maintain emergency equipment
 Have the right tools and equipment and ensure that these are appropriate and are in good
working order
 Always wear and use personal protective equipment that are in good condition and
appropriate for the task
 Always use hearing protection devices in noisy areas
 Always determine whether a permit to work is required before commencing a task. If there
is any doubt ask your supervisor.
 Always report all hazards, incidents, and accidents.
 Always ensure that all employees adhere to these safety rules.

Safety is one of the prime considerations in any organization, whether it is profitable or non-
profitable. Management is fully responsible for planning and implementing all protective
measures to safeguard all employees and properties from any sort of hazard in the workplace.
Safety is also required by local laws, industrial regulations and practices. Employees need to be
trained and informed about all safety aspects they might encounter in their workplaces. Safety
monitoring and controlling is one of the major day to day tasks of management, since the
accidents, damage, injury and other health hazards cost money, hamper production or service
and have tremendous negative effect on employee morale and business goodwill.

Industrial safety can be defined as the ability to manage the risks inherent to operations or
related to the environment. Industrial safety is not a dislike of risks; rather it is a commitment
to clearly identify them in relation to production operations, assess them in terms of quality
and quantity, and manage them.
The safety of an onshore facility is a function of how safely the facility is designed. People are
hurt and sometimes killed when explosions, fires, and toxic-gas releases occur at oil- and gas-
producing facilities that were designed without regard to measures that could have prevented
such incidents. The safety of people and equipment needs to be considered and included along
every step in the engineering of oil and gas facilities. Properly designed oil and gas facilities can
eliminate injuries and deaths.
1.8 WHY SAFETY ENGINEERING.
Safety has become a very important issue each year as a vast number of people die and get
serious injured due to workplace and other accidents. For example, in the u.s alone, for the
year 1996, there were 93400 deaths and vast number of disabling injuries due to accidents
with a total loss of $121 billion.

1.9 IMPORTANCE OF SAFETY ENGINEERING

 Reduce accidents
 Control and eliminate hazards
 Develop new methods and techniques to improve safety
 Maximize returns on safety efforts
 Maximize public confidence with respect to product safety.

1.10 ROLES OF SAFETY ENGINEERS

1. Safety engineers ensure the well-being of people and property.
2. These professionals combine knowledge of an engineering discipline, as well as health or
safety regulations related to their discipline to keep work environments, building and people
safe from harm.
3. The work of safety engineers’ helps their employers lower costs of insurance and comply
with laws and regulations related to health and safety.
4. Inspections. One of the primary duties of safety engineers is to inspect machinery,
equipment and production facilities to identify potential dangers.
5. Safety engineers are also responsible for making sure that buildings meet all codes, and that
manufacturing equipment, storage facilities and products meet all applicable health and safety
regulations. Fire prevention and industrial safety engineers, in particular, spend a great deal of
time involved with inspection-related activities.
6. Safety engineers are also typically involved in consulting and planning activities. Having a
safety engineer involved from the planning stages of a project enables you to focus on safety
as an integral part of the process, rather than just as something tacked on at the end.
7. When working as consultants, safety engineers bring their education and experience to bear
in analyzing complex processes, conditions and behaviors, and apply a systemic approach to
make sure that nothing has been overlooked. Aerospace safety engineers, product safety
engineers, and systems safety engineers spend a lot of time planning, designing, and
consulting.
8. They are involved in doing risk assessment
9. Investigated the causes of accidents, cases of work related diseases or ill health and
dangerous occurrences.
CHAPTER TWO
2.0 CORE PRINCIPLES OF SAFETY ENGINEERING AND THE CARDINAL RULES OF HAZARD
CONTROL
Safety engineering, like any applied science, is based upon fundamental principles and rules of
practice. Safety engineering involves the (a) identification, (b) evaluation, and (c) control of
hazards in man-machine systems (products, machines, equipment, or facilities) that contain a
potential to cause injury to people or damage to property.

A realistic view of the term "accident"

Safety engineers recognize that accidents are typically dynamic events involving a combination
of causative factors. The term “accident” means a dynamic, multi-causal event that begins
with the activation of a pre-existing hazard which then flows through its host system in a
logical sequence of events, factors, and circumstances to produce a final loss event (often
including personal injury of the system operator).
According to OHSAS, any unplanned event results in injury or ill health of people or damage or
loss to property, plant, materials or the environment, or a loss of a business opportunity.
Near miss – this is any incident that could have resulted in an accident. Knowledge of near
misses is very important as research has shown that, approximately, for every 10 near misses
event at a particular location in the work place, a minor accident will occur.
Dangerous occurrence - this is a near miss which could have led to serious injury or loss of life.
Dangerous occurrences are identified in The Reporting Of Injuries, Diseases And Dangerous
Occurrences Regulations 1995 (known as RIDDOR) and are always reportable to enforcement
authorities. Examples are collapse of scaffold or a crane or the failure of any passenger
carrying the equipment.

2.1 IMPORTANT FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS

1. SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
The concept of “system life cycle” recognizes that every system (product, machine, facility,
etc.) has a “life cycle” which begins in the
(a) “Concept or definition” stage before proceeding through the successive stages of
(b) System “design and development,”
(c) “Production, manufacture, construction, or fabrication,” followed by
(d) System “distribution” before arriving at the
(e) System “operation or deployment” stage, which after a period of time, is inevitably
followed by
(f) The “termination, retirement, recycle, or disposal” stage.

2. THE ACCIDENT PROCESS

Effective safety engineering and safety management must also take into account what has
come to be known as “the accident process.” This concept recognizes the fact that although
personal injury or system damage may take place at a moment in time, the foreseeable
causative factors that ultimately produce such injury or damage are typically set into motion,
and could have been controlled or prevented, at an early stage in the system life cycle.
That is, this concept recognizes that foreseeable causes of accidents are typically set into
motion well in advance of the injury or damage occurrence itself. A key element in the
accident process is the concept of cause “foreseeability.” A foreseeable cause is called a
“proximate cause.”

3. PRODUCING VS. PROXIMATE CAUSE

According to the safety engineering literature (having its counterpart in law), a “producing
cause” means a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence or chain of subsequent
producing causes, produces an event, and without which the event (accident/injury) would not
have occurred.
Some producing causes of accidents, through the use of reasonable and prudent methods of
prediction, can be reasonably foreseen or anticipated before they actually produce an
accident/injury event. Such a producing cause may further be identified as a “proximate
cause.”
That is, a proximate cause is a producing cause that is reasonably foreseeable (or should be
reasonably anticipated) by a person exercising ordinary care to discover and control such
causes before they produce accident events.
There can also be a hierarchy of proximate causes. One or more proximate causes might
logically be viewed as a primary, dominant, or root proximate cause; that is, a proximate cause
that necessarily sets all following causes in motion. These root proximate causes are typically
created during the early stages of the system life cycle and should be the primary targets for
elimination or control at that time.

4. FORESEEABLE VS. UNFORSEEABLE ACCIDENTS

Until an adequate accident causation analysis has been conducted, it is unwise to conclude
that its causative factors were unforeseeable. Therefore, one might define the following two
types of “accidents:”
a. Type I Accident
A Type I Accident might be considered an undesired and unforeseen event that results in an
unacceptable system loss, which could have been foreseen and prevented through the prior
application of recognized principles and methods of system hazard identification, evaluation,
and control.
b. Type II Accident
A Type II Accident might then be defined as an undesired and unforeseen event that results in
an unacceptable loss, which could not have been foreseen and prevented through the
application of recognized principles and methods of system hazard identification, evaluation
and control.
Obviously, Type I accident events should not be called “accidents” at all in the traditional
sense, but rather, such an event should more realistically be called a “foreseeable loss event.”

5. UNSAFE ACTS VS. UNSAFE CONDITIONS

Unsafe act is any act or action that deviates from a generally recognized safe way or specified
method of doing a job and which increases the probabilities for an accident. It must contain an
element of unsatisfactory behavior immediately before an accident that was significant in
initiating the event.
Examples of unsafe acts include
 Choosing short cuts,
 Using defective equipment’s,
 Lack of attention,
 Operating equipment without authority,
 Operating at improper speed,
 Failure to secure /make safe,
 Removing safely or environmental device, wrong placement, position for work,
 Failure to use PPE properly,
 Improper loading /lifting, working ,
 Under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and smoking, failure to warn others of sub-
standards conditions, ignoring rules and regulations,
 Fooling around and use mobile phones while driving.
 Energizing an electric line without ensuring that all the persons working on it have
reported back.
 Working without taking proper line clear.
 Replacing fuses or closing breakers without knowing the reason for keeping it open
 Opening and closing of switches without authority or warning.
 Failure to place warning signs or signals where they are needed.
 Working unsafely such as throwing materials or tools at another worker
 Riding on running boards or other unsafe places of vehicles, jumping from vehicles and
Platforms ,unnecessary haste in working ,operating hoists and trucks without proper
Communication., making safety devices inoperative
 Using unsafe equipment, wrong tools for the job or using hands instead of right tools.
 Over confidence like working on live electrical equipment that could be conveniently de-
Energized.
 Taking unsafe position or posture too close to openings and lifting in an unstable Position,
 Distracting, teasing, joking, quarreling, annoying.
 Failure to use recommended safety protective equipment.
ACCIDENTS ARE CAUSED BY (UNSAFE ACTS OR UNSAFE CONDITIONS):
 People not thinking, not following instructions, or not putting their training into practice.
 Unsafe manual handling, loading, stacking and storing of materials.
 Overloading of platforms, scaffolds, hoists, plant, etc.
 Incorrect use and abuse of plant and equipment.
 Use of faulty equipment and “homemade” repairs.
 Illegal adaptions and illegal removal of guards/barriers.
 Failure to use PPE and ignoring safety signs/warning devices etc.
The costs of accidents include
 Pain,
 Suffering,
 Ongoing disability,
 Potential fatalities.
 Loss of earnings,
 Incapacity for the job,
 Inability to support family, etc.
 Employers face financial and time costs in compensation,
 Loss of working time,
 Lost management time during investigations,
 Possible fines,
UNSAFE CONDITION -An unsatisfactory physical condition existing in the workplace
environment immediately prior to an accident event which is significant in initiating the event.
Unsanitary conditions. It generally refers to such conditions or circumstances as might
contaminate with dirt or filth, or lead to injury or health problems
EXAMPLE:
 Slippery floor,
 Broken glass,
 Unguarded machine, trailing cable,
 Low lighting levels, defective guards ,
 Inadequate PPE,
 Environmental conditions, (dust, fumes, gases, vapour),
 Noise exposure,
 Inadequate PPE
 Low /high temperatures,
 Inadequate /excessive illumination, etc
Unfortunately, when discussing the causative factors of accidents, many people cling to the
traditional over-simplified labels that have divided such factors into “unsafe acts” and “unsafe
conditions.” In balance, this dichotomy approach has proven harmful to the effective control
of accidents.

Many otherwise sincere individuals have mistakenly believed or assumed that these factors
are subject to equal control and that only one or the other of the two need be of major
concern in the prevention of accidents. Typically, such focus has been on “unsafe acts,” as the
majority of practitioners do not possess the expertise to evaluate the technical issues involved,
or do not recognize with what relative ease and positive effect unsafe conditions can be
controlled.
The term “unsafe act” may also contain an unwarranted implication of blame or fault (rather
than a genuine lack of knowledge or training). During the investigation of accidents, such an
inordinate focus on “unsafe acts” will typically stifle the effective control of accidents, as the
investigation is typically ended when the first immediate cause is identified (unsuraprisingly
some action or inaction on the part of the accident victim). As a result, potentially more
important root causes related to system design are overlooked.

Herein, the term “unsafe condition” is retained, but the term “unsafe act” is rejected as
historically leading to error or incomplete cause analysis.
Rather, inappropriate human actions or inactions of persons that contribute to accidents
(resulting from error or human nature associated with the common relevant human factor
capabilities and limitations of men and women) are called “unsafe actions,” defined as unsafe
system use methods and procedures, without any initial implication of fault or blame.
2.2 HAZARD CONTROL:
Engineering vs. Work Methods
Given the initial proposition that accidents can be prevented by either controlling the design of
a system’s hardware, or by controlling the actions or behavior of system operators – that is, by
controlling the design of the product, machine, or facility (the machine or environment), or by
controlling the actions of operators or users of such systems (the man or human factor), the
question then becomes:

If the goal is the effective prevention of accidents (personal injury), should one give initial
primary attention to the identification and control of potential unsafe physical conditions
(hazardous system hardware components), or the identification and control of potential
unsafe actions (unsafe work methods and system use procedures)?

In essence, this question is asking: Are hazardous product, machine, and facility components,
or the hazardous actions or behaviors of people, more easily or effectively (a) identified, (b)
evaluated, and (c) controlled? (See Appendix for a discussion of this issue.)

2.3 BASICS OF SAFETY IN ENGINEERING

STEP 1: HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
The first step in safety engineering is “hazard identification.” A hazard is anything that has the
potential to cause harm when combined with some initiating stimulus.
Many system safety techniques have been pioneered to aid in the identification of potential
system hazards. None is more basic than “energy analysis.” Here, potential hazards associated
with various physical systems and their associated operation, including common industrial and
consumer related activities, can be identified (for later evaluation and control) by first
recognizing that system and product “hazards” are directly related to various common forms
of “energy.” That is, system component or operator “damage” or “injury” cannot occur
without the presence of some form of hazardous “energy.”
“Hazard identification” in reality can be viewed as “energy identification,” recognizing that an
unanticipated undesirable release or exchange of energy in a system is absolutely necessary to
cause an “accident” and subsequent system damage or operator injury. Therefore, an
“accident” can now be seen as “an undesired and unexpected, or at least untimely release,
exchange, or action of energy, resulting, or having the potential to result in damage or injury.”
This approach simplifies the task of hazard identification as it allows the identification of
hazards by means of a finite set of search paths, recognizing that the common forms of energy
that produce the vast majority of accidents can be placed into only ten descriptive categories
 Hazard. A hazard is any situation, substance, activity, event, or environment that could
potentially cause injury or ill health or harm. A hazard can be ranked relative to other
hazards or to a possible level of danger. Good management can control hazards. Hazards
may take the following forms:
 Hazardous situations are situations, conditions or working area that can cause injury or ill
health. Examples of potentially hazardous situations include slippery or uneven walking
surfaces, cramped working conditions, badly ventilated areas, high altitudes, and noisy
locations, poorly lit areas, and confined spaces.
 Hazardous substances are substances that can cause injury or ill health. Examples of
potentially hazardous substances include corrosive and toxic chemicals, flammable and
explosive materials, dangerous gases and liquids, radioactive substances, particulates,
poisons, bacteria, and viruses.
 Hazardous activities are the actions, act, or activities that can cause injury or ill health.
Examples of potentially hazardous activities include dangerous tasks, unnatural
movements and postures, heavy lifting, repetitive work, interpersonal conflicts, bullying,
and intimidation.
 Hazardous events: these are occurrences that can cause injury or ill health. Examples of
potentially hazardous events include explosions, implosions, collisions, vibrations, fires,
leaks, releases, chemical reactions, electric shocks, falling objects, loud noises, structural
breakdowns software failures, equipment malfunctions, and unscheduled shutdowns.
 Hazardous event probability the likelihood express in quantitative or qualitative terms that
a hazardous event will occur.
 Hazard probability the aggregate probability of occurrence of the individual hazardous
events that create a specific
 Hazard severity: an assessment of harm that could be cause by a specific hazard.
The goal of this first step in the hazard control process is to prepare a list of potential hazards
(energies) in the system under study. No attempt is made at this stage to prioritize potential
hazards or to determine the degree of danger associated with them – that will come later. At
this first stage, one is merely taking “inventory” of potential hazards (potential hazardous
energies).

TYPES OF HAZARDOUS ENERGY

 Mechanical Energy Hazards
Mechanical energy hazards involve system hardware components that cut, crush, bend, shear,
pinch, wrap, pull, and puncture. Such hazards are associated with components that move in
circular, transverse (single direction), or reciprocating (“back and forth”) motion. Traditionally,
such hazards found in typical industrial machinery have been associated with the terms
“power transmission apparatus,” “functional components,” and the “point of operation.”
 Electrical Energy Hazards
Electrical energy hazards have traditionally been divided by the general public into the
categories of low voltage electrical hazards (below 440 volts) and high voltage electrical
hazards (greater than 440 volts).
 Chemical Energy Hazards
Chemical energy hazards involve substances that are corrosive, toxic, flammable, or reactive,
to include chemical explosives.
 Kinetic (Impact) Energy Hazards
Kinetic energy hazards involve “things in motion” and “impact,” and are associated with the
collision of objects in relative motion to each other. This would include impact of objects
moving toward each other, impact of a moving object against a stationary object, falling
objects, flying objects, and flying particles.
 Potential (Stored) Energy Hazards
Potential energy hazards involve “stored energy.” This includes things that are under pressure,
tension, or compression; or things that attract or repulse one another. Potential energy
hazards involve things that are “susceptible to sudden unexpected movement.” Hazards
associated with gravity are included in this category and pertain to potential falling objects or
persons. This category also includes the forces of gravity transferred biomechanically to the
human body during manual lifting.
 Thermal Energy Hazards
Thermal energy hazards involve things that are associated with extreme or excessive heat,
extreme cold, sources of flame ignition, flame propagation, and heat related explosions.
 Acoustic Energy Hazards
Acoustic energy hazards involve excessive noise and vibrations.
 Radiant Energy Hazards
Radiant energy hazards involve the relatively short wavelength energy forms within the
electromagnetic spectrum to include the harmful characteristics of visible, infrared,
microwave, ultra-violet, x-ray, and ionizing radiation.
 Atmospheric/Geological/Oceanographic Hazards
These hazards are associated with atmospheric weather situations such as excessive wind and
storm conditions, destructive geological events such as instabilities of the earth’s surface (rock
or mud slides and earthquakes), and oceanographic currents and wave action, etc.
 Biological Hazards
These hazards are associated with poisonous plants, dangerous animals, biting or poisonous
insects, and disease carrying bacteria, etc.
 Systematic Inventory of Potential Hazards
To develop a list of potential system hazards, one should consider each form of energy in turn.
First, list each particular type of energy contained in the system under study, and then
describe the various reasonably foreseeable circumstances under which it might become a
proximate cause of an undesirable event. Here, full use of the published literature, accident
statistics, system operator experience, scientific and engineering probability forecasting,
system safety techniques (such as Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard
Mode and Effects Analysis, and What-If Analysis), as well as team brainstorming are brought to
bear on the question of how each form of energy might cause an undesirable event.
Prerequisite to such an identification of all system hazards is a thorough understanding of the
system under study related to its general and specific intended purpose and all reasonably
anticipated conditions of use.
Specifically, one must thoroughly understand (a) the engineering design of the system,
including all physical hardware components - their functions, material properties, operating
characteristics, and relationships or interfaces with other system components, (b) the
intended uses as well as the reasonably anticipated misuses of the system, (c) the specific
(demographic and human factor) characteristics of intended system users, taking into account
such things as their educational levels, their range of knowledge and skill, and their physical,
physiological, psychological, and cultural capabilities, expectancies, and limitations, and (d) the
general characteristics of the physical and administrative environment in which the system will
be operated. That is, one must have a thorough understanding of the man/ machine/ task/
environment elements of the system and their interactions.

STEP 2: HAZARD EVALUATION

The evaluation stage of the safety engineering process has as its goal the prioritizing or
ordering of the list of potential system condition or physical state hazards, or potential system
personnel of human factors compiled in Step #1.
The mere presence of a potential hazard tells us nothing about its potential danger. To know
the danger related to a particular hazard, one must first examine associated risk factors.
RISK - this is the likelihood of substance, activity, or process to cause harm. A risk can be
reduced.
Risk. can be measured as the product of three components: (a) the probability that an injury
or damage producing mishap will occur during any one exposure to the hazard; (b) the likely
severity or degree of injury or damage that will likely result should a mishap occur; and (c) the
estimated number of times a person or persons will likely be exposed to the hazard over a
specific period of time. That is...
(1) H x R = D, and since
(2)R=PxSxE, then
(3)H(PxSxE)=D
where:
for (H x R = D)
H= Hazard
R = Risk
D = Danger
For (PxSxE)
P = Probability
S = Severity
E = Exposure
In the evaluation of mishap probability, consideration should be given to historical incident
data and reasonable methods of prediction.
Use of this equation must take into account that an accident event having a remote probability
of occurrence during any single exposure, or during any finite period of exposure to a
particular hazard, IS CERTAIN TO OCCUR if exposure to that hazard is allowed to be repeated
over a longer period of time. Therefore, a long term or large sample view should be taken for
proper evaluation.

Determination of potential severity should center on the most likely resulting injury or damage
as well as the most severe potential outcome. Severity becomes the controlling factor when
severe injury or death is a likely possibility among the several plausible outcomes. That is, even
when other risk factors indicate a low probability of mishap over time, if severe injury or death
may occur as a result of mishap, the risk associated with such hazards must be considered as
being “unacceptable,” and strict attention given to the control of such hazards and related
mishaps.
Exposure evaluation should consider the typical life expectancy of the system containing a
particular hazard, the number of systems in use, and the number of individuals who will be
exposed to these systems over time.
 Acceptable vs. Unacceptable Risk
This step in the hazard evaluation process will ultimately serve to divide the list of potential
hazards into a group of “acceptable” hazards and a group of “unacceptable” hazards.
Acceptable hazards are those associated with acceptable risk factors; unacceptable hazards
are those associated with unacceptable risk factors.
An “acceptable risk” can be thought of as a risk that a group of rational, well-informed, ethical
individuals would deem acceptable to expose themselves to in order to acquire the clear
benefits of such exposure. An “unacceptable risk” can be thought of as a risk that a group of
rational, well-informed, ethical individuals would deem unacceptable to expose themselves to
in order to acquire the exposure benefits.
Hazards associated with an acceptable risk are traditionally called “safe,” while hazards
associated with an unacceptable risk are traditionally called “unsafe.” Therefore, what is called
“safe” does contain elements of risk that are judged to be “acceptable.” Once again, the mere
presence of a hazard does not automatically mean that the hazard is associated with any real
danger. It must first be measured as being unacceptable.
The result of this evaluation process will be the compiling of a list of hazards (or risks and
dangers) that are considered unacceptable. These unacceptable hazards (rendering the system
within which they exist “unreasonably dangerous”) are then carried to the third stage of the
safety engineering process, called “hazard control.”

STEP 3: HAZARD CONTROL

The primary purpose of engineering and the design of products and facilities is the physical
“control” of various materials and processes to produce a specific benefit. The central purpose
of safety engineering is the control of system “hazards” which may cause system damage,
system user injury, or otherwise decrease system benefits. Current and historic safety
engineering references have advocated a specific order or priority in which hazards are best
controlled.
For decades, it has been well established by the authoritative safety literature (as well as by
logic and sound engineering practice) that, in the order of preference and effectiveness,
regardless of the system being examined, hazards are first to be controlled through (a) “hazard
removal,” followed by (b) the use of “physical safeguards,” and then, after all reasonable
opportunities have been exhausted related to hazard removal and safeguarding, (c) remaining
hazards are to be controlled through the development and use of adequate warnings and
instructions (to include prescribed work methods and procedures).
Listed in order of preference and effectiveness, these control methods may be called the
“cardinal rules of safe design,” or the “cardinal rules of hazard control.”

Cardinal Rule #1
The first cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is “hazard elimination” or “inherent
safety.” That is, if practical, control (eliminate or minimize) potential hazards by designing
them out of products and facilities “on the drawing board.” This is accomplished through the
use of such interrelated techniques as hazard removal, hazard substitution, hazard
attenuation, and/or hazard isolation through the use of the principles and techniques of
system and product safety engineering, system and product safety management, and human
factors engineering, beginning with the concept and initial planning stages of the system
design process.

Cardinal Rule #2
The second cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is the minimization of system hazards
through the use of add-on safety devices or safety features engineered or designed into
products or facilities, also “on the drawing board,” to prevent the exposure of product or
facility users to inherent potential hazards or dangerous combinations of hazards; called
“extrinsic safety.” A sample of such devices would include shields or barriers that guard or
enclose hazards, component interlocks, pressure relief valves, stairway handrails, adequate
lighting, and passive vehicle occupant restraint and crashworthiness systems.
Passive vs. Active Hazard Controls
A principle that applies equally to the first two cardinal rules of safe design is that of “passive
vs. active” hazard control. Simply, a passive control is a control that works without requiring
the continuous or periodic involvement or action of system users. An active control, in
contrast, requires the system operator or user to “do something” before system use,
continuously or periodically during system operation in order for the control to work and avoid
injury. Passive controls are “automatic” controls, whereas active controls can be thought of as
“manual” controls. Passive controls are unquestionably more effective than active controls.

Cardinal Rule #3
The third cardinal rule of hazard control (safe design) is the control of hazards through the
development of warnings and instructions; that is, through the development and effective
communication of safe system use (and maintenance) methods and procedures that first warn
persons of the associated system dangers that may potentially be encountered under
reasonably foreseeable conditions of system use, misuse, or service, and then instruct them
regarding the precise steps that must be followed to cope with or avoid such dangers. This
third approach must only be used after all reasonably feasible design and safeguarding
opportunities (first and second rule applications) have been exhausted.
Further, it must be recognized that the (attempted) control of system hazards through the use
of warnings and instructions, the least effective method of hazard control, requires the
development of a variety of state-of-the-art communication methods and materials to assure
that such warnings and instructions are received and understood by system users.
Among other things, the methods and materials used to communicate required safe use or
operating methods and procedures must give adequate attention to the nature and potential
severity of the hazards involved, as well as reasonably anticipated user capabilities and
limitations (human factors).
Briefly stated, the cardinal rules of hazard controls involve system design, the use of physical
safeguards, and user training. It must further be thoroughly understood that no warning or
safe procedure can equal or replace an effective safety device, and no safety device can
equal or replace the elimination of a hazard on the drawing board.
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 RISK ANALYSIS
4.1 RISK ANALYSIS AND INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE
• “Risk analysis methods and tools are important resources for articulating scientific
knowledge to those who make decisions regarding public and occupational health.” Synergist
April, 2012
• “Risk analysis is a framework for decision making under uncertainty.”
Me March, 2013

4.2 RISK ASSESSMENT / SAFETY ASSESSMENT

 The public wants safety
 Safety is a subjective determination
– Chemicals used under reasonably foreseeable conditions should not adversely affect humans
and the environment
– Someone must decide what safe is
– Subjective decisions rarely satisfy everyone
 Risk is a more objective concept

 RISK
• Risk is a measure of the probability and consequence of uncertain future events
– Risk = Probability x Consequence
 In industrial hygiene
– Risk = Likelihood x Severity
Toxicity/adverse effects on humans, environment or other endpoints
Exposure = e (frequency, duration, magnitude, pathway/route)

“FLAVORS” OF RISK
• Risk includes
– Exposure to losses (hazards)
• Risk managers avoid risks
– Potential for gain (opportunities)
• Risk managers take risks
UNCERTAINTY LEADS TO RISK
Macro-Level (Values)
• Increasing social complexity
• Rapidly increasing pace of change
• Global effects
Micro-Level (Facts)
• Knowledge uncertainty

RISK ANALYSIS->DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY

Risk Assessment
• Analytically based
Risk Management
• Policy and preference based
Risk Communication
•Interactive exchange of information, opinions, and preferences concerning risks

Why Use Risk Analysis?

• To protect human, life and health as well as other endpoints
• To ensure a more reliable flow of workplace outputs and therefore desirable outcomes
• To improve decision making under uncertainty
• Traditional standards based approaches are no longer enough—problems persist
• National and global communities are embracing risk analysis

• What is the problem?

• What questions do we want risk assessment to answer?
• What can be done to reduce the impact of the risk described?
• What can be done to reduce the likelihood of the risk described?
• What are the trade-offs of the available options?
• What is the best way to address the described ?
• Is it working?
4.3 RISK MANAGEMENT
The Risk Manager’s Job!
• Risk managers are responsible for risk analysis; they identify or validate problems
• Risk managers need scientific information to make decisions under uncertainty
– They ask questions, which when answered yield the information needed to make decisions

The Risk Manager’s Job!

• Risk assessors answer the questions and characterize the uncertainty in their answers
• Risk managers mitigate risks that are not acceptable and take risks that are prudent
• Risk managers make sure that risk communication takes place

Risk Management Process

Risk Monitoring
1. Monitoring
2. Evaluation
3. Iteration
Risk Estimation
1. Establish risk analysis process
2. Individual risk management activities
Problem Identification
1. Problem recognition
2.Problem acceptance
3. Problem definition
Risk Control
1. Formulating RMO’s
2. Evaluating RMO’s
3. Comparing RMO’s
4. Choosing an RMO
5. ID decision outcomes
6. Implement decision
Risk Evaluation
1. Principles for establishing acceptable risks and tolerable levels of risk
2. The decision

Who Are the Risk Managers?

• OSHA? State? Company? Workers?
• There need to be many risk managers
• Who “owns” what part of the risk?

Risk Management Strategies

Risk Management Strategies
Accept the risk as is?
Risk Reduction Risk Taking
Risk Avoidance Risk Creation
Risk Prevention Risk Stimulation
Risk Mitigation Risk Promotion
Risk Transfer Risk Sharing
Risk Retention Risk Ignoring

Risk Assessment
• What can go wrong?
• How can it happen?
• How likely is it?
• What are the consequences?

Risk Assessment Model

An analytical and scientifically based process consisting of the following steps:
 Look for the Hazard or Opportunity
Identify the hazards that can cause harm or the opportunities for gain that are uncertain.
 Consequence Assessment
Decide who or what may be harmed or benefited and in what ways. Gather and analyze the
relevant data. Characterize the consequences and their uncertainty qualitatively or
quantitatively.
 Likelihood Assessment
Assess the likelihood of the various adverse and beneficial consequences. Characterize these
likelihoods and their uncertainty qualitatively or quantitatively.
 Risk Characterization
Estimate the probability of occurrence, the severity of adverse consequences, and the
magnitude of potential gains, including attendant uncertainties, of the hazards and
opportunities identified based on the evidence in the preceding steps. Characterize the risk
qualitatively or quantitatively with appropriate attention to baseline and residual risks, risk
reductions, transformations and transfers.

4.4 QUALITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODS TOOLBOX

• Increase or Decrease Risk
• Risk Narratives
• Evidence Mapping
• Screening
• Ratings
• Rankings
• Enhanced Criteria Ranking
• Operational Risk Management (Risk Matrix)
• Develop a Generic Process
• Qualitative Assessment Models
• Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis

4.5 QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

• Safety Assessment
• Scenario Planning
• Scenario Analysis
– Deterministic Scenario Analysis – Probabilistic Scenario Analysis
• Sensitivity Analysis
• Uncertainty Analysis
• Modeling
• Vulnerability Assessment

4.6 RISK COMMUNICATION

• Why are we communicating?
• Who is our audience?
• What do our audiences want to know? • What do we want to get across?
• How will we communicate?
• How will we listen?
• How will we respond?

4.7 RISK COMMUNICATION GOALS

  Tailor communication so it takes into account the emotional response to an event.
  Empowers stakeholders and public to make informed decisions.
  Prevent negative behavior and/or encourage constructive responses to crisis or danger.
APPENDIX
Behavioral Human Factor Causes vs. Physical Condition Causes of Accident Events:
Are hazardous product, machine, and facility components, or the hazardous actions or
behaviors of people, more easily or effectively (a) identified, (b) evaluated, and (c) controlled?
QUESTION #1 – Within any man-machine system, are potential unsafe conditions (unsafe
system hardware components) or potential unsafe actions (unsafe system use methods and
procedures) easier to IDENTIFY? That is, how many potential unsafe system hardware
conditions can be reasonably foreseen as compared with reasonably foreseeable potential
unsafe actions (unsafe system use methods and procedures) or human error factors associated
with system operation?
ANSWER – In most systems, the set of potential unsafe condition hazards is typically fewer in
number (more finite) than the set of potential human errors or potential deviations from
prescribed safe system use methods or procedures resulting from fatigue, distraction, and
various hardwired (intrinsic and relatively unmodifiable) human factor capabilities and
limitations).
Logically, one must choose to analyze and control the finite over the comparatively infinite.
That is, potential unsafe system condition hazards are potentially easier to identify. It follows
then that it is more effective to give one’s initial primary attention to “the machine” rather
than to “the man.”

QUESTION #2 – Are potential unsafe conditions (unsafe system hardware components) or

potential unsafe behaviors (unsafe system use methods and procedures) easier to EVALUATE?
That is, are the probabilities (and related injury severities) associated with foreseeable
exposures to potential system unsafe condition hazards and resulting loss events easier to
calculate or estimate than similar determinations of probability associated with potential
unsafe actions or human error factors related to system operation?
ANSWER – In most situations, it is typically easier, more predictable, and more accurate to
calculate or estimate the failure rates (accident probabilities and severities) associated with
hardware system hazards (defects/wear/failures) than it is to predict the multitude of
potential human errors or deviations from prescribed safe system use methods or procedures.
Once again, this indicates that it is more effective to give primary attention to “the machine”
rather than to “the man.”
QUESTION #3 – Are potential unsafe conditions (unsafe system hardware components) or
potential unsafe behaviors (unsafe system use methods and procedures) easier to CONTROL?
That is, if the ultimate goal is overall “hazard control,” are hazardous physical conditions of
hardware systems, or potential human error and deviations from prescribed safe system use
methods or procedures, more susceptible to effective, positive, and more permanent control?
ANSWER - As verified by the authoritative safety literature for the past several decades,
engineering controls (the removal or physical safeguarding of potential hazardous product,
machine, or facility system components) are universally recognized as being more effective
and long lasting than behavioral or administrative controls.
For the third time, this recognized hierarchy dictates that, at the earliest stage in a system’s life
cycle that potential system hardware hazards can be foreseen, primary attention should be
given to the elimination or engineering control of hazards.
A “bonus” advantage of controlling physical system condition hazards in the early stages of a
systems life cycle is the safe system design “on the drawing board” can automatically eliminate
the potential effect of later “operator errors.” The fact that operator errors are typically the
result of system design errors is exemplified in the safety and human factors engineering
proverb: “How a system, product, or facility is designed will dictate how it can and will be
used.”

CAUTION: The fact that control of system hazards and resulting potential personal injury to
system operators and users is recognized as first involving attention to designing hazards out,
and designing safety into various product, machine, and facility systems, should not detract
from the vital importance of giving paramount attention to the use of adequate warnings and
instructions and the development and effective communication of safe system operating
methods and procedures to system users at the proper time in the system design process.

In every hardware system, not only must human factors be considered early in the design
process to learn how people might be exposed to system hazards, so that these hazards can be
removed or minimized in the design process, residual hazards that cannot be designed out of
such systems through engineering means must be given proper attention in the form of
adequate warnings and instructions, and in many situations, required formal training (and
subsequent supervision). If the training becomes complex, a formal certification program must
be developed.
For Total Company, that means, in practical terms, regularly looking at how risk management
is addressed at the company's facilities and how much progress the company has made in its
action plans to reduce them.
Total company is exposed to three types of risk: risks related to the products that we use or
make; risks related to the processes and equipment used in our operations; and transportation
risks related to our operations.
Risk is never acceptable in itself. A risk is acceptable or unacceptable in a given environment at
a given time. A risk may be considered to be less serious when the environment is not very
sensitive, but is assessed more critically when the same operations are conducted in a more
sensitive environment.
Risk acceptability is assessed through dialogue and cooperation between the company and its
environment throughout a facility's lifetime. In the past, dialogue did not seem as necessary as
it is today, particularly in France. After the Toulouse disaster, a wide-ranging national debate
revealed the increased importance of cooperation among stakeholders.
Total company is aware of the need to broaden dialogue and is an active participant in the
process. 2004 was the third year of application of Total's 2002–05 safety action plan, which
focuses on two areas and is supported by real-world targets.
The purpose of safety engineering is to control risk by reducing or completely eliminating it. It
also aims to reduce the rate of failures and if failure does occur, it is not life threatening.
Safety engineering usually begins during the design of a system or product development.
Safety engineers study possible accidents under various conditions and bring forward the
accident risks. They then design safety guards or procedures the operators must follow to
remain safe. Sometimes, they take the help of computer models, prototypes or replicate the
situations to assess the hazards and risks. Before implementing a system or produce a product,
safety engineers consider all possibilities, including, engineering, technical safety, material
reliability, legislations and human factors to make sure that there is no known hazard.

Acceptable Risk. A risk is acceptable if it has been reduced to a level that your organization can
tolerate given its occupational health and safety (OH&S) policy and its legal obligations.
Audit. An audit is an evidence gathering process. Audit evidence is used to evaluate how well
audit criteria are being met. Audits must be both objective and independent and the audit
process must be both systematic and documented.

Corrective Action. Corrective actions are steps that are taken to remove the cause or causes of
an existing nonconformity or other undesirable situation. Corrective actions address actual
problems. In general, the corrective action process can be thought of as a problem solving
process.
Hazard Identification Hazard identification is a process that involves recognizing that an OH&S
hazard exists and then describing its characteristics.

ILL Health ILL health is an adverse physical or mental condition. In order to qualify as an
occupational health and safety problem, an adverse physical or mental condition must be
identifiable and be caused or aggravated by a work activity or a work related situation.

Incident. An incident is a work related event during which: injury, ill health, or fatality actually
occurs, or injury, ill health, or fatality could have occurred.
An accident is a type of incident. It is a work-related event during which injury, ill health, or
fatality actually occurs.
It is a type of incident A close call, near miss, near hit, or dangerous occurrence is also a type of
incident. It is a work-related event during which injury, ill health, or fatality could have
occurred, but didn’t actually occur (see 2, above).

Nonconformity Non conformity is the non- fulfillment of a requirement or a deviation from a

standard. When an organization fails to meet requirements or deviates from a standard, a
nonconformity exists. Accordingly, any deviation from the OHSAS 18001 standard is a non
conformity. Or could affect health and safety in the workplace. and achievements against your
OH&S policy, objectives, or any other suitable OH&S performance requirements.

Preventive Action Preventive actions are steps that are taken to remove the causes of
potential nonconformities or other undesirable situations that have not yet occurred.
Preventive actions address potential problems. In general, the preventive action process can
be thought of as a risk analysis process .must be used to carry out the work.

Risk. Risk combines three elements: it starts with a potential event, and then combines its
probability with its potential severity. In the context of OH&S, the concept of risk asks two
future oriented questions: What is the probability that a particular hazardous event or
exposure will actually occur in the future? How severe would the impact on health and safety
be if the hazardous event or exposure actually occurred? A high risk hazardous event or
exposure would have both high probability of occurring and a severe impact on OH&S if it
actually occurred. A high risk event or exposure is one that is likely to cause severe injury or ill
health.
REFERENCES
1. Introduction to Risk Analysis
Chesapeake AIHA/ASSE Educational Seminar March 13, 2013
Charles Yoe, Ph.D. cyoe1@verizon.net
2. Safety and reliability engineering design (2015)
mr. jonathan oteng / all nations university college (Studocu.com)