COMPETITIVE EXAMS

PREPARATORY INSTITUTE

February 12, 2023

Table of Contents
 Why Pakistan Is Facing a Growing
Food Crisis
Last Saturday in Mirpur Khas, a city in Pakistan’s
Sindh province, hundreds of people lined up for hours
outside a park to buy subsidized wheat flour, offered
for 65 rupees a kilogram instead of the current,
inflated rate of about 140 to 160 rupees.
When a few trucks arrived, the crowd surged forward,
leaving several injured. One man,
Harsingh Kolhi, who was there to bring a
five kg bag of flour home for his wife and
children, was crushed and killed in the
chaos.
As the dust settled, a group of people at
the site took Kolhi’s body to the local
press club and demanded the registration
of a murder case against officials
responsible for the stampede as well as
the flour crisis across the province,
according to Dawn.
The incident is just one example of how
the impact of the country’s burgeoning
food shortage and a looming economic
crisis are already being felt by Pakistan’s
poorest.
As the country still reels from the devastating floods
that hit over the summer, which government officials
estimate damaged more than 80% of the country’s
crops, it’s also contending with economic uncertainty
that has left food and medicine lingering in ports. The
State Bank of Pakistan says that their foreign exchange
reserves have fallen to a critical level of $4.3 billion—
barely enough for three weeks of imports.
Pakistan’s economic crisis is twofold, says Uzair
Younus, Director of the Atlantic Council’s Pakistan
Initiative. Even before last year’s floods, food inflation
Simmone Shah
was already high, especially in rural areas, and many
struggled to keep up with the rise in prices.
“Over the last four years, blue collar workers in
Pakistan have lost around 30% of their purchasing
power,” says Younus. “These are lower-middle-class
and lower-class citizens that basically earn $2 a day.”
Before former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s party came
to power in 2018, the government borrowed heavily in
dollars to fund growth, keeping an overvalued
exchange rate. By 2018, the policy of using an
overvalued exchange rate could not continue because
the country’s foreign exchange reserves were sharply
down. Khan’s party was forced to turn to the IMF in 2019
for a $6 billion economic bailout.
The IMF program was suspended in March 2020 due to
the arrival of COVID-19, and has
undergone many starts and stops
since then, as Younus says the
government failed to meet some of the
IMF’s demands.
In an effort to stretch dollars, imports
are being held at the ports, impacting
everything from food to medicine.
“Containers of onions are stuck at port
because the payments are not being
cleared by the bank, so onion prices
are now soaring,” says Younus. “In a
country of 230 million on the verge of
default, shortages are bound to pop up
across the supply chain, especially for
imported food and medicine.”
In December, Pakistan’s Poultry
Association protested a two-and-a-
half-month pending shipment of
soybeans, a staple in the diet of chickens, which they
said was leading to an increase of 162 rupees in the
price of poultry—a 45% price hike. The country’s

FOLLOW US
Ministry of National Health Services, Regulations and
Coordination issued a warning that the country could
soon face a shortage of life-saving drugs in the new
future, as local banks are refraining from opening
letters of credit for the import of medicines’ raw
material.
During the International Conference on Climate
Resilient Pakistan, a pledging conference hosted by the @cepipak
Pakistani government and the United Nations in Geneva
earlier this week, the international community—
including France, the EU, and China—pledged over $10
billion in loans to help Pakistan recover from flood
damages. /cepipakistan
The one-day conference was held to present a plan for
a climate-resilient recovery, and raise continued
assistance from the public and private sectors, shaping
up to be a test case for having large emitters pay loss
and damages for smaller emitters bearing the brunt of
CEPI Pakistan
climate change. For now, Younus notes that they’re just
pledges; it might be months until the funds materialize,

@cepipak
and they’re likely to be allocated towards specific
reconstruction plans.
When a deal might be reached “is anyone’s guess,”
according to Younus. Pakistan has been in a deadlock
with the IMF over $1.1 billion in funding since last
September. The country’s army chief, General Syed
Asim Munir, recently visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia
KnOW AbOUt OUr ServiceS
in the hopes of securing additional loans from them.
The funds were dependent on various conditions—such
as raising energy prices and taxes—which the 0303-6449744
Pakistani government has yet to meet. On his way out
the door last April following a vote of no confidence,
in energy prices worldwide. “He was basically laying a
former Prime Minister Khan subsidized energy prices,
minefield for the incoming government.”
just as the war in Ukraine was causing sharp increases
With elections on the horizon this August
(or possibly earlier, as Khan’s Tehreek-e-
Insaf party is pushing to dissolve
provincial assemblies in a bid for earlier
elections), the government is unwilling to
make any moves that might put them out
of favor with voters. “A political party that
is in power would not want to impose
upward adjustments of prices and more
inflation in the run up to an election.” says
Younus. “Why inflict more pain on your
citizens?”
In the meantime, Younus says, routines
and decisions once considered mundane
have become a lot more difficult. “You
hear stories from doctors beginning to
see adult malnutrition in adults who have
given up two meals a day. You hear from
teachers in schools saying that parents
come and say ‘I have four children, can
you tell me which one to keep in school? I
cannot afford to pay the school fees for
the other three.’”
“People cannot make ends meet,” Younus
says. “Life is unbearable.” © Time
 Tensions will linger over a Chinese
balloon downed by America
THE PRECISE purpose of the Chinese balloon that
drifted across America, kiboshing a brief detente in the
world’s most consequential bilateral relationship, has
yet to be proven. But troubling answers may soon
emerge from the Atlantic. US Navy divers have already
started retrieving debris from the airship, which was
shot down by an American F-22 fighter jet off South
Carolina on February 4th. The divers aim to complete
their work within days.
The equipment they find could bolster American
officials’ assertions that the balloon was part of a fleet
of similar craft gathering intelligence worldwide. They
say they have already got plenty of evidence from
tracking it across America. Yet China is doubling down
on its claim that the balloon was monitoring weather
and blown off course. And with Chinese authorities now
suggesting that they want the debris returned, the two
sides seem to be heading for a stand-off that could
push them deeper into a cold-war-style confrontation.
In some ways, the saga echoes previous bilateral
upsets, including China’s testing of an anti-satellite
missile in 2007 (first revealed by American officials)
and its show of muscle by trying out a prototype of a
stealth fighter-jet during a visit to Beijing by a Pentagon
chief in 2011. What makes it more dangerous is that both
countries’ leaders are now facing intense domestic
political pressure to stand up to each other. Their
armed forces are already gearing up for a potential
conflict over Taiwan.
At first, a relatively quick resolution seemed within
reach. Before the balloon was shot down, China
expressed regret and said it respected the White
House’s decision to postpone a visit to Beijing by
Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, that was
due to start on February 5th. That briefly held out the
possibility that the two sides could manage the crisis
and reschedule the visit, which was supposed to
consolidate the detente since Presidents Joe Biden and
Xi Jinping met in November.
But China’s rhetoric later hardened. Its foreign ministry
expressed “strong dissatisfaction”, accusing America
of over-reacting and violating international practice. It
pledged to safeguard the interests of “relevant Chinese
companies” and said it reserved the right to respond.
Asked if China had demanded the return of the debris,
a spokeswoman said: “The airship does not belong to
the US. It belongs to China.” The defence ministry
threatened to “use necessary means to deal with
similar situations”.
In America, China hawks are in full cry. Republican
leaders, questioning why the balloon was not shot
down earlier, originally planned a resolution criticising
Mr Biden’s response but have since pivoted to a
bipartisan one condemning China’s balloon escapade. “I
am committed to work with China where it can advance
American interests and benefit the world,” Mr Biden
told Congress on February 7th. “But make no mistake:
as we made clear last week, if China threatens our
sovereignty, we will act to protect our country.”
Some observers shrug off the episode, noting that
China already has a formidable array of spy satellites.
In China, there are experts with their government’s ear
who suggest the Biden administration is hyping the
issue to out-hawk Republicans ahead of a presidential
election in 2024 and to mobilise public support for a
long-term confrontation with China. “If the public does
not support you, how can you engage in a new cold
war?” says Jin Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing.
But American officials insist that the balloon
represents a serious threat. They say China has
recently developed a fleet of them to spy, often for the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Although less
sophisticated than satellites, the balloons can gather
some communication and other data only accessible at
lower altitudes, and can often linger for long periods
using a small solar-powered engine. They are also far
cheaper.
The balloons have been spotted over countries across (195 hectares) in waters less than 50 feet deep.
five continents, including Europe, and have violated the
It is unlikely that they will find anything labelled PLA.
sovereignty of several, the officials say. On February
China’s balloons are thought to carry a wide range of
6th China acknowledged that another balloon, seen
sensors, including some that gather meteorological
over Latin America in recent days, was one of its own
data. But that data can be used to help track or guide
but insisted that it, too, was a stray weather-monitoring
weapons including ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
airship.
And there could be incriminating kit such as electro-
Also that day, America’s deputy secretary of state, optical cameras or sensors that “sniff” for nuclear
Wendy Sherman, led a briefing on China’s balloon isotopes in the atmosphere. Some of it might even
espionage for about 40 embassies, according to the include Western dual-use technology (despite
Washington Post. The newspaper said that American American-led efforts to stop it, China still acquires
officials believe some of these operations are being run plenty).
from China’s southern province of Hainan and collect
There may even be evidence of involvement by a
military information from countries including India,
Chinese civilian entity. Yet that would do little to allay
Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
American concerns. Mr Xi has in recent years ordered
Some of the previous sightings were already public, the civilian sector to play a greater role in national
including one over Japan in June 2020, another over defence through what China calls a “military-civil
India in January 2022 and a swarm over Taiwan last fusion” programme. Much of China’s research on high-
February that its armed forces linked to the PLA Rocket altitude balloons appears to have been done by the
Force. That month, America scrambled fighters to civilian Chinese Academy of Sciences. Any of that
intercept an unmanned balloon off Kauai, a Hawaiian organisation’s equipment or data has to be made
island with a missile-testing range (the balloon was not available to the PLA if requested.
identified as Chinese at the time).
What happens next will depend partly on what
But American officials have only revealed in recent American officials learn from the debris and what they
days that Chinese government surveillance balloons choose to reveal. It will also be determined by China’s
have briefly transited continental America at least four response, especially if it makes good its threat of
times before: three during the Trump administration reciprocal action. As for Mr Blinken’s trip, it is unlikely
and once earlier in Mr Biden’s presidency. Some to be rescheduled before the annual session of China’s
passed over Texas and Florida and went near sensitive parliament, which starts on March 5th. “The big issue is
military sites, the officials said. what is Xi Jinping telling his colleagues,” says Drew
Thompson, a former Pentagon official now at the
More worrying still for America, those intrusions were
National University of Singapore. “Is he telling them,
not detected at the time. They were identified only later
stop fussing about this and move on?”
by intelligence officials using “additional means of
collection”, according to General Glen VanHerck, America and its allies have many other questions. If Mr
commander of the North American Aerospace Defence Xi approved the balloon’s mission, how does that tally
Command. “That’s a domain-awareness gap that we with his recent diplomatic charm offensive? If he did
have to figure out,” he said on February 6th. not, then how come it went ahead? If it was an accident,
why didn’t China promptly tell America? And if a civilian
This time, however, American forces spotted the
company was responsible, why not identify it and
Chinese balloon as it approached Alaska. That allowed
provide some details? After the balloon was downed,
them to ensure that no sensitive activities or
China refused to take a call from America’s defence
communications were exposed nearby, and to monitor
secretary, Lloyd Austin. Answers will be slow to come.
it closely and try to assess its ability to gather and
transmit data. One finding that American officials say © Economist
undermines China’s claims is that the balloon appears
to have manoeuvred itself over
military sites, including a base in
Montana with intercontinental
ballistic missiles.
The American navy divers now
hope to gather further evidence
from the wreckage of the balloon,
which was about 200 feet (61
metres) tall and carried kit
roughly the size of a regional
passenger jet. Counter-
intelligence specialists have
joined the search for the debris,
which is spread across about
three-quarters of a square mile
 It’s Time to Tie India to the West
India’s new enthusiasm for the global south—it just
convened a special summit of developing nations and
presides over the G-20 with a development-focused
agenda this year—should not be mistaken for reduced
interest in its quest to build stronger ties with the West.
On the contrary, the centrality of the G-7 for India’s
economic and geopolitical prospects is continuing to
grow. For India, the West is the most important trading
partner, the dominant source of capital and technology,
and the major destination for the Indian diaspora.
Cooperation with the G-7—comprising Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States—
is also critical for India to effectively deal with the
increasing challenges from China. In fact, India’s dual
orientations are converging: Both its gradual but
inexorable
alignment
with the West
and its
renewed
engagement
with the
global south
are
expressions
of New
Delhi’s
repositioning
against
Beijing and
its growing
influence.
The West,
too, has an
interest in a
stronger India that can counter growing Chinese and
Russian diplomatic, economic, and military influence
among developing countries. Washington’s recent offer
of a range of technologies to India—including jet
engines—underlines the Biden administration’s desire
to strengthen ties with New Delhi despite Indian
ambivalence on Russia’s war in Ukraine. The United
States is also eager to incorporate India into a new
network of global supply chains with trusted partners.
Integrating India—soon to be the world’s third-largest
economy—into the G-7 process is therefore the logical
next step for the West. After all, the G-7 is no longer
just a forum for major industrialized countries to align
economic policies, as it was in the past. In recent years,
it has increasingly taken on the character of a bloc of
leading democracies cooperating on global security
and other important issues, including more effective
competition with China and Russia.
C. Raja Mohan
India’s new enthusiasm for the global south—it just
convened a special summit of developing nations and
presides over the G-20 with a development-focused
agenda this year—should not be mistaken for reduced
interest in its quest to build stronger ties with the West.
On the contrary, the centrality of the G-7 for India’s
economic and geopolitical prospects is continuing to
grow. For India, the West is the most important trading
partner, the dominant source of capital and technology,
and the major destination for the Indian diaspora.
Cooperation with the G-7—comprising Britain, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States—
is also critical for India to effectively deal with the
increasing challenges from China. In fact, India’s dual
orientations are converging: Both its gradual but
inexorable
alignment
with the West
and its
renewed
engagement
with the
global south
are
expressions
of New
Delhi’s
repositioning
against
Beijing and
its growing
influence.
The West, too,
has an
interest in a
stronger India that can counter growing Chinese and
Russian diplomatic, economic, and military influence
among developing countries. Washington’s recent offer
of a range of technologies to India—including jet
engines—underlines the Biden administration’s desire
to strengthen ties with New Delhi despite Indian
ambivalence on Russia’s war in Ukraine. The United
States is also eager to incorporate India into a new
network of global supply chains with trusted partners.
Integrating India—soon to be the world’s third-largest
economy—into the G-7 process is therefore the logical
next step for the West. After all, the G-7 is no longer
just a forum for major industrialized countries to align
economic policies, as it was in the past. In recent years,
it has increasingly taken on the character of a bloc of
leading democracies cooperating on global security
and other important issues, including more effective
competition with China and Russia.
India’s long history as a leader of the Non-Aligned
Movement has given rise to fears—or hopes, depending
on whom one asks—that New Delhi is returning to its
old habit of mobilizing the global south against the
global north. But there are few indications that this is
the case. At the Voice of Global South Summit convened
by New Delhi in January, for example, there was little
anti-Western rhetoric.
For now, India’s immediate objective for its outreach
isn’t geostrategic—it’s more about reconnecting with a
global constituency. New Delhi had built up much
goodwill across the global south during the Cold War
but has somewhat neglected these regions in recent
decades. As India focused on finding its place in great-
power relations commensurate with its growing
economic heft, on reconnecting with its neighborhood,
and on joining Asian regional institutions, engagement
with the rest of the global south fell low among India’s
priorities.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in particular, got flak at
home for ignoring India’s old partners in the Non-
Aligned Movement. But Modi’s interest in the global
south picked up in recent years. The devastating impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic on the developing world, as
well as the effect of Russia’s war in Ukraine on global
food and energy security, lent some urgency to—and
provided a window of opportunity for—India’s
reengagement with the global south. In part, this push
has been enabled by India’s growing economy over the
last three decades, which has given New Delhi more
ways to aid (and invest in) poor countries. This year,
India’s presidency of the G-20 is a major diplomatic
opportunity to build on this engagement.
That said, geopolitics is never far behind. India’s
growing concerns about an assertive China have
convinced the Modi government not to simply cede a
large part of the developing world to Beijing. Although
India does not yet have the resources that a richer
China brings into play, New Delhi could fill at least part
of the vacuum left by the West in the global south. But
it’s difficult to see India have much more than a small
impact acting alone. If India were to partner more
closely with the West, on the other hand, it could offer
much stiffer competition to China—a geopolitical
priority for both India and the West.
India is not the only major power outside the trans-
Atlantic West worried about China’s deep penetration
of the global south. Japan, too, has woken up to the
danger. In a major speech during his visit to the United
States in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio
Kishida called on fellow G-7 leaders to do more to
engage the global south—and show more humility
when they do so. Kishida also warned of the
consequences if developed nations continued to
neglect the global south: “Even if we walk on a path
which we believe to be right, if the global south, holding
integral places in the international arena, turn their
back, we will find ourselves in the minority and unable
to resolve mounting policy issues.” Japan’s expanding
geopolitical profile and newly muscular security
policies have raised the value of Tokyo as a partner for
New Delhi. Japan, as the only Asian voice in the G-7,
can also help bring greater nuance to Western policies
and move the group closer to India on regional issues.
Kishida has been particularly concerned about the
West’s inability to convince large parts of the global
south of the dangers of Russian aggression against
Ukraine—a topic on which India’s silence is largely a
relic of Soviet-Indian cooperation. Japan, like India,
also has no interest in seeing China as part of the
global south.
In the last few years, Japan and India have sought to
work together in the Indian Ocean region to counter
China’s expanding regional influence. India’s
participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—
known as the Quad—along with Japan, Australia, and
the United States, is also driven by growing security
concerns about China. At the bilateral level, too, India’s
economic and security cooperation is increasingly
oriented toward Western countries.
It is no surprise, then, that New Delhi has no desire to
frame its outreach to the global south in adversarial
terms with the West. Indian External Affairs Minister S.
Jaishankar has often talked about India as a south-
western power—rooted in the global south with “very
strong bonding” to Western and West-aligned
countries.
This brings us to the growing engagement between
India and the G-7 in the last few years. While India was
only occasionally invited to G-7 summits (or G-8
summits before Russia’s expulsion from the group)
since 2000, it has become a regular attendee in recent
years. It participated as a special guest at the 2019
summit in Biarritz, France, the 2021 summit in
Cornwall, England, and the 2022 summit in Bavaria,
Germany. This May, Modi is expected to attend the
group’s next summit in Hiroshima, Japan.
Beyond the regular participation of India, there has
been some discussion about expanding the G-7 to
include a few additional countries outside the
geographic West—without including Russia and China,
as in the G-20. Currently, Japan is the only member
outside Europe and North America. One proposal has
been to turn the G-7 into the “Democracy Ten” (D-10)
with the addition of Australia, India, and South Korea.
But the idea did not gain much traction when it was last
proposed during the Cornwall summit.
The proposal deserves another look. Strengthening the
G-7 while keeping its democratic geopolitical
orientation deserves more intensive discussion.
Drawing New Delhi away from Moscow and enabling it
to compete with Beijing have long been U.S. objectives.
This should be a goal for the G-7 as well.
Tying India, especially, more strongly to the G-7 by
including it in the group would also lend the West
greater influence and legitimacy with the global south.
India is the key to breaking the old East-West and
North-South divides that shaped so many of the
debates and conflicts of the 20th century.
© Foreign Policy
InFOGrAPHIcS
EARTHQUAKES
IN
TÜRKIYE
&
SYRIA
 The Battle for Internet Search
For more than 25 years, search engines have been the
internet’s front door. AltaVista, the first site to allow
searches of the full text of the web, was swiftly
dethroned by Google, which has dominated the field in
most of the world ever since. Google’s search engine,
still the heart of its business, has made its parent,
Alphabet, one of the world’s most valuable companies,
with revenues of $283bn in 2022 and a market
capitalisation of $1.3trn. Google is not merely a
household name; it is a verb.
But nothing lasts for ever, particularly in technology.
Just ask IBM, which once ruled business computing, or
Nokia, once the leader in mobile phones. Both were
dethroned because they fumbled big technological
transitions. Now tech firms are
salivating over an innovation that
might herald a similar shift—
and a similar opportunity.
Chatbots powered
artificial intelligence (AI) let
users gather information
via typed
conversations. Leading
the field is ChatGPT, made
by OpenAI, a startup. By the end
of January, two months after its
launch, ChatGPT was being used by
more than 100m people, making it
the “fastest-growing consumer
application in history”, according to UBS, a bank.
AI is already used behind the scenes in many products,
but ChatGPT has put it centre stage, by letting people
chat with an AI directly. ChatGPT can write essays in
various styles, explain complex concepts, summarise
text and answer trivia questions. It can even (narrowly)
pass legal and medical exams. And it can synthesise
knowledge from the web: for example, listing holiday
spots that match certain criteria, or suggesting menus
or itineraries. If asked, it can explain its reasoning and
provide detail. Many things that people use search
engines for today, in short, can be done better with
chatbots.
Hence the flurry of announcements, as rival firms try
to seize the initiative. On February 7th Microsoft, which
has invested more than $11bn in OpenAI, revealed a new
version of Bing, its search engine, which incorporates
ChatGPT. Satya Nadella, Microsoft’s boss, sees this as
by
his chance to challenge Google. For its part, Google has
announced Bard, its own chatbot, as a “companion” to
its search engine. It has also taken a $300m stake in
Anthropic, a startup founded by ex-OpenAI employees,
which has built a chatbot called Claude. The share price
of Baidu, known as the Google of China, jumped when
it said it would release its chatbot, called Ernie, in
March.
But can chatbots be trusted, and what do they mean for
search and its lucrative advertising business? Do they
herald a Schumpeterian moment in which AI topples
incumbent firms and elevates upstarts? The answers
depend on three things: moral choices, monetisation
and monopoly economics.
ChatGPT often gets things wrong. It has been likened to
a mansplainer: supremely confident in its
answers, regardless of their
accuracy. Unlike search engines,
which mostly direct people to
other pages and make no claims
for their veracity, chatbots present
their answers as gospel truth.
Chatbots must also grapple with
bias, prejudice and misinformation as
they scan the internet. There are
sure to be controversies as
they produce incorrect or
offensive replies. (Google is
thought to have held back the
release of its chatbot over such
concerns, but Microsoft has now
forced its hand.) ChatGPT already gives
answers that Ron DeSantis, Florida’s
governor, would consider unacceptably
woke.
 InFOGrAPHIcS
Chatbots must also tread carefully around some tricky
topics. Ask ChatGPT for medical advice, and it prefaces
its reply with a disclaimer that it “cannot diagnose
specific medical conditions”; it also refuses to give
advice on, say, how to build a bomb. But its guardrails
have proved easy to circumvent (for example, by asking
for a story about a bombmaker, with plenty of technical
detail). As tech firms decide which topics are too
sensitive, they will have to choose where to draw the
line. All this will raise questions about censorship,
objectivity and the nature of truth.
Can tech firms make money from this? OpenAI is
launching a premium version of ChatGPT, which costs
$20 a month for speedy access even at peak times.
Google and Microsoft, which already sell ads on their
search engines, will show ads alongside chatbot
responses—ask for travel advice, say, and related ads
will pop up. But that business model may not be
sustainable. Running a chatbot requires more
processing power than serving up search results, and
therefore costs more, reducing margins.
Other models will surely emerge: charging advertisers
more for the ability to influence the answers that
chatbots provide, perhaps, or to have links to their
websites embedded in responses. Ask ChatGPT to
recommend a car, and it will reply that there are lots of
good brands, and it depends on your needs. Future
chatbots may be more willing to make a
recommendation. But will people use them if their
objectivity has been compromised by advertisers? Will
they be able to tell? Behold, another can of worms.
Then there is a question of competition. It is good news
that Google is being kept on its toes by upstarts like
OpenAI. But it is unclear whether chatbots are a
competitor to search engines, or a complement.
Deploying chatbots initially as add-ons to search, or as
stand-alone conversation partners, makes sense given
their occasional inaccuracies. But as their capabilities
improve, chatbots could become an interface to all
kinds of services, such as making hotel or restaurant
reservations, particularly if offered as voice assistants,
like Alexa or Siri. If chatbots’ main value is as a layer
on top of other digital services, though, that will favour
incumbents which provide such services already.
Yet the fact that today’s upstarts, such as Anthropic and
OpenAI, are attracting so much attention (and
investment) from Google and Microsoft suggests that
smaller firms have a shot at competing in this new
field. They will come under great pressure to sell. But
what if an upstart chatbot firm develops superior
technology and a new business model, and emerges as
a new giant? That, after all, is what Google once did.
Chatbots raise hard questions, but they also offer an
opportunity to make online information more useful
and easier to access. As in the 1990s, when search
engines first appeared, a hugely valuable prize—to
become the front door to the internet—may once again
be up for grabs.
© Economist
 Saving the IWT
Ali Tauqeer Sheikh
THE Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that governs Pakistan- Pakistan’s historical position is that in case of failure to
India water relations is under siege. The future of the resolve outstanding issues bilaterally, the country
treaty is threatened by recent Indian proposals, as reserves the right to take matters to other forums. As
leaked in the media, to amend its conflict-resolution a relatively weaker country, Pakistan feels that its
clauses. The reported amendments propose that, ability to internationalise bilateral disputes
instead of taking differences to neutral experts or strengthens its position at the negotiation table. The
arbitration courts, they be resolved bilaterally by the treaty protects these rights of signatories and offers an
two countries, without engaging a third party. If elaborate mechanism for resolving all differences. In
accepted, the amendments would make the Indus River fact, the treaty’s clauses dealing with the appointment
Systems and its governing ecosystem, that stretch of neutral experts or the International Court of
from southwestern Tibet to the Arabian Sea, Arbitration as well as the honest broker’s role for the
subservient to India’s regional foreign policy. The World Bank, are unique to IWT, and mostly absent in
sovereigns must obey the integrity of transboundary other regional transboundary water agreements.
basins.
For Pakistan, the Indus is its lifeline as the river’s
Pakistan’s response has been predictable even if the tributaries are the source of almost all freshwater
country has not formally reacted to the proposals. India resources. In India, diversions and infrastructure on
has invoked Article XII (3) of the IWT asking Pakistan to the Indus tributaries have been erected to meet part of
initiate negotiations within 90 days for amending the the water demand in Ladakh, Indian-occupied Jammu
treaty by incorporating ‘lessons’ learnt over the last 72 & Kashmir, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana
years. and Rajasthan. These areas also rely on Yamuna, a
tributary of Ganges that, like the Indus, originates in
The Shimla Agreement that was signed between the
Tibet.
two countries in June 1972, months after the 1971 war,
had explicitly committed that both countries would India wants to amend the treaty ostensibly for speedier
resolve their outstanding issues bilaterally. For resolution of bilateral water disputes, presumably in
Pakistan, bilateralism was the beginning of the reaction to slow decision-making on its
negotiation process, while for India it was the first and Kishanganga and
last stop for resolving differences. The spirit of the Ratle hydropower
accord was ruined by irreconcilable differences in projects. On its
two official definitions of ‘bilateralism’. India and part, Pakistan
Pakistan have not been able to bridge this gulf in the considers
last half century; and in fact it has been widening to the the design
extent that it has become a cornerstone of each of both
country’s foreign policy. projects in
violation of
the treaty
and has raised
its concerns
in the
Permanent Indus

Commission
since 2006 on
Kishanganga and six years
later, in 2012, on Ratle. The dispute
pertains to Pakistan’s concerns over India’s
construction of the 330 MW Kishanganga project
on the Jhelum and the 850 MW Ratle project on the
Chenab. The two sides failed to find an amicable
solution at PIC meetings for 10 years before Pakistan
took its case to another level. Typically, both sides were
comfortable accusing each other of intransigence; now,
for the first time, India has placed the burden of failure
on the treaty itself.
The World Bank lifted its embargo on the appointment

FOLLOW US
of neutral experts and taking the case to the arbitration
court in 2016. It failed in bringing the parties to agree on
an option. It erred in its decision, which has unwittingly
pitched two countries against each other, by letting
them pursue two different conflict-resolution options.
Pakistan had opted for the appointment of neutral

@cepipak
observers in 2015 but revised its position a year later
and in 2016 took its case to the arbitration court in the
Hague under Article IX of the treaty.
India objected to this change and has proceeded with
the appointment of neutral experts. As the two
processes were unleashed concurrently, it has created
a risk of conflicting decisions. India has boycotted the /cepipakistan
proceedings of the arbitration court, making the utility
of the court’s decision far from uncertain. While
Pakistan is seeking an ex parte decision from the court,
India has already built the Kishanganga project. So
much for the efficacy of Pakistan’s water diplomacy! CEPI Pakistan
The delays in decision-making have been detrimental
for Pakistan, yet the initiative to amend the treaty has

come from India. Irrespective of the nature of
Pakistan’s response, the proposal to amend the treaty
will make the IWT dysfunctional, PIC even less
effective, and increase acrimony between the two
countries, particularly in the absence of any high-level
political dialogue. Religious strife in India and political
polarisation in Pakistan will add fuel to the fire.
In reality, both India and Pakistan have failed to
strengthen PIC and have not allowed it to evolve into a
robust institution. Globally, many transboundary water
agreements have functioned successfully, primarily
because their implementation institutions have evolved
into robust professional institutions with dedicated
staff and specialised research arms. Examples abound
and include the Permanent Water Commission
@cepipak
KnOW AbOUt OUr ServiceS
0303-6449744
between Turkey and Armenia over the Arpacay river,
the International Joint Commission for Boundary Water
Treaty between Canada and America, the Danube River
Commission in Europe, the Mekong
River Commission, and the
International Panel of Experts from
Ethiopia, Egypt and other riparian
countries for the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam over the Nile.
The proposed changes in the treaty will
bring the future of regional water
relations to the brink. It seems that
India’s water policy managers have
begun to lose their space to
geostrategic thinkers. It goes without
saying that no single signatory can
unilaterally introduce any amendments
to the treaty. Likewise, no single
country can save it. Both countries will
need to be equally committed to protect
the IWT. If it takes two to tango,
protecting the treaty will need more
than two, given that India and Pakistan
aren’t even on talking terms. The
challenge for policymakers in both
states is to negotiate practical solutions
rather than allow arbitrariness to
become the norm. © DAWN
 The Third Intifada?
Since the collapse of the second intifada—a large and
sustained Palestinian uprising—in 2005, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has smoldered. Hamas has
launched miniature wars in the Gaza Strip, and
Palestinian armed groups and individuals have carried
out terrorist attacks in the West Bank, prompting a
harsh Israeli military response. Palestinians have
resisted in other ways, too—marching, protesting, and
throwing rocks. Despite many violent flare-ups,
however, both sides have avoided fighting that reaches
the scope and scale of the second intifada, even though
a negotiated settlement seems more distant than ever.
But dangerous developments on both the Israeli and
the Palestinian sides are now converging, and the
outlook for 2023 seems grim. On January 27,
terrorists attacked a synagogue in Jerusalem, killing
seven people—one of the deadliest attacks on
Israelis in years. It followed an Israeli raid in a
refugee camp in Jenin that killed nine Palestinians,
an unusually high body count.
This latest violence builds on deadly foundations.
Last year was the deadliest year in Israel and
the West Bank since the second intifada.
Israeli forces killed 151 Palestinians in the
West Bank and in Palestinian
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, almost
double the figure for 2021. In Gaza, 53
Palestinians died in clashes between
Israel and Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, a terrorist group. Israel,
too, suffered its highest death
toll in years. Palestinian
attacks killed 31 Israelis. The
Israeli military claims that
Palestinians fired on Israeli troops
almost 300 times, compared with 61
in 2021 and 31 in 2020. Incidents of
stone-throwing, Molotov cocktail
attacks, and firebombings all rose, as
well.
In November 2022, the United Nations
warned that the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict was “again reaching a boiling
point.” Amit Saar, a top Israeli intelligence
official, predicted that violence in the West
Bank (although not Gaza) will rank as Israel’s
second biggest challenge in 2023, just below
the perennial threat from Iran. Saar warned not
only that violence was increasing but also that
the foundations for managing it were becoming
“unstable.” The policing capacity of the Palestinian
Authority, the governing body in the West Bank, and
its relationship with Israel are eroding. No political
process holds the promise of Palestinian
Daniel Byman
independence. And ordinary Palestinians are growing
frustrated with established groups and leaders that
reject violence—such as Fatah, the party that has long
dominated Palestinian politics, and its head, Mahmoud
Abbas, the president of the PA. In yet another
foreboding development, in December
2022, Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu created a new
government that put settlers,
political extremists, and racists
in key positions overseeing the
West Bank. All this leads to a
despairing, inescapable
conclusion: the odds of a third
intifada are higher than they have
been in years.
THE SHADOW OF THE PAST
The legacy of the second intifada
still shapes politics for both
Israelis and Palestinians. Between
September 28, 2000, and February
8, 2005, 1,038 Israelis and 3,189
Palestinians were killed. During
that time, Israeli forces demolished
over 4,000 Palestinian homes and
arrested thousands of Palestinians.
Israel also shut down and bombed
Palestinian ministries and
infrastructure to coerce Palestinian
leaders to end the violence.
The second intifada erupted because
of a mix of factors, some particular to
the time but others that could recur.
Ariel Sharon, an Israeli politician who
was then leader of the opposition—and,
in the eyes of many Palestinians, a war
criminal—triggered the uprising with a
deliberately provocative visit to the site
known to Jews as the Temple Mount and to
Muslims as Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians
rioted in response to the visit, which prompted
a harsh Israeli crackdown that, in turn, killed
more Palestinians, sparking more protests in a
deadly cycle.
More broadly, Palestinians were frustrated with
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which
had initially raised hopes for independence but
eventually stalled. The negotiations led to the
creation of the PA, which was headed by longtime
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and largely
composed of officials from Fatah, the organization he
co-founded. In the 1990s, the PA helped Israel crush
Hamas, and both Israel and the United States looked
the other way from the corruption and human rights
abuses of Arafat and his cronies. Palestinians believed
that Israel was dragging its feet on negotiations,
refusing to make concessions, delaying transfers of
territory, and wreaking havoc on the Palestinian
economy through border and travel restrictions.
Hamas and factions within Fatah exploited this
sentiment. As peace negotiations stalled in the 1990s,
some Palestinian groups, with Arafat’s knowledge,
armed for a coming conflict. When the Camp David talks
failed in 2000, they seized the moment. Some hoped to
use violence to force Israeli concessions. More
extreme elements believed they could use terrorism to
drive Israel from the West Bank and Gaza altogether.
The groups often competed with one another, attacking
Israel to demonstrate their resolve to ordinary
Palestinians. The violence received enthusiastic
support from outside Israel, with people in Saudi
Arabia and other Arab and Muslim countries sending
funds to Palestinians, including to the families of
suicide bombers.
The last time Israelis and Palestinians had real hope for
peace was the late 1990s.
As the violence grew, many Israelis came to believe the
negotiations were always a sham—that Arafat was
unwilling to make peace and that Palestinians were, in
general, committed to violence, despite the
concessions Israel offered at Camp David. Palestinians
reached a similar conclusion in the opposite direction,
seeing the peace process as a way for Israel to
consolidate the occupation of Palestinian territories
and believing that they were set up for failure at Camp
David.
Arafat did not plan the violence in 2000, but he did
try to exploit it, relying on his own popularity
and charisma to ensure that no strong
rivals among the militant leaders
emerged to challenge him. He even
believed he could exploit Hamas
without it eclipsing his leadership.
Soon, however, the violence spiraled
out of his or anyone’s control.
Israel’s ferocious counterterrorism
response devastated Hamas and
various Fatah factions, as well as the
Palestinian institutional
infrastructure, reducing their ability to
attack Israelis. But the response also
made it harder for Palestinian leaders
to control the violence because the
organizations had splintered.
After several bloody years,
the second intifada
petered out.
Major
armed
Palestinian groups, including Hamas, declared a
cease-fire in 2005, and the fighting steadily declined in
the years that followed, with others, such as the al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, eventually accepting a cease-
fire, too. Negotiations did not end the violence; Israeli
intelligence and military forces did. They did so by
killing suspected terrorists, gathering intelligence on
armed Palestinian groups, reoccupying cities in the
West Bank, arresting large swaths of Palestinians,
establishing checkpoints throughout the West Bank,
and erecting a barrier that roughly follows the former
green line between the West Bank and Israel (having
already built a barrier on the Gaza border). Over time,
Palestinian armed groups grew weak, and Palestinians
grew weary of fighting. Arafat died in 2004, and his
successor, Abbas, renounced violence.
After the 2005 cease-fire, Israeli forces withdrew from
Gaza and severely restricted movement across the
Gazan-Israeli border. They withdrew unilaterally, so
that Abbas and the PA could not take credit by claiming
to have successfully negotiated a withdrawal. Hamas
was quick to declare victory, arguing credibly that its
attacks, not peace talks, had led Israel to leave. Hamas
won Palestinian elections in 2006 and seized power in
2007 in Gaza, cementing the division between Gaza and
the West Bank and between Hamas and the Fatah
leaders of the PA.
In the years that followed, Abbas and the PA often acted
at the behest of Israel’s security services, helping crack
down on Hamas and other violent groups in exchange
for Israeli support. Israel also maintained a heavy
intelligence and, at times, military presence in the West
Bank. The United States, too, backed Abbas, despite the
PA’s dismal human rights record and lack of
legitimacy, with the latter problem
becoming more acute as the PA
repeatedly postponed elections.
Violence in Gaza persisted. From
time to time, Israel launched
full-scale military operations
there, often in response to
Hamas rocket attacks. During
these operations, Israeli
forces tried to kill
Palestinian leaders in Gaza,
destroyed tunnels, and
bombed infrastructure
(sometimes deliberately and
sometimes as collateral
damage). Israel also maintained
tight restrictions on goods
going to and from Gaza,
strangling its
already
weak economy.
VEER TO THE RIGHT
The last time Israelis and Palestinians had real hope for
peace was the late 1990s. Since then, both sides have
grown increasingly skeptical. Palestinians point to an
intensifying occupation and ever-expanding
settlements as proof that Israel has no desire to leave
the West Bank. Israelis see the violence of the second
intifada and Hamas’s assumption of power after the
Gaza withdrawal as proof that concessions, including
leaving a territory, will be rewarded with violence. Most
Israelis believe that they will “always live by the sword,”
in the words of a study from the Institute for National
Security Studies, an Israeli think tank. The Two-State
Index, a survey run by proponents of a two-state
solution, found that in 2022, support for a negotiated
peace had hit its lowest point since the index began in
2003. Politicians have
echoed such
sentiment. “This year
has consolidated the
fact that there is
absolutely no political
process,” Mustafa
Barghouti, a violence. In 2022, Israeli
Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO)
official, lamented in
2022. Such perceptions
lead to a downward
spiral: as support for
peace talks wanes,
politicians are reluctant
to endorse negotiations and
instead play up communal
hostility, further decreasing
popular support for talks.
The current Israeli government is
likely to provoke Palestinians and
includes politicians who seek to
expand the presence of settlers and
Israel’s military in the West Bank.
Although Netanyahu has served as
prime minister for longer than any other Israeli, his
current government differs from his old ones. In legal
jeopardy because of corruption allegations, Netanyahu
picked his coalition members based on who was willing
to help him block the judicial process.
As a result, he has allied himself with an array of far-
right figures, including open racists. Itamar Ben-Gvir—
the minister for national security, a newly formed
position that has authority over Israeli police—was
convicted in 2007 of inciting racism and supporting a
Jewish terrorist organization. Before he entered
government, he hung a portrait in his living room of
Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli American terrorist who
gunned down 29 Palestinian worshippers in Hebron in
1994. Bezalel Smotrich, the new finance minister, led an
extremist settler movement before joining the
government. He will have partial control over Israel’s
day-to-day operations in the West Bank, the same
territory that Smotrich openly proposes annexing. Such
a government may loosen restrictions on using live
ammunition against protesters and rioters. It has
already promised to expand settlements and some
ministers have indicated they favor legalizing so-called
wildcat settlements, which are built on Palestinian land
without Israeli government approval and which
previous Israeli governments have often shut down.
Settlers, for their part, are attacking Palestinians with
greater frequency while Israeli military forces stand
idly by. At times, according to the UN, they have even
facilitated it.
DO IT FOR THE LIKES
The previous Israeli government, headed by rotating
prime ministers Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, was
hardly gentle. But it did take small steps to
improve the situation in the West Bank and
Gaza, issuing a relatively high number of
permits for Gazan workers and
canceling a planned settlement in
East Jerusalem. Yet such
gestures seemed empty in the
face of last year’s
security forces injured
more than 9,000
Palestinians, and over 30 of
the 151 Palestinians killed in
the West Bank were children.
New Palestinian armed groups
have emerged in the West
Bank, notably the Jenin
Brigades in 2021 and the
Lions’ Den in 2022. These
groups do not fit neatly
into existing categories.
The Jenin Brigades
receive some
support from
Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, but young Palestinians from
Hamas, Fatah, and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine have also joined. The new
factions enjoy significant online followings and use
TikTok and other platforms to reach young
Palestinians. It is particularly concerning that
members of Fatah, the group intertwined with PA
leadership, have joined. Indeed, some their fathers
work in the PA.
Such splintering mirrors a problem Israel faced in the
second intifada, when it could no longer trust its
Palestinian partner because the PA would not, and at
times could not, crack down on violence. If significant
numbers of young Fatah members support violence
today, they may sideline the peaceful faction and
pressure the organization to be more militant. The
Jenin Brigades and the Lions’ Den are poorly organized
and lack the skill and size of Fatah during its militant
days or Hamas today. But they embrace their informal
structure, declaring that they are open to anyone who
acts in their name—a recipe for disorganized but broad
violence and lone-wolf attacks.
Dissatisfaction with the PA is widespread. Israel’s
military operations and settler provocations weaken
the PA’s legitimacy, showing the organization to be
flimsy at best or an Israeli pawn at worst. The growth
of settlements suggests that the PA is complicit in, or
at least has no way to oppose, Israel’s increasing hold
on the West Bank.
PARTNERS IN CRIME
The PA acts as Israel’s police force on the West Bank
in part because leaders such as Abbas think that
violence is counterproductive for Palestinian
aspirations. But the PA also relies on funding from the
EU and the United States, money it can receive only if
it opposes all attacks on Israel. And such outside
backing helps the PA crush more extreme political
opponents who might challenge Abbas and his
henchmen for power. The PA co-opts some
critics and arrests, beats, and tortures others.
A particularly effective PA tactic is to
threaten the liberty
and livelihoods of
families unless they
stop individual
members from using
violence or opposing the
PA.
Yet the PA is politically weak.
As Al-Haq, a Palestinian
rights group, has warned,
“The near-daily raids in
areas under control of
the PA show that the
sovereignty of PA
doesn’t exist.”
Weapons remain plentiful, and it is easy for
an angry individual to act violently. The PA also
lacks democratic legitimacy. There is a good
chance Abbas would lose free and fair elections if
they were ever held. Indeed, in 2021, Abbas, likely
fearing embarrassment at the polls, canceled long-
delayed legislative elections.
A thorny succession question also looms. Abbas is 87
years old, and it is not clear who will replace him.
Indeed, there are multiple succession processes: for
Fatah, for the PA, and for the PLO, all of which Abbas
currently heads. It’s possible that each of these
organizations will take a different leader. A succession
crisis is likely as factions jockey for influence.
Palestinians have little hope that the current system
will bring them independence. More than two-thirds of
them believe that a two-state solution is no longer
viable, and many fear the new Israeli government will
annex parts of the West Bank and Jerusalem. More
than 70 percent of Palestinians favor the formation of
armed groups such as the Lions’ Den.
DÉJÀ VU?
The situation today is dangerous, but it differs in many
ways from when the second intifada broke out. Israeli
security forces are more capable than they were in
2000. They have developed extensive intelligence
networks throughout the West Bank and have
improved their use of technology, including artificial
intelligence, big data, and signals intelligence. Israel is
also less reliant on its Palestinian partners for
security. By 2000, Israel had allowed much of its own
intelligence gathering to wither as peace talks
progressed in the 1990s, and it depended heavily on
cooperation with the PA. Although Israel still works
closely with PA security services, it is better prepared
today to act on its own.
The international picture is also worse for the
Palestinians. Although polls still show broad Arab
public support for the Palestinian cause, many
governments are far less supportive than they were
20 years ago. In particular, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states have
normalized or strengthened ties with Israel.
They no longer support Palestinian violence,
fearing that it will enrage their publics and
thus make it hard for
them to cooperate
with Israel. From many
erstwhile allies,
Palestinians today can
expect only silence.
Palestinian leaders are also
wary of violence. Abbas
recognizes that much of his
power depends on Israeli
goodwill and that
factions within Fatah or
its rivals want new
leadership. This
stands in stark
contrast with Arafat, who was secure in his
own popularity and believed he could control
and exploit violence. Indeed, Palestinian politics
and society are fragmented, and any massive
mobilization, whether armed or not, will be difficult.
Even Gaza is an unexpected bright spot. Hamas
remains hostile to Israel and has larger and longer-
range missiles than it did in various skirmishes with
Israel in the years that followed the second intifada. But
its leaders seem to recognize the futility of a broader
struggle and are competing for Palestinian leadership
by trying to govern Gaza effectively. Israel is quick to
respond to violations of the cease-fire, creating a more
effective deterrent. When Israel intensely bombed
Palestinian Islamic Jihad targets in Gaza in August
2022, Hamas stayed out of the fighting. In response to
Hamas’s caution, Israel’s previous government
permitted more Gazans to work in Israel. It also tried
to ease the humanitarian crisis in the strip—for
example, by allowing repairs of Gaza’s water and
electricity infrastructure.
SPARKS FLYING
Predicting when violence might break out is difficult, in
part because Israeli security forces also try to forecast
such outbreaks and tighten security in anticipation.
That said, high-profile visits to contested religious
sites, such as Ben-Gvir’s visit to the Temple Mount in
January, risk inciting anger.
Jerusalem, as always, remains a flash point. The new
government may allow religious Jews to pray on the
Temple Mount or otherwise loosen restrictions on
Jewish religious activity that would violate the status
quo, which endured even during the worst days of the
second intifada. Such a move would suggest to
Palestinians that they have lost control over Muslim
holy sites. In addition, the government is likely to ramp
up settlement construction in traditionally Arab areas
in or near Jerusalem to permanently change the
demography so that these neighborhoods are no longer
primarily Palestinian, should talks about land swaps
ever resume.
Meanwhile, attacks by Israeli settlers against
Palestinians will likely grow. Settlers accurately
believe that the government favors their presence and
that the military and police will defend them, even when
they initiate violence. Such government backing may
inspire Palestinians to take up arms for self-defense,
creating a dangerous spiral. Politics on both sides risk
exacerbating tensions. Some of Israel’s new leaders
FOLLOW US
@cepipak
/cepipakistan
CEPI Pakistan
@cepipak
KnOW AbOUt OUr ServiceS
0303-6449744
may try to exploit Palestinian violence, even in
response to a provocation, to whip up Israeli support
for their extreme positions. Similarly, should there be
a contest to succeed Abbas, aspiring Palestinian
leaders may compete to condemn Israel and call for
more unrest.
It is also quite possible that violence will break out
because of some small, unplanned incident: a video
taken of a soldier abusing a Palestinian, a shoving
match between settlers and Palestinians that
escalates, or some other daily event that occurs when
people live contentiously side by side. Problems may
spin out of control if the PA’s security forces stop
collaborating with Israel. As such, Israeli and
Palestinian leaders should be prepared for violence to
flare up with little notice.
WALKING ON EGGSHELLS
Israel has shown that as long as violence is not
sustained and Israeli casualties remain low, it can
continue its current approach. But the risk of
significantly greater violence remains real, threatening
not only the lives of Israelis and Palestinians but also
the relations between Israel and Arab states, where
peace deals are already unpopular.
To head this off, it is tempting to advise a return to
negotiations that might secure a Palestinian state in
exchange for security guarantees. But successful talks
were a long shot a decade ago and are implausible
today. The Biden administration has little appetite for a
confrontation with the new Israeli government. And
even if it did, the United States would probably fail to
change Israeli or Palestinian politics.
The most realistic hope is simply crisis management,
with the United States, Jordan, and other interested
parties regularly pressing both sides not to escalate.
The tentative truce with Hamas should be preserved if
possible, with Israel continuing to ease conditions in
Gaza if Hamas keeps its guns holstered. Israel and the
United States should also engage with Palestinians
outside Abbas’s coterie in preparation for his
departure. Given the success of the Abraham Accords,
the normalization agreements between Israel and
several Arab countries, the United States should enlist
Arab governments to press the PA and Hamas if
violence appears to be growing.
Competition resulting from Abbas’s succession, daily
low-level violence, and the creeping annexation of
Palestinian areas all have the potential to escalate, and
for now at least, the chance of a grand, negotiated
solution has passed. Efforts from the United States and
Israel’s other allies to discourage provocative visits
and settlements in hot-button areas are examples of
modest steps that may often fail but can head off
broader confrontations. To prevent a third intifada,
Israelis, Palestinians, and their partners need to think
small—working every day to prevent all possible
sparks from occurring and, if they do, acting quickly to
prevent all the dry tinder from catching fire.
© Foreign Affairs
 Current Economic Crisis Could be
an Opportunity for Pakistan
Pakistan is in the midst of perhaps the most serious period, Chinese elites focused on building their
crisis it has faced since 1971. The political economy has domestic economic, technological and human capital
been ripped to shreds through self-inflicted wounds, its capabilities, even if it meant building closer ties with
international stature is down in the dumps, and if the Taiwan — a country China does not even formally
country was listed in the stock market, its stock would recognise.
be categorised as a penny stock.
Pakistan must follow a similar approach, focusing on
But crises are opportunities and amidst the doom and the task at hand at home and adopting a pragmatic
gloom, it is important to recognise that societies that posture with India, its archrival. In the near-term, the
have experienced much more turbulence and country must make concerted attempts to normalise
destruction have not only recovered, but become ties with Delhi, even as it gets overtaken by a far-right
powerful, influential nations in the international Hindutva ideology.
community.
Trade, investment, and integration with India provide
The plethora of challenges faced by Pakistan today do significant near-term benefits to Pakistan and while
not require rocket science or significant innovation to Kashmir remains a core dispute, Pakistan’s elites must
resolve. The ongoing crisis is a result of years of recognise that they are in no position to make headway
irrational policies pursued across the political, on this issue given the decline of Pakistan’s own
economic and foreign policy domains. capabilities and standing.
The solution then is to fundamentally alter the status Breaking the Economic Status Quo
quo in three key domains: foreign policy, economy, and
While Pakistan adopts a policy of strategic patience in
governance.
foreign policy, it must aggressively pursue a
Punching above its Weight restructuring of its own economy. Patience on the
foreign policy front, paired with a slow and steady
The first and perhaps most important pivot that must
normalisation of ties with India, is unlikely to yield any
be made is in the domain of foreign policy. For far too
positives so long as the economic
long, Pakistani elites have tried to punch above their
status quo holds.
weight in the international arena, not recognising that
Pakistan is, at the best of times, a middle-power. This To survive and thrive for the next
bravado has led the country’s elites, particularly its 75 years, Pakistan must
military establishment, to develop and execute a abandon reckless and irrational
foreign policy that is fundamentally at odds with the economic policies its elites have
hard and soft power capabilities it possesses. adopted for decades. This means
ending the real estate casino
Given the ongoing crisis, Pakistan must adopt strategic
economy, getting rid of policies
patience in foreign policy, where the country’s elites
that distort markets, incentivising
accept that they will be unable to, at least for the
investment in productive, export-
foreseeable future, achieve core foreign policy and
oriented sectors, and
strategic goals.
redirecting resources
This policy is similar to what Pakistan’s to benefit the many,
strategic ally China followed for not the few.
decades, with the
term
“hide
your

This process
must begin first and
foremost by getting rid of the
disastrous Dar Peg, reforming the
energy sector to reduce the cost of
strength, bide your time” summing up the electricity, and consistently following a
country’s foreign policy approach. During this prudent macroeconomic framework that
seeks to run balanced budgets, even if that comes
at the expense of low, but sustainable levels of
economic growth. In addition, the military’s role in
the economy, overt and covert, must be
systematically reversed, both in terms of its
influence in policy making and the plethora of
corporations it runs.
In addition, the country’s elites must go back to the
basics in terms of economic modernisation —
improving agricultural productivity and value
addition must be priority number one. An example
is Gwadar, where the elites have desired to build
oil refineries instead of leveraging local fishermen
to build a labour-intensive, world-class seafood
cluster focused on exports.

Focus on Governance
Such a realignment, however, requires governance
improvements in Pakistan’s cities, towns, and
villages. Systemic decentralisation of governance
must be the final pillar of this reorientation. For far
too long, Pakistan’s elites have tried to centralise
power, believing that a strong central government
can deliver sustainable growth.
Evidence from around the world, including
Pakistan, shows that decentralised governance is
the most effective way to improve outcomes in
terms of security, social welfare, and economic
development. While power has been devolved to
the provinces, Pakistan continues to lack a robust
system of local governance where communities
make decisions about their own taxes,
development, education, and security.
Decentralisation will not only empower local
communities and create competition across the
country for better delivery, it will also create a
pipeline of talent in the political domain. Over time,
such a process would bring to the forefront leaders
who have experience in governance from the
ground up — this is sorely needed in a country that
continues to recycle old faces in new parties,
expecting different results.
To most readers, the above suggestions may read
as obvious. And that is the whole point. Pakistan’s
problems may seem complicated, but the solution
to them is actually quite ordinary. The issue at hand
is the sustained irrationality of Pakistan’s ruling
elites. If they continue to ignore obvious solutions,
Pakistan’s survival over the next 75 years will
require a miracle.
© DAWN
 Saudi Arabia, BRICS, and the
Future of Petrodollar Sana Azhar

Introduction BRICS Threatens the Dollar

As the international system is transitioning from a This petrodollar agreement was the main reason why
unipolar world to a multipolar world, the significance of even after the end of the Bretton Woods system, the US
the countries in the East is increasing. It is visible that dollar was able to dominate the world. However, this
new power centers are emerging on the world stage in agreement which is considered the backbone of the US
the form of China, India, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia, economy is being threatened by Saudi Arabia’s interest
among others. In wake of the changing paradigm of the in joining BRICS. BRICS is a political and economic
world, the US is facing a significant decline in its power international organization that contributes to 40% of
and stronghold, particularly the petrodollar, that it once the world’s population, 20% to the world’s GDP, and 16%
maintained in the post-cold war to international trade.
era.
BRICS aims to come up with an alternative
international system to IMF and World Bank. In
addition to this, it also aims to develop its
own reserve currency. At the 14th
summit of BRICS, President Putin
came up with the idea of a
reserve currency which will
be a basket currency system
that should constitute the
ruble, yuan, Indian rupee,
South African rand, and
Brazilian real. This would in
turn be pegged with gold.
The idea behind this is to
develop a more
decentralized
Dollar’s currency,
and
Dominance pegging it
To understand how dollar with gold
dominance is being impacted by
the current global situation, it is
important to understand the significance of
the dollar on the global stage. The US helped
Israel militarily in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
This made the Arab countries impose
embargos on the oil which
skyrocketed the cost of
petroleum products; oil
prices increased from 3
dollars per barrel to 17 dollars per barrel.
This led to one of the biggest economic recessions will
faced by the world. enhance the
As a result, the USA decoupled its currency from gold, investor’s
and it led to a drastic decline in the value of the dollar.
confidence in it.
However, in 1974, when the embargo was lifted, the US
But the question remains: how will the
saw the real value of petroleum products and so it
inclusion of Saudi Arabia into the organization damage
made a secret agreement with Saudi Arabia related to
the petrodollar agreement? As the world’s emerging
oil exports. According to the petrodollar agreement,
economies like Russia, China, India, Brazil, and South
Saudi Arabia was supposed to sell oil in dollars, and in
Africa constitute major oil trade in the world. Thus, if
return for this, the US would provide military
Saudi Arabia becomes a member of the BRICS, it will
assistance in the form of selling weapons to Saudi
sell oil to these countries in the BRICS reserve
Arabia Thus, the petrodollar agreement came into
being.
currency which will shift the trade away from the
dollar.
In addition to this, the countries to buy oil in BRICS
currency would need other currencies for which they
would have to withdraw their US treasury bonds. This
would mean that the loans the US provides to
businesses at a very low-interest rate will no longer be
possible, which will bring a severe impact on the
country’s development. These bonds which are around
7.5 trillion dollars in worth will be withdrawn, reducing
not only the dollar demand but also impacting the
developmental progress of the US.
Although there hasn’t been any formal agreement on
the given issue, and Saudi Arabia is also reluctant, the
possibility cannot be completely discarded. It is
believed that if this becomes a reality, it might even
alter the world order, as the current world order
primarily stands on dollar dominance. The BRICS
reserve currency which aims to be backed by gold will
also have the backing of oil, making this currency far
more valuable and stronger than the dollar.
Besides, the market will have more confidence in the
BRICS currency because it will be more stable. Thus, it
can shift international trade away from the dollar in the
long run. Moreover, if the BRICS currency is not
functionalized, countries can still go ahead with
currency swap agreements like the ones already
happening between Russia and India.
China & Saudi Arabia
The recent visit of the Chinese president to Saudi
Arabia primarily centered around the oil trade with
China in yuan. Although these talks have been going on
for more than six years, they have accelerated recently.
Therefore, if the two countries agree to trade oil in yuan
it will be a major setback to the demand for the dollar.
China buys more than 25% of its oil from Saudi Arabia
which will shift a major portion of oil sales away from
dollar to yuan.
If China were to buy oil in yuan, it will have to take out
its currency from the US treasury bank which alone is
1 trillion dollars, big enough to give the US economy a
shock. China is also working on a prototype model of
an international payment system called the mBridge.
This system is to make international transactions with
central banks in digital currencies. It is simply an
alternative to SWIFT. This system would include the
banks of UAE, China, Thailand, and Hong Kong to
conduct payments worth 22 million dollars. Therefore,
if this becomes functional, it too will be a challenge to
the dollar.
Although there is still no certainty that these systems
will materialize or Saudi Arabia will join BRICS, it is
sure that the balance of power is shifting away from
the US. The recent threat to the petrodollar has also
emerged because of the realignment between Saudi
Arabia and US relations. Ever since President Joe
Biden came into power, the US has been more focused
on the Indo-Pacific region.
When OPEC countries decided to cut 2 million barrels
per day, it compelled the US to pass the NOPEC bill
which increased the tensions between the two old
allies. With the Russia-Ukraine war, oil has become the
most crucial element to define international relations.
Therefore, the future of the petrodollar seems dark in
the near future. However, in international relations, one
can never be very sure about the future as there are no
permanent friends or enemies in international
relations, only permanent interests.
© Paradigm Shift
 Global Climate Agreements:
Successes and Failures Lindsay Maizland

Introduction UN Framework Convention on Climate Change

(UNFCCC), 1992. Ratified by 197 countries, including the
Over the last several decades, governments have United States, the landmark accord was the first global
collectively pledged to slow global warming. But treaty to explicitly address climate change. It
despite intensified diplomacy, the world is already established an annual forum, known as the Conference
facing the consequences of climate change, and it is of the Parties, or COP, for international discussions
expected to get worse. aimed at stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse
Through the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, gases in the atmosphere. These meetings produced the
countries agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
but the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere Kyoto Protocol, 2005. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in
keeps rising, heating the Earth at an alarming rate. 1997 and entered into force in 2005, was the first legally
Scientists warn that if this warming continues binding climate treaty. It required developed countries
unabated, it could bring environmental catastrophe to to reduce emissions by an average of 5 percent below
much of the world, including staggering sea-level rise, 1990 levels, and established a system to monitor
record-breaking droughts and floods, and widespread countries’ progress. But the treaty did not compel
species loss. developing countries, including major carbon emitters
Since the Paris accord was signed in 2015, many China and India, to take action. The United States signed
countries have strengthened their climate the agreement in 1998 but never ratified it and later
commitments during the annual UN climate withdrew its signature.
conferences known as COPs. At the end of the 2021
gathering, countries said they would come to the next
year’s conference, COP27 in Egypt, with even more Paris Agreement, 2015. The most significant global
ambition. Still, experts say the current pledges are not climate agreement to date, the Paris Agreement
enough to prevent catastrophic warming or adapt to its requires all countries to set emissions-reduction
consequences. pledges. Governments set targets, known as nationally
determined contributions (NDCs), with the goals of
What are the most important international preventing the global average temperature from rising
agreements on climate change? 2°C (3.6°F) above preindustrial levels and pursuing
efforts to keep it below 1.5°C (2.7°F). It also aims to
Montreal Protocol, 1987. Though not intended to tackle reach global net-zero emissions,
climate change, the Montreal Protocol was a where the amount of
historic environmental accord that greenhouse gases
became a model for future emitted equals the
diplomacy on the issue. amount removed from
Every country in the the atmosphere, in the second half of
world eventually ratified the century. (This is also known as
the treaty, which required being climate neutral or carbon
them to stop producing neutral.)
substances that damage
the ozone layer, such as Every five years,
chlorofluorocarbons countries are supposed
(CFCs). The protocol to assess their
has succeeded in progress toward
eliminating nearly implementing the
99 percent of agreement through a
these ozone- process known as the
depleting global stocktake; the
substances. In 2016, first is planned for
parties agreed via 2023. Countries set their
the Kigali Amendment own targets, and there
to also reduce their are no enforcement
production of mechanisms to ensure they
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), meet them.
powerful greenhouse gases that The United States, the world’s
contribute to climate change. second-largest emitter, was the only
country to withdraw from the accord, a move by
former President Donald Trump that took effect in
November 2020. However, President Joe Biden
reentered the United States into the agreement during
his first months in office. A few countries have not
formally approved the agreement: Eritrea, Iran, Libya,
and Yemen.
Is there a consensus on the science of
climate change?
Yes, there is a broad consensus among the scientific
community, though some deny that climate change is a
problem, including politicians in the United States.
When negotiating teams meet for international climate
talks, there is “less skepticism about the science and
more disagreement about how to set priorities,” says
David Victor, an international relations professor at the
University of California, San Diego. The basic science is
that:
 the Earth’s average temperature is rising at an
unprecedented rate;
 human activities, namely the use of fossil fuels—
coal, oil, and natural gas—are the primary drivers
of this rapid warming and climate change; and,
 continued warming is expected to have harmful
effects worldwide.
Data taken from ice cores shows that the Earth’s
average temperature is rising more now than it has in
eight hundred thousand years. Scientists say this is
largely a result of human activities over the last 150
years, such as burning fossil fuels and deforestation.
These activities have dramatically increased the
amount of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, primarily
carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere, causing the planet
to warm.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), a UN body established in 1988, regularly
assesses the latest climate science and produces
consensus-based reports for countries.
Why are countries aiming to keep global
temperature rise below 1.5°C?
Scientists have warned for years of catastrophic
environmental consequences if global temperature
continues to rise at the current pace. The Earth’s
average temperature has already increased
approximately 1.1°C above preindustrial levels,
according to a 2021 assessment by the IPCC. The report,
drafted by more than two hundred scientists from over
sixty countries, predicts that the world will reach or
exceed 1.5°C of warming within the next two decades
even if nations drastically cut emissions immediately.
An earlier, more comprehensive IPCC report
summarized the severe effects expected to occur when
the global temperature warms by 1.5°C:
Heat waves. Many regions will suffer more hot days,
with about 14 percent of people worldwide being
exposed to periods of severe heat at least once every
five years.
Droughts and floods. Regions will be more susceptible
to droughts and floods, making farming more difficult,
lowering crop yields, and causing food shortages.
Rising seas. Tens of millions of people live in coastal
regions that will be submerged in the coming decades.
Small island nations are particularly vulnerable.
Ocean changes. Up to 90 percent of coral reefs will be
wiped out, and oceans will become more acidic. The
world’s fisheries will become far less productive.
Arctic ice thaws. At least once a century, the Arctic will
experience a summer with no sea ice, which has not
happened in at least two thousand years. Forty percent
of the Arctic’s permafrost will thaw by the end of the
century.
Species loss. More insects, plants, and vertebrates will
be at risk of extinction.
The consequences will be far worse if the 2°C threshold
is reached, scientists say. “We’re headed toward
disaster if we can’t get our warming in check and we
need to do this very quickly,” says Alice C. Hill, CFR
senior fellow for energy and the environment.
Which countries are responsible for
climate change?
The answer depends on who you ask and how you
measure emissions. Ever since the first climate talks
in the 1990s, officials have debated which countries—
developed or developing—are more to blame for
climate change and should therefore curb their
emissions.
Developing countries argue that developed countries
have emitted more greenhouse gases over time. They
say these developed countries should now carry more
of the burden because they were able to grow their
economies without restraint. Indeed, the United States
has emitted the most of all time, followed by the
European Union (EU).
However, China and India are now among the world’s
top annual emitters, along with the United States.
Developed countries have argued that those countries
must do more now to address climate change.
In the context of this debate, major climate agreements
have evolved in how they pursue emissions reductions.
The Kyoto Protocol required only developed countries
to reduce emissions, while the Paris Agreement
recognized that climate change is a shared problem
and called on all countries to set emissions targets.
Are the commitments made under the
Paris Agreement enough?
Most experts say no. Countries’ pledges are not
ambitious enough and will not be enacted quickly
enough to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C.
Policies as of late 2021 could result in a 2.7°C (4.9°F)
rise by 2100, according to the Climate Action Tracker
compiled by Germany-based nonprofits Climate
Analytics and the NewClimate Institute.
“The Paris Agreement is not enough. Even at the time
of negotiation, it was recognized as not being enough,”
says CFR’s Hill. “It was only a first step, and the
expectation was that as time went on, countries would
return with greater ambition to cut their emissions.”
Since 2015, dozens of countries—including the top
emitters—have submitted stronger pledges. For
example, President Biden announced in 2021 that the
United States will aim to cut emissions by 50 to 52
percent compared to 2005 levels by 2030, doubling
President Barack Obama’s commitment. The following
year, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that could
get the country close to reaching that goal. Meanwhile,
the EU pledged to reduce emissions by at least 55
percent compared to 1990 levels by 2030, and China
said it aims to reach peak emissions before 2030.
But the world’s average temperature will still rise 2.1°C
(3.8°F) by 2100 even if countries fully implement their
pledges for 2030 and beyond. If the more than one
hundred countries that have set or are considering net-
zero targets follow through, warming could be limited
to 1.8˚C (3.2°F), according to the Climate Action Tracker.
What are the alternatives to the Paris
Agreement?
Many experts foresee the most meaningful climate
action happening outside of the Paris Agreement. Some
call for the creation of a climate club—an idea
championed by Yale University economist William
Nordhaus—that would penalize countries that do not
meet their obligations or do not join. Others propose
new agreements that apply to specific emissions or
sectors to complement the Paris accord.
“Progress is going to happen not globally with all
countries joined together, but in smaller groups and by
sector,” says Victor. In the past few years, there have
been more examples of this. In 2021, Group of Twenty
(G20) countries pledged to stop financing new coal-
fired power plants abroad, and dozens of countries
committed to collectively reduce emissions of
methane, a potent greenhouse gas, by 30 percent by
2030. In 2022, countries in the International Civil
Aviation Organization set a goal of achieving net-zero
emissions for commercial aviation by 2050. Meanwhile,
cities around the world have made their own pledges.
In the United States, more than six hundred local
governments have detailed climate action plans that
include emissions-reduction targets.
Companies are a large source of emissions, and many
big firms have said they will try to reduce their
emissions. Some have pledged to go carbon neutral,
while others have said they will be carbon negative,
meaning they would remove more carbon from the
atmosphere than they release. During COP26,
hundreds of financial institutions joined the Glasgow
Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) and pledged to
achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. However, some
firms have since threatened to back out, while others
haven’t published plans for how they will reach that
goal. This has led critics to accuse some of these
companies of greenwashing, or marketing themselves
as eco-conscious while continuing harmful practices.
Although moves by corporations are important for
raising awareness and reducing some emissions, “it’s
all pretty small relative to governments around the
world setting a forceful climate policy,” Michael
Greenstone, an economics professor at the University
of Chicago, tells CFR’s Why It Matters podcast.
© CFR
 The State During the British Raj: Imperial Governance
in South Asia 1700-1947

Azfar Khan Niazi

Introduction The governor was subjected to the constitution which

meant that he had to act under the restraints of the
Toynbee elucidated the decay of the civilization constitution, preventing the ruling elite from corruption
because of challenge and response, asserting that and plundering because they could be subjected to the
when the empires fail to respond shrewdly to contain trial too.
challenges, they see their nemesis. It was posited by
Toynbee that when an empire fails to respond to the Civilian Supremacy
challenges, it would be overthrown by a violent military
The State During British Raj emphasizes that the rise
takeover or by a movement based on utopian claims
of civilian supremacy was a vital phenomenon in the
referred to as ‘schism in the soul’.
Indian precinct because, in most of Indian history,
In The State During British Raj: Imperial Governance in empires were built around military patronage and a
South Asia 1700-1947, Dr Ilhan Niaz uses Toynbee’s sturdy ruler could only manage to control the empire.
concept to explain the challenges by the Timurids and When powerful Timurids died, successors were not
the British as well as the responses they made to those powerful enough to control the military and the empire
challenges. Although with the gradual demise of the started crippling.
Timurids, no utopian movement came to replace them,
The British Raj made the military subordinate to
its proponents invited alien rulers such as Shah
civilians, and this was the
Waliullah’s invitation to Nadir
consequence of civilian
Shah, which set the stage for the
supremacy at home in Britain.
rise of the trading company’s
The rise of representation in the
takeover of the Timurids
Indian context was gradually
administration.
modified along the British lines
It would not be wrong to mention where representation was based
that it was this representative on land ownership, but in the
system via which Pakistan was Indian subcontinent, the ruler
won by Muslim League. Ilhan was virtually the owner of all the
Niaz aptly and eruditely proves land.
the gradual evolution and
After the introduction of
development of the institutional
permanent settlement and
framework in Indian conditions,
private property in India, it moved
with most of the British
toward the representative
administrative framework being
system because this
a modification of Timurids’ such
representative system led to
as management of law and order
competition between different
that was administered by
classes, demanding
faujdars or shiqdars.
representation to protect their
However, the advancement of interests.
constitutionalism, civilian
Ilhan Niaz posits that it was in
supremacy and meritocracy can
this context that the constitution
only be credited to the British
started emerging, the
because previously most of the
provenance of which goes back
appointments were made on personal loyalty and
to the 1773 Regulating Act of the company. The subject
patronage. The introduction and development of the
of the British Raj’s governance is not an intriguing
police as an independent institution was a distinct
subject to moot for the insular scholars of the sub-
feature of the British Raj to maintain law and order.
continent, but this book is an interesting feat towards
As noted above, the recruitment and appointments in the objective analysis of institutional development
pre-British empires were founded on patronage based during the British Raj.
on loyalty to the ruler and the recruits were personal
In a nutshell, this book is a must-read for the
servants of the ruler, while the empire was the
policymakers and upper echelons of both the
personal state of the ruler. The British advanced the
successor states to understand the institutionalization
concept of meritocracy—the selection of recruits based
of the British Raj so that they can understand and
on open competition which was also seconded by
modify the developments that are taking place in the
Jinnah—was a leap forward towards transparent
contemporary period. © Paradigm Shift
recruitment for bureaucratic administration.