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Philippine Sociological Society

Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections: 'Churchifying' Democracy or Democratizing


the Church?
Author(s): ELEANOR R. DIONISIO
Source: Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. 62, SPECIAL ISSUE: SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
(2014), pp. 11-40
Published by: Philippine Sociological Society
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Philippine Sociological Review

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ELEANOR R. DIONISIO

Catholic Partisanship
in the 2013 Elections:
'Churchifying' Democracy
or Democratizing
the Church?

This essay examines a form of Catholic partisanship in the Philippines in the


2013 elections: campaigns for or against candidates on the basis of Catholic
ethics, launched from the level of the hierarchy and from the level of the
unconsecrated laity. It explores possible effects of such partisanship on
the autonomy of political processes and on freedom of conscience. Using
Casanova's model of modern public religions (1994), it seeks to refine the
concept of religious self-location in political society by limiting it to the
establishment of long-term relationships with political forces. The essay
explains why self-location in political society seems unlikely for the Roman
Catholic Church in the Philippines. The essay also considers whether
engagement with political society, even from a civil society locus, may pose
dangers to the autonomy of the political process or to the freedom of conscience
of non-Catholics and Catholic dissenters. Based on results of the 2013 elections

and on previous surveys of Catholic opinion, there is little evidence of a


Catholic vote, that may impose Catholic beliefs on non-Catholics, or of Catholic
susceptibility to electoral coercion by the Church. Finally the essay discusses
how partisanship might potentially benefit the Catholic Church as well as
political society.

Keywords: Catholic Church, elections, reproductive health

Philippine Sociological Review (2014) • Vol. 62 • pp. 11-40 11

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Which Side Are You On? Team Buhay and Team Patay Posters Outside a Catholic Church
(Photo By: Watchmen Daily Journal)

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INTRODUCTION

Philippines were attempts by Roman Catholic Church groups


Among to Philippines to
mobilizemobilize
the main were a "Catholic
a media attempts vote." storiesvote."
"Catholic by Roman ThisThis
of the mobilization Catholic 2013 elections Church
mobilization consisted groups in theof
consisted of
campaigns for candidates opposed to the Reproductive Health (RH)
Law, enacted five months before the elections, and against candidates
supporting it. Both Catholics and non-Catholics decried some of those
campaigns as an infringement on freedom of conscience and on the
autonomy of the democratic process.
This essay evaluates that criticism by examining one form of
partisan political engagement by the Catholic Church in the Philippines
(henceforth "the Church"): support of specific candidates based on
Catholic ethical principles. It focuses on two campaigns: (a) the diocese
of Bacolod's Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign and; (b) the White Vote
Movement (WVM). These represent efforts launched from two different
locations within the Church. The Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign
was an intervention from the hierarchy of the Church, constituted by
its bishops - or in this case, one particular bishop. The WVM was an
intervention from the unconsecrated laity , non-ordained Catholics who
do not exercise institutional authority within the Church.1

1 The term unconsecrated laity excludes non-ordained members of religious


orders (often called "brothers" and "sisters" or "nuns"). Technically, non-

ordained members of religious orders are members of the laity. However,

the non-ordained religious are subject to the same canonical restrictions

on electoral partisanship as the clergy and the bishops (CIC Canon 672;

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1988).

Eleanor R. Dionísio is an Associate Director of the John J. Carroll Institute on

Church and Social Issues (JJCICSI), and heads its Church and Society Program.

She has an M.Phil, in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New
York City. Her main field of interest is the Catholic Church in the Philippines

and its political engagements. She has previously worked in government,


journalism, and non-government organizations, writing on industry, alternative

education, labor issues, and gender subordination. Comments may be sent to


eleanor.dionisio(S)yahoo.com.

Philippine Sociological Review (2014) • Vol. 62 1)

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I use Casanova's (1994) discussion of modern public religions to
explore whether such mobilization threatens the autonomy of the state
and of political society that is crucial for religious freedom. I also
speculate on the impact of such mobilization on the Church, and on the
differing implications of campaigns launched by the Church's hierarchy
and those launched by the unconsecrated laity. I will make brief reference
to political parties based on Catholic ethical principles, a phenomenon
deserving its own investigation.

INSTITUTIONAL PARTISANSHIP
FOR SPECIFIC CANDIDATES:
THE TEAM BUHAY/TEAM RAW CAMPAIGN
About ten weeks before the 2013 elections, a banner appeared on the
façade of San Sebastian Cathedral, seat of the Roman Catholic diocese
of Bacolod. On this banner were two lists. One, labelled Team Buhay
(Team Life), named six senatorial candidates and two party-list groups
opposed to the Reproductive Health (RH) Law. The other, labelled Team
Patay (Team Death), named seven senatorial candidates and four party-
list groups supporting the law (Reuters 2013).
The banner was an unmistakable suggestion to the Catholic electorate
of Bacolod to vote for Team Buhay and not for Team Patay. Efforts were
made to portray the banner as a response to lay demands for guidance, but
clearly the banner was hung at the initiative of the head of the diocese,
Bishop Vicente Navarra (Dela Cruz 20 1 3). The campaign was reportedly
supported by most of the clergy of Bacolod (Sorote 2013).
One news report inaccurately depicted the campaign as the opening
salvo of a "new voter education campaign" by "the Catholic hierarchy
of the Philippines" (Reuters 2013). Bishop Navarra is a member of the
Catholic hierarchy, but his campaign was not endorsed by the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). The CBCP is the only
entity, save the pope, that may issue authoritative pronouncements on
behalf of the Catholic Church in the Philippines (Dionisio 2011). The
Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign was therefore a project of one bishop,
not of the Catholic hierarchy of the Philippines.
One reason the CBCP did not endorse the campaign was that Catholic
Canon Law restricts bishops, clergy, and members of the religious orders

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from partisan politics "unless, in the judgment of competent ecclesiastical
authority, the protection of the rights of the Church or the promotion of the
common good requires it" (Code of Canon Law 287 §2). Only once has
the CBCP rendered that judgment: when it declared Ferdinand Marcos's
presidency after the 1986 election to have "no moral basis" (CBCP
1996:621). Despite Vatican displeasure over the decision (see Claver
2009:38; Carroll 2006d:235-236; and Hanson 1987:331), the CBCP
maintains to this day that the decision was correct. Nonetheless, in 1991,
the bishops implicitly affirmed in the Acts and Decrees of the Second
Plenary Council of the Philippines (PCP-II) that the 1986 statement
was an exception and not the rule. Article 28 §2 of the decrees states
that "bishops, priests and religious must refrain from partisan politics,
avoiding especially the use of the pulpit for partisan purposes, so as to
avoid division among the flock" (PCP-II 1992:241). This admonition was
reiterated in two pastoral documents (CBCP 1998b, 1997).
The CBCP's "Catechism on the Church and politics" admits an
exception, "a case when the Bishops can authoritatively order the lay
faithful to vote for one particular and concrete option."

. . . [T]he case would certainly be extraordinary. This happens when a


political option is clearly the only one demanded by the Gospel. An example

is when a presidential candidate is clearly bent to destroy the Church and


its mission of salvation and has all the resources to win, while hiding his

malevolent intentions behind political promises. In this case the Church may

authoritatively demand the faithful, even under pain of sin, to vote against this

particular candidate. But such situations are understandably very rare (CBCP

1998b).

The restriction on clerical partisanship was why the Team Buhay/Team


Patay campaign was cast as a response to lay demands for guidance.
Its defenders also sought to portray the campaign as mere opposition
to the RH law and not an electoral campaign (Bayoran 2013 and Asia
News Monitor 2013). Nevertheless, Bishop Navarra, the competent
ecclesiastical authority for Bacolod, had the power in his own diocese
to determine that the RH Law was sufficient threat to the common good,
or to the Church's rights, to warrant an exception. The same was true of

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections IS

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two other bishops who released lists of candidates, Archbishop Ramon
Arguelles, for Lipa, and Bishop Emilio Marquez, for Lucena (Gomez and
Mayol 2013).
Not many bishops followed their lead. A few archdioceses distanced
themselves from such campaigns. A spokesperson of the archdiocese
of Palo announced it would not endorse candidates (Gomez and Mayol
2013). When lay groups of the archdiocese of Cebu released their own
Team Buhay/Team Patay lists, Archbishop Jose Palma is said to have
asked that they not be displayed on Church property (Mercado 2013).
Palma had previously stated that the Cebu clergy should not use the
pulpit for partisan campaigns (Napallacan 2012). Archbishop Sergio
Utlég of Tuguegarao reminded the clergy of his see that "as Clergy, we
do not endorse any party or any candidate" (Utlég 2013). Archbishop
Socrates Villegas of Lingayen-Dagupan was emphatic in his rejection
of such campaigns: "When the Church ENDORSES CANDIDATES in
political elections she always ends up a LOSER. The endorsed candidate
may win in the votes but the Church never wins with him" (Villegas
2013; emphasis in the original).
Other priests invoked the Church's teaching on freedom of conscience
to criticize the campaign. Msgr. Victorino Rivas of Bacolod, Fr. Joel
Tabora, SJ, president of the Ateneo de Davao University, and Fr. Eric
Marcelo Genilo, SJ, Associate Professor of moral theology of the Loyola
School of Theology, made separate statements pointing out that the
campaign went against the Church's commitment, stated in Dignitatis
Humanae , the Declaration on Religious Freedom of the Second Vatican
Council (Vatican II), to respect the freedom of conscience of dissenters
(Genilo 2013; Gomez 2013; Tabora 2013).

Lay Partisanship for Specific Candidates:


The White Vote Movement
Different Church rules on partisanship apply to the unconsecrated
laity. Article 28 §1 of PCP-II states that "[l]ay men and women in
responsible positions in our society must help form the civic conscience
of the voting population and work to explicitly promote the election to
public office of leaders of true integrity" (1992:242). The 1997 pastoral
exhortation on politics designates "direct participation in the political

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order" as "the special responsibility of the laity," with a view "to
renewing] the temporal order according to Gospel principles and values"
(CBCP 1997). The "Catechism on the Church and politics" identifies
"active and partisan political involvement" as part of this responsibility
(CBCP 1998b). Since 2009, the CBCP has called the laity to engage in
"principled partisan politics" (2010a, 2010b, 2009).
In April 2013, an assembly of lay associations, the "White Vote
Movement," endorsed their own set of candidates, including all six on the
diocese of Bacolod's Team Buhay. Initiated by the Sangguniáng Laiko ng
Pilipinas (Council of the Laity of the Philippines), the WVM consisted of
such reputable Catholic groups as the Adoración Nocturna Filipina , the
Apostleship of Prayer, the Catholic Women's League, Couples for Christ,
the Christian Family Movement, Family Rosary Crusade, the Luzon
jurisdiction of the Knights of Columbus, the Legion of Mary, and Light
of Jesus (CBCP for Life 2013; Santiago 2013). But the WVM's largest
member group, El Shaddai, which boasts a following of six million, is
sometimes seen by other Catholics as less than reputable (Esguerra and
Tubeza 2013; Weigele 2004).
The WVM endorsed ten senatorial candidates and a number of

party-list groups opposed to the RH Law, which suggests this was the
main criterion for endorsement. A week before the elections, however,
El Shaddai's founder, Mariano Velarde Jr., more popularly known as
Bro. Mike, announced he had obtained permission from the WVM to
include two senatorial candidates, Paolo Benigno Aquino IV and Ramón
Magsaysáy Jr., who were in favor of the RH Law. Velarde was vague
as to whether the two candidates were in the WVM's list or only in El
Shaddai's (Ager 2013). Both were members of the slate supported by
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Disgruntled Catholic quarters
suggested their inclusion was a gesture of allegiance to the president
(Esguerra and Tubeza 2013), who is unpopular with anti-RH activists.
The WVM raised some Catholic hackles by declaring on its website
that "Catholic faith calls for unity with the White Vote Movement"
(WVM 2013). This claim overstepped a boundary set by the CBCP
(1997), which had previously stated that "there can be no one political
party nor one political program that can exclusively claim the name
Catholic. That is why there is normally no such thing as 'the Catholic

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections 17

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vote.' Nor can particular Catholic groups present their candidates as
the Church's candidates." In 2007, Archbishop Angel Lagdameo, then
CBCP president, warned that insistence on a single slate of candidates for
Catholics could constitute a violation of freedom of conscience. He said

that while the CBCP encouraged Catholic lay groups to agree upon which
candidates to support, it discouraged them from imposing this decision
on others, even on their own members. "To dictate on them whom to
vote [for]," he admonished, "is as bad as buying their votes" (Lagdameo
2007). Specifically mentioned in this statement was El Shaddai, which
has a history of endorsing candidates, not all of them acceptable to the
hierarchy.

IS MODERN PUBLIC CATHOLICISM POSSIBLE?


While Catholic partisanship in the 2013 elections was criticized by
Catholics for its inconsistency with the Church's rules and teaching, other
Catholics criticized it for its potential impact on the political process.
After the launch of the Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign, a group
called "Catholics for Reproductive Health" (C4RH) joined the Akbayan
party-list (which was on the Bacolod blacklist) and other organizations
in picketing the CBCP offices. "[For the Church] to campaign for and
against particular candidates in the coming elections," the protesters
claimed, "impinges on the constitutional guarantees to a secular society"
(Sun Star Manila 2013).
The 1987 Constitution declares the separation of Church and State
to be "inviolable" (Art. II, Sec. 6). But this provision guarantees a
secular state; nowhere does the Constitution guarantee a secular
society. The Constitution upholds freedom from established religion,
i.e., state religion. But freedom from established religion does not mean
freedom from religion. The Constitution protects freedom of religion,
commanding not only that all citizens be considered equal regardless
of religion, but also that "the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination, or preference, shall
forever be allowed" (Art. Ill, Sec. 5). Far from guaranteeing a secular
society, the constitution directs the state to permit all religions to
flourish in society. This provision may lend itself to the interpretation
that religious adherents and institutions must be free to use religious

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principles in discerning electoral choices, to announce those choices
publicly, and to campaign for those choices.
However, C4RH, Akbayan, and their allies raise valid concerns for
the autonomy of the political process from religious encroachment. The
endorsement of specific candidates by elements of the Church may not
violate the constitution, but does it violate this autonomy, and thus the
religious freedom and freedom of conscience, of those with different
convictions?

To gain clarity on this question, it is useful to review Casanova's


concept of modern public religions. Casanova (1994:61, 218-219) asserts
that modern structurally differentiated societies still have a place, even a
need, for religious participation in the public sphere. He identifies three
levels on which public religions may locate themselves. The first is the
state - established religion, which the 1987 Constitution forbids. The
second is political society, which Stepan (1998:4), whose conceptual
scheme Casanova borrows, defines as "that arena in which the polity
specifically arranges itself political contestation to gain control over
public power and the state apparatus." This encompasses "political
parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, intraparty alliances,
and legislatures."
Public religions at the level of state or political society levels endanger
the autonomy of the political subsystem, hence its capacity to protect
equally the rights of all citizens regardless of religion. They endanger
democratic principles such as freedom of religion and of conscience.
They endanger their own moral autonomy because of the potential for
instrumentalization by the state or political society. They also endanger
their own chances for survival, since religions identified with states,
especially repressive ones, may gain coercive authority but lose moral
authority. As Casanova (1994:29) notes, it is in European nations where
religion has had the closest alliance with the state that churches are
emptiest.
The third possible level for public religious engagement is civil
society, which consists of institutions of social life such as associations
and social movements (Stepan 1988:3-4). Following Jürgen Habermas,
Casanova conceives of civil society as the realm for informal contestation
and collective construction of norms and definitions of the common good.

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections 19

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Casanova contends this is the most fruitful place for the self-location of
modern public religions, where they can contribute to the forging of a
moral framework without recourse to the coercive mechanisms of the

state or to the formal mechanisms of political competition. For such a


contribution to be constructive, however, religions must relinquish their
monopolistic ambitions and learn to live with plurality, accepting that
theirs is not the only legitimate moral voice. This also means they must
learn to frame their contributions to ethical conversations in universalistic

language accessible to their diverse interlocutors. Casanova hopes


that through such participation in the ethical rationalization of society,
religions may develop their own self-reflexivity - the capacity to clarify,
interrogate, reevaluate, and renovate their own traditions and convictions
(Habermas 2009; Casanova 1994:228-232).
This conceptualization resonates with ideas in the writings of Popes
John Paul II and Benedict XVI about the potential of faith to purify
modern reason by challenging its claims to autonomy from ethics and by
grounding it in an ethical lifeworld. But reason also has the potential to
purify faith by leading it to question its own traditions, and by inducing it
to problematize received rules and ethical norms (Benedict XVI 2009:56-
57 and John Paul II 1998).
Casanova observes that the Catholic Church after Vatican II has

retreated from the state and political society and relocated itself in civil
society (1994:62,213). Two Council documents herald this retreat from
the state: Gaudium et Spes , which declares respect for the lawful autonomy
of the secular spheres, and Dignitatis Humanae , which embraces the
principles of religious freedom and freedom of conscience and accepts
the constitutional separation of Church and State as a requirement for
these freedoms.

This does not mean the Church has receded from politics since
Vatican II; on the contrary, its political advocacy has expanded.
Dignitatis Humanae's incorporation of civil and political liberties into
the Church's moral agenda has impelled Church personnel to oppose
threats to these liberties, particularly as local churches have moved
away from alliance with the state. The Church's post-conciliar turn to
this-worldly concerns of social justice and development, as well as to
collaboration with civil society groups of the marginalized rather than

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with the state or political parties, has also involved it in advocacy for
redistributive reforms (see pages 114-134 for Brazil; 184-200 for the
United States).
But such political advocacy takes place predominantly if not
exclusively from the location of civil society. The Church acts neither
like a state nor like a political party, but like a civil society organization
advocating policy recommendations, or ethical principles to ground
those recommendations. In authoritarian situations in which the state

controls the institutions of political society and civil society, it can


seem at times as if certain segments of the Church act like political
movements. Nevertheless it is Casanova's contention that this level of

engagement is temporary, and diminishes during the post-authoritarian


period as institutions of political democracy and of secular civil society
congeal ( 1 994: 133-134 and 222-223). The Church then returns to pastoral
concerns, although it does not necessarily cease to be a political actor. Key
Church personnel and agencies, including national bishops' conferences,
may continue speaking out on social justice, democracy, or sexual and
reproductive ethics, just as might other civil society organizations, and
usually in collaboration with them.
Casanova has since reevaluated his contention about the incongruence
between modern democracy and religions at the state and political
society level, admitting the possibility of state religions compatible with
democracy (2006:21). Nonetheless he has not undertaken a systematic
interpretation of empirical cases that might lend cogency to this revision,
and his caveats on the dangers of religious self-location in the state and
political society seem valid in a respectable number of cases.

IS THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE PHILIPPINES


RELOCATING TO POLITICAL SOCIETY?
During the Marcos dictatorship (1972-1986), segments of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines figured prominently in the endeavor to extricate
the nation from it - notwithstanding the conflicting agenda, alliances,
and political ideologies of different groups of Church personnel, from
its Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) of mostly poor lay people
to various factions of the CBCP (Moreno 2006:31-68; Carroll 2006a,
2006b, and 2006c). In the first decade or so after the dictatorship, the

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections 21

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Church's support for agrarian reform, urban poor legislation, peace,
clean elections, and environmental protection seemed largely to take
place from civil society, through education campaigns and lobbying in
collaboration with secular groups. But boundaries were occasionally
breached. Church personnel sometimes assumed surrogate functions
for the state. For instance, the government deputized parish priests
of the diocese of Malaybalay as forest rangers with police powers
for enforcing compliance with the total logging ban won by BECs
and Church-supported secular organizations (Moreno 2006:168). The
government also mobilized a Church-mandated electoral watchdog
group, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV),
to participate in cleaning up voter registration lists (134). Church-
based organizations such as BECs, as well as individual bishops, also
ventured into partisan involvement during elections, sometimes on
different sides (UCANews 1992; Franco 2001:236-239).
In 2001, support by certain bishops, priests, and religious and lay
movements for the ouster of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada over
corruption charges marked a new spike in Catholic involvement in the
state arena, although Moreno observes that such involvement was less
solid and widespread than that in 1986 (124-131). The episcopate's
2005 refusal to call for the impeachment of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, despite pressure from civil society groups, seemed to mark a
definitive withdrawal from direct involvement in political partisanship
or in transfers of state power (CBCP 2005). But within a few years, the
battle over RH legislation saw Church elements re-engaging in partisan
politics.
One explanation for continuing Church engagement with the state and
political society, amid what might be assumed to be increasing structural
differentiation in a post-authoritarian setting, is the weakness of state
and political party institutions, and their failure adequately to connect
with, channel, or accommodate negotiation and contestation among civil
society groups. This weakness creates a need and an opportunity for
non-state and non-party institutions, such as the Church, to move into the
vacuum (Moreno 2006:260).
Nonetheless, the more recent partisanship of certain Church elements
over RH legislation does not necessarily herald an attempt by the Church

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to relocate itself in political society. It is true that the Team Buhay/Team
Patay and WVM campaigns resemble involvements of the Catholic
Church in Europe and Latin America which Casanova identifies as
instances of self-location in political society (1994:61, 218-219). But I
would argue that while Team Buhay/Team Patay and the WVM are cases
of religious engagement with political society, they are not necessarily
cases of religious self-location in political society. Archbishop Villegas'
pastoral letter on the 2013 elections warns that when a religion endorses
candidates, it is "reduced to a political party" (2013). But church
organizations do not, simply by endorsing political candidates, become
political parties, any more than do secular civil society organizations that
endorse candidates, especially if the endorsement is decided election by
election.

Here I differ from Casanova's (1994:218) concept of religious self-


location in political society, which is broad enough to include any partisan
or nonpartisan electoral mobilization by Catholics. In my view one can
truly speak of religious self-location in political society only where
religion develops a long-term alliance or identification with a particular
political party or set of parties.2 Until such a relationship stabilizes,
church agents who endorse candidates, be they from the laity or from the
hierarchy, are merely civil society agents who endorse candidates.
Such enduring relationships between the Church and political parties
have never been the case in the Philippines, partly because of a defective
party system. No stable relationship can be cultivated with mainstream
political parties, which are constantly shifting alliances with no long-
term programs.
But even non-mainstream parties with platforms based on Catholic
principles cannot necessarily count on the support of the hierarchy or
Catholic lay organizations. Three such parties are Ang Kapatiran Party
(AKP), Ang Pro-Life Party List, and Buhay (Life) Party List. The
CBCP has kept within canonical restrictions on institutional partisanship
by endorsing none of these. AKP has occasionally won endorsement
from individual bishops. In the 2013 elections all three of its senatorial

2 Examples include the relationship between the Catholic Church and


Conservative parties, and later the Christian Democratic parties, in certain

countries of Europe and Latin America.

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections 2)

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candidates were on Cebu's Team Buhay ? But only one was endorsed by
the WVM, a snub for the other two, which stung all the more because of
El Shaddai's last-minute endorsement of two RH Law supporters. The
WVM endorsed both Ang Pro-Life and Buhay , but Cebu's Team Buhay
excluded Buhay (Go 2013).
This brings up another impediment to a stable relationship between
the Church and any political party: the tendency of Catholic partisans
to take a "cafeteria approach" toward candidates. The Team Buhay
candidates of Bacolod and Cebu and the WVM candidates were from

rival parties, divided among themselves and from the Church on some
issues, but united in opposition to the RH Law.
It is also significant that Catholic partisans disagreed on which
candidates to endorse even when they agreed that the RH Law was the
litmus test for the choice. The laity of Cebu and the diocese of Bacolod
both used candidates' positions on the RH Law to determine inclusion in
Team Buhay and Team Patay. But while Cebu's Team Patay was identical
to Bacolod's, its Team Buhay was completely different (Go 2013).
The situation is further complicated when more than one criterion
is considered. Velarde justified inclusion of Aquino and Magsaysay in
El Shaddai's list as consistent with the WVM's criteria of "conscience,
competence, and commitment" (Ager 2013), prescribed by the bishops
nine years previously (CBCP 2004). Three weeks before the elections, a
small group of lay Catholics endorsed a senatorial candidate on Bacolod's
Team Patay list. Their letter, "Catholics for Risa Hontiveros," circulated
on Facebook and email, argued that despite Anna Theresia Hontiveros's
support for the RH Law, she was a reliable ally of the Church on other
important issues: agrarian reform; environmental preservation; health care

3 None of AKP's 20 1 3 senatorial bets were on the diocese of Bacolod's Team

Buhay. AKP senatorial candidate Marwil Llasos explained this was because
Bacolod's Team Buhay included only legislators who had proven their pro-

life credentials by voting against the RH Law or previous versions thereof.

Since the diocese of Bacolod claimed that the Team Buhay/Team Patay

campaign was not an electoral campaign but an education campaign on how


senatorial candidates had voted on the RH Law, its Team Buhay could not

have included the AKP candidates, who, never having been legislators, had
never voted on the Law.

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for the poor; and opposition to abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, and
corruption (Alvarez, Ambrosio, Banzon, Baquiran, Batistiana, Borcena,
Canias, Catipon, Chiù, Co, Del Rosario, Demaisip, Despabiladeras,
Díaz, Dionisio, Dolorical, Esquivel, Fernandez, Gabuna, Galvez, Gapuz,
Johnson-Herrera, Karaos, Ledesma-Deduque, Lopa, Lopa, Marin, Marin,
Marzan, Mendoza, Nepomuceno, Nolido, Nuera, Perez, Porio, Sabinorio,
Salvador, San Andres, Sicam, Tan, Tañada, Tolosa, Tuaño, and Yuson
2013; Nery 2013).
"Catholics for Risa Hontiveros" demonstrates another reason why
it is difficult for the Church to establish a stable relationship with any
political party or set of candidates. There is a plurality of Catholic ethical
premises for choosing candidates. Guidelines issued over the years by the
CBCP and individual bishops propose a variety of criteria for assessing
candidates: not just defense of the conventional heterosexual family
and of life in utero, but also commitment to the common good, human
rights, justice, care for the environment, and a preferential option for
the poor. Personal characteristics sought in candidates include integrity,
moral rectitude, compassion, competence, nonmembership in political
dynasties, and the absence of ties with gambling, smuggling, the sex
trade, and environmentally destructive logging and mining (Ledesma
2013; Utlég 2013; Villegas 2013; CBCP 1996:765-768, 823-824, 1998a,
2013a). The CBCP recognizes not only this plurality of ethical standards,
but also a plurality of ethical options for each standard. In their 1997
exhortation on Philippine politics, the bishops stated:

In the light of the Gospel and consistent with the Gospel, there are many

political options open to Catholics. The Gospel does not prescribe only one
way of being political nor only one way of political governing... Justice,
peace, and integral development can be pursued through many political ways

(CBCP 1997).

There is a fourth reason, both ethical and strategic, why Catholic


endorsement of specific candidates in the 2013 elections does not
necessarily portend Church self-location in political society. Ecclesiastical
authorities realize that long-term identification with political parties or
forces may compromise the institution's ethical mission. Archbishop

DIONISIO • Catholic Partisanship in the 2013 Elections 25

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Villegas (2013) writes: "The Church must be a mother and teacher also for
all the candidates from opposing political parties. As mother she loves all
and refuses no one. As a teacher, she rebukes with love; she corrects with
mercy; she guides firmly always celebrating what is right and beautiful
among her opposing children" (20 1 3). Coming down on one side or another
compromises these self-defined maternal and magisterial charisms.
Archbishop Villegas also warns of the moral impurity that partisanship
incurs. "In endorsing candidates, the Bride of Christ the Church tarnishes
her spiritual mission with the stain of the mundane... Religion has been
used for political gain and our spiritual mission has been compromised"
(2013). But more than the stain of the mundane, partisanship can bring
upon the Church the "stain of sin". The diocese of Bacolod's Team
Buhay and the WVM slate include two former military men involved in
attempted coups d'etat against legitimately elected governments. One of
these two is suspected of human rights violations, including complicity in
the assassination of activists in the late 1980s. Such ethical inconsistency
poses dangers to the Church's moral standing. Lay groups such as the
WVM or Catholics for Risa Hontiveros can afford to argue that in real-
world democracies, imperfect choices must be made, and that the ethical
choice may be the one that elects the lesser evil for the sake of the greater
good. But the Church, exhorted by its Gospels to "be perfect" as its
"heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), cannot afford to be tainted
even by the lesser evil.

IS CATHOLIC PARTISANSHIP DELETERIOUS


TO FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND THE
AUTONOMY OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS?
The point may be raised that Church engagement with political society,
even if not stable or institutionalized, can still violate the autonomy of the
political process and the freedom of conscience of dissenters. One way to
assess this claim is to look at empirical evidence. Based on the results of
the 2013 elections, there seems to be no significant Catholic vote, at least
on the senatorial and party-list levels.
Five of six candidates on Bacolod's Team Buhay won a senate seat,
but January 2013 opinion polls conducted by the Social Weather Stations
(2013) show these five already predicted to win before the diocese's

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Table 1. Ranking of Bacolod Team Buhay and White Vote Move-
ment (WVM) Candidates in January 2013 Social Weather Stations
Survey (SWS)a and in May 2013 Final National Election Tallyb
RANK-
IN RANKING
ING IN
BACOLOD IN SWS
IN WVM NATIONAL
CANDIDATES TEAM SURVEY
SLATE ELEC-
BUHAY JANUARY
TIONS
SLATE 2013

Ma. Lourdes Nancy S. Binay Y 12 5

Joseph Victor G.v


Estrada Ejercito
Y Y v Yn
Y . n
1111

Richard J. Gordon Y 14 13

Gregorio B. Honasan Y Y 5-6 12


Marwil N. Llasos Y 33 32

Ma. Milagros Esperanza E. y Y 21 22 21


Magsaysay

Aquilino Martin D. Pimentel v . 0


jjj v Y Y j-o 0 o
Antonio F. Trillanes IV Y Y 10-11 9

Cynthia A. Villar Y Y 8-9 10

Juan Miguel F. Zubiri Y 7 14

a See SWS 2013.

b Rankings were drawn from final election returns obtained from the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).

campaign began. Four of them slipped in the national rankings after the
Team Buhay endorsement (see Table 1). In the territory of the diocese
of Bacolod, as well as in Bacolod City, the center of the Team Buhay
Campaign, only three candidates made it into the first twelve places.
Four of the seven Team Patay candidates won nationally, the same four
who won in the diocese of Bacolod. But in Bacolod City, five made it into
the first twelve places (see Table 2). This may suggest that the campaign
failed in the diocese's own backyard.
Six of the WVM's ten candidates won, but all six were expected to
win two months before the endorsement (see Table 1). All three AKP

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Table 2. Comparative ranking of Bacolod Team Buhay and Team Patay
Candidates: Nation, Diocese of Bacolod, and Bacolod City*
RANKING IN RANKING IN RANKING IN
TEAAÍ BUHAY
NATION DIOCESE OF BACOLOD BACOLOD CITY

Estrada 11 18 26
Honasan 12 16 16

Magaysay, M. 21 20 20
Pimentel 8 9 7

Villar

Trillanes 9 10 9

RANKING IN RANKING IN RANKING IN


TEAM PATAY
NATION DIOCESE OF BACOLOD BACOLOD CITY

Angara 6 2 2
Casino 22 22 21

Cayetano 3 3 3
Enrile 15 15 '1~
Escudero 4 5 4
Hontiveros 17 13 12

Legarda 2 4 6
c Rankings were drawn from national and municipal data obtained from the COMELEC. Data for the
diocese of Bacolod were obtained by aggregating votes for each candidate from all municipalities included
in the diocese.

candidates on Cebu's Team Buhay lost. So did Ang Pro-Life , endorsed by


Cebu's Team Buhay and the WVM.
AKP's and Ang Pro-Life's poor showing indicates that Catholic-
inspired parties are not yet capable of generating a Catholic vote. Buhay ,
a party-list group that relies on El Shaddai for its voter base, topped the
party-list elections at 900,000 votes. But that may point less to a Catholic
vote than to El Shaddai's loyalty to Velarde, whose son Michael was a
Buhay standard bearer. It may also be significant that with a supposed
El Shaddai membership of six million, Buhay got 900,000. Part of the
reason is that Velarde allegedly divided the El Shaddai vote by directing
movement leaders to marshal votes for the Pilipino Association for
Country-Urban Poor Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW), for
which another son, Rene, was a standard bearer (Esguerra and Tubeza
2013). If that allegation is true, this demonstrates that parties with

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Catholic links are not immune to dynastic self-interest which can override
commitment to Catholic causes or principles.
Hence the 2013 elections yield no evidence for a Catholic vote in
the senate race, and inconclusive evidence in the party-list race. More
telling is a series of surveys conducted by the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP). Over the last two decades Filipino Catholics have
consistently given the Church high trust ratings - 70% in 1991, 73% in
2001, 76% in 2008 - but this does not mean they will vote for Church
endorsements. Six to seven of every ten Filipino Catholic respondents
agree that the Church should not try to influence how people vote in
elections - 63% in 1991, 68% in 1998, 67% in 2008. The percentage
who strongly agree with this position has risen, from 1 2% in 1 99 1 , to 34%
in 1995, to 40% in 2008 (Nicolas, Batomalaque, Rabaçal, and Rivera
2011). These findings indicate that a Catholic vote might be a hard sell
even among Catholics. They also suggest that Filipino Catholics are
in little danger of surrendering their freedom of conscience to Church
endorsements.

That does not mean that attempts to mobilize a Catholic vote have
no impact on Catholics. The growth in the percentage of respondents
who strongly agree that the Church should not try to influence people's
electoral choices coincided with years when elements of the Church
lobbied against candidates supportive of reproductive health bills. The
campaigns do not seem to have persuaded the majority of Filipino
Catholics that a Catholic vote would be salutary, especially in the light
of surveys which show seven of every ten Filipino Catholic respondents
supporting access to artificial contraception (see, for instance, Social
Weather Stations 2008).

CAN CATHOLIC PARTISANSHIP BE GOOD


FOR THE CHURCH OR FOR POLITICS?
Efforts to mobilize a Catholic vote around opposition to the RH Law in the
2013 elections may not have encroached on the autonomy of the political
process or on the freedom of conscience of Catholics. But these efforts
are crystallizing debate within the Church and causing some degree of
countermobilization. Public statements from Catholic bishops and clergy
criticizing the Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign have made visible the

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Church's internal debates about its role in the political process. Catholics
for Reproductive Health (C4RH) and Catholics for Risa Hontiveros
are examples of countermobilization that occurs when some principles
are used as a basis for political mobilization to the exclusion of other
principles. Catholics who privilege those excluded principles also begin
to organize in an attempt to change the discourse.
Those who value strict unity within the Church may find such
developments distressing. The canonical curbs on institutional
partisanship are partly intended to avert the divisions that partisanship
inevitably generates. But these developments have the potential to
democratize the Church by compelling dissenters to break silence and
make their positions heard. The ensuing debate forces antagonists to
clarify and refine their reasoning. Political partisanship among Catholic
elements can thus create spaces for internal deliberative discourse that
may foster self-reflexivity among its participants, and promote the ethical
rationalization of Catholicism.

Political partisanship also obliges Catholics to dialogue with those


who do not share their religious convictions, and thus to translate their
ethical principles into language understandable to non-Catholics. Because
Catholics are the majority in the Philippines, the persuasive gestures of
those mobilizing around the RH Law have been largely addressed to fellow
Catholics, often rendering it unnecessary to speak anything but Catholic.
But even discourse addressed to fellow Catholics must be presented in a
political arena that includes non-Catholics. Anti-RH Law activists must
contend with criticism that in a religiously plural nation they cannot
justify their policy advocacies on the basis of Catholic doctrine alone.
This puts pressure on them to engage with other faiths, which evinces
itself, for instance, in the contention that the fight against contraception is
not just a Catholic struggle but part of a universal struggle for the dignity
of human life.
Whether or not Catholics are able to convince non-Catholics of the

universality of their principles, this effort at dialogue may at least increase


their knowledge of other religions, and their capacity to frame arguments in
language accessible to those who do not share their religious convictions.
This capacity for translation - what I call ethical multilingualism (not be
to be confused with ethical pluralism) - is, as Habermas (2009) asserts,

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a skill essential for constructive religious participation in democratic
discourse. The effort of learning to translate Catholic arguments into
language that non-Catholics will understand can force Catholics to look
at their issues from a perspective other than faith, which may help them
to cultivate the capacity to "purify their faith with reason."
Thus Catholic partisanship may have unintended benefits for the
Church, at least if not launched from the level of the hierarchy. But
there may also be benefits to political society. Bacolod's Team Buhay/
Team Patay and the WVM are forms of partisanship based on ethical
principles. This principle-based partisanship, even when couched in
religious language, is an improvement over partisanship based on
patronage, personal loyalties, or individual self-interest. The Church's
candidates need not even win for such campaigns to have an impact.
Merely justifying support for candidates in terms of ethical principles
already presages an alternative political culture.
Another potential benefit is the content of the Church's ethics, which
cannot be reduced to sexual and reproductive ethics. Catholic social
teaching provides respectable universal principles that can be used to
call to account political parties and candidates. PCP-II (1992:99-113)
enumerates them as follows: integral development based on human
dignity and solidarity; the universal purpose of earthly goods and private
property; social justice anchored in love; peace and active nonviolence;
a love of preference for the poor; the value of human work; the integrity
of creation; popular empowerment and participation. Bringing these
principles into political discourse would be a contribution to the
development of Philippine political culture.

CONCLUSION
In this essay I have examined two examples of a particular form of
Catholic partisanship in the Philippines in the 20 1 3 elections - campaigns
for or against specific candidates on the basis of a particular ethical
position, launched from the hierarchical level and from the level of the
unconsecrated laity - in terms of their possible effects on the autonomy
of political processes and on freedom of conscience. Using Casanova's
model of modern public religions (1994), I have sought further to refine
the concept of religious self-location in political society by limiting it

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to the establishment of long-term relationships with political parties
or forces. Episodic Catholic partisanship may be viewed as religious
engagement with political society, but not necessarily as religious self-
location in political society, and therefore not necessarily damaging to the
autonomy of democratic processes. I have explained why self-location in
political society seems unlikely for the Church in the Philippines.
I have considered whether even mere engagement with political
society, albeit launched from a civil society locus, may pose dangers to the
autonomy of the political process or to the freedom of conscience of non-
Catholics and Catholic dissenters. Based on results of the 2013 elections

and on previous surveys of Catholic opinion, there is little evidence of a


Catholic vote which may impose Catholic beliefs on non-Catholics, or of
the susceptibility of Catholics to electoral coercion by the Church.
I have also discussed how partisanship may potentially benefit the
Church, though not as its proponents intend. Participation in secular
democracy causes Catholic dissent to be articulated publicly, thus opening
space within the Church for argumentation, values clarification, and
perhaps even ethical rationalization. It also forces the Church to learn "to
speak in tongues" - that is, in language non-Catholics can understand.
This ethical multilingualism creates opportunities for Catholics to view
their own positions from the vantage point of those who do not share them,
allowing them to expand their perspectives and gain greater reflexivity.
Finally, Catholic partisanship may even make some contribution to
the development of political society by upholding ethical principles as
standards for electoral choice. Catholicism's own social teaching provides
a source of universal ethical principles for calling state actors, political
actors, and economic actors to account.
I am not asserting that Catholic electoral partisanship, whether of the
institution or of the laity, should be the rule. With Casanova (2006:21)
I share a normative preference for religious social engagement to
remain at the civil society level. Political partisanship, especially of the
hierarchy, compromises the organization, erodes its moral standing, and
creates disaffection among the faithful, particularly when dissension
is not acknowledged or allowed. I have merely tried to show how
religious partisanship, if it does not congeal into long-term alliances
between religious institutions and specific political forces, may create

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opportunities for the ethical rationalization of the Church and of
political society.
Nonetheless, the Church can contribute to the ethical rationalization
of politics without directly engaging political society. Basic Ecclesial
Communities (BECs), mentioned briefly in this article, constitute
one possibility for such a contribution. BECs are small community-
based groups of families which meet regularly to study scripture,
hold paraliturgical celebrations, discuss community issues, and map
out resolutions. Since their inception in the late 1960s as a means of
evangelizing the poor, some have become crucibles for growth not only
in faith but also in social and political engagement (Claver 2009:107-
130). The hierarchy now recognizes BECs as a means not just for
evangelization but for increasing the participation of the poor within the
Church and in their own communities (PCP-II: 267-269).
The potential of BECs to transform Philippine society, or the
Church, has been overrated. BECs may even perpetuate class, gender,
and ecclesiastical hierarchies (see cases in Mendoza, Luz, and Deles
1988). Nonetheless BECs have also formed movements of the poor
to claim economic rights, protect the environment, carve out "zones
of peace" amid armed conflict, and participate in local and national
politics (Moreno 2006:141-185, 200-224; Franco 2001:226-234). In
many places BECs are the only forum in which the poor can discuss and
analyze their problems. BECs have the potential to transform political
culture by sharpening their members' capacity collectively to articulate
interests, formulate action, and engage the political system. Whether this
potential is being cultivated and how it can be realized is a matter that
merits greater empirical research and reflection.
Work with BECs and similar organizations of the poor can also
transform the Church. The CBCP has since the 1990s voiced its concern,
in pastoral documents, about large-scale mining projects which displace
communities and destroy the environment. This concern is not issuing
from the top; it rose from the bottom, through the involvement of BECs,
religious missionaries, parish priests, and Diocesan Social Action Centers
in communities negatively affected by mining. Their struggles have
moved bishops across the country to support community resistance to
such projects (Karaos 201 1).

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The serious promotion of BECs could be an important contribution
of the Church to the strengthening of the polity on three counts. It would
build active citizenship within communities. It would strengthen demands
for accountability from the state and the political class. And it would turn
the Church from an inordinate focus on the defense of its own doctrines

and institutional prerogatives, to solidarity with those marginalized by


economic and liberal democratic processes, who most need to have their
voices heard above the din of electoral campaigns in which their concerns
are rarely discussed.

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