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Philippine Sociological Review
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ELEANOR R. DIONISIO
Catholic Partisanship
in the 2013 Elections:
'Churchifying' Democracy
or Democratizing
the Church?
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Which Side Are You On? Team Buhay and Team Patay Posters Outside a Catholic Church
(Photo By: Watchmen Daily Journal)
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INTRODUCTION
on electoral partisanship as the clergy and the bishops (CIC Canon 672;
Church and Social Issues (JJCICSI), and heads its Church and Society Program.
She has an M.Phil, in Sociology from the New School for Social Research in New
York City. Her main field of interest is the Catholic Church in the Philippines
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I use Casanova's (1994) discussion of modern public religions to
explore whether such mobilization threatens the autonomy of the state
and of political society that is crucial for religious freedom. I also
speculate on the impact of such mobilization on the Church, and on the
differing implications of campaigns launched by the Church's hierarchy
and those launched by the unconsecrated laity. I will make brief reference
to political parties based on Catholic ethical principles, a phenomenon
deserving its own investigation.
INSTITUTIONAL PARTISANSHIP
FOR SPECIFIC CANDIDATES:
THE TEAM BUHAY/TEAM RAW CAMPAIGN
About ten weeks before the 2013 elections, a banner appeared on the
façade of San Sebastian Cathedral, seat of the Roman Catholic diocese
of Bacolod. On this banner were two lists. One, labelled Team Buhay
(Team Life), named six senatorial candidates and two party-list groups
opposed to the Reproductive Health (RH) Law. The other, labelled Team
Patay (Team Death), named seven senatorial candidates and four party-
list groups supporting the law (Reuters 2013).
The banner was an unmistakable suggestion to the Catholic electorate
of Bacolod to vote for Team Buhay and not for Team Patay. Efforts were
made to portray the banner as a response to lay demands for guidance, but
clearly the banner was hung at the initiative of the head of the diocese,
Bishop Vicente Navarra (Dela Cruz 20 1 3). The campaign was reportedly
supported by most of the clergy of Bacolod (Sorote 2013).
One news report inaccurately depicted the campaign as the opening
salvo of a "new voter education campaign" by "the Catholic hierarchy
of the Philippines" (Reuters 2013). Bishop Navarra is a member of the
Catholic hierarchy, but his campaign was not endorsed by the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). The CBCP is the only
entity, save the pope, that may issue authoritative pronouncements on
behalf of the Catholic Church in the Philippines (Dionisio 2011). The
Team Buhay/Team Patay campaign was therefore a project of one bishop,
not of the Catholic hierarchy of the Philippines.
One reason the CBCP did not endorse the campaign was that Catholic
Canon Law restricts bishops, clergy, and members of the religious orders
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from partisan politics "unless, in the judgment of competent ecclesiastical
authority, the protection of the rights of the Church or the promotion of the
common good requires it" (Code of Canon Law 287 §2). Only once has
the CBCP rendered that judgment: when it declared Ferdinand Marcos's
presidency after the 1986 election to have "no moral basis" (CBCP
1996:621). Despite Vatican displeasure over the decision (see Claver
2009:38; Carroll 2006d:235-236; and Hanson 1987:331), the CBCP
maintains to this day that the decision was correct. Nonetheless, in 1991,
the bishops implicitly affirmed in the Acts and Decrees of the Second
Plenary Council of the Philippines (PCP-II) that the 1986 statement
was an exception and not the rule. Article 28 §2 of the decrees states
that "bishops, priests and religious must refrain from partisan politics,
avoiding especially the use of the pulpit for partisan purposes, so as to
avoid division among the flock" (PCP-II 1992:241). This admonition was
reiterated in two pastoral documents (CBCP 1998b, 1997).
The CBCP's "Catechism on the Church and politics" admits an
exception, "a case when the Bishops can authoritatively order the lay
faithful to vote for one particular and concrete option."
malevolent intentions behind political promises. In this case the Church may
authoritatively demand the faithful, even under pain of sin, to vote against this
particular candidate. But such situations are understandably very rare (CBCP
1998b).
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two other bishops who released lists of candidates, Archbishop Ramon
Arguelles, for Lipa, and Bishop Emilio Marquez, for Lucena (Gomez and
Mayol 2013).
Not many bishops followed their lead. A few archdioceses distanced
themselves from such campaigns. A spokesperson of the archdiocese
of Palo announced it would not endorse candidates (Gomez and Mayol
2013). When lay groups of the archdiocese of Cebu released their own
Team Buhay/Team Patay lists, Archbishop Jose Palma is said to have
asked that they not be displayed on Church property (Mercado 2013).
Palma had previously stated that the Cebu clergy should not use the
pulpit for partisan campaigns (Napallacan 2012). Archbishop Sergio
Utlég of Tuguegarao reminded the clergy of his see that "as Clergy, we
do not endorse any party or any candidate" (Utlég 2013). Archbishop
Socrates Villegas of Lingayen-Dagupan was emphatic in his rejection
of such campaigns: "When the Church ENDORSES CANDIDATES in
political elections she always ends up a LOSER. The endorsed candidate
may win in the votes but the Church never wins with him" (Villegas
2013; emphasis in the original).
Other priests invoked the Church's teaching on freedom of conscience
to criticize the campaign. Msgr. Victorino Rivas of Bacolod, Fr. Joel
Tabora, SJ, president of the Ateneo de Davao University, and Fr. Eric
Marcelo Genilo, SJ, Associate Professor of moral theology of the Loyola
School of Theology, made separate statements pointing out that the
campaign went against the Church's commitment, stated in Dignitatis
Humanae , the Declaration on Religious Freedom of the Second Vatican
Council (Vatican II), to respect the freedom of conscience of dissenters
(Genilo 2013; Gomez 2013; Tabora 2013).
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order" as "the special responsibility of the laity," with a view "to
renewing] the temporal order according to Gospel principles and values"
(CBCP 1997). The "Catechism on the Church and politics" identifies
"active and partisan political involvement" as part of this responsibility
(CBCP 1998b). Since 2009, the CBCP has called the laity to engage in
"principled partisan politics" (2010a, 2010b, 2009).
In April 2013, an assembly of lay associations, the "White Vote
Movement," endorsed their own set of candidates, including all six on the
diocese of Bacolod's Team Buhay. Initiated by the Sangguniáng Laiko ng
Pilipinas (Council of the Laity of the Philippines), the WVM consisted of
such reputable Catholic groups as the Adoración Nocturna Filipina , the
Apostleship of Prayer, the Catholic Women's League, Couples for Christ,
the Christian Family Movement, Family Rosary Crusade, the Luzon
jurisdiction of the Knights of Columbus, the Legion of Mary, and Light
of Jesus (CBCP for Life 2013; Santiago 2013). But the WVM's largest
member group, El Shaddai, which boasts a following of six million, is
sometimes seen by other Catholics as less than reputable (Esguerra and
Tubeza 2013; Weigele 2004).
The WVM endorsed ten senatorial candidates and a number of
party-list groups opposed to the RH Law, which suggests this was the
main criterion for endorsement. A week before the elections, however,
El Shaddai's founder, Mariano Velarde Jr., more popularly known as
Bro. Mike, announced he had obtained permission from the WVM to
include two senatorial candidates, Paolo Benigno Aquino IV and Ramón
Magsaysáy Jr., who were in favor of the RH Law. Velarde was vague
as to whether the two candidates were in the WVM's list or only in El
Shaddai's (Ager 2013). Both were members of the slate supported by
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. Disgruntled Catholic quarters
suggested their inclusion was a gesture of allegiance to the president
(Esguerra and Tubeza 2013), who is unpopular with anti-RH activists.
The WVM raised some Catholic hackles by declaring on its website
that "Catholic faith calls for unity with the White Vote Movement"
(WVM 2013). This claim overstepped a boundary set by the CBCP
(1997), which had previously stated that "there can be no one political
party nor one political program that can exclusively claim the name
Catholic. That is why there is normally no such thing as 'the Catholic
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vote.' Nor can particular Catholic groups present their candidates as
the Church's candidates." In 2007, Archbishop Angel Lagdameo, then
CBCP president, warned that insistence on a single slate of candidates for
Catholics could constitute a violation of freedom of conscience. He said
that while the CBCP encouraged Catholic lay groups to agree upon which
candidates to support, it discouraged them from imposing this decision
on others, even on their own members. "To dictate on them whom to
vote [for]," he admonished, "is as bad as buying their votes" (Lagdameo
2007). Specifically mentioned in this statement was El Shaddai, which
has a history of endorsing candidates, not all of them acceptable to the
hierarchy.
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principles in discerning electoral choices, to announce those choices
publicly, and to campaign for those choices.
However, C4RH, Akbayan, and their allies raise valid concerns for
the autonomy of the political process from religious encroachment. The
endorsement of specific candidates by elements of the Church may not
violate the constitution, but does it violate this autonomy, and thus the
religious freedom and freedom of conscience, of those with different
convictions?
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Casanova contends this is the most fruitful place for the self-location of
modern public religions, where they can contribute to the forging of a
moral framework without recourse to the coercive mechanisms of the
retreated from the state and political society and relocated itself in civil
society (1994:62,213). Two Council documents herald this retreat from
the state: Gaudium et Spes , which declares respect for the lawful autonomy
of the secular spheres, and Dignitatis Humanae , which embraces the
principles of religious freedom and freedom of conscience and accepts
the constitutional separation of Church and State as a requirement for
these freedoms.
This does not mean the Church has receded from politics since
Vatican II; on the contrary, its political advocacy has expanded.
Dignitatis Humanae's incorporation of civil and political liberties into
the Church's moral agenda has impelled Church personnel to oppose
threats to these liberties, particularly as local churches have moved
away from alliance with the state. The Church's post-conciliar turn to
this-worldly concerns of social justice and development, as well as to
collaboration with civil society groups of the marginalized rather than
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with the state or political parties, has also involved it in advocacy for
redistributive reforms (see pages 114-134 for Brazil; 184-200 for the
United States).
But such political advocacy takes place predominantly if not
exclusively from the location of civil society. The Church acts neither
like a state nor like a political party, but like a civil society organization
advocating policy recommendations, or ethical principles to ground
those recommendations. In authoritarian situations in which the state
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Church's support for agrarian reform, urban poor legislation, peace,
clean elections, and environmental protection seemed largely to take
place from civil society, through education campaigns and lobbying in
collaboration with secular groups. But boundaries were occasionally
breached. Church personnel sometimes assumed surrogate functions
for the state. For instance, the government deputized parish priests
of the diocese of Malaybalay as forest rangers with police powers
for enforcing compliance with the total logging ban won by BECs
and Church-supported secular organizations (Moreno 2006:168). The
government also mobilized a Church-mandated electoral watchdog
group, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV),
to participate in cleaning up voter registration lists (134). Church-
based organizations such as BECs, as well as individual bishops, also
ventured into partisan involvement during elections, sometimes on
different sides (UCANews 1992; Franco 2001:236-239).
In 2001, support by certain bishops, priests, and religious and lay
movements for the ouster of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada over
corruption charges marked a new spike in Catholic involvement in the
state arena, although Moreno observes that such involvement was less
solid and widespread than that in 1986 (124-131). The episcopate's
2005 refusal to call for the impeachment of President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, despite pressure from civil society groups, seemed to mark a
definitive withdrawal from direct involvement in political partisanship
or in transfers of state power (CBCP 2005). But within a few years, the
battle over RH legislation saw Church elements re-engaging in partisan
politics.
One explanation for continuing Church engagement with the state and
political society, amid what might be assumed to be increasing structural
differentiation in a post-authoritarian setting, is the weakness of state
and political party institutions, and their failure adequately to connect
with, channel, or accommodate negotiation and contestation among civil
society groups. This weakness creates a need and an opportunity for
non-state and non-party institutions, such as the Church, to move into the
vacuum (Moreno 2006:260).
Nonetheless, the more recent partisanship of certain Church elements
over RH legislation does not necessarily herald an attempt by the Church
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to relocate itself in political society. It is true that the Team Buhay/Team
Patay and WVM campaigns resemble involvements of the Catholic
Church in Europe and Latin America which Casanova identifies as
instances of self-location in political society (1994:61, 218-219). But I
would argue that while Team Buhay/Team Patay and the WVM are cases
of religious engagement with political society, they are not necessarily
cases of religious self-location in political society. Archbishop Villegas'
pastoral letter on the 2013 elections warns that when a religion endorses
candidates, it is "reduced to a political party" (2013). But church
organizations do not, simply by endorsing political candidates, become
political parties, any more than do secular civil society organizations that
endorse candidates, especially if the endorsement is decided election by
election.
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candidates were on Cebu's Team Buhay ? But only one was endorsed by
the WVM, a snub for the other two, which stung all the more because of
El Shaddai's last-minute endorsement of two RH Law supporters. The
WVM endorsed both Ang Pro-Life and Buhay , but Cebu's Team Buhay
excluded Buhay (Go 2013).
This brings up another impediment to a stable relationship between
the Church and any political party: the tendency of Catholic partisans
to take a "cafeteria approach" toward candidates. The Team Buhay
candidates of Bacolod and Cebu and the WVM candidates were from
rival parties, divided among themselves and from the Church on some
issues, but united in opposition to the RH Law.
It is also significant that Catholic partisans disagreed on which
candidates to endorse even when they agreed that the RH Law was the
litmus test for the choice. The laity of Cebu and the diocese of Bacolod
both used candidates' positions on the RH Law to determine inclusion in
Team Buhay and Team Patay. But while Cebu's Team Patay was identical
to Bacolod's, its Team Buhay was completely different (Go 2013).
The situation is further complicated when more than one criterion
is considered. Velarde justified inclusion of Aquino and Magsaysay in
El Shaddai's list as consistent with the WVM's criteria of "conscience,
competence, and commitment" (Ager 2013), prescribed by the bishops
nine years previously (CBCP 2004). Three weeks before the elections, a
small group of lay Catholics endorsed a senatorial candidate on Bacolod's
Team Patay list. Their letter, "Catholics for Risa Hontiveros," circulated
on Facebook and email, argued that despite Anna Theresia Hontiveros's
support for the RH Law, she was a reliable ally of the Church on other
important issues: agrarian reform; environmental preservation; health care
Buhay. AKP senatorial candidate Marwil Llasos explained this was because
Bacolod's Team Buhay included only legislators who had proven their pro-
Since the diocese of Bacolod claimed that the Team Buhay/Team Patay
have included the AKP candidates, who, never having been legislators, had
never voted on the Law.
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for the poor; and opposition to abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, and
corruption (Alvarez, Ambrosio, Banzon, Baquiran, Batistiana, Borcena,
Canias, Catipon, Chiù, Co, Del Rosario, Demaisip, Despabiladeras,
Díaz, Dionisio, Dolorical, Esquivel, Fernandez, Gabuna, Galvez, Gapuz,
Johnson-Herrera, Karaos, Ledesma-Deduque, Lopa, Lopa, Marin, Marin,
Marzan, Mendoza, Nepomuceno, Nolido, Nuera, Perez, Porio, Sabinorio,
Salvador, San Andres, Sicam, Tan, Tañada, Tolosa, Tuaño, and Yuson
2013; Nery 2013).
"Catholics for Risa Hontiveros" demonstrates another reason why
it is difficult for the Church to establish a stable relationship with any
political party or set of candidates. There is a plurality of Catholic ethical
premises for choosing candidates. Guidelines issued over the years by the
CBCP and individual bishops propose a variety of criteria for assessing
candidates: not just defense of the conventional heterosexual family
and of life in utero, but also commitment to the common good, human
rights, justice, care for the environment, and a preferential option for
the poor. Personal characteristics sought in candidates include integrity,
moral rectitude, compassion, competence, nonmembership in political
dynasties, and the absence of ties with gambling, smuggling, the sex
trade, and environmentally destructive logging and mining (Ledesma
2013; Utlég 2013; Villegas 2013; CBCP 1996:765-768, 823-824, 1998a,
2013a). The CBCP recognizes not only this plurality of ethical standards,
but also a plurality of ethical options for each standard. In their 1997
exhortation on Philippine politics, the bishops stated:
In the light of the Gospel and consistent with the Gospel, there are many
political options open to Catholics. The Gospel does not prescribe only one
way of being political nor only one way of political governing... Justice,
peace, and integral development can be pursued through many political ways
(CBCP 1997).
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Villegas (2013) writes: "The Church must be a mother and teacher also for
all the candidates from opposing political parties. As mother she loves all
and refuses no one. As a teacher, she rebukes with love; she corrects with
mercy; she guides firmly always celebrating what is right and beautiful
among her opposing children" (20 1 3). Coming down on one side or another
compromises these self-defined maternal and magisterial charisms.
Archbishop Villegas also warns of the moral impurity that partisanship
incurs. "In endorsing candidates, the Bride of Christ the Church tarnishes
her spiritual mission with the stain of the mundane... Religion has been
used for political gain and our spiritual mission has been compromised"
(2013). But more than the stain of the mundane, partisanship can bring
upon the Church the "stain of sin". The diocese of Bacolod's Team
Buhay and the WVM slate include two former military men involved in
attempted coups d'etat against legitimately elected governments. One of
these two is suspected of human rights violations, including complicity in
the assassination of activists in the late 1980s. Such ethical inconsistency
poses dangers to the Church's moral standing. Lay groups such as the
WVM or Catholics for Risa Hontiveros can afford to argue that in real-
world democracies, imperfect choices must be made, and that the ethical
choice may be the one that elects the lesser evil for the sake of the greater
good. But the Church, exhorted by its Gospels to "be perfect" as its
"heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48), cannot afford to be tainted
even by the lesser evil.
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Table 1. Ranking of Bacolod Team Buhay and White Vote Move-
ment (WVM) Candidates in January 2013 Social Weather Stations
Survey (SWS)a and in May 2013 Final National Election Tallyb
RANK-
IN RANKING
ING IN
BACOLOD IN SWS
IN WVM NATIONAL
CANDIDATES TEAM SURVEY
SLATE ELEC-
BUHAY JANUARY
TIONS
SLATE 2013
Richard J. Gordon Y 14 13
b Rankings were drawn from final election returns obtained from the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
campaign began. Four of them slipped in the national rankings after the
Team Buhay endorsement (see Table 1). In the territory of the diocese
of Bacolod, as well as in Bacolod City, the center of the Team Buhay
Campaign, only three candidates made it into the first twelve places.
Four of the seven Team Patay candidates won nationally, the same four
who won in the diocese of Bacolod. But in Bacolod City, five made it into
the first twelve places (see Table 2). This may suggest that the campaign
failed in the diocese's own backyard.
Six of the WVM's ten candidates won, but all six were expected to
win two months before the endorsement (see Table 1). All three AKP
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Table 2. Comparative ranking of Bacolod Team Buhay and Team Patay
Candidates: Nation, Diocese of Bacolod, and Bacolod City*
RANKING IN RANKING IN RANKING IN
TEAAÍ BUHAY
NATION DIOCESE OF BACOLOD BACOLOD CITY
Estrada 11 18 26
Honasan 12 16 16
Magaysay, M. 21 20 20
Pimentel 8 9 7
Villar
Trillanes 9 10 9
Angara 6 2 2
Casino 22 22 21
Cayetano 3 3 3
Enrile 15 15 '1~
Escudero 4 5 4
Hontiveros 17 13 12
Legarda 2 4 6
c Rankings were drawn from national and municipal data obtained from the COMELEC. Data for the
diocese of Bacolod were obtained by aggregating votes for each candidate from all municipalities included
in the diocese.
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Catholic links are not immune to dynastic self-interest which can override
commitment to Catholic causes or principles.
Hence the 2013 elections yield no evidence for a Catholic vote in
the senate race, and inconclusive evidence in the party-list race. More
telling is a series of surveys conducted by the International Social Survey
Program (ISSP). Over the last two decades Filipino Catholics have
consistently given the Church high trust ratings - 70% in 1991, 73% in
2001, 76% in 2008 - but this does not mean they will vote for Church
endorsements. Six to seven of every ten Filipino Catholic respondents
agree that the Church should not try to influence how people vote in
elections - 63% in 1991, 68% in 1998, 67% in 2008. The percentage
who strongly agree with this position has risen, from 1 2% in 1 99 1 , to 34%
in 1995, to 40% in 2008 (Nicolas, Batomalaque, Rabaçal, and Rivera
2011). These findings indicate that a Catholic vote might be a hard sell
even among Catholics. They also suggest that Filipino Catholics are
in little danger of surrendering their freedom of conscience to Church
endorsements.
That does not mean that attempts to mobilize a Catholic vote have
no impact on Catholics. The growth in the percentage of respondents
who strongly agree that the Church should not try to influence people's
electoral choices coincided with years when elements of the Church
lobbied against candidates supportive of reproductive health bills. The
campaigns do not seem to have persuaded the majority of Filipino
Catholics that a Catholic vote would be salutary, especially in the light
of surveys which show seven of every ten Filipino Catholic respondents
supporting access to artificial contraception (see, for instance, Social
Weather Stations 2008).
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Church's internal debates about its role in the political process. Catholics
for Reproductive Health (C4RH) and Catholics for Risa Hontiveros
are examples of countermobilization that occurs when some principles
are used as a basis for political mobilization to the exclusion of other
principles. Catholics who privilege those excluded principles also begin
to organize in an attempt to change the discourse.
Those who value strict unity within the Church may find such
developments distressing. The canonical curbs on institutional
partisanship are partly intended to avert the divisions that partisanship
inevitably generates. But these developments have the potential to
democratize the Church by compelling dissenters to break silence and
make their positions heard. The ensuing debate forces antagonists to
clarify and refine their reasoning. Political partisanship among Catholic
elements can thus create spaces for internal deliberative discourse that
may foster self-reflexivity among its participants, and promote the ethical
rationalization of Catholicism.
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a skill essential for constructive religious participation in democratic
discourse. The effort of learning to translate Catholic arguments into
language that non-Catholics will understand can force Catholics to look
at their issues from a perspective other than faith, which may help them
to cultivate the capacity to "purify their faith with reason."
Thus Catholic partisanship may have unintended benefits for the
Church, at least if not launched from the level of the hierarchy. But
there may also be benefits to political society. Bacolod's Team Buhay/
Team Patay and the WVM are forms of partisanship based on ethical
principles. This principle-based partisanship, even when couched in
religious language, is an improvement over partisanship based on
patronage, personal loyalties, or individual self-interest. The Church's
candidates need not even win for such campaigns to have an impact.
Merely justifying support for candidates in terms of ethical principles
already presages an alternative political culture.
Another potential benefit is the content of the Church's ethics, which
cannot be reduced to sexual and reproductive ethics. Catholic social
teaching provides respectable universal principles that can be used to
call to account political parties and candidates. PCP-II (1992:99-113)
enumerates them as follows: integral development based on human
dignity and solidarity; the universal purpose of earthly goods and private
property; social justice anchored in love; peace and active nonviolence;
a love of preference for the poor; the value of human work; the integrity
of creation; popular empowerment and participation. Bringing these
principles into political discourse would be a contribution to the
development of Philippine political culture.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I have examined two examples of a particular form of
Catholic partisanship in the Philippines in the 20 1 3 elections - campaigns
for or against specific candidates on the basis of a particular ethical
position, launched from the hierarchical level and from the level of the
unconsecrated laity - in terms of their possible effects on the autonomy
of political processes and on freedom of conscience. Using Casanova's
model of modern public religions (1994), I have sought further to refine
the concept of religious self-location in political society by limiting it
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to the establishment of long-term relationships with political parties
or forces. Episodic Catholic partisanship may be viewed as religious
engagement with political society, but not necessarily as religious self-
location in political society, and therefore not necessarily damaging to the
autonomy of democratic processes. I have explained why self-location in
political society seems unlikely for the Church in the Philippines.
I have considered whether even mere engagement with political
society, albeit launched from a civil society locus, may pose dangers to the
autonomy of the political process or to the freedom of conscience of non-
Catholics and Catholic dissenters. Based on results of the 2013 elections
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opportunities for the ethical rationalization of the Church and of
political society.
Nonetheless, the Church can contribute to the ethical rationalization
of politics without directly engaging political society. Basic Ecclesial
Communities (BECs), mentioned briefly in this article, constitute
one possibility for such a contribution. BECs are small community-
based groups of families which meet regularly to study scripture,
hold paraliturgical celebrations, discuss community issues, and map
out resolutions. Since their inception in the late 1960s as a means of
evangelizing the poor, some have become crucibles for growth not only
in faith but also in social and political engagement (Claver 2009:107-
130). The hierarchy now recognizes BECs as a means not just for
evangelization but for increasing the participation of the poor within the
Church and in their own communities (PCP-II: 267-269).
The potential of BECs to transform Philippine society, or the
Church, has been overrated. BECs may even perpetuate class, gender,
and ecclesiastical hierarchies (see cases in Mendoza, Luz, and Deles
1988). Nonetheless BECs have also formed movements of the poor
to claim economic rights, protect the environment, carve out "zones
of peace" amid armed conflict, and participate in local and national
politics (Moreno 2006:141-185, 200-224; Franco 2001:226-234). In
many places BECs are the only forum in which the poor can discuss and
analyze their problems. BECs have the potential to transform political
culture by sharpening their members' capacity collectively to articulate
interests, formulate action, and engage the political system. Whether this
potential is being cultivated and how it can be realized is a matter that
merits greater empirical research and reflection.
Work with BECs and similar organizations of the poor can also
transform the Church. The CBCP has since the 1990s voiced its concern,
in pastoral documents, about large-scale mining projects which displace
communities and destroy the environment. This concern is not issuing
from the top; it rose from the bottom, through the involvement of BECs,
religious missionaries, parish priests, and Diocesan Social Action Centers
in communities negatively affected by mining. Their struggles have
moved bishops across the country to support community resistance to
such projects (Karaos 201 1).
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The serious promotion of BECs could be an important contribution
of the Church to the strengthening of the polity on three counts. It would
build active citizenship within communities. It would strengthen demands
for accountability from the state and the political class. And it would turn
the Church from an inordinate focus on the defense of its own doctrines
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