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Kissinger the Negotiator

Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level
James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin • KISSINGER
THE NEGOTIATOR: Lessons from Dealmaking at the Highest Level by James
K. Sebenius, R Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin. Copyright © 2018 by
James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns, and Robert H. Mnookin. Published by
arrangement with Harper, an imprint of HarperCollins Publishers • 240 pages

Social Skills / Negotiation

History

Take-Aways
• Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic work suggests a variety of negotiating techniques.
• Establish sharp, long-term goals and a clear plan to achieve them.
• To design a “negotiation campaign,” work backward from the ideal pact you have in mind.
• Combine “zooming out” on your broader strategy with “zooming in” on the personality and context of
your negotiating partner.
• Adopt a realistic approach to negotiation that considers all parties’ incentives and interests.
• The most common reason that negotiations fail is a negative or unstable “deal/no-deal balance.”
• Successful negotiations demand more than eloquent rhetoric; include rewards and punishments.
• In a strategic approach, always seize opportunities, but know that strategies are only as sound as their
underlying assumptions.
• Take a broad strategic view, focus on your counterpart and consider both viewpoints.

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 Recommendation
Harvard professor Henry Kissinger was US national security adviser and Secretary of State in the depths of
the Cold War. James K. Sebenius, R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin show how he negotiated the
USSR arms control deal, opened talks with China and moved toward ending the Vietnam war. Negotiating
for presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, he would “zoom out” to broad goals and “zoom in” to
personal relationships with his counterparts. Love or loathe his politics, his work offers compelling insights
into complex, high-stakes negotiations.

Summary

Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic work suggests a variety of negotiating techniques.

Many people think of former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as a great diplomatic negotiator. As
early as 1974, when he was still in office, 85% of Americans polled believed he was doing an excellent
job. Forty years later, more than 1,000 international relations scholars voted him the “most effective” US
secretary of state in the past 50 years. Every president since John F. Kennedy has asked for his advice, as
have CEOs and world leaders.

“While Kissinger’s conception of effective negotiation derives largely from the diplomacy
of earlier decades, we seek to assess the value and limits of his approach as a source of
guidance for today’s diplomats and others who negotiate.”

Kissinger’s international reputation and influence rests on his achievements as a negotiator. As national
security adviser and secretary of state for Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, he spearheaded
complex, high-stakes negotiations with China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, South Africa and Middle Eastern
nations. Kissinger’s sophisticated, consistent approach to negotiations embodies principles and practices
that are useful for diplomats and negotiators in business, finance, public policy and law.

Establish sharp, long-term goals and a clear plan to achieve them.

A negotiation between two or more parties must aim for a “target agreement” on issues they view differently
and on which their interests diverge. The patterns of emotions, debate, counterargument and nonverbal
communication matter to the ultimate outcome.

“Kissinger often reshapes the negotiating setup itself in order to enhance the value of
agreement, raise the costs of impasse – or both.”

People often view negotiation as limited to what takes place when the parties are “at the table” and to details
of personality and culture. However, Kissinger’s approach included what took place “away from the table”
– such as forming or dissolving alliances or preventing certain parties from participating in negotiations.

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 To design a “negotiation campaign,” work backward from the ideal pact you have in
mind.

In March 1976, Ian Smith, Rhodesia’s white prime minister, announced that the black majority
wouldn’t govern there “in a thousand years.” Independent of Great Britain since the mid-1960s, Rhodesia
had a population of 270,000 whites and six million blacks. Britain failed to convince Rhodesia’s government
to accept majority rule. Near the end of President Gerald Ford’s term, Kissinger began a series of complex
negotiations with a coalition of interested parties. Less than a year later, Smith announced that he
would accept black majority rule within two years. Kissinger’s authority waned when Ford lost the 1976
election. Black majority rule in Rhodesia – which became Zimbabwe – didn’t arrive until 1979. Kissinger’s
negotiations were also pivotal in ending apartheid in South Africa.

Kissinger’s approach to Rhodesia didn’t follow the standard script. He didn’t insist on immediate “direct”
talks, which the British had already tried. He knew negotiations often fail when the motive to reject an
agreement is greater than the incentive to accept it. In Rhodesia, the main obstacle to Smith’s concurrence
was that the white population faced an immense loss of power, prestige and money if the black majority
governed.

“Your effectiveness as a negotiator can be dramatically enhanced by determination to

develop a psychological understanding of your counterparts.”

Kissinger changed the calculus by adopting an “indirect” approach. His negotiation strategy deployed a
“wide-angle lens” and offered a quick route to majority rule while assuring that foreign forces wouldn’t enter
the conflict and that a black government would respect the white minority’s rights. Kissinger engaged
European nations with a history of involvement in Africa. He managed the American response, consulting
with Congress and African-American leaders. He moved backward from the goal of an agreement for
majority rule in Rhodesia within a realistic time frame. Instead, he focused on everything that had to happen
for a successful negotiation even to take place.

Combine “zooming out” on your broader strategy with “zooming in” on the
personality and context of your negotiating partner.

Kissinger adopted a wide, historical perspective on negotiations. He was adept at zooming in on his
negotiating counterparts. Zooming in involves focusing on your counterparts as individuals – their
psychological traits, history, interests and incentives – as well as their political influence. Many negotiators
tend to focus on either broad strategic concerns or personal relationships. Kissinger combined the two styles
and tried to align them.

Kissinger saw South Africa’s support as crucial leverage in Rhodesia. With President Gerald Ford’s backing,
he promoted meeting with South African prime minister B.J. Vorster. Kissinger and Vorster’s initial
meetings coincided with a violent crackdown on protests in Soweto where hundreds of civilians were killed.
The US and the United Nations condemned the South African government’s actions. International outcry
gave Vorster an incentive to negotiate.

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 Kissinger’s approach to Vorster was subtle. Vorster was a staunch advocate of South Africa’s racial
policies. Kissinger pointed out that majority rule in neighboring Rhodesia was inevitable. If South Africa
saw its future tied to Rhodesia’s, South Africa would face increasingly violent conflict. Kissinger offered
Vorster an opportunity to address his domestic situation peacefully. Vorster agreed to support majority rule
in Rhodesia if the white population retained certain rights.

“Effective negotiation often requires more than persuasive verbal exchange; actions
away from the table to orchestrate incentives and penalties can be crucial to induce the
desired ‘yes’.”

Kissinger combined empathy and assertiveness in these negotiations. He understood South Africa’s need to
respond to international condemnation and to avoid the consequences of supporting white minority rule in
Rhodesia. While supporting international denunciation of South Africa’s policies, Kissinger insisted that
Vorster pressure Rhodesia. Kissinger’s style of negotiating with Vorster – and then Smith – was stringent
but compassionate. He believed a harsh, demanding, immediate approach would shatter the negotiating
process.

Adopt a realistic approach to negotiation that considers all parties’ incentives and
interests.

Kissinger’s strategic approach to negotiating has five core characteristics: Begin with well-defined, long-
term aims. Don’t see the negotiation as an isolated event; also consider its larger political and historical
context. Don’t depend too much on face-to-face dynamics. Construct a precise, step-by-step plan to achieve
stated goals in person and through other actions that give you leverage and influence. Remain firm on long-
term aims, but be flexible in adapting to shifting circumstances, including actions by other parties or new
information. Be mindful of your reputation; it will affect all your other current and future negotiations.

In addition to being a strategic thinker and negotiator, Kissinger adopted a “realistic” approach to
negotiation, as contrasted with “theological” and “psychiatric” approaches. Theologians believe they can
impose their conditions top-down when one party has absolute dominance over the other. Psychiatrists
believe negotiations are valuable under all circumstances.

During the Cold War, theologians assumed economic and military dominance in advance. For example,
some Americans saw Soviet dreams of world dominance as an intrinsic part of the Soviet system and
didn’t view the Soviets as possible negotiating partners until they gave up those goals. Given that the aim
of US policy was the end of the Soviet system, the United States had no reason to enter negotiations. With
Nixon’s support, Kissinger pursued negotiations toward opening diplomatic relations with China and
forging an arms agreement with the USSR.

“Effective negotiation often requires more than persuasive verbal exchange; actions
away from the table to orchestrate incentives and penalties can be crucial to induce the
desired ‘yes’.”

Kissinger believed well-crafted agreements could serve the interests of the United States, China and the
Soviet Union. Realistic approaches to negotiations are neither blunt and confrontational nor soft and

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 conciliatory. They are sensitive to context and shaped by the interests of all parties. They aim for positions
that serve everyone’s interest. Kissinger doesn’t believe negotiation is a general panacea for conflict, but he
does believe that agreements can produce a “realistic accommodation of conflicting interests.”

The most common reason that negotiations fail is a negative or unstable “deal/no-
deal balance.”

Kissinger emphasized how a prospective agreement would serve the interests of all the parties involved and
always pointed out the price each would pay if they failed to agree. Kissinger was often blunt about the
consequences of having no agreement.

The most common reason negotiations fail is a negative or unstable deal:no-deal balance. Examples
include the failed attempts to end Pakistan’s nuclear arms program and to arrive at a pact between Jordan
and Israel after the 1973 war. The proper balance of incentives for an agreement is central to realistic
negotiating.

“The techniques of reaching agreement, however creative, depend for their ultimate
success on the accuracy of underlying assumptions.”

When anyone involved perceives that the value of not having an agreement is greater than the value of
having one, continued talks are pointless. Changing tactics, location or procedures will serve no purpose.
Steering the process back toward possible success may require altering the structure of the game.

“Changing the game” in a negotiation can involve pushing some parties out or bringing in fresh ones,
shifting the array of subjects under discussion, or making the possibility of no agreement better for you and
worse for your counterpart. When attempting to change the game, “negotiation and consequences” go hand
in hand.

Successful negotiations demand more than eloquent rhetoric; include rewards and
punishments.

In Kissinger’s view, negotiators can’t separate what happens in a negotiation from what happens out in the
world. Negotiations aren’t an academic seminar. They involve real rewards and penalties. In the negotiations
with North Vietnam that eventually led to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the end of the Vietnam War,
the prospects of an agreement initially looked hopeless because Hanoi promoted its interests by rejecting
any agreement. At that point, the United States had little leverage, especially given increasing public and
Congressional hostility to the war. Kissinger changed the dynamic by involving other parties, including the
Soviets and China.

“To craft a strategy, employ a ‘wide-angle lens’ to assess the full set of potentially
relevant parties.”

Since the Chinese valued a relationship with the United States, they were willing to pressure North Vietnam.
The USSR was concerned about the evolving relationship between the US and China and had a stake in a
better relationship with the United States. The Soviets were willing to pressure the North Vietnamese to take

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 the Paris talks more seriously. In the end, the agreement foundered because the combination of Watergate
and poor public opinion made it impossible to enforce.

In a strategic approach, always seize opportunities, but know that strategies are
only as sound as their underlying assumptions.

From Kissinger’s point of view, the negotiation for Israel’s potential disengagement from Jordan may have
had a reasonable shot. He saw that for Israel and Jordan, the eventual value of no agreement was greater
than that of an agreement, so he shifted his focus elsewhere. Later, commentators claimed that Kissinger
could have made an agreement if he’d supported the Palestinians. However, this assessment concerns the
premise of his negotiation more than his strategy.

“A negotiator must, at a minimum, have a target agreement in mind among parties that
often see things differently and have conflicting interests.”

Negotiating strategies and tactics depend on the assumptions that form the foundations of the entire
negotiation. Kissinger downplayed the importance of strategies and skills compared to a deep understanding
of the core issues. For him, the assumptions at play are the crucial determinants of a negotiation’s outcome.

Take a broad strategic view, focus on your counterpart and consider both
viewpoints.

Kissinger’s practice as a negotiator offers three broad core lessons: First, take a wide view for your strategy,
focus on your counterpart and always accommodate both points of view.

“Think strategically; act opportunistically.”

Second, never take for granted the truth or importance of your basic assumptions. Third, make sure you and
your team have a deep knowledge of what you are negotiating.

About the Authors

James K. Sebenius, PhD, teaches advanced negotiation at Harvard Business School. R. Nicholas
Burns teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Robert
H. Mnookin, a leading scholar of conflict resolution, is a Harvard Law School professor.

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