‎OBJECTIONS
‎ INAL CAUSES are merely CONVENIENT
‎ ould it not be preferable to
W ‎FICTIONS and as such are dispensable
‎avoid speaking in terms of final
‎causes? Should we not speak
‎instead only of objectively existing
‎states of affairs, as when we
‎explain an action by referring
‎only to an agent's beliefs and
‎desires as efficient causes?
‎ e have the same reasons to ascribe ends to
W ‎ άλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς
‎items in nature that we have in the case of
‎artifacts: we see certain things fitted to tasks
‎of various sorts, such that THOSE TASKS
‎ HALLENGES TO
C ‎ ACK OF DELIBERATION IS COMPATIBLE
‎THE FINAL CAUSE
‎ INAL CAUSES are operative 'IN
F
‎NATURE' or 'BY NATURE'
F
‎ hields, Christopher, Aristotle, ch. 2:
S
‎Explaining nature and the nature of
‎because reducible to other more routine
‎explanation
‎kinds of causation
‎ he notion of final causation is worse than
T
‎explanatory vacuous: IT IS POSITIVELY
‎INCOHERENT
‎ ristotle envisages an objection to final
A ‎ hy not speak simply and exclusively in
W
‎causation, given in terms of NATURAL ‎terms of the natural material necessities and
‎NECESSITY ‎nothing more?
‎ ntities have final causes even though they
E
‎ PPEAL TO FUNCTION TO EXPLAIN
A ‎ ISCONTINUITY BETWEEN ARTIFACTS AND
D ‎were not given those causes by the activities
‎STRUCTURE ‎NATURE ‎of conscious designing agents
μ
‎ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις
I‎ n the realm of nature, there is NO
‎DESIGNER "‎ This is made most clear when a doctor
‎EXPLAIN THEIR STRUCTURES ‎doctors himself: nature is like that"
‎(Phys. 199b 26-33)
L
‎WITH TELEOLOGY
‎ RISTOTLE'S FIRST ARGUMENT
A
‎FOR TELEOLOGICAL CAUSATION
‎(ATC)
‎ atural phenomena exhibit regularity,
N
‎occurring 'always for the most part'
‎ eaves no room for regularities which are
L
‎neither accidental nor purposeful
‎ s the heart pumps blood, it also thumps:
A
‎there is a NOMOLOGICAL connection
‎ hings happen either by chance of for the
T
‎between muscle contraction and noise, and
‎sake of something
‎ ELEOLOGICAL ELIMINATIVISTS: no
T ‎ ypothesis: perhaps everything in nature
H ‎yet the heart does not beat in order to make
‎purpose in nature whatsoever ‎happens BY NECESSITY ‎a thumping noise
‎OBJECTION ‎ TC-2 interpreted as an exclusive
A
‎disjunction is FALSE
‎ hat happens by chance does not exhibit
W
‎ ATURE IS NOT A BEING WITH
N ‎regularity; chance events do not occur '
‎INTENTIONAL STATES ‎always or for the most part'
‎ o, natural phenomena occur for the sake of
S
‎something
‎ ELEOLOGICAL INTENTIONALISTS: there is
T
‎purpose only where there is design