1

2
3
JINNAH by ISHTIAQ AHMED Critically Reviewed

His Successes, Failures and Role in History

PENGUIN BOOKS

SHORT NOTE

This scribe did not want to review a book written by

a very dear friend Dr Ishtiaq. However I was forced

by Dr. Ishtiaq to review this book. I hold Dr Ishtiaq in

high esteem , however it is not possible to overlook

anything that I observed in this book.

Agha H Amin

4
 Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed

Great Scholar , Great Author , good friend

I came to know Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed through e mail. It

so happened that a very honourable and fine

gentleman Brigadier Yasub Dogar who I knew

through e mail gave Dr Ishtiaq my e mail address.

Our friendship became very strong when Dr Ishtiaq

Ahmed crossed swords with a brilliant lawyer who

5
I held in very high esteem . I was deeply

disappointed on Dr Ishtiaqs revelation that this

brilliant lawyer regarded me as a nut and stupid

man ? However no hard feelings as this is a

common occurrence ! I remember in 1987 an

officer of 10 FF my brigade unit borrowed my

Pajero SUV to lay a famous politician of Multans

daughter ! However a very close friend in 10 FF

told me that he regarded me as a nut and warned

all 10 FF officers not to meet me as the then

divisional commander of our division was against

me !

6
These things happen in life.

Myself and Dr Ishtiaq agreed on our iconoclastic

views about Mr Jinnah . I found great intellectual

inspiration in Dr Ishtiaqs writings.

It was a great honour for me when Dr Ishtiaq

interviewed me for his book .

7
Oxford University had some reservations about

interviewing me but Dr Ishtiaq brushed them aside

I was very glad that Dr Ishtiaq reproduced the

great injustice that Admiral Sharif meted out to my

friend Syed Zafar Abbas Bukhari in FPSC interview

simply because Bukhari wrote that his favourite

poet was Faiz Ahmad Faiz.

Bukhari fought a legal battle and moved from

postal group to police service and is a DIG in

8
Karachi now. It is important that the injustices

done to people in the Zia regime are brought tp

light. Dr Ishtiaq has boldly done so .

My best wishes for Dr Ishtiaqs future life and

intellectual endeavours .

9
10
Brigadier Yasub Dogar played a crucial role in

giving inputs on Dr Ishtiaqs book and Dr Ishtiaq

was gracious and magnanimous to acknowledge

11
Brigadier Dogars contribution.

It was a great honour to meet Dr Ishtiaq visiting

Pakistan from Sweden. He is a great scholar indeed

12
and I consider myself lucky that I have the honour

of being one of his friends.

He was kind enough to interview me for his book.

When he told me that he would meet me in

Pakistan I bought a Grants Whiskey to celebrate ,

although Dr Ishtiaq does not drink !

13
14
15
In the first chapter Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed has

“DEMOLISHED” nonsense , confused and fallacious

claims of Ayesha Jalal that Mr Jinnah never wanted

partition of India.

Dr Ishtiaq dissects Ayesha Jalal’s failure to even

read the book by Rafique Afzal on Jinnah’s speeches

, although Jalal listed this book in her bibliography.

Dr Ishtiaq’s exposure of the shallow 1 style of

Ayesha Jalal is a most refreshing part of this book.

1
On page-10 of his book Dr Ishtiaq thus states while analysing
Ayesha Jalal:-- “Regarding the contents and empirical material
in The Sole Spokesman , 30 it is to be underlined that it includes
accounts of many events and episodes demonstrating Jinnah’s

16
On page-15 the author Dr Ishtiaq describes the

central idea of writing this book :---

“The puzzle this study seeks to solve In the light of

the above discussion, this study seeks to solve a

puzzle: Mohammad Ali Jinnah succeeded,

apparently against all odds, in mobilizing Indian

Muslims to support his demand for the

indefatigable efforts tosurmount challenges to his leadership

from powerful regional leaders to be the sole spokesman of
Muslims. It also abundantly demonstrates Jinnah’s strategy to
work hand in glove with the British to mount a challenge to the
Congress claim to represent all Indians. Was it, as she argues, to
work out a
power-sharing deal with the Indian National Congress and the
British? If yes, then that is not evident from the hundreds of
speeches, statements and messages in which Jinnah explained
repeatedly that he wanted a partition of India to create Muslim
states.”

17
partition of India to create Pakistan; but once

Pakistan came into being, Pakistani Muslims have

interminably disputed Jinnah’s vision of the state

and nation.”

This reviewer is inclined to think that on page-15 Dr

Ishtiaq thought that Mr Jinnah was clueless about

how Pakistan should be organised and governed: ---

“On the other hand, for the Pakistan that finally

emerged in mid-August 1947, he had no consistent

idea or vision.”

18
On page-17 Dr Ishtiaq quotes British historian E.H

Carr’s highly dubious and fallacious claim , without

disputing or refuting it as below:---

“Mainstream historians have accepted the role of

individuals in history but within the context of

objective conditions. For example, the British

historian E.H. Carr distinguished between men

such as V.I. Lenin and Oliver Cromwell, who helped

to shape the social forces which carried them to

historical greatness, and those such as Napoleon

and Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck whom

19
social forces propelled forward with them having

little control over the social forces. Nevertheless,

Carr discarded as absurd the ‘great man’ theory,

which focused exclusively on individuals.”

The harsh fact remains that Lenin entered as a so

called great man in history only thanks to German

intelligence who saw his entry as useful for the

German war effort.

To state that Lenin shaped historical forces which

carried him to greatness is a highly dumb and

debatable conclusion of E.H Carr .

20
On page-22 the author’s historic background about

Muslim advent in India has many loopholes and

some half truths . He stated as below:---

“In the tenth century, Turco-Afghans began to

invade India from the northwest mountain passes.

First, the Punjab was conquered and in the early

thirteenth century Muslim dynasties were

established in northern India. Sunni

Islam subscribing to the Hanafi school of

jurisprudence became the predominant group in

India. A Shia minority comprising the Ithna Ashari

21
(believers in twelve imams), or Ismaili and Bohra

sub-sects also established their presence.”

1. Punjab was not conquered first as the

author stated but Peshawar which had no

connection with Punjab. Even Punjab is a

misleading term since there was no Punjab

till the British East India Company creating a

hitherto unknown , new province in 1849 ,

by combining old Multan and Lahore

provinces as they were known before 1849.

22
2. Southern Punjab as we know it now was

conquered long before the Turco Afghans

came by Arabs in 711-14.

3. Shia Ismaili ascendancy in form of

Qarmathian kingdom of Multan was

established long before Turco Afghans , but

our learned author misses this fact.

4. Shia kingdoms of South India were

established and were a major military

power in India , but the author makes no

mention of them.

23
On page-23 the author mentions an obscure

unknown character called Ms and quotes the below

statement which is “misleading” “vague” and

“incomplete”

“According to Naureen Talha, 86 per cent of the

imperial services were manned by Muslims”.

Quoting this obscure and known author with no

known expertise in Indian Muslim history as far as

Mughal nobility is concerned left a bad taste in the

mouth .

24
On carrying out a detailed search I could locate no

Naureen Talha on reputable research platforms like

researchgate or academia.edu.

Yes there was a naureen Talha on amazon books

selling an overpriced book dealing Pakistan’s

creation and economics . So Naureen Talha was an

absolute disaster as far as Mughal nobility was

concerned !

The layman reader may note that the right person

to quote regarding Mughal nobility is Mr M.Athar

Ali whose book “THE MUGHAL NOBILITY UNDER

25
 2
AURANGZEB” remains the magnum bonum

classic par excellence !

M.Athar Ali summed up the number of Hindus (Non

Muslims) in Mughal nobility under the so called

most bigoted 3 Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb as

below:--4

2
THE MUGHAL NOBILITY UNDER AURANGZEB- M.Athar Ali-
Asia Publishing House – New Delhi-1966
3
Again a debatable conclusion which cannot be proven by
facts.
4
Page-31- Ibid

26
So contrary to pure and unadulterated nonsense

sweaping judgements of unknown and novice Ms

Naureen Talha , Athar Ali who is a most respected

scholar , non Muslims even at their lowest were not

less than 21.6 % , while this Ms Naureen Talha

27
wants to mislead us by claiming that Muslims were

86 % and non Muslims thus only 14 %.

Since this book was published by a highly reputable

publisher “PENGUIN” we expected good editing and

proof reading , but it was a sad shock to read on

page-24 that Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb had died

in 1704 , three years earlier than his actual year of

death.

Dr Ishtiaq states on page-26 as below :--

but the British government decided to abolish the

rule of the Company, which came into effect on 6

August 1858.

28
This is a factual mistake. Rule of British East India

Company was abolished precisely on 2nd August

1858 vide acts 21 and 22 of British parliament.5

The author’s assertion about common kitchens on

page-26 is not correct :--

5
Page-THE CHRONOLOGY OF BRITISH INDIA -James Burgess-
John Grant -Edinburgh-1913- and Page-62- THE HISTORY OF
BRITISH INDIA- A CHRONOLOGY -John. F .Riddick- Praeger -
Westport-2006- 2 Aug. 1858. Queen Victoria (1819-1901 ) gave
her assent to the Act abolishing both the
Company's Court of Directors and the Home Government's
Board of Control. In their place the Act established a Secretary
of State for India and a Council of india comprised of from
twelve to eighteen members to act In an advisory capacity to
the Secretary. In future the Viceroy of India and the Governors
of Bombay and Madras were to be appointed by the Crown and
the Lieutenant-Governors of the provinces by the Viceroy
subject to Royal assent.

29
“Not surprisingly, the British took their cue from Sir

Syed and abolished common kitchens. Thereafter,

Hindu and Muslim soldiers cooked and ate food

separately.”

As a matter of fact there were no kitchens in 1857 .

Kitchens or langars as they were known , came into

being in British Indian Army after 1857 when it was

organised on class company basis , advocated by

“more loyal than the king” Syed Ahmad Khan in his

highly opportunistic pamphlet “causes of Indian

Mutiny”.

30
There were no langars or kitchens in British

company’s army before 1857 and Indians cooked

food through their own arrangements. As a matter

of fact this created Hindu Muslim unity as soldiers

voluntarily organised in small groups by their own

choice known as “HANDIWALS”. This as per the

opportunist par excellence Syed Ahmad Khan

produced unity in Indian soldiers of the company ,

which as per the Syed was one of causes why

Hindus and Muslims united against the British

company in 1857 ! So this opportunistic Syed

advised British to create battalions based on

31
different religion basis , so that a future rebellion

did break out . Cook houses were thus created only

after 1857 as far as the companies regular armies

were concerned.

Novices may note that the first unit organised in

India on class company basis was in the Punjab

Frontier Force by Captain Vaughan , on his own

initiative in 1850s. But Punjab Frontier Force was a

police organisation before 1857 and was not the

regular army of the British company.6

32
The author makes inaccurate and factually

incorrect assertions on page-26 :--

“The much smaller British Army, which comprised

entirely British troops (never more than 50,000),

and the much bigger Indian Army, the bulk of

which consisted of natives but was commanded by

British officers.”

This scribe fails to understand why such inaccurate

and fallacious are required to be made ?

This assertion of Dr. Ishtiaq has no connection with

historical reality.

33
As examples in 1887 British Indian Army strength in

India was :--7

1. British troops - 72,602

2. Indian troops- 153,092

In 1895 there were :-- 8

1. British troops- 72,573

2. Indian troops- 133,663

The most “disputable” and “controversial” part of

Dr Ishtiaq’s book is his “JUDGEMENT” on Lucknow

Pact of 1916 :---

7
Page-197-THE ARMY IN INDIA AND ITS EVOLUTION -
Government Printing Press- Calutta -1924.
8
Page-198-Ibid

34
“The Lucknow Pact was proof of Jinnah’s

outstanding leadership qualities. However, the fact

that the Congress Party was willing to go the extra

mile to accommodate the demands of the Muslim

League deserves to be acknowledged as well. The

Congress had seen the founding of the Muslim

League as a challenge to its claim to represent all

Indians.”

As an eminent political scientist Dr Ishtiaq’s sagacity

should not have missed the most “central” and

“crucial” part of Lucknow Pact.

35
By reducing Bengali Muslims from 52 % to 40 % Mr

Jinnah established the most dangerous unwritten ,

but very much real principle of “ETHNIC

CHAUVINISM” , that Bengali Muslims were inferior

to “ASHRAFIYA” of UP and Bihar .

Dr Ishtiaq as a thinker of high caliber here should

have realised that “TAMPERING” with Bengali

Muslims demography and their “DEMOGRAPHIC

MURDER” at Lucknow laid the foundation of the

later “DEMOGRAPHIC TAMPERING” with legislative

majority of Bengali Muslims in the 1956 constitution

36
of Pakistan where at gun point they were forced to

accept 50 % seats .

Dr Ishtiaq here also failed to analyse that the

Muslim League at this point in time in 1916 was not

a completely representative Muslim party , but

merely a much overrated and much glorified ,

debating club !

He also failed to analyse that the Muslim League

delegates who comprised the Lucknow session

were overwhelmingly from Lucknow city , as

analysed by various eminent writers like K.K Aziz

and Professor Francis Robinson.

37
Dr Ishtiaq quoted figures about Bengali Muslims

unable to win seats in election in Bengal to defend

Lucknow Pact . These figures were most frequently

cited by defenders of Mr Jinnah at Lucknow Pact.

Sadly Dr Ishtiaq became apologist of Mr Jinnah , as

far as Lucknow Pact was concerned.

Dr Ishtiaq totally whitewashed the fact that

Lucknow Pact was opposed by Punjab’s most

notable Muslim leader Sir Mohammad Shafi as well

as various Bengali Muslim leaders.

His short circuiting , critical analysis of Lucknow Pact

and rather most rashly elevating Lucknow Pact as a

38
great achievement of Mr Jinnah is the worst part of

this book . Note that stabbing Bengali Muslims in

the back was , as Shakespeare would say was the

most unkindest cut delivered by Muslim League to

the Bengali Muslims and DIRECTLY LED TO THE

1971 CRISIS AND BREAKING OF JINNAH’S

PAKISTAN !

Dr. Ishtiaq has listed Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman’s

book in his bibliography but surprisingly failed to

analyse Chaudhry Khaliquzzamans most serious

39
criticism of Lucknow Pact. 9 Khaliquzzaman had

described Lucknow Pact as a blunder in his book as

below :--10

9
PATHWAY TO PAKISTAN-Choudhry Khaliquzzaman- Longmans
Pakistan- Karachi -Printed by Ferozsons-1961
10
Page-37-Ibid

40
Dr Ishtiaq ignores the fact that “SEPARATE

ELECTORATES” had already been accepted by the

British in 1906 and , congress was not the major

player as far as accepting or not accepting the

separate electorates was concerned.

Above all the writer of the book fails to see the

larger strategic picture from a high vantage point ,

and thus fails to understand that “DIVIDE AND

RULE” was the major strategic conclusion of the

British from the traumatic events of 1857-59 and

they saw “DIVIDE AND RULE” as the best strategy

.This logically led to “SEPARATE ELECTORATES”

41
which ideally suited British strategy already

formulated and fully enforced after 1857-59 war.

On page-26 the author makes a statement which

this scribe humbly thinks is a “sweaping judgement”

:--

“Oriental despotism, which had prevailed before

the British captured India, and which the Company

had exploited to its advantage, thus, ended.”

Dr Ishtiaq made this seemingly generalized and

harmless statement in perhaps general terms .

However historically speaking this statement

“TOTALLY LACKS SUBSTANCE AND IS ABSOLUTELY

42
INACCURATE , AND THIS REVIEWER HUMBLY FEELS

, BUT WITH ABSOLUTELY UNSHAKABLE

CONVICTION, THAT WE EXPECTED SOMETHING

FAR MORE DIFFERENT FROM DR ISHTIAQ”.

The reader may note that one of the greatest

analytical thinkers of the post 1857 British era in

India was Metcalf , whose magnum bonum

intellectual achievement was the book titled:--

“ The Aftermath of Revolt India 1857-1970 ” 11

11
“ The Aftermath of Revolt India 1857-1970 ”-
Thomas.R.Metcalf- Princeton University Press-1964.

43
Metcalf in this classic book summed up British

state’s rule in India as below :---

“It rested upon the solid support of the

conservative and aristocratic classes and upon the

principle of complete non-interference in the

traditional structure of Indian society, and it

evoked an allegiance above and beyond its value

as a force for the regeneration of India. Yet,

precisely because of this, the Empire after the

Mutiny was less viable than before, for the British

no longer sympathized with the demands of the

educated class for a share of power. They were

44
disabled from meeting the nationalist challenge in

a friendly and responsive spirit.” 12

This reviewer is inclined to agree with Dr Ishtiaq’s

assessment that the Gandhi-Jinnah clash was more

a clash of egos than clash of principles.

(pages-40 to 43)

This reviewer agrees with the author’s analysis that

Mr Jinnah was a superb tactician and brilliantly used

the religious card to mobilise Muslim masses

12
Page-viii- Preface-“ The Aftermath of Revolt India 1857-
1970 ”-Op Cit.

45
particularly after 1940 . This reviewer is inclined to

think that Dr Ishtiaq regarded Mr Jinnah as

strategically barren , and one who had no clear idea

about how Pakistan would be governed ? His

speeches were tactical , rebutting his opponents

and polemical as per Dr Ishtiaq, a point with which

this scribe agrees.

On page-250 Dr Ishtiaq is not clear about role of

Frontier Corps which was always only stationed in

tribal agencies .Thus he stated:--

“Jinnah appreciated their support for Pakistan and

services in Kashmir and decided to withdraw the

46
Pakistan Army by the end of December 1947 from

the tribal areas. Paramilitary units of the Frontier

Corps, known as Scouts, were instead posted there

to police the agencies and maintain law and

order.”

The actual position was that Scouts were already

permanently located and deployed in the tribal

agencies and were not posted there , as some new

policy as Dr Ishtiaq implies.

Dr Ishtiaq’s facts about the tribal invasion of

Kashmir are extremely weak although various

47
sources could have improved his knowledge , if he

had chosen to read them .

His statement on page-254 is incomplete and vague

, whereas , a more clear statement was possible :--

“On the other hand, Pakistani irregulars and

armed Muslim tribesmen from the NWFP entered

the Valley, apparently looking for revenge and

hoping to liberate Kashmir.”

Dr Ishtiaq simply ignored the most important book

on Kashmir war “RAIDERS IN KASHMIR” by Major

General Akbar Khan . Akbar Khan clearly described

48
the background to the invasion of Kashmir and the

fact that Akbar was asked by Muslim League key

leader Mian Iftikharuddin to prepare an

appreciation about armed insurrection in Kashmir

as below :--13

13
Pages-11 and 12- RAIDERS IN KASHMIR – Major General
Akbar Khan, DSO – Karachi-1970

49
50
The absolute complicity and connection between

the Pakistani state and tribals invading Kashmir was

highlighted in the book “PUNJAB CAVALRY” by

Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi . This book was

51
published in 2006 and was readily available in the

open market .

Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi , narrated in this book

that a jeep of this scribes original regiment 11

Cavalry fitted with wireless sets was detailed by

Pakistan Army General Headquarters (GHQ) to

accompany the tribals invading Kashmir and moving

on axis Muzaffarabad-Srinagar.14

14
Pages- 152 to 154 - Punjab CAVALRY-M.Y Effendi-Oxford
University Press-Karachi-2007

52
53
54
Dr Ishtiaq misses the greatest Pakistani state

blunder of Kashmir war when he totally fails to note

that an idea of attacking Srinagar with armoured

cars squadron of 11 Cavalry (FF) well documented

55
and known 15 was rejected by Pakistan Armys

Brigadier Sher Khan and Raja Ghazanfar Ali who had

cold feet .

15
Discussed in detail in RAIDERS IN KASHMIR and in
SEPTEMBER ’65 BEFORE AND AFTER- Brig Amjad Ali Khan
Chaudhry-Ferozons Private Limited-First Edition 1977-50th
Anniversary Edition , September 2015.Published and Printed by
Ferozsons (Private) Limited -Lahore 2015

56
57
Dr Ishtiaq now makes incorrect assertions (page-

254) about the Kashmir war as below :--

“Interestingly, the first commander-in-chief of

Pakistan, General Messervy, decided to retire.

Jinnah promoted Gracey as the C.-in-C. in February

1948. Pakistan had purchased new armaments

from Britain by that time. This time, Gracey, who

had defied Jinnah earlier, agreed to commit

Pakistani troops, and the first Pakistan formation

officially entered the war in the latter half of April

1948”.

58
The situation was other way round the Pakistani

political leadership both Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat

Ali Khan were clueless and indecisive . This point

could have been highlighted by Dr Ishtiaq.

So Dr Ishtiaq’s statement that General Gracey

“agreed to commit troops” is “INCORRECT”.

The situation was totally opposite . General Gracey

had to “WETNURSE” and “PUSH” the Pakistani

politicians to order to deploy Pakistani Army in

Kashmir . The situation was described by Major

General Akbar Khan as below :--16

16
Pages-100 and 101- RAIDERS IN KASHMIR – Op Cit.

59
Dr Ishtiaq could have discussed the caliber of Mr

Jinnah and his hand picked prime minister most

60
effectively if he had read the biography of Liaquat

Ali Khan published in 1997-98. But he totally missed

this well researched/referenced book by

Muhammad Reza Kazimi . In the book Kazimi

describes in detail why Mr .Jinnah and Mr Liaquat

clashed , which is an indicator of their characters

height or depth !

61
62
63
Dr Ishtiaq also surprisingly failed Venktaramani’s

most crucial and well researched book on US

Pakistan relations which this scribe thinks , is

indispensable reading for any Jinnah researcher.

64
In this book Venkatramani described how mr Jinnah

suggested to US amabassador to buy his own

property for the proposed US Embassy building in

Karachi.

65
66
The book describes the meeting between Mr Jinnah

and US ambassador as below :--

67
Another indispensable book missed by Dr Ishtiaq to

understand Mr Jinnah , Lucknown Pact and the

politics of Muslims was Francis Robinson’s

“SEPARATISM AMONG INDIAN MUSLIMS”.

My humble assessment as a reviewer was that Dr

Ishtiaq’s narrative could have been shorter and at

68
times he strays into interesting but irrelevant details

The bottom line is that Mr Jinnah was a marginal

player in the British controlled strategy of “Divide

and Rule” perfected after 1857-59 battles . As this

scribes grandfathers brother Agha Abdul Rauf , an

old police and intelligence hand put it “THERE WAS

NO PAKISTAN STRUGGLE AS FALSELY

CLAIMED……..THE BRITISH DECIDED TO PARTITION

INDIA” .

69
To elevate Mr Jinnah as the SOLE HERO as is the

practice starting from HV Hodson , Bolitho , down to

Wolpert is a an EXERCISE IN FALSE CLAIMS.

Dr Ishtiaq has made a brilliant iconoclastic effort , but

he could have been more RIGHTLY CRITICAL . A

revised edition , abridged and better organised

would be much more successful .

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
India Pakistan
Afghanistan JANUARY 2018
ISSUE

Military Review
ISBN-13: 978-1983886430
ISBN-10: 1983886432
An Infantry direct participant
remembers barapind battles

85