The battalion was commanded by LTC Mohammad

Zulfiqar Ali.1
3 Punjab was part of 115 Brigade in 1965 war and was
deployed as below: --

1
Page-494- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Op Cit
It was deployed in detail as below :--
Enlarged view of the above deployment is as below:--

The battalion’s deployment was faulty with only one

company deployed on far bank of the river and it faced
an overwhelming Indian attack on night 5/6 September
1965 :--
However to the good luck of 3 Punjab this Indian attack
was repulsed by a tank troop of 33 TDU as depicted
below :--
 Another Pakistani military historian brigadier Z.A Khan
however claimed that when Indians launched their
two attack , two companies of 3 Punjab fled across the
river. ZA Khan in his book which was distributed widely
in Pakistan Army to all officers , stated that the counter
attack was organized by the signal company
commander Major Mansur ulHaq Malik. 2

2
Page-100-THE WAY IT WAS-Brigadier Z.A Khan-Dynavis
Private Limited-Karachi-1998
The dangerous position after this counterattack was
that a tank of 33 TDU had blocked the bridge , one tank
had overturned and the third tank withdrew at last
light. 3
Brigadier Rizvi stated that 3 Punjab also captured 17
Gurkha prisoners including 1 officer.4
The Pakistani position was still untenable as Indians
enjoyed numerical superiority . However instead of
withdrawing to north bank of the river brigadier
Muzaffaruddin took the highly fallacious decision of
deploying two additional companies of 3 Punjab on the
far bank (southern bank) of the Ravi river. Naturally in
the Pakistani command environment 3 Punjab’s
commanding officer Zulfiqar could not have taken this
decision on his own.

3
Page-345- HISTORY OF INDO PAK WAR-1965-Op cit.
4
Page-231- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Op cit.
The Indians launched a second attack on night 6th/7th
September 1965 which was successful and the
southern end of Jassar bridge was captured by the
Indians.
The Pakistani GHQ ordered demolition of northern
spans of Jassar bridge at 0650 Hours 7th September
1965. 5
This demolition resulted in three companies of the
battalion being stranded south of the river. These
companies swam across the river in great confusion as
the map below indicates:--

According to lieutenant general Mahmud’s book Major

Syed Ali Tahir Bukhari was the only company
commander of 3 Punjab who was present once the 3
companies swam across the river. 6
Lieutenant General Mahmud totally whitewashed the
role of Major Ghulam Hussain Chaudhry who won a
posthumous HJ in 1971 , when the battalion swam
across the river.

5
Page-347- HISTORY OF INDO PAK WAR-1965-Op cit.
6
Page-349- HISTORY OF INDO PAK WAR-1965-Op cit.
The crisis was aggravated by 115 Brigade commander
brigadier Muzaffaruddin who started giving false
reports that Indians had established a bridgehead
across the river :--

The Indians had no intention of crossing the river and

later these reports were proved to be false.
Howeveran unnecessary operational crisis was
produced and this false alarm almost produced a major
disaster in Ravi-Chenab corridor in the Pakistan Army.
3 Punjab’s operational role ended with this withdrawal
and it did not see any further action.

The battalion suffered surprisingly low 17 fatal

casualties. 7

The battalion lost one officer lieutenant Kaleem 8 killed

in action , who was awarded Sitara e Jurrat.

The battalion was awarded following gallantry

9
awards :--
SITARA E JURRAT - THREE

7
Page-509- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Op cit.
8
Page-506- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Op cit
9
Page-231- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Ibid.
TAMGHA E JURRAT - TWO
IMTIAZI SANAD - FIVE
As per various direct participants who did not wish to
be quoted two of the battalions sitara e jurrats , those
awarded to Major Raja Asghar Ali 10 and Lieutenant
Kaleem 11 were well deserved and genuine , however
lieutenant colonel Zulfiqar 12 did not deserve a sitara e
jurrat.
Pakistan’s 1 Corps whose leadership was much
criticized in Pakistani military accounts written by
lieutenant general gulhassan and lieutenant general
Mahmud had forced an impossible mission of
defending an enclave on far bank of a major river to an
infantry battalion.
3 Punjab therefore cannot be blamed for failing to hold
Dera Nanak enclave.
The unit however was badly led and its commanding
officer lieutenant colonel zulfiqar preferred the safety
of the home bank of ravi river even when three of his
infantry companies were on the far bank.

10
Page-516- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-
11
Page-516- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-Ibid.
12
Page-516- VETERAN CAMPAIGNERS-A HISTORY OF THE
PUNJAB REGIMENT-1759-1981-
Brigadier Zahid Zaman whose battalion 4 FF was
employed in this sector reminiscence that lieutenant
colonel zulfiqar was accused of irresolution after the
war. This needs more research and is not the subject of
this book.
As a battalion 3 Punjab acquitted itself well , despite
being assigned an impossible mission to defend a river
enclave faced by three Indian battalions by an
incompetent corps commander and a weak acting GOC
of 15 Division who was an ASC officer.

The battalion’s actions had zero impact as far as the

overall military scenario was concerned . The Indians
had no intention of crossing Ravi river at Dera Nanak
bridge and demolition of some spans of the bridge
effectively ended this battle.

3 Punjab was a good battalion which fought the war

well , despite being assigned an impossible and dumb
mission, by a badly led 1 Corps, badly led 15 Division ,
and most incompetently and irresolutely led 115
Brigade.
There were serious question marks about the
commanding officer of the battalion , raised by various
participants of 1965 war.
Despite these serious handicaps, a phenomenally bad
commanding officer, the battalion performed
outstandingly.