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Although most labor migration is initially driven by economic pressures and motives,
it has various important and frequently unintended ethnic consequences for both
migrants and their hosts. International migration has historically been (and continues
to be) the main reason for the formation of new ethnic minority groups. Regardless
of their ethnic status in the home country and their relationship to the host country,
when migrants relocate abroad and are exposed to a completely new society their
ethnic status is inevitably reconstituted in racial or cultural terms. Such experiences
frequently cause migrants to reconsider and redefine their ethnic identities. Even
Japan, considered by some to be one of the last bastions of ethnic homogeneity, has
been influenced in recent years by the increasing global movement of populations.
The migration of foreign workers to Japan began in the late 1980s and the country
currently has well over 700,000 unskilled migrant laborers, drawn primarily from
various countries in East and Southeast Asia and Latin America. Most interesting is
the recent influx of nikkeijin (Japanese descendants born and living abroad) who have
been zreturn migratingX from South American countries to Japan as legally accepted,
unskilled foreign workers.
The migration of the Japanese-Brazilians to Japan as unskilled foreign workers
was initiated in the late 1980s because of a severe Brazilian economic crisis and a
crippling shortage of unskilled labor in Japan. Although the Brazilian nikkeijin are
relatively well educated and mostly of middle-class background in Brazil they still
earn five to ten times their Brazilian salaries in Japan as unskilled factory workers.
An open Japanese immigration policy toward the ethnic Japaneseb and well-
established transnational labor recruitment networks between Japan and Brazil have
also contributed to the migrant flow.1 Currently estimated at over 230,000, the
Japanese-Brazilians have become the second largest population of foreigners in Japan,
after the Chinese,2 and their numbers continue to increase at a steady pace despite the
prolonged Japanese recession. Although most of them originally go to Japan with
intentions to work only for a few years and then return to Brazil with their savings,
55
ETHNOLOGY vol. 39 no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 55-71.
ETHNOLOGY, c/o Department of Anthropology,The University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA 15260 USA
Copyrighte 2000 The University of Pittsburgh. All rights reserved.
75
critique that enables them to make demands against its members. Therefore, the
Zweapons of the weak" consist exclusively of elements of the dominant cultural order
(cf. Vandergeest 1993:135).
However, it is important to distinguish this type of dominated resistance iRrom th
resistance of autonomous social groups which have not yet been subjugated and
symbolically incorporated into the dominant ideological system. The emergence of
new social groups is one important source of opposition and resistance to dominant
hegemony (cf. Williams 1977:124). In contrast to dominated resistance such
autonomous groups retain their own eultural systems and generally resist and oppose
dominant hegemony from an independent cultural base by asserting their own system
of values and defending their cultural autonomy. In this case, it is not the specific
meanings of dominant culture that are contested; the imposition of this culture itself
is resisted by rejecting and denying its power to constitute the experiences of the
subordinate group. New immigrant minority groups such as the Brazilian nikkeijin
ffequently engage in this type of resistance since they bring independent cultures with
them from their homelands and frequently defend them from encroachrnent in the
host society. This contrasts with culturally dominated, indigenous minority groups,
whose resistance usually can only contest the meanings of hegemonic cultural
ideologies that they have already been forced to adopt and is less involved with the
assertion of independent cultural values. This distinction between dominated and
autonomous resistance is somewhat analogous to de Certeau's (1984:34-39) concepts
of tactics and strategies.
The almost exclusive concern with the resistance of dominated groups in the
literature partly explains the tendency to Zthin cultureb in ethnographies of resistance
(Ortner 1995:180). According to Ortner (1995), the culture of subordinate groups
engaged in resistance is analyzed merely as a reaction to hegemony and not as an
autonomous and authentic culture per se. In other words, only cultures of resistance
are considered, which are constituted merely by subversive reinterpretations and
manipulations of hegemonically imposed cultural meanings and categories. Even
when cultural production in the act of resistance is considered, these cultures are seen
as generated by opposition to domination and not as independent entities (e.g., Willis
1981). In contrast, the autonomous resistance of new immigrant groups involves the
analysis of independent cultural paterns which are not simply counter-reactions to
dominant cultural forms but exist in their own right. In addition, my focus on ethnic
identity as the motivating locus of resistance behavior also avoids the tendency in the
resistance literature to wdissolve subjectsX by ignoring the subjective experiences and
intentions of individuals (Ortner 1995:183-87).
In Appadurai's (1996:15) words, the Japanese-Brazilians are involved in a
"culturalistX movement zthe conscious mobilization of cultural differences in the
service of a larger national . . . politics [which] is frequently associated . . . with
struggles for stronger recognition from existing nation-states." Since this ethnic
struggle for continued cultural autonomy is not an organized oppositional movement
or an open ethnic rebellion against the Japanese, it is an zeverydayb form of
resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990; de Certeau 1984; Scott 1985) in which the Japanese-
Brazilians assert their counter-identities and cultural differences in the routines of
daily life.
Migrant groups that are ethnically related to the host society confront more (not
less) cultural pressure from the dominant society, which complicates their ethnic
adjustment. Although the Japanese-Brazilians have been marginalized as foreigners
in Japan, this does not mean that they are freed from hegemonic Japanese ethnic
demands. Unlike foreigners who are complete cultural and racial outsiders, the
nikkeijin foreigner is expected to comply with Japanese cultural standards to some
extent because of essentialized ethnic assumptions in which those of Japanese descent
are expected to possess a certain amount of cultural facility as well.3 Therefore, the
ethnic adjustment of the Japanese-Brazilians in Japan is much more difficult and
stressful when compared with other foreigners. Although they cannot escape the
hegemonic ethnic constraints operative in Japanese society because they are not
complete foreign outsiders, they are unable to fully satisfy the ethnic demands made
on them because they are partially foreign. Ironically, from the standpoint of ethnic
adjustment, total marginalization is easier than partial marginalization.
Japanese cultural pressure on the Japanese-Brazilians varies according to region.
Those living in areas with large Japanese-Brazilian populations such as Oizumi-town
(in Gunma prefecture) feel less pressure because the local Japanese are used to them
and know that they cannot be expected to speak and act Japanese. As a result,
Japanese residents in Oizumi do not always show the surprise or disorientation
common among Japanese when they encounter the nikkeijin. As one informant noted,
ZHere in Oizumi, I feel less Japanese pressure because it's like a little Brazil. The
Japanese don't see you strarlgely because you dress differently, speak Portuguese, or
don't act like the Japanese." In addition, in such areas, the Japanese-Brazilians move
around more in large groups, in contrast to cities like Kawasaki (in Kanagawa
prefecture), where they tend to be alone or in couples. Since individuals feel a certain
insulation from outside social pressure when they act in groups, there is less personal
responsibility for their behavior, making it easier to zact BrazilianX without worrying
about sanctions or negative opinions.
The Japanese-Brazilians are acutely aware of the cultural demands imposed on
them as partially marginal beings trapped within the liminal space between native and
foreigner. The reflections of one younger informant were quite typical:
The Japanese make many more demands of us than of whites or other foreigners in Japan because of
our Japanese faces. They think we should speak the language and understand Japanese ways because
we are Japanese descendants. They must realize that we can't understand and act like them because we
are from a foreign country. But the Japanese always demand this. They say you are nikkei, why don't
you speak Japanese? Our adaptation i.s harder becau.se of this pressure.
Unlike the Japanese-Braziliams, I don't have the kind of problem where the Japanese expect you to speak
Japanese well and behave Japanese. Since I look completely foreign, no one expects anythirlg from me.
I am free to behave the way I want here. In fact, when I speak even a little Japanese, the Japanese are
impressed and treat me with interest.
For instance, a young man spoke about his determination not to change his
behavior in Japan gjust because the lapanese want me to act like them. Instead, I
want to show my Brazilian differences.... I am who I am and camlot change this.
So if I don't agree with the Japanese in their way of thinking, I always want to tell
them." Likewise, a few female informants said they would resist Japanese gender
expectations by engaging in assertive behavior, thus demonstrating their identities as
Brazilian women and intentionally differentiating themselves from what they saw as
submissive Japanese women. Martina a self-identified feminist in Japan, had this to
say:
I think it is wrong that we are expected to speak and aet Japanese here just because we are Japanese
deseendants It's espeeially tough on women. I tell people directly that I am not a Japanese woman even
with my Japanese faee and [last] name. I feel more Brazilian now and the Japanese will have to aeeept
the differenees in my behavior. They see me as too aggressive fer a woman beeause I respond and tell
them what I don't agree with. I don't lower my head by staying quiet like a Japanese woman-not
saying anything and keeping my frustratiows to myself. I donSt change my behavior in Japan at all.
A common way in which the nikkeijin display their Brazilianness to the Japanese
is through dress, which is among the most frequent emblems used to symbolize
ethnic difference and identity. Although their manner of dress is normally different
ffom the Japanese some deliberately wear distinctive Brazilian clothes to catch the
attention of the Japanese. One man was quite explicit about his intentions:
At first, I tried eo dress like the Japanese. I knew that the Japanese manner of dressing was different
from ours, so I went out and bought new clothes at the department store. But now, whenever I go to
the bank or to stores, I wear Bermudas or Brazilian T-shirts. The Japanese never dress like this, so ffiey
can always tell I am Brazilian. I feel better this way because I donSt want to be seen or mistaken as
Japanese.
Japanese leads to some coniusion and disorientation among the Japanese. Indeed,
when the Japanese-Brazilians are mistakenly seen as Japaneses their Brazilian cultural
characteristics become even more stigmatizing. Therefore, by introducing themselves
as Brazilians when meeting Japanese for the first time, such individuals implicitly
excuse themselves in advance for their imperfect Japanese and any cult:ural faux pas
they may commit. Geraldo spoke about how he finds it beneficial in this regard to
introduce himself as a Brazilian in order to avoid embarrassment or ill-treatment:
If I just ask simple questions at a store, there is no problem, but if they start using technical terms or
the conversation continues, they are surprised at my lack of comprehension and fimd my accent really
strange because they saw me as Japanese. So it's better to say from the beginIiing that I am Brazilian,
so that the Japanese will understand and explain things to you more carefully without looking down on
you. When I first got to Japan, I would try to act like a Japanese, but now I always say I'm Brazilian.
It's a way to apologize beforehand for my inability to understand Japanese perfectly.
to avoid Japanese pressures and possible embarrassment. Yet the motivation for
engaging in ethnic resistance was similar. Marcos elaborated on the advantages of
showing his Brazilian identity in Japan:
It is easier to live in Japan if you see yourself as Brazilian and give up trying to be Japanese because
this way, you can escape the pressure to act Japanese. I doIl't want to be Japanese here because it's too
much of a hassle-you have to keep explaining to others why you act and think differently. So I always
reveal my Brazilian identity when I communicate with the Japanese so they don't apply the same
standards to me.
For Marcos, appealing to his Brazilian identity is also a way to pre-empt negative
evaluations based on Japanese cultural standards:
If I try to be Japanese they will judge me by their own .standards and this will lead to discrimination
[negative evaluations about his behavior]. But if I make it clear that I'm Brazilian, there is less
discrimination because I can say: "I'm sorry, I'm Brazilian so I come late to appointments and am
lazy." I can pre-empt Japanese discrimination before they come to the same conclusions.
tion and distortion again occur when national symbols are appropriated for ethnic
demonstration abroad. In fact, most Japanese-Brazilian migrants in Japan never
participated in samba in Brazil and even scorned it as a lowly Brazilian activity.
Having insuffilcient cultural knowledge of this national Brazilian ritual, their ethnic
performance in Japan is not structured or regulated by preordained cultural models
of samba, but is a spontaneous cultural form generated by them in the context of
enactment. What is subsequently produced may be barely recognizable in Brazil.
Nonetheless, it remains effective as a collective expression and assertion of a
Brazilian counter-identity and thus becomes another manifestation of ethnic
resistance.
Culture theorists have attempted to overcome an overly mechanistic and static
view of behavior as the product of explicitly stated cultural rules or norms, or the
reproduction of pre-existing structures by reconceptualizing the notion of culture and
structure itself. Some anthropologists have emphasized that culture is not uniform,
homogeneous, and collectively shared, but is fragmented, contested, and unevenly
distributed, consisting of symbols that are multivocal, polysemic, axld constantly
shifting in meaning (e.g., Barth 1987; Clifford 1986; Kondo 1990; Ohnuki-Tierney
1987, 1993; Rosaldo 1989; Turner 1967). In a similar vein, scholars interested in
world systems, transnational migration, and globalization processes (e.g., Basch,
Glick Schiller, and Blanc 1994; Featherstone 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1992;
Hannerz 1996; Wolf 1982) have challenged the traditional anthropological analysis
of culture as territorially bounded, which they believe promotes a static view of
culture as unified and overly coherent. Bourdieu (1977, 1990), one of the pioneers
of practice theory, has replaced the notion of culture as objective rules and structures
with the concept of habitus, a system of habitual, unconscious, and collectively held
dispositions that are learned and deeply internalized by individuals and that structure
their behavior. Others have understood culture as schemas, flexible cognitive
processes and implicit procedures of recognition and interpretation of actual
experience that are learned and internalized to various degrees and that motivate
behavior without always being consciously known by individuals (D'Andrade 1995;
D'Andrade and Strauss 1992). Although he does not reconceptualize the concept of
culture or structure per se, Sahlins (1981, 1985) has advocated a dynamic structural
model of cultural change in which traditional symbolic meanings constantly shift as
they are enacted in practice during historical eventsS which then reorder the cultural
structure. Giddens (1979, 1984) has expounded on a theory of "structuration," which
moves away from a rigid concept of structure as external constraint on individual
behaviorS and instead defines structure as a generative set of rules and power
resources that exist only in the zmemory tracest of individuals and are instantiated
in their actions. Structure in this sense is not only the medium of action (practice),
but also its outcome it both produces and is constituted by action. The culture-as-
generative view has also been expounded most explicitly by Bourdieu (1977:ch. 1
3), who sees the habitus as consisting of flexible wgenerative schemest which can be
[Ethnieity] may have a purely identity-oriented instrumentality rather than an instrumentality that, as
is so often implied, ls extracultural (economic or political or emotional). Put another way, the
mobilization of markers of group differenee may itself be part of a eontestation of values about
differenee, as distinet from the consequenees of differenee for wealth, seeurity, or power.
Man is human only to the extent to which he tries to impose his existenee on another man in order to
be recognized by him.... It is on that other being, on recognition by that other being, that his own
human worth and reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed.
. . . [This] human reality in-itself-for-itself can be achieved only through conflict and through the risk
that conflict implies.
Only through an active struggle for ethnic recognition from others can a truly
independent and autonomous self-consciousness be attained (cf. Crapanzano
1982:200).8 If individuals passively wait for recognition to be bestowed on them,
they abdicate the right to actively deElne themselves and assert their self-worth.
Through the performative enactment of their Brazilian counter-identities and the
display of cultural difference, the Japanese-Brazilians in Japan have asserted
themselves as Brazilian. And the Japanese have been forced to take notice and
perhaps reconsider.
Consider the reflections of one Japanese informant after his long association with
the Brazilian nikkeijin:
At first, I wanted them to beeome like the Japanese and tried to speak only Japanese to them, but I later
realized that this is smpossible. They ean't beeome Japanese, nor do they want to. They want to remain
Brazilian in Japan and I eame to respeet them for that. After a while, I started teaehing myself
Portuguese and learning about Brazil. Now I want to travel to Brazil someday to experienee the eountry.
This type of ethnic acknowledgment is the first step toward granting the Japanese-
Brazilians their humanity. It entails a recognition of their self-delilnitions and
independent existence as a distinct ethnic group instead of merely constituting them
through the hegemonic imposition of essentialized and assimilative Japanese ethnic
understandings. Yet few Japanese I knew were willing to sustain contact and
friendship with the nikkeijin long enough to make this type of ethnic recognition
possible. For most, the nikkeijin are either persistent ethnic curiosities or temporary
ethnic anomalies that should eventually conform to Japanese expectations.
NOTES
1. For an analysis of the causes of Japanese-Brazilian return migration, see Tsuda (1999a).
2. This is exeluding the approximately 650,000 Korean-Japanese who are still registered in Japan as
foreigners, though 80 per eent of them were born and raised in Japan. In 1997, there were 201,795
individuals of Brazilian nationality registered in Japan, a vast majority of whom are Japanese-Brazilians.
In addition, over 10 per cent of the Japanese-Brazilians in Japan have Japanese nationality and do not
register as foreigners.
3. See Tsuda (1998) for an analysis of Japanese pereeptions and prejudiees toward the Japanese-
Brazilians.
4. Kondo (1986:76-77) also reeounts her experienees as a Japanese-Ameriean in Japan who was
expeeted to aet Japanese:
They e . . had every reason to make me over in their image, to guide me toward properly Japanese
behavior, so that the discrepancy between my appearanee and my eultural competenee would not be s
painfully apparent. I posed a challenge to their sense of identity. How eould someone who looked
Japanese not be Japanese? Their response in the face of this dissonance was to make me as Japanese
as possible.
5. Seiza involves siting on folded legs with the knees together. The sitting position is very
uncomfortable for those who are not accustomed to it, and the anthropologist himself eannot endure
seiza for more than several minutes, although men are allowed to sit Indian-style on the tatami floor.
6. Barth (1987) sbserves a similar process among the Ok in New Guinea. Because precise oral
transmission of ritual practices is not possible, the cultural content of the performance is elaborated by
ritual actors through such processes as metaphor. This generates a wide range of cultural variation in
the performance of the same ritual.
7. Ironicallys the most professional samba parade in Japan occurs in Asakusa in Tokyo and is run
almost exclusively by Japanese. The Asakusa carnival festival has a fifteen-year tradition and involves
30 schools of samba with 3,000 dancers and 500c000 spectators. The costumes are much like those used
in Brazil and the dancing is well organized. These Japanese, who have carefully studied samba, provide
a much more faithful reproduction of Brazilian samba than the rlikkeijin.
8. This presupposes an ability to see oneself from the perspective of the other so that the self becomes
an object to itself (Mead 1977 [1956l).
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