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Case Study on Gas Emission and induced Explosion during Tunnelling in

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Conference Paper · October 2014

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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

Case Study on Gas Emission and induced Explosion during Tunnelling in

Taiwan

C.H. Leea,b* and T.T. Wangb

a
United Geotech, Inc., Taiwan
b
National Taipei University of Technology, Taiwan *
ug513@mail.ugi.com.tw (corresponding author’s E-mail)

Abstract

This manuscript introduces a gas-induced accident in the west tunnel of Tsengwen Reservoir Trans-
basin Diversion project (TRTD). Tunnelling sections with problematic gas emission have been investigated
and paid attention during design stage, with gas detection instruments and associate hazard mitigation
measures prepared. However, excavation of tunnel run into gas outburst, with methane concentration
reaching 844,535 ppm revealed by Gas Chromatography-Flame Ionization Detector (GC-FID), resulting in
a severe explosion at the cost of 2 workmen. Due to two other sections to be excavated have similar
engineering geology conditions, the TRTD project was then reviewed and associate with a strict and
comprehensive gas-related hazard mitigations design modification. Lessons learned from the gas emission
and associate hazard are discussed and commented.

Keywords: Tunnelling in Rock, Gas emission, Explosion, Geological Investigation

1. Introduction
Emission of hazardous gas during tunnelling can cause catastrophic hazard and have been classified
into one of unfavorable geological conditions for many tunnelling projects worldwide.
Various theoretical and empirical approaches, based on geological investigation results, have been proposed
for identifying or predicting the ground with potential hazardous gas problems before tunnel construction.
However, the increase of hazardous gas related accidents, especially wide-spreading from coal mine to
traffic or hydraulic tunnels, shows that the gas emission and related explosive potentials should be paid
more attention for tunnelling tasks.
Gas outbursts are mainly affected by the stress, gas, physical properties of the rock mass, production
process and so on (Beamish and Crosdale, 1998; Cao et al., 2001; Huang et al., 2010).
Kidybinski (1980) proposed the presence of three precursor zones in the coal seam ahead of the roadway
face: (1) broken zone, (2) high gas pressure/active zone and (3) abutment stress zone, and concluded that
gas outburst would occur when the three fundamental conditions meet with each other.
Williams and Weissmann (1995) describe the coal and gas outburst by emphasizing on the gas pressure
and stress gradients existing ahead of the excavated face.

2. Statistical analysis of cases

2.1 Characteristic of gas
Tunnels excavated into ground formations with hidden flammable or non-flammable gases may cause
hazards such as explosion, hypoxia, and poisoning. Flammable gases are primarily composed of petroleum-
based gases (mostly methane, with small amounts of ethane, propane, and butane), coal-based gases
(almost entirely methane), water-soluble natural gases (methane is water-soluble), and biogas (mainly
methane). In summary, methane (CH4) is the flammable gas mostly likely to be encountered during
tunnelling.
Methane is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas with a light density of 0.679 g/l, and has an auto-
ignition point of approximately 537°C, and product explosions at 5-15.4% concentration when fire is present.
The explosive power of methane is the strongest at 9% concentration. When methane concentration is
lower than 5% or higher than 15.4%, blue colored flame and black smoke will appear around the ignition
source, but will not extend to other areas or produce explosion. Methane explosions absorb a large amount
of oxygen and create low oxygen conditions inside the tunnel, and
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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

even worse, create CO, which is harmful to humans. Methane explosions produce high temperatures
(approximately 2000°C), extremely powerful pressure (7 kg/cm2 ), and strong winds. The center of the
explosion is a vacuum, which causes a strong backflow of wind into the tunnel (CPAMI, 2000).

2.2 Statistical analysis

This study integrates 80 tunnelling cases collected by Kang (2009) and Ding (2010) as a database for
gas emission or explosion during tunnelling. Among which, 50 cases with gas measurement records
(Table 1) are selected for statistical analysis. Results of statistical analysis show that: (1) eight cases of
database did not pass through any coal layer, but still had gas overflow; (2) two of these tunnels are not
located in gas regions, but still had gas overflow and combustion phenomenon; (3) the higher the gas
pressure, the greater the quantity of gas, as shown in Fig. 1(a); and (4) the greater the gas pressure, the
higher the gas concentration, as shown in Fig. 1(b). Potential gas overflow is not limited to tunnels that
pass through a coal layer; tunnels that pass through fault fracture zones or anticline sedimentary rock
zones can also encounter potential gas overflow hazards.

Table 1 The cases of gas emission or explosion in tunnel.

Tunnel name Length (m) Overburden (m) Coal seam thickness Gas region Gas content Gas emission Gas pressure Gas concentration (%) Gas burning / explosion
No.
(m) (MPa)
(m3 /t) (m3 /min)

- - -
4845 600 0.8 High gas area 10.84 1.17
Bailongshan Baishatuo

- - - - -
1 2 No. 3 761 High gas area 0.37 4.85

- - - -
3 Baishatuo No. 4 2118 300 High gas area 0.78 10

- - -
4 4360 800 1.2 High gas area 10 Gas escaping & burning
Darroliangzi

- - -
5 Mayor 1241 100 2.13 High gas area 10.03 11

- -
6 Fenshui 4747 300 0.9 High gas area 5 0.96 19

- - -
7 719 300 1.5 High gas area 4.14 0.87
Fungshuepai Hejiazhai

- - -
8 2335 280 2
High gas area 13.5 2.3
Hongshiyan Hongfu

- - - -
9 7857 560 Non gas area 1.09 Gas burning
Huayingshan Hwangcho

- - - -
10 1527.5 0.15 High gas area 18.46 1.216
Huanglianpo Huiyu

- - -
11 4714 800 2.55 High gas area 9.16 1.87
Jiazhuqing Jiaoling

- - - -
12 7186 800 Low gas area 0.258 0.3
Jindong Liangfengya

- - -
13 5036 0.03 High gas area 0.43 0.74 1
Longxi Longyanjing

- - - - -
14 3455 High gas area 0.3 -
Mawangcao No.1

- - -
15 4990 500 4.38 High gas area 14.17 1.34
Meihuashan

- - - - -
16 1655 250 High gas area 4.93

- -
17 9108 1000 1.05 Low gas area 8.741 0.498 2.192

- - - -
18 4085 550 High gas area 0.7 Many times of gas burning

- -
19 3691 839 High gas area -- - 5

- -
20 933.5 280 High gas area -- - Gas explosion

21 1266 550 0.72 Low gas area -- - 3 -

- - -
22 3968 600 High gas area -- 2

High gas area One time of gas burning; two times of gas explosion
- - -
23 Paotaishan 3078 400 3.03 0.2

- - - - -
24 Paozilin 6460 500 High gas area 0.7

- - - -
25 10528 670 Low gas area 0.14 1.2
Qiyueshan

- - - -
26 4268 1000 High gas area 9.35 2.24
Qingshan

- - -
27 4238.29 533 300 High gas area 4 0.92 15
Shanghai

- - - -
28 90 5
High gas area 1.5
Sunjiazhai

- - - -
29 2450 High gas area 9.62 1.2 5.2
Tianshengqiao

- - - -
30 6030 630 Low gas area 2.16 0.15
Tiefengshan

- - - - -
31 2196 Non gas area 1.3 Gas burning
Dingtonggou

- - - -
32 4289 1000 2
Low gas area 2.98
Tongyu

- - -
33 9418 500 High gas area 0.8 60 Gas burning
Wulong

- - - - - -
34 1520 High gas area 0.8
Xishanping

- - - -
35 2730 460 Low gas area 4.69 80
Xiaojiapo

- - - -
36 New Dabashan 10638 790 2
Low gas area 0.5

- - - -
37 1152 400 2
High gas area 1.4
New Shiyakou

- - - -
38 New Suzhai 698 200 0.8 High gas area 0.64

- - - -
2641.5 7.1 High gas area 15.2 2.5
39 New Yanjiaozhai 40

- - -
New Zhai 4409 450 160 High gas area 15.779 1.82

- - - -
41 2714 8.92 High gas area 0.4 Five times of gas explosion
Yanjiaozhai

- - - - -
42 13791 1350 High gas area 0.58
Yesanguan

- - - -
43 950 209 High gas area 0.857 Gas explosion
youyi

- - - -
44 11068 780 0.5 Low gas area 0.9
Yuanliangshan

- - -
45 Yuntaishan 8178 350 1.84 Low gas area 4.03 0.18

- - -
46 Zenjiaping 2477 500 Low gas area 0.044 8.2 Gas burning

- - -
47 5194 370 2.1 High gas area 1.7 12.5
Chuga

- - -
48 3165 275 High gas area 181.09 50 4
Zhongliangshan

- - -
49 4090 550 0.3 High gas area 3.19 0.67
Zipingpu

- - - -
50 2469 400 0.13 Low gas area 0.529
Zoumaling
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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

18

16

y = 7.5954 x 0.6239 R2 =
14

0.7981
12

content
(m3/
Gas
t)
10

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

Gas pressure (MPa)

(a)

20

18

16 y = 7.4397 x 1.257 R2 =

14
0.4918
12

concentration
Gas
(%)
10

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8

Gas pressure (MPa)

(b)
Fig. 1. Relationship between (a) gas content and gas pressure and (b) gas concentration and gas pressure from the
studied database with gas emission or explosion during tunnelling.

3. Case study in Taiwan 3.1

Project background
The Tsengwen Reservoir Trans-basin Diversion project (TRTD) near the Qishan river area has many spots with natural gas
emissions through veins, for example, the Shanminhuo in Minzu village.
The Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) has performed a petroleum survey of the geological structures near the study are for
the potential gas reserves. The major gas-related geological structures includes the Honghuazhi anticline and the Zhuqi structure,
which are revealed by the Shanminhuo and Jiasian number 1 well. Only the Zhuqi anticline had records of petroleum gas
production prior to 1945; however, because production quantity drastically declined, it was abandoned in 1968.

Although the petroleum gas in this area does not reach economic exploitation magnitude, it can still pose a threat during
tunnel excavation. Furthermore, other geological drilling surveys have detected harmful gases at the Laorenxi anticline, Pingxi
fault, and the Biaohu fault (including CO and CH4). Which indicates that tunnel construction may encounter problems caused by
harmful gas overflow.

3.2 Gas emission and the induced explosion

In response to gas overflow during tunnelling, which may impact the work environment and worker safety, contractors conduct
coring or non-coring survey in sections with high gas emission potential. Furthermore, a fixed gas detector have be placed every
500 meters in the tunnel and 2 portable gas detectors have be carried during excavation to detect possible overflow of harmful
gases during construction. All workers for this tunnelling project have be educated with skills for safety operations in potential
gas emission environment.
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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

Unfortunately, the west excavating face of the west diversion tunnel of TRTD project run into a flammable methane
gas explosion at the 13k+300 mark (between the second and third Pingxi fault fracture zone, shown in Fig. 2) that caused
the death of two engineering personnel and delayed the construction in November 2007 (Xiao et al., 2009).

Fig. 2. The cross-section of gas explosion location in west diversion tunnel of TRTD project.

3.3 Investigation
Gas sampling and analysis was then conducted at Charshan and Shanminhuo in May 2007. Gas Chromatography-
Flame Ionization Detector (GC-FID) and Gas Chromatography-Thermal Conductivity Detector (GC-TCD) analysis results
showed that the gas collected at these two locations contained mostly methane (84.6355 and 80.7038 % and 761996.00
and 715869.00 ppm, respectively).
Additionally, oil sampling and analysis was conducted at the TRTD project 13k+547 mark in August 2007. Gas
Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS) instrument analysis showed that this oil contained 23.0 vol % gasoline,
74.0 vol % kerosene and diesel, and 2.5 vol % reduced crude.
Sampling and analysis were conducted on oil and gas that seeped out at the TRTD project 13k+300-400 marks in
January 2008. Table 2 shows the instrument analysis results of the sampled gas. The gas contained 844,535 ppm of
methane, which accounted for 94.8616% of the gas. This is similar to the samples collected at the Charshan and
Shanminhuo, which also contained mostly methane. Oil samples from the 13k+300-400 mark were analyzed with GC-MS
instrument. The total ion chromatogram showed that the oil is composed of dark brown suspended emulsion and oil slick.

The oil components consist of light and medium oil. This conformed to the soil sample collected at Charshan and
Shanminhuo prior to the accident, which also consisted of light and medium oil (Weng et al., 2009).

Table 2 The analysis result of GC-FID.

Site Methane Ethane Propane

(ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
TRTD 844535.00 31669.70 3544.18
Chashan 761996.00 53400.70 24620.20
Sanminhuo 715869.00 27842.30 10524.70
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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

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4. Design feedback and construction management

4.1 Design feedback
The accident during tunnel and associated supplementary investigations leads to a design feedback.
The level of gas explosion hazard during tunnel are proposed and estimated by five factors including
geological lithology (G), geological structure (S), coal seam thickness (T), overburden (O), hydrogeological
(H) (Dingÿ2010). Thickness of lining exceeding 30 cm is recommended for Level III (potential danger) or
IV (no danger) section. Blower type ventilation system is adopted for ventilation during tunnelling and
construction machines and equipment in tunnel section with gas explosion are optionally changed to be
non-explosion-proof types. Additionally, Thickness of lining exceeding 40 cm is recommended for Level I
(extremely dangerous) or II (dangerous) section, and vertical and incline shafts or pilot tunnel forced
ventilation are suggested during tunnelling. The electrical equipment and machines used in the tunnel are
mandatory changed to explosion-proof types, and fixed hazardous gas detectors must be set at fixed
distances during construction period. After each excavation cycle, portable gas detectors (which should be
carried by all workers) are used to detect concentrations of hazardous gases.

If overburden or topography limits the use of vertical shafts, inclined shafts, or pilot tunnels for
ventilation, the gas prevention grouting is suggested as an alternative for areas with high gas emission.
Typically, gas prevention grouting method with deep boreholes is used where holes are drilled in the tunnel
excavation surrounding area. Then grouting materials, can be cement, polyurethane resin, or silicate resin,
is then injected into the holes from top to bottom. Validation check of grouting effect is carried out after the
completion of grouting. If gas emission is still detected, then gas prevention grouting on the excavating
tunnel surface is launched.

4.2 Construction management

Considering with the gas-induced explosion during tunnelling needing the combination of three
conditions, i.e., flammable gas in explosive concentrations, adequate oxygen, and an ignition source, the
post-explosion improvement measures focusing on mitigation of such a combination are proposed as
follows (Xiao et al., 2009).
1. Supplementary geological investigations for the section subsequently tunnelling to have in hands
the distribution and quantity of hazardous gases, including tunnel horizontal coring or non-coring exploratory
drilling for the entire line to investigate concentrations of hazardous gases, coordinate drill rod connections
and test for gas (and keep records) every 3 meters. Exploratory work should have at least 5 meters of
parameter overlap.
2. Improving gas detection methodologies during tunnelling. The major part includes the installation of
a series of fixed gas detectors that can conduct automatic readings every 500 meters in the tunnel. The
detectors are moved to the top of the tunnel crown from their original height of 1.8 m.
Besides, portable gas detectors are setup every 100 to 150 m in the front of the tunnel excavation, which
can be adjusted based on the progress of the excavation. Additionally, the portable gas detectors are
raised to the crown of the tunnel with a telescopic rod and test for gas at every 250 m of the tunnel to
prevent measurement blind spots. Furthermore, ensure that tunnel drilling and blasting operation includes
a hazardous gas detection procedure.
3. If coagulated oil emits into the tunnel, clean up immediately or seal it off to prevent
accumulation of flammable gases.
4. Improvement of tunnel ventilation through increasing blower ventilation from 1500 m3 /min to 1800
m3 /min, increasing ventilation pipe from 120 cm ø to 140 cm ø, and increasing the air speed in the tunnel
from 0.2 m/sec to at least above 0.5 m/sec.
5. Ignition source control by adding flame arresters on construction machinery and vehicles, and
preventing lighters, cigarettes, and other ignition source from workers of the tunnel.
6. Implementation of flammable gas management standards (Table 3).
7. Strengthening the supervisor system, including establishing a supervisor’s checking procedure for
gas emission detection and explosion mitigation operation for various working faces, and the mandatorily
full participation of supervisor during tunnelling. Supervisors are responsible for various command and
control operations, including the implementation of flammable gas safety management standards and
tunnelling work suspending and evacuating personnel when blowers stop or ventilation is inadequate.
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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

Table 3 The construction management measures of hazardous gases inside tunnel.

Items Countermeasures 1.
The fixed hazardous gas detectors are set at each 500 m and in front of the
Hazardous gas excavation face in addition.
detection 2. The fixed hazardous gas detectors are changed to automatically logger
equipment type.
3. The portable gas detectors are increased to 5 units per excavation face.
Gas detection 1. Gas detection position is increased to 4 points per excavation face.
2. Gas detection position is also located at each advancing exploration
position borehole.
1. After each work shift.

Gas detection 2. Before each drilling and blasting.

3. After each drilling and blasting.
frequency
4. During each rockbolt drilling.
5. During each advancing exploration borehole.
1. The ventilation volume is increased to 1800 m3 /min.
Ventilation
2. The diameter of ventilation tube is increased to 140 cm ø.
equipment
3. The wind speed in the tunnel is increased to 0.5 m/sec.
Lighting facilities The lighting facilities are changed to explosion-proof type.
Construction Jumbos, excavators, trucks, spraying machines and other devices are installed Flame bane.
equipment

5. Conclusions
The TRTD project run into the accident of gas-induced explosion during tunnelling in Taiwan.
Although the cause is different from every case, occurrence of such an explosion generally need a combination of three
conditions, a flammable gas in explosive concentrations, adequate oxygen, and an ignition source. Rescue and post-
processing after a tunnel gas explosion is extremely difficult. If tunnels cannot avoid areas with potential gas deposits, gas
survey, gas concentration monitoring system, safety management measures, increase ventilation to reduce concentration,
and ignition control measures are the foremost principles in handling gas overflow.

Statistical analysis results from gas-induced tunnelling problem in this study showed that potential gas emission may
occur in areas outside of coal layers. Tunnels that pass through faults or anticline sedimentary rock regions may also
encounter gas overflow hazards. Thus, the survey and design stage should conduct gas explosion hazard level evaluations
to assess ventilation method during tunnel excavation. When necessary, gas prevention grouting must be prepared in
coordination with specific hazardous gas detection, construction management, emergency response measures to reduce
potential gas explosion risk to a minimum, thereby ensuring worker safety.

Acknowledgements
Authors would like to thank the Ta-Chen and Nishimatsu joint venture group for offering the data
and agreement for publishing this article.

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8th Asian Rock Mechanics Symposium ARMS8

14-16 October 2014, Sapporo, Japan

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