Fidh Mali Report 2022 - Central Mali

In Central Mali, Victims
and Perpetrators Live

Side by Side
Fact-Finding Mission Report
November 2022 / N° 798a
Cover photo: Fishing boat on the Niger River, Mopti, 13 March 2022. © AFP / Florent VERGNES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MAP OF MALI 5
ACRONYMS 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7
METHODOLOGY 9
I. CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY CRISIS IN CENTRAL MALI 13

A. The year 2022: a turning point for violence in central Mali 13
B. The crisis shifts southwards 15
C. Growth of militias and ethnicisation of the conflict: major risks faced by the Fulani populations 19
II. CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, VICTIMS OF A MULTITUDE OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 23

A. Violations of the right to life 24
1. By the FAMa and their international partners 24
Douentza Cercle 24
Niono Cercle 26
2. By jihadist groups 28
Mopti Region 29
Ségou Region 31
3. By self-defence groups 31
B. Sexual and gender-based violence 33
Douentza Cercle: rape as a “weapon of war” 34
1. By self-defence militias 35
2. By jihadist groups 36
3. By the FAMa and their international partners 38
Moura massacre: five days of organised violence 38
C. Other violations perpetrated against civilian populations 41
1. Abductions by jihadist groups 42
2. Threats and pressure against civilian populations by the FDS 44
3. Siege of villages and other restrictions imposed by jihadists on civilian populations 45
4. Roadblocks and discriminatory practices imposed on certain civilian populations
by self-defence militia and jihadist groups 48
5. Looting, destruction and confiscation of civilian property by jihadist groups 49
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CHARACTERISATION OF VIOLATIONS IN CENTRAL MALI 51

A. Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law 52
B. Crimes under international law 53
IV. REIGNING IMPUNITY 59
A. Action by the authorities 60
1. Conduct of investigations without conclusive results 60
2. What role should the PJS play in the fight against terrorism and transnational
organised crime? 61
3. The International Criminal Court and complementarity in the fight against impunity
in central Mali 62
4. Limited transitional justice mechanisms 63
B. Obstacles to the proper administration of justice 64
1. Lack of political will 64
2. Security challenges 66
3. Technical and administrative issues 66
4. Lack of resources 67
5. Inadequate protection of victims and witnesses 67
6. Turning ongoing reforms into an opportunity in the fight against impunity in Mali 68
CONCLUSION 69
RECOMMENDATIONS 71
4 FIDH – In Central Mali, Victims and Perpetrators Live Side by Side – November 2022
MAP OF MALI
Map N° 4231 Rev. 3, March 2013. Source: United Nations,

Departement of Field Support, Cartographic Section
FIDH – In Central Mali, Victims and Perpetrators Live Side by Side – November 2022 5
ACRONYMS
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

AI Amnesty International
AJM Association des juristes maliennes (Association of Malian lawyers)
AMDH Association malienne pour les droits de l’Homme (Malian Association for Human
Rights)
AQIM Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CNT Conseil national de la Transition (National Transitional Council)
DIRPA Direction de l’information et des relations publiques des armées (Directorate of
Military Information and Public Relations)
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EUTM Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali
FAMa Forces armées maliennes (Malian Armed Forces)
FDS Forces de défense et de sécurité (Defence and Security Forces)
FIDH International Federation for Human Rights
FORSAT Force spéciale antiterroriste (Special Anti-Terrorist Task Force)
HRW Human Rights Watch
ICC International Criminal Court
ICG International Crisis Group
IED Improvised explosive device
ISGS Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISS Institute for Security Studies
JNIM Jamā‘at nusrat al-islām wal-muslimīn (Group for the Support of Islam and
Muslims)
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad)
MSF Médecins sans frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PJS Pôle judiciaire spécialisé contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transfrontalière
organisée (Specialised Judicial Unit Against Terrorism and Transnational
Organised Crime)
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WAEMU West African Economic and Monetary Union
WILDAF Women in Law and Development in Africa
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The year 2022 marks a decade of conflict in Mali and is expected to be the deadliest on record. The
central regions of Mopti and Ségou have seen an unprecedented rise in attacks on civilians, including
conflict-related sexual violence. Other serious human rights violations have been committed with
impunity by all actors in the armed conflict. According to analysis by the International Federation
for Human Rights (FIDH), some of these violations could constitute war crimes under international
law as recognised by Malian law. Such violence against the civilian population is the main feature of
the conflict, which is played out behind closed doors in the centre of the country. It is also the direct
consequence of the violent response of the state, through the intensification of military operations led
by the Forces armées maliennes (Malian Armed Forces – FAMa) and their partners from the Russian
paramilitary organisation the Wagner Group, on the one hand, and competition between community
.
self-defence militias and jihadist insurgents affiliated with Jamā‘at nusrat al-islām wal-muslimīn (Group
for the Support of Islam and Muslims – JNIM), on the other. This situation, which seems to be out of
control, is gradually spreading southwards and approaching the capital Bamako.
This report follows on from that published in November 2018 by the International Federation for
Human Rights (FIDH) and its member organisation in Mali, the Association malienne pour les droits de
l’Homme (AMDH), In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism.1
The research on which this report is based was carried out by FIDH and draws on nearly one hundred
testimonies collected from victims, witnesses and other actors between 2021 and 2022. The period
covered by this report, from June 2018 to June 2022, reveals both the deepening of the security
crisis in the centre of the country and the acceleration of serious human rights violations suffered
by the civilian population since the beginning of 2022. Among the violations described in the report,
conflict-related sexual violence is documented to an unprecedented degree. These violations are
perpetrated by community self-defence groups, and jihadist insurgents, but also by the FAMa and
their international partners from the Wagner Group during key events, such as the massacre in Moura,
in the Mopti region, in March 2022.2
The scale and nature of the various abuses perpetrated by all parties to the conflict amount, in
some cases, to crimes against humanity and war crimes under international criminal law and Malian
criminal law. These include summary executions, targeted killings, enforced disappearances, torture,
rape and other acts of sexual violence, unlawful arrest and detention, inhumane treatment, mutilation
including post-mortem, and forced recruitment of young men. Sieges, roadblocks and violent thefts
mark the daily lives of the civilian population, trapped by the predatory strategies of armed actors in
the regions of Mopti and Ségou. Analysis of the social context in Mali and the testimonies collected
by FIDH indicate that the Fulani communities are particularly targeted and persecuted in the context
of the conflict.
1. F
IDH and AMDH, In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Fact-finding mission report,
2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_
november2018.pdf.
2. Although the Malian authorities deny the presence of foreign mercenaries and claim that cooperation is limited to the presence
of Russian “trainers” under a cooperation agreement with the Russian State, FIDH estimates that the Malian government has
recruited approximately 1,000 mercenaries from the Wagner Group.
In the recommendations included in the 2018 report, FIDH warned the Malian authorities that
“[w]ithout a profound change in its analysis of the situation and the means of remedying it, the Malian
State runs the risk of losing the confidence of those living in the centre for a long time”, and of seeing
the regions of Ségou and Mopti mired in a spiral of violence with terrible consequences for years to
come. In the intervening four years, Mali has experienced two successive coups d’état, in 2020 and
2021, which brought a military junta to power. The European military partners of the time have been
replaced by mercenaries from the Russian Wagner group, who have been involved in serious abuses
in other countries. A way out of the conflict is more than ever conditional on the transitional Malian
government’s willingness to prioritise the protection of civilians and the fight against impunity. The
difficulties encountered in the fight against impunity, whether security-based, legal or administrative,
cannot be overcome without the firm political will of the transitional government and technical and
financial support from the international community.
As impunity persists in Mali, the idea that violence is the only form of justice possible is becoming
entrenched in people’s minds, fuelling mistrust of the state, community fragmentation and the creation
of militias among the civilian population. The impasse in the country, after a decade of conflict, is
spreading to neighbouring Burkina Faso and threatens the countries of the Gulf of Guinea. General
mobilisation of Sahelian governments is required to address this. The situation is urgent: every day,
eight civilians are killed in the Central Sahel.3
3. P
eople’s Coalition for the Sahel, The Sahel: What has changed, Progress Report of the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, June 2022.
METHODOLOGY
FIDH is an international organisation defending and promoting all civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its action is aimed at States
and others in positions of power, including armed opposition groups and multinational companies,
in situations of human rights violations, with a view to consolidating democratisation processes.
Documentation, advocacy and strategic litigation form part of its action to protect and uphold human
rights around the world.
Since 2013, FIDH has been carrying out fact-finding missions, producing analysis and conducting
advocacy for the resolution of the conflict, the fight against impunity and better democratic
governance in Mali. In doing so, FIDH draws on a vast network of members, human rights observers
and information officers in many parts of the country, allowing constant monitoring of the political,
security, humanitarian and human rights situation. FIDH also provides support to victims of serious
human rights violations before national and international courts.
In November 2018, FIDH, together with its member organisation AMDH, published a joint report
entitled In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism. This
report was based on two fact-finding missions carried out in May and June 2018 in Bamako and
in the regions of Mopti and Ségou.4 It described the extent of human rights violations in the centre
of the country, while mapping out the alleged responsibilities of all armed actors in the conflict and
highlighting the lack of action by the Malian state and its international partners in the fight against
impunity.
This report follows on from the 2018 report. Its objective is to document, over a four-year period
between June 2018 and June 2022, the increase in violence against civilians in the regions of Mopti
and Ségou in central Mali, where human rights violations linked to the conflict are most prevalent.
To this end, two fact-finding missions were conducted in the country. The first, from 14 to 28 September
2021, documented events that took place in central Mali between June 2018 and November 2021.
The second mission, from 15 June to 4 July 2022, focused on violations committed in central Mali
between December 2021 and January 2022. To complement fact-finding and research, FIDH also
carried out an advocacy mission in November 2021 and a legal observation and advocacy mission in
July 2022 in Bamako. These missions provided an opportunity to exchange with representatives of
the Malian political, judicial and security authorities.
In total, more than 95 interviews were conducted with victims and survivors of human rights
violations, association and community leaders, local elected officials and public figures, political and
administrative authorities, members of the Malian judiciary and military, researchers from the region
and representatives of foreign diplomatic missions based in Bamako.
4. F
IDH and AMDH, In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Fact-finding mission report,
2018, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-terrorism_727_en_
november2018.pdf.
Accessibility and security conditions
Difficulties in accessing the localities of Macina, Nampalari, Seno and Hayre (in the regions of Ségou
and Mopti) prevented the fact-finding delegation from travelling to the sites of most of the abuses
described in this report. The FIDH delegation was unable to visit the areas occupied by jihadist groups,
where a large proportion of the abuses for which they are responsible appear to be concentrated. This
explains the apparent imbalance in the attribution of responsibility for the violations identified in this
report. During the first documentation mission at the end of 2021, the security context meant that the
delegation was unable to reach all of central Mali. However, the delegation was able to visit Ségou,
Mopti, Sévaré, Koutiala and Bamako. The deteriorating security situation in central Mali from the end
of 2021 onwards made it impossible for human rights organisations and national and international
journalists to access certain areas. It was therefore decided, for security reasons, to conduct an
additional documentation mission in June 2022 from Bamako only, where meetings with victims
and witnesses from Niono, Ndola, Diabali, Farabougou, Dogofry (Ségou region), and Boni, Douentza,
Sevaré, Badiangara, Diallassagou, Moura, Dionkè Ourou (Mopti region) were organised and supported
by FIDH.
When conditions did not allow access for the fact-finding delegation, FIDH drew on a network of
human rights defenders in several localities of the country to collect some of the testimonies, by
means of a database that is updated daily. These individuals are not named in this report in order to
protect their safety.
Interview, confidentiality and security conditions for victims and witnesses
The fact-finding mission delegations met with a total of 67 victims of human rights violations,
members of their families and witnesses. Victims and witnesses came from various localities in Mopti
(Djonkekourou, Boni, Mondoro, Bandiagara, Douentza, Moura, Songo, and Diallassagou); from several
localities in Ségou (Diabali, Niono, N’tola, and Dogofry); and from the vicinity of Koutiala (Yorosso,
Kouri, Boura, Mahou, Koumbia, and Ourikela). During the September 2021 mission, FIDH collected
testimonies from 40 individuals, survivors and witnesses (21 in Ségou and 19 in Mopti). These 40
people included five women victims of sexual violence. During the June 2022 mission, 27 victims’
testimonies were collected (18 from the Mopti region and nine from the Ségou region).
A survivor-centred approach was adopted in the research. The needs and expectations of interviewees
were identified and taken into account as much as possible throughout the research process,
from initial contact to post-interview follow-up. All those involved in the collection of testimonies
were made aware of the risks of retraumatisation for survivors and were trained in FIDH interview
methodology,5 in particular the “Do no Harm” principle. When requested, interviewees were provided
with psychological support, from a source identified in advance. Survivors were informed of the reasons
for their participation in the fact-finding exercise, how the information would be used, who would have
access to it, the potential risks involved in participating in the research and how to respond to them, so
that they could participate on the basis of informed consent. All participants were informed that they
could withdraw at any time. Confidentiality was strictly respected in all interviews.
In this report, efforts have been made to protect the identity of survivors, including by the use of
pseudonyms and the non-disclosure of the exact locations of the accounts. No children participated
in this study. The research was also conducted in a way that took into account the social, cultural,
5. M
ethodology for documenting sexual and gender-based violence, internal document, May 2022.
political and economic context of those interviewed, recognising and respecting the norms and values
expressed implicitly and explicitly during interactions.
In addition to victims and witnesses, the FIDH fact-finding delegation interviewed members of
community militias, religious and customary leaders, civil society representatives including youth
and women, as well as journalists and researchers, in order to supplement the testimonies collected.
Given the highly polarised situation in the centre of the country, and in accordance with FIDH’s fact-
finding practices and methods, the fact-finding delegation paid particular attention to community,
ethnic and political balance, and to faithfully reflecting the views of all parties involved. However, the
resulting analysis is the sole responsibility of FIDH.
Gender-sensitive survey methodology
During the fact-finding and research process, FIDH used gender-sensitive fact-finding methodology.
The composition of the fact-finding delegations respected gender balance. The methodology was
tested during fact-finding missions carried out between 2013 and 2015 in northern Mali on crimes of
sexual violence committed by armed groups and state agents, in particular in Gao and Timbuktu, and
then in central Mali in 2018.
FIDH also paid particular attention to contextual elements that could reveal the commission of acts
of gender-based violence, including sexual violence. Specific training in the documentation of sexual
and gender-based violence, based on FIDH’s internal methodology, was provided to all the mission
delegates and contributors to this report prior to missions. Crimes of sexual violence were documented
by FIDH during the missions, in particular rapes of women. While our organisations did not record
any cases of sexual and gender-based violence against men and boys, this does not rule out the
possibility that such acts may have been committed. The phenomenon of sexual and gender-based
violence committed by armed actors in the ongoing conflict remains poorly documented. The number
of acts of sexual and gender-based violence is likely to be much higher than those documented in
this report, due to the difficulties of access to survivors, the specific stigma attached to this type of
violence - which discourages survivors from recounting the violence they have suffered - and the
absence of investigations into these violations by the Malian judicial authorities. These obstacles are
all the more acute in cases of violence against men and boys, which explains the lack of testimonies
or information on such survivors in this report.
Right of reply
At the time of the two fact-finding missions and two advocacy missions carried out in Mali between
2021 and 2022 in preparation for this report, requests for meetings to discuss the documented
violations and the progress of ongoing procedures were addressed to members of the government,
in particular the Prime Minister, Dr Choguel Kokalla Maïga, the Minister of Defence and Veterans’
Affairs, the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, the Minister of State Restructuring and Institutional
Relations, Security and Civil Protection, the Minister of Reconciliation, Peace and National Cohesion,
the Minister of Women, Children and the Family, and the Minister for Institutional Reforms. The
President of the National Transitional Council (CNT), the President of the CNT’s Law Commission,
the President of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) and the National Human
Rights Commission (CNDH) were contacted by FIDH for consultations. Judicial actors, including
the Attorney General of the Bamako Court of Appeal, the Prosecutor of the Specialised Judicial Unit
against Terrorism and Transnational Crime (PJS), and the President of the Indictments Chamber,
were also approached during these missions.
The President of the CVJR and the President of the Indictments Chamber accepted our requests for
meetings and our organisation was able to discuss its findings with them. In the regions of Ségou
and Mopti, the mission delegates met with regional authorities and independent institutions. In
Ségou, discussions were held with the governor’s chief of staff, the head of division of the Regional
Directorate for the Promotion of Women, the Family and Children, the deputy regional director of the
Ministry of Social Protection and the CVJR branch in Ségou. In Mopti, the delegation met with the
advisors on administrative and judicial affairs and security of the Governorate of Mopti, the public
prosecutor of the Court of Appeal of Mopti, the public prosecutor of the High Court of Mopti, the
Directorate of Women, Social Action, the CVJR and the CNDH. FIDH’s fact-finding delegation met with
15 people in Koutiala, including the prefect (accompanied by the mayors of Yorosso, Koutiala, Koury,
and Mahou), public figures, school heads, local elected officials and civil society actors, as well as
journalists from the localities of Yorosso, Koury, Boura, Mahou, Koumbia, and Ourikela.
On 20 October 2022, FIDH sent a draft of this report in its entirety to the competent authorities of
the Transitional Government of Mali (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and Ministry of Defence
and Veterans’ Affairs) so that the latter could provide its observations and additional elements to
the research and analysis presented. Several of these comments have been incorporated into the
relevant parts of the report. In general, the authorities did not recognise the acts and crimes attributed
to the FAMa, in particular in Boni, Massabougou, Sokolo, Moura, Diabali, Sinko, Kogoni-Peulh, and
Belidanedji, while stating that “it would be premature to classify these acts as war crimes while the
investigations are underway” (comments by the authorities on the report, received on 14 November
2022).
This report has been updated until 15 November 2022.
Mali, Dogon country, villages along Bandiagara cliffs, landscape from the top of the cliff.
© Daniel RIFFET / Photononstop / Photononstop via AFP
I. CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE

SECURITY CRISIS IN CENTRAL MALI
A. The year 2022: a turning point for violence in central Mali
The year 2022 is likely to be the deadliest on record in Mali since the conflict began in 2012.6 According
to MINUSMA, in the first half of 2022, the total number of victims of human rights violations and abuses
perpetrated by all parties to the conflict (jihadist groups, self-defence groups, and defence and security
forces) increased by 35% compared to the last half of 2021, rising from 948 to 1,279 between January
6. A
rmed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022 : The Sahel. Mid-Year Update, accessed
on 20 October 2022, https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/sahel/mid-year-update.
and June 2022.7 The majority of victims were in the centre of the country. Another trend noted by
MINUSMA over the same period is the increase in the number of victims of violations attributable
to Malian defence and security forces supported by “foreign elements” operating in the centre of the
country.8
The acute deterioration of the situation in the central regions of Ségou and Mopti comes after years
of state neglect, with the establishment of community-based militias to deal with incursions by JNIM-
affiliated jihadist groups. After strengthening its grip on political power through two consecutive coups,
the Malian army, supported by paramilitary partners from the Wagner Group, launched a new offensive
in central Mali in late 2021. The state’s violent return contributed to the exacerbation of violence at
the local level and has led to an unprecedented level of human rights violations against the civilian
population. Fulani communities are the primary targets of these serious abuses.
In 2020 and 2021, Malian security forces adopted a defensive posture in Ségou and Mopti, remaining
in their camps rather than conducting patrols: in most cases, they did not even respond to calls for help
from rural inhabitants under threat from jihadists, in some instances even accepting local ceasefire
agreements with fighters to avoid trouble.
In December 2021, the transitional authorities launched “Operation Keletigui”, a large-scale military
offensive in central Mali. The diversification of their security partnerships and the authorisation of
additional offensive tactics that put civilians at high risk appear to have provided a new framework for
addressing security issues. Paramilitary forces from the Wagner Group, a private military company
close to the Kremlin with no official existence, known for its disregard for international humanitarian
law,9 and practising torture and extrajudicial executions, began deployment in Mali in January 2022 to
support Operation Keletigui. Although the Malian authorities deny the presence of foreign mercenaries
and claim that cooperation is limited to the presence of Russian “trainers”, it is estimated that the Malian
government has recruited approximately 1,000 mercenaries from the Wagner Group.
This military partnership with the Wagner Group, which European countries considered incompatible
with their security operations in Mali, further deteriorated relations between Paris and Bamako. At
the same time, the junta entered a period of international isolation from January to June 2022, with
the closure of its borders and economic and financial sanctions voted by ECOWAS. The transition’s
proposed electoral timetable, pushed back to 2026, was deemed too slow by its regional partners. In
7. M
INUSMA, Note sur les tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l’Homme et au droit international humanitaire au Mali,
1er juillet – 31 décembre 2022, (Note on trends in violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of
international humanitarian law in Mali, 1 July – 31 December 2021), March 2022, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/
default/files/note_tendances_rev_typo_juillet-dec_2021_final_220324.pdf ; MINUSMA, Note trimestrielle sur les tendances des
violations et atteintes aux droits de l’Homme au Mali, 1er janvier – 31 mars 2022, (Quarterly note on trends in human rights violations
and abuses in Mali, 1 January – 31 March 2022), May 2022, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/220530_
notetrimestrielle_jan-mars2022_final.pdf ; MINUSMA, Note trimestrielle des tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de
l’Homme au Mali, 1er avril – 30 juin 2022 (Quarterly note on trends in human rights violations and abuses in Mali, 1 April – 30 June
2022), August 2022, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/note_trimestrielle_-avril_a_juin_2022_-_note_sur_les_
tendances_des_violations_et_atteintes_aux_droits_de_lhomme_et_au_droit_international_humanitaire_au_mali.pdf.
8. In its correspondence with FIDH in November 2022, the Transitional Government of Mali underlined an overall 20% reduction
in human rights violations committed by all parties to the conflict, as reported in the MINUSMA quarterly note (July-September
2022) on trends in human rights violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law in Mali, published
on 9 November 2022. However, the same MINUSMA note confirms a 33% increase in cases attributed to the FAMa, while
attacks by groups that signed the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation increased by 21% over the same period, and attacks
attributed to JNIM and ISGS jihadists decreased by 45%. MINUSMA, Note trimestrielle des tendances des violations et atteintes
aux droits de l’Homme au Mali, 1er juillet – 30 septembre 2022 (Quarterly note on trends in human rights violations and abuses
in Mali, 1 July – 30 September 2022), November 2022, paras 16-17, https://minusma.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/
quaterly_note_july_-september_2022_finalsrsg.pdf.
9. In June 2022, lawyers from FIDH, Memorial Human Rights Center (HRC) and Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression
(SCM) filed a complaint at the European Court of Human Rights following the murder of a Syrian national by members of
the Wagner Group in 2017. See FIDH, “Wagner in Syria: Appeal to European Court of Human Rights after case dismissed
in Russia”, Press release, 9 June 2022, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/north-africa-middle-east/syria/syria-russia-wagner-
appeal-european-court-human-rights.
February 2022, citing obstacles created by the Malian transitional authorities, France and its Western
allies announced the end of the Barkhane and Takuba operations in Mali, followed shortly afterwards
by the suspension of the European Union training mission (EUTM). According to Western diplomats
in Bamako, the suspension of these missions removed several safeguards that had encouraged the
Malian military to monitor and prevent human rights violations in the country.
At the same time, there has been an increase in the militarisation of the political authorities in the
capital. With the second coup d’état in May 2021, which resulted in Mali’s international isolation
and the imposition of sanctions, the military strengthened its grip on the government. Civil society
actors who had helped to manage the transition, through broad popular mobilisation in Bamako,
were gradually side-lined by members of the junta. “Since the second coup, the government has had the
same approach as the soldiers. It’s the military victory that interests them, not the negotiations,” a Western
diplomat stressed.
Having abandoned central Mali in recent years, the state returned with full force. The new joint offensive
by the Malian armed forces and agents of the Wagner Group in the centre of the country caused
heavy losses for the civilian population. Between January and March 2022, there was a rapid increase
in human rights violations, resulting in an escalation and diversification of violence perpetrated by
the military and its partners, including the establishment of a torture camp in Pergue (Diabaly, Ségou
region) run by the Wagner Group (see below, p. 28) and a series of cases of gender-based violence in
Moura (Mopti region). The existence of this torture camp is not acknowledged by the Malian military
authorities, who claim that apprehended suspects are handed over to the Provost Marshall. Malian
soldiers have also resorted to techniques generally attributed to jihadist attackers, such as slitting
the throats of victims and burying explosives in their bodies. At the end of March 2022, the violence
culminated in the killing of hundreds of civilians and the rape of dozens of women by the FAMa and
Wagner Group agents during a five-day operation in Moura (Mopti region).10
B. The crisis shifts southwards
Since 2015, central Mali - which encompasses the two administrative regions of Mopti and Ségou11
– has become the epicentre of violence linked to jihadist insurgencies, the response of national and
international security forces in the framework of the “fight against terrorism”, and the emergence of
a multitude of armed self-defence groups of varying degrees of autonomy. Between the beginning
of 2019 and June 2022, the period covered by this report, according to quarterly reports from the
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and data collected on a daily basis by several
independent organisations, most violence against civilians in Mali took place in the centre of the
country, with a tendency to shift further south.
As jihadist groups from Mopti approach the neighbouring Ségou region, concerns are growing. This
area is the site of the Office du Niger, with an irrigation scheme to provide land suitable for agriculture,
which supplies the inhabitants of the capital with basic foodstuffs such as rice and onions. A jihadist
takeover of these resources could have serious consequences for already fragile national food security.
No authority seems to be able to contain the worrying shift of the conflict towards the south. The
attack on the military base of the Soundiata-Keïta camp in Kati (Koulikoro region) on 22 July 2022
10. T
he government denies the violations attributed to the FAMa, which, it says, “operates autonomously on the ground in strict
compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law” (comments by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans’
Affairs, November 2022).
11. T
he administrative map of Mali has evolved in recent years. New regions have been created, in particular in the centre of the
country: Bandiagara, San, Douentza, Koutiala. Mali now has twenty regions.
Map of JNIM’s Presence and Activity per Cercle in Mali
Source: International Crisis Group, Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM,
Africa Report No. 306, 10 December 2021, p. 32, Appendix A.
by a JNIM kamikaze commando confirms this. The event, which occurred the day after a series of
six attacks in the centre of the country, demonstrated JNIM’s capacity to move closer to the capital
Bamako, and the determination of jihadist groups to undermine the Malian state by attacking the city
that symbolises military power.
Ségou
LJNIM’s influence goes far beyond the “front line” of 2012,12 and varies in degree: in some areas, JNIM-
affiliated groups have an almost hegemonic presence, resulting in a reduction in violence against
civilians; in others, its presence is contested, resulting in numerous deaths, either through conflict
between the belligerents, or through individual or collective punishment. Finally, in some areas, its
influence is marginal, but this does not imply a lack of violence (mainly against the security forces or
state representatives).
Until 2020, with the exception of the Macina cercle, the Ségou region had remained relatively untouched
by the violence in the neighbouring Mopti region. Its northern peripheries (notably Nampalari) were
already the site of jihadist group activity and self-defence militias had already been formed. Since then,
the jihadists have gradually gained many localities, although their presence remains highly contested.
According to several observers, jihadists are now active in five of the seven cercles (administrative
territorial divisions) that make up the Ségou region.13 This is particularly the case in some villages in the
Niono cercle, where since mid-2021, armed jihadist groups – likely to be linked to the Katiba Macina –
and self-defence groups, mostly made up of Dozos (traditional hunters), have been engaged in clashes.
Since 2020, a large part of the Niono cercle has been removed from the control of the Defence and
Security Forces (FDS), which had only a few bases in the main urban centres and conducted almost
no patrols in rural areas. Civil servants, including judges and prosecutors, do not perform their duties
because of the security risks they face. Schools are mostly closed. Many elected officials have fled the
violence and settled in the regional capital and the district of Bamako. The justice system is inoperative in
the affected localities, as it is impossible to execute court orders outside the towns. Taxes are no longer
collected. Only health workers (and some NGOs) continue to carry out their work, with the acceptance of
the armed groups.
The situation in Niono cercle in 2022 is comparable to that prevailing for several years in most of the Mopti
region in 2021, and in particular in Macina, Plateau Dogon, Seno and Hairé, where the state was absent,14
and the population was forced to choose sides between the jihadists and the self-defence groups.15 In
this context, the law of the strongest prevailed, and violence against the civilian population was rife. In
2022, the situation in the Ségou region deteriorated even further with an increased security threat to the
civilian population,16 and certain communities in particular, after the army and its Russian partners began
to regain control of the area.
12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM, Africa Report No. 306, 10 December
2021.
13. B
arouéli, Bla, Macina, Niono, San, Ségou, and Tominian.
14. T
he Malian authorities claim that the state has strengthened its presence over the past two years, with 325 out of 338
administrative posts filled nationwide, including governors, prefects and deputy prefects (comment by the Ministry of Defence
and Veterans’ Affairs, November 2022). FIDH does not have the means to verify this information.
15. M
acina is referred to here as the historical region, which is located in the flooded area of the Niger River, straddling the cercles
of Macina, Tenenkou, and Youwarou.
16. P
eople’s Coalition for the Sahel, The Sahel: What has changed, Progress Report of the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, June 2022.
Previously, jihadists had passed through from time to time, but without making much of a mark.
According to a local elected official, “They told people not to pay taxes to the state. But that was as far as it
went.”17
The pressure intensified in mid-2020, and clashes began in October 2020. At that time, according to
several testimonies collected in Ségou by FIDH, jihadists came from the neighbouring Macina - part of
which is controlled by the Katiba Macina - and began to impose their rule from their bases located in the
wooded areas.
“It was Macina that brought the problem to Niono,” a man from central Mali who has played
a role in negotiations between the different armed groups in recent months told the FIDH
delegation.18
In Bamako, many observers are concerned about this situation. The Niono cercle is approximately 100
kilometres from Ségou, the region’s capital, which is a two-hour drive from Bamako.
“If Ségou is affected, then it’s as if Bamako is also affected. Who would have thought a few
years ago that fighting would be taking place three hours away from Bamako?”, one observer
said.
Koutiala
Since 2016, the advance of the jihadists, most of whom are members of the Katiba Macina, towards
Koutiala and its region, the most populous in the country, has highlighted a long-term strategy: to oust the
state little by little, without exerting too much pressure on the population – first by asking the population to
stop paying taxes; then by threatening state representatives and elected officials; and finally by attacking
the FDS with the aim of driving them out of the area. This relatively slow strategy is beginning to yield
results. The state representatives and local elected officials met by FIDH expressed their powerlessness
in this regard, even though the jihadists’ camps and their movements are known.
Hiding in valleys and caves in the wooded area of Boura (Yorosso cercle, Sikasso region), 10 km from the
border with Burkina, the jihadist groups began their attacks against the FDS as early as 2016, although
they did not intensify their attacks on Sikasso until 2019.19 Most attacks have targeted state officials,
elected representatives and local public figures. From 2019 to 2021, the jihadists mainly focused on the
FDS, including attacks on the gendarmerie and police stations, but also on Water and Forestry officers
and sub-prefectures. They also abducted village chiefs who collected taxes and ordered that no more
taxes be paid to the state. This strategy of abduction and pressure resulted in village chiefs and public
officials who collected taxes fleeing Yorosso and Koutiala cercles.
Since 2020, following pressure from these same jihadist groups, all state representatives have left and
schools have closed in the regions of Boura (Yorosso cercle, Sikasso region), Tiere (Koutiala cercle,
Sikasso), Koumbia (Yorosso cercle, Sikasso region), Sanguela (Koutiala cercle, Sikasso region), and Ourikela
(Yorosso cercle, Sikasso region).20 In these villages, the jihadists have set up patrols to check that women
17. Interview with a local elected official, Ségou, 15 September 2021.

18. Interview with a mediator in Bamako, 13 September 2021.
19. Interview with an elected official from Yorosso cercle conducted in Koutiala, 19 September 2021.
20. Interviews with a public figure from Yorosso cercle, a teacher from the commune, and a local elected official conducted in
Koutiala. September 2021.
are covered, and that the ban on football and civil marriages is respected.21 The jihadists have gradually
imposed increasingly strict rules on the population, while generalising their mode of governance, through
justice and the levying of their own taxes. A further consequence of the state’s absence is the possibility
of the formation of self-defence militias. The FIDH delegation received information that discussions on
this issue are underway in Yorosso. Moreover, it seems that Dozos from the area have gone to fight
alongside Dozos who are active in the Mopti region: it is not impossible that, on their return, they will try
to set up self-defence groups in Koutiala.
C. Growth of militias and ethnicisation of the conflict: major risks faced by

the Fulani populations
Following the counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Malian army with French support
from 2013 onwards with Operation Serval, the dispersal of various jihadist groups in the rural areas
of central Mali where the state is absent has led to violent competition between communities for
resources and access to land. Gradually, these communities have taken up arms to defend themselves.
The growth in militia activity has led to competition between armed groups for the protection of
the civilian population. As a major consequence of the organisation of this economy of violence
around community objectives, armed groups have been formed on the basis of ethnicity. The civilian
population, and particularly the Fulani community, has been the target of numerous deadly attacks
perpetrated by self-defence militias and the FDS.22
It is essential to take account of local geopolitical factors connected to natural resources to

understand why jihadist groups have become closer to Fulani communities in central Mali. Their
long-standing ambition to extend their influence has led to a strategic calculation to recruit from the
marginalised populations who are under-represented in the Malian army and state. In some areas, the
jihadists have been called upon by herders (who, in the Ségou region as in the rest of the country, are
mostly from the Fulani community) to enforce their right to graze their livestock and to defend them
in conflicts with farmers (from various communities, including many Bambara and Dogon). Alliances
established with certain local public figures and elected officials are also a key element in explaining
this rapprochement.
These various elements have contributed to the gradual development of antagonism, with Fulani
communities being assimilated to jihadists and therefore targeted by the violence of the army and
Dogon or Bambara self-defence groups. This dynamic in turn encourages young Fulani men to join
jihadist groups to provide protection for their people.
In response, the Dozos from Niono (Ségou region), who had already formed hunters’ associations,23
and villagers, formed self-defence militias and called in the Dozos from Macina for reinforcement. The
latter had already been trained and equipped with weapons to confront the jihadists for several years.
Some of these militiamen, who already had experience of taking up arms while fighting in Liberia, Côte
d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, joined the Dan Na Ambassagou groups. As soon as they arrived in the Ségou
area, they started to set up camps, to erect roadblocks and to establish a hierarchical structure. There
are now three main camps in the Niono cercle: Bouyagui Were, B324 and Dogofry (the main camp).
21. Idem.
22. In particular the Ogossagou massacre on 23 March 2019, when more than 150 Fulani civilians were killed by men from the
Dan Na Ambassagou group, a Dozo community militia. The village was attacked again on 14 February 2020, killing at least
35 people.
23. T
anguy Quidelleur. “Courtiser l’État et traquer les djihadistes: mobilisation, dissidence et politique des chasseurs-miliciens
dogons au Mali”, Critique internationale, vol. 94, No. 1, 2022, pp. 53-75.
24. S
ome of the municipalities in the Niono cercle, located in the irrigated area of the Office du Niger have a sector name defined
“Each group of Dozos that is formed at village level is autonomous, but since 2020,
coordination has been put in place at the level of the whole Niono cercle, with the aim of
carrying out joint efforts and coming to the aid of each other in the event of an attack,” a
senior member of the movement underlined.
Each camp has a leader, who is answerable to a coordination unit headed by Modibo Dembele, with
several spokespersons (Sina Dembele, Oumarou Coulibaly, Aboubacar Konare). This coordination unit
is in direct contact with the chief of the Macina Dozos, Mama Dembele. Taking the place of state
authorities, the groups ask villagers to contribute to the war effort by putting pressure on the families.
This strategy has resulted in forced recruitment, violent robbery and extortion at the community level.
“The Dozos recruit by force,” an inhabitant of the Niono cercle told FIDH.
“They come to see the families and they ask for a child to carry out patrols (...). When they
arrive in a village, they demand that each family give one of their children to the group to
fight alongside them. Patrols are organised and each family has to take turns to participate.
If a family refuses, they are ordered to pay a large fine,” an elected official of the Niono
cercle reported.25
Several inhabitants of the area confirmed these methods to FIDH delegations.
In response to the dynamics observed in the Niono cercle, as in the rest of central Mali, local and
international human rights organisations very quickly sounded the alarm regarding the increase in
serious acts of violence committed against the civilian population on the basis of ethnicity. Several
reports, including those by Human Rights Watch in 2017,26 and FIDH and AMDH in 2018,27 documented
the targeting of Fulani communities by the FDS. In 2019, International Crisis Group stated, “This
violence qualifies as ethnic cleansing, an unprecedented crime [in central Mali]”.28 Recent data from
ACLED show the extent of the phenomenon.
The testimonies collected during the FIDH fact-finding missions in 2021 and 2022 reinforce the
observations already made by these NGOs on the alarming situation of persecution suffered by
members of the Fulani communities in Mali. In central Mali, the Fulani population is specifically
targeted by self-defence groups and the FDS. For example, ethnically motivated summary executions
of men and rapes of women were documented in Moura in April 2022 (see below, p. 40). Other crimes
committed on the basis of ethnicity such as enforced disappearance and torture (see below, p. 25) are
also documented in this report. Malian authorities deny the involvement of the FAMa in the targeting
of Fulani communities.
by the Office at the time of colonisation.

25. Interview with a local elected official, conducted in Ségou, 16 September 2021.
26. H
uman Rights Watch, “Mali: Unchecked abuses in military operations”, 8 September 2017, accessed on 14 September 2022,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/08/mali-unchecked-abuses-military-operations.
27. FIDH
and AMDH, In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Fact-finding mission
report, 2018, p. 35, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre-of-mali_population-sized-between-terrorism-and-counter-
terrorism_727_en_november2018.pdf.
28. International Crisis Group, Central Mali: Putting a Stop to Ethnic Cleansing, Q&A, 25 March 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/
africa/sahel/mali/centre-du-mali-enrayer-le-nettoyage-ethnique.
A Fulani herder brings the cattle back to a fenced area a day after that a fire ravaged the camp for displaced people
in Bamako on April 29, 2020. A fire on April 28, 2020, destroyed much of the main camp for displaced people in Bamako,
where more than 1,000 people who fled the violence in central Mali have found refuge. © AFP / Michele CATTANI
II. CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, VICTIMS

OF A MULTITUDE OF SERIOUS
VIOLATIONS
Attacks on the civilian populations are the major feature of the conflict in central Mali over the period
studied in this report. Several types of violations, sometimes targeting a particular community, are
committed against civilian populations by all parties to the conflict. Many of the violations described in
this report had already been documented by FIDH and AMDH in 2018, including summary executions,
enforced disappearances, cases of sexual violence and arbitrary arrests.
A. Violations of the right to life
1. By the FAMa and their international partners
The FAMa and their international partners committed serious violations of the right to life in the
centre of the country during the period covered by the report. Summary executions and mass killings,
along with other types of violations, were documented by FIDH and AMDH in 2018.29 During the 2021
and 2022 missions, the FIDH delegation documented numerous cases of summary executions, in
particular in the Douentza cercle (Mopti region) and the Niono cercle (Ségou region) and noted that
since the launch of Operation Keletigui at the end of 2021, violence has increased significantly.
Douentza Cercle
Boni
The FIDH delegation documented very serious human rights violations in the Douentza cercle, where
the FDS based in Boni (Douentza cercle, Mopti region) committed summary executions during the
first half of 2021. The victims were mostly from the Fulani community.
On 7 January 2021, the FAMa arrested two young men from Serma (Boni commune, Douentza cercle),
aged 27 and 22, on the grounds that they were carrying military uniforms and a telephone in their
bags. The men were suspected of belonging to the Katiba Serma, linked to the JNIM. Their bodies
were found in a mass grave on 12 January 2021, five kilometres from the village of Yarama (Hairé
commune). On 13 January 2021, the FAMa arrested two talibé children, including one with a disability,
in Linkaïna (Hairé commune, Douentza cercle). Their bodies were found the next day seven kilometres
from the village of Boro. On 15 January 2021, the FAMa arrested five men aged between 35 and 47
in the vicinity of the village of Boro, located about 15 kilometres from Boni. One of them was a liaison
officer for the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Their bodies were found on 21 January 2021
a few hundred metres from Boro: three were buried in a mass grave, two others had been dumped
nearby. Their throats appeared to have been slit.
Human rights activists and public figures in Boni also informed the FIDH delegation of other abuses
allegedly committed by the FAMa in the months that followed.
On 18 March 2021, at around 9 am, a military vehicle was on its way to the centre of Boni when it hit
an improvised explosive device (IED). Two soldiers were injured, one of whom later died of his injuries.
Retaliation was immediate. According to several witnesses, several vehicles were following the FAMa
car when it hit the explosive. The soldiers made all the passengers get out. They ordered two cattle
traders from the Fulani community, F.F. and G.G., from the village of Ouro-N’Guerrou (Hairé commune),
aged 37 and 35 respectively, to lie down at the side of the road, and executed them on the spot.
“A soldier forced them to get off their motorbikes and to lie on their stomachs. In front of us,
the soldier gunned them down,” a witness to the incident told FIDH.30
Once reinforcements had arrived from the camp, the soldiers spread terror in the town: they fired
warning shots in the market, flogged passers-by, and threatened residents. The soldiers prevented
the parents of the two victims from recovering the bodies of their children. Some of them said that
29. F
IDH and AMDH, In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Fact-finding mission
report, 2018.
30. Interview with a Boni resident, conducted in Bamako, 22 September 2021.
they were beaten by the soldiers, who also stole their personal belongings, including phones. It was
only after the intervention of elected representatives that the parents were able to recover the bodies.
Several days later, on 23 March 2021, at around 4 pm, the FAMa stopped a bus at the crossroads,
close to their camp, to carry out a check, and detained dozens of passengers. The bus had left Bamako
the day before, headed for Boni. According to a witness, they separated the passengers, the majority
of whom were Fulani, into three groups: women and children, young men and older men.31
“The soldiers blindfolded the young and old. There were about 35 of them. They beat young
people with sticks and whips. Then two vehicles arrived. The soldiers made all the men get
in - except the bus driver. And they drove towards the camp.”
According to survivors, they were again beaten inside the camp. Some were burned with cigarette
butts; others were whipped with belts. The next day, about 20 men were able to return to the bus. They
all had injuries to their heads, backs and arms.
The remaining passengers, 13 men in total, all Fulani and mostly from Burkina Faso, were killed and
buried not far from the camp, according to testimonies collected during the mission. A herder claimed
to have seen two trucks leaving the camp the day after their arrest and to have seen the soldiers
digging a mass grave a few hundred metres away. Residents tried to approach the area but were
afraid.
On 6 May 2021, soldiers from the FAMa burst into the Boni market and arrested H.H., a 64-year-old
trader, in front of his shop. Several witnesses saw them take him without saying anything, strike him,
then make him get into one of their vehicles before heading towards the camp.
His daughter, who agreed to testify openly,32 recounted the steps she took:
“A gendarme called me and put my father on the phone, but he quickly interrupted the
discussion because we were speaking Fulani. For two days I came to bring food to the
camp without seeing my father. On the third day, the gendarme called me and told me to
come to the camp with a relative. With one of my father’s cousins, we went back at about
10 o’clock. The gendarme asked me to leave him alone with the cousin. That’s when he told
him that my father was dead.”
The relatives asked for the body, but they were refused. Two days later, H.H.’s cousin sent someone
to collect the money H.H. had with him on the day of his arrest (1.5 million CFA francs, according to
his family) and the keys to the shop. The military gave him the keys and the phone, but not the money.
H.H. had 13 children. The youngest was five years old. His daughter filed a complaint with the public
prosecutor of the Mopti High Court, who is also the prosecutor of the Military Court. But so far, no one
has been questioned.
Several cases of enforced disappearances involving members of the FAMa were reported to FIDH
during the same period. On 8 April 2021, two young men aged 24 and 36 were arrested and taken
to the Boni army camp; they have not been seen since. On 18 April 2021, a trader was arrested in
front of his shop by the FAMa, in front of his eight-year-old daughter, he was taken to the army camp
and has been missing since then. On 29 April 2021, the day of the Boni fair, the FAMa arrested three
stallholders and took them to the camp; they have not been seen since.
31. Interview with Boni residents, conducted in Bamako, 21 and 22 September 2021.
32. T
o protect her safety, FIDH has decided not to reveal her identity. Interview conducted in Bamako, 28 September 2021.
“We don’t know why all these people were arrested. The FAMa and the gendarmes never
give any explanation to the relatives. All these problems started when Captain Bakayoko
arrived. Everyone is afraid of him in Boni,” a relative of one of the disappeared said.
According to several sources contacted by the FIDH fact-finding delegation, during the first half of
2021, the FAMa and the Boni gendarmes did not transfer any prisoners to Sévaré or Bamako. Many
of the relatives of the disappeared have little hope of seeing them alive again. During a meeting
organised in Boni between gendarmes and inhabitants, questions were asked about the fate of the
disappeared. According to witnesses, the gendarmes replied that “the past is the past” and that it was
now time to “move forward”.
Niono Cercle
In the Ségou region, the FDS have also been accused of abuses against the civilian population,
including mass killings. Since 2020, the Niono cercle in particular has been the scene of escalating
violence, a sign of the extension of the crisis to the south of the region. Documentation of violence
against the civilian population revealed collaboration between the FAMa and self-defence militias,
and the targeting of the Fulani community in the region, as illustrated by the following examples.
Diabali
In the vicinity of Diabali Commune (Niono cercle), the FAMa are accused of having conducted several
operations in February 2020 resulting in the death of 15 civilians in the three villages of Massabougou
(7 February), Sinko (11 February) and Kogoni-Peuhl (12 February).
On 16 February, they entered the village of Belidanedji (commune of Diabali) while a baptism was
taking place. According to witnesses, the Malian soldiers arrived at around 11.30 am in 15 vehicles,
including three covered trucks.
“They surrounded the village and started shooting at everything that moved. They went to
the site of the baptism and killed four men there, all from the same family. Then they killed
others they came across in the streets: old people, a father and his son, two young people
in front of a shop, another who tried to flee (...) Then they looted the warehouse where the
farmers store their grain. They left at around 5 pm,” P.P., an inhabitant of the village, told
FIDH.
P.P. said that he buried four bodies that day, and a fifth the following day. He said the military took
away the other bodies. A local man looking for a relative reportedly saw the bodies piled up in the
military camp in Diabali. In total, 20 people died that day (19 Fulani and one Bambara).33
Since January 2022, T.T., a rice farmer from the village of Koramebougou, in the Sokolo commune
(Ségou region), has witnessed repeated harassment and attacks by the military against the civilian
population, including children. He told FIDH about a series of extrajudicial executions, arrests and
pillaging.
“In Sokolo, there’s no problem between the Fulani and the Dozos”, he said. “Our biggest
problem is the military. One Monday, the military came in 20 vehicles, raided our market and
executed two people, one of them a member of my family. They slit his throat at his home.
33. Interview conducted in Ségou, 15 September 2021.
A month later, the military came back and killed two more people in the market. Later, the
FAMa came back in more than 30 vehicles, and they looted a warehouse funded by WAEMU
[West African Economic and Monetary Union] belonging to the Fulani community, taking
more than 200 bags of rice with them. There was another warehouse belonging to the
Songhai where grain was stored, but they didn’t touch that. Two other people were found
dead. In June 2022, the military shot and killed a man who was fetching fodder for his
cattle. They arrested several men, including some who are still missing.”34 35
According to testimonies, since January 2022, the FAMa have arrested more than 50 people in Sokolo,
including 18 children. At the time of the FIDH fact-finding mission in June 2022, only four of them had
been released.
Since the end of 2021, villagers in Ndola, 12 km from Niono, have also been victims of threats. Their
situation illustrates the way in which the FAMa sometimes work alongside the Dozo militia, receiving
false accusations and becoming involved in conflicts between villages.
Ndola is nestled between two villages whose communities have been fighting over land for decades:
the predominantly Bambara village of Tiemaba and the Fulani village of Aliou Boubou Were. After
the destruction of two bridges by fighters in October 2021, the Fulani of Ndola, allied with the Fulani
of Aliou Boubou Were, suddenly found themselves on the front line of the conflict, while their lands,
situated nearer the road, became the most accessible area for military patrols.
A witness from Ndola told FIDH: “The men from Tiemaba immediately mobilised more than
40 Dozo allies from the region and besieged our village. The first victim was a man who
was going to have his sick child treated. They shot him in the head. On the second day, they
executed another man. We informed the mayor of Niono and the commander of the Niono
brigade. The next day, a reduced patrol of five vehicles came from Niono to Tiemaba, Aliou
Boubou Were and Ndola. They returned several times a few days apart.”36
At first, the presence of the patrols seemed to reassure the inhabitants of Ndola, but subsequent
patrols rapidly degenerated. When the military returned for a fourth patrol with 15 vehicles, they shot
a mentally disabled man who ran when he saw them coming. That same day, the military arrested
18 men in Ndola, and took them to the gendarmerie in Niono, as the men from Tiemaba had convinced
the authorities that Ndola was harbouring jihadists.
“When we went to the authorities to explain that these men were not jihadists, the 18 men
were released. But the military continued their patrol. They have come back eight times
since October. They took one man, Amadi, who was in his field and cut his throat on the
spot. They also slit the throat of his seven-year-old nephew who had come with him. At a
bridge, they shot a man on a motorbike who was just crossing. The villagers sensed danger
when they saw a plane passing by and tried to run to hide. The military went from house to
house. They arrested 23 men, including Saidou Diallo who was almost 100 years old, as well
as his son and grandson. They tied up the others and loaded them into vehicles heading for
Niono. But as they were leaving the place, when they got to the bridge, they slit the throats
of Saidou, his son and grandson, and two other men. Then they carried on to Niono with the
other detainees. A few weeks later, Dozo fighters stole 300 cattle in Ndola.”37
34. Interview with a Koramebougou resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

35. M
alian military authorities denied pillaging the WAEMU-funded warehouse (comments received in November 2022).
36. Interview with a Ndola resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.
37. Interview with Ndola residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.
In early March 2022, two of these detainees, Sidi Bare Bah and Seku Bah, were identified among
35 bodies found burnt to death. According to a witness, “a white soldier,” probably from the Wagner
Group, was driving the military vehicle which transported the blindfolded prisoners to a mass grave in
the hamlet of Danguèrè Wotoro (Dogofry commune, Ségou region). They were allegedly taken there
from the “Pergue” camp in Diabaly, a military camp that MINUSMA handed over to the FAMa at the
request of the government when Operation Keletigui was launched. The Wagner Group agents took
over the Pergue camp, which was not far from the FAMa camp in Diabaly, and converted it, in the
presence of the FAMa, into a torture camp.
The use of various practices of torture have been reported including electrocution, flogging, drowning
and mock executions. One witness saw the bodies of the 35 men being burnt and detected the smell
of petrol. In addition to the two men from Ndola already identified, local residents were able to identify
the burnt bodies of several men from surrounding villages who had been detained in Niono in recent
months.
Zanakoro
During the same period, the inhabitants of the Fulani village of Zanakoro (10 km from the village of
M’Pokok, Macina, Ségou region) described similar abuses, in the context of the collaboration between
Dozos and the FAMa.38
“In March 2022, soldiers came to Zanakoro, which is in the middle of several Bambara
villages that want us to leave. They report on us and give false information about us to the
soldiers. During their first raid in March 2022, the military arrested seven men who were
trying to escape. They were taken to different camps before being released,” one of the
witnesses interviewed told FIDH.
But the next raid did not unfold in the same way. On 28 May 2022, a large contingent of soldiers returned
in 26 vehicles with two Dozo fighters recognised by the inhabitants of the surrounding villages. They
were members of the self-defence group led by Seyni Diarra and they took part in the raid.
“They arrested ten men in the mosque and then searched all the houses for four hours,
stealing the women’s valuables and pillaging our grain stores. Two women gave birth to
stillborn babies during the raid. The soldiers arrested a total of 16 men, aged between 45
and 78. We thought they would be released like the other seven before, but we found no
trace of them in the different camps,” the same witness continued.
Four days later, children herding cattle in the forest found the bodies of some of the men who had
been arrested, hastily buried between the villages of Togoloba and Togolokora. The villagers were
able to identify them by their bracelets and wedding rings. According to two other witnesses, no
foreign soldiers took part in this raid.
2. By jihadist groups
The jihadists’ strategy of conquest is based on a combination of terror and seduction: on the one hand,
they offer an alternative to the failings of the state, by providing a new form of governance, particularly
in terms of justice. Education is at the heart of this strategy, with the promotion of the Koranic school.
38. Interview with Zanakoro residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.
Jihadist groups also allow health workers to carry out their mission in the field. On the other hand, they
threaten, abduct and kill all those who stand in the way of their expansion: security forces, public officials,
elected representatives and local authorities, religious dignitaries, etc.
Mopti Region
From 2015 onwards, jihadists carried out a campaign of terror in the Douentza cercle (Mopti region),
particularly against Dogon communities in Boni and Mondoro, who were perceived by JNIM fighters to
be allies of the Malian FDS, or potential members of self-defence militias. In mid-2019, several massacres
against the civilian population were perpetrated by JNIM fighters over a six-week period resulting in the
deaths of 18 people in Mondoro on 1 May 2019, at least 35 people in Sobane Da (Bandiagara cercle,
Mopti region) on 9 June 2019 and 41 in Gangafani and Yoro (Koro cercle, Mopti region) on 17 June 2019.
In parallel with the large-scale killings which were covered by the media, abuses against the civilian
population have increased and become commonplace, with jihadists taking advantage of the absence
of the state in order to extend their influence to new areas. Over the same period, the advance of jihadist
groups also reached the flooded area (Djenne and Mopti cercles) of Mopti region. Since the end of 2021,
violence has spread to the Bandiagara, Bankass, and Niono cercles.
Songho
On the morning of 3 December 2021, about fifty inhabitants of Songho (Bandiangara cercle, Mopti
region), the majority of them women, loaded the firewood they had just collected near the village and
boarded a truck, carrying their babies, which was heading for the weekly market in Bandiagara, about
15 km away. Between eight and nine o’clock, as the driver Elaji Guindo was about to reach the RN 15,
three kilometres from Songho, men in turbans and fatigues burst in, shouting at them to stop in Fulani.
The driver swerved and the vehicle spun around, facing other armed men, in even greater numbers.
They surrounded the van and started firing shots, the driver lost control of the vehicle and it overturned,
leaving many passengers trapped. Several of them were shot. The truck, filled with wood, caught fire. At
least 32 passengers, most of them women and children, died. Eighteen managed to escape.
R.X., one of the survivors, said: “When the driver tried to right the vehicle, I was shot in the
arm. My baby was also hit and did not survive. The vehicle, full of passengers, overturned
and caught fire. I managed to get out and I could hear the people trapped inside screaming.”39
Another survivor who was travelling with his mother told the FIDH fact-finding delegation that the bodies
were so burnt that it was impossible to identify them.
This attack is an example of the violence suffered by rural women who are victims of daily harassment
by Islamist groups in central Mali. It was carried out as part of a punitive campaign waged by jihadists
who, from October 2021 onwards, increasingly resorted to intimidation techniques against inhabitants
in the region, following the breakdown of local agreements, or in retaliation against communities who
refused to sign such agreements.40 According to those interviewed by FIDH in Bankass, this campaign
was seen as a way of punishing or putting pressure on communities suspected of supporting the Dozos,
who refused to be bound by the agreements. The attack on the truck carrying women from Songho to
Bandiagara market is an example of the particular risks faced by women who are responsible for the
care and basic needs of their families.
39. Interview with a Songho resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

Violence between the Dogon and Fulani communities is gradually spreading towards the centre of Mali,
from Koro towards Bankass and Bandiagara. According to a mayor in the region, since 2017, the village of
Songho has been plagued by this violence. The village has become increasingly isolated, abandoned by
the Fulani minority who also left the 17 surrounding villages several years ago.
The majority of the inhabitants of the Dogon villages have also fled in recent years under the threat of
jihadism, leaving the villages around Songho strangely empty, to the extent that those who remain in
the area refer to them as “ghost villages”.41 The jihadists have taken over these ghost villages, taking
advantage of the hills, cliffs and recesses, and have ordered the inhabitants of Songho to stop going
to the fields where they used to grow groundnuts, millet and fonio to sell at Bandiagara market, under
threat of being shot. This situation hardly changed with creation of a small group of Dan Na Ambassagou
fighters for the protection of Songho. The women of Songho, no longer able to cultivate their land, began
to collect firewood to exchange for food at Bandiagara market.
“Since the end of 2019, jihadists have been attacking anyone who goes to the field, women,
children or men,” A.M, a woman from Songho who survived the truck attack, told FIDH.42
“The jihadists [...] burned some of our fields and told us to stay away from the others. They
execute anyone who disobeys. Since we can no longer farm our land, we have to collect wood
in small groups of three or four women to sell at the market to feed our families.”
But since the December attack, these women cannot even count on this income, as drivers refuse to
make the journey.
“Now we go in search of baobab leaves and we grow some vegetables on the outskirts of the
village, which are taken by trike to Bandiagara market,” A.M said.
“I used to grow millet. When that was no longer possible, I went to cut wood. But now I can’t
even rely on that. These days, women walk to Bandiagara, where they collect small parcels
that their relatives in Bamako send to them to support them,” C.T., whose mother was killed
in the truck attack, explained.43
Diallassagou, Diamweli and Deguessagou
There have been other more recent cases of such punitive deadly attacks by jihadist groups in retaliation
for the breakdown of local agreements in Mopti region. The FIDH delegation collected several testimonies
from people who had lost a family member or witnessed the violence of the 18 June 2022 attack in the
villages of Diallassagou, Diamweli and Deguessagou.
T.F. an inhabitant of Diallassagou said: “The incident started at around 4 pm, the attackers
came on more than 100 motorbikes (two people on each motorbike), surrounded the village of
Diallassagou, and went from house to house looking for the men. They arrested about 50 men,
tied them up and took them about two kilometres away from the village to execute them. They
then robbed and burnt shops and storehouses, taking money and other goods. Afterwards,
some of them headed for Diamweli and Deguessagou. In all, they killed 132 people, all men,
including 67 in Diallassagou, 56 in Diamweli and nine in Deguessagou.”
41. Interviews with Songho residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

According to other eyewitnesses, the attackers were looking for people suspected of having “collaborated”
with the Malian FDS, in this area where local agreements had been reached in February 2021 between
the population and the jihadists: a “non-aggression” undertaking by the armed groups in exchange for a
commitment by the inhabitants not to report them to the authorities.
According to T.M., another inhabitant of Diallassagou: “[The jihadists] entered M.’s house, his
wife had begged them to spare his life because he was ill. They said no, that they had come
for revenge, claiming ‘It was your men who called the gendarmerie’. The attackers stayed in
the village until dawn. The soldiers arrived after sunrise.”
These serious human rights violations, attributed by the Malian authorities to fighters from the Katiba
Macina of Amadou Kouffa, a JNIM member, were allegedly committed in reprisal for military operations
by the FAMa. Information transmitted by villagers to the FAMa led to the “Maliko” anti-terrorist operations
on 24 May 2022 in Diallassagou and Diamweli, during which the army announced that it had “neutralised
12 terrorists”.44
Ségou Region
On 8 November 2021, two farmers from the village of Bamako Koura K13 (Dogofry commune, Niono
cercle, Ségou region) were killed by jihadists.
“The villagers left to work in the fields in the morning. A few hours later, jihadists suddenly
arrived and attacked them for no reason. Seven men were shot, two of them died,” a local
leader said.45
The two victims were aged 45 and 35. The jihadists also destroyed crops, as well as equipment
(motorbikes, threshers, power tillers).
On 9 October 2021, C. C., an inhabitant of Sanamadougou (Sibila commune, Ségou cercle, Ségou region),
was abducted by jihadists. Three days later, he was beheaded. According to local inhabitants, his village
had concluded a pact with the jihadists. Under this pact, festivities were forbidden, women had to wear
the full veil and the Dozos had to lay down their arms. Following the signing of this agreement, C.C. fled
the village and went to a Dozo camp in Sansanding. When he returned, at around 10 pm, a dozen jihadists
came to his home to look for him. He was reportedly tortured for two days before being executed.46
In the same village, on 12 July 2021, D.D, a farmer living in the village of Tiongoni, came to visit his sister.
He was stopped by jihadists on his way back. They executed him on the spot.47
3. By self-defence groups
The Dan Na Ambassagou militia, created in 2016 in Bandiagara (Mopti region), is comprised mainly
of traditional Dozo hunters from the Dogon community. This militia has also been responsible for
mass killings of civilians in the centre of the country.48 However, their attacks on civilians decreased
44. F
AMa, Communiqué 041 de l’État-Major Général des Armées (Statement 041 of the General Staff of the Armed Forces), 25 May
2022, https://www.fama.ml/communiques?page=3.
45. Interview with a traditional chief, Niono, 12 November 2021.
46. Interview with inhabitants of Sanamadougou, conducted in Niono, 16 October 2021.
47. Interview with a representative of Sanamadougou residents, conducted in Niono, 19 July 2021.
48. FIDH
and AMDH, In Central Mali, Civilian Populations Are Caught Between Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Fact-finding mission
report, 2018.
following fighting with the JNIM in March 2020 and October 2021, in which many hunters died.49 The
negotiation of local agreements in some areas of central Mali together with a period of ceasefire also
explain the drop in civilian casualties over this period.
In 2019, the Dan Na Ambassagou militia committed unprecedented massacres in Koulogon (37 deaths
on 1 January 2019) (Bankass cercle, Mopti region) and Ogossagou (160 deaths on 23 March 2019,
and 21 deaths on 14 February 2020) (Bankass cercle, Mopti region).50 Following the wave of outrage
caused by the first massacre in the Fulani village of Ogossagou, perpetrated by Dogon hunters, in
which 160 people were killed, including 46 children, the government ordered the dissolution of the
militia. But the Dozo hunters opposed this and continue to operate in some areas of Mopti.51
Since 2020, acts of violence committed by this group have continued, although the scale of the
violations is smaller. In the last two years, less publicised massacres have been committed, particularly
in the Ségou region.
Source: ACLED, https://acleddata.com/2022/05/09/actor-profile-dan-na-ambassagou/
On 5 May 2020, Dozos attacked the Fulani village of Djonkè Ouro (Fakala commune, Djenné cercle, Mopti
region) in the middle of Ramadan. The previous evening, a self-defence group had shot dead three men
on their motorbikes in the predominantly Bambara village of Djonkè Bambara. The villagers of Djonkè
Bambara suspected the three men of being jihadists and of having links with the Fulani village of Djonkè
Ouro. This suspicion was refuted by the inhabitants of the village of Djonkè Ouro.
49. A
CLED, Actor Profile: Dan Na Ambassagou, accessed on 20 October 2022, https://acleddata.com/2022/05/09/actor-profile-
dan-na-ambassagou/.
50. T
hese killings have been documented by other organisations, including MINUSMA Human Rights Division.
51. J
euneAfrique.com, “Mali: les raisons de la démission de Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga,” 19 April 2019, accessed on 20 October
2022, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/765358/politique/mali-les-raisons-de-la-demission-de-soumeylou-boubeye-maiga/.
During the night, Dozos from Djonkè Ouro called in other Dozos from the area, in particular Dogons
from the village of Somadougou, known as “Fatobougou” (“group of madmen”), who are known to be
particularly violent.
The following morning, at around 11 am, the Dozos arrived and opened fire on the villagers of Djonkè
Ouro.
A local public figure said: “There were lots of them, armed with hunting rifles and guns. Many
people took refuge in their houses and others tried to flee into the bush. The Dozos had
cordoned off the town to prevent any escape. In total, 22 people died, including a woman and
two children aged eight and ten respectively.”52
E.E was repairing his house with his son when he saw the Dozos arrive.
“There were at least 40 motorbikes. There were two people on each one. The one behind was
shooting at everything that moved. My son started running. I hid in the house. When I came
out after an hour, I headed for the bush. A woman told me that my son was dead. He had been
shot in the shoulder, arm and chest. There were bodies everywhere. We picked up the bodies
and buried them.”53
The next day, a FAMa unit came to the village to secure it. But they left after two days and the gendarmerie
investigation yielded nothing.
“Today, the two villages have made peace,” the public figure quoted above told FIDH. “Both
sides agreed to forgive each other and pledge never to engage in such massacres again.”
During a meeting, the Dozos of Djonkè Bambara stated that they had not wanted to attack their neighbour
from Djonkè Ouro and that they had been betrayed by the “Fatobougou” group.
The account of the Djonkè Ouro attack illustrates the relative impunity with which attacks against the
civilian population are perpetrated. The difficulty in accessing justice in these areas, where the judicial
authorities have not been seen for years, entrenches the impunity of those responsible for the most
serious violations, and forces the victims to live side by side with the perpetrators.
B. Sexual and gender-based violence
Since the beginning of the conflict in 2012, FIDH has repeatedly drawn attention to cases of sexual
and gender-based violence linked to the ongoing conflict in Mali, including rape, sexual slavery,
abduction and forced marriage.54 These crimes, mostly committed against women, can have multiple
consequences, including physical, psychological, economic and social. FIDH has called on the Malian
authorities and the international community to address these crimes, which are likely to be much
more numerous due to their under-documentation. Indeed, although in the north of Mali particular
efforts have been made to investigate and determine responsibility for sexual violence, in central Mali
there seems to be a particular lack of documentation of such violence, even though it is on the rise.

54. A
SFC and FIDH, Note on sexual and gender-based violence, forthcoming in December 2022.
This lack of documentation can be explained by the sensitive nature of the issue, the social
consequences of reporting, the fact that most of these crimes are committed in remote areas under
the rule of armed men, and the passivity of the state, which offers no protection or support to the
victims.55 Ostracised by society, victims often prefer to keep silent about the violence they have
suffered rather than file a complaint with the justice system.
“In our society, being raped is shameful,” a local elected official said. “Women who are
raped are doubly victimised, because they are then rejected by their village, or even by their
family, and find themselves isolated.”56
During its missions to Bamako, Koutiala, Ségou, and Mopti in September 2021 and to Bamako in June
2022, the FIDH delegation was able to meet several victims of these crimes who said that they had
been stigmatised by their neighbours following rape and forced to leave their village. Many of them
also explained that they had never considered filing a complaint with the courts, not only because they
did not believe that it would succeed, but above all because they thought that they would not even be
heard, as they did not speak French. These testimonies reflect a justice system that is perceived as
inaccessible to its users. Most of them have had some medical follow-up but feel that they are left to
fend for themselves, even though there are now structures to provide support, such as the “One Stop
Centres”.57
In this context, it is almost impossible to quantify the number of victims of sexual violence, including
rape, committed in connection with the armed conflict in central Mali. However, FIDH has observed
that the phenomenon seems to be steadily increasing in central Mali since 2018, a year marked by
the intensification of fighting in the region. The deterioration of the security situation, the absence of
the state and the proliferation of weapons may explain the fact that an increasing number of women
are at the mercy of armed men - whether from a jihadist group, a self-defence militia, or the Malian or
international security forces. In central Mali, as in other regions where sexual violence is on the rise,
jihadist groups, self-defence militias and law enforcement and security forces use rape as a weapon
of war to spread fear, drive people from their land and demoralise the enemy.
In addition to sexual violence, the FIDH delegation received many testimonies reporting other
forms of gender-based violence in the areas controlled by the jihadist groups, both in the Ségou
and Mopti regions. These groups require the population to comply with discriminatory rules. They
impose restrictions on women’s freedom, such as the prohibition on leaving the village without a male
companion (father, husband or uncle) or the obligation to wear the full veil. Cases of forced marriage
to men belonging to armed groups have also been reported.
Douentza cercle: rape as a “weapon of war”
Despite the heavy silence, during missions in 2021 and 2022, FIDH delegations collected dozens
of testimonies from women accusing jihadists, militiamen or members of the FAMa and their
international partners of rape in central Mali. These testimonies were subsequently cross-checked
55. F
IDH, “Mali: Complaint filed on behalf of 80 victims of rape and sexual violence during the occupation of northern Mali:
response by Malian judiciary to victims’ need for justice is essential without delay,” 12 November 2014, https://www.fidh.org/
en/region/Africa/mali/16455-mali-complaint-filed-on-behalf-of-80-victims-of-rape-and-sexual-violence.
56. Interview with a local elected official in Niono cercle, conducted in Ségou, 16 September 2021.
57. Inspired by the Rwandan model, the initiative is part of a vast global programme to combat violence against women, known as
the “Spotlight Initiative”. Created in 2019 by the United Nations with the support of the European Union, the “One Stop Centre”
is a logistical unit managed by the Ministry of Health and Public Hygiene and includes staff who provide police services for
security, psychological and gynaecological assistance. The first centre in Mali was opened in 2017. By 2022, the country will
have 14 One Stop Centres throughout the country, including five in Bamako, two in Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, and Sikasso, and
one each in Gao and Mopti.
with additional testimonies and information from FIDH sources in the localities concerned. While the
documented violence was perpetrated against women, this does not exclude the possibility that such
violence was also committed against girls, men and boys.
The 2021 FIDH delegation documented a dozen testimonies of women who had been raped in the
Douentza cercle since 2019. The testimonies of these women often recount the same ordeal: abducted
by armed men, they were used as sexual slaves for several days, or even several weeks, before being
sent back home. Some were then rejected by their relatives. Others received support. Several women
said that the perpetrators were fighters from the Dan Na Ambassagou militia. Other women were
victims of JNIM-affiliated jihadist fighters. In many cases, it appears that the perpetrators targeted
victims on the basis of their membership of a particular ethnic group. In most cases, victims suffered
stigmatisation in their communities as a result of having been subjected to sexual violence.
1. By self-defence militias
Douentza
T.A. is 33 years old, with five children, living in a Fulani village in Douentza commune. In June 2018,
several months after witnessing the murder of her husband by Dozos, she encountered two men in
the forest while searching for wood. They abducted her and took her to their Dozo camp a two-hour
motorbike ride away. T.A. told the FIDH fact-finding delegation that she arrived at a camp where other
women were being held, lying on the ground, some of them in tears.
“After a while, three men came for me, one of them had a gun. They blindfolded me and
took me away from the group to a remote place. They told me to lie down. They took turns
abusing me: while one man penetrated me, the other two men held my arms. I begged them
to leave me alone. They smelled of alcohol. They said that when they were finished with me,
they would kill me.” T.A.’s ordeal lasted three days. “The next day I was very tired. I was
abused again by three other men. On the third day I was raped by one man. The other two
said they didn’t want to touch me anymore because I was too worn out.”
Early the next day, her torturers released her, and she managed to reach her village. The next day,
she was taken to the hospital where a doctor issued a document certifying that she had been raped.
Although she did not see her attackers, as she was blindfolded during her captivity, she said she was
sure that they were part of the Dan Na Ambassagou, the same group that had previously attacked
her village.
“The Dogon attack Fulani villages, and the jihadists attack Dogon villages, that’s how it is,”
she murmured.
In 2020, the Dogon militia attacked her village again. All the inhabitants fled to Douentza. Then they
returned. Today, T.A. lives with the danger of one day running into her torturers. Since the attack, T.A
has been stared at by her neighbours.
“In our community, a woman who has been raped is a sullied woman. Some people say I had it
coming, that I didn’t have to go into the forest.”58
58. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 25 September 2021.
Kerena
U.G. is 32 years old. She lives with her three children in a Fulani village in Kerena commune (Douentza
cercle). In August 2019, she was attacked by Dozos. She was in the early stages of pregnancy.
“They killed a lot of people, about 20 people,” she said. “And they caught me along with
three other women. While the others continued the massacre, a small group blindfolded us.
They took us away on motorbikes. At around nine o’clock, they made us get off, blindfolded.
They said, ‘We’re not going to kill you, and we won’t hurt you if you do whatever we tell
you’. The one who seemed to be the leader asked us if we agreed. We said ‘yes’. They took
the blindfolds off. At about 8 pm we were divided into two groups. They ordered us to do
the cooking and cleaning and said that we had to be available to everyone. ‘Anyone who
refuses will be killed’. Very early the next day, they made us leave our hut to prepare food.
Afterwards, the chief told us that in the evening we should welcome our ‘evening husbands’.
In the evening, we were separated, each one in a hut. A man came to my hut. He forced me
to undress. He said, “If you resist, I will hurt you. I was afraid, I let him do it. He penetrated
me. It hurt a lot when he penetrated me. Afterwards, he got up and left.”
Every night, U.G. suffered the same violence. A man – never the same one – would come to her hut to
rape her. Even though she did not see them, because it was dark, U.G. told FIDH that her torturers were
Dogon. Her captivity lasted four or five days – she cannot remember exactly – until a plane passed over
the camp. The next day, the men were gone.
“With the other women, we decided to walk up the hill that separated us from the village.
Some young people from the village saw us and rescued us.”
When she arrived home, U.G. found her children, but her husband was not there. He has not been seen
since the attack. After receiving treatment in Douentza, she decided to move there.
“No one here knows that I was raped,” she said. «“If I had stayed in my village, I would have
been marginalised.”59
2. By jihadist groups
Douentza
Other women have been victims of JNIM-affiliated jihadist fighters. Their accounts point to a method
that seems to have become widespread: the insurgents kidnap small groups of women, take them by
force to their camp, where they are subjected to sexual slavery and forced labour.
T.B. is 25 years old and lives with her two children in a village in the Douentza cercle. At the beginning
of 2019, she was travelling to the main town by public transport, when armed men stopped the bus.
She was three months pregnant. Three women got off the bus and the attackers ordered the driver
to leave.
“They blindfolded us and took us into the bush to a windowless hut. A man told me to
undress. I said I couldn’t, that I was married. He said he needed me. He hit me and undressed
me. Then he penetrated me with his penis. When he finished, he got dressed and left without
saying a word. After that, a man came to rape the second woman. Then another man came
for the third woman. For more than a week, men came at night to abuse us, and left.”
Later, T.B. told the FIDH delegation that she was raped by three different men each night. Her ordeal
and that of the other two women may have lasted ten days – she lost track of time. During the day,
the women were confined to the hut that served as their prison. They were given food three times a
day. And in the evening, the men came and went, one after another. She said that she did not see her
torturers because they only came at night. She thinks that were young adult men, who spoke several
languages (Bambara, Fulani, Songhay, etc.).
“One morning they told us we were going to be released. They took us on their motorbikes
and left us on the tarmac. We saw a bus that took us to Douentza.”
After seeing a doctor, T.B. went to Sévaré for treatment, but also because she was “ashamed” and
“afraid” to return home. When she did go home, her family marginalised her, but her husband welcomed
her.
“Luckily, he knew I was pregnant before I was captured,” she said.
But a few days later, her village was attacked. The grain stores were set on fire.60
G. A., aged 27, lived in a Dogon village in the Douentza cercle. In late 2019, she went out at dusk to
relieve herself in the bush. There she came across two armed men hiding in the forest.
“I wanted to scream, but they threatened me with death. They blindfolded me with a red
turban. Then they put me on a motorbike and drove to a house about an hour away in the
middle of the bush. I was taken to a room made of mudbrick where there were about ten
other women crying. When I was inside the room, they took off my blindfold. We were lying
on the floor, without a mat or blanket.”
On the first night of her detention, she was abused by two men.
“With the first one I resisted. But another man twisted my arms and blindfolded me again
with a black turban. That was my first time. I lost my virginity with that rape. Afterwards,
the second man who had held my arms also raped me. Every time they wanted to rape me
they blindfolded me. Every time they wanted to have sex with us they came at night, twenty
of them. They would rape us at the same time and then they would all go out together. They
were violent. I was slapped because I didn’t let them. On the second day, three men abused
me. On the third day, I was raped by two different men. And on the fourth day, I got sick:
I was vomiting and had a fever. That was lucky for me, because I was released after that.
They put me on a motorbike, blindfolded me and took me back to the place where they had
taken me from.”
After her return, her fiancé, a cousin, broke off the engagement because, she said, “He seems to hate
me.” She has also been subjected to taunts from villagers.
“Everywhere I went, people in the village stigmatised me. They looked at me strangely. They
laughed and made fun of me. I had to leave the village and move to Douentza.”
She believed that her attackers were jihadists. They spoke Fulani and wore short trousers.
She said that she “hates the Fulani”.61
Q.P. is 17 years old. She is married and lives in a Dogon village in Douentza cercle. Early one morning
in 2019, she was collecting firewood with a friend when four men appeared on two motorbikes.
“We threw away the wood and started to run. But they caught up with us. They blindfolded
us and put us on the motorbikes. After an hour on the road, we heard women’s voices
pleading, “Don’t kill us! They spoke Dogon and Fula. We were put in the same room with
them, a large room with a window and a door. We were lying on the floor. They undressed us
by tearing our clothes. They were armed. They raped us. Three men took turns abusing me.
They didn’t use protection. They looked about 35 to 40 years old. They threatened to kill us.”
Their captivity lasted five days, and they suffered rape on four of them.
“After the first day, it was two men a day. They usually came to see us twice: during the day
and in the evening. On the sixth day, a Saturday, they put us on motorbikes and took us both
back to where they had taken us from.”
When she returned home, her 40-year-old husband, who had married her when she was 14, threw her out.
“I tried to make him understand that I was not to blame. But he wouldn’t listen. He left for
Bamako with his first wife the week after my release. I stayed with his family. My parents
are still in the village and want me to go back home, but I want to stay.”
In March 2021, jihadists attacked her village. Several villagers were killed, including one of her
brothers-in-law, who was 30 years old. The day after the attack, Q.P. and her family left the village.
3. By the FAMa and their international partners
Moura massacre: five days of organised violence
On Sunday 27 March 2022, market day in Moura, as local villagers made their last purchases before
Ramadan, Malian special forces soldiers accompanied by men reportedly from the Wagner group
arrived by helicopter. They stormed the town, blocked the exits, and then searched every corner in
an “anti-terrorist” operation that lasted five days and left hundreds dead. The event was described as
the worst massacre since the start of the armed conflict in Mali in 2012. In a statement about the
event, the Malian army claimed to have neutralised 203 terrorists in accordance with the principles
of international law. However, witnesses described indiscriminate massacres of people targeted
because of their ethnicity or the way they were dressed. FIDH documented numerous cases of sexual
violence committed during this assault.
For years, the inhabitants of Moura, a predominantly Fulani town, have had to reluctantly submit to
the authority of jihadist groups. The Katiba Macina fighters moved to Moura (Mopti region) in 2015,
following the withdrawal of the state there. Wahhabi Islam, which in the early 2000s was a marginal
sect with few followers in the village, gradually gained in popularity as Wahhabis rode through Moura
on their motorbikes, armed with machine guns, seducing young people who did not remain indifferent
to the proliferation of armed groups in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising.62 They imposed Sharia
law, closed the schools and evicted the occupants of the mayor’s office. Their arrival also marked
the end of rivalries between two village chiefs with divergent political and religious convictions, and
established the authority of another chief, a follower of Wahhabi ideology, affiliated to the Katiba
Macina.
In total, from 2015 onwards, 80 young men and 20 young women left Moura to join the Katiba and
returned on several occasions to impose Sharia law on the population.63 These fighters insisted that
the men and women of Moura wear the imposed dress code – beards and short trousers for men,
full-face veils for women. They banned card games, football and music, as well as the neighbourhood
meeting places known as “grins”. They set fire to public spaces and whipped women who went out
without full veils. Many inhabitants, mostly Fulani, Bozo, and Soninké who were of Tijani origin or who
disagreed with the new rules, did not react for fear of reprisals, preferring to obey the rules so as not
to risk trouble.
In the days after the 27 March 2022 raid on the Moura market, special forces soldiers searched houses
looking for men. Those who were dressed “like jihadists” or who spoke only Pulaar were executed on
the spot by the soldiers.
“The soldiers spoke to the men in Bambara and killed those who couldn’t speak the
language, because only educated Fulani speak Bambara. They executed dozens of slaves
and griots, just because they didn’t speak Bambara and were dressed like jihadists,” S.V., a
survivor of the attack, told FIDH.64
By 30 March 2022, hundreds of victims had been shot dead by the security forces. At least three mass
graves had been dug.
“On Sunday [27 March 2022], we counted 89 bodies lying on the ground in the market and
on the street - they ended up in the mass grave. There were two other graves - one dug by
the FAMa containing 213 bodies, and the other 262,” S.V. said, adding that none of the
victims were armed.
According to information gathered during the FIDH missions, about 30 jihadists were killed during the
massacre, and hundreds of civilians were executed in the process. Approximately 300 members of
the FAMa and Wagner Group mercenaries are said to have participated in the operation, with regular
backup.
62. S
ee International Crisis Group, Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, Report No. 238, 6 July 2016, https://www.crisisgroup.
org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making.
63. Interview with a Moura resident, Bamako, June 2022.
An image captured by commercial satellite company Planet Labs on April 6, 2022.
and analyzed by The Times, shows the location of mass graves in Moura.
(Extract fromThe New York Times, “The Killings Didn’t Stop.” In Mali, a Massacre With a Russian Footprint, 1 June 2022)
On 29 March 2022, after taking the men away, the soldiers committed widespread sexual violence
against the women who had been left alone in their homes. The victims spoke neither Bambara nor
French and told FIDH that they had identified their attackers as “foreign men” because they “spoke
in a foreign language” and by the colour of their skin. All the victims interviewed estimated that at
least 20 women had been raped, although there could have been more. Several victims described the
sexual violence they suffered.
B.X., aged 33: “The soldiers took my husband and shot him on the ground. The same day,
my eight-year-old child was shot in the market and did not survive. I found his body the
following day in the market. I also found my husband’s body lying where he had been killed.
On Tuesday night [29 March 2022], a black soldier came to my house. I locked my three
young children in the bedroom. He raped me in the living room. He came back on Wednesday
night and did it again, then on Thursday night. He spoke in a language I didn’t understand.
He always carried his gun with him.”65
D. A., aged 25: “There was a lot of panic when the military launched the assault on Moura
on market day. On Tuesday night [29 March 2022], seven soldiers entered my home, five
were black, two were white. They took four women from our house, and from our neighbours’
house, and raped them under the shelter in our yard. I was the last to be raped at around
11 pm. A black soldier pushed me into my room and threatened me with his gun. He took me
by the wrist and threw me on the bed before tearing off my clothes. He me held down while
a white soldier raped me. I know that at least 21 women were raped.”66
Z. M., aged 26: “On Sunday [27 March 2022], soldiers entered and searched the house where
I live with my mother-in-law. They came back on Tuesday, took our mats and blankets and
set up beds in our courtyard and in my room. They wouldn’t let us leave. There were eight
soldiers who came and went frequently, they often came back with women and brought
them into the bedroom. Two of them, T.N. and B.A.C., told me that soldiers had raped them.
They said that the soldiers had called them ‘jihadist wives’. They had heard that two other
women had been raped, U.B. and I.V. Together with my mother-in-law, we managed to
escape and find refuge with a neighbour. I could hear them talking to each other in French,
the soldiers encouraging each other by shouting ‘go on!’”67
On the day after the rapes, 30 March 2022, the soldiers held hundreds of women from the village
captive for several hours on the sandy banks of the river, during the hottest part of the day. In panic
and pain, four pregnant women went into labour. Only one infant survived.
M. T. U., aged 22: “Three black soldiers came in and searched the house without finding any
men inside. They came back the next day, Tuesday [29 March 2022], between 11 pm and
midnight. A black soldier took my son and a white tattooed soldier grabbed my hands and
took me to my bedroom where he raped me. After that, I was injured in my genital area. When I
tried to resist, the other soldier came in with my son and threatened to hurt him, until I gave in.
That night, at approximately 8 pm, four soldiers brought two women to my house and raped
them. The next day, the soldiers brought all the women to the riverbank. The sand was so hot
that it was burning. Four pregnant women started to go into labour on the sand, only one baby
survived. I was told that 26 women were raped.”68 69
C. Other violations perpetrated against civilian populations
In addition to being the targets of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law, civilians in central Mali are victims of attacks on their physical integrity, abductions, and various
kinds of harassment and threats. Armed actors in the area, including jihadist groups, self-defence groups
and the FDS, use these practices to pursue various strategies aimed at dominating civilian populations.
Communities suffering harassment are repeatedly subjected to pressure. Sieges, roadblocks and

69. A
ccording to the version of events of the Malian military authorities, as communicated to FIDH in November 2022, “among
the dead, there were only terrorist fighters and no [civilian] from Moura lost their lives during the military operation; all those
arrested were transferred to the Sevaré Gendarmerie.” According to several other credible sources interviewed by FIDH for
this report, there were jihadist fighters among the dead, but also several dozen non-combatants who arrested and victims of
summary execution.
racketeering mark the daily life of populations trapped by the predatory strategies of the multiple armed
actors present. Their right to access health care and to work to meet their basic needs are impeded,
along with their freedom of movement. All these practices also have severe humanitarian consequences.
1. Abductions by jihadist groups
Abductions of civilians in this conflict are not new. However, the UN and ACLED have noted an increase
in this practice since 2021, particularly in the centre of the country. Observing the growing targeting
of Malian aid workers, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) considers the rise in abductions as a
sign of the failure of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreements to anticipate the deterioration
of the situation in central Mali. For jihadist groups, abductions have become a means of maintaining
pressure on populations that resist their grip. Jihadist fighters have developed a network to exert
permanent social control using informers within communities, who alert fighters in the bush about
suspicions or misconduct. In a few hours or days, the fighters come on their motorbikes to punish
individuals resisting their authority. They mostly target state representatives and community leaders,
but sometimes ordinary citizens.70
Many abductions are carried out in areas controlled by JNIM-affiliated jihadist groups: from Niono
cercle (Ségou region) to Mondoro, including in Macina, Hairé and Seno (Mopti region). The FIDH
delegation met many witnesses who had been abducted by jihadists. Most of them were suspected
of having collaborated with the FDS or the state, on the basis of information given by local residents.
But after several days in captivity, during which they were interrogated, they were released. Most of
them said that they had been treated quite well, despite basic conditions, poor food and stress.
D.A.A., a resident of a village in Niono cercle (Ségou region), was abducted by jihadists on three
occasions. His account illustrates the grip exercised by the Katiba Macina fighters in this area, the
pressure they exert on the population, but also the complicity they enjoy and the role they play in local
and even interpersonal conflicts.
His first period in captivity, in August 2019, lasted nine days and followed a conflict with the president
of an association. Since the latter’s mandate had come to an end, D.A.A. refused to recognise his
legitimacy and to pay him a fee. The man complained to the jihadists, who have been settled in the
area for several years.
“They arrived in a pick-up truck in front of my house,” D.A.A. reported. “They blindfolded me
and made me get into the car. We left at about 9 pm and drove for more than five hours before
stopping. In the early hours of the morning, they tied me to a tree trunk and gave me food and
water. Nothing happened for three days. Then their leader explained to me why I was there.
I explained why I didn’t accept the man’s authority. They told me to pay. I refused. Finally, they
contacted my family who paid the amount they asked for. On the ninth day, they released me.
They blindfolded me and took me back to the village.”
D.A.A. said that he had not been beaten. His captors, who spoke Fulani, tested him to see if he knew
the Koran. But they did not try to recruit him.
70. A
. Gérard, Gender relations and violent extremism in the Central Sahel. A study of Fulani women’s place within jihadist insurgencies
in Liptako-Gourma, Dissertation, 2021, SOAS, London, p. 29.
His second period in captivity, in March 2020, lasted seventeen days. He was travelling back from
Bamako, where he had met with the authorities following a massacre in the area.
“During my stay in Bamako, some people told the jihadists that I had gone to visit the
Americans to ask for support to protect my village. When I returned, I was arrested by the
jihadists. Three of them showed up on a motorbike. They said: ‘You are a djassous (a spy),
we have come to kill you.’ One of them hit me with his rifle. Another pretended to shoot me.
Then they blindfolded me and made me get on the motorbike. They took me six kilometres
away from my village. There, they threatened me again. Then, men in a pick-up truck took
me to their camp. They blindfolded me and tied me up. Some of them wanted to torture me,
but their leader objected. After three days, he came to interrogate me. He accused me of
working with the army. I said it wasn’t true. They moved me three times. After 17 days, they
released me. They apologised to me before leaving me.”
The third period in captivity, in November 2020, was shorter: it only lasted a few hours. He was taken
while he was carrying out a mission for an NGO in a village in the Diabali commune (Ségou region).
“The jihadists asked us what we were doing in the area. We told them we had come about the
water tower. They robbed us and kept our phones for two hours. Later, they kept our equipment
and let us go.”
D.A.A. said that he fears for his life whenever he travels to his village.
“The jihadists are in the bush. From time to time, they come to check that women are
respecting the rules or, if they have been alerted by local populations, to settle their
conflicts,” he explained.
There are also many abductions in the Boni area (Mopti region), where there is a strong jihadist
presence. X.R., from a well-known family in Boni, was abducted several times. In 2012, members of
the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the pro-independence group controlling
the area at the time, arrested him on suspicion of collaborating with the state of Mali. In 2020, during
the month of fasting, the jihadists came to abduct him.
“The jihadists intercepted us, threatened us and stopped our vehicle. They said that I was
a spy. They blindfolded me and took me to their camp in the Serma forest. For the first
three days of my captivity, they beat me with motorbike straps that they used as whips.
Their leader interrogated me. He suspected me of giving their positions to the FAMa. I
denied it. They told me that an Arab would come to try me. He spoke French and Arabic.
He questioned me in the early afternoon. The others thought I was a ‘djassous’. But a bit
later, the Arab and the leader came to tell me that I was going to be released. They took off
my handcuffs, gave me clothes and 10,000 CFA francs to buy food. Then, we left on three
motorbikes, and they took me back to near Boni.”
2. Threats and pressure against civilian populations by the FDS
The FAMa and the gendarmes of Boni (Mopti region) have exerted intense pressure on the town’s
public figures and elected officials to collaborate with them in the fight against terrorism. In the very
tense context in Boni, this pressure is likely to put them in danger and expose them to reprisals from
jihadist groups. Those who refuse to collaborate with the FDS are perceived to be colluding with the
jihadists. Those who accept are perceived by the jihadists to be colluding with the authorities. In
both cases, their lives are threatened. Furthermore, this practice undermines trust between civilian
populations and security forces.
On 10 March 2021, L.K., a gendarme, summoned key figures from Boni to the camp: a local elected
official and his deputy, K. D.; a former mayor, F.A.M.; and one of his brothers, S.T. They were questioned
for several hours by gendarmes. One of them said that he had been hit and threatened with death.
“They said: ‘If we don’t get rid of you, the Boni problem will never end. Today, we’re going to
finish you off.’ Then they blindfolded us, took away our phones and took us to a cramped
place, a kind of room underground, maybe a tunnel – it’s hard to say because we were
blindfolded. We went down some steps. It was narrow. There was a smell of dead animals.
We just heard a man sharpening a knife. He said he was going to cut our throats. Luckily, a
lieutenant arrived and took us out of that room. He said: ‘You’re lucky.’ Just before nightfall,
they released us.”
Three days later, the witness left Boni to seek refuge in a big city.
The men had been summoned in relation to a shooting incident that had taken place a few days
earlier, on 2 March 2021: three hooded men had gone to the home of the first deputy mayor, Boukary
Sow, and shot at him. The elected official was hit by four bullets and was seriously injured. He was
transferred to Sévaré (Mopti region) in a MINUSMA helicopter, and he recovered from his injuries.
Doubts remain as to the identity of the attackers. The day after the attack, the jihadists in control
of the area – in a rare move – claimed that they were not responsible for the attack. A man who
had helped to evacuate the wounded man claimed that a soldier criticised him for coming to his
assistance, saying: “Sow is a jihadist. You want to save jihadists.” The three men summoned to the
army camp on 10 March 2021 were among those who had provided assistance to Boukary Sow.
Another elected official from Boni, N.D., claimed to have been put under heavy pressure by Lieutenant
Sidi Bakayoko. Following the attack of 18 March 2021 (see p. 24), during which a FAMa vehicle was
blown up by a mine, this elected representative had intervened at the request of the relatives of two
men killed by the soldiers, asking for them to be able to recover the bodies. He contacted the head of
the district in Douentza. The following day, Lieutenant Bakayoko confronted him about it.
“He called me and threatened me. He told me that I shouldn’t contact his superiors or human
rights activists, that it would help the jihadists gain ground. He advised me to leave the city.”
The following day, the same lieutenant called him again: “He asked me to send him three
people he wanted to interview, a local elected official, a deputy and a youth representative. I
told him that it was not my role, that it would put me in danger. I finally agreed to accompany
them to the camp. But they were arrested, and the soldiers blindfolded them. I asked him
why. The lieutenant told me: ‘We’re not finished with them.’ I told him that it was not right,
that they would think that it was me who had handed them over. When they were released,
one of the three men accused me of handing him over to the military.”
After receiving threats, N.D. decided to leave the town in April 2021. Shortly after his return to Boni in
August 2021, N.D. was abducted by jihadists and taken to one of their bases.
“One of the leaders came and told me that I was accused of three things: denouncing people
to the military, having been in conflict with the mayor of Boni, and using a military plane to
fly from Gao to Bamako. I protested.”
Over several days, N.D. was transported to various jihadist camps, known as markaz. Most of the time,
his hands and feet were tied, but he was not beaten. He was held with other hostages, some of whom
he knew, and who had been held for several months. It seemed that he was going to be held for a long
time. However, after three weeks, he managed to escape when his jailers dropped their guard.
The situation in Boni is exceptional. Since the departure of the detachment commanded by Lieutenant
Sidi Bakayoko, the pressure on the inhabitants has decreased, and violence against civilians by the
FDS has become less frequent.
3. Siege of villages and other restrictions imposed by jihadists on civilian populations
Jihadists have developed a strategy based on both persuasion and coercion. On the one hand, they
allow the population to have access to basic services and regain a semblance of security that allows
them to pursue - or sometimes resume - their economic activities. According to the International Crisis
Group, “the jihadists have also sought compromise with residents in places they control, maintaining
traditional power structures and allowing local officials to manage daily affairs on militant[s’] terms.
[…] In areas under their control, JNIM militants often strive to provide services to locals, including
Islamic courts and protection from crime, as well as price regulation and quality control in rural
markets. […] They have also allowed humanitarian NGOs to supply health care, veterinary services,
[drinking] water and food.”71
On the other hand, they impose collective punishments on those who oppose their hegemony. These
punishments generally take the form of sieges: if a village has a self-defence group, or if some of its
inhabitants are suspected of collaborating with state authorities and security forces, the jihadists
demand that these people lay down their arms; if they refuse, they surround the village and prevent
its inhabitants from leaving. Under these circumstances, villagers cannot fetch water, get supplies,
seek medical care or farm their fields. In addition to preventing villagers from enjoying a fundamental
freedom – the right to move about freely – these collective punishments have serious consequences:
the inability to harvest crops and fill the family grain store, resulting in food insecurity during the next
“hunger gap”; the impossibility to access health care in the event of illness or pregnancy; and the
impossibility for children to receive an education.
This strategy, less violent than targeted killings, nonetheless has devastating effects on civilian
populations.
“It is a form of oppression and a means for the jihadists to subjugate populations. Today,
if you resist, you know that you can be killed, but you also know the entire community risks
paying the price,” a Malian mediator underlined.
71. International Crisis Group, Mali: créer les conditions du dialogue avec la coalition djihadiste du GSIM, Rapport 306, 10 décembre
2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/sahel/mali/306-mali-enabling-dialogue-jihadist-coalition-jnim.
This strategy was implemented in particular in the regions of Mopti and Ségou. The FIDH mission
documented several cases of sieges that, in some cases, lasted several months or even years.
Mondoro area
In the Mondoro area (Mopti region), five villages were subjected to a siege for more than two years,
between February 2018 and June 2020. During this period, the inhabitants of these Dogon villages
were prevented from farming their fields and moving around, and they lost all their animals, which
were stolen from them.
“We couldn’t go on like that. We started discussions,” explained O.O.
In January 2019, an initial agreement was signed between the jihadists and local public figures, under
the aegis of an NGO, but it was soon violated. A second agreement was signed in June 2020, under
which the Dogons could grow crops, organise events (but only among themselves) and the members
of the self-defence group were allowed to keep their weapons, but they could not leave the village
with them. The jihadists, in turn, were allowed to come to preach and to get supplies and obtained the
closure of the so-called “French” schools.
Several weeks later, in July 2020, the town of Mondoro also came under siege, following the killing
of several Fulani civilians living in and around the town, and the decision of most members of the
community to leave the town to escape the violence. For more than two years, the inhabitants of
Mondoro, and the National Guard elements stationed there, were not allowed to leave the town. The
town was finally liberated on 31 August 2022.
Niono area
In the Niono area (Ségou region), several localities were also subjected to a prolonged siege. The
most emblematic case concerns the village of Farabougou, located in the Dogofry commune. The
national and international media reported on the ordeal of its inhabitants, who were banned from
leaving their village, and the political authorities established after the coup d’état of 8 August 2020
highly publicised their attempt to put an end to the village’s isolation.
The siege of Farabougou began on 6 October 2020, when fighters from a group affiliated to the Katiba
Macina surrounded the village and banned anyone from leaving. This first siege lasted almost six
months. Several inhabitants of Farabougou interviewed in September 2021 said they were unaware
of the precise reasons for the siege. There were several versions. An elected official in the area
mentioned an attempt by the jihadists to punish a butcher who was alleged to have stolen cattle. The
butcher was arrested, but he managed to flee. While he was hiding in the bush, he reportedly called
the Dozos in the area to come and rescue him, but they were ambushed and four of them were shot
dead. The brother of one of the victims allegedly sought revenge and shot a Fulani man in a field. The
jihadists then asked the population of Farabougou to hand over the individual. The village refused.
This was his explanation of how the siege began.
Another elected official in the area told a similar story, but referred to a “jihadist,” rather than a civilian:
“At the end of September, a jihadist was killed in the vicinity of Farabougou. The jihadists
then demanded that the killer be handed over to them, in vain.”
According to several inhabitants of Farabougou, on 6 October 2020, nine villagers, including three
minors, were on their way to the weekly fair in Dogofry when they were abducted by armed men. Three
days later, the Dozos sent a team to try to find them, but they were ambushed and twelve of them
were killed.
“From then on, we were prevented from going out,” D.D., a farmer, explained.
Those who were in Farabougou Fitini (the farming hamlet of the residents of Farabougou, inhabited by
about 70 households and located approximately eight kilometres from the village), remained trapped
there for 17 days, before they were able to escape and take refuge in Dogofry.
“After we left, everything was burnt down: our huts, our fields. There’s nothing left,” D.D.
added.
The 500 households in the village were prevented from going out for seven months. Villagers described
their daily lives as one of hardship and severe pressure.
“If we went out, we were shot at. We couldn’t do anything: we couldn’t go to farm, we
couldn’t fetch water, we couldn’t go to fairs, we couldn’t go to the health centre in Dogofry
for treatment. We were stuck in our homes,” M.D., a farmer, reported.
At the start of the siege, the inhabitants ate the village reserves. Then they started eating wild
watermelons. After the fifth month of the siege, the authorities delivered medicine and food by air. But
it was not enough. The villagers had access to water at two wells in the “authorised” area.
Throughout the siege, the jihadists were positioned around the village.
“Sometimes they would fire warning shots to remind us that they were there,” M. D. said.
During the siege, young people formed a self-defence group. Armed with machetes and sticks, they
organised patrols to protect the villagers.
“The women cooked the food and did the laundry. The children didn’t have classes anymore.
If someone was sick, they were treated with plants. No one could go out to get medical
treatment,” V.M.A., a farmer who lost her husband in the ambush that preceded the siege,
explained.
For months, the inhabitants were deprived of basic freedoms such as access to health care and
education, the right to move about and to work. They were also subjected to intense stress.
“It was very hard. Every day we were afraid,” V.M.A reported.
Family members were separated: some of the men who were outside the village when the siege
began were not able to return to their homes until seven months later.
After a long process of negotiations between the jihadists and local public figures, a ceasefire
agreement was signed in March 2021. It concerned several localities in the Dogofry commune. This
agreement provided that villagers could move freely, while respecting some strict rules (which applied
to women in particular). However, it was not until April 2021 that the inhabitants of Farabougou were
able to leave their village.
Several inhabitants left Farabougou, fearing a new siege. Their fears proved to be justified: three
months after the agreement was implemented, it was broken – by the jihadists, according to the
inhabitants of Farabougou; by the Dozos, according to other sources living in the area. By July 2021,
Farabougou was once again cut off from the world. Deprived of the possibility of entering or leaving
the village, the inhabitants were supplied by MINUSMA planes. The village was finally liberated on
6 February 2022 by the Malian Armed Forces, after more than seven months of siege.
Other localities in Niono cercle suffered the same fate, including Songho in Diabaly commune.
According to several testimonies gathered in Ségou by the first FIDH fact-finding mission, the siege
began on 26 June 2021.
From that date, “the inhabitants of the village were forbidden to go more than 200 metres
from their homes,” N. M., a farmer, told FIDH. “If they saw us, they shot at us.”
For more than two months, the residents of Songho ate their reserves. According to several residents,
three children aged 8, 12 and 15 and a woman aged 90 died during the siege as a result of the lack
of medical care. In addition, five men aged between 35 and 45 were killed by jihadist gunfire. All were
buried in the courtyard of their homes, since the inhabitants had no access to the cemetery outside
the village. After more than two months of living under siege, the inhabitants decided to leave the
village. On 11 September 2021, at around 8 pm, all the men, except for the elderly, left under cover
of darkness. The next day, the women also left the village. After their departure, the inhabitants of
Songho were told that the armed men had pillaged the village and taken everything: motorbikes, food,
valuable items, etc. The people of Songho said they received no help from the authorities throughout
the siege.
“We informed the governorate. Twice we asked for help to leave the village. But our requests
were ignored,” A.A., a resident of Songho, told FIDH.
4. Roadblocks and discriminatory practices imposed on certain civilian populations

by self-defence militia and jihadist groups
Self-defence groups do not organise sieges as such. However, they also employ strategies that prevent
civilian populations from moving freely and working. They set up roadblocks on major roads, allowing
them to target members of the Fulani community in particular, whom they identify as jihadists or as
colluding with jihadists.
There are numerous reports of roadblocks erected by Dozos or self-defence militias, notably the Dan
Na Ambassagou group which is active in the Bandiagara, Bankass, Koro and Douentza cercles (Mopti
region). The most feared roadblocks are in the Niono cercle (especially on the Niono-Dogofry route),
in the Bandiagara, Bankass and Koro cercles, and on the RN 16 (the road between Sévaré and Gao),
between Douentza and Boni, at a place called “Petaka”. This stretch of road is particularly feared
by civilian populations. At the Petaka roadblock, controlled by the Dan Na Ambassagou group, the
militiamen perform tasks normally carried out by internal security forces: they stop vehicles, tell
passengers to get out, check their identities by demanding their papers, search personal belongings
and arrest those who they consider suspicious. When an individual is apprehended, he or she
disappears.
“When they stop a bus, they make everyone get off and they put all the Fulani to one side.
Then they order the others to take their seats on the bus and tell the driver to continue his
journey. We don’t know what happens to the people they arrest,” a man from Boni, who
used to travel along this road for a long time before changing his route, told FIDH.
The FIDH mission collected numerous testimonies mentioning arrests of relatives in Petaka – most
of them Fulani – and in some cases forced disappearances. Fulani, of whom there are many in this
area, are now forced to take a side road to avoid the roadblock. Those coming from Sévaré, take a
laterite road when they reach Douentza that passes north of the RN 16, behind a rocky massif, and
joins the main road at Nokara.
“This makes the journey longer, more expensive, and more dangerous too, because this
road is under the control of the jihadists. But at least they don’t stop us just because we’re
Fulani,” another inhabitant of Boni stressed.
As a result of these obstacles, it takes two days for the inhabitants of Boni commune to reach Sévaré.
For those who come from further afield, from Mondoro, for example, it takes three days.
Control of the RN 16 is strategically important. This explains the setting-up of roadblocks there by
jihadists. Unlike the one in Petaka, controlled by Dan Na Ambassagou, these roadblocks are not in
a fixed location and are not permanent. Jihadists regularly block the middle of the road between
Douentza and Konna and stop vehicles. They also make passengers disembark, check their identities,
and search their luggage. They do not target a particular community, rather they look for individuals
– often members of the FDS, state officials or suspected informers for the authorities.
“If they find you with fatigues in your bag or with a military card, they arrest you,” a local
elected official said.
Soldiers and civil servants are now strongly discouraged from using this road.
Many civilians, especially Dogons, although not targeted, also take parallel routes to escape these
improvised roadblocks. To reach Douentza from Sévaré, most of them now take the RN 15 to
Bandiagara, then the road between Bandiagara and Douentza, where they join the RN 16.
“The road is longer, but it’s safer,” the local elected official told FIDH.
5. Looting, destruction and confiscation of civilian property by jihadist groups
In Niono cercle (Ségou region), jihadists not only lay siege to villages they consider to be resistant,
they also carry out reprisal operations by attacking the most valuable possessions of the populations
living from farming: their fields. For the past two years, they have destroyed or set fire to numerous
fields, especially at harvest time.
V. T., a farmer in Bamako Koura K13 (Dogofry commune), saw everything he owned destroyed on
6 November 2021.
“Early in the morning, at approximately six o’clock, my employees and I went to the fields to
harvest,” he said. “At between nine and 10 o’clock, I went back home to do other business.
A few moments later, we heard gunshots. I immediately called my employees who were in
the fields. They told me that armed men were shooting everywhere. I told them to go home.
A few hours later, at around 2 pm, we noticed smoke coming from our fields. They burned all
my 11 hectares of land, as well as other fields belonging to people from my village.”
Three days later, the jihadists came back to set fire to more crops. V.T. said he was unaware of their
motives.
On 8 September 2021, jihadists attacked the fields belonging to the inhabitants of B4 and B6 (Toridaga-
Ko commune). According to them, armed men arrived at approximately 6 am riding motorbikes. They
first fired warning shots at the entrance to the village of B6, then at around eight o’clock they went
to the fields, drove away those who were harvesting rice with threshing machines, and set fire to the
fields, as well as to the harvest and equipment. In the afternoon, they attacked the fields of village B4,
located a few hundred metres away from B6.
Sometimes villages are destroyed. For example, on 4 September 2021, the village of Dongaly (Kala-
Siguida commune) was burnt to the ground by jihadists. According to the inhabitants interviewed by
FIDH, the village was under the protection of the Dozos. But the Dozos left at the request of the village
chief and the imam of the mosque. Following their departure, the jihadists came and set fire to all the
huts.
The information collected by the FIDH delegations during fact-finding missions in Mali reveals
numerous serious human rights violations against civilian populations in central Mali, particularly
in Douentza cercle (Mopti region) and Niono cercle (Ségou region). These violations took the form
of summary executions, enforced disappearances, torture, sexual and gender-based violence,
including rape and forced marriage. Other violations were also committed against civilian
populations, such as abductions, repeated threats and pressure, long-term sieges and restrictions
on freedom of movement, as well as the pillage, destruction and confiscation of civilian property.
According to information documented by FIDH, all armed actors in the conflict are responsible for
serious violations. Some of these violations, by virtue of their nature and scale, constitute crimes
under international criminal law and crimes under Malian criminal law.
Moura, in Djenné cercle (Mopti region), 28 March 2022. Individuals arrested and rounded up by the FAMa
and members of the Wagner Group, before several of them were executed a few moments later. DR
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND

CHARACTERISATION OF
VIOLATIONS IN CENTRAL MALI
FIDH’s investigations documented a significant number of crimes committed by all the forces present
in the regions of Ségou and Mopti: JNIM jihadist groups, community self-defence militias and the
Malian Armed Forces and their international partners. These crimes, which are described in detail in
the Part II of this report, are first and foremost subject to national law and constitute offences under
the Penal Code of Mali. Given their nature, gravity and scale over the past seven years, FIDH considers
that they also constitute crimes under international law, in particular war crimes.
A. Violations of international human rights law and international
humanitarian law
The investigations conducted by FIDH in central Mali (described above in the “Methodology” section),
supplemented by research and analysis, identified several types of human rights violations, as
detailed in Part II. Given that the unstable situation in Mali constitutes an armed conflict of a non-
international character, as described in the “context” section of this report, our organisation has also
identified violations of international humanitarian law.
Violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law identified in this
report, committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict, include extrajudicial or
summary executions or killings of civilians, enforced disappearances, rape and other forms of
sexual violence, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, arbitrary arrests and unlawful
detentions, abductions, attacks on civilians and their property, and the destruction or confiscation of
property (including pillage).
The abovementioned acts constitute violations of fundamental rights as protected by several

international conventions and instruments ratified by the Republic of Mali, including the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights72 (and its Optional Protocol)73 of 1976 (date of entry into force),
which guarantees, inter alia, the right to life (Article 6) and prohibits the use of torture and cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 7), arbitrary and/or unlawful arrest and
detention and other violations of the right to liberty and security of the person (Article 9), as well as
forced labour (Article 8(3)); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) of 1986,74
which recognises, inter alia, respect for the right to life and integrity of the person (Articles 4 and
5) and the right to property (Article 14); and the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women
in Africa (Maputo Protocol) (2005),75 as well as the Guidelines on Combating Sexual Violence and
its Consequences in Africa drawn up by the ACHPR in 2017;76 the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) of 1987;77 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981);78 and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (1990),79 protecting children from all forms of violence, including sexual violence, and its
Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2002).80
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes several provisions that are
considered norms of customary international law, also protects the right to life, liberty and security
of the person (Article 3), the right to property (Article 17), and prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment (Article 5).
72. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights.
73. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/optional-protocol-international-covenant-civil-and-
political.
74. S
ee https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011_-_african_charter_on_human_and_peoples_rights_e.pdf.
75. S
ee https://alliancesforafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Protocol-on-the-Rights-of-Women-Maputo.pdf.
76. S
ee https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/achpr_guidelines_on_combating_sexual_violence.pdf.
77. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-
or-degrading.
78. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-elimination-all-forms-discrimination-
against-women.
79. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-child.
80. S
ee https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/optional-protocol-convention-rights-child-
involvement-childre.
In addition to international human rights law, conventional and customary international humanitarian
law applies to all parties to the conflict. For example, parties are obliged to respect Article 3 common
to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions81
relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts. These instruments cover,
inter alia, the violations listed above, including attacks against civilians and their property, pillage and
forced displacement of civilians.
The state of Mali is obliged to respect these human rights and international humanitarian law standards
and to take the necessary measures to prevent and punish violations, whether committed by its
security forces or by non-state actors, including by investigating and prosecuting those responsible
for such violations.
Some of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law mentioned in this report
could, depending on the circumstances, constitute crimes under Malian criminal law and international
criminal law. It is up to the Malian justice system to investigate these crimes, since it has jurisdiction
over all crimes committed by members of the armed forces and armed groups on the territory of Mali.
B. Crimes under international law
In their 2018 report, FIDH and AMDH concluded that, in view of the context, nature, gravity and scale
of human rights violations committed in central Mali, JNIM jihadist groups, the Malian armed forces
and the Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence militia were responsible for war crimes. In 2020, the
International Commission of Inquiry set up by the United Nations, in accordance with Article 46 of the
Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, characterised acts attributable to the Malian army,
committed between 2012 and 2018 in northern and central Mali, as war crimes.82 The Commission
also concluded that armed jihadist groups and the Dan Na Ambassagou militia committed crimes
against humanity in massacres of civilians in June 2017 in Fulani hamlets near Koro (centre), during
which “at least 39 civilians, including children” were killed.83 FIDH considers that the numerous crimes
that are still being perpetrated by the same actors on the territory constitute war crimes under the
Penal Code of Mali, which in Articles 29-l and 31, reproduces the main elements of the definitions of
war crimes provided for in Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was
ratified by the state of Mali in August 2000. Since 2001, the Penal Code of Mali has included a broad
list of sexual crimes that constitute war crimes.
From the outset of the conflict, massive resources have been invested in the “fight against terrorism”
by the state of Mali and its international partners. However, these efforts have had a limited effect
on the level of violence and the commission of international crimes, and have failed to contribute to
their reduction. The two fact-finding missions conducted by FIDH in September 2021 and June 2022
confirmed the persistence of numerous crimes, including wilful killings, murders, rape and other acts
of sexual violence, illegal arrests and detentions, acts of torture and inhuman treatment, mutilations,
including post-mortem, and acts of forced recruitment.
81. S
ee https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols.
82. International Commission of Inquiry for Mali, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry for Mali, S/2020/1332, para 304,
19 June 2020.
83. Ibid.
War crimes
According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, war crimes include:
a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts
against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
i)     Wilful killing;
ii)    Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
iii)   Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
iv)   Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
vi)   Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular
trial;
vii)  Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement.
c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts
committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or
any other cause:
i)     Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
ii)    Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
iii)   Taking of hostages;
iv)   The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are
generally recognized as indispensable.
e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
i)    Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
ii)   Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with
international law;
iii)   Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian
objects under the international law of armed conflict;
v)   Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
vi)  Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7,
paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a
serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions;
vii)  Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or groups or
using them to participate actively in hostilities;
ix)   Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary.
Contextual element: armed conflict
In order for any of the above acts to constitute a war crime, it must have been committed in the
context of, or be associated with, an armed conflict, whether or not of an international character,
depending on the act in question.
In the Tadic decision of 2 October 1995, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided a succinct definition of the concept of armed conflict.
According to the Appeals Judges, “an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State.”84
For the definition of war crime to apply, it is also recognised that the confrontation must reach a
minimum level of intensity and that the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum level of
organisation.85 Based on all the evidence gathered by FIDH during its investigations, and on an analysis
of that evidence, it is clear that violence in Mali has reached a sufficiently high level and that the
various armed entities, including militias and jihadists, are very well structured. FIDH’s documentation
work has also contributed to a clearer understanding of the chain of command in some of the militias.
In the case of Mali, on the basis of the above considerations, the ongoing conflict can be characterised
as an armed conflict of a non-international character.86
Material element: the prohibited act
Based on the testimonies presented in this report (see Part II) and analysis of the context of violence
in central Mali (see Part I), some of the acts perpetrated by all parties to the conflict may constitute
war crimes.
Killings
Jihadist groups committed various violations of the right to life, at least in the killing of 32 stallholders
in Songho on 3 December 2021 (see p. 29); in the targeted killings perpetrated in Niono cercle (see
p. 26) between 2018 and 2021; and in the Bankass attacks of 18 and 19 June 2022, when 132 people
were victims of summary executions (see p. 30).
Such abuses were also committed by self-defence militias, including the Dozo self-defence militia
known as “Fatobougou” in the attack on the Fulani village of Djonkè Ouro in May 2020, which resulted
in the death of 35 civilians; and the Dozo militia based in B3 (Niono), which claimed at least five
victims (see p. 33) between February and August 2021.
The FIDH investigation revealed that the FAMa, supported by their international partners, were also
responsible for acts that could be characterised as war crimes. At least six emblematic cases were
documented and analysed by FIDH (see Part II.A). Such acts were perpetrated when the FAMa
84. ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, a/k/a “Dule”, [Tadić Case], Appeals Chamber, Decision on the Defence motion for interlocutory
appeal on jurisdiction (Case No. IT-94-1), para. 70, 2 October 1995.
85. International Committee of the Red Cross, “How is the term ‘armed conflict’ defined in international humanitarian law?,”
Opinion Paper, March 2008.
86. S
ee details on the conflict in Part I of this report, “Context and analysis of the security crisis in central Mali”.
detachment was stationed in Boni (summary executions, forced disappearances, torture sometimes
inside the camp); during the operations carried out in Massabougou in 2020, and in Sinko, Kogoni-
Peuhl and Belidanedji in February 2020, all located in the vicinity of Diabali (Ségou region), during
which 15 people were killed (see p. 26); during aerial bombardments of a wedding by French Barkhane
forces as part of Operation “Eclipse” on 3 January 2021 in Bounti (Mopti region), in violation of the
precautionary principle, resulting in the death of 19 civilians.87 According to testimonies collected by
FIDH (see p. 27), other similar acts were perpetrated in the vicinity of Sokolo in June 2022, resulting in
at least two cases of civilian killings, as well as in the Moura massacre in March 2022, during which
the FAMa and their partners from the paramilitary Wagner Group are said to have caused the death
of 470 civilians.
Inhumane acts and other bodily harm, torture, mutilation and cruel treatment
Such acts were perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. FIDH’s investigation revealed cases of torture
in Boni (Mopti region) in March 2021 by the FAMa (see p. 25), and use of the same practice in the
camp of Pergue (Ségou region) in early March 2022 (see p. 28), as well as the mutilation of dead
bodies by explosion, by the FAMa and the Wagner Group (see p. 15).
During the sieges of Farabougou (Ségou region), Songho and Mondoro (Mopti region), civilian
populations were encircled and consequently unable to collect water, obtain food, access health care,
cultivate their fields or harvest crops. This form of long-term collective punishment caused food crises
in some localities amid the COVID-19 outbreak, death and disease (see p. 46). Sieges can amount to
“severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law,”88 but they
are also “[...] inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health.”89
Pillaging
Several cases of pillaging can be attributed to jihadist groups in Niono cercle (Ségou region) between
September and November 2021 (see p. 51). Evidence collected also points to the responsibility of
self-defence militias in the pillaging of cattle in the Ndola area in late 2021 (Ségou region) (see p. 28).
The FAMa are also responsible for the looting of the WAEMU-funded warehouse for storing crops in
Sokolo, near Niono (Ségou region) (see p. 27) in early 2022.
Sexual crimes
In relation to sexual violence, Article 8.e.vi of the Rome Statute refers to the following acts, which
may be characterised as war crimes: “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
[...] enforced sterilisation, and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious breach of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions.”
Between 2021 and 2022, the FIDH mission delegation collected about a dozen testimonies from
women reporting rape, sometimes gang rape, over periods ranging from a few days to several weeks
87. F
IDH, Mali : il est urgent de mener une enquête judiciaire indépendante sur les frappes à Bounty, 12 April 2021, https://www.
fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/mali/mali-il-est-urgent-de-mener-une-enquete-judiciaire-independante-sur.
88. A
rticle 29 (e) of the Malian Penal Code.
89. A
rticle 29 (j) of the Malian Penal Code.
in Douentza cercle (Mopti region) between 2019 and 2021. Many of these accounts tell of the same
ordeal: women area abducted by armed men and taken to camps for sexual slavery. Testimonies
point to the responsibility of JNIM jihadists and militiamen from the Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence
groups (see p. 36). Other women described the same practices, attributable to JNIM-affiliated jihadists,
over the same period and in Douentza cercle (see p. 37). According to the testimonies collected, at
least 20 women were also raped in Moura in March 2022, in the Mopti region (see p. 40). Members of
the FAMa, accompanied by “white” foreign soldiers who did not speak French, perpetrated individual
rapes and gang rapes, following the execution of the male residents as part of sweep operations in
towns. Some women were also displaced and rounded up before being subjected to these crimes.
The Malian military authorities, in their response to FIDH in November 2022, argue that no complaints
alleging sexual crimes have been registered. However, to our knowledge, no civilian victim of Moura
has yet decided to file a complaint due to fear of reprisals, of not being heard, and of the stigma
attached to such cases, as noted above in Part III.
In addition, jihadists and self-defence militias were responsible for forced marriages (see p. 34),
which can be prosecuted as various war crimes, including cruel, humiliating or degrading treatment.90
Furthermore, the findings of FIDH’s investigation also revealed increased persecution of the
Fulani community, although this aspect cannot be characterised as a war crime. According to the
testimonies and analysis in this report, the factor of ethnicity plays a role in the perpetration of crimes
by the self-defence militias and the FAMa, especially in relation to Fulani populations in central Mali.
There is ample evidence that Fulani civilians are targeted by various violations on the basis of their
membership of this group, identifiable by language, occupation, or dress (see p. 40). In this respect,
the attack in Moura in March 2022 is particularly illustrative of the targeted persecution of this
community. The exponential increase in attacks against Fulani civilians by self-defence groups and
the FAMa, especially since the arrival of their paramilitary partners from the Wagner Group (see p. 21),
raises many concerns, particularly in relation to the damaging and potentially devastating conflation
of jihadism and membership of the Fulani community.
90. ICC, Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15,
para. 124, 23 March 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/CR2016_02331.PDF.
Passers-by in front of the courthouse in Bamako on 28 August 2012. © AFP PHOTO / Habibou KOUYATE
IV. REIGNING IMPUNITY
As the conflict continues to escalate, serious human rights violations persist and increase in intensity.
This phenomenon can be explained in part by the reigning impunity, which “feeds the population’s
distrust of the state, exacerbates community tensions and contributes to a spiral of violence that
fuels recruitment by armed groups”, as underlined by the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, of which
FIDH is a member.91
The double attack on the village of Ogossagou (Mopti region) is a clear illustration of the persistence
of impunity in Mali. Just before the first anniversary of the first Ogossagou massacre in March 2019,
during which 160 civilians were killed by members of the Dan Na Ambassagou self-defence militia,
the village was attacked again by the same assailants on 14 February 2020. This second attack,
91. F
IDH, “Moura, Mali. The vicious cycle of violence and impunity in the Sahel must end,” 8 April 2022, https://www.fidh.org/en/
region/Africa/mali/the-vicious-cycle-of-violence-and-impunity-in-the-sahel-must-end.
which resulted in 35 victims, caused national outrage. The massacre could have been avoided: the
leader of the militia, Youssouf Toloba, has never been held accountable by the justice system, despite
repeated incitement to hatred and violence against the Fulani community.92
At the time of the publication of the findings of the special fact-finding mission on serious human
rights violations committed in Ogossagou on 14 February 2020, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, then Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSMA, declared he was “very concerned
by the impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators [of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali],”
underlining the absolute necessity “to put an end to the cycle of murderous violence fuelled by the
impunity of its perpetrators.”93
While some actions have been taken by the authorities to fight impunity for human rights violations,
there are still major gaps.
A. Action by the authorities
1. Conduct of investigations without conclusive results
The authorities have announced that they have opened investigations into numerous crimes. However,
there is every reason to fear that these investigations will stall, like all the other investigations into
crimes under international criminal law (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide) committed
since 2012.
Proceedings opened since 2012 have made little progress or have come to a standstill, while
victims continue to demand justice, despite fearing reprisals, in the absence of adequate protection
measures. Several organisations, including FIDH, AMDH, DEME-SO (La Maison de l’Aide), Women in
Law and Development Africa (WILDAF), the Association of Women Jurists of Mali (Association des
juristes maliennes – AJM) and the Cri de Cœur Collective, filed complaints with applications to join
proceedings as civil parties in the Malian courts, including the High Court of Bamako Commune III
(Tribunal de Grande Instance de la Commune 3 de Bamako). In 2012 and 2013, Supreme Court rulings
granted jurisdiction to the Court of Bamako Commune III to hear crimes that had previously fallen
under the jurisdiction of courts in the northern regions. In February 2015, the Supreme Court restored
jurisdiction to the northern courts. By virtue of these decisions, these organisations collectively
filed a complaint with the High Court of Bamako Commune III on 12 November 2014, on behalf of
80 women and girls who were victims of rape and sexual violence in the northern regions, and a
second complaint on 6 March 2015, on behalf of 33 victims of serious crimes committed in Timbuktu.
Further applications to join as civil parties were filed in proceedings against Aliou Mahamane Touré,
Houka Houka, Iyag Ag and others, by FIDH and AMDH between 2013 and 2014. In addition to these
complaints supported by a pool of fifteen Malian and international lawyers, other complaints were
filed with the Pôle judiciaire spécialisé contre le terrorisme et la criminalité transfrontalière organisée
(Specialised Judicial Unit against terrorism and transnational organised crime – PJS) by the Cri de
Cœur Collective and WILDAF in Mali.
92. M
aliweb, contribution. “Nettoyage ethnique au Centre du Mali?,” Dr Bouréima Gnalibouly DICKO, https ://www.maliweb.net/
contributions/nettoyage-ethnique-au-centre-du-mali-2852177.html, accessed on 12 October 2022.
93. M
INUSMA, Conclusions de la mission d’enquête spéciale sur les graves atteintes aux droits de l’Homme commises à Ogossagou le
14 février 2020 (Findings of the special fact-finding mission on serious human rights violations committed in Ogossagou on
14 February 2020), 18 March 2020.
Some of the victims were heard by the Commune’s investigating judges, mainly in 2015-2016, and
by those of the PJS, between 2019 and 2022, as a result of the logistical support provided by these
organisations. These two case files (corresponding to the two complaints mentioned above) are still
at the investigation stage.
Since the opening of judicial investigations in July 2012, the national justice system has organised
very few trials in which civil parties have been involved. With the exception of the trial against Aliou
Mahamane, and the transfer of Al Hassane to the ICC, there is still work to be done by the Malian
justice system in dealing with and trying crimes under international criminal law. Aliou Mahamane
Touré was tried and sentenced on 17 August 2017 to 10 years’ imprisonment and damages for
undermining state security, criminal conspiracy, illegal possession of weapons, and intentional
assault and battery. It is important to note that Aliou Mahamane Touré was also prosecuted for
war crimes, but the indictment chamber did not retain this count on the grounds that “Mali has not
made a declaration of war.” The Assize Court had also dismissed this count despite the insistence of
the civil party and the prosecution. Aliou Mahamane Touré never served his full sentence as he was
released for the second time in 2020 and has since returned to fight with armed groups. Meanwhile,
the victims are still waiting for reparation.
While the trials for the Radisson Blu Hotel attacks94 in October 2020 and the Koulogon-Peuhl
massacre95 in June 2021 should have been important steps forward in the fight against impunity,
they were marked by a lack of full participation of civil parties and the absence of one of the main
perpetrators, who was freed in exchange for the release of hostages.
The extension of the PJS’s jurisdiction in 2019, as requested by civil society organisations involved in
legal actions for human rights violations linked to the conflict, including FIDH, was expected to bring
improvements in the fight against impunity.
2. What role should the PJS play in the fight against terrorism and transnational
organised crime?
In July 2019, given the limited progress in the area of national justice, FIDH welcomed the extension of
the PJS’s material jurisdiction to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Our organisations
also welcomed the effective transfer of several proceedings to this institution, as of May 2020,
including cases of sexual crimes initiated by FIDH and AMDH in 2014 and 2015.96 The objective of this
measure was to overcome the jurisdictional issue relating to cases under investigation by the High
Court of Bamako Commune, which could not be investigated by the courts of the northern regions
due to security concerns.
The broadening of PJS’s jurisdiction was thus intended to contribute to the effective respect of the
right to justice for victims of crimes under international criminal law, including those who had suffered
sexual and gender-based violence. The PJS was given additional resources, including at least one
public prosecutor, seven deputy public prosecutors, eleven investigation offices and a specialised
investigation brigade. Regional offices were to be established, including one in Mopti, which is not
yet operational despite major work having been carried out. “The PJS branch in Mopti has been built
94. O
n 20 November 2015, a jihadist attack killed 20 people and wounded 10 in the Bamako hotel and on its terrace.
95. In January 2019, the Dan Na Ambassagou militia massacred 39 villagers.
96. F
IDH, “Mali: 33 victimes de Tombouctou et sept associations portent plainte contre 15 auteurs présumés des crimes de guerre
et crimes contre l’humanité,” 16 March 2015, https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/mali/mali-33-victimes-de-tombouctou-
et-7-associations-portent-plainte.
and equipped but no human resources have yet been allocated,”97 the Minister of Justice and Human
Rights explained to the FIDH delegation in July 2022. In addition, communication about the extension
of PJS’s jurisdiction by the Public Prosecutor’s Office has been inadequate. Very few people in Mali,
including in the legal community, are aware of the role played by the PJS. The lack of visibility of the
PJS, coupled with the inadequate qualification of the offences as described below (“Technical and
administrative issues”), discourage victims from joining proceedings as civil parties.
Furthermore, it is said that the PJS is no longer in a position to organise certain trials, including those
related to massacres committed in the centre, the list of which is growing dangerously long, as well
as those committed in the north between 2012 and 2013, including Aghuelhoc in January 2012,
and other sexual violence, extra-judicial executions, disappearances and acts of torture perpetrated
during the 2012 and 2013 occupation by jihadist groups.
In their comments on this report, the Malian military authorities indicated that the investigating
magistrates’ offices of the military courts of Mopti and Bamako had obtained orders for the
prosecution of the cases of Boulkessi, Malemana, Binedama, Nantaga, Dioura Nantaga and Dioura.
According to their comments, the latter two cases (Nantaga and Dioura) are to be “very soon set for
trial.” The cases of Songho, Diallassagou, Ogossagou and Sobane Da are reportedly pending before
the PJS. The authorities attribute the slowness of justice in these cases to the insecurity that makes
access to certain areas difficult.
Three years after the expansion of its material jurisdiction, the PJS is making greater progress in
the investigation of anti-terrorist cases.98 A total of 47 cases were tried at the Bamako Court of
Appeal in October and November 2021, during a special assize session. In addition to the various
PJS investigations, several anti-terrorist trials are organised by the Bamako Assize Court each year.
In October 2020, during the trial of those responsible for the attacks on the Radisson Blu hotel and
the terrace restaurant, the Mauritanian Fawas Ould Ahemed, a.k.a “Ibrahim 10”, Souadou Chaka a.k.a
Moussa Maïga and Abdoul Faki Abdrahame Maïga were prosecuted for criminal conspiracy, illegal
possession of weapons, intentional murder, complicity in an act of terrorism, and the transport of
weapons of war, ammunition and explosives. They were sentenced to death and each fined 10 million
CFA francs.
Amnesty International, in its report Mali. Crimes Without Convictions – Analysis of the Judicial Response
to Conflict-Related Crimes in Central Mali, published in April 2022, denounced hasty proceedings that
“do not meet the minimum standards of fairness required by international law,”99 following allegations
of torture and ill-treatment and the absence of a defence lawyer, as raised by the UN.
3. The International Criminal Court and complementarity in the fight against impunity
in central Mali
“Any person who incites or engages in acts of violence including by ordering, requesting, encouraging
or contributing in any other manner to the commission of crimes within ICC’s jurisdiction is liable
to prosecution before the Court, with full respect for the principle of complementarity. The violence
must stop”, affirmed ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda in March 2019 in relation to the upsurge of
violence and mass killings reported in Mopti region. This warning to those responsible for human
97. M
eeting between the Minister of Justice and Human Rights and FIDH, 21 July 2022.
98. P
eople’s Coalition for the Sahel, Sahel: What has changed. Progress Report of the People’s Coalition for the Sahel, June 2022.
99. A
I, Mali. Crimes Without Convictions – Analysis of the Judicial Response to Conflict-Related Crimes in Central Mali, 13 April 2022,
p. 58, https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/AFR3751922022ENGLISH.pdf.
rights violations, combined with the impunity for the perpetrators of crimes under international law
committed in central Mali, raised hopes that a new ICC investigation into war crimes and crimes
against humanity would be opened, this time in the centre of the country.
Since the beginning of the conflict, some progress in the fight against impunity has been made as a
result of Mali’s referral of the situation in the country to the ICC in July 2012, for crimes committed
in the north by jihadist insurgents. Following the opening of an investigation in January 2013, the
ICC tried and convicted Ahmad Al-Faki Al-Mahdi in September 2016 for his responsibility in the
destruction of the mausoleums and mosque in Timbuktu.100 In March 2018, the investigation also
led to the transfer to the ICC of Al Hassan, former commissioner of the Islamic police in Timbuktu
during the occupation of the city by jihadist groups in 2012 and 2013. He is accused of war crimes and
crimes against humanity, including sexual crimes.101 His trial opened in July 2020. This is a significant
opportunity to advance the fight against impunity in northern Mali, particularly for war crimes and
crimes against humanity committed by political and military officials.102
In April 2022, in the aftermath of the events in Moura, Alioune Tine, UN Independent Expert on the
situation in Mali, stated that “The information received at this stage raises serious questions and
concerns about potential serious violations of international human rights law and/or international
humanitarian law. In addition, some of these violations may constitute crimes within the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court”.103 As the ICC complements national courts, with the latter
retaining primacy of prosecution and primary responsibility for action, this new chapter should guide
the national justice system to revive investigation and prosecution of other crimes under international
law committed in Mali since 2012, in particular in the central regions.
Given the recurrence and intensification of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC, a more
systematic application of the complementarity principle seems necessary, where the lack of political
will and the insufficient capacity of national courts, in particular the PJS, despite the extension of its
jurisdiction, mean that judicial responses are not commensurate with the seriousness of the crimes
committed in central Mali by all parties to the conflict.
In comments on the FIDH report in November 2022, the Malian Ministry of Defence and Veterans
Affairs argued that “the Malian justice system [was] functional and [that] any idea of complementarity
would be an attack on its sovereignty.”
4. Limited transitional justice mechanisms
In addition to national and international justice systems, other transitional justice mechanisms
provided for in the Peace Agreement have important roles to play in addressing serious human rights
violations in Mali. They include the International Commission of Inquiry and the CVJR,104 which were
100. S
ee ICC, “ICC Trial Chamber VIII declares Mr Al Mahdi guilty of the war crime of attacking historic and religious buildings
in Timbuktu and sentences him to nine years’ imprisonment,” 27 September 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-trial-
chamber-viii-declares-mr-al-mahdi-guilty-war-crime-attacking-historic-and-religious.
101. F
IDH, “ICC: Towards the first trial for crimes against humanity committed in northern Mali?,” 8 July 2019, https://www.fidh.
org/en/issues/international-justice/international-criminal-court-icc/icc-towards-the-first-trial-for-crimes-against-humanity-
committed-in.
102. Ibid.
103. O
HCHR, “Mali: UN expert urges probe into grave rights violations in Moura.” 6 April 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-
releases/2022/04/mali-un-expert-urges-probe-grave-rights-violations-moura.
104. C
reated in 2014, the CVJR’s mission is to “contribute to the establishment of lasting peace through truth-seeking, reconciliation
and the consolidation of national unity and democratic values.” The Commission is composed of 25 members who hold the
title of commissioners, and is headed by a president assisted by two vice-presidents, who are appointed by decree of the
Council of Ministers. To date, 29,822 statements have been recorded by the CVJR.
set up to investigate serious human rights violations,105 take statements from victims and make
proposals for reparation to victims,106 including victims of terrorism. While the former delivered its
report in 2020, the latter, whose mandate expires at the end of 2022, has developed a reparations
policy that will soon be enacted into law.107
Created in 2014, the CVJR’s mission is to “contribute to the establishment of lasting peace through truth-
seeking, reconciliation and the consolidation of national unity and democratic values.” The Commission
is composed of 25 members who hold the title of commissioners and is headed by a president assisted
by two vice-presidents, who are appointed by decree of the Council of Ministers. As of July 2022, 29 822
statements had been recorded by the CVJR.108 Five public hearings have been organised, with the fifth,
held in June, focusing on victims of sexual violence and child victims of conflict.
B. Obstacles to the proper administration of justice
1. Lack of political will
Although measures have been taken by the authorities to deal with the crimes and human rights
violations committed in Mali, gaps remain. Efforts and actions have not always been backed up by
the political will necessary to genuinely fight impunity in Mali.
Neither the Roadmap of September 2020, nor the Transitional Charter of March 2022, contain any
specific reference to the fight against impunity for serious human rights violations, whereas the
governmental action plan presented in July 2021 includes the fight against impunity in its Priority 4.
This necessitates, on the one hand, the “opening and continuation of judicial proceedings on serious
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law,” and, on the other, the “continuation
of investigations into killings and other human rights abuses on 10, 11 and 12 July 2020 in Sikasso,
Kayes and Bamako.”109
The case described below clearly illustrates the lack of political will to fight impunity for the most
serious crimes. On 30 June 2021, the 12 defendants tried in relation to the January 2019 Koulogon-
Peuhl massacre, which resulted in the death of 39 civilians, were sentenced to death in absentia
and fined 500 million CFA francs in civil damages. As analysed by Lawyers Without Borders Canada
(ASFC), “this decision, like those handed down by the Bamako Assize Court during its special session
in October-November 2021 (…) on terrorist crimes and transnational organised crime, is likely to
reopen the debate on the application of the death penalty in Mali. This penalty, which is still enshrined
in the Malian legislation (Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code), appears increasingly out of step
with international norms and standards on the protection of human rights, which aim to abolish this
practice.”110 FIDH is fully committed to the abolition of the death penalty.111
105. A
SFC, “La CVJR prête à mettre en lumière les cas de disparitions forcées au Mali,” Press Release, 2 April 2021, https://www.
asfcanada.ca/medias/nouvelles/mali-cvjr-audience-publique-disparitions-forcees-2021/.
106. A
SFC, “Mali: la première audience de la Commission Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation a permis à des victimes d’exprimer
publiquement leurs souffrance,” Press Release, 17 January 2020, https://www.asfcanada.ca/site/assets/files/7254/
audiences-publiques-cvjr-justice-victimes-droits-humains-2020.pdf.
107. Interview with CVJR President Ousmane Oumarou Sidibé, July 2022.
108. I nterview with CVJR President Ousmane Oumarou Sidibé, July 2022.
109. T
ransitional Government Action Plan 2021-2022, July 2021.
110. A
SFC, “Affaire Koulogon: témoin d’un processus de justice transitionnelle partiel,” 29 June 2022, https://www.asfcanada.ca/
site/assets/files/9419/affaire-koulogon_un-processus-de-jt-partiel_docx.pdf.
111. FIDH, “At UN crime congress, Alice Mogwe shed light on path to abolishing death penalty across Africa,” 30 March 2021,
https://www.fidh.org/en/issues/death-penalty/at-un-crime-congress-alice-mogwe-shed-light-on-the-path-to-abolishing.
Shortly after the massacre, the 12 individuals accused of offences related to the attack were arrested
and remanded in custody by the Mopti Prosecutor’s Office. They were granted provisional release at
the request of their lawyers, but thereafter failed to comply with their obligation to appear at the Mopti
assize session in December 2020 and again in June 2021. Yet, the Malian justice system did not issue
an arrest warrant, which explains their convictions in absentia.
Given the scale of the crimes committed and therefore the risk of absconding, it seems inappropriate
that the defendants were granted provisional release. This may indicate a lack of willingness on the
part of the authorities to ensure the effective prosecution of those responsible for crimes.
This deficiency is particularly acute in relation to prosecution of members of the FAMa. Although
several proceedings against the security forces have been opened, based on the information available
to our organisation, none of them have yet resulted in convictions. In addition, it appears that the
soldiers prosecuted are not systematically suspended or disciplined following the disclosure of
violations. Invoking imperative security grounds, actors in the Malian justice system argue that they
do not want to take action that “could be detrimental to the morale of their comrades in the field and
cause them unnecessary stress.”112
From the beginning of Operation Keletigui in December 2021, with the deployment of the military
in central Mali, the transitional authorities made efforts to present an enhanced image of reality. In
the media and on social networks, the now ubiquitous Directorate of Military Information and Public
Relations (Direction de l’information et des relations publiques des armées – DIRPA) sought to convince
the Malian population of the FAMa’s growing influence in the centre of the country, relegating
violence against civilian populations committed by the army and its partners from the Wagner Group
to the background. At the same time, an unprecedented crackdown on critics, dissidents, national
and foreign journalists and human rights defenders was organised, with systematic expulsions,
detentions, intimidation and death threats against those who refuted the official narrative and pointed
to the transitional government’s failings in upholding human rights113 and fighting impunity.
From January 2022 onwards, Malian leaders began to reduce access to certain sites for MINUSMA
forces and overflying rights, thus obstructing the efforts of human rights defenders investigating
violations against civilians. Since then, all requests to fly over Malian territory must be submitted
between 48 and 72 hours before the flight. In certain specific circumstances, access to the area may
be denied. This was the case in April 2022 following the Moura abuses, considered to be among
the largest-scale violent acts of the decade-long conflict.114 These additional restrictions could be
aimed at limiting the monitoring of human rights violations committed by the military and avoiding
MINUSMA’s monitoring of the Wagner Group’s deployments.
The Malian transitional authorities, in their response to FIDH in November 2022, confirmed that an
investigation had been opened, which was followed by a forensic inspection carried out by the Mopti
Prosecutor’s Office. On the issue of overflying authorisations, the authorities stated that a temporary
no-fly zone had been established in January 2022 to assert “the sovereignty of the state of Mali and
avoid incidents, with a monthly derogation for MINUSMA, which is required to submit a request 36
hours before a flight.”
112. AI, Mali. Crimes Without Convictions – Analysis of the Judicial Response to Conflict-Related Crimes in Central Mali, 13 April 2022,
113. FIDH, ASFC and AI, “Human rights in Mali: The silence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,” see Note
on the Human Rights Situation in the Context of the Conflict and the Transition in Mali, 24 August 2022, https://www.fidh.org/en/
region/Africa/mali/human-rights-mali-silence-african-commission-ACHPR.
114. FIDH, ASFC and AI, “Allegations of crimes against civilians in Moura, Mali: an independent investigation must take place,” 7 April
2022, https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/allegations-of-crimes-against-civilians-in-moura-mali-an-independent.
Beyond the lack of political will observed in some cases by our organisation, the fight against impunity
in Mali also faces security and technical challenges.
2. Security challenges
The security crisis in central Mali is regularly described as a conflict behind closed doors, to the
extent that it takes place beyond the reach of humanitarian organisations, international human rights
organisations, journalists and the last remaining representatives of the state, the majority of whom
have fled to Bamako and the south since the arrival of jihadist insurgents in the region. Amnesty
International, in its report Mali: Crimes Without Convictions, published in April 2022, provides an
exhaustive review of the constraints on judges’ access to the sites of violations. In particular, the
report states that as of 30 November 2020, only 9% of civilian administrators in northern Mali and the
Mopti region were physically present in their duty stations, the lowest figure since at least September
2015.115 The Malian authorities in their response to FIDH in November 2022 claimed that the state
had strengthened its presence over the past two years, indicating that 325 of the 338 administrator
positions on national territory were filled, including by governors, prefects and sub-prefects (comment
by the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, November 2022). FIDH was unable to verify this
information.
In order to perform their duties, prosecutors require FAMa escorts to ensure their safety and access
to areas under investigation which, in some cases, are “in a battlefield setting.”116 The FAMa, fully
mobilised on counter-terrorism operations, are often not available for such missions. Insecurity is
also a factor hampering victims’ access to justice, as risks of reprisals are high for those who file a
complaint or are heard by an investigator. Victims may face significant risks and dangers as a result
of their participation in criminal proceedings.
3. Technical and administrative issues
Although the Malian legal framework has been improved, significant technical issues remain in terms
of the legal characterisation of events. Most of the charges retained are characterised as offences
against state security, criminal conspiracy or terrorism. The confusion between transnational crimes
and crimes under international law is recurrent. This may be the result of interpretations based solely
on national texts, even though Mali has partially incorporated the Rome Statute into its Penal Code.
The following statement by the Minister of Justice provides a good illustration of the technical and
administrative obstacles existing in Mali: “Some prosecutors do not automatically refer offences of
terrorism, transnational organised crime or money laundering to the PJS. Some act on the basis of
a lack of knowledge of the circumstances of the case and consider these offences as common law
offences.”117 It is rare that offences are characterised as war crimes and crimes against humanity,
despite the reality on the ground. This is partly due to a certain lack of technical expertise on crimes
under international law.
Similar observations are often made about the handling of acts constituting war crimes and crimes
against humanity, which are often brought before either ordinary criminal courts or military courts in
115. AI, Mali. Crimes Without Convictions – Analysis of the Judicial Response to Conflict-Related Crimes in Central Mali, 13 April 2022,
116. Ibid., 3.1.1, p. 32.
117. Circular No. 64 MJDH-SG of 12 September 2022 of the Minister of Justice and Human Rights setting out the criminal policy
and prosecution strategy in the fight against terrorism and crimes under international criminal law.
the case of offences committed by military personnel, which raises recurrent conflicts of jurisdiction.
According to the information available to FIDH at the time of writing, a dozen cases which are currently
pending before the military courts of Bamako and Mopti will instead be brought before the PJS, a
more specialised exceptional court.
These technical and administrative shortcomings do not help to encourage victims to join criminal
proceedings as civil parties, as they rarely recognise their situation in so-called “terrorist” offences. This
could result in serious crimes being relegated to the background, whereas crimes under international
law should be given priority over terrorism or ordinary law offences when the circumstances of the
events so require.
For many years, FIDH has been calling on the judicial authorities to develop a criminal policy on
strategies for case prioritisation, characterisation of the facts and publicity around proceedings and
trials. In response, in September 2022, at the time of finalising this report, the Minister of Justice
and Human Rights adopted a circular “setting out the criminal policy and prosecution strategy in
the fight against terrorism and crimes under international criminal law.” This document, if effectively
implemented, would contribute to resolving the conflicts of jurisdiction that may arise between the
PJS, the military justice system and other ordinary courts. In effect, the circular clearly stipules that
the PJS has “exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute military personnel accused of committing such
offences, based on the principle of speciality and by virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction to hear offences
of terrorism and crimes under international criminal law.”118
4. Lack of resources
The lack of resources available to judges to carry out investigations on the ground is also an obstacle
to the fight against impunity in Mali. In many proceedings, including those involving crimes of sexual
violence, investigating judges rely solely on the records of preliminary investigations, hearing civil
parties and interviews with the accused, to conduct and close an investigation. It is common to find
that, besides hearings of the civil parties organised and supported by human rights organisations,
including FIDH, the justice system has not taken any other steps in the case. Some of Mali’s technical
partners could support judicial activities on the ground by facilitating and securing transport to and
investigations at the scene of the crimes.
Significant efforts have been made in this area since the extension of PJS’s material jurisdiction to
war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, challenges remain. The National Concord Law
passed in the wake of the 2015 Peace Agreement, which pardons several “acts that may be qualified
as crimes or misdemeanours (…)”119 is ambiguous as to the exact temporal and material scope of
these amnesties.
5. Inadequate protection of victims and witnesses
The inadequate protection of victims and witnesses is a central issue at every stage of the proceedings,
from investigations to trials and at the time of enforcement of sentences. Without effective protection
of their lives and physical integrity, victims and witnesses cannot contribute to justice efforts and
make their voices heard. In Mali, there is no specific law on protection, apart from the Law of 2012 on
118. Ibid.
119. FIDH, “Procès Sanogo: Un recours à la loi d’entente nationale qui envoie un mauvais signal aux victimes,” 19 March 2021,
https://www.fidh.org/fr/regions/afrique/mali/proces-sanogo-un-recours-a-la-loi-d-entente-nationale-qui-envoie-un.
trafficking in persons and related practices. Article 23 of this Law provides for the possibility of holding
trials in camera and exempting victims from appearing in court.120 However, there are no provisions
in Malian law for measures to ensure the physical, medical or psychological recovery of victims of
trafficking. There is also no specific law against sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-
related violence.
Since 2016, civil society organisations in Mali have made proposals for draft laws on the protection
of victims and witnesses and on the prevention, suppression and handling of gender-based violence.
Unfortunately, no bill has yet been adopted. In the meantime, in order to ensure a minimum level of
protection for victims and witnesses in line with international standards, judges, prosecutors and
lawyers can refer directly to certain provisions of the Rome Statute. Among such provisions, Article
68121 of the Rome Statute provides that “to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, [it is possible
to] conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic
or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the case of a victim
of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness, unless otherwise ordered by the Court,
having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness.” Furthermore,
despite the existence of a law on legal aid, assistance to victims, whether judicial/legal, psychological,
medical or economic, is usually provided by non-governmental organisations.
6. Turning ongoing reforms into an opportunity in the fight against impunity in Mali
Ongoing reforms, especially of the Penal Code and the 2001 Code of Criminal Procedure, are expected
to introduce much-needed new measures, in particular in relation to combating gender-based
violence, descent-based slavery practices, minors in the context of terrorism, and the introduction of
investigative techniques and the right to a second hearing in criminal matters.
A major obstacle remains in relation to the prosecution of military personnel suspected of human
rights violations, under Articles 32 and 34 of the Code of Military Justice. Indeed, the 1995 Code, still
in force today, grants prosecutorial discretion to the Minister of the Armed Forces. The minister also
has the power to dismiss a victim’s complaint “when the facts reported [...] do not justify the issuance
of a prosecution order”.122
The current review of the 1995 Code of Military Justice, which given that it predates the Code of
Criminal Procedure is somewhat outdated, could contribute to the fight against impunity, victims’
access to justice and respect for the rights of the defence.
Under the reform, the procedure for issuing prosecution orders will be amended, granting prosecutorial
discretion to the military prosecutor, while at the same time ensuring that the Minister of the Armed
Forces can continue to issue them. This reform also affects victim and witness protection, by taking
into account the gender dimension. Finally, it introduces the possibility for a foreign lawyer to appear
before the Military Courts.123
120. L
aw No. 2012-023 of 12 July 2012 on the fight against trafficking in persons and similar practices.
121. According to Article 68(2) of the Rome Statute, “As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in article 67,
the Chambers of the Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in
camera or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means.”
122. Article 34 of Law No. 95-042 of 20 April 1995 on the Code of Military Justice in the Republic of Mali.
123. On condition that the foreign lawyer is a national of one of the WAEMU countries, and that this country applies reciprocity
with lawyers from Mali.
Demonstration held by civil society organisations in Bamako on 11 September 2014, to demand the arrest and transfer
of Ag Alfousseyni Houka Houka, former head of the Timbuktu Islamic Court, during the jihadist occupation. DR
CONCLUSION
After a decade of conflict, Mali seems more than ever to be caught up in a spiral of violence for which
civilian populations continue to pay a high price. The difficult fightback by the Malian armed forces
and their international partners against the jihadist insurgency has contributed to the crisis becoming
entrenched in the centre of the country. The inability of the state to stop the jihadist advance, has led
to the conflict becoming militia-based, with the formation of self-defence militias, who are responsible
for further human rights violations, in addition to hose committed by the JNIM jihadists. It has also
meant that the transitional authorities, who came to power in 2020 following two consecutive coups,
have turned to new international partners in the fight against terrorism, prompting the withdrawal of
France and the European Union at the end of 2021. The “rise” of the Malian Armed Forces with their
new partners from the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group has led to an increase in serious violations
of international human rights humanitarian law.
Based on the evidence gathered by FIDH during two fact-finding missions between 2021 and
2022, Fulani communities, stigmatised and assimilated to jihadist groups, are particularly targeted
by violence committed by the FAMa, their international partners and self-defence militias. FIDH’s
investigations revealed that summary executions, enforced disappearances, sexual and gender-
based violence, and acts of torture were committed by all parties to the conflict between June 2018
and June 2022.
Despite the gravity of these crimes, the commitment expressed by the transitional government to
fight impunity for the most serious crimes has yet to be implemented in practice. Although some
efforts have been made, many gaps and difficulties remain.
The International Federation for Human Rights calls for an end to violations and crimes committed
by all parties to the conflict, the protection of civilian populations in the context of the conflict in
central Mali, and increased efforts in the fight against impunity of perpetrators of crimes committed
in the centre of the country since 2018. FIDH also reiterates its call for a shift from an anti-terrorist
approach to a holistic strategy aimed at restoring sustainable peace.
FIDH makes the following specific recommendations to all stakeholders, including the Malian political,
military and judicial authorities, non-state armed groups, the United Nations, the African Union and
the International Criminal Court.
Members of the Transitional Council give a standing ovation to the military president and junta representative, Malick Diaw
in Bamako on 21 February 2022. The assembly serving as the legislative body in Mali since the takeover by the military
endorsed a period of up to five years before a return of civilians to the head of the country. © AFP / Florent VERGNES
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Malian political and administrative authorities:
- Put an end to all acts that undermine respect for human rights, international humanitarian law and
the rule of law;
- Guarantee and strengthen provisions on the independence of the judiciary in the draft Constitution
currently being prepared;
- Provide adequate financial, human and technical resources to the justice system, and in particular
to the Specialised Judicial Unit (PJS), to investigate the most serious crimes throughout the country
and prosecute those responsible within a framework that respects the right to a fair trial and does
not use the death penalty;
- Contribute to strengthening the technical capacity of actors in the criminal justice system, including
judges and prosecutors, lawyers, security and military forces and any other relevant authorities in
international human rights law and international humanitarian law, in particular in relation to the
prosecution of sexual violence, and ensure regular follow-up;
- Facilitate the creation of independent and ad hoc commissions of enquiry where there are serious
allegations of human rights violations to shed light on the violations, including the cases reported
in Boni in 2021, and in Diallassagou, Bounti and Moura in 2022;
- Encourage the relevant authorities to prosecute serious crimes committed by self-defence militias;
- Demand an end to policing and judicial activities by the Dozo, ensure the effective disbandment
of all self-defence militias and call for the prosecution of the leaders of these militias who bear
responsible for violations;
- Promote the reestablishment of state authority in areas retaken from jihadist insurgent groups,
through the deployment of police and justice services that respect human rights;
- Respect and ensure respect for the rights of human rights defenders and journalists, and guarantee
the conditions necessary for them to carry out their legitimate work to promote and defend human
rights and for the free dissemination of information, and put an end to all forms of pressure on civil
society in Mali;
- Allow UN mechanisms, and in particular MINUSMA, to investigate all allegations of human rights
violations and abuses without distinction regarding actors and areas in accordance with UN
Security Council Resolution 2640 (2022) of 29 June 2022;
- Issue a standing invitation to the Special Rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights and the United Nations on human rights defenders and facilitate their visits; and in
particular implement the recommendations made by the UN Independent Expert, Mr Alioune Tine,
on the situation of human rights in Mali, in his report of March 2022;
- Authorise the fact-finding mission to Mali mandated by ACHPR Resolution 441 of 7 August 2020
on the socio-political situation and the realisation of human rights in Mali, concerning cases
of serious human rights violations committed since the coup d’état of August 2020 and other
violations committed in the context of political transition;
- Abolish the death penalty.
To the Malian judicial authorities:
- Conduct prompt, independent, credible and impartial investigations into human rights violations
committed in the context of the conflict in Mali, and if evidence of crimes is found, prosecute all
those allegedly responsible for such violations, regardless of their rank;
- Ensure that the ongoing reform of the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Code of
Military Justice includes the following provisions:
- definition of crimes under international law as set out in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court;
- definitions of all forms of sexual violence;
- protection of victims and witnesses;
- an end to prosecutorial discretion based solely on the initiative of the Minister of the
Armed Forces;
- confirmation of the jurisdiction of the PJS to deal with crimes under international law,
including those committed by the military;
- Strengthen the independence of the judges and prosecutors of the PJS, in particular through the
recruitment and training of its members, while guaranteeing their security and the means available
to them;
- Promote judicial transport and letters rogatory with the support of the State and partners such as
MINUSMA in order to enable investigating judges to carry out in-depth investigations and take the
necessary legal steps to establish the truth and deliver justice;
- Strengthen cooperation between the ICC and the national justice system by facilitating exchanges
of experience between national and ICC judges;
- Define concrete measures to implement the circular setting out the criminal policy and prosecution
strategy in the field of counter-terrorism and crimes under international criminal law in order to give
new impetus to proceedings, including against military personnel, by transferring them to the PJS;
- Classify offences in accordance with their seriousness and encourage victims to apply to join
proceedings as civil parties by means of appropriate and secure communication;
- Take adequate protection measures for victims and witnesses through the strengthening of
legislation and practical measures both during investigation and trial, paying particular attention to
survivors of sexual violence and children;
- Guarantee safe physical access to justice for victims: by creating branches of the courts as close as
possible to victims and witnesses, in particular by ensuring the prompt opening of the PJS branch
in Mopti; by providing judges and prosecutors with the necessary means for letters rogatory and
judicial transport and by covering the travel costs of victims from the regions to the capital;
- Encourage the indictment chambers to regularly monitor the activities of investigating judges, as
provided for by law, and to visit places where people are detained in order to ensure that cases
are dealt with swiftly and appropriately, and to prevent infringements of the rights of detainees
(compliance with legal detention periods, access to a lawyer, absence of ill-treatment);
- Making PJS actions visible while providing security safeguards for victims and court staff;
- Encourage publication of the reports produced by the UN International Commission of Inquiry and
that to be released by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR) by the end of 2022,
and ensure implementation of the recommendations contained therein.
To the Malian military authorities:
- Respect human rights and international humanitarian law during military operations, including by
ensuring that civilian populations are not targeted, and by applying the principles of necessity,
proportionality and precaution in the targeting and implementation of military attacks;
- Ensure the implementation of disciplinary measures, including automatic suspension, and that any
member of the defence and security forces suspected of involvement in human rights violations
and crimes under international law is brought to justice;
- Provide technical support, including full cooperation with the PJS by: securing PJS judicial
investigations, making available to the PJS military personnel under investigation for serious
human rights violations;
- Ensure regular training of soldiers and commanders on their international humanitarian and human
rights law obligations, in order to prevent human rights violations;
- Preserve the physical and moral integrity of captured combatants in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions;
- Respect the principle of necessity (in relation to security) and procedural safeguards under
international humanitarian law in the arrest and detention of persons.
To non-state armed groups:
- Cease attacks and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law against civilian
populations and respect their physical and psychological integrity;
- Respect the physical integrity of captured combatants;
- Respect international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions in all circumstances as well
as humanitarian access by NGOs, including medical and food access, to populations;
- Declare ceasefires in combat zones to allow for local political dialogues and talks aimed at achieving
a just, fair and lasting peace;
- Unconditionally release all detainees and guarantee their physical and moral integrity.
To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court:
- Expand the current investigation [OR open a new investigation] into crimes under international law
committed in central Mali, given the lack of willingness and capacity of the Malian authorities to
investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction;
- Continue the investigation into the situation in Mali since January 2012, mainly focusing on three
northern regions, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, and on Bamako and Sévaré in the south in relation to
certain facts, in particular sexual violence constituting war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in Aguelhoc;
- Strengthen cooperation with the Malian authorities, including through support for judicial
procedures at national level and exchanges of experience with Malian judges and prosecutors,
based on the principle of positive complementarity.
To the United Nations:
- Strengthen support to the Malian authorities to reinforce the protection of civilians and combat
impunity as a priority for the restoration of peace and reconciliation in Mali, in particular through
support for the adoption of legal protection measures, technical support for the Malian justice
system, and strengthened collaboration between the Malian judicial authorities and the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA);
- Remind the Malian authorities of their commitments under their joint communiqué with the United
Nations on combating conflict-related sexual violence;
- Encourage the regular publication of reports by the MINUSMA Human Rights Division; and provide
MINUSMA and the Human Rights Office with the necessary means to fulfil their mandate, in particular
to support the work of the International Commission of Inquiry and the strengthening of the CVJR;
- Call on the Malian authorities to extend a standing invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights Defenders and to facilitate their visits; and in particular, to implement the recommendations
made by the UN Independent Expert, Mr Alioune Tine, on the situation of human rights in Mali, in
his March 2022 report;
- Strengthen consultation with and support for civil society involved in monitoring and documenting
abuses of freedoms, violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as the
behaviour of forces on the ground, and the fight against impunity of those responsible for serious
crimes, in particular crimes and violence against women;
- Ensure the respect of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP) in any UN support to security
forces, including the Malian Defence and Security Forces (FDS).
To the African Union:
- Condemn the human rights violations and crimes committed in the context of the conflict in Mali
and urge the Malian authorities to put an immediate end to all acts that undermine respect for
human rights and the rule of law, in accordance with Resolution 88 of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 2005 on the protection of human rights and the rule of law
in the fight against terrorism (ACHPR/Res.88(XXXVIII)05);
- Remind the Malian authorities of their obligation to respect the rights of human rights defenders at
all times and to guarantee the conditions necessary for them to carry out their legitimate work of
promoting and defending rights, and to cease all forms of pressure on civil society in Mali;
- Strengthen the mandate and capacity of the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL)
to monitor human rights violations and publish reports on the situation in Mali and the Sahel;
- Encourage the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to resume fact-finding missions
in Mali, with the Chairperson of the Commission, the rapporteur in charge of the human rights
situation in Mali, and relevant special rapporteurs, to meet with representatives of the national
authorities, the political opposition and civil society in order to work towards the promotion and
protection of human rights in the country.
Keep your eyes open
Establishing the facts - Investigative and trial observation missions

Supporting civil society - Training and exchange
Director of
Mobilising the international community - Advocacy before intergovernmental bodies
publication:
Alice Mogwe Informing and reporting - Mobilizing public opinion
Editor in chief:
Éléonore Morel
Authors:
FIDH/Africa Desk
Design: For FIDH, transforming societies relies on the work of local actors.
FIDH / Stéphanie
Geel The Worldwide Movement for Human Rights acts at national, regional and international
levels in support of its member and partner organisations to address human rights
abuses and consolidate democratic processes. Its work is directed at States and those
in power, such as armed opposition groups and multinational corporations.
Its primary beneficiaries are national human rights organisations who are members
of the Movement, and through them, the victims of human rights violations. FIDH also
cooperates with other local partner organisations and actors of change.
CONTACT
FIDH
17, passage de la Main d’Or
75011 Paris
Tel: (33-1) 43 55 25 18
www.fidh.org
Twitter: @fidh_en / fidh_fr / fidh_es
Facebook: www.facebook.com/FIDH.
HumanRights/
Dépôt légal Décembre 2022 - FIDH (Éd. anglaise) ISSN 2225-1804 - Fichier informatique conforme à la loi du 6 janvier 1978 (Déclaration N°330 675)FIDH - 79
FIDH
is an
international human rights
NGO
federating 192 organisations
from 117 countries
ABOUT FIDH
FIDH takes action for the protection of victims of human rights violations, for
the prevention of violations and to bring perpetrators to justice.
A broad mandate
FIDH works for the respect of all the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights.
A universal movement
FIDH was established in 1922, and today unites 192 member organisations in
117 countries around the world. FIDH coordinates and supports their activities and
provides them with a voice at the international level.
An independent organisation
Like its member organisations, FIDH is not linked to any party or religion and is inde-
pendent of all governments.
www.fidh.org

Fidh Mali Report 2022 - Central Mali

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In Central Mali, Victims

and Perpetrators Live

I. CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY CRISIS IN CENTRAL MALI 13

II. CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, VICTIMS OF A MULTITUDE OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS 23

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND CHARACTERISATION OF VIOLATIONS IN CENTRAL MALI 51

Map N° 4231 Rev. 3, March 2013. Source: United Nations,

ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project

Interview, confidentiality and security conditions for victims and witnesses

Gender-sensitive survey methodology

This report has been updated until 15 November 2022.

I. CONTEXT AND ANALYSIS OF THE

A. The year 2022: a turning point for violence in central Mali

B. The crisis shifts southwards

17. Interview with a local elected official, Ségou, 15 September 2021.

C. Growth of militias and ethnicisation of the conflict: major risks faced by

It is essential to take account of local geopolitical factors connected to natural resources to

Several inhabitants of the area confirmed these methods to FIDH delegations.

by the Office at the time of colonisation.

II. CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, VICTIMS

1. By the FAMa and their international partners

33. Interview conducted in Ségou, 15 September 2021.

34. Interview with a Koramebougou resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

38. Interview with Zanakoro residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

39. Interview with a Songho resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

Diallassagou, Diamweli and Deguessagou

41. Interviews with Songho residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

Source: ACLED, https://acleddata.com/2022/05/09/actor-profile-dan-na-ambassagou/

B. Sexual and gender-based violence

52. Interview conducted in Ségou, 16 September 2021.

Douentza cercle: rape as a “weapon of war”

58. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 25 September 2021.

59. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 26 September 2021.

“Luckily, he knew I was pregnant before I was captured,” she said.

60. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 26 September 2021.

She said that she “hates the Fulani”.61

3. By the FAMa and their international partners

Moura massacre: five days of organised violence

61. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 25 September 2021.

65. Interview with a Moura resident, Bamako, June 2022.

C. Other violations perpetrated against civilian populations

66. Interview with a Moura resident, Bamako, June 2022.

1. Abductions by jihadist groups

3. Siege of villages and other restrictions imposed by jihadists on civilian populations

“We couldn’t go on like that. We started discussions,” explained O.O.

4. Roadblocks and discriminatory practices imposed on certain civilian populations

5. Looting, destruction and confiscation of civilian property by jihadist groups

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND

The abovementioned acts constitute violations of fundamental rights as protected by several

B. Crimes under international law

According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute, war crimes include:

Material element: the prohibited act

IV. REIGNING IMPUNITY

A. Action by the authorities

1. Conduct of investigations without conclusive results

4. Limited transitional justice mechanisms

B. Obstacles to the proper administration of justice

1. Lack of political will

3. Technical and administrative issues

5. Inadequate protection of victims and witnesses

To the Malian political and administrative authorities:

- Abolish the death penalty.

To the Malian judicial authorities:

To non-state armed groups:

17. Interview with a local elected official, Ségou, 15 September 2021.

33. Interview conducted in Ségou, 15 September 2021.

34. Interview with a Koramebougou resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

38. Interview with Zanakoro residents, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

39. Interview with a Songho resident, conducted in Bamako, June 2022.

52. Interview conducted in Ségou, 16 September 2021.

58. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 25 September 2021.

59. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 26 September 2021.

60. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 26 September 2021.

61. Interview conducted in Sévaré, 25 September 2021.

65. Interview with a Moura resident, Bamako, June 2022.

66. Interview with a Moura resident, Bamako, June 2022.