Fire Safety: How a clock nudged a nation so fire

couldn't kill
Alice Huntley and Alison Hoad
Source: Institute of Practitioners in Advertising, Silver, IPA Effectiveness
Awards, 2014
Downloaded from WARC

This case study demonstrates how the Department for Communities and Local Government in the UK
nudged people into checking their smoke alarms by connecting it with a pre-existing behaviour.

When it comes to fire, people are at least four times more likely to die in a fire if they do not have
a working smoke alarm, so instead of people merely just thinking they should test their smoke
alarms, they needed to actually test them.
Using the principles of behavioural economics, a campaign nudged people into testing their
smoke alarms by capitalising on an existing behaviour - the twice-yearly changing of the clocks.
Over the period of this campaign, deaths from fires in dwellings fell by 41 fatalities to 211,
delivering a ROMI of £7.12 for every £1 invested.

Principal authors: Alice Huntley and Alison Hoad, RKCR/Y&R

Contributing authors: James Webb and Mary-Ann Auckland, Department for Communities and Local
Government; Maziyar Karimian, RKCR/Y&R

Summary
"I myself am made entirely of flaws, stitched together with good intentions."

- Augusten Burroughs

This paper starts with the hard truth that people often really want to do the right thing, but can fail to follow
through – sometimes with fatal consequences. To reduce the number of people dying through want of a working
smoke alarm, we needed to find a way to help people help themselves, and turn their good intentions into action.

Where previous campaigns aimed to increase people's motivation to test, we sought to decrease the perceived
effort required to act. Using the principles of behavioural economics, we found a way to nudge people into
testing their smoke alarms by capitalising on their existing habitual behaviour – the twice-yearly clock change.

If this approach had saved just one life, it would have more than paid for itself several times over. In fact we can
show that it paid for itself more than 7 times over, with an ROI of £7.12 to every pound spent.

In addition, by associating smoke alarm testing with a calendar date, we're creating the potential for the date
itself to become a testing reminder in future years, reducing reliance on continued marketing investment to
prompt people's testing habit.

Introduction
Fire kills. Every year more than 200 people die in fires in dwellings in England1.

The emotional cost of this loss of life cannot be quantified. The financial cost to the country is £1.65m per life2. A
total of £330m, every year, on average.

"There's no smoke without a fire" is a common adage. Less commonly known is that in a fire in the home, it's the
smoke, not the fire, that kills you first3. Which is why having a working smoke alarm is so important. You are at
least four times more likely to die in a fire if you do not have a working smoke alarm4.

This is the story of a campaign, that, based on this insight, even if it saved just one of those lives, would have
paid for itself several times over.

Background
Smoke alarms give people the crucial few seconds they need to escape alive - they can literally be the
difference between life and death if a fire strikes your home.

By 2008, over 90% of people had a smoke alarm. But that same year, 100 people died in dwelling fires where an
alarm was present but failed to operate5. This was the case in 18% of all dwelling fires6. Simply put: people had
smoke alarms that weren't working. The government recommends that you test your smoke alarm at least
monthly. But people weren't doing this.

Given the importance of having a working smoke alarm, how could this possibly be?

Our research showed that most people fundamentally misunderstood the role of smoke in a fire. Over half of all
fatal fires in the home occur at night when people are asleep7. People mistakenly thought the smoke was the
alarm. They believed the smoke would wake them up, and alert them early to a fire from which they would then
have plenty of time to escape. (Figure 1 & 2)
Figure 1: Erroneous beliefs about smoke in a house fire8

Figure 2 Qualitative research showed people thought smoke would wake them up in time to escape

How wrong they were.

In fact, fire experts will tell you, 'just 2-3 breaths of toxic smoke can make you unconscious9.' So, ironically, the
smell of smoke that people think will alert them, will actually suffocate them before they're even half awake. One
respondent told her story of being rescued during a fire in the home at night10:

We needed people to realise how vulnerable they were to smoke. Drowning consistently features in the top
three most feared ways to die11, and we found that although people can't easily imagine being unable to breathe
in smoke, they can quickly grasp the concept of not being able to breathe underwater. The creative idea sought
to provoke people out of their false sense of invulnerability to smoke, dramatising people "drowning" in their
sleep in smoke from a house fire. The message: "Don't drown in toxic smoke – test your smoke alarm weekly"
(Figure 3 and Figure 4).
Figure 3: Don't drown in smoke – TV October 2009

Figure 4: Don't drown in smoke - press and digital October 2009

We worked with 46 national Fire and Rescue services in England to reinforce the message as they echoed the
idea of "Drowning in toxic smoke" in their owned channels. The idea surfaced on websites and twitter feeds and
fire spokespeople even adopted this language in the press interviews that typically follow fires in the home.

Critically, we used secondary media such as radio and print solely at weekends to encourage habituation as
weekends are a time when people were most likely to be at home with a little extra time. Partnerships were
helpful here e.g. Safelincs, a retailer of fire safety equipment, created a free SMS or email alert which reminded
people to test weekly.

A budget of £3.1m was allocated for the first year, to be split across three main tasks:

1. Provocation – helping people realize their vulnerability to smoke via impactful TV campaign;
2. Reinforcement – high repetition in radio and viral of the key "just 2-3 breaths" provocation message
3. Habituation – time-sensitive communication that prompted people at moments in their week where we knew
from data they were more likely to be willing and able to test their alarms – e.g. Sunday evenings,
weekends.

The intention was to gradually increase the proportion of the budget dedicated to habituation as the campaign
progressed (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Planned Phasing of "Don't Drown in toxic smoke" campaign

Results of the step change

After just one burst, we saw people's sense of invulnerability towards smoke from a house fire begin to decrease
(Figure 6).

Figure 6 Campaign successfully challenged erroneous beliefs re smoke in dwelling fires12

In a single year of the campaign, it was found by independent econometric analysis to have saved between 8
and 21 lives13.
More investment in the campaign approach was planned, with the proportion of media budget designed to shift
over time from provocation to "habituation" – (Figure 5). However, before we could enter phase two, everything
changed, and in a big way.

Cue: the biggest global economic crisis the world has ever seen, and a new government.

The freedom of a tighter budget

In the light of the impact of the global economic downturn on the UK's own economy, the new coalition
government embarked on a comprehensive Spending Review14. In 2010 substantial cuts were made to
government marketing spend across the board. As a sign of the importance of the issue, Fire Safety was one of
just three campaigns to survive the cut15. But its own budget was reduced to less than one third (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Fire Safety Annual Campaign Budget

A radical new approach was needed. We no longer had sufficient budget for a three-tier, always-on
communication strategy. We needed something much more efficient.

It was time for the Department for Communities and Local Government and RKCR/Y&R to find a new way
forward.

The beauty of behavioural economics

Being efficient meant focusing even harder on achieving the behaviour we wanted to see – for people to actually
test their alarms to make sure they are working. This meant that together, client and agency needed to delve
deeper into behavioural science.

Behavioural science (and most probably your own personal experience) tell us that attitudes and intentions often
have a very weak correlation to actual behaviour in real life16. We saw this plainly in the smoke alarm testing
research. Even though 85% of people agreed attitudinally that "testing your smoke alarm regularly can save
lives", nearly half as many claimed to actually test their smoke alarm with any regularity (Figure 8).
Figure 8: Smoke Alarm Testing - Belief in importance vs actual claimed behaviour17

This discrepancy is common across many types of behaviour from recycling to eating healthily to quitting
smoking. People's positive intentions to change their behaviour are often foiled by their own human
weaknesses. Factors like procrastination, laziness, forgetfulness and distractions at the last moment are the
enemy18.

Convincing people that a working smoke alarm could save their life was only ever half the battle. The other half
of the battle was to overcome inertia.

Overcoming inertia
Latest thinking in behavioural economics unlocked a new strategy.

1. Triggers: specific times and contexts aid action

The first was the concept of "implementation intentions". Implementation intentions are fundamentally a simple
plan, where you link the new desired behaviour to a specific time or context.

So for example, the broad intention "I need to drink less coffee" becomes linked to a trigger "When I get a
craving for coffee, I'll drink a glass of water". Or "I'm going to get fit" becomes "Every Monday & Wednesday at
7pm, I will leave for the gym".

Hundreds of studies have shown that introducing concrete details on when/how/where the new habitual
behaviour should happen, makes it much more likely that people will carry it out. It also increases the likelihood
that the new behaviour will become automated in those situations, reducing our reliance on willpower alone19.

2. Nudge: understanding cost can help you nudge people into action

According to 'nudge theory', even small differences in the perceived incentives or costs of an option exert a big
influence on people's choices20. In this case, the 'cost' of testing smoke alarms was the time and effort it
required.

Although the "cost" of dying in a fire in the home should outweigh the short-term cost of testing your smoke
alarm, thinking about the behaviour from the point of view of "cost-to-user" as opposed to "risk-to user"
transformed the way we understand what we were asking people to do.

Figure 9 explores the potential user journey of a homeowner who has encountered the right messaging, but who
requires a ladder to test a smoke alarm. The level of real-time, actual personal cost and inconvenience is
significant, compared to the theoretical, and difficult to imagine threat of dying in a house fire.

Figure 9 The real cost of testing your smoke alarm21

So far it's not been possible to make the act of testing your smoke alarm any easier22. It's still, probably, going to
require a ladder, or at least the movement of furniture. Regulation and innovation are helping to make smoke
alarms more reliable23. Even if you have a smoke alarm hardwired into your house, you need to test your alarm.
The question we asked ourselves was: when are people already going to those 'costly' lengths? Could we align
with their existing "costly" behavioural moments? (Figure 10)

Figure 10 – Summary of behavioural learnings

So, the question was, what would be a specific time and context when people were already carrying out the kind
of costly behaviours we needed them to do and when they could be "nudged" into testing their smoke alarm?

The answer lay in a national habit that has been taking place twice a year for nearly one hundred years24: clock
change.
The marketing strategy
The strategy was simple: to build an association between changing your clocks and testing your smoke alarm.

Many shared similarities made the association seem natural: both clocks and smoke alarms can require you to
stand on a chair or step ladder to reach them, and both changing your clocks and testing your smoke alarms are
seen as a bit of a chore. By doing both together, it halves the effort.

Since many people were already going around their house in order to put their clocks back or forward, we were
just asking them to carry out another quick new behaviour at the same time.

This association could help people form a new testing habit, but crucially, with less of the hardship that usually
comes with trying to embed a new habitual behaviour. If communications could help forge a twice-yearly testing
habit, it would also augment the activities of the local fire and rescue authorities which encouraged more regular
testing.

These insights led us to a clear opportunity for our campaign. We could bypass the attitudinal persuasion part of
the campaign entirely, and go straight for a behaviourally driven idea.

Instead of increasing the strength of people's motivation to change their behaviour, we would just make it seem
easier to do.

And by giving them a specific time and relevant context to act on, we could increase the likelihood that they
would actually follow through, and repeat the behaviour. (Figure 11).

Figure 11: The new behaviourally led advertising model

Media strategy
The strategy also reaped efficiency gains in media spend. By concentrating our activity into two annual bursts,
we saturated those dates, ensuring a significant level of cut through with as many people as possible. And
unlike some occasions like Mother's Day or Christmas, the Clock Change dates were relatively free from
competition, giving Fire Kills the opportunity to dominate despite a relatively modest media budget.

The campaign ran for two weeks, twice a year, for two years (and is still running in 2014). We spent £850k in
2011/12, and £1m in 2012/13, starting in October 2011 and, for the purposes of this paper, finishing in March
2013. Lighter activity in the run-up to the clock change weekend intensified into a concentrated burst around the
day itself. Radio set up the idea first, with a mixture of longer 30 second executions and shorter 10 second
reminders. Heavy print coverage kicked in during the second week and over the weekend itself. This helped to
build social norming in two ways: both descriptive and injunctive (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Media "blitzing" around clock change weekends was designed to build social norming

Creative strategy
The creative brief laid out the new task simply. In contrast to previous campaigns which increased people's
perceived vulnerability or highlighted the devastating effects of fire, we needed to forge an indelible link between
changing clocks and testing smoke alarms. The tricky part would be finding a way to do this that was just as
impactful and attention-grabbing.

Radio was our lead medium. It worked by lulling people into the false sense that the advertisement was going to
be an information notice about the clock change, before shattering this illusion in a chilling switch to our
message (Figure 13). This radio advert was the second most impactful radio advert that the Radio Advertising
Bureau have ever measured.25

Figure 13: Example of radio creative

In print, we centred on a single powerful image of a burnt clock, as if it were forensic evidence retrieved from a
home that had been on fire. It visually linked the clock change with fire safety, and added a layer of emotional
resonance on top. In the second burst of activity, the executions were further refined to place the visual of the
burnt clock in the context of a real home, adding even more pathos with the hint of a victim through the style of
clock (child, older person, middle aged man). (Figure 14)

Figure 14: Example of print creative

Winter 2011

Spring 2012

Digital activity included Facebook advertising in the week before and after each clock change, leading to 245m
impressions and 84,000 clicks through to the Fire Kills facebook page, at a cost of £0.42 per click. Promoted
posts in October reached over 500,000 users and those in March reached nearly 850,000 users – a huge
increase on the typical reach before then of around 400 per post.

To boost the March 2013 campaign an online video was produced26 and released on Youtube. Promoted in
owned media channels like DCLG's and fire and rescue authorities' social media pages they were viewed over
120,000 times. The powerful and emotive video featured the fact that 15 children died in fires the previous year.
It depicted a young boy in a burnt-out home surveying the damage before solemnly asking parents to repeat
after him: "I swear on my child's life to test my smoke alarm on clock change day" (Figure 15).
Figure 15: "On your child's life" Youtube video

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ir2bekewg-8&list=PL16540F1E4C131181

PR activity included a 10 minute feature on ITV's This Morning about fire safety, linked to the clock change
campaign and featuring the press adverts and the campaign's key messages27. The programme had 1.5m
viewers. Dannii Minogue both tweeted and blogged about the campaign to her extensive fan base.

The campaign was designed to be flexible enough to be taken up by local Fire and Rescue services. For
example, Lincolnshire Fire and Rescue Service used images from the October online video to create a banner
for display outside two of their larger fire stations. These were displayed for a week either side of each clock
change weekend. The Service estimated that 20,000 people drove past with many more walking by (Figure 16).

Figure 16 Example from Lincolnshire of local Fire and Rescue Service activity28

Partnerships with commercial organisations were also key. In October 2012, national DIY chain B&Q ran and
promoted 20 in-store events with local fire and rescue authorities in England. Firefighters talked to customers
and handed out leaflets. B&Q promoted the events and fire safety messages in the relevant local press. (Figure
17)
Figure 17: Example of partnership activity, B&Q29

Every piece of communication, across every channel, ended with the clear and single-minded call to action:

When you change your clocks, test your smoke alarms.

Results
1. THE CAMPAIGN WAS SEEN AND COMMUNICATED CLEARLY

i) Three times more memorable

Despite a significantly reduced media weight and frequency relative to our previous campaign, the clock change
campaign proved to more than three times more memorable per £ spent (Figure 18)

Figure 18: Campaign Recall3031

ii) Campaign awareness built over time

Individual campaign elements performed well above normative data levels and built awareness over time –
showing no sign of "wear out" (Figure 19)

Figure 19: Ad awareness built over time32

iii) The advertising powerfully reminded people to test their smoke alarms
Figure 20: Campaign Impressions & Communication33

Independent testing by the Radio Advertising Bureau found the radio executions to be the second most impactful
radio adverts they have ever tracked34 (beaten only by a campaign that was much heavier weight) (Figure 21)
as verbatims from their research show (Figure 22):

Figure 21 Clock change radio ad performance vs RAB norms

Figure 22: Verbatims from RAB Radio Gauge

2. THE CAMPAIGN HAD A CLEAR BEHAVIOURAL IMPACT

Awareness and involvement only matter if we can show that more people took action and tested their alarms as
a result of the campaign. And we can.

i) Behavioural impact on clock change weekend

On average, 28% of people who recalled the campaign had tested their smoke alarms when the clocks changed
– whilst only 8% of people who didn't recall the campaign had tested theirs (Figure 23). To put it another way,
people who had seen the campaign were three times more likely to have tested their smoke alarm. This is very
different from "intention to test" – this is claimed actual testing over the clock change weekends.
Figure 23: Those who saw campaign over three times more likely to actually test their alarm35

ii) The more channels the campaign was seen in, the greater its impact

The media worked well in combination, with those who saw both radio and print being five times more likely to
have tested their alarm on a clock change weekend than those who did not recall seeing the advertising (Figure
24)

Figure 24: Those who saw both media over three times as likely to test their alarm36

iii) Impact on behaviour beyond clock change

Critically, given the government recommendation to test monthly, we saw increases in the regularity of alarm
testing beyond the biannual clock change. Once you have performed a behaviour once, you are likely to perform
it again. Those who recalled seeing the clock change advertising were 23% more likely to test their clocks once
a month or more (Figure 25).
Figure 25: % who claim to test their smoke alarm once a month or more37

In fact, over the two years of the clock change campaign, we saw regularity of smoke alarm testing steadily
increase, with the number of people testing their smoke alarms at least 2-3 times a month increasing by one
third, from 18% to 24%, and those testing at least once a month increasing from 29% to 37% (Figure 26).

Figure 26 Increased frequency of testing smoke alarm over campaign duration38

Independent IPSOS research in April 2013 concluded that

"The Fire Kills campaign activity should be considered a great success. Visibility of the campaign material was
strong and surpassed our norms. Campaign reach continues to grow and impact on changing behaviour
continues to be strong even after two years."

The most important result: deaths from fires in the home fell by 16%
We have demonstrated that the campaign was noticed, that people who saw the campaign did test their smoke
alarms on a clock change weekend, and that regularity of testing smoke alarms improved over the campaign
period. At the same time, there was a significant (16%) reduction in the annual number of deaths from in 'fires in
dwellings'. (Figure 27) In total, there were 41 fewer deaths over the two year campaign period vs no reduction in
the two years previously.
Figure 27: 16% fewer deaths from accidental fires39

As mentioned earlier, econometric analysis found that the previous Toxic Smoke campaign accounted for
between 8 and 21 lives saved in just one campaign year40. As the Clock Change Campaign achieved similar
levels of awareness, on much smaller budgets, without the power of TV, and had much greater demonstrable
behavioural impact than the Toxic Smoke campaign, it seems fair to assume that the Clock Change campaign
could have contributed significantly to the cumulative 60 lives saved since the start of the campaign in October
2011.

What else could have accounted for this drop?

The 2012/13 DLCG report accounts for the reduction in the following ways: "smoke alarms and other building
fire safety systems and features, audits and enforcement activity, fire safety campaigns and education and
other advice".

Let's take each of these in turn.

1. Number of smoke alarms.

Penetration of smoke alarms remained static over the period, at around 91%41.

2. Building fire safety systems.

Building regulations were introduced in 2006 requiring new build dwellings and housing extensions
and building works to include smoke alarms mains wired with a back up power source (i.e. batteries).
Tracking showed the number of houses with this level of smoke alarm to be static at 25% during the
period of the campaign42.

3. Audits and enforcement activity.

Home Fire Risk Checks carried out over this period remained fairly constant, at around 700,000. Fire
audits are only undertaken for business premises, meaning overall enforcement activity was
consistent over the period.
4. Education campaigns

Fire services work tirelessly in communities to promote fire safety – from talks in schools to a presence
at local events. They promote a number of messages throughout the year focusing on key threats,
from candles at Diwali to fairy lights at Christmas, as well as all-year-round initiatives such as the
excellent home check. However, as noted earlier in this paper, fire services integrated the campaign
into their own messaging. The campaign gave them a new message and two new moments in the
calendar. There is evidence that it actually amplified the work they were already doing in their
localities but there was no new investment.

5. Seasonal variation

The end of 2012 was characterised by unusually high levels of rainfall43, exemplified by extensive
flooding during the Christmas period of 2012, which may have contributed to a proportion of the
national decrease observed in dwelling fire deaths in England in the 2012/13 data.

National fire statistics cover twelve month periods from April through till March, meaning that the
2011/12 data do not include the time period of heavy downpours in late 2012.

The 2011/12 (April-March) data show 19 fewer deaths year-on-year compared to the 2010/11 period,
despite the fact that there was no adverse weather, which suggests that seasonal weather variation
cannot be the prime driver of the fall in fatalities.

6. The introduction of safer cigarettes

In November 2011, fire safer cigarettes, which go out if not actively puffed by the smoker, were
introduced across England. According to unverified estimates from fire authorities, fire safer cigarettes
could be responsible for saving up to 20 lives in the two and a half years since the new standard was
brought in. Nevertheless, the fall in dwelling fire deaths between 2010/11 and 2012/13 amounted to
41 fatalities, leaving 21 people whose deaths were prevented thanks to other means. If just two of
those prevented fatalities were attributable to the campaign, then it would have more than paid for
itself.

Furthermore, the fire safer cigarettes were only introduced in November 2011, meaning that their
potential effect would have been limited to 6 months of the 2011/12 April-March data period.

Given that the fire safety authorities estimate the effect of fire safer cigarettes to be, at most, 20 lives
saved over the two and a half years since their introduction, they could reasonably account for up to 5
of the 19 fewer deaths year-on-year in the 2011/12 period, implying a potentially significant role for the
campaign in the remaining 14 fewer fatalities over that period.

Reflecting on the 2012-13 campaign, the Fire Minister said:

"I am delighted to say that once again the Fire Kills campaign, delivered in partnership by fire and rescue
authorities and the Department for Communities and Local Government, has had a very successful year. The
award-winning 'clock-change' national advertising continued to prove effective. Local fire and rescue
authorities made sure relevant messages were delivered when and where they were most needed"
Calculating payback
In order to calculate the ROI of the campaign, we used nationally representative figures from 2011/12, the
twelve-month April-March period during which fire statistics were least affected by exogenous variables such as
late 2012's unseasonably high rainfall and the introduction of fire safer cigarettes.

We calculated both the economic and human cost savings. Please see the Appendix for a full breakdown of the
data and calculations involved.

Table 1: Total households "protected" by the campaign

After calculating the number of fires that should have been experienced by these "protected households" (Table
1), we extrapolated the human and economic cost savings attributable to the campaign (Tables 2, 3, and 4).

Table 2: Economic cost of fire - savings attributable to the campaign

Human cost savings attributable to campaign

We know from national statistics that, on average, there were 6.58 fatalities per 1000 dwelling fires in England in
2011/1244, and that Fire and Rescue Service incident records show that you're more than four times as likely to
die in a fire if you don't have a working smoke alarm45.

We therefore calculated the human costs of dwelling fires in two "universes": one in which the campaign did not
run (the "unprotected" universe), and one in which it did (the "protected" universe).

Table 3: Cost of human lives saved by campaign

TABLE 4: TOTAL COST SAVINGS ATTRIBUTABLE TO CAMPAIGN (2011/12)

Minimum return on investment

The total cost saving, as per Table 4, is £6.06m in the 2011/12 period. Given the campaign's first year
budget was £850k, this translates to an impressive return on investment of £7.12 to every pound
spent, or 712%.

In fact, the true number of households "protected" by the campaign may have been far greater than 53,040. The
statistical proxy used for the proportion of households in possession of a non-functioning smoke alarm was the
difference between the proportion of households which had a smoke alarm installed at the time that the
campaign began, approximately 92%46, and the proportion of households who claimed in the 2011 English
Housing Survey to have a working smoke alarm, 88%47.

However, the EHS figure for the national proportion of working smoke alarms, 88%, is based upon self-reported
figures, rather than actual tests. This is likely to be an overestimation. For instance, we know from 2012 Ipsos
ASI tracking that a third of the nationally representative sample admitted to testing their smoke alarm only once a
year, or even less frequently than that, with an average of 16% "never" testing their smoke alarm48.

It seems reasonable to suggest that the proportion of households in possession of a non-functioning smoke
alarm would, in reality, have been far higher than 4%. After all, when was the last time you checked your smoke
alarm was working?

This has very significant positive implications for the ROI of the campaign.

A self-perpetuating strategy
Past campaigns had undoubtedly delivered good recall and effects while active. However once off air their
impact faded rapidly49. This campaign works differently. If we can make the memory link between changing your
clocks and testing your smoke alarm strong enough, through repetition year after year, there will hopefully come
a time when the dates themselves become the reminder to test, without advertising support.

New learnings
One of the biggest contributions to marketing communications to emerge from behavioural economics has been
to shatter the illusion of people as rational actors who accurately calculate risk and gain, and act in their own
best interests. Alongside this we've seen increasing psychological evidence that people's decisions are often
driven more by automatic and unconscious responses over effortful conscious thinking50.
Conclusion
These insights formed the foundation of a radically different direction for the Fire Kills safety campaign, and
optimised the effectiveness of a significantly reduced budget:

1. Targeting behaviour directly: the behavioural association primarily targeted people's automatic actions
instead of focusing on their conscious attitudes.
2. Changing the context around testing: rather than increasing people's motivation to test, we reframed it
so it would be perceived as an easier task.
3. Encouraging a new social norm: by owning a calendar date, we created the potential for an ongoing
memory reminder that didn't rely solely on marketing investment.

Footnotes

1 English Housing Survey and DCLG Fire Statistics

2 English Housing Survey and DCLG Fire statistics

3 The most common identified cause of death from a fire incident is being overcome by gas or smoke. In 2008,
fire and rescue services reported that 189 people died this way, accounting for 42 per cent of all deaths. A
further 76 (17%) deaths were

attributed jointly to both burns and being overcome by gas or smoke. Source: 2008-2009 Fire Statistics

4 HM Treasury Green Book adjusted for inflation

5 DCLG Fire Statistics 2008-9

6 DCLG Fire Statistics 2008-9

7 The incidence of fires decreases at night but the proportion of fatalities increases.

8 RKCR/ICM Omnibus 2009, and CLG AIA tracking 2009

9 Australian Broadcasting Corporation http://www.abc.net.au/blackfriday/aftermath/jrigby.htm

10 RKCR/Y&R 2CV qualitative research, 2009

11 e.g. Top 10 Worst Ways To Die www.totallytop10.com

12 Source: AIA Tracking

13 Greenstreet Berman, Quantitative Exploration of the Fire Kills Campaign, 2009

14 Announced by Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osbourne in October 2010

15 The other two campaign issues were road safety and smoking.

16 Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour: A meta-analysis of the empirical literature.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin.?

17 CLG Fire Kills Evaluation July 2012 (Testing Attitude), AIA Fire Kills Tracking Feb 2010 (Testing Behaviour).
"Regularly" is defined here as once a month or more.
18 Gollwitzer, P.M, & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta-analysis of
effects and processes. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

19 Gollwitzer, P.M, & Sheeran, P. (2006). Implementation intentions and goal achievement: A meta-analysis of
effects and processes. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology

20 Thaler, R H & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness. Yale
University Press. Ariely, Dan, (2008) Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions,
Harper Collins.

21 The average number of smoke alarms per household is 2. Source English Housing Survey

22 The Google Nest system which enabled you to test your fire alarm status on any internet connected device
(e.g. your smartphone) has currently been withdrawn as the "gesture" functionality used to switch off the alarm
itself was found to be unreliable in the case of an actual fire. Source:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/04/04/nest_waves_goodbye_to_alarm_switchoff_feature/

23 Since 2006, Fire Safety Building Control Regulations have required smoke alarms to be automatic -
hardwired into the electrical mainframe, and have back-up batteries in case of a power-cut. However these still
need to be tested regularly

24 Daylight saving was first adopted by Britain in May 1916. Source: Royal Museums, Greenwich
www.rmg.org

25 Source: Radio Advertising Bureau - who have been compiling a database of top performing radio ads since
2006

26 At no extra cost to the campaign - production costs were donated by the production company concerned

27 March 27, 2012

28 DCLG Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2012-13

29 Fire Kills Campaign Annual Report 2012-13

30 CLG "Toxic Smoke" Campaign Tracking Research, AIA, Feb 2010 ?

31 CLG IPSOS Tracking, April 2011-3. Average recognition of any advertising across the four bursts.

32 IPSOS Tracking 2011-13

33 IPSOS Tracking 2011-13

34 Only marginally outperformed by the RKCR/Y&R radio execution for the "Don't drown in toxic smoke"
campaign, which ran a great deal longer at much heavier weights

35 CLG IPSOS Tracking, Nov 2012. These figures are based on the average across the three bursts. 28% of
those who recalled the campaign tested vs. 8% who did not recall it?

36 Source: IPSOS tracking

37 Source: IPSOS tracking march/april 2012. Base Seen (464); Not Seen (1068)
38 IPSOS Tracking 2011-2013

39 Fire Statistics Monitor: April to September 2013, Table 2a.

40 Greenstreet Berman, Quantitative Exploration of the Fire Kills Campaign, 2009

41 IPSOS Tracking 2010-2013

42 IPSOS Tracking 2010-2013

43 Met Office, Annual Weather Summary 2012

44 Fire statistics monitor: April 2012 to March 2013

45 Fire and Rescue Service incident records and the English Housing Survey

46 Ipsos ASI tracking data 2012

47 English Housing Survey 2011

48 Ipsos ASI tracking data 2012

49 CLG Fire Kills Evaluation July 2012

50 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, (2011), Macmillan

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