Reasons Why

1. Cases of “why-questions” in the Introduction.

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2. Tiers of reasons why. Reason R why P, and reason why reason R is a reason. This distinction will
play a crucial role in his argument that the proliferating examples of non-causal explanations are
confused. (Though he substitutes “theory of answers to why-questions” for “theory of
explanation.”)
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3. I am speechless at Skow's naïveté. He made a very useless point about the verb “to explain” and
the word “explanation” to designate answers to wh-questions other than “why,” such as explaining
how to get somewhere, or explaining that one is not feeling well, or explaining who will be at a
party, and so on. Then he says: what scientists are interested in are explanations in the context of
why questions so, for the sake of clarity, we should speak of a “theory of answers to why questions”
instead of a “theory of explanation.” Good thing philosophers are not directors of communication...

Every single philosopher in the entire existence of the Universe has dedicated perfectly the totality
of their time to studying what Skow calls a “theory of answers to why questions” by calling it
“theory of explanation.” In the entire history of the whole of the Multiverse, there is exactly a single
person which thinks that “theory of explanation” must mean, or suggests the meaning, of a theory of
explanations as speech acts (like illustrating and formulating, which Austin calls expositives). (It's
Skow.) They research what it is to be the answer to a why question.
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4. A