S alvador A raneta

A m erica’s
D ouble - C ross
OF THE
P hilippines
A DEMOCRATIC ALLY IN 1899 AND 1946
 courtesy of Ma. Lina A. Santiago
Claro M. Recto (Father of the 1935 Constitution) in a lively conversation with Dr. Salvador
Araneta at a dinner commemorating the birthday of Pres. Manuel Luis Quezon on August
19, 1954 at the Manila Hotel. The durable Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo enjoys his drink (right).
About the Author
Dr. Salvador Araneta’s driving force was his love of God and country.
When Martial Law was declared, Salvador Araneta was in the United States,
after signing the proposed provision for the 1971-72 Constitution limiting the
President to only a single term in office. When the Philippine Embassy in San
Francisco refused to renew Araneta’s passport, Araneta sought political asylum in
the United States. This was denied. The Americans’ refusal to grant Araneta politi­
cal asylum was no surprise. Araneta had spent a lifetime saying no to America.
According to the Manila Bulletin in 1949, Araneta was the most consistent oppo­
nent to the Bell Trade Act.
Araneta was a member of the Legion of Mary and a Carmelite Tertiary. He
was the first Lieutenant of the Equestrian Order of the Holy Sepulchre of Jerusa­
lem, and a member of the Order of Saint Sylvester. With these credentials, plus a
close friendship with a former Papal Nuncio to the Philippines, Cardinal Egidio
Vagnozzi, the Vatican readily issued identity papers to Araneta so that he could
live in self-exile in Canada.
Araneta was never in doubt about the capacity of the Filipino to achieve rapid
industrialization, given the tools—protection, credit, tax incentives. He believed in
capitalism for all, the importance of a bold low and medium cost housing policy
and program.
He prepared a Bayanikasan Constitution, based on Pilconsa (Philippine Con­
stitutional Association) studies from 1961-71, as well as his own. Fordham awarded
him a doctorate in 1946. He took up special studies at the Harvard Law School
(1921-22).
Araneta was also a pioneer in industry. He founded the Far Eastern Air Trans­
port Incorporated in 1946; the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation and Feati
University in 1947; Feati Industries, a manufacturer of electric motors under li­
cense from Associated Electric Industries, the biggest English manufacturer of
electrical machineries (1957), and Republic Flour Mills (RFM) 1957.
 A m erica’s
D ouble - C ross
OF THE
P hilippines
A DEMOCRATIC ALLY IN 1899 AND 1946

Salvador A raneta
America’s Double-Cross of the Philippines
published by Sahara Heritage Foundation
All rights reserved
This edition copyright © 1999 Sahara Heritage Foundation
Original 1978 edition copyright © Bayanikasan Research
Foundation
This book may not be reproduced in whole or in part by any
means, mechanical or electronic, without permission from the
publisher. Permission is granted for the reproduction of brief
extracts for purpose of review or citation.
Edited by Manuel L. Quezon III
Proofreading by Marianne C. Carandang
Cover art by Jerry Isaac, Binary Soup.
Cover design by Jerry Isaac, Binary Soup and Javier V. Rufino,
Black Book Publishing, Inc.
Book design by Javier V. Rufino, Black Book Publishing, Inc.
Film output and electronic pre-press by Symphony Graphics
Printed in the Republic of the Philippines by Victoria Press
Special thanks to:
Bayanikasan Research Foundation
Dr. and Mrs. Renato Constantino
Digna H. Santiago
Mr. Luis Mauricio
Binary Soup
Mr. Felicisimo M. Escuadro
ISBN 971-92095-0-X
 A m e r i c a ’s
D ouble - C ross
OF THE
P hilippines
A DEMOCRATIC ALLY IN 1899 AND 1946
 Contents
Preface..................................................................iii
Foreword to the 1999 Edition.............................v
Author’s Introduction...................................... xii
The Pearl of the Orient Seas—
An historical introduction.................................15
Pre-historic and pre-Spanish eras.................................15
Pre-historic art and culture............................................ 16
Pre-historic governmental system................................. 16
Arrival of the first European...........................................17
Legacy from Spain............................................................19
Appraisal of Spanish domination................................... 19
The first Philippine-American alliance..........21
The War of Independence.............................................. 21
The American-Spanish War...........................................22
The Philippines as America’s ally...................................23
The Republic is born....................................................... 23
First double-cross of an ally.............................26
The American-Philippine War.......................................26
Did Dewey act in bad faith?............................................ 27
Dewey’s formula adopted by Nixon...............................28
The screws tightened on the Filipinos...........................29
Costly price paid by the Americans...............................30
The price paid by the Filipinos...................................... 31
Death of the First Asian Republic..................................32
American resistance to the
Philippine-American War............ 34
American anti-imperialists............................................. 34
Philippine contact with the anti-imperialists............... 35
Struggle doomed to failure..............................................37
Could treaty ratification have been stopped?.............. 38
Determination to get the Philippines............................39
The peaceful fight for Philippine
independence......................................................40
Osmena’s leadership........................................................40
Creation of the Philippine Assembly.............................41
Advance toward self-government..................................42
Osmena-Quezon break.................................................. 44
The first Philippine Independence A ct.........................45
Second Quezon-Osmena break.....................................46
Quezon’s victory in Washington....................................47
Quezon tampers with the Constitution.........................47
Quezon elected President............................................... 49
Quezon’s second disservice............................................ 50
The system of government..............................................51
Quezon’s third confrontation with Osmena.................51
Second double-cross of an ally........................53
The Philippines shunted aside....................................... 53
United States impositions on the Philippines.............. 54
Quezon’s last disservice...................................................56
The lessons from the wars.............................................. 56
End of Osmena’s political career...................................57
Roxas’s betrayal of his principles...................................58
Osmena’s disillusionment with the United States......60
History repeated itself......................................................60
Epilogue...............................................................61
Endnotes..............................................................65
Editor’s Postscript...............................................75
Appendix.............................................................78
Index...................................................................108
 Preface

he Centennial celebrations in 1998 served to

institutionalize certain historical myths which
.A. have been largely responsible for certain Filipino
attitudes and behavior. It may even be posited that me­
morializing June 12, 1898 as the day of Philippine Inde­
pendence is a grand deception that hides the reality of
another century of colonial and neocolonial rule.
By pouring all their efforts into the commemoration
of our people’s successful revolution against Spain, the
centennial celebration planners in effect diverted public
attention from the attack by the United States on the
infant Republic. The focus on June 12, 1898 as the climax
of the Filipinos’ struggle for independence subtly
transformed American colonization into liberation, as if
the Americans had liberated us from Spain. With June
12, 1898 as its highest point, the Centennial celebration
downgraded the Philippine-American War which the
Americans deliberately provoked on February 4, 1899.
The fierce resistance of our people in defense of their
Republic is a memory every Filipino should be proud of.
Moreover, this was the first act of deception committed
by an emerging imperial power on a supposed ally. It led
to a colonial period that has evolved into the present
relations between a superpower and the Philippines, a
relationship characterized by American dominance over
the political, economic and cultural life of the Filipinos.
Dr. Salvador Araneta reveals an awareness of historical
realities which led him to call the American action a
m
“double-cross,” and his book a “humble contribudon to
our search for forces which have destroyed the first
Republic.” Writing more in sorrow than in anger, Dr.
Araneta focuses on aspects of Philippine-American
relations to remind the reader that the past must be a
part of present consciousness in order to expose the forces
of “greed and materialistic vision” responsible for the
present situation.
Araneta not only went back to the beginnings of our
relations with the United States, but also decried the unjust
treatment we received from a supposed benefactor and
ally after the Second World War. He then called this the
second “double-cross.” And rightly so, because we were
“granted” independence with strings attached such as
parity, the military bases, etc. Dr. Araneta then describes
what went on in the Philippines under the American flag
up to 1946, defining it as a “colonial imperialist system
which still lingers on.” Had he been alive today, he would
have readily seen the signs of recolonization with the
adoption of globalization measures as well as the return
of American military presence in the form of the Visiting
Forces Agreement.
When Filipinos attain their real independence and
succeed in recapturing their history, Dr. Araneta will be
among those Filipinos who will be recognized as having
escaped from the intellectual imprisonment of American
education and colonial history.
This reissue of the 1978 edition is a definite
contribution to a “liberative” history of the Philippines.
Like Araneta’s other books, this volume will help Filipino
readers to define correctly our relations with the United
States.

Renato Constantino
Quezon City
December 12, 1998
 Foreword to the
1999 Edition

T
he C e n t en n ia l celebration of the proclamation
of Philippine independence has not ended. It has
just begun with the reawakening of Filipinos and
their interest in the history, culture, and most important
of all, the future direction of their country.
When General Aguinaldo and his group of patriots
proclaimed to the world our sovereignty and our right to
nationhood, it was a momentous event, because it ante­
dated all other republics in Asia by fourteen years. But it
was brief.
Thereafter, many followed so we could regain the glory
of sovereignty and enjoy the full benefits of independence
that should be ours. One such driving force was the late
Dr. Salvador Araneta.
A National Artist for Literature—N.V.M. Gonzalez—
once wrote of Araneta, before the Second World War,
that “amongst the lawyers in the Philippines, Attorney
Araneta, at 39, appears to have the biggest voice, though
paradoxically, he is a soft-spoken man.” Araneta at the
time had become “the Commonwealth’s most quoted
private citizen in the U.S. not excluding Vicente Villamin,
the Filipino columnist. Araneta is one private citizen the
American press and even Washington itself listen to.”
(According to Gonzalez, Araneta’s prominence was at­
tested by James Winge, a journalist in Washington). In­
deed, Salvador Araneta at the time had already been voted
as the country’s most outstanding man under 40 in the
profession of law. He was, in the eyes of his peers, one of
the most successful practitioners of law. High praise in­
deed, considering the luminaries considered his contem­
poraries: Undersecretary of Justice Emilio Abello, Assis­
tant Solicitor-General JBL Reyes, and Prof. Arturo
Tolentino, who in later years took a dissenting stand in
the famous debate with Araneta on the Sabah issue.
But it was as a delegate to the Constitutional Conven­
tion of 1934 that Salvador Araneta gained the greatest
prestige—and it was because of his frustrating experiences
in that Convention that he found the great mission of his
life. As a delegate, he fought almost singlehandedly against
the provision that made it possible for Pres. Marcos to
impose martial law without the approval of Congress. Sal­
vador Araneta also advocated for the nationalization (now
known as the Filipinization) of the retail trade. Approval
of this proposed provision was blocked by President
Manuel L. Quezon, upon the advice of a caucus of del­
egates that Quezon convened after being notified that
the provision could jeopardize the approval of the Philip­
pine Constitution by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The
Convention could only approve a separate resolution di­
recting the National Assembly to pass an act to that ef­
fect. It took Congress (which replaced the National As­
sembly after the amendments of 1940) and subsequent
presidents twenty years to finally enact the first Retail
Trade Filipinization Act.
For Araneta, the “fundamental objective of economic
policy is the Filipinization of the Philippine economy.”
He strongly believed that it would be “useless if all our
efforts were directed to amassing wealth which is not ours
to dispose.” Not only that; he wanted to see the Philip­
pines achieve genuine industrialization—but warned that
“real industrialization cannot be achieved as long as for­
eigners dominate our economic life.”
 His vision of an economically self-sufficient and free
Philippines inspired Salvador Araneta to match his
thoughts with deeds. He was, prior to the war, one of the
organizers and a moving spirit behind NEPA (the Na­
tional Economic Protectionism Association), founded in
1935. In 1939, together with the late Assemblymen José
Romero, Narciso Ramos, Dominador Tan, and Teodoro
Sandiko, he organized the Philippine Civic League to
support the re-examination movement concerning the
Philippine Independence Act (also known as the Tydings-
McDuffie Act). The organization had the blessings of
President Quezon on condition that the body insist on a
Dominion status for the Philippines similar to that en­
joyed by Canada under the British Commonwealth. The
issue of re-examining the date and conditions concern­
ing Philippine independence had been initiated by Ameri­
can High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt. Filipinos were
concerned with the economic dislocation of the Philip­
pines as a result of the conditions attached to indepen­
dence. The interested reader would do well to consult
Frank Hindman Golay’s Face of Empire: United States-Phil-
ippine Relations, 1898-1946 for an exhaustive treatment
of this debate.
After World War II, Araneta became the main orga­
nizer of another civic league, the “Liga Filipina,” this time
aimed at fighting against the adoption of the Parity
Amendment to the Constitution and the accompanying,
onerous, Bell Trade Agreement (which, among other
things, pegged the Peso-Dollar exchange rate at 2 to 1
and which was to last for 28 years! At that time the peso
was worth 4 to 1). Years later (1965), together with econo­
mist Alejandro Lichauco (head of the Institute of Eco­
nomic Studies and Social Action of Araneta University,
founded by Salvador Araneta), he championed the
Filipinization of credit. The reason for this was that it
had become the policy of multinational corporations to
borrow capital from host countries. Because of this they
would bring far more dollars out of the country than
they would bring in.
A prolific and deeply intellectual writer, Araneta wrote
Economic Re-Examination; Christian Democracy; Economic
Nationalism and Capitalism for All in a Directed Economy;
Bayanikasan: The Effective Democracy for All; Educational
Philosophy of a University President; and World Government:
The United Nations Reborn, Charter and Supporting Views.
These and many other works all record his studies, his
reflections and his aspirations. He wanted his country­
men to think about the society they lived in and the means
by which it could be made more compassionate and equi­
table.
Araneta’s passion for Constitutionalism -for the full­
est expression of the rule of law- was expressed in his
ambitious Bayanikasan Constitution, coined from the
word lakas ng bayan or strength of the nation and
bayanihan, or neighborly fellowship. Bayanikasan would
emanate through participatory democracy -the State
would establish and promote non-profit institutions and
foundations that would be involved in drafting and pass­
ing reform legislation and promoting socio-economic
development.
A Federal Form of Government was envisioned in the
Bayanikasan Constitution, which would separate Chris­
tian Mindanao from Muslim Mindanao. Foreseeing
today’s environmental problems, the Bayanikasan Con­
stitution called for the creation of the NEDA (National
Economic Development Authority) for the purpose of
achieving a sustainable economy. NEDA would be tasked
in consultation with NACE (National Authority on Cul­
ture and Education) to define national economic and
social policies.
Araneta saw the need for us to adapt a Bayanikasan
way of life (simpler and in harmony with nature) as well
as a national purpose. To stimulate employment, govern­
ment would be tasked with establishing high schools fea­
turing both vocational and academic courses in every mu­
nicipality, as well as a sustained program for the estab­
lishment and maintenance of schools and universities in
every province. Promoting the use of herbal medicine
(in combination with western practices) so that health
care may become accessible to all, was another visionary
objective of the Bayanikasan way of life.
Araneta also believed in Capitalism for all. His aim
was for government to provide financing so that families
could own their homes. The Bayanikasan philosophy en­
visioned giving small savers access to credit so that the
middle and working classes could own shares of stock or
have equity participation in the means of production.
Araneta stressed that property rights are fundamental to
human rights.
Araneta’s driving force was his love for God, country
and humanity as a whole. He said “loving our Mother­
land and working for and defending the rights of our
nationals ... will not subtract from our duties to humanity
and the need for an ever increasing realization of the
brotherhood of men, of the unity of peace in this atomic
age and of the growing interdependence of national des­
tinies.”
Long before the critics of the United Nations called
for the rebirth of the U.N., Araneta called for world gov­
ernment based on a confederation of equals. According
to Araneta, the stumbling block for the effectivity of the
United Nations was the problem of voting rights assigned
to countries unequal in population, territories, and wealth.
His response, to start with, was that members of the
world government should be made up of nation states
which met an average weighted standard in population,
area of territory, and gross national product. Nation states
which did not meet these standards would have to group
themselves together in blocs in order to meet the crite­
ria.
 Araneta took the same view as Dwight D. Eisenhower
with regard to the importance of a confederation of
equals, but was saddened that Eisenhower did not go as
far as to call for an amendment in the United States Con­
stitution renouncing war as an instrument of national
policy. Nor did Eisenhower attempt to spell out the de­
tails of that equality. Araneta’s book, World Government
Charter and Supporting Views, details his advanced ideas.
IN A SPEECH delivered on Independence Day in 1970 at
the Public Plaza in Pasay City, Salvador Araneta said,
“One thing is mighty clear. In Aguinaldo’s time, we
were dominated by an alien rule; Spain was followed
by America. In our time, both Spain and America have
ceased to claim sovereignty over our territory and our
people. If America still maintains a foothold on these
islands, it is due to an ill-advised understanding of
the demands of our security. If aliens are dominating
and have a lion’s share of the wealth of our country, it
is due to the failure of our government and leaders to
make use of all the sovereign rights of a sovereign na­
tion. We have our political independence recognized,
but we have surrendered our sovereignty many times.
We now have American bases in the heart of our land.
We were cowed to grant parity rights, and we failed to
exercise our sovereignty to give to our people our eco­
nomic emancipation from foreign vested interests.”
In this book, Araneta reminds us of our many en­
counters with superior forces, both on our shores and in
the halls of the U.S. Congress. His message, as he once
said, is that “today’s battles are in the more prosaic eco­
nomic field, in production and foreign trade.”
We ask our readers, have things really changed, as we
enter the third millennium? Araneta reminds us that “the
sovereignty we enjoy is ours to preserve, ours to use, a
heritage that we received from past generations of Fili­
pino patriots, and which provides precisely the tool that
we need to overcome the problems and the challenges
we face today.”
Death in 1982 may have deprived Araneta of seeing
the end of America’s formal breach of Philippine sover­
eignty, but it has not stilled his voice with the reissue of
his book, America’s Double-Cross of the Philippines.
Now with the discussion on whether to ratify the Vis­
iting Forces Agreement (VFA) treaty with the United States
on the table, the publisher feels the need for all of us to
hear that voice again. Let us heed that voice as there is
no better time than the present for us, as a nation, to
reflect and respond to the issues of today that will dictate
the future we mold for tomorrow. Should we stand with
our heroes, those who gave their lives in the revolution
and who continued, thereafter, to fight that we may all
be truly free, or do we again cow to foreign pressure?
We believe that we should not repeat the shame of
1946. We hope that the re-publication of this book will
help inspire a new generation of Filipinos to avoid the
errors of the past.
Lina Araneta Santiago
Sahara Heritage Foundation
Malabon, December 15, 1998
Author’s Introduction

“It was all, of course, with the best of intentions and in

the loftiest of motives but General Aguinaldo, one re­
grets to report, had been neatly double-crossed.”
- Walter Millis, The Martial
Spirit, 1931, The Literary
Guild of America, (page
225)
Double-crossed!
That indeed is a strong word. This explains why I was
at first reluctant to use it in the title of this book. But I
finally consented to its use when I found out that it was
the very word adopted by a distinguished American his­
torian in passing judgment on the treatment which the
leaders of the Philippine Revolutionary Government re­
ceived in 1899, at the hands of the people in power in the
United States, both in government and in business.
History repeated itself, in 1946.
In both cases, the Philippines was the virtual ally of
the people and government of the United States during
moments of trial. But in both instances, at the Ameri­
cans’ hour of triumph, the Philippines was shabbily
treated; she was unceremoniously denied the place of
honor she merited at the peace conference table, in the
case of the first, and at the surrender ceremonies, in the
second. Once victory had been obtained, the Philippines
had become expendable and the Filipino lives sacrificed
to attain that victory conveniently forgotten.
 This book fills the need for an introductory history—
to Filipinos and Americans of this age—to Philippine-
American relations which started at the end of the last
century. Now that the era of colonization is about to end
in all the continents, America’s true role in colonialism
needs to be better understood.
Truth will make America free and enable her to imple­
ment her commitment to human rights and freedom for
all mankind, which is embedded in her own Declaration
of Independence. It will liberate America from her self-
created mirage of national security, with which, as sug­
gested by Dr. Daniel B. Schirmer, she became overly con­
cerned when, annexing the Philippines, she ceased to be
a Republic and became an Empire.
American taxpayers’ money, running into thousands
of billions of dollars, have gone down the drain since
America pursued her war in the Philippines and, during
this century, the four wars that climaxed several instances
of U.S. international intervention. All this waste in hu­
man and material resources was brought about by her
new and semi-colonial expansion and domination thinly
disguised as a search for national security. In the process,
she has created her own superpower counterpart, and no
amount of arms limitation can bring back her national
security, now based on violence and armaments of de­
struction of unbelievable lethal power.
History books can be rewritten, but the facts which
constitute history cannot be erased from true historical
records. If humanity is to learn from the eloquent les­
sons of the past, that past must be ever-present in the
minds of succeeding generations, the events correlated
to show where humanity is going and what new direction
must be given to the compass of the leading nations’ ship
of state.
The age of empires and colonization is a thing of the
past, but it must be replaced by the political evolution of
the states into regional federations united in the ancient
spirit of Sufism, the spiritual message of brotherhood
harmony and hope, and, if you will, in the spirit that this
planet, by the fantastic discoveries of the physical sciences,
has become, in reality, a One World, and by necessity, a
single humanity.
It is in this spirit that this book was written—not in
anger but in sorrow—by a man in self-exile, assisted and
advised along the way by his brothers Antonio and (Fr.)
Francisco. Thanks are specially due to Dr. Daniel B.
Schirmer, for the inspiration he has shed in our direc­
tion; to Mr. Luis R. Mauricio, editor-in-chief of the Phil­
ippines’ pre-martial law GRAPHIC magazine, for his edit­
ing of the book and for valuable suggestions offered by
him and accepted by me; to Mr. Gonzalo del Rosario for
valuable assistance, and to Mrs. Angelita Cruz, for pre­
paring the index.
Our father gave to his children a legacy of faith in
America. We honor that legacy, for we feel that friend­
ship and faith should be manifested by sincerity and open­
ness of heart. Because we believe that there are two forces
in America—those of love and those of greed, those of
universal brotherhood and those of narrow and material­
istic vision—we hope that this book will help reinforce
and support the forces of love and universal brotherhood.
If in some measure this work of love for a better hu­
manity and a better tomorrow serves to enlighten the
forces of reaction, the author and his collaborators will
feel that their efforts have served, although in a small
measure, humanity’s need to discover herself and have
faith in herself.
The Author
Vancouver, B.C., 1978
Chapter 1
The Pearl of the
Orient Seas—An
historical
introduction

Pre-historic and pre-Spanish eras

T
HERE IS A school of thought in geology which
propagates the theory that, during the last ice age,
the waters surrounding what is now the Philip­
pines fell about 150 feet below the present sea level, ex­
posing vast areas of land that became bridges connecting
the islands with each other and with mainland Asia. This
condition remained for about twenty thousand years;
during this time, different waves of people from Malay­
sia, China, and India settled in what later came to be
known as the Philippines.
 They believed that, about 7,000 years ago, the last ice
age ended and the sea level rose again, submerging the
land bridges to Asia; the Philippines returned to its for­
mation as an archipelago. Migration continued by water
from Indochina, South China, Malaysia and Borneo.
During the 14th century, Muslim Malays migrated to the
islands of Mindanao and Sulu, many years after Islam
had been propagated by traders, missionaries, and teach­
ers.
Pre-historic art and culture
The blending of races and cultures, arising from these
migrations, enriched the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The influence of the Hindu-Malay culture was evident
to the Spanish conquistadores when they found in wide
use in the Philippine archipelago the Sanskrit syllabary
of 17 symbols.
There are eight major languages in the country, all
sister languages descended from one parent stock—the
Malayo-Polynesian or the Austronesian.
Our literature was folk literature representing our
group heritage and our daily lives.
We had native music and dances typical of different
regions. Later on, these would be enriched by the more
mellowed Spanish and European cadences, at present
imbued with sophistication by the niceties of modern the­
atrical presentation. The music and dances of different
epochs and different regions of the country depict very
vividly the pageant of the evolution of our culture.
Pre-historic governmental system
Spain found the archipelago ruled by different chiefs,
some called Datu, each governing a barangay of about
100 families, but in some instances covering an entire
island, such as Panay.
The barangay was a single-level unit of government:
nothing was above or below it. In this regard, the
barangays resembled the city states of ancient Greece.
Each was generally governed by a Council of Elders.
Most of the Chiefs and their barangays were imbued
with the spirit of “bayanihan”, or organized togetherness,
of caring and sharing—a system which can be described
as one of self-help. Most barangays led a simple, peace­
ful, industrious and happy existence.
Indeed, there were sporadic petty vendettas that could
end in deadly retribution. But there could also be severe
penalties for crimes committed by the people of a
barangay, or from outside. Fights between barangays could
result from the murder or maltreatment of men or the
kidnapping of wives.
Among the barangays, there were pacts of friendship
sealed with the ceremony of the blood compact. The con­
tracting chiefs would drink from one cup of wine mixed
with blood drawn from their arms.
The separate barangays had a common denominator.
The women enjoyed equal civil and political rights with
men. Some vestiges of the pre-Spanish colonial age have
remained in the country to this day.
By and large, it can be said that the more primitive
the culture of a people is—once a certain degree of basic
human civilization has been reached—the less bloody are
their relations.
Arrival of the first European
Ferdinand Magellan, the famous Portuguese naviga­
tor, travelling from Spain by way of the farthest end of
South America, was the first European to reach the Pearl
of the Orient Seas.
In 1521, Magellan had the first Mass celebrated in
one of the islands, having been received peacefully by the
ruler, who permitted 800 of his subjects, including his
wife and daughter, to be baptized into the Catholic faith.
Lapu-Lapu, the chief of the neighboring island of
Mactan, however, resisted Magellan’s intrusion, and a
battle took place between native arrows and Spanish bul­
lets. An arrow hit the leg of Magellan and he was slain in
battle. Only one ship—the Victoria—out of five, returned
to Spain, sailing westward through the southernmost end
of Africa, thus circumnavigating the world for the first
time.
There followed four other expeditions to the archi­
pelago, the last two already from Mexico, which was, at
that time, a Spanish possession. None of the five expedi­
tions were able to establish a settlement in the islands.
All of them took place during the reign of Charles of
Ghent. It is said that Charles V of the Holy Roman Em­
pire abdicated his throne because he became very de­
pressed by these failures.
The sixth expedition—that of Legazpi and Urdaneta,
the latter an Agustinian friar who had been in previous
expeditions as a layman—finally started the permanent
Spanish occupation of the Philippines in 1571. Legazpi
had a blood compact with Sikatuna, the Chief of the is­
land of Bohol. He organized a settlement in Cebu, and
another in Manila, where he established the capital of
the Philippines. Thus, he started Spain’s 327-year occu­
pation, more than a century before the Spanish settle­
ment of San Francisco in California.
Legazpi died in Manila in 1572 after a substantial part
of Luzon had been placed under Spanish rule. His suc­
cess was due to the humane qualities of the first mission­
aries and soldiers. Noteworthy were the intrepid and dip­
lomatic qualities of his nephew, Juan Salcedo, who had
reached the northern part of Luzon, including the gold
and copper mines in Bontoc.
The smallness of the political units of government,
coupled with the peaceful, non-violent and hospitable
nature of our people, was a prime factor in the easy and
speedy colonization of the country. It should be a major
lesson to the countries of South East Asia in this modern
world that, separated and divided, they stand, relatively
speaking, in a situation similar in vulnerability to that of
the barangays when Spain came to these islands.1
Legacy from Spain
With all the abuses and defects of a dictatorial form
of government, Spain colonized the country and ruled
over her for over three centuries until 1898, when she
left the Philippines enriched with the Christian faith and
Catholic religious practices.
Spain gave the Philippines a central government, a
united geographical identity, the Spanish language and a
common identifying name—Filipinos.
The unity of Church and State entrusted power to the
friars who were parish priests in Manila, and throughout
the country. The friars created many towns and intro­
duced many trades.
But there were abuses, too. While the Jesuits used to
have great sympathy for the Filipinos, the friars generally
looked down on them. But it was no different from the
attitude which an enlightened Jefferson, the American
statesman who wrote the declaration that all men are cre­
ated equal, had for African Americans in the United States.
And yet, the Dominican friars founded the University
of Santo Tomás, which incidentally antedates Harvard,
the oldest American university, in our land. Santo Tomás
has the distinction of having produced the very leaders
who demanded basic reforms and even separation from
Spain and later fought the United States.
Appraisal of Spanish domination
It can be said that Filipinos under Spanish rule fared
better than the Malays and the Borneans under British
rule, and the Indonesians under Dutch rule.
We were more advanced, owing to the very education
received from Spain. During the tri-centennial celebra­
tion of the University of Sto. Tomás, William Howard
Taft, the first American civil governor of the Philippines,
praised Spain’s educational influence in the country. It is
perhaps because of this advance in education that it was
in the Philippines where the cry for independence was
first heard in Asia, and where the First Asian Republic
was born in 1898.
These benefits are more visible if we compare the fate
of our race with that of the Native Americans of the United
States, due, I would think, at least in part to the fact that
there has been a greater miscegenation between native
and Spanish blood.2
The Spanish conquest and occupation of our self-
governing ancestors, and the occupation of the country
without the benefit of basic civil rights granted to the
people, constitute the first betrayal of democracy in our
country. Perhaps the only justification for this occupa­
tion, with all its attendant evils, is the fact that the Span­
ish abuses in the country existed even in Europe before
the French Revolution; and, during that period, democ­
racy was not practised in any part of the world. As a mat­
ter of fact, during her occupation of the Philippines, Spain
never had any pretensions to being a democracy—in sharp
contrast to her successor.
Chapter 2
The first Philippine-
American alliance

The War of Independence

RIZAL FORETOLD, his m artyrdom sparked th e
bloody war of independence against Spain, a war
initiated by Bonifacio, a man of the people who
had organized the Katipunan (The Highest, Most Exalted
Association of the Sons of the People). He was supported
and later replaced5by General Aguinaldo, who came from
the middle class.
The fight was an uneven one, mostly of bolos and
daggers against rifles.
After a reign of terror in Manila, which included the
execution of Rizal and many other patriots who had not
taken up arms, and after a year of fighting, Pedro Paterno,
a member of the Filipino elite, worked for an amicable
settlement between General Aguinaldo and the Spanish
Government.4 He succeeded in having the General sign
the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, named after the caves where
Aguinaldo had sought refuge.
The Spanish Governor promised to establish, among
other reforms, freedom of speech and of the press, and
to pay an indemnity. On his part, Aguinaldo agreed to
leave the country with his staff, which he did after receiving
half of the indemnity. The signing of the pact was
celebrated with a solemn Te Deum in Manila and Madrid
at about the same time on January 23, 1898, followed by
many festivities in Manila.
The other half of the indemnity was never paid. Soon
Aguinaldo found out that the reforms were not being
implemented, and in the end, he used the funds he had
previously received for the purchase of arms and
ammunition in Hong Kong.5
The American-Spanish War
By that time, the United States had declared war
against Spain—over Cuba.
In declaring war, the U.S. Congress embodied in the
Teller Amendment the announcement that the United
States had no desire to possess Cuba permanently, and
promised to leave the country to the Cubans after the
Spaniards had been driven out and the country pacified.
By “coincidence”, Commodore George Dewey and his
naval fleet were, at the time of declaration of war,
conveniently in Hong Kong waters; and when hostilities
started, he proceeded to Manila Bay to attack the Spanish
naval forces in the Philippines.
Dewey’s convenient presence in the waters near the
Philippines was not really a “coincidence”, however. It
was really part of a grand design. Theodore Roosevelt,
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, had prepared
plans to launch a naval attack on the Philippines the instant
the war with Spain broke out. On February 25, 1897, he
ordered Dewey to proceed to Hong Kong with this mission
in mind. This order was given by him when his superior,
Secretary of the Navy James D. Long, had taken the
afternoon off.
The Philippines as America’s ally
Before the battle of Manila Bay, Dewey realized that
he had no ground troops to fight a war on land, and
through the American consuls in Singapore and Hong
Kong, he induced Aguinaldo to be his ally against the
Spaniards. This is a fact that was confirmed later on by
Dewey himself in Manila Bay on board his flagship the
Olympia.
Aguinaldo claimed that the consuls and Dewey assured
him that the U.S. would adopt for the Philippines the
same policy announced for Cuba in the Teller Amend­
ment. The telling argument which the Americans
presented to Aguinaldo was that, if the United States was
not going to retain Cuba, which was at her very doorstep,
she had even less reason to retain the Philippines.6
Aguinaldo and seventeen members of his staff were
taken to Manila from Hong Kong on a navy boat, the
McCulloch, while two other officers of Aguinaldo
accompanied Dewey on his flagship to Manila Bay.
Dewey fought the Spaniards only at Manila Bay, a naval
fight coupled with the bombardment of the Cavite naval
base. The Filipinos did all the fighting on land.
The Republic is born
Dewey’s naval victory at Manila Bay contributed
splendidly to the breaking of the Spanish will to fight the
war. His evident and clear support of the Philippine war
against Spain, which was proclaimed by Aguinaldo in
several manifestos and proclamations issued to the Filipino
people, boosted tremendously the General’s prestige and
more importantly the morale of the Filipinos.
With arms bought from Hong Kong, as well as those
supplied by Dewey and those surrendered by Filipino
soldiers who had been serving in the Spanish Army,
Aguinaldo and his revolucionarios battered the Spanish
Army. Soon, Spanish control of the towns disappeared.
The success of the war against Spain moved so fast
that, about a month after the battle of Manila Bay,
Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the
Philippines and “unfurled the first Filipino flag, the result
of Admiral Dewey’s suggestion” to Aguinaldo, at a formal
ceremony in Aguinaldo’s hometown, Cavite Viejo, now
Kawit, Cavite.
This was followed by the proclamation of a provisional
Constitution which declared the national objective “to
struggle for the liberation of the Philippines until all
nations, including Spain, shall have expressly recognized
it, and to prepare the country for the establishment of a
Republic.”
Simultaneously, a dictatorial government was
established by Aguinaldo, with the following declaration:
“As the great North American nation has evinced interest
in our welfare and has extended her hand to help us obtain
our liberty, I again assume control of our forces in their
endeavour to attain the supreme object we all have in
view . . .”
In July of 1898, Aguinaldo formed his Cabinet, and in
September, he assembled the first Congress in Malolos,
Bulacan, which drafted and approved a Constitution for
the Republic of the Philippines which was proclaimed by
Aguinaldo on January 21, 1899. Two days later, the
Republic was formally inaugurated, with Aguinaldo taking
the oath of office as its first President.
The Constitution embodied a democratic government
and guaranteed all basic freedoms. It declared that
“sovereignty resides exclusively in the people.” It had 32
articles to guarantee due process of law, freedom of
speech, of the press, and of domicile, property rights,
the rights of the accused to be presumed innocent, etc.
 More important, the said basic rights could not be
suspended; and martial law could not be imposed by the
unilateral action of the President without the concurrence
of the National Assembly; and in case the latter was not
in session, approval must come from the Permanent
Commission of the Assembly.
Chapter 3
First double-cross of
an ally

The American-Philippine War

N
O SOONER HAD the Filipinos inaugurated the First
Philippine Republic than the Americans provoked
a war against their former allies on the fourth of
February, 1899.
When President McKinley announced, rather belat­
edly, his stand in favor of the complete transfer of Fili­
pino sovereignty to the United States,7 Dewey disclaimed
the solemn promise he had made to the Filipinos—a prom­
ise that involved his honor and that of his country.
The war was an undeclared one, but premeditated. It
was waged in order to pursue a policy already decided by
McKinley in September of the previous year, when he
instructed the American Commissioners in Paris (who
were negotiating a treaty of peace with the Spanish rep-
resentatives) for the cession of the entire archipelago, for
which the United States eventually paid Spain the sum of
$20 million.
Aguinaldo undertook the utmost effort to prevent the
outbreak of a war with an erstwhile ally. He sent to Wash­
ington a diplomatic mission in the person of Felipe
Agoncillo, who was then in Hong Kong. McKinley re­
ceived Agoncillo unofficially and very coldly. All of
Agoncillo’s well-documented efforts were in vain.8
Years later, the unabashedly imperialist President,
Theodore Roosevelt, admitted: “If we act so that natives
understand us to have made a definite promise, then we
should live up to that promise.”9 But the fact remains
that in 1899 they did not.
Did Dewey act in bad faith?
Evidence to the effect that Dewey had promised an
alliance to Aguinaldo in the war against Spain is over­
whelming. The acts of the two parties to the alliance in
the course of the war do not admit of the contrary.
The kind of assistance given by Dewey to Aguinaldo
was that given only to mercenaries or to an ally in a war.
Dewey never claimed that Aguinaldo was a mercenary.
The American consul in Hong Kong received substan­
tial funds from Aguinaldo for the purchase of arms and
ammunition. Dewey gave Aguinaldo additional arms—
captured from the arsenal in Cavite. The headquarters of
the Spanish naval commander in Cavite were made avail­
able by Dewey to Aguinaldo after the battle of Manila
Bay.
Dewey himself afterwards gave the following testimony
before a U.S. Congressional Committee as follows: “I was
waiting for troops to arrive and I thought that the closer
the Filipinos invested [besieged] the city [of Manila], the
easier it would be when our troops arrive to march in.
The Filipinos were our friends, assisting us: they were
doing our work ...saving our troops. Up to the time the Army
came, Aguinaldo did everything I requested. He was most
obedient; whatever I told him to do, he did. I saw him
almost daily.”10
An American historian, Walter Millis, said that
“General Aguinaldo, one regrets to report, had been
neatly double-crossed.”11
Aguinaldo, however, took the view that Dewey, as well
as the American consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore,
were acting in good faith when they assured him of what
they believed would be the American policy towards the
Philippines, based on the declared policy of the U.S.
Congress for Cuba. These assurances were made at a time
when American public opinion had not yet been fired by
the “yellow press” into advocating the occupation of the
Philippines, which McKinley consequently pursued as his
policy.
What would have happened to the stature of Dewey,
the recognized hero of the battle of Manila Bay, had he
come out at that time, courageously stating that he had
made certain commitments to the Filipino people? In his
memoirs, Aguinaldo said that, from a beloved hero, he
might have become a heel. But Aguinaldo also believed
that “had he [Dewey] stood for the truth and won over
the American people, he would have become a hero many
times over—resolute in war, magnanimous in victory, and
honorable in peace.”12
Dewey’s formula adopted by Nixon
Dewey’s tactics, which Aguinaldo, in his memoirs,
prefers to call a “splendid improvisation,”11' were to be
actually implemented, 70 years later, in the Nixon formula
to extricate America from the holocaust of Vietnam—the
use of native troops to fight her war.
It was a complete success in the Philippines, and
Aguinaldo and the Philippine troops were rewarded by
the Americans with bullets. But when the U.S. government
repeated it in Vietnam, it proved to be a great tragedy,
and 70,000 South Vietnamese had to be given asylum in
America.
The screws tightened on the Filipinos
The easy and spectacular victory at Manila Bay created
among the American people euphoric feelings of
patriotism and exuberant exaltation, duly promoted by
the “yellow press.” It gave rise to memorials from business
groups and even churches, urging the retention of the
Philippines as the key to the vast markets of eastern Asia
and the Christianization of the Orient.
From October 10 to 21, McKinley toured the United
States and—according to one account—he observed the
victory-induced hysteria among the people, interpreting
it as a demand for expansion and imperialism. But Daniel
Schirmer in his book quotes a contrary view expressed
by Charles Emory Smith, then McKinley’s close adviser.
He wrote of this tour of the President: “What is much
nearer to the truth is that he led public sentiment quite
as much as public sentiment led him, and the popular
manifestations on the journey were in response to the
keynote he struck.”14
The fact remains that, at that period of the history of
the United States, the American public was fed by the
imperialist press with reports that were orchestrated to
make them demand annexation of the Philippines.
From London, Ambassador John M. Hay reported to
Secretary William R. Day that he had heard it on excellent
authority—and this was dutifully circulated by the press
to the American public—that the Germans intended to
seize the Philippines, but that Great Britain preferred
the United States to Germany. In the Senate, Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge was determined to launch America
on an imperialist course, and on May 4, he told Henry
White: “We must on no account let the islands go...” On
May 24, Lodge confided to Roosevelt: “In confidence but
in absolute certainty,” the administration is more fully
committed “to the large policy we both desire.”
On June 12, Roosevelt was more definite; he told
Lodge: “You must get Manila and Hawaii; you must
prevent any talk of peace...” This campaign went on and
on, until September 18 when McKinley instructed the
Peace Commissioners in Paris “...The United States cannot
accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty
of the island of Luzon.”
From O ctober 1 to November 28, the Peace
Commission met in Paris. The dispatches from the
expansionist Commissioners (Whitelaw Reid and Senators
David and Frye) to McKinley finally swayed the latter to
demand the cession of the entire archipelago. On
November 28, the Treaty of Paris was signed.
But there was still one problem the imperialists had
to hurdle. This was the matter of ratification by the U.S.
Senate.
On February 4, 1899, the United States provoked a
war, and shooting started between American and Filipino
troops. As anticipated by the imperialists, this was enough
to influence the voting in the U.S. Senate. On February
6, the treaty was ratified—although by only one vote over
the required two-thirds majority of the Senate.
Costly price paid by the Americans
The United States thus decided to shed the habiliments
of a republic in favor of those of an empire. For the folly
she committed in embarking on an adventure in
imperialism, she had to pay dearly.
Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, she paid Spain
the sum of US$20 million as an indemnity for the transfer
of sovereignty which the latter had already lost. At the
time of the signing of the treaty on November 28, 1898,
the sovereignty of the Philippines—with the exception of
the city of Manila, which the Spaniards had surrendered
to the Americans—was already by law and in fact, under
the control of the Philippine Republic and not the United
States.
The price that the United States had to pay, however,
for dishonoring Dewey’s commitment to the Filipinos was
much higher than what Spain got from her. Costly in
terms of dollars and the loss of American lives was the
war she had to wage against Aguinaldo and his army, a
war that officially lasted for two years (February 4, 1899
to March 23, 1901, when Aguinaldo was captured in the
province of Isabela).
Costlier was the ignominious defeat she suffered at
Bataan and Corregidor a few months after the start of
World War II; and again, when she undertook the bloody
re-conquest of the Philippines from Japan.
America’s history of imperialism, from the start, has
been one of many tragedies and great dishonor. It is a
strange record for a country which was borne of the
highest ideals of liberty and democracy; a country which,
since its independence, had always explained its relations
with other countries with strident protestations of the
most high-minded of motivations.
If from those to whom much is given, much is
demanded, it must follow that those who proclaim high
ideals should be measured with a more demanding
yardstick.
The price paid by the Filipinos
There is no doubt, of course, that the Philippines paid
a high price, too. But the price she had to pay did not
include her dishonor.
The loss of American lives and the American casualties
during the Philippine-American War was small indeed
compared to that of the Filipinos. Some 600,000 Filipinos
died and hundreds of thousands suffered cruelty at
American hands, especially from the infamous so-called
“water cure” that was extensively used by American
soldiers in their “pacification.”
 As a price for being an American colony, Filipinos
had to fight America’s war against Japan, the Philippines
lost two million inhabitants, and had to bear the
destruction of her villages and cities to an extent second
to none, except possibly Poland.
It was the Filipinos who paid the costliest price in the
loss of human and natural resources. During the second
war, due to two invasions—first, that of Japan; later that
of America, to dislodge Japan—and, in between, the
guerrilla war against the Japanese Occupation Army,
Filipinos experienced all too thoroughly the suffering and
indignities and cruelties of war.
Death of the First Asian Republic
The greatest loss dealt to the Filipinos, however, was
the death of their Republic, the first in Asia.
Without the U.S. occupation of the country, the Phil­
ippine Republic would have been the training ground of
the Filipinos in self-government. The official morality of
our public officials and their conduct of public affairs
could not have been worse than the one that was devel­
oped under American materialistic economic neo-impe­
rialism.15
Had the United States abided with the pristine purity
of her Republic and not embarked on a quest for an
Empire, with an outpost in the Philippines, perhaps the
American-Japanese War may not have taken place at all.
But even if it had, certainly, the Philippines would not
have suffered as much as she did. Like Thailand, she would
not have fared as badly. An independent Philippines, with­
out a navy and not occupied by a white power, most likely
would have been bypassed by Japan.
Without the Japanese occupation of the country, and
the four months’ delay that Japan suffered in the Philip­
pines in her march to the south, Australia would have
been invaded by Japan. But even if the Philippines had
been occupied by the Japanese, her fate would have been
like that of Hong Kong. In the end, a Japan defeated
through America’s atomic bomb would have relinquished
the Philippines without leaving in her wake the destruc­
tion of the latter’s resources and economy and the deci­
mation and the hardships experienced by her people.
Indeed, these are all speculations. But one thing is
most probable: the chain of events in the Philippines
would have been more honorable for America, and more
peaceful, fruitful and democratic for our people, if Hearst
and Pulitzer had not started the “yellow press” that was
to goad America’s adventurism in her march to Imperial­
ism.
Chapter 4
American resistance
to the Philippine-
American War

American anti-imperialists

W
HEN THE U nited S tates turned her back on her
erstwhile ally in the Pacific, a gallant band of
anti-imperialists in America launched a spir­
ited fight against the policies of their own government
and against the influential leaders of their nation:
McKinley, Lodge, and Theodore Roosevelt.
The anti-im perialists from Massachusetts, still
animated by the abolitionist spirit and Lincoln born of
the Civil War, were slowly able to enlist a number of
influential leaders in private and public life to support
their cause. Sufficient public support forged a national
movement that made the question of Philippine
annexation the paramount issue of the presidential
elections of 1900, in which the Democrats pitted William
Jennings Bryan as their standard bearer against the
incumbent McKinley.
T h e a n t i - im perialists raised several issues, namely: (1)
the American war against the forces of Aguinaldo; (2)
the annexation provided in the Treaty of Paris; (3) its
ratification by the Senate; (4) the continuation of the war
after the Treaty; (5) the reelection of McKinley; and (6)
the atrocities committed by the U.S. Army in the Philip­
pines. Although they lost, their fight served a good pur­
pose: it influenced the White House to establish thereaf­
ter a benevolent policy of colonial rule in the Philippines.
The ammunition of the anti-imperialists was supplied
by the letters of the soldiers to their friends and families.
Like their counterparts in the Army in Vietnam some 65
to 70 years later, the fighting men were very unhappy
over their participation in the war, and appalled by the
atrocities they were forced to commit or were being
committed before their own eyes.
The news reports of correspondents who were
covering the inhumanity of the war, supported by the
occasional admissions made by U.S. Army officers, served
the purpose of the anti-imperialists. The excellent and
dignified performance of Aguinaldo and his troops, as
well as a few of Aguinaldo’s manifestos which received
some publicity by the American press, also helped the
anti-imperialist position.
Philippine contact with the anti-imperialists
Daniel Schirmer gives in his work16 a vivid and
thorough review of the anti-imperialists’ valiant but
doomed struggle. In his book, he also mentions Sixto
Lopez’s contact with the anti-imperialists.
As mentioned earlier, after the establishment of the
Republic, Aguinaldo sent a diplomatic mission to the
United States, with Felipe Agoncillo as ambassador, and
Sixto Lopez as secretary. McKinley received the mission,
not in an official capacity, as he wanted to make it clear
that he was not receiving an envoy of the Philippine
Republic. He suggested that Agoncillo put down in writing
the Philippine position. This was done, but nothing else
was ever heard of it afterwards.
Agoncillo went to Paris to have an audience with the
U.S. Peace Commissioners, but he was never received.
Agoncillo did leave with them his position paper on the
issues. Subsequently, he returned to the United States to
fight against the ratification of the treaty.
Unfortunately, Agoncillo was no Quezon. He did not
know how to get the attention of the American People,
nor that of the anti-imperialists.
Schirmer recounts a meeting Lopez had with the anti­
imperialists in Boston on March 30, 1901, but does not
even mention Agoncillo’s mission in the U.S.
Schirmer relates that the meeting that Lopez attended
was held long after the Paris Peace treaty had been ratified,
Democrat front-runner Bryan had been defeated in the
elections, and the annexation of the Philippines and the
peace treaty were no longer an issue. The meeting was
held under the slogan, “Free America, Free Cuba, Free
Philippines.” Speakers denounced the Platt Amendment,
through which strong states tyrannized weaker ones on
the pretext of aiding and defending them. One after
another, the speakers denounced the re-concentration
of inhabitants, the resort to the “water cure,” and the
hiring of Filipino mercenaries. When Colonel Charles
Codman told the audience that Filipino dead out­
numbered the wounded five to one, the hall was filled
with cries of “Shame! Shame!” Lopez got the most
enthusiastic ovation of the evening when he denounced
the new system of cruel warfare adopted by the Americans
in the Philippines.
Struggle doomed to failure
Was there anything that Filipino and American anti­
imperialists could have done, but did not do, to have
turned the course of events, and make possible the survival
of the First Philippine Republic?
Apparently nothing.
The pursuit of empire of profit, and of war to bring
about prosperity was the driving force in the United States
at the turn of the century. This was motivated by a feeling
of white superiority, and an unfortunate prejudice against
the colored natives of Cuba and the Philippines. The
feeling of strength and optimism created by the easy
American naval victories at Manila Bay and in the
Caribbean sea; the heightened influence of the great
industrial corporations; and the growing strength of the
financial sector, were factors that doomed the struggle
for independence.
A factor not to be dismissed peremptorily was the
“yellow press” of William Randolph Hearst, in California,
and of his counterpart, Joseph Pulitzer, in the East Coast.
It did much in fomenting to the spirit of jingoism in the
United States which, in the view of Prof. William James
of Harvard, was then a new force that made the
maintenance of peace more difficult.
The only thing that the Filipinos could have done was
to prolong the guerrilla war. But in the end, the sufferings
of the people and the destruction of the country at large
would have been multiplied many times over, without
altering the course of events.
Aguinaldo saw the futility of armed resistance when
he was captured, so he decided that it was his duty to
advise his countrymen to accept the inevitable. Other
Filipinos before him, even before the shooting war had
started between the two forces, saw the inevitability of
the American occupation. Even Rizal, in an essay, had
predicted the coming of the Americans.17
 This attitude, which Aguinaldo considers “mis­
conduct,”18 was not responsible for the defeat of the
Philippine troops, but it accelerated the advent of peace
under the American flag, the establishment of limited
home rule and the vesting of legislative powers on Filipinos
in the Philippine Assembly, which had Sergio Osmena as
its first Speaker. Under the circumstances, it was a good
and glorious beginning.
Could treaty ratification have been stopped?
There was nothing the anti-imperialists in the United
States could do to stop ratification of the treaty that sealed
Philippine annexation.
The Treaty of Paris, under which America paid Spain
US$20 million for the Philippines, was approved by the
U.S. Senate with only one vote to spare. Schirmer points
to evidence that supports the rumors then prevailing in
Washington that a few of the Senators were influenced
to vote in favor of the Treaty with material and patronage
considerations, the latter extended by McKinley himself.19
We do not say that this could have been prevented.
What was lamentable was William Jennings Bryan’s
support of the Treaty and even his open lobbying in the
Senate for its approval.
Aguinaldo explained Bryan’s strange position thus:
Bryan had the view that the U.S. electorate would not
forgive McKinley for paying Spain US$20 million for the
privilege of inheriting a war against Filipinos, and
therefore, would not reelect him in 1900.
It would seem then that Bryan had expected for
McKinley the kind of unpopularity that, 65 years later,
would develop against Lyndon B. Johnson for his
involvement in Vietnam.
Determination to get the Philippines
This great miscalculation of Bryan and his wrong
appraisal and unfortunate support of the Treaty are things
that ought not to have happened. But would the
imperialists—McKinley, Lodge and Roosevelt, and the big
financial and industrial interests backing and promoting
imperialism—have desisted from occupying the Philip­
pines?
Schirmer points out that Washington started the
shooting war against the Filipinos just two days before
the date set for the ratification of the Treaty.20 He
maintains that in the event the Treaty was not confirmed,
it was assumed the American people, already saddled with
a war, would consider it afait accompli. And the undeclared
war would have had to be prosecuted up to a successful
conclusion.
But it is also possible that, without the Treaty of Paris
having been ratified, McKinley would have been more
amenable to talking peace with Aguinaldo. The result
would have been an American protectorate, similar to
what the Platt Amendment provided for Cuba.
Would our history have differed much from what it
turned out to be? Would it have been different from what
came about in Cuba under the Platt Amendment?
This is all speculation. What is not speculation is the
answer to the question: what went wrong in the Philippines
under the American flag up to and beyond 1946, under a
neo-colonial imperialist system which still lingers,
although it now has to face new strong foreign and
domestic forces?
Chapter 5
The peaceful fight
for Philippine

Osmeña’s leadership
TER AGUINALDO’s capture, several other Filipino
generals continued the war against the United
States. But other leaders, by this time, had come
to the conclusion that annexation of the Philippines was
inevitable, and that the next step would be to work for
independence peacefully.
The story of the struggle for Philippine independence
is the story of the patriotic leadership of Sergio Osmeña
and the rivalry for leadership between him and Manuel
Luis Quezon.
Osmeña and Quezon had been intimate friends since
their youth. They were classmates at Letran College and,
later, at Sto. Tomás University, both of which were run by
Dominican friars. They competed for academic honors
and were the brightest in their class.
Each had seen and played a part, although a minor
one, in the Revolution. Osmeña later founded and ran a
paper, which he called El Nuevo Dia (The New Day), in
his province, Cebu; he had his problems with the
American censors, but he always came out well after each
run-in. Quezon was a major in the Philippine-American
war.
Both Osmena and Quezon were appointed Provincial
Fiscals or Prosecuting Attorneys, and later Provincial
Governors, of their respective provinces. Both had colorful
and brilliant careers in these positions.21
Gradually, Osmena, who was frequently asked by the
American Governor to accompany him in his trips
throughout the country, gained national prominence. This
popularity was enhanced when he was elected President
of the First Convention of Provincial Governors, which
took place a few months before the Philippine Assembly
was inaugurated in 1907.
Creation of the Philippine Assembly
The Philippine Assembly became the lower chamber,
while the already existing Philippine Commission, with
all members appointed by the President of the United
States (always with a majority of Americans), became the
upper chamber of the legislature.
The creation of the Philippine Assembly, which
constitutes the first landmark in the march to self-
government, was authorized by the First Organic Act. The
establishment of the Assembly was subject to two
conditions: a declaration by the American Governor that
general peace and order had been established throughout
the country, and a general census that was to follow the
declaration. It was inaugurated by the then Secretary of
War, William Howard Taft, who, as first civil governor of
the Philippines, gained favor with Filipinos with his slogan
“The Philippines for the Filipinos.”22
On the first day of its session, Osmena was
unanimously elected Speaker of the Assembly, while
Quezon was elected Floor Leader by the Nacionalista
Party, the majority party.
From the start, Osmeña led the Philippine Assembly
brilliantly and with outstanding statesmanship. The era
of suppressed nationalism imposed by the American-
controlled Philippine Commission had reached its height
when it banned the use of the Philippine flag just one
month before the inauguration of the Philippine
Assembly. Nothing but the diplomacy of Osmeña made
possible the gradual erosion of that era of suppressed
nationalism. The repeal of the Flag Law, however, was
not obtained until 1919, after the Philippine Commission
had already been replaced by the elective Philippine
Senate.
Osmeña always enjoyed the respect of the American
Governors in the Philippines, not only because Taft had
declared the position of Speaker to be second only to
that of the Governor, but especially because of Osmeña’s
sincerity, capacity, and dedication to the national interest.
Advance toward self-government
Under Osmeña’s leadership, the Assembly which was
familiar with the problems of the country, seized the
initiative from the Commission, which was not aware of
the interests of the nation, in enacting all major legislation.
Osmeña won a victory on one important issue which
he raised: that the two Philippine Commissioners in
Washington, with power of voice but not of vote in the
U.S. House of Representatives, were meant to represent
the people of the Philippines, and therefore, should be
nominated by the Assembly and that the Commission,
controlled by Americans appointed by the U.S. President,
should have to give way to the Assembly’s preference.
The impasse on this issue between the Assembly and
the Commission had to be resolved by a new Act of the
U.S. Congress which tacitly accepted Osmeña’s theory
that the Resident Commissioners were representatives of
the Filipino people, and that, of the two Houses of the
Legislature, only the Assembly possessed the popular
mandate and, therefore, by implication, had the sole—or
at least the greater—right to elect the Resident
Commissioners.
In 1909, after two years of service in the Philippine
Assembly, Quezon was elected as one of the Resident
Commissioners to the United States, where he served for
nine years with great distinction.
Osmeña took up in peace the fight for Philippine
independence and the vindication of the American
promise to Aguinaldo, making good use of the leadership
he commanded as the second highest official in the
Philippine Government. From Manila, he directed the
fight for greater Filipino autonomy and accelerated
Filipinization of the government services.
In 1912, Woodrow Wilson was elected President of
the United States, the first Democrat to be elected to
that office since the U.S. occupation of the Philippines.
He appointed Francis Burton Harrison as Governor
General of the Philippines, thus starting a new era of
Philippine-American relations.
Harrison served as Governor from October 1913 to
1921, the longest tenure of any U.S. Governor in the
islands. The Cabinet, as well as the Commission, was
placed entirely in the hands of Filipinos, although the
members were still to be appointed by the Governor-
General.
The era of Filipinization of the government, which
Harrison initiated under instructions from Wilson,
constitutes the second landmark in the progress toward
autonomy.
The third landmark was the enactment of the Jones
Law in 1916, which created the Philippine Senate—with
22 members elected by the people, and two appointed by
the Governor General to represent the so-called non-
Christian tribes. The Act promised the granting of
independence as soon as a stable government was
established. Incidentally, the Government was never more
stable than at this time under the leadership and
statesmanship of Osmeña.
Osmeña-Quezon break
Quezon, who returned to the country as a national
hero with the Jones Law in his pocket, so to speak,
suggested to Osmeña that he run for the Senate so that
he could be the Senate President, while Quezon would
run for the Speaker of the Assembly.
Osmeña, however, preferred to remain as Speaker,
mistakenly likening the Philippine Assembly to the House
Of Commons in England. He believed that the Assembly,
being the more “popular” chamber and having more
members, was the more prestigious of the two houses.
He failed to give due importance to the power of the
Senate to approve the appointments extended by the Chief
Executive, the American Governor General.
The fact is that, in practice, Osmeña continued
proposing the appointments in his capacity as Speaker of
the Assembly and head of the party in power. In social
and official functions, Osmeña preceded Quezon, a
situation which the latter found intolerable as years went
by.
In 1922, Quezon forced a break with Osmeña, the
leader of the party, charging him with practising
“unipersonal” leadership. Osmeña argued for a unified
and responsible leadership, while Quezon argued for
collective leadership.
In the speech in which he openly declared his break
with Osmeña, Quezon divided the party. Ever the effective
demagogue, he proclaimed to an electrified audience
composed mostly of young university students and self-
seeking politicians that he would prefer a government
run like hell by Filipinos to a government run like heaven
by Americans.
 In retrospect, this is precisely what Quezon (supported
and directed by Americans) did accomplish: bring hell to
his countrymen.
In the election for members of Congress that followed
the split, no single party received the control of either
chamber. The three contending parties were the Osmeña-
Nacionalista Party, the Quezon-Collectivista Party, and
the Recto-Democrata Party, the traditional opposition
party.
Recto offered Osmeña victory over Quezon on a silver
platter by proposing a coalition of their parties, under
which Osmeña would be elected President of the Senate,
and Recto Speaker of the House.
But Osmeña refused the offer. His whole life’s purpose
had been the preservation of the unity of the Nacionalista
Party which he had organized and built to become the
standard-bearer in the fight for national independence.
Instead, he chose to offer his hand in unity to Quezon
even at the cost of playing second-fiddle to him. Quezon
became the President of the Senate and the undisputed
leader of the Filipino participation in the government,
while Manuel Roxas, a promising young Assemblyman,
was chosen as Speaker. Thus, in 1922, Osmeña’s brilliant
and patriotic leadership in government came to an end.
The first Philippine Independence Act
In Washington, the Democratic administration by this
time was replaced by a Republican administration, with
Presidents Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover holding office
in succession. Consequently, the Philippines had a series
of Republican governors-general: General Leonard
Wood, Henry Stimson, Dwight Davis, and Theodore
Roosevelt Jr., the son of Theodore.
Quezon fought Wood, ingratiated himself with
Stimson and had good relations with the other governors.
During all those years, the independence movement
received a serious setback.
 During the Hoover administration, Quezon decided
to send Osmeña and Roxas to the United States on an
independence mission, with little hope that they would
accomplish anything.
It turned out, however, that various American interests
by this time had grown tired of having to face the
competition of Philippine commodities. With the help of
these forces, which had a strong lobby in Congress, the
Osmeña-Roxas team obtained an independence bill
enacted by Congress. It was vetoed by Hoover, but
Congress overturned the veto, and the Osmeña-Roxas
mission brought home the Hare-Hawes-Cutdng Act.
Second Quezon-Osmeña break
Quezon found fault with this Act of Congress. He
denounced its provisions that would liquidate free trade
and would establish military bases even after the grant of
independence.
This resulted in his second fight with Osmeña, and
his first fight with Roxas. The issue of whether or not to
reject the so-called Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act divided the
Nacionalista Party into two camps again—the antis and
the pros, with Quezon and Osmeña leading each group.
Quezon won the fight with the rejection by the
Philippine Legislature of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act.
Roxas resigned his Speakership in the Lower House
when it rejected the Independence Act that he had worked
for.
During his maximum term as Speaker, Roxas
distinguished himself as an ardent nationalist, claiming
that the Philippines could survive without free trade with
the United States. To raise the nationalist spirit among
the masses and taking inspiration from Bonifacio, he
organized the Bagong Katipunan. But as we shall see later,
Roxas betrayed all these principles when he was elected
President of the Second Republic of the Philippines in
1946, after the Second World War.
Quezon’s victory in Washington
After the Legislature rejected the Hare-Hawes-
Cutting Act, Quezon went to Washington on a separate
independence mission. With a sizeable propaganda fund
raised among his friends, he was able to get Franklin D.
Roosevelt, who had just been elected President, to meet
him halfway. Roosevelt recommended, and Congress
approved, what came to be known as the Tydings-
McDuffie Act.
There were slight but substantial differences between
the first Independence Act which the Osmeña-Roxas team
had obtained and the second one which Quezon got.
Except for a promise by President Roosevelt that the
second Act would be subject to future study and revision,
there were no changes in the economic provisions. On
the other hand, the provision for the retention of
American Army bases in the Philippines was deleted, and
instead the Congress of the United States directed the
President of the Philippines to work for the international
neutralization of the Philippines, at least two years before
the proclamation of independence which would be
preceded by a ten-year transition period in the form of a
Commonwealth Government.
The new Independence Act, subject to certain
limitations, authorized the Filipino people to approve their
own Constitution. It was speedily accepted by the
Philippine Legislature.
Quezon tampers with the Constitution
In the ensuing election of delegates to the Con­
stitutional Convention that was to draft a Constitution
for the Commonwealth and the Republic, the Anti group
of Quezon won the majority. The Convention was actually
controlled by the Quezon-Recto-Roxas combination.
Recto, who was the leader of the Demócratas, had earlier
moved to the Quezon Anti camp when he opposed the
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and favored the Tydings-
McDuffie Act. Roxas was back in the graces of Quezon.
Thus Quezon dictated on the C onstitutional
Convention, through Recto, who was his choice for
President of the Convention, and Roxas, who gave able
support to Recto.
I was a delegate to that Convention. I take pride in
stating that, in that Convention, I fought almost single-
handedly against the provision which granted the
President of the Philippines the unilateral power to declare
martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus, without
the approval of the Legislative power.
Under the Jones Law, this same power was vested in
the Governor General alone, because the legislative power
had been transferred to a Filipino-elected Legislature.
Naturally, Washington would not tie the hands of the U.S.
Governor-General to an action of the Legislature which
was completely in the hands of Filipinos. In vain did I
argue that the precedent provided by an Act of the U.S.
Congress to protect American authority should not be
followed when both the Executive and Legislative powers
would be in Filipino hands.23
The events of the Martial Law imposed in 1972 showed
that the fears that I expressed then, in opposing the grant
of unilateral power to the President to suspend the writ
and to declare martial law, were not hobgoblins conjured
out of thin air.
My fight for the establishment of a Committee on
Account in the legislative power, composed of a majority
of members of the opposition party, with powers to
investigate all the books and accounts of the government,
did not fare any better.
The proposal at first found great acceptance among
the delegates and was ably supported by Delegate Briones,
an eloquent parliamentarian who later became Senator,
a leader who had never until then been in opposition.
But Recto, who had always been in the opposition in
Congress, relinquished temporarily the chair of the
Convention and, for the first time, took to the floor to
argue against my proposal.24 This was high signal to the
delegates, even to those who had earlier found the
proposal to be acceptable, that Quezon was against it. As
a result, the proposal was killed.
The rejection of these two proposed provisions,
together with the amendment of two others which will
be discussed later, made a mockery of democracy in the
Philippines. Their disapproval, upon the instigation of
Quezon, constitutes his first disservice to the country in
matters affecting the Constitution.
Quezon elected President
The Constitution provided for a Commonwealth, a
transition government that was to be inaugurated
immediately; hence, national elections were held in 1935.
Osmeña decided to reunite the Nacionalista Party in
that historical moment of our nationhood. With Osmeña
as his Vice-President, Quezon became the first President
of the Commonwealth.
Quezon’s first concern was the defense of the
Philippines. He obtained the services of General Douglas
MacArthur as military adviser. Assisted by then Colonel
Dwight Eisenhower, MacArthur organized the Philippine
Army under a plan of defense that the U.S. Army had
been studying for years, and which was followed
substantially by the MacArthur-Eisenhower team.
It was a plan that was naturally kept secret, but not to
Quezon. After the war, it became known that it had two
alternatives, both envisioning retreat to the small peninsula
of Bataan, which faced to its southwest the island of
Corregidor. The latter was well fortified by the American
government, but Bataan itself was not.25
Quezon did what he could for the economic
development of the country with the organization of
several government corporations, particularly the National
Power Corporation and the National Development
Corporation, to develop water power, ocean shipping, and
a textile factory and the construction of major roads in
the Greater Manila area. The excise tax on Philippine oil
collected in the United States and which was returned to
the Philippine Government was of great assistance in
financing these projects.
On the whole, Quezon’s administration could not
provide lasting benefits in the areas mentioned, because
of the Japanese invasion at the end of the sixth year of
his administration.
Quezon’s second disservice
W hat were of lasting ill-effect were the two
constitutional amendments which Quezon obtained from
a subservient party and a mesmerized people. They
constitute his second disservice to the country on matters
affecting the Constitution.
The Constitution produced by the 1934-1935
Convention had provided for a presidential term of six
years without reelection. Quezon had this changed to a
term of four years with one allowable reelection, so that
he could have a total presidential term of office of eight
years instead of six.
The Constitution had provided for a unicameral
legislative system. Quezon had this changed to a bicameral
system, with the creation of the Philippine Senate whose
members would be elected by the whole electorate of the
country, although the candidates in practice were being
handpicked by the controlling leader of the party, Quezon,
who by then was leading the Nacionalista Party.
But he could exercise these prerogatives only once, at
the last election before the Second World War. Quezon
had succumbed to tuberculosis by the time the country
held its first post-war election.
The system of government
These two Quezon-sponsored amendments brought
about for the Philippines a system of government very
similar to that of the United States. It now had a bicameral
legislative system; a presidential form of government with
a President elected for four years, with only one reelection;
a judiciary that could declare laws unconstitutional; and
a government of checks and balances, with economic
power buying political power.
There existed a strong two-party system which did
not allow the emergence of a third party, because members
of Congress were elected in single-member con­
stituencies,26 and the system of proportional re­
presentation has not been adopted.27 We also had the
system of impeachment, although it was more difficult to
make it operative because of the larger majorities required
in the 1935 Constitution.28
Not only was our system of government similar to that
of the United States; it was also, to a great extent,
controlled by the United States. Since her occupation of
the Philippines at the turn of the century, Philippine
politics has been maneuvered by U.S. economic and
political power.
Quezon’s third confrontation with Osmena
Quezon’s term was to expire for the second time when
he was President-in-exile in Washington. Although he
was in the throes of death, Quezon enunciated the theory
that a governm ent-in-exile was not subject to a
Constitution which had been suspended by the Japanese
occupation.
Neither the legal luminaries in Washington nor
Osmena could accept this theory. But out of compassion
for a dying man, Osmena finally offered to give his consent
to a Resolution of the U.S. Congress allowing Quezon to
continue as the president until new elections could be
held.
 This Resolution extended Quezon’s terms for only a
few months. He died in the United States shortly before
MacArthur’s landing in Leyte.29
Chapter 6
Second double-cross
of an ally

The Philippines shunted aside

N
O ONE CAN deny the fact the Philippines became
an ally of the United States for the second time
when the U.S. went to war against Japan.
President Roosevelt gave the Philippine Government-
in-exile a seat in the Pacific War Council, which was
attended by the heads of states at war with Japan. Quezon
sat in that Council with Roosevelt and Churchill.
When the Japanese-American War ended, the United
States gave the Philippines the same shabby treatment
she had given her wartime ally 47 years earlier following
the Spanish-American War.
At the hour of triumph, at the surrender ceremonies
on the deck of the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay, Japan
officially capitulated before representatives of United
States, Great Britain, China, Russia, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the Netherlands, and France. The
Philippines was shunted aside; her wartime efforts were
not given any recognition by the United States during
that historic moment.30
This was just the beginning of a series of un­
conscionable decisions imposed by American vested
interests, who had the upper hand in Washington. Other
decisions were to come later which betrayed the promise
of independence to the Philippines through a series of
economic and military impositions on Philippine
sovereignty. These impositions made a farce of Philippine
independence.
Instead of fulfilling a promise, as expected of a
wartime ally, the United States instituted neo-economic
imperialism in the Philippines. It was a second edition
of the Platt Amendment for Cuba.
United States impositions on the Philippines
Osmena succeeded Quezon as President of the
Commonwealth when the latter died on August 1, 1944,
less than two months before MacArthur landed in Leyte
to begin the re-conquest of the Philippines.
As President, Osmena was invited to join MacArthur
in the historic landing. On February 27, 1945 the
Commonwealth government was reestablished in Manila.
Osmena did his best to revitalize the shattered
economy, but the United States conveniently forgot
American promises to indemnify the damages the
Filipinos suffered in a war that was not theirs but
America’s.
The United States reneged on MacArthur’s promise
to give Filipino soldiers serving in the United States Army
pay equal to those of the American soldiers, on the excuse
that it would disrupt wage and salary standards of the
Filipinos.
 The insufficient recognition of guerrillas and the
limited payment of war damages, serious as they were,
however, cannot compare with the damage caused by the
economic and military impositions that Washington made
on her former ally, who, before World War II, had been
promised complete independence.
The indifferent economic development of the county—
at least during the first two decades that followed the
grant of formal independence—was due to America’s
policy toward Japan and the Philippines. This policy was
the result of the Dodds Report, which Truman accepted,
and which had, as its objective, to make Japan the
industrial workshop of Asia and the Philippines a mere
supplier of raw materials.
We do not argue against the wisdom of providing Japan
with the means to rehabilitate herself and to allow her to
become an industrial country once again, although this
was contrary to the prior recommendation of a post-war
planning committee headed by Secretary Morgenthau, a
recommendation which was in line with the prevailing
sentiment at the end of the war. But certainly we can
argue against a policy that would make Japan the exclusive
industrialized country in the Far East, for such a policy
was most detrimental to the Philippines.
Indeed, the United States could not justify a policy
that provided all kinds of stumbling blocks to the
industrialization of her ally in the war against Japan. As a
result of this policy, industrialization in the Philippines
suffered severe setbacks and delay; efforts in this direction
started only during the administration of President Elpidio
Quirino, who took over after Roxas died, and this was
made possible only by a belated American toleration of
import and exchange controls.
Quezon’s last disservice
On top of that, the United States adopted a policy of
maintaining military bases in the Philippines, even after
she was granted her independence. Of course, it must be
admitted that the United States was not wholly to blame
for this.
It is sad to record at this point what I consider to be
another great disservice of Quezon—the last before his
death—to his country. Having been instrumental in the
elimination of the bases provision in the Tydings-
McDuffie Independence Act a few years earlier, he later
agreed, as President-in-exile in Washington, to have the
U.S. Congress approve a resolution providing for
American bases in the Philippines even after the war.
His action betrays all too clearly the fact that his
opposition to the first Independence Act was, as his critics
then pointed out, m otivated by purely personal
considerations.
The lessons from the wars
The lesson to be gained from the Japanese-American
War, together with the Japanese occupation of the
Philippines, as confirmed by the Vietnam experience, is
that American bases in the Far East are not a guarantee
of security against an invading Asian force of the caliber
ofJapan or China, or against any force supported by either
of them.
Therefore, to save democracy in our part of the world—
or all over the world, for that matter—military force is not
the answer. Neither the First World War (which resulted
in the victory of Communism in Russia), nor the Second
World War (which brought about Communism in China),
nor the Vietnam War, have saved Democracy for the world.
On the contrary, we have seen that wars breed
Communism and dictatorships.
End of Osmeña’s political career
Osmeña was President of the Commonwealth for a
period of 22 months, and this included a period of about
one month when he was already a lameduck President.
In the elections that took place on April 23, 1946, he
was defeated by Manuel Roxas. On May 28 of the same
year, Roxas was inaugurated the third President of the
Philippine Commonwealth. On July 4, the United States
proclaim ed, with cerem onies and on paper, the
independence of the country, and Roxas was proclaimed
the first President of the Second Republic of the
Philippines.
He thus succeeded to the office that Aguinaldo
occupied in a prior Republic that was destroyed by the
United States’ double-cross of an ally in war.
And this happened only because, although Osmeña
wanted the presidency, he would only have it without
having to cajole, bribe or deceive the people; he wanted
it given to him on the basis of his past record of patriotic
service that started in 1907, when he was elected Speaker
of the Philippine Assembly, not counting his prior
distinguished record as provincial fiscal and governor of
Cebu.
Osmeña lost the 1946 elections because the Filipino
people were beguiled by a young politician who promised
to all officials and employees of the government an
incentive that was called “back pay,” their salaries during
the entire period of the Japanese occupation of more
than three years.
In clear contrast with Roxas’s position, Osmeña had
declared that the national treasury was not in a position
to pay those salaries, for the national government had no
income during the said period. This stand of his made
his election difficult, but it was just like him that, during
his long public service, he never could sacrifice principles
for political expediency.
Roxas’s betrayal of his principles
Not so highly motivated was Manuel Roxas. Possessed
with a brilliant mind, he was a political protégé of Quezon,
from whom he learned his politics.
During the Japanese occupation, he had been forced
for a while to serve the occupation army. He had to go
through the motions of loyalty to the Japanese emperor.
But definitely his heart was not with the invaders. He
actually was involved in the underground movement
against Japan.
When World War II ended, Roxas decided that this
was his hour of destiny—his time to reach the pinnacle of
power in his country and the honor of being the first
President of the reborn Republic.
To this end, he was ready to betray the nationalist
pronouncements that distinguished him once upon a time
as the fighting Speaker and the founder of his New
Katipunan, which was to bring about the rebirth of the
society founded by Bonifacio.
When the Philippines was recaptured from Japan,
MacArthur gave Roxas a clean bill of health, and
announced that the returning American forces had
“liberated” him from the Japanese—thus setting him apart
from the other distinguished Filipino political leaders who
were “captured” by the American Army of liberation and
put in prison.31 The problem of collaboration was a very
delicate and difficult problem, but Osmena, in opposition
to the policies of Secretary Ickes of the United States,
handled it with tact and wisdom.
But Roxas needed more than the blessings of
MacArthur to win the presidency. He needed also the
blessings and support of the American High Com­
missioner, Paul V. McNutt, of high officials in Washington,
and of American businessmen in Manila, San Francisco
and New York.
American vested interests had earlier decided on a
plan that would negate the Independence Act which would
have restored to the Filipinos their sovereignty on July 4,
1946. Independence would become only a semblance of
the real thing, and this could be accomplished with a
series of treaties that would make the Philippines politically
independent on paper, but in reality an economic vassal
dependent on the United States. To all these treaties,
Roxas gave his agreement and his promise to sign them
immediately after the proclamation of Philippine
Independence.
I may state, in passing, that this arrangement, which
was already known to me then, so disgusted and depressed
me that I did not attend the ceremonies at the Rizal Park
to be a witness to what I considered to be a comic opera.
The treaty, popularly called the Bell Trade Agreement,
surrendered to the President of the United States
Philippine power of legislation affecting immigration,
tariff, currency, and credit. To the detriment of Philippine
products exported to the United States, it tied the foreign
exchange of the Philippine peso at the unrealistic rate of
two pesos to one U.S. dollar, at a time when, because of
the inflation produced by the war and the Japanese army
of occupation, one dollar was actually worth four pesos.
And this fixed rate of exchange was to last for a not-
inconsiderable period of 28 years.
In addition, President Roxas committed that the
country would amend its Constitution to grant Americans
a special privilege that came to be known as “parity rights,”
which had the effect of granting Americans the same
rights as the Filipinos in the exploitation of natural
resources and the operation of public utilities in the
Philippines.32These were actually the only two areas where
the Constitution of the Philippines required a 60%
minimum equity for nationals.
And in order to amend the Constitution, Roxas had
to resort to political legerdemain to annul the elections
of several municipalities in four provinces, with the end
in view of reducing the number of those who were known
to be against the resolution amending the Constitution
that was to be proposed in Congress.33
Osmeña’s disillusionment with the United States
Osmeña declared himself against these inordinate
demands of Washington, which had by this time come
under the control and influence of American vested
interests in the Philippines. This was to be his last stand
on a most basic national issue.
I can still recall the great sorrow and disappointment
felt by Osmeña in those days, when he saw all his labors
and dreams for the country destroyed by his successor,
the First President of a Republic on paper. Gone were his
dreams for complete and absolute independence.
History repeated itself
For the second time, a minority of selfish Americans
dominated the situation and prevailed over the latent
goodness of the greater majority of the American people.
Aguinaldo, who was still living in those days, did not
realize this second double-cross on the Philippines. He
reveled in the thought that, on that 4th day of July, 1946,
the verbal commitment that he had obtained from
Admiral Dewey had been at last vindicated.34
Chapter 7
Epilogue

T
HE AIM OF this book has been to provide the back­
ground for America’s past control and present
commanding influence over the Philippines, and
thus covers the very interesting story of the assurances
received by Aguinaldo from Commodore Dewey, who ac­
tually improvised a policy which, some 70 years later, was
to be the Nixon-Kissinger policy adopted to extricate the
U.S. from the holocaust that was Vietnam—in other words,
a policy of having the natives of the land fight America’s
wars.
Foreign to the title of this book, but included in it
nevertheless in order to provide continuity, is a study of
the period covering the leadership of the Osmeña-
Quezon team, which was subsequendy superseded by the
Quezon-Osmeña team; and likewise, the leadership of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention by the invincible
Quezon-Recto-Roxas team—a team, sad to say, that jetti­
soned democracy in the Philippines.35
This study has also aimed to cover, rather briefly, the
Filipino participation in the colonial government up to
the grant by the U.S. of the trappings of independence
to the Philippines in 1946, when the United States recti­
fied her ostensible relinquishment of sovereignty over the
Philippines by enacting and implementing the Bell Trade
Agreement, the Military Bases Agreement, and the Mili­
tary Technical Assistance Agreement.36These agreements
were extorted by a victorious and powerful United States
of America from a Philippines prostrate at the end of the
war, under a weak and captive Philippine president.37
I have also included in the book brief appraisals of
the real heroes of the Motherland. The quality of great
dedication and selflessness of our heroes in the past re­
veals the qualities of heroism that are latent in all our
countrymen.
As models of genuine heroism, we have, in my opin­
ion, three who were really outstanding. They were, in the
order of their appearance in our national history: José
Rizal, Emilio Aguinaldo, and Sergio Osmena. Unfortu­
nately, their work was frustrated by superior forces. Their
story constitutes the colonial odyssey of the Philippines.
But their patriotic efforts were not in vain, for they con­
tinue to inspire our people.
I CANNOT WRITE finis to this study on a purely negative
note on the United States. My father taught all of his 14
children to have faith in America. He had served
Aguinaldo in the establishment of the first Philippine Re­
public as a man of peace, but he refused to continue the
moment America’s intention to go to war against the Fili­
pino forces became inevitable.
Aguinaldo himself, in his memoirs, took the view that,
“More than a symbol, the Philippines is a living witness
to American philanthropy in international relations.
More than a ‘show window of Democracy in the East,’
a phrase by which it is often described, the Philippines
is the first beneficiary and witness to the fact that
 America, far from being the heir to European imperi­
alism, really started this ancient evil’s complete and
orderly liquidation.”
Aguinaldo went on to say that
“In the Philippines, the United States has committed
many errors. From Dewey to MacArthur, there have
been American acts which, if taken out of their con­
text and put together as authentic American policies,
could make Uncle Sam deservedly the most hated, the
most despised in the world. These mistakes have
spawned resentment, disappointment, and even war.
“But all in all, taking these mistakes together with the
impressive accomplishments, America’s record stands
out as an example of international magnanimity. While
there are indeed varied grounds for criticizing Ameri­
can policies and methods, the broad soundness, the
abiding honesty of purpose, and the ultimate worth of
America’s Philippine work cannot be questioned. It has
shown that there is in the American people, a depth of
goodness and humanity which, to my mind, is the great­
est hope of a world anxious to see the return of pros­
perity, peace, and security.”
Although I cannot subscribe to some of the sentiments
of Aguinaldo in his appraisal, which are all too laudatory
of America’s work in the Philippines, I have quoted them
only because they would seem to express, too, the senti­
ments of my father, Gregorio Araneta.38
I END THIS STUDY with by once more quoting the thoughts
of Aguinaldo—this time, on the subject of democracy.
These thoughts I make my own:
“One of the basic virtues of democracy is its power of
self-correction—although sometimes, the process takes a
terribly long time. Dictatorship, on the other hand, can­
not correct itself—except by total explosion and disinte­
gration. The freedom of discussion and the control of
public opinion (over the evils of government) enable de­
mocracy to purge itself eventually, emerging stronger from
the experience. But the evils of dictatorships can end only
if the regime is completely destroyed as were the reigns
of Mussolini and Hitler....
“...But democracy’s slow and lumbering pace, on one
hand, and susceptibility to propaganda on the other, are
nevertheless inherent weaknesses....”
This is the challenge to all people of goodwill through­
out the world today: to find the cure to these and other
inherent defects so that there will be no further betrayal
of democracy.
 Endnotes
Chapter 1
1. In his book The Effective Democracy for All, the author proposed
that the local autonomy of the ancient barangays be applied to
different contemporary levels, from the village (barrio), munici­
pality, province and on to the state level, ending in a semi-uni-
tary form of government. The state level in the Philippines would
be an innovation, consisting of three States: Luzon, the Visayas,
and Mindanao.
2. For further reference, read Readings in Philippine History by
Horacio de la Costa, S.J. (Bookmark, 1965), Relaciones de las Islas
Filipinos, The Philippines in 1660, by Pedro Chirino, S.J. (Histori­
cal Conservation Society, Spanish and English ed., 1969), and
The Christianization of the Philippines: Problems and Perspectives, by
Miguel Bernad, S.J. (1972).
Chapter 2
3. Most unfortunately, Bonifacio submitted himself to the Conven­
tion of Filipino Revolutionary leaders held at Tejeros, Cavite. I
quote from Emilio Aguinaldo’s memoirs, A Second Look at America,
the following extract:
“The Tejeros Convention was held at a time when I
could not leave the field, being hard-pressed by the
Spanish forces. Bonifacio and the other leaders were,
however, present. After considerable discussion, the Del­
egates decided to dissolve the Katipunan, which was
mainly a secret society patterned after Freemasonry in
organization and secret rituals, and to organize a revo­
lutionary government. Proceeding with the election of
new officers, they chose me as President and Genera­
lissimo...
“Defying the decision of the Convention over which
he (Bonifacio) had presided, he refused to recognize
the Revolutionary Government and its duly elected of­
ficers... He and his followers held another election, and
claiming to be the true government, began to act not
only independently of, but even with a certain mea­
sure of hostility against the Revolutionary Government.
Since a division of our ranks would have been fatal to
our cause, Bonifacio and his followers were arrested as
counterrevolutionaries. A court-martial condemned
the top leaders, including Bonifacio, to death.
“I should explain that, during all this trouble, the
Spaniards prosecuted the war against us with great ag­
gressiveness... With the Spaniards at our heels, I acted
fast. I issued an order commuting Bonifacio’s sentence
from death to ‘indefinite exile to a separate island’. 1
decided on this course because I did not want to spill
Filipino blood uselessly... I recognized, as did my col­
leagues, the invaluable service of Bonifacio in organiz­
ing the Katipunan. I was in hopes that... in the context
of his patriotic deeds, his error for which the court-
martial condemned him to die would also be forgiven.
“But now forces beyond my control came into play.
All my ranking subordinates led by Generals Mariano
Noriel and Pio del Pilar, were against my commutation
of Bonifacio’s death sentence and they pressed me to
withdraw it. I resisted them at first. I was chagrined
that they should thus disagree with my decision. But
they pointed out to me that Bonifacio’s act of defiance
was a most serious offense even in times of peace; that
in wartime, it was doubly condemnable. They main­
tained that as long as Bonifacio lived, there would be
Filipinos who would rally around him and with him,
defy the Revolutionary Government openly or secretly.
And if Bonifacio would manage to escape from exile,
he would be able to do us a great deal of damage. The
possibilities they mentioned ranged from my assassi­
nation by his agents, to joining forces with the Span­
iards... I had to yield. I withdrew my commutation or­
der.
“On the same day, the Spaniards marched against
Maragondon. The officer in command of our local
forces, upon learning of the imminent Spanish attack,
made his own fateful decision. Major General Noriel,
who had been himself the President of the Court Mar­
tial, handed a subordinate officer, Major Macapagal, a
sealed order. Verbally, he told him to gather a few sol­
diers, then take Bonifacio and the other prisoners to a
secluded mountainside and then open his order and
carry out its contents immediately. It turned out to be
an order to shoot the prisoners until dead.
 “...Investigation established the fact that General
Noriel had made his decision mainly on two grounds.
He had construed my withdrawal of my commutation
order as confirmation of the Court Martial’s decision.
On this matter, he was certainly hasty. It had been my
intention to delay my own final decision on Bonifacio
until my subordinates had cooled off... Noriel offered
another reason for his decision. The Spaniards were
about to attack and he feared the possibility of their
liberating Bonifacio and his men and taking them as
captives...
“While I deeply deplored Bonifacio’s loss, I could
not show weakness... Scholars who have studied the
docum ents and other evidences pertaining to
Bonifacio’s trial and death have found the procedure
which led to his death quite logical under the circum­
stances. Dean Maximo M. Kalaw, an authority on Phil­
ippine politics, has stated the following: ‘The revolu­
tionists could not afford to be divided. One of two
courses had to be taken: either the continuation of the
Katipunan Government under Bonifacio or the main­
tenance of the new Revolutionary Government under
Aguinaldo which had the support of the majority: The
Revolutionary Government was forced to eliminate
him.’
“This view is supported by the elder Teodoro M.
Kalaw, a noted scholar and former Director of the Na­
tional Library, T.H. Pardo de Tavera, and Clemente
Jose Zulueta.” (pp. 23-27).
For a well-rounded view of what really transpired at the Tejeros
Convention, the reader is invited to read The Philippine Revolu­
tion, by Artemio Ricarte; Revolt of the Masses, by Teodoro
Agoncillo; The Philippines: A Past Revisited, by Renato Constantino;
The Philippine Insurrection Against The United States, by John R.
Taylor, edited by Renato Constantino, published by the Eugenio
Lopez Foundation, Manila, 1972.
4. See The Philippines: A Past Revisited, supra, on the checkered
career of Paterno during the Spanish occupation, the Philip-
pine-American war (he was elected President of the Malolos
Congress), and the American occupation.
5. See Aguinaldo’s description of the fortunes of the war of inde­
pendence against Spain under his command (op. cit., supra, pp.
27, 28).
6. Ibid. Chapter III, pp. 29-39.
Chapter 3
7. It was the view of Prof. James of Harvard University, at that
time, that the American war against Spain and, later, the deci­
sion to occupy and retain possession of the entire Philippines
were promoted to a great extent by the “yellow press” in America
in their efforts to sensationalize the news and increase their re­
spective circulations. Particularly responsible were two chains of
papers, one in the West and one in the East. McKinley, however,
explained to a group of Protestant ministers that his decision to
demand sovereignty over the Philippines was a “heavenly inspi­
ration.” The “heavenly message” summarized four alternatives
of McKinley, to wit:
(a) to return the Philippines to Spain —this was “cowardly and
dishonorable”;
(b) to give them to France or Germany, America’s rivals in the
Orient—that would be “bad business and discreditable”;
(c) to give the Filipinos independence—they were unfit for self-
government.
(d) and, therefore, “there was nothing left for us but to take
them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize
and Christianize them, and by God’s grace, do the very best
we could by them, as our fellow men for whom Christ also
died. And then I went to bed and went to sleep and slept
soundly.” (Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, p. 65. See also footnote
16 as to the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government at
that time.)
8. Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, pp. 84-91.
9. Ibid, p. 66.
10. For more details on the subjects see Chapter IV, V, and VI of
Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, pp. 40-81.
11. Ibid, p. 66. The quotation comes from Walter Mills, The Martial
Spirit: A Study of Our War With Spain, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Boston and New York (1931) P. 225.
12. Ibid, P. 61.
13. The phrase was used by the historian, Walter Mills, referring to
Dewey’s decision to ask the assistance of Aguinaldo.
14. Daniel Schirmer, From Republic to Empire, op. cit., supra, p. 95.
15. On the state of education of the Filipinos in 1898, we have the
view of Dewey himself who said in his cable to the Secretary of
the Navy on June 23, 1898: “In my opinion, these people are
superior in intelligence and more capable of self-government
than the natives of Cuba.” (Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, p. 55).
Chapter 4
16. Schirmer, op. cit., supra, p. 229.
17. See Jose P. Rizal’s essay, The Philippines A Century Hence.
18. Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, p. 99, in which Aguinaldo refers to
and quotes a paragraph “from the book on the Philippines of
former Governor-General Forbes” (W. Cameron Forbes, The
Philippine Islands, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston and New York
(1928) Vol. I, p. 90.
19. Schirmer, op. cit., supra, pp. 122-123.
20. Ibid., p. 125
Chapter 5
21. Both Osmeña and Quezon had very colorful records as Provin­
cial Fiscals and Governors of their respective provinces, Cebu
and Tayabas. Concerning Osmeña’s record, see his biography,
Sergio Osmeña, in two volumes by Vicente Albano Pacis, published
by the Philippine Constitution Association, Araneta University
Research Foundation, and President Sergio Osmeña Memorial
Foundation, Phoenix Press, Inc., Quezon City (1971), Vol. 1, pp.
48-87. Concerning Quezon’s record, see his biography, Quezon,
Paladin of Philippine Freedom, by Carlos Quirino, Filipinas Book
Guild, Manila, Vol. I. XVIII (1971), pp. 71-77.
22. After his stint as the first Civil Governor of the Philippines, and
later Secretary of War (the Department that had supervision
over the Philippines as a colony) Taft became the choice of Presi­
dent Theodore Roosevelt to succeed him and he was elected
President of the United States for a term of four years. He was
succeeded by President Wilson. Later, he was appointed Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
He was a close friend of the author’s father, Don Gregorio
Araneta, and they died on the same day in 1930. Incidentally,
the Philippines was the training ground for many Americans in
the public service. Such personalities as General “Black Jack”
 Pershing, General Douglas MacArthur, President Dwight
Eisenhower, Secretary Henry Stimson and Justice Frank Murphy
saw service in the Philippines.
23. See The Philippine Constitution, Philippine Lawyers Association
edition, Volume V, pp. 428-480.
24. See Proceedingsfor the Constitutional Convention, byjose P. Laurel.
25. The problem that concerned many thinking Filipinos at that time,
the author among them, was the Japanese menace to the Philip­
pines. Not being privy to the defense plans of the War Depart­
ment, which admitted a collapse of the Philippine-American
Army in the end, they believed that the American flag over the
Philippines was her best defense. When Commissioner Paul V.
McNutt advocated the reexamination of complete independence
scheduled to take effect after the 10-year Commonwealth Gov­
ernment, and instead, advocated what we understood to be rela­
tions with the United States similar to that of Canada with Great
Britain, a group of prominent Filipinos, which included Assem­
blyman José Romero and Assemblyman Narciso Ramos. The au­
thor came out publicly in support of the reexamination move­
ment advocated by Commissioner McNutt. But the group acted
in consultation with President Quezon, with whom it had two
long conferences. The author has kept an aide mémoire on those
two conferences. President Quezon promised not to attack the
movement as long as they advocated a system akin to that which
Canada had with Great Britain. However, he said that Ameri­
cans would not understand such a system and be unwilling to
grant the same to the Philippines.
With the experience the Filipinos had during the war, which
showed America’s inability to defend the Philippines from an
army of occupation, and the experience of Vietnam, this author
is now against the establishment, or continuation, of military,
naval or air bases of any foreign country in the Philippines.
26. In a single-member constituency, the elector votes for only one
officer of a kind—a President, a Senator, a Congressman, a Gov­
ernor, a Mayor, etc. In a multi-member constituency, the elector
votes for two or more officers of a kind, say, senators, congress­
men, councilors. The constituency in the latter case is generally
bigger than in a single-member constituency. Thus the city coun­
cilors in a city may all be elected by the endre electorate of the
city, or the city could be divided into separate councilor dis­
tricts, and each district assigned to elect only one councilor. The
experience in the Philippines has been that, in a single-member
constituency, the elector is not inclined to waste his vote by vot­
 ing for the candidate of a new party, for he knows that only the
candidates of the two well-entrenched parties are the ones with
a chance to win. The result is that candidates of a third party
generally do not win an election. On the other hand, if congress­
men were to be elected by provinces —not by congressional dis­
tricts into which the province would be divided, one congress­
man per district —candidates of a third party have greater chances
of being elected. The elector would be more inclined to cross
party lines, as he could vote for more than one candidate.
27. In the Philippines, the two big parties, the majority and the larg­
est minority party, were given by law the right to appoint one
inspector each for the canvassing of the voting and the counting
of the election results. These inspectors, paid by the Govern­
ment, became leaders of their respective parties before the elec­
tion day and helped in campaigning for the candidate of their
respective parties. This was a very great advantage given to the
two established parties, thus promoting the two-party system.
28. The Philippine Constitution of 1935 required the vote of two-
thirds of the members of the House to institute an impeach­
ment proceeding, while only an absolute majority is required in
its U.S. counterpart. The Philippine Constitution required the
vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate to find the
impeached officer guilty, while only a vote of two-thirds is re­
quired in the U.S. Senate.
29. For a description of the last days of Quezon, see his biography
by Carlos Quirino, supra, pp. 375-385.
Chapter 6
30. In October 1943, when President Quezon, then in exile in the
U.S. because of the Pacific war, tried to secure from President
Roosevelt some reassuring statement regarding Philippine inde­
pendence, Roosevelt’s flattering but evasive reply was: “As far as
the executive branch of the American government is concerned,
because of the splendid resistance put up by the Filipinos against
the common enemy, I consider the Philippines as a sovereign
country and the Commonwealth Government as an indepen­
dent entity.” (Carlos Quirino, op. cit., supra, p. 374).
31. This distinction between the “liberated” and the “captured” ap­
peared in the Free Philippines, the official organ of the
AFWESPAC, issue of April 18, 1945. The United States decision
to anoint Manuel Roxas was started many years ahead of the
event by the planners in Washington. Osmena was in Washing­
ton during the Japanese occupation, and was well known to be a
 man of principles. He was the father of the slogan demanding
“complete, absolute and immediate independence.” But he was
also getting old. So the objective of U.S. imperialism was to make
Roxas, at the start of his political career Quezon’s protege the
first President of the Republic.
32. In December, 1945, U.S. military leaders sought from Roxas a
pledge to re-examine Philippine independence. He agreed to
do so, on condition that he announce it only after his elevation
to the Presidency. On April 30, 1946, seven days after his elec­
tion, he witnessed in Washington the signing by the President of
the United States of the companion bills just approved by Con­
gress —the Bell Trade Act and the Philippine War Damage Act.
The first Act directed the President of the United States to se­
cure parity rights for U.S. nationals and corporations in the Phil­
ippines. The second Act assured war damage payment in the
Philippines upon fulfillment of the condition that the Philip­
pine Congress adopt a resolution amending the Constitution to
allow the grant of parity rights to Americans, and that the people
approve it in a plebiscite. It was reported that Roxas, the Presi­
dent-elect, initiated drafts of over a dozen US-PI agreements,
including the Bases Agreement in the Philippines, which would
ostensibly be “negotiated” as soon as he formally assumed of­
fice.
33. To make good his commitments to the American leaders, Roxas
had to use high-handed tactics for the purpose of pushing
through the amendment of the Constitution. He maneuvered
both Houses of Congress into declaring as invalid the election
of known opponents of the “parity amendment” and to certify,
albeit falsely, that the Congressional resolution to amend the
Constitution received the required 3/4 majority vote. When the
question was brought to the Supreme Court in the case of
Mabanag, et al vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (78 Phil. 1, March 5, 1947), the
high tribunal declined to pass squarely on the issue of whether
the 3/4 majority vote should be based on the total membership
of Congress, as stated in the Constitution, or the total of validly-
elected members, and instead decided for Roxas by conveniently
applying the “enrolled bill rule” giving full faith to the certifica­
tion of the two Heads of both Houses that it actually received
the 3/4 vote. Thus, the way was paved for the submission of the
amendment to a plebiscite on March 11, 1947. Except for the
President himself, hardly any of his party leaders campaigned
for the Parity Resolution. They preferred not to support an un­
popular cause.
 The author of this book took direct issue with the arguments
submitted by President Roxas at a convention of the student
body of the University of the Philippines. His piece, entitled “Pre­
cepts We Can Not Surrender”, was printed in the January 1947
issue of the Philippine Journal of Education, and was the basis
of his speech before the Rotary Club in the same month. (See
Economic Re-examination, by the author, published by the Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, 1953, pp. 95-129.)
It is generally believed that, in the provinces controlled by Roxas’
Liberal Party, the order was issued that ballots not used were to
be filled up with “Yes” votes. Thus, without the will of the Con­
gress and the electorate, the Filipino people were saddled with
Parity rights for Americans for 28 years. Within the purview of
this study, we cannot, even if we are disposed to, elaborate on
the disastrous effects of this great disservice of Manuel A. Roxas,
the first President of the Second Republic of the Philippines, to
his people, in setting the precedent for the perversion of the
Constitution.
34. Aguinaldo, op. cit., supra, p. 17.
Chapter 7
35. If we consider democracy, in the strictest sense, as the power of
the people, it can be said that the Philippines has never been a
democracy. The Philippines became a political unit under Span­
ish domination, when Spain was at the height of her power. De­
spite the herculean efforts of Aguinaldo to set it up, the first
Philippine Republic was short-lived; after a few months of exist­
ence it was reduced to being a government pursued by the mili­
tary power of the United States, to which Spain had ceded her
authority. And even the democracy that Aguinaldo envisioned
for the Philippines was supposed to be under United States pro­
tection. It must, therefore, be understood that the word “de­
mocracy” as used in these end notes and generally throughout
this book carries its meaning in the domestic sense, which, after
all, is the meaning that has the greatest application, under
present-day realities. If indeed there is no democracy, in the
very strict sense, in a country that does not have full unham­
pered sovereignty, very few countries can be said to enjoy genu­
ine democracy. It may serve us well to bear in mind that a dis­
tinction should be made between a democracy that is defective
due to outside pressures and a democracy that is defective due
to internal deficiencies and structures.
36. But we have not analyzed in this study the necessary role of true,
real, effective independence in its relation to national growth
and development. Indigenous power, i.e., effective political in­
dependence, is what gives a people the real ability to make deci­
sions on their own -correct or wrong decisions, but in all cases,
theirs alone. Where that capability or power belongs to another,
the decision -or even the views- of the alien influence will pre­
vail, and most likely, such decisions and views are for the benefit
of the latter. This explains why in the Philippines, industrializa­
tion was underrated by the American advisers, and we were told
not to establish industries that required the importation of raw
materials, such as the wheat flour milling and the textile indus­
tries. An effective effort was made under President Elpidio
Quirino to overcome American influence in this respect, but
this effort was slowed down under President Ramon Magsaysay
who was an American creation. A renewal of this effort was at­
tempted under President Carlos P. Garcia, only to be nullified
under President Diosdado Macapagal who nullified all import
controls. This and other subjects have been omitted from this
study because this book was not meant to cover the entire pe­
riod of Philippine-American relations or the economic history
of the Philippines.
37. Before the war, the author was for the re-examination of the
plan of complete independence, favoring, instead, that of a Do­
minion form of government, similar to the status of Canada within
the British Commonwealth of Nations. He was one of the lead­
ers of a movement which had two conferences with President
Manuel L. Quezon. The author voiced in public what Quezon
could only voice in private: that he was in favor of the Dominion
form of government, in the wrong belief that the American flag
would protect the Philippines from Japan. But as it turned out,
the American flag provided no protection from ajapanese occu­
pation that lasted three years. The author did raise his voice
against continuation of American bases even after independence,
as well as against other treaties signed by President Manuel A.
Roxas which required the ratification of the Congress of the
Philippines, on the grounds that this necessitated amending our
Constitution.
38. The author’s father, Don Gregorio Araneta, was elected First
Secretary of the Malolos Congress in 1899. See Renato
Constantino’s The Philippines: The Past Revisited, supra, p.211.
 Editor’s Postscript

SALVADOR A ranet A was a prolific writer. Americas Double-

Cross of the Philippines was one of his last works, written
when he was in self-exile, and with an earnest purpose:
to make a generation that had grown up under the pro­
paganda machine of the New Society realize that democ­
racy was not, as Ferdinand Marcos and his apologists had
insisted, a fetish; and show that depriving the Filipinos of
their democratic government could only have been made
possible by the United States’s role as accomplice in the
assassination of democracy. Araneta saw the tacit approval
of the imposition of martial law as part of a historical
pattern in which America’s avowed mission to institute
democratic government in the Philippines always foun­
dered when faced with the imperatives of American
realpolitik.
This new edition has been published with this objec­
tive in mind—to educate a new generation as to the
author’s belief in the unfortunate, cyclical nature of Phil­
ippine history. The publisher, in turn, believes that
Araneta’s message is particularly relevant at the present
time, with the renewed debate on the nature of Philip­
pine sovereignty precipitated by the Visiting Forces Agree­
ment.
This edition, however, reflects my decision as editor
to alter the manuscript in order to make it more compact
and thus useful and relevant to the lay reader. Minor de­
letions and changes involving points of style have been
made with the author’s original purpose and points in
mind; none of his arguments have been altered in any
way. It is my hope that the changes will be judged true to
the spirit in which the work was written, and I willfully
assume responsibility for the cosmetic changes thus made.
Araneta pulled no punches in his book, and was un­
afraid to criticize people he counted as his friends: he
was that rare Filipino: a man who did not let private friend­
ship intrude into what he saw as his public and intellec­
tual duties to his country and to posterity.
A t THE END of one’s life, one is judged by the extent of
one’s resume. Salvador Araneta, had he been the kind of
man inclined toward bragging about his achievements,
could have boasted that his resume listed accomplishments
in many and varied lines of endeavor. A lawyer with de­
grees from the University of Sto. Tomas and Fordham
(1946), Araneta was also a pioneer in industry. His Far
Eastern Air Transport Inc. (Feati) was the first local air­
line, after the war, to operate all over the Philippines and
to other Asian countries and the United States. He set
up Feati Industries in 1957 to manufacture electronic mo­
tors under license from Associated Electric Industries,
the biggest English manufacturer of electrical machin­
ery; Republic Flour Mills, which has grown to be one of
the country’s biggest and most diversified conglomerates,
also in 1957; Biochemical Laboratories, a research labo­
ratory for the manufacturing of medicine for animals in
1959; Aia Feeds (1963), the first financially viable extrac­
tion plant for the manufacture of animal feeds from soy­
beans; Premiere Paper (1964), the first plant of its kind
in the Philippines for the manufacture of cigarette pa­
per; Republic Soya (1965), also the first plant of its kind
using soybean oil as a raw material. His Araneta Pulp and
Paper (1971), designed to use all wood waste in forest
areas and locally grown pine trees (which grow 4 to 5
times faster in the Philippines than in Norway and Swe­
den), was taken over by a Marcos crony.
In education, he was the founder of Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation and Feati University; in the realm
of public service, he served as a delegate to the 1934 and
1971 Constitutional Conventions, as a cabinet officer to
Presidents Quirino and Magsaysay, and was a guiding force
in the creation of the Philippine Constitutional Associa­
tion. Such was his prestige that Araneta was invited twice
to run as President of the Philippines, but he declined,
wishing instead to devote his time to pioneering ventures.
This is what Araneta should be remembered as
having been, first and foremost: a pioneer. He devoted
his intelligence and wealth toward the pursuit of a vision.
Few are the men who have been so sincere in the fulfill­
ment of what they have preached.
Manuel L. Quezon III
New Manila, Quezon City
January 6, 1999
Appendix:
Notes on the anti­
imperialist movement
in the United States
HE MEMORIES OF the Civil War were still fresh in
the minds of many Americans when
the American-Spanish War took place at the end
of the nineteenth century. The North in particular, con­
tinued to be mindful of the tradition of opposition to
slavery, against the slave-holding doctrine which pro­
claimed the superiority of the white race over the black.
When the problem of the Philippines and Puerto Rico
was being debated in the press of America, Moorefield
Storey, a Boston lawyer of national standing and leader
of the campaign against the U.S.’s war atrocities in the
Philippines, calling in mind the congressional pledge of
independence for Cuba, asked this question: “Do these
words, these solemn promises, mean something? To say
that we mean only Cuba, and no other territory of Spain,
is to construe a great public document as if it were a
criminal indictment” (that is, a document in which accu­
sations were to be specifically stated and not just con­
demned by inference). He concluded that if America were
to take Puerto Rico (or the Philippines, for that matter)
“not by will of its citizens but by grant from Spain... one
oppressor succeeds another, and the people whose liber­
ties we interfered to defend are not consulted either.”
 Professor Daniel B. Schirmer, in his exhaustive book,
“Republic or Empire” depicting the story of the resis­
tance by a group of anti-imperialists to the Philippine
War, observes that Storey’s argument “was unanswerable
in the light of the democratic principle of majority rule
and self-determination of nations.” And he noted that
“the imperialists did not attempt to answer it on these
grounds. They retreated to white racism, the legacy of
the defeated slave owners,” with this kind of argument:
“Supremacy in the world appears to be the destiny of the
race to which we belong... (the U.S.) is the most compe­
tent governor of inferior races... the clear path of duty
for us appears to be to bring to the people of the Spanish
islands in the Pacific and the Adantic an opportunity to
rise from misery and hopelessness to a promise of just
government and commercial success.”
This was in essence the slave-holding doctrine, merely—
as Schirmer points out—“freshened up with Puritan cant
about duty, and extended to the world at large.” And he
adds: “Apparendy conservative newspapers were accurate
in attributing to the Spanish war and foreign expansion
the final reconciliation of the former Confederate States
with those that had supported the Union” (Ibid., pp. 88,
89).
T h is , TO ME, is the most plausible explanation as to why
the Anti-Imperialist League, which saw its birth in Bos­
ton and which for a few years at least became a national
movement, lost the fight.
It had eminent national supporters which included
Harvard professors, Mayflower descendants, progressive
proponents of labor reforms, Protestant ministers, cham­
pions of civil rights, people who sympathized with Irish
nationalists and were of Irish descent, friends and associ­
ates of Abraham Lincoln, journalists and supporters of
the abolition of the slave trade, middle-class reformers,
intellectuals, a few businessmen which at times included
Andrew Carnegie, some labor leaders, and a good num­
ber of congressmen and senators. Yet at the moment that
their support counted most, the Democratic Party and
its presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan, and
many Democratic senators voted for the ratification of
the Treaty of Peace with Spain.
The anti-imperialists did not lose for lack of informa­
tion about true conditions in the Philippines. Their fight
was on several fronts. It included the fight against in­
volvement in Cuba, and a war against Spain, during which
the pro-war advocates enunciated for the first time their
belief that “War is prosperity”: a view which the anti-im­
perialists branded as “The Political Economy of Barbar­
ism” (Ibid., Chapter 4). It included speaking up in sup­
port of Aguinaldo and denouncing their own government
for “betraying its Filipino allies” (Ibid., p. 71). During these
debates, they accused the imperialists of being supported
by the great commercial trusts and monopolies which
“are learning more and more that they have only to bring
together sufficient money power to work their will with
Congress” (Ibid., p. 77). It continued with the fight pro­
voked by the announcement of President McKinley of
his decision to annex the entire Archipelago, made eight
days before the mid-November election of 1900.
On the day of the election, the Boston Evening Tran­
script carried an advertisement signed by 18 prominent
anti-imperialists calling upon the voters to reject all can­
didates supporting Philippine annexation, a “new and
dangerous policy” (Ibid., p. 98). The vote in the entire
country was in favor of the administration.
McKinley proved to be an able politician. While he
had decided upon his policy of annexation much earlier,
he made the announcement only eight days before the
election, so as not to give time to the anti-imperialists to
make a big issue of the Philippine case. Thus, after the
election, the impression was that the country had voted
in favor of the annexation of the Philippines.
 After the elections, the anti-imperialists in Boston for­
mally organized the League. They chose former Lincoln
appointee and past Massachusetts governor, George
Boutwell, as president; a Union Army General, Francis
A. Osborn, treasurer, and Edwin Winslow, secretary. They
had a long list of vice-presidents, including the steel mag­
nate, Andrew Carnegie, who sent in a check for $1,000,
and noted labor leader, Samuel Gompers (president of
the American Federation of Labor) who had spoken
against the Spanish war before its outbreak. The key to
the organization was an executive committee of some ten
members who met twice a week (Ibid., p. 99).
The anti-imperialist fight against ratification of the
peace treaty
Schirmer remarks that the League was faced with “the
heavy task of overturning national policies that had the
support of powerful business interests and considerable
popular endorsement.” The organization turned out to
be a dynamic body. From all over the country, men who
had seen press accounts of the Boston organization wrote
in to ask for suggestions to form branch leagues (Ibid., p.
100).
Popular opinion was much divided. For example, in
Boston, the Merchants Association passed a resolution
against annexation, except for a naval station, while the
textile and shoe manufacturers supported annexation. The
Republican imperialist candidate for the Lower House of
Congress from Massachusetts lost and yet Senator Lodge,
was from the same state; his fellow Republican from Mas­
sachusetts, Senator George Hoar, though, was against
annexation.
The League was most active in its opposition to the
ratification of the Treaty of Paris, but independent of
the League, Senator Hoar was the one who turned out to
be the most active exponent of non-ratification. The good
Senator took this position as a matter of principle. Ar­
rayed with him against annexation were other regular
Republicans of the Civil War generation, notably Hoar’s
close associate, William Draper, who had been a Union
General. But partisan political and personal ambitions
interfered with the attitude of some prominent Demo­
crats, who helped ratify the treaty.
T h e IMPORTANT POINT to stress is that events in the Phil­
ippines were followed very closely in the Congress of the
United States.
During the deliberations in the Senate on the ratifica­
tion of the Treaty, Iloilo was occupied by the Army of the
Philippine Republic, and the Spanish forces having fled.
Schirmer described the Philippine-American encounter
in Iloilo and its repercussions in America as follows:
“The argument for American occupation of Iloilo was
the same as that used at Manila: it was necessary to
prevent lawlessness. But the (American) press reported
that after the occupation of Iloilo, the insurgents ‘im­
mediately established a municipal government and
placed guards over foreign property’. There was some
looting at night, but five of those guilty were shot, ‘which
had an exemplary effect on the rest’.
“The insurgents refused to give permission to the
American troops to land in force. So the United States
soldiers remained on board ship in the harbor of Iloilo,
even after it was clear that they were not needed to
‘prevent lawlessness’. This gave credence to the anti­
imperialist charge that the real reason the Administra­
tion had sent troops to Iloilo was to check the insur­
gents and overawe their desire for independence.”
Prof. Schirmer comments that “although Spain had
signed the treaty, the United States Senate had not yet
ratified it, so that from the constitutional standpoint alone,
McKinley’s assertion of sovereignty was arbitrary and with­
out foundation, and speakers at a meeting of the Boston
Merchants Association expressed alarm at the way the
Philippine issue ‘was being driven along without due con­
sideration by the representatives of the people’. Similarly,
Moorefield Storey wrote Senator Hoar that the threat of
American military force at Iloilo was without constitu­
tional authority since Congress had declared war against
Spain, not the Filipinos” (Ibid, p. 113). McKinley decided
on “going slow at Iloilo” and advised his commanders in
Manila that conflict in the Philippines would be “most
unfortunate” and advised: “Tact and kindness [are] most
essential just now.”
At the end of December, the League suggested to
Senator Hoar that the vote on the treaty be postponed
up till the next session of the Senate. The League’s Secre­
tary went to Washington to lobby against ratification, and
obtained from Gompers and other trade union leaders
assurances that they would use their influence against
the treaty. He told the leading Senators who were against
the Treaty (Hoar, Pettigrew and Gorman, the spokesman
for the Democratic Party in the Senate) that sentiment
against the Treaty was rising in the country particularly
in the West, and that the longer the vote was put off, the
more opposition could crystallize.
N o t SINCE THE impeachment proceedings against Presi­
dent Andrew Johnson was so much public interest
aroused, nor has there been such a hard-fought contest
in the Senate as that surrounding the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris. It was a close vote, with only one vote to
spare. It was a case where high principles lost and materi­
alism won. There were several causes for this debacle:
1. Senator Hoar, a close friend of President McKinley,
acting as the spokesman of the anti-imperialist movement,
and also as a good member of the Republican Party, spoke:
 “of the anti-slavery days, and he warned the Ameri­
cans that their nation, having just risen to abolish sla­
very, was now asked to accept the principle ‘that it is
right to conquer, buy and subject a whole nation if we
happen to deem it for their own good.’ Invoking
Abraham Lincoln’s words that ‘No man was ever cre­
ated good enough to own another,’ Hoar declared, ‘No
nation was ever created good enough to own another.’
He attacked President McKinley by contrasting his past
condemnation of ‘forcible annexation’ as ‘criminal ag­
gression’ with his present policies, thus exposing what
the anti-imperialist saw as his duplicity. In another com­
pelling passage, he reminded his audience of the great
picture of the signing of the Declaration of Indepen­
dence that hang in the Capitol building and suggested
that this painting be turned over its face to the wall. In
its place, Hoar said, should be hung ‘a representation
of some great battle where the guns of our army and
navy are turned on the men struggling for their liberty
at Iloilo.’”
This magnificent presentation lost some relevance with
half-true statements by Senator Foraker, from McKinley’s
own state of Ohio and generally considered a presiden­
tial spokesman, when he spoke for ratification. He said
that McKinley “did not contemplate a permanent annex­
ation of the Philippines, and with a straight face, said
that ‘no one, so far as I am able to learn, is preparing by
force and violence to hold them...’”
This was not confirmed by later events. There now
appeared in the press something about a civilian com­
mission the President had appointed to visit the Philip­
pines and advise him on policy. On his part, Senator Lodge
argued that the Treaty would not commit the country to
permanent annexation, but would bring peace. For some
time, the Treaty had hung, with the senators wavering
and indecisive, in the balance. Only a few weeks remained
in the current session in Congress which was due to ad­
journ March 4. Many pressing matters of legislation were
still pending, including the bill to increase the standing
army to 100,000 men in order to provide fresh troops for
the Philippines. Senator Hoar proposed an amendment
declaring the United States’ intention to free the Philip­
pine after treaty ratification. But the President announced
that he wanted the treaty passed without amendment.
And Senator Gorman, who was supposed to be the anti­
imperialist leader of the Democratic Party, made an ef­
fort to line up the Democrats against making any amend­
ments. His misleadership was called “deliberate and ve­
nal” (Ibid., p. 120).
McKinley ordered the high command in Manila to go
slow in the Iloilo incident, but just two days before the
date set for the vote on the Paris treaty, with the green
light having been given by McKinley, American troops
attacked Philippine sentries and killed them in an area
which was Philippine-occupied territory. McKinley falsely
proclaimed that the Filipinos had provoked the attack.
This was another case of the jingoism reflected in slo­
gans such as “Remember the Maine” which had helped
precipitate the war against Spain!
The influence and able maneuvering of President
McKinley was the first cause of defeat, which included
the purchase, with patronage, of the votes of two Demo­
cratic senators (Ibid., p. 122).
2. The second cause was the shameful and tremen­
dous pressure applied by railroad and commercial inter­
ests on Senators and, it was implied, from many other
sources, with actual money paid by business interests of
New York.
Lodge himself declared: “There is not an issue today
in American politics. You cannot throw an issue in them
because it turns to money when it strikes” (Ibid., p. 120).
On the day before the vote, Senator Pettigrew, a Re­
publican from South Dakota, complained to Senator Davis,
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
against “the open purchase of votes to ratify this treaty
right on the floor of the Senate and before the eyes of
the Senators and all the world.”
“Pettigrew charged and Gorman hinted that business
pressure took the form of outright purchase of votes, and
this was widely rumored in Washington at the time of the
treaty passage” (Ibid., pp. 123, 124).
3. The third cause for the defeat of high principle was
pressure from the military. At that time “the Army was
for expansion and war, the navy even more so.” Schirmer
in his book enumerates facts and documents which prove
that the attack was well planned by the American high
command, reflecting a change of policy in Washington,
all in line with the over-all need to insure the passage of
the Treaty. And what is revealing is that even the Presi­
dent of the United States wilfully gave statements that
were entirely against what he knew to be the facts (Ibid.,
pp. 125-150). Professor Schirmer gives the following analy­
sis:
“It is possible that the Administration opened the way
to conflict with more than one eventuality in mind.
On February 4, a ‘prominent Republican Senator’ told
O’Brien of the Transcript (Boston Evening) that should
the treaty be defeated, ‘we shall then have to go ahead
and... take actual possession of the Philippines Islands,
and if Aguinaldo gets to the way, to push him out of it.
If this indeed represented the opinion of the Adminis­
tration, then it may be that the decision to unleash
Otis (give him the green light to attack) was taken with
an eye to the possibility of treaty defeat as well as treaty
victory. In any case, hostilities could not have been bet­
ter timed from the Administration standpoint —com­
ing too late to arouse effective popular opposition to
the treaty, but just in time to put effective pressure on
the Senate for its passage” (Ibid., p. 132).
 4. Just before the vote was taken, the Senate was pre­
sented with a Memorial in opposition to ratification, which
was signed by an imposing list of public figures, includ­
ing ex-President Cleveland, former Secretary of the Trea­
sury John G. Carlisle, Andrew Carnegie, President Charles
W. Eliot of Harvard University, Charles Francis Adams,
Carl Schurz, Samuel Gompers, Moorefield Storey, and
eighteen other men of prominence. It was, like the pro­
tests of labor and farmers and the rest of the anti-imperi­
alist campaign against the treaty, to no avail.
Both parties must be held responsible for the passage
of the treaty, “with the Republicans carrying the major
burden.” Both were incapable of resisting the pressure of
big business and its allied military interests. Only 29 votes
opposed the treaty, five of them Republicans. As many as
11 Democrats voted to ratify the Treaty, when originally
only four were expected to do so. “The pressure gener­
ated by industry, the military, by partisan and personal
interests proved too great, the atmosphere of racism and
chauvinism too pervasive” (Ibid., p. 123).
But the campaign of the anti-imperialists helped start
the evolution of a policy that mandated that annexation
was to be only a temporary matter.
The anti-imperialist fight against the Philippine war
The day following the Senate vote of ratification of
the Treaty, the Springfield Republican issue of February
7,1899, said that the question of annexation was still open
and could be reversed by public discussion. It advocated
that the United States should stop fighting and open ne­
gotiations with “the Filipino insurgents” and proclaim its
policy to be one aimed at establishing a self-governing
State and then withdraw.
The Amti-Imperialists, in a general meeting, demanded
the immediate suspension of hostilities in the Philippines,
and a congressional pledge of independence to the is­
lands (Boston Evening Transcript, February 10, 1899). In
the late winter and early spring of 1899, the Anti-Imperi­
alist League held mass meetings, helping establish local
branches, and issue printed materials in great quantity.
President McKinley at that time visited the cradle of
anti-imperialism, Boston, “in the nature of a triumphant
procession.” W.B. Plunkett, the wealthy Massachusetts
textile manufacturer, organized a banquet in honor of
the President which took place on February 16, “the larg­
est banquet in the country’s history, with 1,914 diners,
400 waiters, 12,000 plates, half a ton of fish.” In the
speeches McKinley was compared with Lincoln, to the
latter’s disadvantage. Lincoln had only emancipated 4
million human beings, while McKinley had “lifted 10 mil­
lion into light and freedom.” On the day of the banquet,
the Springfield Republican called it the ‘Belshazzar Feast”
(Ibid., pp. 136, 138).
T h e a n t i -im perialist L eague sought and won allies in
the fight against McKinley’s war.
The Massachusetts Reform Club, the American Peace
Society, the Massachusetts Sons of the American Revolu­
tion, held meetings in which anti-war declarations were
made. Speakers attacked Anglo-Saxon colonization and
opposed the killing of Filipinos because they were “fight­
ing for just what our forefathers sought thirty-five years
ago.”
In March, the Boston Post called for a negotiated
peace. In April, the Young Men’s Democratic Club of
Massachusetts passed a resolution against the United
States’ attempt to force its sovereignty on the Philippines.
Irish-born citizens of Boston formed a “Committee of
Safety” to inaugurate statewide agitation among Ameri­
cans of similar descent for peace, the withdrawal of Ameri­
can troops and Philippine independence.
Samuel Gompers, in a public meeting, denounced the
United States war as being “against the only Asian coun­
try that has ever made an attempt to establish a republi­
can form of government” and warned that “if peace can­
not be secured in any other way, the time is coming when
federated labor will refuse to make implements that are
intended to strike down their fellow-men.”
Meanwhile, General Otis drew the Philippine soldiers
from their trenches around Manila with the aid of Dewey’s
guns, and he reported 250 American casualties as against
4,000 Filipinos killed, wounded, and taken prisoner. In
the weeks following, reports persisted of terrible Filipino
losses.
Thousands of American soldiers were appalled by the
war and were writing home revealing “the horrible truth.”
Their relatives turned over these letters to the press, and
the Anti-Imperialist League published these “Soldiers’ Let­
ters.” It became a documented record of racism and
slaughter.
Wrote one Captain Elliot: “Caloocan was supposed to
contain seventeen thousand inhabitants. The Twentieth
Kansas swept through it, and now Caloocan contains not
a living native. Of the buildings, the battered walls of the
great Church and dismal prison alone remain.” A Kansas
private wrote that “...with my own hands, (I) set fire to
over fifty houses of Filipinos... Women and children were
wounded by our fire.” Another admitted shooting four
Filipinos after his officer told him, “You know the or­
ders.” A volunteer from the State of Washington wrote:
“Our fighting blood was up, and as we all wanted to kill
‘niggers’...this shooting human beings beats rabbit hunt­
ing all to pieces.”
Another wrote that “the racist feeling among the rank
and file was stimulated by the white supremacist attitude
of officers over them... It kept leaking down from sources
above that the Filipinos were ‘niggers’ no better than In­
dians, and were to be treated as such.” Colonel (later Briga­
dier-General) Funston said: “The boys go for the enemy
as if they were chasing jackrabbits... I, for one, hope that
Uncle Sam will apply the chastening rod, good, hard, and
plenty., until they come into the reservation and promise
to be good ‘injuns’.”
In Boston, a bookstore exhibited in its show window
photographs of the trenches beyond Manila filled with
the bodies of dead Filipinos, with this heading: “The hea­
thens we are converting by this new missionary method.”
Someone wrote to a newspaper that while there was a
campaign to save the sparrows, “in the Pacific... hundreds
and thousands of our fellowmen are being ruthlessly slain.”
A Transcript’s columnist wrote that one night, the war
became for him literally into a nightmare. At that time,
they were still lynching blacks in Georgia, and a public
rally was held linking “public anger at the Georgia atroc­
ity to the demand for an end to the Asian war.” The
speaker insisted that American troops be brought home
from the Philippines and sent into the South to “repress
this rebellion against humanity” (Ibid., pp. 143-147).
Popular Opposition to the War in the Philippines
TWELVE THOUSAND, out of some thirty thousand Ameri­
can soldiers in the Philippines volunteered for the war
against Spain. With the war’s end, they were eligible for
discharge. There developed a general desire among the
volunteers not to re-enlist, and demand grew in the United
States to bring them home. It was clear evidence of the
unpopularity of the Philippine war.
Much of this was the result of the work of the anti­
imperialists which had run anti-war advertisements in
newspapers with the largest circulation in the northwest
and two southern states, which provoked a large number
of letters in response.
Bryan, Senator Pettigrew, and numerous Southern
Democratic congressmen were vocal against the war. Let­
ters from the volunteers themselves continued to reveal
not only the inhumanity of some American soldiers, but
also their general distaste for the war. The farm papers
of Herbert Myrick from Springfield, Mass., had thousands
of readers in the South and West, and the editorials of
many papers in these regions were constantly anti-impe­
rialist. The unpopularity of the war was increased with
each Western boy who was killed or wounded.
Early in February, the California Senate requested that
the first California regiment be sent home. In March,
relatives and friends of a Pennsylvania regiment got let­
ters from Manila that information on deaths of the vol­
unteers was being suppressed. Great efforts were made
to secure the return of these troops.
In April, the movement mushroomed. Demands for
the return of the troops came from Tennessee, Oregon,
Minnesota, South Dakota, and Nebraska. The demand
would either come from the Governor of the State (Or­
egon, Minnesota, South Dakota) or from a senator or its
State Legislature, or made in public meetings or in press
reports on the feelings of the soldiers themselves.
This one came uncensored from Manila via Hongkong:
“ ‘We did not enlist to fight niggers’, was a remark con-
standy heard.” The Dispatch also reported the view of an
outstanding general in the field that it would take 100,000
soldiers to subdue the islands. The Philadelphia Times
reported a unanimous vote by the Tenth Pennsylvania
volunteers against re-enlisting. In the second week of April,
Washington admitted that only 7% of the volunteers would
re-enlist, even when offered a bounty of $500 per man.
In June, a Manila newspaper correspondent wrote a
London friend that “the volunteers or at least a portion
of them, were one time on the verge of mutiny.” Under
such pressure, the Government announced its decision
to send home 12,000 volunteers who would be replaced
by 14,000 regulars.
T h e a d m in is t r a t io n b r a n d e d and attacked Edward
Atkinson, a prominent 72-year-old Bostonian, from a very
distinguished family who was a very active and vocal sup­
porter of the anti-war movement (as he had been before
 a strong anti-slavery advocate) as a traitor. He had at­
tempted to send anti-war propaganda to the soldiers in
the Philippines, but they were never transmitted by the
Post Office.
The Anti-Imperialist League did not wish to be associ­
ated with this grave a charge, and its secretary, in the
name of the Executive Committee, sent a telegram to
McKinley urging Philippine independence but after a U.S.
military occupation lasting five years, and the Philippine
surrender of a small island for a U.S. naval station.
The Administration spokesman observed that this was
not far from McKinley’s position. Actually, this was not
far from the position that would have been acceptable to
Aguinaldo and many Filipinos, as a compromise measure
just to avoid the continued ravages of war.
In a subsequent meeting held on May 16,1900, the
Executive Committee of the League passed a resolution
that restored the League’s original position. The five-year
occupation and the naval base station were forgotten, and
instead, there was a denunciation of “unjustified censor­
ship of the press” and “high-handed violation of the mails,”
as well as support for the stand taken by Edward Atkinson.
Four times during the months of April and May,
Aguinaldo sent emissaries behind the American lines with
offers to stop the fighting and begin negotiations for a
peaceful settlement. But Washington had no more use
for Aguinaldo. With Washington’s approval, Otis rebuffed
the overtures.
The American-Philippine war becomes a national and
political issue
In July of 1899, a prominent Boston attorney and sec­
retary of the National Colored Protective League, Clifford
H. Plummer, in an interview with the press, declared that
McKinley was the first President since the Civil War who
had refused to stand against Southern lynchings, which
at that moment were on the increase, and that, as a re-
suit, the country’s three million black voters would desert
McKinley in 1900 even as the Administration wanted to
get hold of another eight million Negroes in the Philip­
pines for the commercial benefits they would bring.
“They (McKinley and his group) would swallow the
devil if he had anything in him of financial benefit,” said
Plummer. He further declared that blacks in America had
full sympathy for the “poor blacks of the Philippines”
who, like themselves, were fighting for their independence.
He did not doubt, said Plummer, that were it not for the
distance, many American blacks would have taken up arms
for the Filipinos.
A colored auxiliary of the League was organized, and
a big public assembly passed resolutions condemning
McKinley for his war in the Philippines and his silence on
lynching.
During the summer of 1899, McKinley’s Philippine
War dragged on without success. “Despite General Otis’s
persistent reports of the defeat and disintegration of the
Philippine Army, the fact remained that by the middle of
June (1899), American troops had made practically no
headway in suppressing the revolution, having advanced
only a few miles beyond the walls of Manila.”
General Arthur MacArthur, second in command in
the Philippines, told the press that, contrary to his origi­
nal view, he presently believed “that the Filipino masses
are loyal to Aguinaldo and the government which he
heads.”
“With oppressive regularity the only word from the
Philippines was that of the death of American soldiers
from tropical sickness and inconsequential batde (reported
to kill even more Filipinos). Since the cost to the taxpayer
was $300,000 a day, there were those who wondered
whether ‘the game was worth the candle’. Returning vol­
unteers were nearly unanimous in their disgust for the
war and for their commanding general, ‘old lobster Otis’.”
Su c h e x pr e ssio n s OF discontent reached Administra­
tion supporters. Senator Frye of Maine, who had been a
member of the Paris Peace Conference and an ardent
advocate of annexation, now had second thoughts: he
charged that General Merritt had deceived the Commis­
sion when he gave it assurances that the Philippines could
be easily subdued with 5,000 troops.
Navy Secretary Long began to worry about the Cabi­
net with reports of “reckless slaughter of the natives by
the navy’s vessels.”
The Springfield Sunday Republican, in its issues of
July 3, and 18, 1899, published a statement by General
Funston, the victor of Caloocan, that he had become an
anti-imperialist (“though not a bitter one”) and could see
no benefit from the Philippines save for a few “big syndi­
cates and capitalists.”
On July 9, all the American newspaper correspondents
in Manila, representing the most radical expansionist jour­
nals in the United States as well as the important news
associations, called upon General Otis and laid upon him
a round-robin letter of protest against the military cen­
sorship of their dispatches to the United States. This was
published in the United States on July 17.
The journalists charged that Otis would not allow them
to tell the whole truth because “it would alarm the people
at home,” and that the official dispatches had presented
an “ultra-optimistic view” not shared by the general offic­
ers in the field. The publication of this exposé brought
consternation to the imperialists.
But McKinley continued to support the censorship. A
scapegoat was found. The New York Herald had said that
Alger, the Secretary of War, as Otis’s immediate supe­
rior, was to blame for official misrepresentation of the
war, and should, therefore, be dismissed.
McKinley must have been happy to oblige. Alger was
made to resign and replaced by a more determined and
able imperialist, Elihu Root of New York City, the most
sought-after corporate lawyer in the country. He became
a most valuable addition to the McKinley Cabinet.
In MlDjULY, the Boston Post and the Boston Globe car­
ried feature stories about the Anti-Imperialist League.
Secretary Winslow claimed that the League had 40,000
members and 40 branches. The Boston office was then
receiving several hundred letters a day, and had sent out
at least half a million pieces of literature. The small room
in the business district that housed the headquarters was
“the storm center of a discussion sweeping from sea to
sea.”
At that time, there also emerged an anti-imperialist
organization in the West. Samuel Gompers and the pub­
lisher Herbert Myrick, after touring the West, reported
strong anti-imperialist sentiment among workers and farm­
ers. States in the West as far apart as Texas and Ohio
were thickly populated with citizens of German descent,
many of whom, like Carl Schurz, had come to America to
escape from the imperialism and militarism of their na­
tive land. Their organizations and newspapers were very
responsive to anti-imperialist agitation.
The Midwest was also provided with a headquarters.
A national convention of anti-imperialists was held in
Chicago on October 16 and 17, attended by more than
100 delegates from 29 states, with about the same num­
ber of Republicans and Democrats. Chicago was desig­
nated as the national headquarters.
A public meeting attended by 10,000 people was held,
chaired by Cleveland’s Secretary of Agriculture, and ad­
dressed by Carl Schurz. A resolution was approved advo­
cating the end of the war, and to fight for the defeat of
any person or party in the elections of 1900 advocating
the forcible subjugation of the Philippines.
THE NEW SECRETARY of War, Elihu Root, announced plans
to have an army of 70,000 in the Philippines, more than
double the 30,000 troops estimated by Otis to be enough
to crush Aguinaldo. This big reinforcement was urgently
needed.
Twenty-one Philippine towns had been taken by the
United States troops, only to be abandoned for lack of
forces. One town was taken and abandoned six times. At
the end of October, after seven months of campaigning,
American forces had established United States rule in
117 square miles of Luzon’s total area of 42,000 square
miles. In the fall of 1899, there were twice as many troops
in the Philippines as there were in the spring.
Bryan, with an eye on the elections of 1900, started
hitting hard at McKinley and his imperialist policy. This
issue became the paramount issue in the election, while
the silver currency issue was made secondary.
Bryan was eloquent in his exposition on the issue. He
denounced the Republicans for pouring funds into the
military establishment instead of the nation’s schools, and
added that the money spent on the Philippine war could
be much better used in building reservoirs to irrigate the
arid west. But, he commented, “the Republicans would
rather waste blood than save water.”
Time and again, Bryan declared that the 1900 elec­
tions represented the marshaling of democracy against
plutocracy, the man against the dollar, republic against
empire.
He declared: “Imperialism would be profitable to the
army contractors; it would be profitable to the shipown­
ers, who would carry live soldiers to the Philippines, and
bring dead soldiers back; it would be profitable to those
who would seize upon the franchises, and it would be
profitable to the officials whose salaries would be fixed
and paid there; but to the farmer and laboring man, and
to the vast majority of those engaged in other occupa­
tions, it would bring expenditures without returns and
risks without rewards.”
 And he asked about what years of experience proved
to be the sad fact of American economic penetration: “If
in this country, where the people have the right to vote,
the Republican leaders dare not take the side of the people
against the great monopolies which have grown up within
the last few years, how can they be trusted to protect the
Filipinos from the corporations which are waiting to ex­
ploit the islands?”
President McKinley agreed with Bryan that foreign
policy was the central issue. The Republican campaign
manager, Senator Mark Hanna, pointed out that the war
had brought prosperity. He put the issue in its simplest
terms: Did the working people wish to keep the jobs and
wages they now enjoyed under the Republicans, or did
they wish to return to the dark days of the Democrat
Grover Cleveland by way of Bryan and his dangerous fi­
nancial schemes?
Because of the evident prosperity of the nation, in no
small measure brought about by the war in the Philip­
pines, Gompers, who was an anti-imperialist, did not,
however, campaign for Bryan. Gompers did not even at­
tack the trusts. Instead he condemned those who wished
to legislate against them.
W h ile t h e r e u n q u e st io n a b l y was support for Bryan
among working people in 1900, the nation’s organized
labor movement generally did not participate in the Demo­
cratic campaign.
During the period of the election campaign, the white
supremacy offensive against the voting rights of blacks
was accompanied by bloody attacks against blacks in New
Orleans, Akron, Ohio and New York City.
The Springfield Republican connected this racist mob-
violence “to the overbearing and contemptuous career of
force and blood pursued by the nation for two years past
towards the ‘niggers’ of the Spanish islands.”
 The connection between the worsening conditions of
the blacks at home and McKinley’s war in the Philippines
was the gist of two pamphlets issued in thousands of cop­
ies by the Anti-Imperialist League, one written by a black
intellectual, Prof. Miller of Howard University, the other
by three authors who described themselves as trained from
youth in the strictest school of anti-slavery conviction.
And yet, the black community appeared to be divided.
Traditionally, the black vote was Republican because of
Democratic disfranchisement in the South. But promi­
nent blacks openly broke with McKinley over imperial­
ism.
Sad to say, educators and clergymen were generally
for McKinley. Even in Massachusetts, few educators and
clergymen came out for Bryan. A majority of Harvard’s
faculty led by President Eliot declared for McKinley. But
Rabbi Fleischer did campaign actively for Bryan as did a
Protestant minister, Rev. Bisbee, who got into serious dif­
ficulty with his congregation as a result.
Senators Hoar and Pettigrew and the anti-imperialists
condemned the war Great Britain had begun in October,
1899 against the Boer republic of South Africa. They com­
pared it with the United States war against the Filipinos.
But McKinley refused to condemn the war or offer
sympathy to the Boers. The war had brought the United
States imperialists a step closer to their goal of interna­
tional financial supremacy. The banking house of Mor­
gan financed the Boer war for the British government.
American investors quickly subscribed to the 20-million-
dollar bond issue which Morgan offered to float, and the
imperialist press rejoiced that New York was replacing
London as the financial center of the world.
E arly IN 1900, Secretary of State Hay, persuaded Great
Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan, and Italy to agree
that, in the Chinese territories under their control, all
powers would have equal commercial rights. This was
called the “open-door policy.”
On July 8, Hay supplemented the open-door policy
with another note addressed to the European powers
calling for the preservation of “China’s territorial and
administrative unity.” Thus, Hay discouraged further ap­
propriation of Chinese territory.
Senator Lodge and his like-minded colleagues hailed
America’s recently announced open-door policy as a no­
table boost to the expansionist program. A high official
in Washington said that as a result of this achievement,
“China is ripe for the investment of American capital.”
(Forty-six years later, America would exact from a weak
Filipino President the parity agreement that would give
Americans equal rights with Filipino nationals in the ex­
ploitation of Philippine natural resources and the opera­
tion of public utilities; to be followed years later with the
grant by another weak Filipino President of civil rights to
American nationals equal to those of Filipino nationals.)
In particular, the open-door policy was an Anglo-
American project to limit the growing militancy of Rus­
sia in China.
A diplomatic agent of the McKinley Administration
praised the open-door policy as the direct result of the
United States annexation of the Philippines. The open-
door policy was endorsed by the National Association of
Manufacturers and the Boston Merchants Association.
However, there were criticisms heard. The Springfield
Republican thought that Hay acted as he did only be­
cause the government did not dare grab Chinese territo­
ries outright for fear of opposition at home; the United
States opposed further partition because it wanted to
preserve the Chinese market it now had.
It was at this time that a militant Chinese society,
known as the Boxers, attacked French and German mis­
sionaries and, aided by government troops, put under
siege the U.S. Minister and other foreign legations in
Beijing.
The crisis brought sharply home to the President, the
Secretary of State, and the Cabinet, the difficulties con­
nected with the United State’s new role as a “world power.”
A battleship from Manila and a detachment of marines
from the Philippines came to the rescue. Moving from
Taku, the Chinese port near Beijing, with the troops of
other powers, and burning villages as they went, these
marines were stopped by the Chinese 80 miles from
Beijing. An American observer saw the bodies of Chi­
nese slain by Americans, clogging the river enroute, “and
there were so many of them that they filled it from bank
to bank, and it was hard for steamboats to get along.”
T h e r e pu b l ic a n n a t io n a l convention took place on
the third week ofJune against this background of events.
Senator Lodge was the chairman of the convention. His
speech set the tone of the convention as a triumphant
affirmation of McKinley’s imperialist policies.
Lodge said that a withdrawal of American troops from
the Philippines would subject the pro-American Filipinos
to certain massacre. He brushed aside the humanitarian
pretensions voiced by McKinley and bluntly declared that
the United States had taken the Philippines to benefit
Americans, no one else. The Islands were the key to the
Chinese market, and the cornerstone of Hay’s open-door
policy.
But it was also Roosevelt’s convention. Members of
the press understood that New York financiers wanted
Roosevelt’s nomination as vice-president. He was an in­
corrigible imperialist and perfecdy combined the jingo
spirit of the delegates and the financial strength of New
York. His nomination as McKinley’s running mate had
the air of inevitability.
Shordy after the convention, McKinley ordered 4,000
troops from the Philippines to join the allied forces of
Britain, Japan, Germany, France, and Russia, which were
prepared to march on Beijing. Root’s offensive of the year
before had destroyed the Philippine Government and
army, thus enabling the Republican convention to assume
an air of triumph, but the fact remains that General Arthur
MacArthur could spare only these troops in the face of
constant guerrilla attacks. Before a meeting of Boston
Republicans, Lodge pointed to the dispatch of troops from
the Philippines to China in support of the necessity of
the Philippines for the defense of United States interest
in China.
The Anti-Imperialist League did not take a position
on intervention in China, but individual anti-imperialists
condemned President McKinley’s usurpation of powers
in sending troops to China without congressional autho­
rization. But this intervention did not become a major
issue in the election. Unlike the Philippine war, it was of
very short duration and resulted in complete victory for
the allied forces. The American troops soon returned to
the Philippines to suppress the guerrilla war.
Against Atrocities —The Last Anti-Imperialist Cam­
paign
On the eve of the election of 1900, the resistance of
the Philippine guerrillas, following the directive of Gen­
eral Aguinaldo, reached such a pitch that General Young
in northern Luzon recommended the use of “European
methods against rebellious Asiatics.” General MacArthur
refused, for fear of arousing public opinion in the United
States and instigating a congressional investigation (Ibid.,
p.225). MacArthur was overruled by higher authorities.
Atrocities were committed; American public opinion was
aroused, as MacArthur had feared, and there was a con­
gressional investigation.
In his report for the year submitted in October, 1900.
General MacArthur frankly told Washington that the suc­
cess of the Philippine guerrillas was due to the “almost
complete unity of action of the entire native population.”
The guerrilla fighters were able to sustain their warfare
because they enjoyed the support of the overwhelming
majority of the Philippine people. The problem was how
to break the link between the guerrillas and the civilians.
The day after the election, the Cabinet met and sent
orders to MacArthur to “start a vigorous campaign at
once, pressing the remnants of the Filipino army to the
last extremity.”
Ten days later, the Washington correspondents of two
Boston papers, the Herald and the Globe, gave an idea
of the campaign the Administration proposed. It was pat­
terned after that of Lord Kitchener in South Africa (i.e.
no mercy to those in active rebellion and those who give
aid and comfort to insurgents), and that of Weyler in
Cuba (force the Filipinos to leave the rural areas and keep
them concentrated in the towns where they can be kept
under the eye of the army). The Globe reported the ru­
mor that the War Department had told MacArthur that
his course had not been entirely satisfactory to the Presi­
dent.
On December 20, MacArthur put the islands under
martial law. He proclaimed that civilians helping guerril­
las “divest themselves of the character of soldiers, and if
captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners
of war.”
In his book, Schirmer pointed out that “the United
States war against the Filipinos had not lacked for harsh­
ness before this, as soldiers’ letters and anti-imperialist
protests had been made known. Just after the war broke
out, reports had reached the United States that an unde­
clared practice of taking no prisoners was in evidence,
and anti-imperialists had pointed to the casualty ratio of
five Filipinos killed to one wounded (the reverse of the
usual) as confirmation of the practice of taking no pris­
oners. What was new at this point is that the McKinley
Administration elevated the application of extreme mea­
sures, hitherto unofficial and unacknowledged, into a War
Department policy to MacArthur and the forces in the
field...Thus in July, 1901, the General reported to Wash­
ington that the application of military methods since
December 20, 1900, had been very drastic.”
T h e ANTI-IMPERIALIST FIGHT against atrocities commit­
ted by the American army received indirect support from
three actions taken by Secretary Root.
1. A bill he sponsored which was debated in Congress
in January, 1901, proposing to enlist 12,000 Filipinos into
the American Army.
Native troops were necessary due to continuous pres­
sure from servicemen and their families to be released
from Philippine duty. At its height, the United States had
80,000 troops in the Philippines, at this point, the num­
ber had been reduced to almost half. Senator Pettigrew
opposed the enlistment of native troops, pointing out
that it would increase the severity of the United States
war against the guerrillas. He maintained that only the
most “savage peoples like the Macabebes, traditionally
hostile to the majority of the Filipinos, would enlist as
mercenary troops” (as they had under Spain), and the
Senator quoted Secretary Root to the effect that the
Macabebes were prone to “murder, burn, and rob” and
were difficult to keep “within the lines of civilized war­
fare.”
In a letter to the press, Gamaliel Bradford charged
that the Macabebes had taught the American troops “the
fiendish expedient of the ‘water cure’,” and that the
Macabebes had learned this form of torture from the
Spanish as it was practiced during the Inquisition. Not
long after Bradford’s protest, a band of Macabebe scouts,
under the direction of General Funston, the victor of
Caloocan, proved to be extremely useful to the American
high command. Posing as guerrillas, they wormed their
way into Aguinaldo’s hiding place, surprised and over­
whelmed his guards, captured the Filipino leader, and
brought him to Manila, a prisoner of the United States
Army. The operation disgusted Senator Hoar, who called
the capture of Aguinaldo a “miserable and pitiful busi­
ness,” voicing the feelings of a number of his constitu­
ents.
2. The McKinley-Root proposal to establish a protec­
torate over Cuba in the winter of 1901, when the Cuban
Constitutional Convention was in session, also gave am­
munition to the anti-imperialists.
The Root proposal was embodied in the Platt Amend­
ment, which afforded the United States control over Cu­
ban finances and foreign affairs, the right to military in­
tervention in the islands, and to naval stations therein.
American capital had penetrated Cuba. Root had been
an attorney for big interests in New York, and the Platt
Amendment was demanded by capitalists in New York.
Public opinion was molded by such arguments, inspired
by Administration sources: “It should not be supposed
that the United States would allow Cuba to make treaties
with both foreign governments, incur debts without limit,
or do anything else it pleases regardless of our rights.”
It was also pointed out that the proposed Constitu­
tion of Cuba granted universal suffrage “which means
the rule in Cuba of illiterates, principally negroes, and in
the opinion of the majority of the people here, under
such a constitution, Cuba would soon become another
Haiti.” It was the view of the imperialist press at the time,
contradicted by the Springfield Republican, that Haiti,
an all-black republic, was rapidly “deteriorating.”
In March, 1901, the Platt Amendment was approved,
the Democrats opposing, the Republicans supporting. The
open-door policy and the Platt Amendment represented
a shift in the policy of economic penetration, which be­
came America’s policy toward the Philippines, after it had
granted its independence and after its proven loyalty in
the Second World War. It also meant American political
domination and military intervention, short of direct co­
lonial possession. But the Bell Trade Act, which was the
Platt Amendment for the Philippines, was approved by a
Democratic Congress and a Democratic President, Harry
Truman.
3. The third incident which helped the anti-imperial­
ist, in pressing their point of cruelty in the war in the
Philippines, was a written denial by Secretary Root to
Senator Lodge that there was such cruelty.
During the Senate investigation of the atrocities, it
was determined that Secretary Root had received from
the highest ranking officer of the United States Army,
Army General Nelson A. Miles, a report protesting “the
marked severity” of the war against the Filipinos, which
was supported by the report of Governor Cornelius
Gardiner of Tayabas province.
The report was examined by the Senate investigating
committee which had denounced the following excesses
of the army: (a) “the extensive burning of barrios (native
villages) in trying to lay waste the country so that the
insurgents cannot occupy it,” (b) “the torturing of natives
by so-called water-cure and other methods in order to
obtain information,” (c) one-third of the population had
been killed by the military, by famine and pestilence, and
that out of a population of three hundred thousand of
Batangas, one hundred thousand had died.
It was clear that the Gardiner Report was in Root’s
hands when he publicly denied charges of cruelty and
praised the Army for exemplary humanity. The Spring-
field Republican accused both Roosevelt and Root of con­
cealment and bad faith.
To appease public opinion, Roosevelt ordered the
court martial of General Smith and Major Glenn. (A simi­
lar tactic — setting up a scapegoat —was used by Presi­
dent Nixon many years later).
In the fall of 1901, about the time that McKinley was
assassinated, the island of Samar was one of the last areas
still in active revolt, and there, a company of American
soldiers was taken by surprise and massacred.
On November 4, the Manila Times, an American news­
paper in Manila, reported that Brigadier General Jacob
Smith had been in Samar about 10 days and had already
ordered all natives to be concentrated in coast towns, and
declared that those who were found outside ‘should be
shot and no questions asked’. “When the time limit had
expired, General Smith was as good as his word. His policy
of reconcentration is said to be the most effective thing
of the kind ever seen in these islands under any flag.”
This report was reprinted in the United States press.
Major Glenn was accused by two American soldiers
of having ordered a town of ten thousand to be burned
to the ground, its inhabitants escaping only with the
clothes on their backs.
The Philadelphia Ledger, another paper which sup­
ported the Administration, carried a dispatch from its
correspondent in Manila which said: “The present war is
no bloodless, fake, opera bouffé engagement; our men
have been relentless, have killed to exterminate men,
women, children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents
and suspected people from lads up of 10 up, an idea pre­
vailing that the Filipino as such was little better than a
dog...”
E arly IN D ec e m b er , the anti-imperialists held a confer­
ence in Boston attended by Moorefxeld Story, Carl Schurz,
George Boutwell, and others. In the view of Storey, the
United States was committing cruelties in the Philippines
worse than those by Spain in Cuba or England in South
Africa, while the American people looked on with appar­
ent acquiescence.
This meeting generated a petition supported by hun­
dreds of signatures (including that of many notables), that
resulted in the turbulent debate in the Senate initiated
by Senator Hoar. It was more agitated than the discus­
sion of the resolution leading to the Spanish-American
war.
The Army and Navy Journal admitted that it was non­
sense to suggest that the Administration did not know
and approve the harsh methods practiced by the United
States forces in the Philippines. Just after Roosevelt or­
dered the court martial of General Smith, he sent a letter
of congratulations to General Bell who had thrown one
hundred thousand Filipinos into concentration camps and
whose methods none other than Senator Lodge con­
demned as cruel. The court martial fined Glenn $50,
Smith was admonished, and retired by Roosevelt one year
and a half earlier than usual.
The Senate investigation under Lodge was held be­
hind closed doors, and nothing resulted from it. But Sena­
tor Lodge was unable to prevent the public disclosure of
the atrocities committed.
The Washington correspondent of the Boston Her­
ald concluded that “our troops in the Philippines look
upon all Filipinos as... niggers, and entided to all the con­
tempt and harsh treatment administered by white over-
lords to the most inferior races.”
 Index
A
Africa 18
Agoncillo 27, 35
Aguinaldo xii, 21, 27, 31, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, 57, 60, 62
America 19, 20, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 38, 61, 62, 63
American atrocities and cruelties 31, 35, 36
American foreign policy 28, 61
American military bases 46, 47, 56
American occupation 32, 37, 43
American protectorate 39
American vested interests 46, 54, 58, 60
annexation 29, 34, 36, 38, 40
Anti-imperialists 34-37
Asia 15, 20, 29, 55
Assembly 41, 42, 43
Australia 32, 54
autonomy 43
B
Bagong Katipunan 46, 58
barangay 16-17
Bataan 31, 49
Battle of Manila Bay 23
Bayanihan 17
Bell Trade Agreement 59
Bicameral system 50
blood compact 17
Bohol 18
Bonifacio 21, 46
Bonifacio' 58
Bontoc 18
Borneo 16
Boston 36
Briones 48
Bryan, William Jennings 35, 36, 38
c
California 18, 37
Canada 54
Cebu 18, 41, 57
Charles V 18
China 15, 54, 56
Churchill, Winston 53
Codman, Charles 36
collaboration 58
Collectivista Party 45
Committee on Account 48
Commonwealth Government 47, 54, 57
Communism 56
Constitution, provisional 24
Constitutional Convention (1934) 48, 61
Controls, import and exchange 55
Coolidge, Calvin 45
Corregidor 31, 49
Council of Elders 17
Cuba 22, 23, 28, 36, 37, 39, 54
Currency and credit 59
D
David (U.S. Senator) 30
Davis, Dwight 45
Day, William 29
Democracy 56, 62
democracy 20, 63
Dewey, George 22, 23, 26, 27
Dictatorship 63
Dodds Report 55
Dominican friars 19
£
Eisenhower, Dwight 49
El Nuevo Dia 41
England 44
Expeditions 18

Filipinizadon of the government services 43

First Organic Act 41
Flag Law 42
France 54
free trade 46
Frye (U.S. Senator) 30
G
Germany 29
Great Britain 29
Greece 17
H
habeas corpus 48
Harding, Warren 45
Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act 46-47
Harrison, Francis Burton 43
Harvard University 19, 37
Hay, John M. 29
Hearst, William Randolph 33, 37
Hider, Adolf 64
Hong Kong 22, 23, 27, 33
Hoover, Herbert 45, 46
House Of Commons 44
I
impeachment 51
imperialism 29, 30, 39
Independence Act 45, 46, 47
India 15
JJames, William 37
Japan 31, 32
Japanese invasion 50
Japanese Occupation 32
Japanese occupation 32, 51
Jefferson, Thomas 19
Jesuits 19
jingoism 37
Johnson, Lyndon B. 38
Jones Law 43, 48
judiciary 51
K
Katipunan 21, 46
Kawit 24
L
Lapu-Lapu 17
Legazpi 18
Lincoln, Abraham 34
Lodge, Henry Cabot 29, 34, 39
London 29
Long, James D. 23
Luzon 18
M
Mactan 17
Madrid 22
Malolos Congress 24
Manila 21, 22, 27, 30
McKinley, William 26, 29, 30
Millis, Walter 28
Mindanao 16
Morgenthau, Henry 55
Mussolini, Benito 64
N
Nacionalista 42, 45, 46, 49, 50
National Assembly 25
National Development Corporation 50
National Power Corporation 49
nationalism 42
neo-imperialism 32
Netherlands 54
New Zealand 54
Nixon, Richard 61
o
ocean shipping 50
oil 50
Olympia 23
Osmena, Sergio 40-45
P
Pact of Biak-na-Bato 22
Panay 16
Paris 26, 30, 36
parity rights 59
Paterno, Pedro 21
Philippine-American War 31, 34
death of Republic 32
independence 24, 54-56, 60
Republic, first 24, 26, 37, 62
 Republic, second 57
Philippine-American war 41
Commission 41-43
economic development 49
independence 40, 43-47
legislature 46, 47
neutralization 47
politics 51
Philippines 15, 18-20, 22-25, 28-31, 36, 39, 41-44, 45-49, 51-
52, 62, 63
Platt Amendment 36, 39, 54
presidential term 50
proportional representation 51
Pulitzer, Joseph 33
Q
Quezon, Manuel Luis 36, 40-46
Quirino, Elpidio 55
R
Recto, Claro M. 45, 47, 48
Reid, Whitelaw 30
Resident commissioners 42
Rizal.Jose 21, 37
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 47, 53
Roxas, Manuel 45-48
Russia 54, 56
s
Salcedo 18
Sanskrit 16
Schirmer 29, 35, 36, 38, 39
self-government 32, 41, 42
Sikatuna 18
Singapore 23, 28
single-member 51
Smith, Charles Emory 29
South America 17
Sovereignty, Filipino 26, 30, 54
Spain 16, 17-20, 27, 30, 38
Spanish abuses 20
American War 21
Occupation 18-20
Reforms 22
Stimson, Henry 45
Sto. Tomás, University of 40
Sulu 16
surrender ceremonies 53
T
Taft, William Howard 19, 41, 42
tariff 59
Teller Amendment 22, 23
textile 50
Thailand 32
The Philippines for the Filipinos 41
Treaty of Paris 30, 35-37, 39
Truman 55
Tydings-McDuffie Act 47, 48, 56
u
unicameral legislative system 50
Urdaneta 18
V
Victoria 18
Vietnam 28, 35, 38, 56
w
war damages 55
water power 50
White, Henry 29
Wilson, Woodrow 43
Wood, Leonard 45
Y
yellow press 28, 33, 37
 A Note on the Type
This book is set in New Baskerville, a transi­
tional font based on the work o f John
Baskerville, a contemporary of Benjamin
Franklin. Baskerville was a popular typeface
among American and French revolutionaries
in the 18th century.
 Araneta and
the new ‘Noli’
• By: ALEJANDRO LICHAUCO

S ALVADOR ARANETA, who passed away in

1982, was a man of towering intellect and equally
towering accomplishments who left an indelible
imprint on Philippine society as an entrepreneur and
pioneering industrialist, educator, author, political
economist and constitutionalist. He was one of the
four Filipinos who served two constitutional
conventions - the Convention of 1934 and the
Convention of 1971. In the field of public service, he
served as Secretary of Agriculture under the
Magsaysay administration and as director of the Office
of Economic Coordination.
Manuel L. Quezon III, in an editor's postscript
to Araneta's book which was launched last February
4 and which is the subject of this piece, recalls that it
was Araneta who pioneered the airline industry when
he established the Far Eastern Air Transport Inc.
Among other industries that Araneta pioneered,
Quezon III cites Feati Industries, for the manufacture
of electronic motors; Republic Flour Mills, now one
of the country's most diversified conglomerates; ALA
Feeds, the first financially viable extraction plant for
the manufacture of animal feeds from soybean;
Premier Paper; which pioneered the manufacture of
cigarette paper; Republic Soya, the first plant to utilize
soybean oil as industrial raw material; Araneta Pulp
and Paper, a pioneer in the manufacture of paper from
wood waste and pine trees; Biochemical Laboratories,
a pioneer research laboratory for the manufacture of
1
medicine for animals.
In education, Araneta made his mark as founder
of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation and
Feati University.
As Quezon III aptly put it, Araneta was a man
"who devoted his intelligence and wealth toward the
pursuit of a vision."
What was that vision?
That vision was a Philippines free from poverty.
The long string of industries he established and the
equally long string of books, articles, columns and
speeches he wrote were driven by that vision and had
one central theme: that this is a nation where poverty
has no business existing.
The problem of poverty hounded Araneta's
waking moments. He was bom free from it, and he
wished every Filipino would also be free from it. For
he recognized poverty for what it is - the scourge
which deformed and defaced the very soul of an
individual. He had no use for the view that the poor
are blessed.
Mass unemployment, to Araneta, was at the root
of the poverty problem, and the failure of the nation
to enter the industrial age was at the root of that mass
unemployment. The solution therefore lies in the
massive creation of job opportunities, and that can
be accomplished only through industrialization which
would saturate the nation with sources of employment.
But what has kept this country from
industrializing?
The answer, Araneta contends in his America’s
Double-Cross o f the Philippines is "American
economic neo-imperialism."
Araneta reveals that immediately after the last
world war, the Truman administration adopted the
recommendations of the Dodds Report which
proposed an American blueprint for postwar Asia.
That blueprint, Araneta disclosed "had, as its objective
to make Japan the industrial workshop of Asia and
the Philippines a mere supplier of raw materials."
American postwar strategic planning for Asia
obviously recognized that maintaining Japan as an
industrial power was crucial to American strategic
military interests in the region. Since Japanese
factories rely on raw materials from the Philippines,
among others, this country therefore must be preserved
as an agricultural economy.
How then was the Philippines to be preserved
primarily as a source of raw materials? The answer
was free trade. Free trade should be imposed on the
Philippines in order to stifle its industrialization. That
policy was incorporated in the provisions of the
notorious Bell Trade Act which made free trade,
among others, a condition precedent to our receipt of
desperately needed postwar economic assistance from
the United States.
As Claro M. Recto observed, free trade and anti­
industrialization constituted the cornerstone of
America's postwar economic policy in the Philippines.
The US, Araneta charged had pledged to return
to the Philippines the independence that America had
stolen in 1898. Instead, what America gave the
Philippines after the war was a sham independence.
It was an "independence" saddled with conditions
calculated to render impossible the nation's industrial
development.
The Philippines became the first postwar
example of a neo-colony in Asia. A country
independent in name and theory, but in truth and fact
the economic colony of another. And our condition
as a neocolony lies at the root of our mass poverty.
Araneta, to be sure, isn't the only one to have
traced our under - development and consequent mass
poverty to American imperialism. The theme has been
sounded as well by Recto, Constantino, Diokno and
various others comprising the nationalist school of
political economy. It has in fact been the theme of the
revolutionary movement. The book's special feature,
however, derives from its disclosure and discussion
of the Dodds Report, confirming what many had long
felt instinctively that our underdevelopment had been
planned in Washington all along, and the fact that the
book is being launched at a time when the demand by
Filipinos for a truthful and courageous explanation
for their condition has never been more intense and
widespread.
Rizal's Noli Me Tangere came at a time when
Filipinos were ready to accept a truthful and
courageous explanation for their wretchedness. We
are in such a time now, and that is why Araneta's book
couldn't have been more timely. The book casts light
on the real motivation behind the oppressive
conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank,
institutions that are mere extensions of the US
Treasury and the State Department. Those
conditionalities reflect the continuing implementation
of the Dodds Report, as did the free-trade provision
of the Bell Act which Araneta and Filipino nationalists
so vigorously opposed in 1946.
The message of Araneta, as this piece perceives
it, is that the Philippine-American War continues, and
that the revolution for independence must continue.

Reprinted from Today

 The following corrections should be noted
in the About the Author section.
The word "Embassy" should read "Consulate".
"Pilconsa" should read "Philconsa", the Philippine
Constitution Association.
The Publisher would also like to thank
Colourscan for the color separation of the cover and
Mr. Felicisimo M. Escuadro for additional
proofreading; Francis Hechanova for other post
production arrangements.

Dr. Salvador Araneta (1902-1982)
T
JL . HIS IS A study on how de­
mocracy received a terrible
thrashing in the Philippines, a
country that used to be called
“the show window of democracy
in the Far East”, when she was
twice double-crossed by the
United States of America, the
country which claims to be the
“bastion of democracy” and four
times her ally in war.
The first double-cross occurred
at the turn of this century when
the U.S. after winning her war
against Spain, quietly set aside
prom ises made to G eneral
Aguinaldo and turned against her
ISBN 971-92095-0-X
erstwhile ally, the Philippines, thus
igniting the Philippine-American
War. An American historian, writ­
ing about those events, testified
that “General Aguinaldo, one re­
grets to report, had been neatly
double-crossed.” Victory in those
two wars launched the U.S. on a
career as a world power and as in­
terventionist in the affairs of other
countries.
It is ironical that America’s first
betrayal of democracy had for vic­
tim the first nation in Asia to as­
sert human rights and sovereignty.
The first Republic of the Philip­
pines, organized by Filipinos un­
der a democratic Constitution,
proclaimed that all sovereignty
resided in the people, It was pro­
mulgated by President Aguinaldo
onjanuary 21,1899—fully 14 years
before the Republic of China un­
der the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen,
and it antedated all other repub­
lics in Asia.
The second double-cross of the
same ally took place in 1946, about
50 years later, when the U.S., then
at the height of her power, aban­
doned all scruples in dealing with
her ally in the Pacific War that had
just been ended and unleashed all
forces to ensure neocolonization
of the Philippines through one­
sided military bases agreements,
questionable mutual defense pacts
and the infamous parity amend­
ment to the Philippine Constitu­
tion—all disadvantageous to the
Philippines.