1.

Emergency Rule
Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 16 an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without
much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection
may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.17 Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a vehicular accident
swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting two children suddenly darting into the street, we
held, in Mc Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 that the driver therein, Jose Koh,
"adopted the best means possible in the given situation" to avoid hitting the children. Using
the "emergency rule" the Court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in the
wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming truck occurred, was not guilty of
negligence.19 While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought,
or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which
is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of
the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. – Valenzuela vs. CA

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if
he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence. Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the instant case because the
danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence. – Delsan
Transport vs. C and A construction

2. Aberatio Ictus
A person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed
on somebody else. In aberratio ictus, the intended victim and the actual victim are both at
the scene of the crime. In People vs Mabugat, where the accused, having discharged his
firearm at Juana Buralo but because of lack of precision, hit and seriously wounded
Perfecta Buralo, it was held that the accused was liable for the injury caused to the latter.

3. Entrapment and Instigation

In entrapment the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the
mind of the accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the
crime, the accused cannot justify his conduct. In Instigation, officers of the law or their
agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he
otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing, the accused cannot be
held liable. – Cabrera vs. Pajares

In instigation, where the officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure
an accused into committing an offense, which he otherwise would not commit and has no
intention of committing, the accused cannot be held liable. But in entrapment, where the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates from the mind of the
accused and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the commission of the offense, the
accused cannot justify his conduct. Instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent."
Entrapment is a trap for the unwary criminal. In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways
and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. On the other
hand, in instigation the instigator practically induces the would-be defendant into
committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to
prosecution and conviction while in instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted.
The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve
to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the
 commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into
execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability.
Instigation does. – People vs Lapatha

4. Fruit of a poisonous tree

Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the
exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision
originated from Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants
that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through
unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures." It
ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not
lightly infringed upon and are upheld. – People vs. Cogaed

Section 2, Article III 21 of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a
general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III 22 of the
Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 23

The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the
recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest –
Comerciante vs People

According to the exclusionary rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have
been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct
result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the
same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The
burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel
before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is
also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not
tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and
convincing evidence. – People vs. Alicando

5. Gerrymandering
Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined “gerrymandering” as
the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of
favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates
each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory. As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat
Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together, without the
 inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated allegation that the province was
created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. – Navarro v. Ermita

Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of representative

districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power." The questioned
statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said
representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair
advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed
out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the administration
candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage.
– Ceneza vs. COMELEC

6. Genuine issue
The term "genuine issue" has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived,
set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties to the
court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. Well-settled also is the rule that the
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench,
the Court found that there exists a genuine and vital factual issue, namely, who is the
rightful owner of the subject machinery – Excelsa Industries vs. CA

7. Grave abuse of discretion

By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. –
Pascual vs Burgos

8. Habere Facias Possesionem –

The name of the process commonly resorted to by the successful party in an action
of ejectment, for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff in the actual possession of the
land recovered is called a habere facias possessionem – Arcadio vs. Ylagan

9. Dying declaration
While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a
report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an exception to the
rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an impending death that is
the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as "evidence of the highest order and is
entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a
careless and false accusation."28

Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, thus: First,
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death. This refers not only to the facts of the assault itself, but also to matters both before
and after the assault having a direct causal connection with it. Statements involving the
nature of the declarant's injury or the cause of death; those imparting deliberation and
willfulness in the attack, indicating the reason or motive for the killing; justifying or
accusing the accused; or indicating the absence of cause for the act are admissible. Second,
at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an
impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in
impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying
 declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the approaching death be presaged by the
personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes
of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. Third, the declarant is competent
as a witness. The rule is that where the declarant would not have been a competent witness
had he survived, the proffered declarations will not be admissible. Thus, in the absence of
evidence showing that the declarant could not have been competent to be a witness had he
survived, the presumption must be sustained that he would have been competent. Fourth,
the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim – People vs. Umpas

The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death,
may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances of such death." - Revised Rules on Evidence

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem
statement is evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. It is thus
admissible, to provide the identity of the accused and the deceased, to show the cause of
death of the deceased, and the circumstances under which the assault was made upon him.
The reasons for its admissibility is necessity and trustworthiness. Necessity, because the
declarant's
death renders it impossible his taking the witness stand, and it often happens that there is
no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime; allowing it, therefore, prevents a failure of
justice. And trustworthiness, because the declaration is made
in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive to falsehood is
silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth.
The law considers the point of death as a situation so solemn and awful as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court - People v.
Cerilla

10. Extrajudicial Confession

A confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
or of any offense necessarily included therein. It is a statement by the accused that he
engaged in conduct which constitutes the crime. Thus, when a person admits to shooting
the victim but denies criminal intent in doing so, such statement is merely an admission,
not a confession. Extrajudicial confession pertains to confession obtained outside of court
with due regard to constitutional and substantive law in order to be admissible. It is not
sufficient to sustain conviction and requires to be corroborated by evidence of the corpus
delicti.
"Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained, or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel
or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district
school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such
extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding." – Section 2d
RA748

11. Fear
Fear means the apprehension of the victim of physical harm, dread, or awareness of danger.
When determining whether fear is present in the facts, consider whether the victim is
actually afraid, reasonably or unreasonably, and whether the Individual is aware of and
exploits the fear of the victim.

Fear is a state of anxious concern, alarm or apprehension of harm. It includes fear of

economic loss as well as fear of physical violence. In criminal law, fear means
consciousness of approaching danger.
12. Flight
It is well-established that "the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his
guilt, and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may
be drawn." – People v. Sabalones

Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's
consciousness of guilt. Flight alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous (Valdez v People, G.R. No.
170180, November 23, 2007). However, in a case where the accused escaped from
detention during the pendency of the case, flight was considered as an indication of guilt
or of his guilty mind: "x x x the wicked flee even when no man pursues, but the righteous
stand fast as bold as a lion" (People v. Isang, G.R. No. 18307, December 4, 2008)

13. Forgotten evidence

As distinguished from newly-discovered evidence, forgotten evidence may be seen to refer
to evidence already in existence or available before or during trial, which was known to
and obtainable by the party offering it, and which could have been presented and offered
in a seasonable manner were it not for the oversight or forgetfulness of such party or his
counsel. (Tumang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82072, 1989).

14. Harmless error doctrine

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is
ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. (Sec. 6, Rule 51).

General Rule: No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless
stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or
dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass
upon plain errors and clerical errors. (Sec. 8, Rule 51)

Exceptions:
a. Those affecting jurisdiction over subject matter;
b. Evidently plain and clerical errors within contemplation of law;
c. In order to serve ends of justice;
d. Matters raised in trial court having some bearing on issue which parties failed to raise or
which lower court ignored;
e. Matters closely related to error assigned (Sps. Mario and Julia Campos v. Republic, G.R.
No. 184371, 2014)

15. Human Rights

We have the right to life, liberty, security and property. We have the right to a transparent,
credible, competent and impartial justice system, free from influence and corruption, where
wrongs are redressed and justice is dispensed fairly, speedily and equitably.

16. Imbecile vs Insanity

Imbecility is defined as a mental condition approaching that of one who is insane. It is
analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile is one who, while advanced in age, has
a mental development comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age.
 Within the meaning of Article 12, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment
and freedom of will at the time of committion the crime. People vs Cayetano. An imbecile
is exempt in all cases from criminal liability.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the
act i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment
because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of
freedom of the will – People v. Salvador. AN insane is not so exempt if it can be shown
that he committed the crime during a lucid interval.

17. Identification of the accused –

Positive identification where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over a denial which,
if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. (People v. Caballero y
Garsola, G.R. No. 210673, 2016

Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused as perpetrator of the
crime. In the face of positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness, such
alibi crumbles like a sand fortress (People v. Vargas, G.R. No. 122765, October 13, 2003;
People v. Adam, 413 SCRA 293; People v. Enriquez, 465 SCRA 407). Positive
identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially where such
identification is credible and categorical (People v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 173308, June 25,
2008).

18. In pari delicto

The doctrine of in pari delicto, which stipulates that the guilty parties to an illegal contract
are not entitled to any relief, cannot prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy
against unjust enrichment. – Gonzalo vs Tarnate
Latin for "in equal fault,'' in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or
are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the
parties, when· an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.
Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty,
they shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds
them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo non oritur actio" and "in
pari delicto potior est condition defendentis." As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari
delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code - Ranara vs
Angeles

19. Interlocking confession

In Mones, the conviction of the four accused for robbery with homicide is sustainable under
the doctrine of interlocking confessions: "extra-judicial confessions independently made
without collusion which are identical with each other in their essential details and are
corroborated by other evidence on record are admissible, as circumstantial evidence,
against the person implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in
the commission of the crime." 41 Clearly, the doctrine is inapplicable here for we only have
the solitary confession of the appellant.

20. Irreparable injury

Injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair
or reasonable redress can be had therefore in court or law or where there is no standard by
which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. (Social Security
Commission v. Bayona, G.R. No. L-13555, 1962)

21. Journalist privilege

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1477
 An Act Amending Section One of Republic Act Numbered Fifty-Three, Entitled "An Act
to Exempt the Publisher, Editor, Columnist or Reporter of Any Publication from Revealing
the Source of Published News or Information Obtained in Confidence"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress

Assembled:

Section 1. Section one of Republic Act Numbered Fifty-three is amended to read as

follows:

"Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the publisher,
editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of
general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or
information appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State."

Section 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 15, 1956.

22. Judicial Notice

Judicial notice is based on the maxim, "what is known need not be proved," hence, when
the rule is invoked, the court may dispense with the presentation of evidence on judicially
cognizable facts. The function of judicial notice is to abbreviate litigation by the admission
of matters that need no evidence because judicial notice is a substitute for formal proof of
a matter by evidence. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and is of equal force. It
displaces evidence and fulfills the purpose for which the evidence is designed to ful fill.
Hence, it makes evidence unnecessary (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1980, p.
38 citing Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308). When the court takes judicial notice of a matter,
the court accepts and recognizes the same without necessity of formal proof. Evidence shall
be dispensed with because the matter is so well known and is of common knowledge not
to be disputable.

23. Jurisdictional FactsJurisdictional fact are facts which must objectively exist before a
statutory power can be exercised by a decision-maker. They are created by and operate in
the context of government authority produced by statute and are linked to the legal concept
of jurisdiction

24. Justiciable Controversy –

A justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties who are pitted against each other due to their demanding and conflicting
legal interests.6 And a dispute is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had direct adverse effect on the person challenging it and admits of specific relief through
a decree that is conclusive in character. As aptly observed in Tan v. Macapagal,7 for a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had been
accomplished by either branch of government before a court may step in.
A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. (Velarde v.
SJS, G.R. No. 159357, 2004)
It is one which is definite and concrete, touching on all the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. (Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.204819, 2014)
 It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of a specific relief through a decree
of conclusive character. (Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 2008)

25. Kiting
Kiting operation or the kiting game is a discounting device for the manipulation of bank
credit by means of checks usually undertaken with the connivance of venal bank officials.
Kiting is commonly employed to denote a species of fraud or fraudulent practice consisting
in the exchange of drafts or checks of approximately the same dates and amounts.
Under the agreement to play the kiting game, there would be an exchange of good checks,
so that if one check is cashed, the cash would be returned to the issuer of the check by
means of the check issued by the other player who had cashed the first player's check.

26. Knock and announced rule

sec 7. Rule 126 - Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break
open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.

Being armed with a warrant does not justify outright entry or barging into the place to be
searched. An officer should knock, introduce himself and announce his purpose and only
in exceptional cases may he forego the same like when his safety is in danger of being
jeopardized or when evidence is about to be destroyed (Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,
143 L.Ed.2d 818 119 S.Ct. 1692 1926).

The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a
house or anything therein provided the following requisites are complied with:
(a) The officer gives notice of his purpose and authority;
(b) He is refused admittance to the place of directed search despite the notice; and
(c) The purpose of breaking is to execute the warrant or to liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein (Sec. 7, Rule 126,
Rules of Court).

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence, identify
themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the
premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented by them
and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and understood by them.
The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the essence of the substantial
provision which safeguards individual liberty.68 No precise form of words is required. It
is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their authority and the purpose of
the search and the object to be seized. It must be emphasized that the notice requirement is
designed not only for the protection of the liberty of the person to be searched or of his
property but also the safety and well-being of the officers serving and implementing the
search warrant. Unless the person to whom the warrant is addressed and whose property is
to be searched is notified of the search warrant and apprised of the authority of the person
serving the warrant, he may consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an
unlawful aggression on his property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the
process, may cause injury even to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which
he would not be criminally liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police
serving and implementing the search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or
address of the suspect, or to other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer
the shock, fright, shame or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion.69
Indeed, a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would
violate the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry
were illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by
stealth, or coercion.70

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose premises
or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b) when such
person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority
and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent
peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone
outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence
is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy evidence or dispose of
evidence.71 However, the exceptions above are not exclusive or conclusive. At times,
without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must
decide whether or not to make an unannounced intrusion into the premises. Although a
search and seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective, if the police officers’
entry was without prior announcement, law enforcement interest may also establish the
reasonableness of an unannounced entry.72 Indeed, there is no formula for the
determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and
circumstances.73 In determining the lawfulness of an unallowed entry and the existence of
probable cause, the courts are concerned only with what the officers had reason to believe
and the time of the entry.74 In Richards v. Wisconsin,75 it was held that:

[1] In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be
dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standard—as opposed to a probable-
cause requirement—strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law
enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual
privacy interest affected by no-knock entries.76

As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida,77 what constitutes breaking includes the

lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to or
pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even a closed screen door.78 However,
entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without force is not a "breaking"
requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because the reasons behind
the rule are satisfied – there was no real likelihood of violence, no unwarranted intrusion
or privacy and no damage to the residence of the accused.79

As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking open
any door cannot be distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be decided
on a case-to-case basis requiring an examination of all the circumstances.80 The proper
trigger point in determining, under the "knock and announce" rule, whether the police
waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is when those inside
should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a warrant.81

In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant Lee
admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were accompanied by Chuang, a
Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were police officers and had
a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were going to
search the condominium unit.82 The appellant was sufficiently aware of the authority of
the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their purpose.
Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with her as she
was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being interpreted to the
appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes from the cabinet atop
the headboard.
 Section 6. RULE 126 Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of
the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to
believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules. (5a)

27. Latches –
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned it or has declined to assert it. 10 It has also been
defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar
in equity.11

We have ruled in Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals,12 that:

That principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when
to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an equitable defense, laches does
not concern itself with the character of the defendant's title, but only with whether or not
by reason of the plaintiff's long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be barred from
asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be inequitable and unjust
to the defendant.

The doctrine of laches or stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and . . . is principally
a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
asserted.

The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant
whose claim or demand has become "stale" or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable
length of time, or who has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by
negligence, folly or inattention. In other words, public policy requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of claims grown stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an
impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which has become, under the
circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.

28. Law of the case –

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case before the court.

We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have the finality of res
judicata.1âwphi1 Law of the case applies only to the same case, whereas res judicata
forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. In law of
the case, the rule made by an appellate court cannot be departed from in subsequent
proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the case relates entirely to questions of
law while res judicata is applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact.
Although res judicata may include questions of law, it is generally concerned with the
effect of adjudication in a wholly independent proceeding

The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to perform its duties
satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be impossible if a question, once considered and
decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every subsequent
appeal. Without it, there would be endless litigation. Litigants would be free to speculate
on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once
gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given case.

In Young, we directed the RTC to admit Genalyn’s supplemental complaint. In so ruling,

we also vacated the RTC Orders which dismissed Genalyn’s complaint for failure to
prosecute. Moreover, Genalyn’s move to suspend the proceedings which led to the
dismissal of her complaint stemmed essentially from the RTC's erroneous refusal to admit
the supplemental complaint. On the second issue, we unequivocably also settled that
Genalyn committed forum shopping when she filed an appeal and a petition for certiorari
successively. This ruling we uphold as the ruling that should apply.