Soviet Psychology

ISSN: 0038-5751 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrpo19

Chapter IV; Personality Factors in the Structure

of Pathologically Altered Mental Processes: 1.
Personality Factors in Memory

To cite this article: (1972) Chapter IV; Personality Factors in the Structure of Pathologically
Altered Mental Processes: 1. Personality Factors in Memory, Soviet Psychology, 11:2, 61-68

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RPO1061-0405110261

Published online: 19 Dec 2014.

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 Chapter IV

Personalitv Factors in the Structure of

Pathologicallv Altered Mental Processes

1. Personality Factors in Memory

In the last chapter we tried to show how disorders in the

structure of motives can alter a person's activity, personality
traits, values, and character.
In this chapter we shall examine how changes in motives in-
fluence the structure of mental processes. Indeed, contempo-
rary psychology is no longer a science of separate mental
functions. Our mental processes should be viewed as different
forms of mental activity formed during development. Activity
takes the form of a specific process (perception, memory)
depending on the task to which mental activity is directed. For
this reason the same concepts should be used to analyze all our
mental processes that a r e applied to activity as a whole - that
is, in analyzing these processes, we should consider their
personality-motivated component. Back in 1927 we showed this
in an experimental study of memory, i.e., the so-called phe-
nomenon of "recalling incomplete actions."
In this experiment the subject is given a s e r i e s of 18 to 22
tasks to perform. There is a variety of tasks: drawing a mono-
gram, making a certain figure out of matchsticks, stringing
beads, writing a poem, cutting a spiral out of paper, making a
box out of cardboard, calculating backward, multiplying three-
digit numbers, making a figure out of wire, doing a crossword
puzzle, making a landscape (trees, animals, people, and houses
of colored cardboard are provided), etc. The instruction is:
"You will be given a series of tasks. Try to do them as fast

61
62 SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

and as accurately as possible." Half the tasks the subject

finishes, and half are stopped by the experimenter before they
are completed. The halt is called s o that the experimenter
can give the subject other work. If the subject asks what to do
with the unfinished tasks, the experimenter makes a face indi-
cating he did not hear the question o r keeps busy with protocol.
In any case, the subject does not get a clear and definite an-
swer. Just as indefinite for the subject is the order of the fin-
ished and unfinished tasks. A s soon as the last is done, the
experimenter asks, "Tell me, please, what kind of task did you
do ?" (6)
W e should note that carrying out this experiment correctly
and halting the task performance is a very complicated job re-
quiring that all steps be carefully thought out.
The subject's time for naming h is tasks is limited, and the
experimenter writes them down in the order in which the sub-
ject recalls them.
The recall goes easily at first, but pauses soon set in. The
subject begins to actively "search" and "sort through his mem-
ory." The quantitative data obtained come primarily from the
period of "smooth" recall. After finishing the experiment, the
subject makes a verbal reply. This starts as a free discussion
of h i s experiences; then the experimenter asks him to describe
in more detail the stopping point. Finally, the experimenter
asks what kind of tasks interested and appealed to him most.
The experimenter also utilizes the subject's spontaneous ut -
terances during the experiment.
To exclude the influence of the variations among task struc-
tures and individual differences, both the subjects and the tasks
were divided into two groups, which were alternated with each
other.
The experiment showed that subjects can best recall the un-
finished actions. The ratio of recalled unfinished actions to
recalled finished actions ($)was 1.9, i.e., the unfinished ac-
tions were recalled 90% better than the finished ones.
Better recall of the unfinished actions is also reflected in
WINTER 1972-73 63

the fact that the unfinished tasks are recalled first.

The better recall of unfinished actions can be explained as
follows. In normal subjects the experimental situation evokes
some kind of subjective meaning vis-a-vis the situation itself.
In some subjects it evokes a desire to test themselves and has
the character of an "exam." In others it evokes enthusiasm
("I want to do it, and I'll show you I can do it well."). Still
others do the experimental tasks out of a sense of "duty" and
"politeness." Be that as it may, some kind of motive a r i s e s
in every subject that prompts him to perform the task. P e r -
formance of the task appears as a motivated intention. With
unfinished actions, the intention remains unfulfilled and c r e -
ates emotional activity (in K. Lewin's t e r m s , a "dynamic sys-
tem") that manifests itself in another form of activity, i.e., in
recalling. Applying D. N. Uznadze's concept of "set," F. V .
Bassin described this phenomenon by saying that "this activity,
regulated by a specific set and having met some kind of an
obstacle on the path of i t s unfolding, now leaves a neural trace
that one is not aware of as such" (2, p. 290).
We can say that the memory activity actualized an effective
preparedness because of the subject's subjective meaning v i s -
8-vis the experimental situation. Recently the following two
s e r i e s of observations have been discussed.
F i r s t , the preferential recall of unfinished tasks vanishes if
we replace the neutral and meaningless request of "Tell me,
please, what kind of tasks did you do?" with the instruction
"The experiment w a s done to test your memory. Therefore, I
ask you to enumerate the tasks you carried out." With the lat-
t e r instruction, the unfinished and finished actions were r e -
called with equal frequency. The announcement that the ex-
periment is a test of memory changes the meaning of the situ-
ation for the subject; it actualizes a completely new motive -
to demonstrate one's mnemonic powers o r to test them for
oneself.
This new motive, which forces the subject to recall [the
tasks], is not only meaning-inducing but is energizing as
well, because the subject now has the goal of recalling as many
64 SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

tasks as possible. In light of this motive, the tasks are equal.

Affective preparedness for finishing the tasks remains in the
background in the presence of the new motive of recalling as
many tasks as possible. Thus the activity of recalling is set
in a new structure with a different motive, and the new motiva-
tion produces a different result.
The second series of observations confirming the motivational
component's role in memory structure draws on the fact that i f
subjects are fatigued or satiated, they do not tend to recall un-
finished actions any better than finished ones, because in this
condition they naturally do not strive to finish the tasks.
The claim that memory activity is motivated can also be sub-
stantiated in pathological cases. We carried out finished/
unfinished-task-recall experiments among patients with vari-
ous kinds of motivational disorders. The recall ratio varied
with the various disorders. For example, schizophrenics, who
confused their motives and were emotionally very sluggish,
did not recall unfinished actions any better than finished ones.
But patients with rigid hypertrophied emotional sets (such as in
some forms of epilepsy) showed markedly better recall of un-
finished actions (see Table 2).

Table 2

Normal subjects 1.9

Patients with schizophrenia
(simple form) 1.1
Epileptic patients 1 .a
Patients with a n asthenic
syndrome after transferred
infections 1.2

Thus , comparing unfinished/finished action recall in patients

with various pathologies of motivation and affect again con-
firmed the role of the motivational factor in the structure of
mnemonic processes.
WINTER 1972-73 65

* * *
Our graduate student L. V. Bondareva (1969) studied the mo-
tivational factor in the structure of mnemonic processes. In
the study of various mental illnesses i t has been shown that
changes in cognitive processes a r e often manifest in disorders
of the mediation processes (G. V. Birenbaum, 1933; B. V.
Zeigarnik, 1961).
Bondareva sought to analyze and clarify the diverse links
whose disorders give r i s e to pathologies of the mediation pro-
cess. She sought to ascertain the factor "responsible" for
blocking the auxiliary skills that normally change the structure
of mnemonic processes and give them their specifically human
character (L. S. Vygotsky, A. N. Leont'yev, A. A. Smirnov).
Two groups of epileptics were studied: a group with "symp-
tomatic epilepsy" and another group with "epileptic illness."
Patients with local brain lesions (of the hypophysis and s u r -
rounding areas) were also studied. The experimental methods
involved direct rote memorization of words and mediated mem-
orization (following A. N. Leont'yev and A. R . Luria).
Bondareva demonstrated a reduction in the effectiveness of
mediated memorization compared with direct memorization,
in contrast to [findings with respect to] normal children and
adults (Leont'yev).
She showed that the technique of mediated recall, which im-
proves memorization in normal subjects (as Leont'yev showed),
does not function adequately in epileptics. In different epilep-
tic groups mediated memory was impaired in different ways:
in symptomatic epileptics, mediation improved memorization to
only a limited degree; but in patients with epileptic illness, the
mediation actually impeded recall and lowered productivity.
Bundareva explained this by analyzing how the mediation ac-
tivity is carried out. Associations set up in mediated memory
tests served as the chief indicators of the effectiveness of the
various memory aids employed.
The first parameter was the content-bearing aspect of the
signs used to set up mediated associations. The associations
66 SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

set up by epileptics fell into two categories. The first category

included meaningful associations. In setting up these associ -
ations the patients were guided by objective properties of ob-
jects and phenomena and their socially fixed meanings. The
basic elements in the second category of associations were
purely external things, such as the patient's impressions of
peculiarities in the presented material or subjective emotional
factors.
The second parameter w a s the dynamic aspect of the medi-
ation processes and an analysis of their temporal character.
The mediation processes could be: (a) dynamically adequate,
based on a sequential operation of separate elements, or (b)
not goal-directed, in which case the patients, unable to find a
mediating association, continued to be "involved" with details
and to enumerate secondary properties of the stimuli.
The third parameter in studying mediated memory w a s an
analysis of the recall process, because recall is the basic in-
dicator of successful memorization.
In both groups of patients the most frequent recall e r r o r in-
volved calling out words o r phrases related to the means used
for memorization: the recall process actualized what had only
been a connecting link o r transition vehicle between the given
word and the chosen picture and, conversely, between the pic-
t u r e and the word. For example, for mediated memorization
of the phrase "a walk" a subject chooses a picture card with a
t r e e on it and recalls that "the t r e e seems to be a fir tree."
Another patient trying to memorize this same phrase chooses
a card with a fence, explaining "I always take a walk up to the
neighbor's fence," and then recalls the word "neighbor." We
can illustrate Leont'yev's scheme for mediated memory by the
- -
notation A X A, in which A is the word given for memori-
zation and X is the means utilized to memorize it. With patho-
logical changes in the mnemonic processes, the recall scheme
- -
often looks like A X X o r A - X Y. -
Bondareva hypothesized that these disorders of mediated
memory involved total structural derangements of mental a c -
tivity. Her hypothesis w a s borne out by detailed experiments
WINTER 1972-73 67

using such methods as "object classification," the method of

elimination, Kraepelin's calculation, aspiration levels, and the
satiation process. In symptomatic epileptics the mediation
disorders involved fluctuation of their work capacity, whereas
in patients with epileptic illness the mediation disorders could
be explained by increased inertness and a hypertrophied desire
to throw out all details. These data correspond to those of
I. T. Bzhalav & N. V. Rukhadze, who observed that epileptics
act on the basis of a previously fixed set that has an inert and
intermodal character.
Disorders in mediated memorization structure are particu-
larly clear in patients with lesions of the mid-basal areas of
the frontal regions of the brain. In such patients one sees
aspontaneity , inhibition, and anosognosia [ refusal to acknowl-
edge sensory o r motor defects]. Bondareva noted that such
patients do not choose a picture that corresponds to t h e given
word. They unthinkingly choose the first picture they see.
When forced to use a picture to recall a given word, "The task
itself is for them not a task a t all; they most often call out the
name of an object in the picture, or any other word o r phrase
incidentally connected with the picture." (z)
This attitude is not due to difficulties in o r the impossibility
of handling the experimental task. When closely limited by the
experiment o r the task structure, the patients can perform the
tasks without mistakes. An altered attitude toward their s u r -
roundings and possibilities leads to a destruction of mental ac-
tivity, as has been described by A. R. Luria, S. Ya. Rubinshteyn,
Ye. D. Khomskaya, M. Marushevskiy, V. V. Lebedinskiy, and
others.
Thus loss of control and selectivity of mental processes and
replacement of goal-directed acts by stereotyped o r random,
fragmented actions a r e factors that impede mediation and make
it virtually impossible.
The patients with lesions of the hypophysis, chosen by Bonda-
reva for comparison, showed no marked mental disorders.
They effectively improved their memorizing when they used
mediation.
68 SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY

Bondareva thus showed that in disorders of mnemonic ac-

tivity we find a reflection of the various structural changes in
the patient's motivation. The motivational component is an in-
alienable part of the structure and flow of memory processes.

2. Personality Factors in Perception

The role of personality factors is no less significant in the

process of perception. From the theoretical positions of L. S.
Vygotsky, A. R. Luria, and A. V. Zaporozhets it follows that
the development of perception is determined by new tasks that
a r i s e during ontogenesis. Perception advances as perceptual
actions develop that manifest the subject's activity (B. C. Anan'-
yev, 1960; Yu. B. Gippenreiter, 1958; J. Piaget, 1961; L. A.
Venger, 1969; A. V. Zaporozhets, 1960; V. P. Zinchenko, 1967).
The cited works show how perceptual actions develop and ex-
amine their role in constructing an image. They enumerate
the developmental stages of perceptual actions and their ori-
enting and regulating functions. The skill and operations that
constitute perceptual actions, the child's perceptual develop-
ment, and the methods for studying the level of perceptual de-
velopment have all been researched by L. A. Venger (1969).*
All of these works characteristically approach perception as
an activity that includes a basic feature of the human mind,
namely, i t s selectivity (A. N. Leont'yev).
Personality factors in perception have attracted increasing
interest abroad in recent years. In this research the influence
of psychoanalysis and Gestalt psychology is clear, but the facts
obtained a r e of undeniable interest. Thus Witkin and co-workers
(1954) tried to show how perception depends on previous sets
of the personality, on self-image, on interrelations with the
environment, and on awareness and control of one's impulses
(specifically, in this work, aggressive and sexual impulses).
On the basis of perceptual studies, subjects were divided into
two groups - "field-dependent" and "field-independent." Then

*Editor's note: See Soviet Psychology, 1971, -

l O ( l ) , 1-108.