Soviet Psychology and Psychiatry

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On the Subject Matter of Social Psychology

A. V. Baranov

To cite this article: A. V. Baranov (1963) On the Subject Matter of Social Psychology, Soviet
Psychology and Psychiatry, 1:3, 32-38

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/RPO1061-0405010332

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 Social Psychology
A. V. Baranov
ON THE SUBJECT MATTER OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY*
Psychology and sociology (in that they have to do with
social consciousness) study general problems of hu-
man consciousness. Both sciences investigate, in
the final analysis, the same thing, inasmuch as all
human consciousness is socially conditioned, and
this is the meaning of all consciousness of the social.
Soviet psychology has long since adopted this thesis.
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"Is it possible today to point to any psychological
research, " writes A. N. Leont'ev, "which, in one
form or another, has not dealt with the fact that the
behavior and consciousness of a human being are
subject to the influences of socio-historical condi-
tions and change with change in the latter? Even
researches devoted to narrow problems of psycho-
physiology are compelled to concern themselves
with the influence of social consequences (9, p. 9).
The appearance and evolution of human conscious-
ness "is possible only in unity with the development
of social consciousness." In this respect, it differs
fundamentally from the psychology of animals (10,
p. 215). - psychological laws, and therefore this condition of
However, to this day, there exists no mutual con-
tact between psychology and the sociological study
of social consciousness. As a consequence, psy-
chology studies the mental world of man by itself,
and sociology does so by itself. The former investi-
gates the psychological processes of the individual
consciousness, and the second the results of reflec-
tion of social existence in the consciousness, t, e. ,
the objective content of social consciousness.
This reciprocal segregation has not gone unno-
ticed and has even received theoretical justification.
Its essence is the assertion that the specific subject
area of psychology is study of the individual con-
sciousness, and the subject area of social con-
sciousness is ideology, which is the field of histori-
cal materialism.
Some years ago this thesis could only be shaken,
but not refuted. It was vulnerable at one point, to
wit: social consciousness exists not as social spir-
it or reason, not as counterposed to individual con-
sciousness, but through individual consciousness
*Printed for purposes of discussion.
32
Voprosy psikhologii, 1962, No. 2
and thanks to it. Therefore, in the final analysis,
no fundamental difference can exist between the
content and the processes of individual and social
cons ciousness.
Until recently, historical materialism confined
itself, in its study of social consciousness, to the
specific forms (religion, art, science, etc.), In
other words, the science of social consciousness
resolved itself to that of the various forms of ide-
ology, which was confirmed by the thesis presented
by the partisans of a clear-cut distinction between
psychology and sociology. However, most recent-
ly, philosophers and sociologists have posed the
problem more broadly. Sociology studies social
consciousness not only in its ideological forms, but
in the form of public opinion, everyday conscious-
ness, social psychology, in a word, in the form of
unsystematized consciousness. As distinct from
systematized, ideological consciousness, an enor-
mous role is played in everyday consciousness by
the social consciousness is called social psychology.
It goes without saying that everyday consciousness
does not resolve itself solely to a psychological
basis. This is a social phenomenon, and it is sub-
ordinated to sociological laws. However, psycho-
logical features are by no means least important
in this area. Everyday consciousness can be satis-
factorily examined only if we examine it both from
the sociological and the psychological aspects.
Can the science of psychology as it now stands
be of any great help in the study of social con-
sciousness? No, it cannot be. For psychology to
proceed from the social conditioning of conscious-
ness, although necessary, is insufficient.
Social consciousness is always a mass conscious-
ness, and contemporary Soviet psychology, as we
have seen, consciously limits its subject area to
the individual consciousness. However, to apply
the criteria and concepts of individual psychology
to clarification of social consciousness means to
open the door to biologism, which has already hap-
pened in the past (see, for example, 2 and 4), and
which was one of the reasons for the lack of
 VOL. I, NO.3
success of social psychology when it first made its
appearance in the USSR. In explaining social con-
sciousness, it is necessary to base oneself purely
on collective or social psychology.
This idea is not new. As far back as the end of
the last century, the Italian Marxist, A. Labriola,
wrote: "In order to proceed from the economic base
to the general configuration of the historical proc-
ess, we need the aid of that complex of sciences
which might be termed, for the lack of another
name, social psychology. In saying this, I do not
suggest the fantasy of the possible existence of a
social soul or the idea of a false collective spirit
which exists and is manifested in social life by its
social laws, independent of the individual conscious-
ness of people and their material and specific rela-
tionships. This is the purest kind of mysticism.
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Nor do I have in mind the effort... to transfer and
apply to the concept known as social consciousness
categories and forms established in individual psy-
chology" (8, pp. 68-69). The subject area of social
psychclogy, wrote Labriola, is that which has until
now been exclusively the field of interest of crea-
tive writers.
In his day, G. V. Plekhanov also stated that with-
out a knowledge of the laws of social existence it is
impossible to take a single step in the investigation
of social consciousness. However, there is, as yet,
no Marxist social psychology.
In our literature of the last few years, social psy-
chology is regarded almost unanimously as a bour-
geois pseudo-science. * The argument for this cate-
gorical evaluation is the fact that social psychology
is employed by bourgeois scientists for the psychol-
ogization of sociology. On this basis, Marxist op-
ponents of social psychology have essentially identi-
fied it with the psychological trend in sociology (see,
for example, 5).
Social psychology is "essentially nothing but an
attempt to psychologize sociology, i, e., to drag
idealism into the field of study of the social sci-
ences" (11, p. 240).
It is true that social psychology is employed to
reinforce the idealist understanding of history. But
idealism never took the vow not to adapt itself to
the latest in science. On the contrary, for the sake
of self-preservation, it could not attempt to offer a
philosophical interpretation, favorable to itself, of
the most important scientific discoveries. In
*An exception is presented by the viewpoint of B.
G. Anan'ev, expressed in his review of S. L. Rubin-
shtein's book Bytie i soznanie in the journal Voprosy
psikhologii, No.1, 1959, as well as by a unique ar-
ticle by A. G. Kovalev in Vestnik LGU,1959, No. 11,
"0 sotsial'noi psikhologii. "
33
refuting the idealist interpretation of scientific dis-
covery, we are under obligation to preserve and to
master the discovery itself. Materialism must be
placed in opposition to idealism in this very branch
of science. To admit that even any single minor
scientific discovery is the product of idealism
means to abandon the field of battle to idealism.
The identification of social psychology with the
psychological trend in sociology appears, at first
glance, to be rather radical, and to constitute a
principled Marxist approach to this problem. How-
ever strange this may seem, it is exactly how some
of the interpreters of social psychology regard it
abroad. For the majority of bourgeois scientists,
the identification of social psychology with the psy-
chologization of sociology is a predictable conclu-
sion deriving from their philosophical concepts.
In their opinion, social psychology underlies social
consciousness, and the latter is the foundation of
the entire social structure. For them, admission
of the former thesis necessarily means to recog-
nize that social psychology is the interpretation of
society. For a Marxist, the falsity of the second
thesis is obvious, inasmuch as it is not the con-
sciousness of human beings that determines the
structure of society, but, on the contrary, it is
social existence that determines social conscious-
ness. Nor is there a direct and indissoluble con-
nection between the first and the second assertions.
Therefore, recognition of the fact that social psy-
chology underlies social consciousness must be re-
garded as an independent thesis, false or true. It
must not be automatically related to the idealist
(psychological) understanding of society.
Moreover, even in the bourgeois science, social
psychology is understood to deal with two different
subject areas. On the one hand, it includes the
problems of the behavior and the consciousness of
the group and of the individual in the group. On
the other hand, it is the explanation of social phe-
nomena through the prism of psychological laws.
There is an American college in which social
psychology was placed under the department of psy-
chology. Over a period of years, it was taught for
two semesters each year, but by two different in-
structors. One gave it a sociological orientation,
and the other proceeded primarily from general
psychology. Their courses contained Virtually
nothing in common, and the students were left with
radically different concepts of a discipline taught
for an entire year (16, p, 525).
Proof that it is notvalid to identify social psy-
chology with the psychological trend in sociology
is not itself a demonstration that social psychology
as such is valid. The chief argument against it is
the fact that it does not have a particular subject
 34
area of investigation, but employs psychological
methods to barge into the field of sociology. In the
Large Soviet Encyclopedia, we read the following:
"In Soviet science, problems that bourgeois psychol-
ogy unjustifiably classifies in social psychology have
taken their place in the system of sciences on socie-
ty and are treated by specialists in the appropriate
branches of knowledge (historians, philosophers,
economists, etc.) as problems of historical mate-
rialism" (!, p, 197). Let us see how valid this is.
In the opinion of some bourgeois psychologists
and sociologists, the subject area of social psychol-
ogy is the social conditioning of consciousness. In
their opinion, there are two psychologies: thephys-
iological, which studies the physiological basis of
psychological processes, and the social, which
studies the social conditioning of consciousness.
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Man is a "btu-social" organism, to employ Bekh-
terev's phrase. The duality of psychology alleged-
ly reflects the dual nature of the personality. "So-
cial man is erected on top of physical man, "wrote
E. Durkheim, and therefore "no matter what suc-
cesses psycho-physiology has achieved, it can nev-
er be anything more than a portion of psychology,
inasmuch as the bulk of psychological phenomena is
not dependent upon organic causes." This portion
"pertains to another positive science, which might
be called psycho-sociology" (15, pp. 390-391).
The opponents of social psychology are entirely
correct in asserting that there is no need to segre-
gate it as a separate discipline on this basis. The
social conditioning of consciousness is a significant
characteristic of all human consciousness, and
therefore cannot serve as an exceptional, specific
object of study for social psychology. The social
conditioning in the phenomena of so-called social
psychology plays a more direct role than in other
psychological phenomena. This is recognized in-
directly by all psychologists. It is not this fact
that gives social psychology the right to exist; but
it is to the refutation of specifically this fact that
the chief arguments of its opponents have been di-
rected.
"Inasmuch as human experience means social ex-
perience, " writes the American psychologist J. B.
Furst, "it is clear that there can be no human psy-
che that is not simultaneously a social psyche. To
have a special textbook on 'social' psychology, and
a special field titled 'social' psychology is an ab-
surdity and improper use of terms. The human psy-
che is either social or it is not a psyche at all"
(12, pp. 61-62).
This observation would be valid if the need for
social psychology derived solely from a dualist ap-
proach in explaining the psyche of the human being.
Certain psychological phenomena are explained
SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY
naturalistically, that is, physiologically, and others
socially. However, it is not the "convenience" of
the dual ("supplementary, " in the words of the dis-
tinguished physicist Niels Bohr) description of phe-
nomena that brought social psychology into exist-
ence, but the objective existence in reality itself
of certain phenomena of a complex, socio-psycho-
logical nature, which can neither be classified with
phenomena of the individual consciousness nor with
the ideological forms of social consciousness. At
the same time, they serve as a connecting link be-
tween individual and social consciousness.
It does not appear necessary to prove that there
is not yet a universally approved solution to the
problems of the mutual relationships of individual
and social consciousness on the psychological plane.
In any case, it is certainly posed again and again
in the studies both of psychologists and philoso-
phers.
A profound and acute effort to analyze the inter-
relationships of individual and social consciousness
has already been suggested in the cited article of
A. N. Leont'ev. In this article, the author em-
ploys an analogy with a biological organism and
medium, comparing the individual's acquisition of
social consciousness to the phenomenon of heredity,
introducing the concept of species and genus into
psychology. His reasoning centers around the ma-
jor question as to what to understand under the
term "organism" and "environment" in psychology.
Where does the "organism" end and the "environ-
ment" begin? The very posing of this question tes-
tifies to the fact that the problem of consciousness
(and, of course, psychology) is not limited to the
consciousness of the individual. The entire proc-
ess of recognition of the world occurs not in a sin-
gle head, but in many, and it is necessary to study
by what means a single individual adapts himself
to the concepts of others. Mankind thinks and feels
collectively. Psychology cannot dodge this fact.
The opponents of social psychology demonstrate
the invalidity of one of the concepts of the subject
area of social psychology and think that they thus
demonstrate the impossibility of this subject as
such. The fact is that what is fundamental and
what is today actually the sole concept of the subj ect
area is not even dealt with. The essence of this concept
is the fact that social psychology differs from general
psychology as the collective differs from the individual.
The subject area of social psychology is the psy-
chological activity of human beings in groups, in
masses. In other words, the subject. area of social
psychology embraces mass psychological phenom-
ena arising as the consequence of the interactions
of personalities. One of the characteristics of
social consciousness is its mass nature, its
 VOL. I, NO.3
collectivity. Therefore, one might express oneself
as follows: the subject area of social psychology
comprises the psychological laws of social con-
sciousness.
The segregation of social psychology as an inde-
pendent psychological discipline is dictated by the
fact that, both by the nature of its processes and
by the product of psychological activity, collective
psychology differs from that of the individual.
In his practical experience, man deals not only
with the material, inanimate world, but with the
world of the spirit of other human beings, not only
with the objective evidence of feelings, but with the
subjective opinions of the persons around him. It
is obvious that the psychological elaboration of both
the former and the latter products of the mental re-
flection of the world are fundamentally different.
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In the second case, when we receive and process
information that has already been processed by
someone else, we deal with what is, as it were,
psychology of the second order. Here the products
of the psyche bear the imprint of "dual" subjectivity.
This does not mean that there will be less objective
content in knowledge of the world obtained indirect-
ly (through the impressions gained by other human
beings). On the contrary, "the dual" processing of
the products of reflection make it possible to pene-
trate more deeply into the essence of phenomena.
Of course, at the same time the opportunities for
subjective illusion also increase. "Better to see
once than to hear a hundred times, " as the Chinese
proverb says.
It is also completely invalid to contend that the
interaction of consciousness in the mass will al-
ways result in a diminution in the quality of the in-
tellectual activity, and to dominance by irrational-
ism. Today, Soviet and foreign psychologists have
not only demonstrated theoretically, but have con-
firmed experimentally, the invalidity of LeBon's
rule with respect to "downward leveling, " which
has been used to demonstrate not only the stupidi-
ty of the crowd, but the fact that the individual be-
comes more stupid within the group.
A major portion of the problems of social psy-
chology center around the following fundamental
problem: the nature of the course of psychological
processes in groups. There are two approaches to
classification of this group of problems. External-
ly they differ, but essentially it is not uncommon to
find them coinciding. Psychological processes in
groups may be classified under the same headings
as processes of individual psychology such as per-
ception, memory, feelings. This is the approach
of C. Blondel (13). Primary attention may be cen-
tered on the newly-shaped forms of mental activity
and one may examine its intellectual, emotions,
35
and will-power aspects, respectively. When this
is done, the problems of formation of the person-
ality are examined separately, followed by the in-
terrelationship of personal consciousnesses in the
form of discussion, conviction, styles, customs,
the assimilation of group opinions or sentiments by
the individual, etc. These processes are again
rendered concrete for various types of social
groups. This is the approach more Widely used
(14, 16).
Without defending either of the classifications of
these problems (Marxist social psychology will
doubtless develop its own approach to investigation
of this area and provide its own classification of its
problems), it is clearly necessary to pause to
prove the possibility in theory of psychological
processes of a nature other than those occurring
in individual psychology.
The following idea has already been suggested in
this article. In the process of interaction among
human beings there arises, as it were, a second-
ary psychology, i, e., what we have is a mediation
of the impressions and the thoughts of an individual
by impressions and thoughts of other people.
Thought has distinctive characteristics when it oc-
curs in a group. In the individual act of thought
(assuming normal conditions), the entire process
of analysis and synthesis is an internal one. In the
act of collective thought, for example, in one of an
open debate, the process of analysis and synthesis
has both an internal, personal, and an external, in-
terpersonal nature.
In individual thinking, the feeling of confidence
and correctness with respect to one's conclusion
is governed by the logic of the object under discus-
sion and the state of the consciousness of the think-
ing individual. In collective thought, conviction is
conditioned additionally by the subjective and ob-
jective qualities of other members of the group, for
example, ilie authority they enjoy.
In speaking of the emotional phenomena of collec-
tive psychology, attention is most frequently cen-
tered upon mood. Social mood also has qualities
different from those expressed by the concept of
mood in general psychology. This additional char-
acteristic of social mood is its "infectiousness, "
"volatility" in a mass of people who are in mental
communion with each other or who are merely
within visual proximity and under approximately
equal conditions. The property of the "infectious-
ness" of mood was noted even by primitive peoples
and was employed to excite a corresponding mood
by participation in mass dances or observation
thereof. We find testimony to the "infectiousness"
of moods in the writings of V. I. Lenin. "The work-
ers of neighboring factories always experience a
 36
rise in spirit when they see that their comrades
have begun to fight ... Frequently it takes only a
strike in a single factory to launch a series of
strikes in a large number of factories. So great
is the moral influence of strikes, so infectious is
the effect upon the workers of the sight of their
comrades who have, at least for a time, changed
from slaves to people having rights equal with the
wealthy!" (1, p, 291)
For the understanding of social psychology, mood
as an emotional state spread throughout a mass of
people is of particular significance. However, to
reduce the emotionality of social psychology solely
to the function of mood is erroneous. It is also nec-
essary to take into consideration other fundamental
manifestations of emotionality: affects (such as
panic) and sentiments (such as the sentiment of pa-
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triotism).
Many vivid pages have been written both by crea-
tive writers and by revolutionary journalists on the
nature of the aspect represented by will in the con-
sciousness of people in a collective. They note the
very decisive behavior of people in groups along
with the fact that they are more readily subject to
panic.
In a word, the nature of psychological activity in
the individual human being and in human beings in
groups differs either in form or in intensity or by
other characteristics.
The specific nature of psychological activity in a
group has long been known and considered in psy-
chology to one or another degree. Moreover, de-
spite the sharply negative attitude toward social
psychology, certain of its problems have already
become objects of research.
"Do not Soviet educators and psychologists in
treating problems of psychology and character
building actually concern themselves with the elab-
oration of one of the most important problems of
social psychology? The problem of the formation
of a collective group (including public opinion) and
the shaping of the personality in the group, through
the group, and for the group, is exactly such a
problem. Consequently, in point of fact, problems
of social psychology are already being elaborated
in Soviet pedagogy" (6, p. 79).
The elaboration ofsocial psychology will be of
great significance. Even now it may be stated with
confidence that the contact between psychology and
sociology will be extremely fruitful for the latter,
since it will permit more concrete solutions of a
number of problems of social consciousness, in
some cases with even experimental precision.
The development of social psychology will be of
even greater significance to psychology itself. To
begin with, an entire field of new phenomena will
SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY
be subjected to scientific analysis, and this will en-
rich both the subject area and the methods of psy-
chology. Moreover, it may be stated in a certain
sense that general psychology will come to comple-
tion only with the elaboration of social psychology.
We say "come to completion" not in the sense that
another "outbuilding" will appear, another psycho-
logical discipline, but in the sense that a number
of problems of general psychology will attain a
more satisfactory and rounded illumination. Social
psychology begins where general (individual psychclo-
gyends, that is, with the psychology of the personality.
In Soviet science, the psychology of the person-
ality has as yet been but weakly elaborated. One
of the reasons for this backwardness, in our opin-
ion, is a peculiar "individualism" in the approach
to the problem. "The first and basic principle in
the study of the psychology of the personality of
Soviet man, " says K. N. Kornilov, "consists of
the fact that the direct subjects of its study are the
individual psychological features of the personality,
but not the personality as such, and not its social
relationships" (7). However, in the opinion of many
psychologists, iiie elaboration of the psychology of
the personality is the point of departure as well as
the culminating point of any psychological study.
"The introduction of the personality into psycholo-
gy, " writes S. L. Rubinshtein, "is a necessary
prerequisite for the clarification of psychological
phenomena" (11). The social conditioning of the
consciousness of the individual is the point of de-
parture for psychological investigation. The per-
sonality, as the subject of history, and as the ac-
tor, is the culminating point. However, as a con-
sequence of "individualism, " these valid postulates
remain mere declarations.
Let us summarize. Inorderto progress onthe ba-
sis of mutual enrichment, sociology and psychology
require a certain further development within the frame-
work of these two sciences. Also necessary is a change
in the customary approach to social consciousness as
merely ideology, and to psychology as merely the sci-
ence ofthe individual consciousness. It is necessary
for each to make a step in the direction of the other. It
does not suffice to recognize the social conditioning of
the consciousness ofthe individual. This is necessary
but not sufficient. A second step is necessary, invol v-
ing the recognition, in one form or another, ofthe fact
that social consciousness is a separate and distinct
psychological category. Sociology has made such a
step by introducing the problems of social conscious-
ness into the problem of consciousness in daily life or
social psychology. Nowit's up to psychology to make
its move.
Social, or group, psychology has its subject
area, and consequently its right to exist.
 VOL. I, NO.3
It already does exist and is progressing, particu-
larly in the United States, England, and France. It
goes without saying that Soviet science cannot ac-
cept in its present form what is presented as social
psychology in the West. This is because of the ide-
alistic confusion in the basic problems of the philos-
ophy of history which psycho-sociologists manifest
primarily in their inability to differentiate distinct-
ly between social existence and social conscious-
ness, and in their failure to understand the rela-
tionship between them. Moreover, the problem is
ultimately confused by the introduction into social
psychology of the illusions and confusions of vari-
ous psychological and sociological schools. Bour-
geois social psychology, studying the particulars
of its field, lacks adequate theoretical grounding,
and this is responsible for its descriptive and pet-
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ty empirical character. *
The development of sociology, on the one hand, and
of psychology, on the other, is responsible for put-
ting the problem of social psychology on the order
of the day. The need for researches in social psy-
chology is currently dictated by a number of other
factors in our life. The development of socialist
society as the most democratic of all is inconceiva-
ble Without consideration of the opinion of the broad-
est masses of the people on the broadest range of
problems. To derive from the masses, to systema-
tize and then to return to the masses what are then
scientifically conceived and systematized ideas, is
a matter of principle for our Party. In order to
give more accurate and better consideration to the
opinions of the masses, in order properly to orient
ourselves in social psychology and yet not find our-
selves led around by the nose by it, we must study
its laws. It may be stated with confidence that re-
searches in social psychology are needed, above
all, by practical workers in the Party, in the labor
unions, and in the sphere of politics in general.
Today, the problem of combatting the vestiges of
religion in the consciousness of Soviet people is
particularly acute. However, we know that the
propaganda of atheism does not always find its goal.
The point is that religious moods among a portion
of the Soviet people are not based upon religious
dogma, and therefore exposure of the stupidity of
*The theoretical rootlessness of bourgeois so-
cial psychology is recognized to some degree by
the psycho-sociologists themselves. "It must be
stated, " we find in the latest edition of the Encyclo-
pedia Americana, "that social psychology as a
whole is still in need of a theoretical basis of suf-
ficient breadth and solidity" (Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana, 1957, Vol. 25, "Social Psychology," by
Floyd H. Allport). [Retranslated from the Russtan.]
37
religious ideology does not convince them that con-
sistent atheism is correct. Their religious faith
is frequently particularly psychological in its basis.
In order to triumph and eliminate all religious ex-
periences, it is necessary to influence the psychol-
ogy of religious persons, and this again requires
that we study the laws of social psychology.
Finally, one might also refer to what might be
called the moral need for a study of social psychol-
ogy. The fact is that in capitalist society, which
is individualistic through and through, an attempt,
good or bad, is being made to study collective psy-
chology, whereas in our society which is thorough-
ly permeated with the spirit of collectivism, only
individual psychology is being developed. But the
fact is that our collectivism is the most favorable
of soils for the development of social psychology!
Finally, we have something that does not exist
in bourgeois science, and the lack of which deter-
mines its pedestrian and petty empiricism. We
have a scientific theory of society, historical mate-
rialism, which provides an irreplaceable theoreti-
cal foundation for social psychology. We have all
the conditions for the development of social psy-
chology, and there is the most acute need for it
both among practical workers and among social
scientists. Inasmuch as this is the case, Marxist
social psychology must take its place among the
Marxist social sciences.
Footnotes
1) Lenin, V. I., Soch., Vol. 4.
2) Bekhterev, V. M., Kollektivnaia refleksolo-
giia.
-"3) Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, Vol. 40,
2nd ed., 1957.
4) Vagner, V. A., Psikhologicheskie tipy i
kollektivnaia psikhologiia, 1929.
5) Zamoshkin, Iu, A., Psikhologicheskoe naprav-
lenie v sovremennoi burzhuaznoi sotsiologii, Izd-
vo IMO, 1958.
6) Kovalev, A. G., "0 sotsial'noi psikhologii,"
Vestnik LGU, 1959, No. 11.
7) Kornilov, K. N., "Printsipy izucheniia psikh-
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 38
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Downloaded by [New York University] at 17:27 24 June 2016
Experimental Neurosis
T. D. Dztdztgurf
A TECHNIQUE FOR INDUCING EXPERIMENTAL NEUROSIS
IN SMALL LABORATORY ANIMALS
Research in the mechanism of endocrine dis-
orders in functional disturbances of the central
regulatory apparatus requires the development of
an appropriate model of the affection. The employ-
ment of an experimental neurosis would seem to
be promising in this regard. The Pavlov school
has thoroughly elaborated techniques of inducing
experimental neuroses in dogs, but when small
laboratory animals (mice, rats) are employed in
large-scale experiments, existing techniques do
not provide a means of inducing a long-lasting
pathological condition of the higher centers of
the central nervous system.
The technique we developed is based on the
Widely-known incident of disturbance in the higher
nervous activity of dogs in Pavlov's laboratory
during the Leningrad flood of 1924.
The author is associated with the Laboratory of
Pathological Physiology, Institute of Female
Physiology and Pathology, Georgian Ministry of
Public Health, Tbilisi.
SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY
15) Durkheim, E., Les Formes elementaires de
la vie religieuse, Paris, 1912, pp. 390-391.
16) Lindsey, G., ed., Handbook of Social Psy-
chology, Cambridge, 1954, Vols. 1, 2.
17) Tomas, A. S., "Sociology and Interdiscipli-
nary Developments," Modern Sociological Theory,
New York, 1957, p, 525.
***
Zhurnal vysshei nervnoi deiatel'nosti, 1962, No.3
A glass-walled cage allowing observation of the
behavior of the animals was built to permit imita-
tion of a flood, so as to produce experimental
neurosis in rats. The cage had two pipe connec-
tions permitting controlled admission and drainage
of water. A horizontal bar with suspended ladder
for access to it when the water reached a specific
level (see illustration) was installed in the upper
portion of the cage. The experiments were run
with 14 white Wistar rats.
Positive motor food reflexes and inhibitory
reflexes (the positive to a bell, a 120-beat metro-
nome and 50-watt light, and the negative to a 60-
beat metronome) were developed in the animals in
a separate chamber (by the method of L. I.
Kotliarevskii) to permit judgment as to the func-
tional condition of the higher centers of the nervous
system. Ovarian activity was studied with the aid
of vaginal masks to determine the functional state
of internal organs.
After the system of conditioned reflexes had
become firmly established and the background
level of ovarian actiVity determined, the artificial