The Turkey-Pakistan

entente: Muslim middle

powers align in Eurasia

In the 1950s, at the onset of the Cold War, Pakistan and Turkey were part of
the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO, a pro-Western bloc of Muslim-
majority states. Today, the two countries — both with troubled relations with
the United States — are Muslim middle powers with a growing entente in a
multipolar Eurasia.

In recent years, cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey has strengthened

not just in the defense, diplomatic, and economic realms, but also in the
cultural space, causing geopolitical ripple effects in the Himalayas, the
Arabian Peninsula, and the South Caucasus.

The emerging Pakistan-Turkey entente now has the buy-in of Pakistan’s

leading political parties and three military services, as well as the Turkish
leadership. The partnership aids and, at times, complicates the quest of both
countries for strategic autonomy as options in the West narrow. However, the
potential of the Pakistani-Turkish entente will be constrained by the economic
precarity of the two countries and the limited prospects for growth in trade in
the near term.

Brothers in arms
On Jan. 23, at a ceremony for Turkish-built naval vessels, including a corvette
for the Pakistan Navy, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke of the “great
potential” for defense industrial cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey,
which he described as “brotherly countries.”
Indeed, as its domestic arms industry has grown rapidly, so too has the profile
of Ankara’s defense deals with Islamabad, quickly shifting from the upgrading
of Pakistani hardware originally procured from other NATO countries
— American F-16s and French Agosta 90-B subs — to the sale of arms made
in Turkey.
Turkish arms transfers to Pakistan totaled $112 million from 2016-2019,
according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
During this period, Turkey was Pakistan's fourth-largest source of arms,
surpassing the United States, and Pakistan was Turkey’s third-largest arms
export market, according to SIPRI. These numbers will grow as Turkey fulfills
recent orders from Pakistan exceeding $3 billion, including the purchase
of four MILGEM Ada-class corvettes, two of which will be built in Pakistan,
and 30 T-129 Atak helicopters.
Pakistani and Turkish aspirations for defense autarky were both born from
bitter experiences of being sanctioned by the West. Continued Western
compellence also drives — and problematizes — Pakistan-Turkey defense
cooperation. The T-129 helicopter deal has been in limbo as Congress has
blocked export licenses to Turkey for its American-British designed LHTEC
T800-4A turboshaft engine. Turkey is developing a replacement for the T800-
4A, the TEI TS1400, which could salvage the deal should U.S.-Turkey
relations remain cold. But the TS1400 is currently in the prototype stage —
years away from service. 
While China will remain Pakistan’s main source of imported defense
hardware, Turkey too provides an alternative to increasingly inaccessible
American and French equipment, and modestly eases Islamabad’s
dependence on Beijing. The T-129s are intended to replace Pakistan’s aging
fleet of American AH-1F Cobras. Pakistan has also purchased Turkish
armaments for its JF-17 fighter jet, jointly manufactured with China.
Pakistan-Turkey defense relations go beyond purchases of Turkish arms by
Islamabad. Ankara has procured training aircraft, drone parts, and bombs
from Islamabad. And the two countries are also increasingly pursuing
technological cooperation. The MILGEM Ada-class ship deal, for example,
involves the transfer of technology. Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) has
also secured an agreement with Pakistan’s premier engineering school, the
National University of Science and Technology, for research and development
cooperation and faculty and student exchanges. TAI has also agreed to set up
shop at Pakistan’s National Science and Technology Park, a section of which
will focus on defense projects, including cyberwarfare, drones, and radar
technology.

A diplomatic bloc
Earlier in January, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, and Turkey held the second round of
foreign minister-level trilateral talks in Islamabad, issuing a joint
statement reflecting alignment on the disputes in Cyprus, Kashmir, and
Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan and Pakistan have for some time sided with one another on their
main territorial disputes. And Turkey has long been a supporter of Azerbaijani
sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh. But Turkey’s embrace of the Kashmiri
cause is relatively new. In recent years, Erdoğan has vocally advocated a
negotiated settlement to the Kashmir conflict, including at the U.N. General
Assembly, where he called for the dispute to be resolved “within the
framework of the U.N. resolutions” and “in line with the expectations of the
people of Kashmir.”
Erdoğan’s language has angered New Delhi, which bristles at any outside
attempt to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. And Erdoğan has won hearts
in Pakistan, which has struggled to gain diplomatic support, including from
Muslim-majority countries, for its position on Kashmir.
Driven in part by a desire to expand ties with New Delhi, a leading energy
importer, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh have distanced themselves from support for
the Kashmiri cause. But Pakistan, particularly after India’s effective
annexation of Kashmir in 2019, sees Kashmir as an existential issue. As a
result, it has doubled down on alignment with Turkey, even initially partnering
with Iran, Malaysia, and Turkey to hold an Islamic summit in Kuala Lumpur in
December 2019. This angered Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, resulting in Islamabad
backing out of the summit. Despite Pakistan’s compliance, months later, after
Erdoğan’s state visit to Islamabad, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to repay
short-term loans meant to bolster its precarious foreign exchange reserves.
The Turkish-Pakistani bloc has also ruffled feathers elsewhere. In October,
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gave an interview with an Indian
news channel partly owned by a member of the country’s Hindu
nationalist ruling party and, without evidence, accused Pakistan of sending
mercenaries to Nagorno-Karabakh.
A culture of Muslim nationalism
Turkey’s diplomatic reach into Pakistan extends into the soft power space as
well. An Urdu-language version of the series, “Diriliş: Ertuğrul,” which
chronicles the rise of the father of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, is a hit
in Pakistan.
The Turkish state television-produced show airs in primetime on the state-run
Pakistan Television. Views of its first episode on YouTube alone exceed 90
million and the show’s Turkish cast members are now celebrities in Pakistan.
The success of “Ertuğrul” has spurred discussions between the two countries
on the development of a new series, “Turk Lala,” profiling a man from present-
day Pakistan who migrated to Turkey in 1920 and fought in support of the
embattled Ottoman Empire.
Muslim nationalism, both as a contemporary sentiment and a historical
narrative, now colors a relationship rooted in realpolitik.

The road ahead: Vulnerable economies

Alongside rising arms sales, Turkish economic investment in Pakistan has
grown in the past decade. Turkish foreign direct investment in Pakistan since
2009 has exceeded $300 million. Zorlu Energy, a Turkish company, has
constructed a series of renewable independent power projects. In 2016,
Arçelik, the home appliance subsidiary of the Turkish conglomerate Koç
Holding, bought the Pakistani company Dawlance for $258 million. Lahore’s
waste management has also been outsourced to two Turkish
companies since 2012.
While Turkish investment in Pakistan has risen, bilateral trade between the
two countries has remained stagnant over the past decade, peaking at around
$1.1 billion in 2011, according to U.N. Comtrade, partly due to Ankara’s
protectionism. Talks over a free trade agreement have also stalled.
Late last year, Turkey’s transport minister said that a rail line connecting Iran,
Pakistan, and Turkey could become operational in 2021. But policies that
inhibit trade and the abysmal state of Pakistan’s rail network will have to be
addressed for their economic connectivity aspirations to go beyond rhetoric.
Pakistan and Turkey have rapidly formed a strategic partnership in recent
years amid a very fluid global order. The two countries share important
elements of national power — strong militaries, strategic locations, and
sizeable populations — that will drive defense, diplomatic, and technological
cooperation in the years to come.

But the two countries also share some vulnerabilities: their economies are in
their worst shape in two decades and both countries are net energy importers.
In the case of Pakistan, the structural economic weaknesses are far more
deep: chief among them, the dismal state of human development.

For both Pakistan and Turkey to succeed in their respective quests for
strategic autonomy and leverage their partnership into firm geostrategic gains,
sustained economic growth is absolutely essential.