andthe

Science,Technology,
SpanishColonialExperiencein the
NineteenthCentury
AlbertoElena*and JavierOrd6nez**

ABSTRACT

Nineteenth-centurySpain-usingtheresources thatremained ofitsvastempire-

struggledtomaintain itsplaceas an international
power.Followingthelossofits
coloniesontheAmerican continent,
however,itcouldassumeonlya modestimpe-
rialpresence.This loss occurredat preciselythetimethatthecountry, lagging
behindotherEuropeanpowers,was takingitsfirst tentative
stepstowardindustri-
alizationand modernization.The delayin modernizing, alongwithSpain'sstill
quitemodestscientific and technologicalcapacities,madeit impossibleforthe
country tobecomeanything morethana spectator duringtheage ofgreatimperial
adventures.As thecentury facedthecrisisof 1898.
closed,Spain,disillusioned,

It is truethatSpain, convalescingfroman illness whichhad lastedforfour centuries,

could not now considerprovidingbeingsfor new societies . . ., because it wouldfirst
have to colonize itselfratherthanotherunknownand wild regions.Yet,ifitis at present
unable tofoundgreatsocieties,itshouldat least endeavorto sow theseedsfor themor
renounceits hope of immortality .. .; it should establishhere a tradingpost, therea
smallfarmingsettlement, set up a militarycamp in Borneo,in Jolo,on theRed Sea, the
islands of thePacific,the Gulfof Guinea, along theSlave Coast and theBarbaryand
Saharian coasts, in theRif so that,underitspresentslow development, theseoutposts
mightserve as a reserveand pave thewayfor solvinga problemwhichwill be facing
us once morein a few years' time. -Joaquin Costa

*Departmento de Logica, Facultadde Filosophia,UniversidadAut6nomade Madrid,28049

Madrid,Spain.
**Departmento Linguisticay Logica,Facultadde Filosophiay Letras,Universidad Autonomade
Madrid,28049 Madrid,Spain.
Ciertoque Espafna, de una enfermedad
convaleciente de cuatrosiglos,no puedepensarahora
en darel sera nuevassociedades. . ., que antesdebe atendera colonizarsea si propiaque a
colonizarregionesignotasy salvajes.Perosi de momento no puedefundar grandessociedades,
cuandomenosdebe sembrarlas o renunciar a viviren la posteridad.... Debe establecerora
factorfascomerciales, orapequefiosnuicleos de poblaci6nagrfcola, ora estacionesmilitares
en
Borneo,en Jol6,en el marRojo, en las islas del Pacifico,en el golfode Guinea,en la costade
los Esclavos,en las de Berberiay del Sahara,en el Rif,paraque,desarrollandose ahoralenta-
mente,sirvande reservay preparen la soluci6ndel problematalcomovolveremos a plantearlo
dentrode pocos anlos.
JoaquinCosta,Marinaespanolao la cuesti6nde la escuadra(Madrid:BibliotecaEcon6mica,1913),
p. 40.

C 2001 byThe Historyof ScienceSociety.All rights

reserved.
0369-7827/99/1401-0004$02.00

Osiris,2001, 15:00-00 70

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 71

INTRODUCTION

DURINGTHE SECOND HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,THE

industrializednationsof Europe, led by Britain,Prussia,and France, were
enjoyingenormouseconomicgrowthand tradingtheirmanufactured goods bothat
home and throughout the world.Afterthe 1870s, theybecame the leaders in an
aggressivecampaignto acquirenew colonies,particularly in Africa,whichtheyas-
sumed would make themeven moreprosperous.Spain, demoralizedand impover-
ished by theloss of mostof its formerempire,wishedto sharein thisprosperity.
In orderto do so, it seemed obvious to manyin earlynineteenth-century Spain
thattwo changes were essential:(1) Spain mustfinallycatch up withmodem sci-
ence, improveits transportation and communicationssystems,develop a modem
industrialbase, and enhance its own productivity and thatof the colonies it still
possessed; (2) Spain must,like the othergreatpowers,acquire new colonies. The
firstgoal was to be deeply underminedby a trading/manufacturing mentalitythat
Spain had inheritedfromits earlierempire.The second goal was flawedin itself,
since in thisera colonies seldom broughtthe greatEuropean powersthe expected
profits.Wealthcame ratherfromindustryand fromtradingmanufactured products
widelybothat home and abroad. The Spanish,who had gained greatwealthfrom
theirSouthAmericanconquestsin the sixteenthcentury, could hardlybe expected
to anticipatethatcolonies were now a dubiousinvestment.

ACQUIRING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

It has been well establishedthatSpain was veryslow to embracemodem science

and technology, farbehindtheleadingEuropeannations.2Spain's leaderswerenot,
however,as has oftenbeen asserted,completelyindifferent to theneed to develop a
modem industrialbase at home and in the colonies and to enjoy the benefitsof
modem technology.The Spanish leadershipunderstoodthatmodem science and
technologywere essentialif Spain were to enjoy theprosperity and easier lifestyle
thattheUnitedStatesand manynationsin Europe possessed by thistime.
A traditionalSpanish attitudetowardstrade with the colonies and industryat
home, which we mighttermthe "rentiermentality," underminedthese efforts,as
well as thestrenuouseffortsthatweremade after1850 to introducemoderntechnol-
ogy,communications, and industryin Spain. In its firstcolonial experience,Spain
had grownused to importing wealthwholesalefromthecolonies,in a fairlyuncom-
plicatedmanner:largequantitiesof silverand othervaluable naturalproductsfrom
SouthAmerica; luxuryitemssuch as tobacco, to enhancethelifestyleof theelite;
cash in theformof rents,taxes,duties,and fees; foodstuffs; and productsthatcould
be used by established in
industries Spain-all of these simplycame to themetropo-
lis withoutrequiringmuch culturalchange at home to maintainthe flow.As for
exports,Spain could exportmanyof itsagricultural or manufactured productsto the
colonies,sometimesimposingthemthroughmonopolistictraderestrictions. To gain
wealthfromthiseconomy,Spain had not had to develop manynew technologies,

2 See especially industrial

Nadal,El Fracasode la revoluci6n
Jordi enEspara, 1814-1913(Barce-
withhislaterreassessment
lona:Ariel,1975),together in"Ii Fallimento industriale
dellarivoluzione
inPeterMathias,DavidS. Landes,S. BerrickSaul etal., La
in Spagna:Un Bilanciostoriografico,"
Rivoluzione trail Settecento
industrials (Milan:Mondadori,1984),pp. 209-32.
e l'Ottocento

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72 ALBERTO ELENA AND JAVIERORDONEZ

revolutionize itsindustries, or aggressivelyseeknewmarkets beyondthecolonies

themselves. The habitofexpecting goodeconomicthingsto comeintoSpainfrom
abroadwastohavean ironicresult.In attempting tomodernize itscommunications
andindustries between1850and1900andtodevelopa scientific andtechnological
infrastructure, Spainandsomeofitscolonieswere,ineffect, colonizedbyscientifi-
callyadvancedcountries and failedto developa firmscientific, technological, or
industrial base ofitsown.
Theintroduction oftherailways inSpainis a goodexampleofthereverse coloni-
zationthatthecountry experienced. Enthusiasm fortherailways was,if anything,
too greatin Spain.ProsperMerimee,in a letterto FranqoisAragoon 2 February
1859,observed, "Everything has changedin Spainandit has becomeprosaicand
French.People onlyspeak abouttherailwaysand industry."3 The investment of
Spanishcapitalin thefirstphaseof railwayconstruction (1848-1866)was huge;
indeedeconomichistorians suchas GabrielTortellahaveattributed thefailureof
theentireprojectof industrialization in Spainto excessiveinvestment in therail-
ways,whichabsorbedcapitalthatcouldhavebeenusedto developothersectors.4
In hisnovelJourney totheMoon(1865),JulesVernecommented revealingly when
he explainedSpain'ssmallcontribution to thescientific projectdescribedin the
book:'As forSpain,itwas impossible to gettogethermorethanone hundred and
tenreales[,]underthepretext thattheyhadto completethelayingoftheirrailway
network." "Thetruth is thatscienceis notgivenverymuchattention inthatcountry.
Itis stilla littlebackward?5 Theenormous investmentmadebySpaininrailways in
the1860sprovedbarelyprofitable andcausedthesectoritselftogo intocrisis.6
In principle, therailwaysseemedan irreproachable investment. At firstrailways
hadbeenseenbytheindustrialized powersprimarily as a meansforimproving re-
gionaltransportation, butit was notlongbeforetheirusefulness forensuring the
exploitation ofrawmaterials fromthecoloniesandforpenetrating foreign markets
was understood.7 The mostrecenteconomicexpansionin industrialized countries
suchas theUnitedStatesorPrussiahadclearlybeenfueledwithwealthgenerated
bytherailways.8 In bothcases,however, importing thebasicrailway technology had
required an educational infrastructure
to assimilateideasarriving fromBritainand
(later)France,together withan industrial andcommercial base to supplymaterial
fortherailways andmanufactured goodsforcommerce.
However, theSpanishcase hadlittleincommonwiththeexperience oftheyoung
UnitedStatesorPrussia.According totheleadinghistorian ofscienceJuanVernet,
Spaindid notevenbegintojoin thewaveof scientific andtechnological develop-

3Quotedin M. C. L6cuyerandC. Serrano,La GuerredAfriqueetses repercussions en Espagne:

Ideologieset colonialismeen Espagne,1859-1904(Paris:PressesUniversitaires de France,1976),
p. 21.
4 Gabriel Tortella,
Los Origenesdel capitalismoen Espaha: Banca, industriayferrocarrilesen el
sigloXIX (Madrid:Tecnos,1973),pp. 163-200and338-40.
5 JulesVerne,De la terreii la lune(Geneva:Fanot,1979),chap. 12,"Urbietorbi,"pp. 109-10.
6 Nadal,El Fracasode la revoluci6n industrial,
(cit.n. 2), p. 50.
7 See, forexample, DanielR. Headrick,TheToolsofEmpire:Technology and EuropeanImperial-
ismin theNineteenth Century (New York:OxfordUniv.Press,1981),pp. 180-203,and idem,The
Tentacles ofProgress:Technology intheAgeofImperialism,
Transfer 1850-1940(NewYork:Oxford
Univ.Press,1988),pp. 49-96.
8 See DarwinStapleton, The Transfer ofEarlyIndustrialTechnologies toAmerica(Philadelphia:
AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,1987), especiallypp. 127 ff.,and Wolfhard Weber,"Preussische
Transferpolitik,
1780bis 1829,"Technikgeschichte, 1983,50:181-96.

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 73

mentuntilthe 1850s.9The educationalinfrastructure was barelyestablished.Al-

thoughbetween 1834 and 1855, under Isabel II, engineeringcolleges had been
founded(or refounded,in the case of theEscuela de Caminos, Canales y Puertos
[School of Public Works]),it was stilltoo earlyfortheseto bear fruit.Spain would
be largelydependentupon foreigntechnologistsfor building and operatingthe
railways.
Spain's slownessto industrializemeantthatthe manufactured productsrequired
forthe railwaysalso had to be purchasedabroad. Spain producedlittlesteel and
few steelmanufactured products.As a result,thebuildingof therailwaysdepended
initiallyon huge purchasesof materiel fromabroad. The factthatno steamloco-
motivewas manufactured in Spain until1884 is a good indicationof thesituation.
By the same token,the international tradein manufactured productsthathad so
enrichedPrussiaand theUnitedStateswiththeaid of therailwaysdid notoccur in
Spain; thecountryhad veryfew manufactured productsto sell.
Afterthe initialrailwaysboom, a shortageof capital occurred,and Spain would
have been unable to continueto develop the railwayswithoutthe aid of foreign
investors.After1866, 60 percentof all the capital investedin the railwayswas
French,and theprofitsfromthisinvestment wentto France.10This financingdid,of
course,help to improvethetransport networkin mainlandSpain, but no consider-
ationwas givenat anytimebytheSpanishas to whetherthenetworkwas evergoing
to them.Insteadtheygave themselvesoverto "railwaysfever"
to be reallyprofitable
ratheras thoughit werejust anotherluxury.11 Railwayswere adoptedprimarilyas a
tokenof progress.The desireforprofitwas alwayssubordinateto thedesireforboth
internaland internationalpoliticallegitimationof Spain as a modernstate.
The modernization of Spain'sminingindustry is anotherexampleofreversecolo-
nization.Miningwas one of Spain'straditional sourcesof wealth,butmodernization
of the industryin the late nineteenthcenturyenrichedotherEuropean countries
ratherthanSpain. In theirlegal modificationof the miningindustryin 1849 and
1859, as the economic historianJordiNadal has pointedout,12Spanish legislators
were promptedby a desire to make the technologicallyoutmodedindustryprofit-
able, butbecause Spain could notitselfprovidethenecessarytechnologicalexper-

I JuanVernet, de Espania,1975),p. 284.

Historiade la cienciaespanola(Madrid:Instituto
10See Ivan T. Berend and GyorgyRanki, The European Peripheryand Industrialization,1780-
1914(Cambridge/Paris/Budapest:Cambridge Univ.Press/Editionsde la Maisondes Sciencesde
l'Homme/Akad6miaiKiad6,1982),p. 81. Farfrombeingexceptional, hegemony
thisforeign like-
see theworksofGabrielTortella,
othervitalsectorssuchas thechemicalindustry:
wiseinfluenced
Empresaquimicaespaniola:
"La Primera La SociedadEspafiolade Dinamita(1872-1896),"in Hist-
oria economica y pensamientosocial: Estudios en homenaje a Diego Mateo del Peral, eds. Gonzalo
Anes,Luis AngelRojo, andPedroTedde(Madrid:Alianza,1983); andJordiNadal,"La Debilidad
Moneday Credito,
quimicaespafiolaen el siglo XIX: Un Problemade demanda,"
de la industria
1986, 176, reproducedin idem, Moler, tejer y fundir: Estudios de historia industrial(Barcelona:
Ariel,1992),pp. 273-305.
11In relationtothebuildingandexploitation
oftherailwaysin Spain,see MiguelArtola,ed.,Los
Ferrocarrilesen Espana, 1844-1943,2 vols.(Madrid:Serviciode Estudiosdel Banco de Espafia,
1978); Antonio G6mez Mendoza, Ferrocarril,Industriay Mercado en la modernizaci6nde Espana
(Madrid:Espasa-Calpe,1989);FranciscoCominComin,PabloMartinAcefia,MiguelMuniozRubio
et al., Ciento cincuenta ahos de historia de los ferrocarrilesespanoles (Madrid: Fundaci6n de los
FerrocarrilesEspanioles/Anaya, 1998), vol. 1; La Era de las concesiones a las compahfiasprivadas;
andFranciscoCay6nGarcia,EsperanzaFraxRosales,MariaJesusMatillaQuiza et al., Viaspara-
lelas: Invencionyferrocarrilen Espana (1826-1936) (Madrid: Fundaci6n de los FerrocarrilesEs-
1998).
panioles,
(cit.n. 2), pp. 90-3.
industrial
i2Nadal, El Fracasode la revoluci6n

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74 ALBERTOELENAAND JAVIER
ORDONEZ

tise,materiel, or capital,it was forcedto import all of thesefromabroad.During

thefollowing yearsSpain indeedexperienced a spectacular increasein domestic
production ofsomemineralogical products-especially ironorebutalso coal,cop-
per,andmercury-but withlittlebenefittotheeconomy.
By thebeginning of thetwentieth century, Spainhad becomea worldleaderin
theexportofironore,butata timewhena nation's strength wasmeasured partly
by
thesize of itssteelindustry, Spainstillhad onlyone steelmill,at Vizcaya,in the
Basque country. Themill,founded in theearly1880s,producedonlya smallquan-
tityofsteel.Theindustries thatmight haverequired steelformanufactured products
didnotyetexist,so mostoftheironorewas shippedtoSpain'sEuropeanrivals.
Manyofthemineswerebothownedandoperated byforeign companies. By 1913,
thereweremorethan130suchcompanies inSpain,andtheircombined capitalmade
upmorethan50 percent ofall ofthecapitalinvested inmining inthecountry.During
thelastdecadesof thenineteenth century, theflowof foreign capitalensuredthat
theincreasein production fundamentally responded to theneedforrawmaterials
of themaincolonizingcountries (especiallyBritain, France,andBelgium)rather
thantotheeconomicneedsofSpainitself.13 Ironically,
Spain,whichsoughttocolo-
nizeothers, was itselfin effect beingcolonizedbythegreatpowers,becauseofits
desireto acquirescienceandtechnology. 4

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE SPANISH COLONIES

By themid-nineteenth century,Spain'sonce-greatcolonialempirehaddwindled to
a fewwidelyscattered colonies.Close tohome,SpainheldtheCanaryIslandsand
someterritoriesonthenorthern shoreofAfrica.IntheNewWorld, onlya fewCarib-
beanislandswereleft;all of themainlandcoloniesin SouthandCentralAmerica
had achievedindependence. In Asia,onlythePhilippines andtheMarianaIslands
remained, anduntil1869,whentheSuez Canalwasopened,shipscouldreachthese
coloniesonlybymakingthelongjourneyaroundtheCape ofGoodHope,through
seas ruledby otherEuropeanpowers.Communications withtheseAsiancolonies
werepoor,butSpain'srelationswiththeCaribbeancoloniesremainedclose. Not
onlyweretheymoreaccessible,buttherulingeliteof thecolonies,frightened by
thesuccessfulslaverebellion
inSantoDomingoattheendoftheeighteenth century,
desiredtheSpanishpresence. Independence movements didnotgaintheactivesup-
portofthecriollo population here,as theyhad in themainlandcoloniesof South
America.15
Duringthelatenineteenthcentury,thecolonialempires oftheindustrialized
Euro-

13 See ibid.,
pp. 87-187;andRafaelDobado,"La Minenfa estatalespafiola,1748-1873,"inHistoria
de la empresapablica en Espaia, eds. FranciscoCommn andPablo MartinAcefia(Madrid:Espasa-
Calpe, 1991),pp. 89-138.
14 Thisechoestheusualconcept ofSpainas a scientific
semi-periphery,a topicfirstdevelopedby
Jos6Sala Catald,"La Communaut6 scientifique
espagnoleau XIXe siecle,et ses relationsavec la
Franceet l'Am6rique Latine,"in Naissanceet developpement de la science-monde: Production et
reproduction des communautes scientifiques
en Europeet en AmeriqueLatine.,ed. XavierPolanco
(Paris:La D6couverte /Conseilde l'Europe/UNESCO, 1990),pp. 122-47.
15 Thereis no complete or rigoroushistoryof Spanishcolonialism.However,fortheunderlying
ideology, see Elena Herrnndez Sandoica,Pensamiento burguesyproblemascolonialesen la Espaha
de la Restauracion, 1857-1887(Madrid:Univ.Complutense, 1982),andRobertoMesa,El Colonial-
ismoen la crisisdel XIX espahol(Madrid:CienciaNueva,1967), and idem,La Idea colonialen
Espaha (Valencia:FernandoTorres,1976).

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 75

pean powersgrewdynamically, servingas marketsformanufactured productsand

as sources forthe raw materialrequiredby industry. Wealthflowedin bothdirec-
tions,to and fromthemetropolis,and it appearedto thegreatpowers,and to most
observers,thatthecolonies wereenrichingthem.This seemedto make investments
in science and technologyin the colonies not only worthwhilebut essential.Im-
provements in steamnavigationand telegraphnetworkswerebasic prioritiesin such
colonies in thesecond halfof thenineteenth century.16

Because of itstechnologicalshortcomings and dependenceon foreigntechnology,

Spain was behind in steam navigationand could not send merchantfleetsto the
Asian colonies.For thesame reasons,ithad notsucceededin modernizingcommu-
nications.A contemporary economistwrote,"We mustconfess,althoughwithpro-
foundregret,thatSpain is one of the mostbackwardcountriesin Europe when it
comes to communications.' 17 For decades, the Madrid government had failed to
organizecommunicationswithin the empire, unable to integratethem into a new
and moreflexible network.
In orderto takea closerlook at Spain'seffortsto introducescienceand technology
intoits old colonies in thelate nineteenthcentury, two of themostimportant colo-
nies,thePhilippinesand Cuba, mayserveas examples.

ThePhilippines
how littlewe know about science and technologyin thePhilippines
It is surprising
duringthisperiod,which has not yetreceivedmuch scholarlyattention.18 As we
have seen,themetropolishad few scientistsor technologists to sendto thecolonies,
and gettingthereat all was noteasy.Of thefewSpanishcolonistsin thePhilippines,
manywere membersof religiousorders.'9Althoughsome teachingordersdid help
to importscientificand technologicalknowledge,thatwas obviouslynot theirfirst
priority.
The Spanishgovernment made limitedeffortsto increasescientificknowledgein
were foundedduringthe nineteenth
the Philippines.Several scientificinstitutions
century-theEscuela de Nautica (NauticalCollege) in 1820, theEscuela de Botan-
ica y Agricultura(College of Botanyand Agriculture)in 1858, and theEscuela de
Medicinay Farmacia(Medicine and PharmaceuticalCollege) in 1875-but because
of the colony's poor educationalsystemnone of themgave eitherintellectualor
materialbenefitsto the Philippines,and scientificpracticeremainedmainlyin the
handsof Spanish missionaries.
16
See Headrick,TentaclesofProgress(cit.n. 7), pp. 18-48 and97-144.
7 BrigadierRamirezArcas,Anuarioecon6mico-estadistico (Madrid,1859),p. 58.
18A pioneeringandstillveryusefulworkis BenitoFernandezLegarda,Jr.,"ForeignTrade,Eco-
nomicChangeandEntrepreneurship in theNineteenth-Century Philippines"(Ph.D. diss.,Harvard
Univ.,1955).See alsoAna MariaCalaveraVaya,"Inversiones en Filipinasdurante
espafiolas el siglo
XIX: Estado de la cuesti6n,'"in ExtremoOrienteIberico: Investigacioneshist6ricas; metodologiay
estadode la cuesti6n,eds. Franciscode Solano,FlorentinoRodao,and Luis E. Togores(Madrid:
ConsejoSuperiorde Investigaciones 1989),pp. 499-507,andJosepM. Fradera,Filipi-
Cientificas,
nas, la colonia mas peculiat: La Hacienda piiblica en la definici6nde la politica Colonial, 1762-
1999).
Cientificas,
1868 (Madrid:ConsejoSuperiorde Investigaciones
'9 See EvergistoBazaco, HistoryofEducation in thePhilippines: Spanish Period, 1565-1898 (Ma-
nila:Univ.ofSantoTomasPress,1953).
2() See Antoni Marimon,La Politica colonial dAntoniMaura: Les Colonies espanyoles de Cuba,
Puerto Rico i les Filipines a finals del segle XIX (Palma de Mallorca: Documenta Balear, 1994),
pp. 97-8.

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76 ALBERTO ELENA AND JAVIERORDONEZ

Although primary educationwas madecompulsory in the1860sandthelevelof

literacyinthenativepopulation wasreasonably high,theelementary schoolsystem
wasdeficient.2'Littleornothingwasachievedinsecondary, andtherefore inhigher,
education.Two church-owned theUniversity
universities, of San Ignacioand the
University ofSantoTomas,hadexistedsincetheseventeenth century,buttheformer
hadto shutdownin 1768whentheJesuits wereexpelledfromthecolony.A third,
theshort-livedUniversity of San Felipe,was establishedin 1707 butclosedonly
twodecadeslaterforlack of students. The universitycurriculum emphasized the
humanities, andsciencewas almostcompletely neglected.
As forcommunications, theonlydevelopments worthyofmention thataffected
thePhilippines wereachievedbyothernations:theopeningof theSuez Canal in
1869 (a Frenchinitiative),and thelayingof a telegraph cable fromHong Kong
by theBritishin 1880.Throughout thecentury, thePhilippinesremained in poor
communication withthemetropolis.
The onlyexampleof scientificexcellenceduringthenineteenth century was the
meteorological observatoryin Manila,established by theJesuits in 1865 to help
forecast thedreadedbaguios(typhoons).22 The observatory was soonreceiving re-
questsforexchangeofinformation withothersinAsia,especiallytheonein Hong
Kongbutalso thoseinZikawei(inChina)andDjakarta.However, eventhisworthy
projectbecameentangled in beaurocraticredtapewhentheSpanishcivilservants
triedto chargetheobservatory theordinary telegram rateforthetransmission of
themeteorological information.Although theproblem was solvedoncetheSpanish
authoritieswereconsultedand theManilaObservatory was officially
recognized,
officialindifference
continued toplagueitsoperations.23
IndustryinthePhilippineswasincreasingly concentratedinthehandsoftheChi-
nese,especiallytowardstheendof thecentury, andtheeffectof investment from
NorthAmericawas also beginning tobe felt.24
TradebetweenSpainandthePhilip-
pineshadlittletodo withscienceortechnology. Spainwascontent withthevaluable
tobaccotrade.25Exporttothecolonywasquitelimited. As a grievingwitnesswrote

21
Even so, onlyin thelatenineteenth-century
administration ofValerianoWeyler(governor gen-
eralofthePhilippines1888-1891)was a certainsustainedeffort notedtoencouragethecreationof
elementary schools,providethemwithteachingmaterials, and efficiently controlthe salariesof
teachers.See Marimon,La PolfticacolonialdAntoniMaura (cit.n. 20), p. 110,andW.E. Retana,
Mandode Weyler en Filipinas(Madrid:Viudade M. Minuesa,1896).
22 See MiguelSaderra Masso,Historiadel Observatorio
de Manila(1865-1915)(Manila:McCul-
lough,1915);WilliamC. Repetti,TheManilaObservatory (Manila,Philippines)(Washington D.C.,
n. p., 1948);JamesJ.Hennessey, "TheManilaObservatory,"Philippine Studies,1960,8:99-120;and
JohnN. Schumacher, "One Hundred YearsofJesuit
Scientists:
TheManilaObservatory, 1865-1965,"
PhilippineStudies,1965,13:258-86.
23 See Saderra Masso,Historiadel Observatoriode Manila (cit.n. 22), pp. 63 ff.
24
See EdgarWickberg, "EarlyChineseEconomicInfluence in thePhilippines, 1850-1898,"Pa-
cificAffairs,1962,275-85; idem,The Chinesein PhilippineLife,1850-1898 (New Haven:Yale
Univ.Press,1965);NormanG. Owen,Prosperity without
Progress:ManilaHempandMaterialLife
in theColonialPhilippines(Quezon City,Philippines: Ateneode Manila Univ.Press,1984); and
BenitoFernandezLegarda,Jr.,"American Entrepreneursin theNineteenth-Century Philippines,"
BulletinoftheAmericanHistoricalCollection,1972,1, 25-52.
25 See EdilbertoC. de Jesus,TheTobaccoMonopolyin thePhilippines:Bureaucratic Enterprise
and Social Change,1766-1880 (Quezon City,Philippines: Ateneode Manila Univ.Press,1980),
especiallypp. 161-66; Miquel Izard,"Dependenciay colonialismo:La Compafifa Generalde Ta-
bacos de Filipinas,"
Moneday Credito,1974,130,47-89; E. GiraltRavent6s, La CompahiaGeneral
de Tabacosde Filipinas,1881-1981(Barcelona:Compafifa Generalde Tabacosde Filipinas,1981),
pp. 9-99; andJavier L6pez LinageandJuanHernandez Andreu,UnaHistoriadel tabacoenEspania

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 77

in
betweenSpainandthePhilippines
in 1879,theonlybusinessthathadincreased
recenttimeswas theexportfromSpainofplayingcards.26

Cuba
Cuba was Spain'sbest-loved colony.BecauseCuba wantedSpanishprotection and
SpanishshipscouldeasilyreachCuba,communications betweenthemetropolisand
thecolonyweregood.Although CubawasmuchmoreadvancedthanthePhilippines
and farbetterable to affordmoderntechnology, therentier mentalityprevented
Spainfromhelpingthecolonytomodernize.
Theprimary impetus foracquiring modern technology camefromthelocalelites
inCuba,notfromSpain.Thankstoitsslaveeconomy, Cubaproduced largequanti-
tiesof sugar,coffee,andtobaccoto sell abroad.The capitalfromthesale ofthese
products produceda buoyant economyanda criollobourgeoisie thatwas notonly
anxiousto acquirenewtechnology butcouldafford railwayin Latin
it.The first
Americawasbuiltbetween HavanaandGuinesin 1837,elevenyearsbeforethefirst
railway Forhelpthecriolloturned
openedin Spain.27 firsttotheBritishandlaterto
American By thetimethelinebetweenBarcelonaandMataroopenedin
engineers.
1848,morethan600 kilometers of railshad alreadybeenlaid in thecolony.The
bourgeoisiealso pioneeredtheintroduction of steam-enginetechnology intosugar
production.
Cuba absorbedexcesswheat
Spainhad littleto sell to thecolony.In principle,
fromthepeasantworkers of Castille,andfromthispointof viewitcouldbe said
thatitgavemoneytoSpanishagriculture. Butinmanufacturedgoods,onlytheCata-
lantextile
industrybenefited fromtheCubanmarket, thankstoa monopolyimposed

(Madrid:MinisteriodeAgricultura, 1990),especiallypp. 86-101and150-77.

Pesca yAlimentaci6n,
In 1870 theSpanishoverseasministerhimself,SegismundoMoret,openlyrevealedto Parliament
overthefactthattradewiththePhilippines
his frustration brought Spainno profit, exceptforthe
nothing,
orvirtually
givenothing,
tobaccotrade:"The Philippines toSpain,ifwe discount theexcel-
lenttobaccoproductssentfromtheirfactories.And whilethisis thecase . . . it can be seen that
andwealthis notdeveloped;ina word,
doesnotadvance,tradedoesnotprosper,
Spain'scolonization
wouldnotseemeventohavetakenpossessionofthoselands."Quotedin Mesa,
Spanishcivilisation
La Idea colonial en Espaha (cit. n. 15), p. 93.
26 Carlos Recur, Filipinas: Estudios administrativosy comerciales (Madrid: Ram6n Moreno &
RicardoRojas, 1879),p. 111.
de
Sorzano,EduardoMoyanoet al., El Camnino
27 See BertaAlfonsoBallol, MercedesHerrera
hierrode La Habana a Giiines,primerferrocarrilde Iberoamirica (Madrid: Fundaci6n de los Ferro-
carrilesEspaholes,1987). See also Oscar Zanettiand AlejandroGarcia,Caminospara el azticar
(Havana:Editorialde CienciasSociales,1987),andEduardoL. MoyanoBazzani,La NuevaFrontera
del azvicar: El Ferrocarrily la economfacubana del siglo XIX (Madrid: Consejo Superiorde Investi-
1991).
gacionesCientificas,
28 Concerning andtrading
thecultivation withitssignificant
of sugarin Cuba,together economic
importancein therelationship Spain,see theworksofManuelMorenoFraginals,
withmetropolitan
El Ingenio: Complejo economico social cubano del azlacar (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales,
1978), and Cuba / Espaia, Espaia / Cuba: Historia comain(Barcelona: Critica, 1995), as well as
thosebyManuelMartinRodriguez, Azdicary descolonizacion (Granada:Univ.de Granada,1982),
idem, "Del Trapiche a la flbrica de aztcar, 1779-1904," in La Cara oculta de la industrializaci6n
espafiola,eds. JordiNadal and JordiCatalan(Madrid:Alianza,1990),pp. 43-97, and idem,"El
Azicar y la politicacolonialespafiola (1860-1898)2"in Economia y colonias en la Espaha del 98,
ed. PedroTedde(Madrid:Sintesis/Fundaci6nDuquesde Soria,1999),pp. 161-77.ForPuertoRico,
see AndrdsRamos Mattei,La Sociedad del azticar en Puerto Rico (1870-1910) (Rio Piedras: Univ.
de PuertoRico, 1988).

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78 ALBERTO ELENA AND JAVIERORDONEZ

on thecolony:whenthismonopoly endedafterSpanish-American War,Catalonia

suffereda seriouscrisisfromwhichitwouldtakeyearstorecover.29
Despitetheearlyintroduction ofrailways,
thesameshortsightednessthathadlim-
itedthevalueof newtechnology in Spainwas evidentin Cuba. Technology was
usedtosupport traditionalagriculturerather
thantodevelopothermodemindustries
ortrade,andmuchofthewealthderivedfromsalesofthemajoragricultural prod-
uctswas sentabroadto purchasetechnology andmanufactured Eventhe
products.
sale ofsugarsentcapitaloutsidetheSpanishEmpire.Thelargestcustomer forCu-
ban sugarwas notSpainbuttheUnitedStates,whichconsumed75 percent ofthe
totaloutputby1860and85 percent by1890,making theislandeconomicallydepen-
dentuponitsneighbor.30
As a result,Cuba was unableto engagein thekindof profitable domesticand
international
tradethatmight havebrought industrial
andeconomicdevelopment on
theislandandencouraged itin themetropolis.
Scienceandtechnology madeonly
limitedadvancesin Cuba duringthenineteenth andbecauseof itsdepen-
century,
denceon thesale ofagricultural Cubabecamean economiccolonyofthe
products,
UnitedStates.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE SECOND COLONIAL VENTURE

Fromthe1870stheindustrialized nationscompetedto acquirecoloniesin Africa.

Spain,ambitiousto sharein theprosperityofitsneighbors,
didnotwishtobe left
out.As theSpanishinvasionofMoroccobeganin 1859,thenewspaper La Discusion
enthusiastically
proclaimed, "The futureof our fatherland
is on thebeachesof
Africa."3'
Spainhadlonghadclosetieswithnorthern Africabut,fromthefifteenth
century,
hadfeltitsufficient
toholda fewoutposts onthenortherncoast.Thesewerevalued
notonlyforstrategicreasonsbutbecausetheyhelpedtoensuresafepassagethrough
thewestern MediterraneantotheCanaryIslands,vitaltotradewiththeNewWorld.
LeavingasideManuelIradier's incursionsfarther
southintheGulfofGuineaterrito-
ries(1875 and 1886),in thelatenineteenthcenturySpanishcolonization
inAfrica
was confinedtothenorthern coast-Morocco andthewestern Sahara.32
Publicrhetoricin Spainin 1859presented theinvasionofMoroccoas a selfless
act, a missionto bringcivilizationto a benightedcountry.Both parliamentary
speechesandmoremundane articlesinthepresswerefullofferventpatriotic
state-
mentsjustifyingtheinvasion.Naturally,however,thewarbetweenSpainandMo-

29 See JordiMaluquerde Motes,"El Mercadocolonialantillanoen el sigloXIX,"inAgricultura,

comerciocolonialy crecimiento econ6micoen la Espaniacontempordnea, eds. JordiNadal andGa-
brielTortella(Barcelona:Ariel,1974),pp. 322-56.
3() MartinRodriguez, "El Azucar"(cit.n. 28), pp. 166-8.
3l La Discusi6n,6 Dec. 1859.QuotedinL6cuyerandSerrano, La GuerredAfrique (cit.n. 3), p. 62.
32 ManuelIradierBulfy, Africa.Viajesy,trabajosde la Asociaci6nEuskara "La Exploradora"
(reconocimiento de la Zona Ecuatorialde Africaen las costasde occidente:sus montanas, sus rios,
sus habitantes,clima,producciones yporvenir de estospaises tropicales.Posesionesespanolasdel
Golfode Guinea.Adquisici6npara Espana de la nuevaprovinciadel Muni) (Vitoria:Asociaci6n
Euskaraparala Exploraci6ny Civilizaci6ndel AfricaCentral"La Exploradora," 1887).No recent
studieshavereplacedthoseof Jos6Maria CorderoTorres,Iradier(Madrid:Instituto de Estudios
Politicos,1944),andRicardoMaj6 Framis,Las Generosasyprimitivas empresasde ManuelIradier
Bulfy(Madrid:ConsejoSuperiorde Investigaciones Cientificas,
1954),howeverideologically biased
theyare.

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 79

rocco can in no way be understoodto have been, as RaymondCarr claimed in his

influentialSpain, 1808-1939 (1966), "a classic exampleof a war of honourunsup-
portedby economicinterest."33 Althougheconomicintentions werenotdefinitive at
the outset,therelationshipbetweenSpain and Morocco overthe last fourdecades
of thenineteenth centurywas unquestionablymarkedby economicinterests.Spain
saw in thekingdomof Morocco a vast,potentialmarketand excellentpossibilities
for investment. When the experiencefailed,it servedto emphasize the manifest
economic supremacyof Franceand Britain,countriesthatwould exerta sharedin-
fluencein theregion.34
Whateverthe reasons, the campaign of 1859 markedthe beginningof Spain's
presencein northern Africa,a presencethatwould last a century,
ifwe considerthat
Morocco became independentwiththe end of the protectorate in 1956. (It lasted
even longer if we include Equatorial Guinea and the Sahara.)35For those who
thoughttheywereon thethresholdof a second greatSpanishEmpire,theenterprise
was frustrating:"a largewar and a small peace" was theusual lament.For thehead
of government in Morocco, General Leopoldo O'Donnell, economic factorswere
decisivelyimportant. One ofhis mostambitiousprojectsconsistedof buildingroads
betweenCeuta and Tangiersand betweenCeuta and Tetian, paid forby the Mor-
occan treasurybut built underthe supervisionof Spanish engineers.36 However,
O'Donnell's ideas broughtno profitto Spain. When peace was signed,the great
beneficiarywas Britain.It was the Britishwho financedthe war debt and who
strengthened theirpresence in the Straits (a presence that graduallyincreased
throughout thenineteenth centuryas the strategicvalue of Gibraltargrewwiththe
openingof the Suez Canal). A Britishsteamshipline was inauguratedbetweenGi-
braltarand Tangiersin 1857, in open competitionwiththe Frenchships thathad
been sailing fromMarseilles since 1852, and Britishtextileswere introducedinto
thekingdomof Morocco. This influencecontinuedthroughout thecentury;in 1875,
SultanMuley Hassan, rulerof Morocco, authorizedthelayingof a telegraphcable
betweenGibraltarand Tangiersby theBritishEasternTelegraphCompany.
Spanisheuphoriagave way to therealizationthatSpain's influenceoverMorocco
could notbe sustainedby theforceof armsalone. Followingthetreatyof 1860, the
presence of civil servants,soldiers,and the clergyin Morocco contributedto a
greaterculturaland social interestin the country,and manypublicationsappeared
on the Moroccan languages,culture,and geography.As a resultof this interest,a

RaymondCarr,Spain,1808-1939(Oxford:Clarendon,1966),p. 261.
3 Withregardto Europeanpenetration Midge,
in Morocco,thelocusclassicusis stillJean-Louis
Le Marocetl'Europe,4 vols.(Paris:PUF, 1961-1963).
31 On theSpanish inMorocco,see theworksofVictorMoralesLezcano,El Colonial-
protectorate
ismo hispanofrancesen Marruecos (1898-1927) (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1976), pp. 21-150, and idem,
Espaha y el Norte de Africa: El Protectoradoen Marruecos (1912-1956) (Madrid: Univ. Nacional
SpanishSahara (London:
de Educaci6na Distancia,1984);on theSpanishSahara,see JohnMercer,
George Allen & Unwin, 1976); JuanBautista Villar,El Sahara Espafiol: Historia de una aventura
HistoriadelSaharaEspahol(Madrid:
colonial(Madrid:Sedmay,1977);Jos6Ram6nDiegoAguirre,
Kaydeda, 1988); and JavierMorillas, Sahara Occidental: Desarrollo y subdesarrollo (Madrid: Pre-
1988);on EquatorialGuinea,see MarianoL. de CastroandMaria
nsa y EdicionesIberoamericanas,
Luisa de la Calle, Origende la colonizaci6n espafola en Guinea Ecuatorial (1777-1860) (Valladolid:
Univ.de Valladolid,1992); and MarianoL. de Castroand Donato Ndongo-Bidgoyo, Espaha en
Guinea: Construcciondel desencuentro,1778-1968 (Madrid: Sequitur, 1998).
36 See Manuel Fernmndez Rodriguez,Espaia y Marruecos en los primerosahos de la Restauraci6n
1985),p. 14.
Cientificas,
(1875-1894)(Madrid:ConsejoSuperiorde Investigaciones

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80 ALBERTO ELENA AND JAVIERORDONEZ

pro-Africanistmovement arosein Spain,whichwas consolidated in 1883 by the

founding of theSociedadde Africanistas y Colonistas(SocietyofAfricanists and
Colonists)withthesupportof theSociedadGeografica de Madrid(Geographical
SocietyofMadrid).37 Iradier'sjourneys toGuineain 1884,andthejourneys ofAlva-
rezPerez,Cervera, Quiroga,andRizzototheSaharain 1886,wereundertaken with
thesupport oftheSociedadde Africanistas.
Freefrommilitaristic overtones, theAfricanistprogramme formed a partofthe
contemporary Europeanmovement thatlookeduponcolonization as a civilizing
mission.Despitethisfragilecommitment, JoaquinCostaandFranciscoCoello (the
whowerethemainideologuesofcolonialism)
politicians werehighly criticalofthe
Spanishbourgeoisie's inability to imitatethegreatcolonialpowers,Britainand
France.The Africanists wereawareof thefactthatafterthewarwithMorocco,
Spanishindustry didnotfollowthesoldiers,andwarships wereneverreplacedby
merchant shipsfromAndalusiaandCatalonia.38 As a resultoftheAfricanist move-
ment,and withtheinitiative of theSpanishminister of state,Segismundo Moret,
chambers ofcommerce wereopenedinMoroccoin 1885,creating a framework for
economicactivity in thecountry. The Catalanbourgeoisie, themainbeneficiary of
commercewithSpain'sAmericancolonies,also lookedforwaysto improve eco-
nomicpenetration innorthern Africa,imitatingnotonlythepoliciesofothercoun-
triesbutalso theirproducts: British textiles
wereunquestionably thebestexample,
butotherswerenotafraidto imitate thesparklingwinesof Champagne or Cuban
rum.In 1886,in an attempt to keepup withtheBritishandFrench,theCompania
Transatlantica(Transatlantic Company)established a regularshipping linebetween
Spainand Moroccoto ensurethesteadyflowof Catalanproducts to thecountry.39
However, thecivilwarsandtheeconomiccrisisin Spainthatlastedfrom1873to
1896 substantially decreasedtheefficiency of CatalantradewithMorocco,and it
becamerestricted, finally, to theCaribbean.In theend,Spainwouldbe one ofthe
fewEuropeancountries whosetradebalancewithMoroccowas, duringthelast
decadesofthenineteenth century, alwaysunfavorable.
Itwasprobably innorthern AfricathatSpainfeltmostkeenlyitsinability tocarry
outa modernizing colonialpolicy.The French-British hegemony abortedthefew
Spanishcommercial initiativesthatexisted,andsomeofitsmostambitious projects.
Thiswas thecase,forexample,withtheprojected Tangiers-Tetutan railway, which
was to havebeen builtby Spain undertheguarantee of theSublimePorte.The
projectcameup in 1882,witha proposalbytheSpanishambassador in Constanti-
nople,JuanAntonioRascon,whoemphasized withtypically Africanist rhetoric the
traditional
tiesbetweenSpainand Morocco.Rasconwas carefulto pointoutthat
themostpowerful reasonforsupporting thebuilding oftherailwaywasnottofavor
Spanishpenetration inthearea,butmerely tosafeguard Morocco'sinterests against
theambitions ofcountries thatweretraditionally strangers inthearea(France,Brit-
ain,and Italy).The railwaywas neverbuilt.Largecivilworksweretraditionally
carriedouton thebasis of prioragreement betweenthepowersinvolved, andthe

37 See Jos6AntonioRodriguez Esteban,Geografiay colonialism La Sociedad Geogrdfica de

Madrid(1876-1936) (Madrid:Univ.Aut6nomade Madrid,1996),pp. 85-93.
38 See, forexample,thesignificant
speechgivenbytheeconomist GabrielRodriguezintheTeatro
Alhambra, Madrid,on30 Mar.1884,published inthevolumeIntereses de Espara enMarruecos(Ma-
drid:Institutode EstudiosAfricanos
/ConsejoSuperiorde Investigaciones Cientificas,
1951),p. 39.
39 See L6cuyer andSerrano,La GuerredAfrique(cit.n. 3), pp. 273-5.

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 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE SPANISH COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 81

government in Madrid declinedto promotean initiativethatmightupsetthe great

powers.In thebuildingof theTangiers-Tetouanrailway,Spain would have openly
dependedon Britishtechnologyand was notable to ensurethe maintenanceof the
line.40

CONCLUSIONS

The optimisticexpectationsof economicexpansionthathad motivatedtheSpanish

to introducescience and technologyand to acquire new colonies after1850 ended
badly withSpain's defeatin the Spanish-AmericanWar.Once again Spain became
demoralizedand pessimisticaboutthefuture. ManySpaniardspointedto thecoun-
try'spatentscientificand technicalbackwardnessas an essentialkey to thedisaster.
On 23 June1899,deputyEduardoVincenti,commenting on thedefeatbytheUnited
States,toldtheParliament,

we shouldtake
thatleavingon one sidefalsepatriotism,
I shallnottireof repeating
fromtheexamplegivenus bytheUnitedStates.TheUnitedStateswonnot
inspiration
onlybecauseitwasthestronger, butalso becauseitwasbetter andeducated,
instructed
yetunderno circumstances was itmorevaliant.No Yankeesbaredtheirbreastsbefore
ourtroops;ourarmyhadto confront a machineinvented bysomeelectricianor some
mechanic. Therewasno fight.Wewerebeateninthelaboratory andtheoffices,butnot
on thesea oron dryland.42

The same mighthave been said aboutSpain's generalfailureto achievetheprosper-

ityenjoyedby the industrializednationsor to bringthatprosperity to its colonies.
Crippledby the rentiermentalityinheritedfromits firstempire,Spain could not
fullyintegratescience and technologyintoits own culture,and it also became inca-
pable of modernizingthecolonies.
As a finalirony,it now seems probablethattradewithcolonies playedlittlerole
in theprosperity nationsthatSpain wishedto emulate.The great
of theimperialistic
powersthemselvesbelievedthatthecolonies werebringingthemwealth,and Spain,

40 See FerndndezRodriguez, Espaia yMarruecos(cit.n. 36),pp. 102-5.An illuminating compari-

soncan be madebylookingatthestrictly contemporary case ofthebuildingoftherailwaybetween
AlgeriaandTunisia,recently studiedbyMohamedLazharGharbi,Imperialisme et riformisme au
Maghreb:Histoired'unchemindeferalgero-tunisien (Tunis:C6res,1994).
41 The recentcommemoration of thefirstcentenary of thecrisishas producedsomeinteresting
publicationson thiscrucialperiodofSpanishhistory. Amongthemostrelevant forourpurposesare
JuanPan-Montojo, ed., Mds se perdi6en Cuba: Espaha, 1898 y la crisisde finde siglo (Madrid:
Alianza,1998);PedroLainEntralgo andCarlosSeco Serrano,eds.,Espaha en 1898: Las Clavesdel
desastre(Barcelona:GalaxiaGutenberg /Circulode Lectores,1998); SantosJulia,ed.,Debatesen
tornoal 98: Estado,sociedadypolftica(Madrid:Comunidadde Madrid,1998);RobertoMesa, ed.,
Tiemposdel 98 (Seville:Fundaci6nEl Monte,1998);Raymond Carr,MariaDoloresElizalde,Carlos
Malamudet al., Imdgenesy ensayosdel 98 (Valencia:Fundaci6nCafnadaBlanch,1998); and the
excellent monographic issueofRevistade Occidente, Mar.1998,202-3,devotedtothesubjectunder
theheading1898: ,Desastrenacionalo impulsomodernizador? interest
Of particular forourpur-
pose is Tedde,Economiay coloniasen la Espara del 98 (cit.n. 28).
42 QuotedbyAntonio MorenoandJos6ManuelSanchezRon,"La Cienciaespaniola contempord-
nea: Del Optimismo regeneracionista in Mundializaciande la cienciay
a la exaltaci6npatri6tica,"
culturanacional,eds.AntonioLafuente, AlbertoElena,andMariaLuisa Ortega(Aranjuez/Madrid:
Doce Calles/Univ.Aut6nomade Madrid,1993),p. 392. Fora fineoverviewofSpanishbackward-
nessinscienceatthetime,see Jos6ManuelSanchezRon,"Fisica,matematicas yla derrota de 1898,"
Arbor,1998,630:279-94.

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82 ALBERTO ELENA AND JAVIERORDONEZ

perhapsin partbecauseofitsearliercolonialexperience, The

sharedthatbelief.43
sameviewwasheldbyauthoritative commentators on nineteenth-century
imperial-
ism,suchas LeninandJ.A. Hobson.In thetwentieth theaccusationthat
century,
in losingthecoloniesthegovernment had destroyedtheSpanisheconomymade
effectivepropagandaforthedictatorsPrimode Riveraand Franco.44Untilrather
recently,thetheorythatcolonieswereprofitablewas also theacceptedhistorical
view.
Economichistorians whohaverestudied theissue,however, havedemonstrated
thatduringthelastthirdofthenineteenthcentury colonieswereseldomprofitable
Britainwas perhapstheonlypowerthattrulymanagedto
fortheirpossessors.45
fromitscolonies.46
profit
obtaina substantial If thatis thecase,thentheemphasis
on tradingwithcoloniessimplydistractedSpain'sattention froma muchmoreim-
portantsourceof prosperity:domesticand international tradein manufactured
be-
anditsfailureto graspthecrucialrelationship
goods.Spain'srentiermentality
tweenscience,technology, madethehopeofparticipating
andcapitalism inthepros-
perityof its Europeanneighborsin thesecondhalfof thenineteenth century
an
impossible dream.
43 Therebeingstillno comprehensive of theSpanishcolonialmodelof thenine-
reinterpretation
teenthcentury, see CandelariaSdiz Pastor,"El Modelo colonialespafiolduranteel sigloXIX: Un
Debateabierto," Estudiosde HistoriaSocial, 1988,44-7:651-5; DoloresElizalde,"Modelosde im-
perio,"in Viejosy nuevosimperios:Espanay GranBretanfa, siglosXVII-XX,eds. IsabelBurdieland
Roy Church(Valencia:Episteme,1998),pp. 83-93; and JosepM. Fradera,"La Politicacolonial
espafioladel sigloXIX: Una Reflexi6n sobrelos precedentes de la crisisde finde siglo,"Revistade
Occidente,1998,202-3:183-99.
44 An important contribution is, however,thatmadebyJordiMaluquerde Motes,"El Impactode
las guerrascolonialesde finde siglosobrela economiaespaniola," inTedde,Economiay coloniasen
la Espaniadel 98 (cit.n. 28), pp. 101-21,wheretheauthor, disagreeing withtheideologiesofPrimo
de RiveraandFranco,convincingly arguesthattheloss ofcolonialmarkets did no seriousdamage
to theSpanisheconomy.
45 See, amongothers, JohnGallagherand RonaldRobinson,"The Imperialism of Free Trade,"
EconomicHistoryReview,1953,6:1-15; David K. Fieldhouse,Economicsand Empire,1830-1914
(London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson,1973); Paul Bairoch,"Le Bilan 6conomiquedu colonialisme:
Mythesetr6alit6s," Itinerario,1980,1:29-41; PatrickO'Brien,"EuropeanEconomicDevelopment:
The Contribution of thePeriphery," EconomicHistoryReview,1982,35: 1-18;A. M. Ekstein,"Is
Therea Hobson-LeninThesison LateNineteenth-Century ColonialExpansion?"EconomicHistory
Review,1991,44:297-318;JosepM. Fradera,"La Experienciacolonialeuropeadel sigloXIX: Una
Aproximaci6n al debatesobrelos costesy beneficiosdel colonialismoeuropeo,"in Europaen su
historia,ed. PedroRuizTorres(Valencia:Univ.de Valencia,1993).
46 The classicquantitative estimatesare stillthoseof Lance E. Davis and RobertA. Huttenback,
Mammonand thePursuitof Empire:The PoliticalEconomyof BritishImperialism, 1860-1912
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.Press,1986),andPatrickO'Brien,"The CostsandBenefits ofBritish
Imperialism, 1846-1914,"Pastand Present,1988,120:163-210.

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