Acta Sociologica: Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault, and Analytics of Power

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Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault, and Analytics of Power

Christian Borch
Acta Sociologica 2005; 48; 155
DOI: 10.1177/0001699305053769
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ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2005
Systemic Power
Luhmann, Foucault, and Analytics of Power
Christian Borch
Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
abstract: Niklas Luhmann’s theory of power is based on two fundamental pillars.

First, he analyzes power functionally as a symbolically generalized medium of
communication, which endows his conception of power with a strong evolutionary
foundation. Second, he claims that power is constitutively tied to negative
sanctions. Drawing upon Michel Foucault’s analytics of power, the article is a
critical examination of Luhmann’s theory of power. In particular, Foucault’s critique
of the so-called discourse of sovereignty is transformed into an immanent critique
of the second pillar in Luhmann’s theory of power. The argument is that this pillar
is converse to Luhmann’s evolutionary theoretical objectives, as it reinstalls an Old-
European semantics of power. The article contends that systems theory would
better redeem its historical goals if it focused primarily upon the functional
dimension of power. It is argued that this conceptual revision endows systems
theory with a more flexible perspective on power that is both attentive to historical
transformations of how power is exercised, and which still carries a strong link to
a general theory of society and its evolution. In the article, this openness is demon-
strated through a systemic reconstruction of Foucault’s notion of subjectification
which, in its Luhmannian version, is coined semantic intrusion.
keywords: communication ◆ evolution ◆ functional analysis ◆ government ◆

media ◆ sanctions ◆ subjectification
The reception of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory has mainly pivoted around the impli-
cations of the many conceptual innovations that are closely tied to his sociology, e.g.
autopoiesis, self-reference, operational closure, etc. Only rarely, however, has Luhmann’s
theory of power been scrutinized, although he did publish one book and several articles and
chapters on the subject (a few exceptions include Brodocz, 1998; Esposito, 1999; Sand, 2000;
Guzzini, 2004). In this article, I propose a critical examination of Luhmann’s theory of power,
in particular of what I take to be its two fundamental pillars. The critical dimension is based
on Michel Foucault’s analytics of power.1 Basing a critique of Luhmann on Foucault may be
surprising at first glance, as Foucault’s deliberately non-sociological genealogies of concrete
historical phenomena are indeed quite different from Luhmann’s general and very abstractly
formulated sociology. Yet their similar epistemological–analytical perspectives – on differ-
ence rather than identity, on second-order observation rather than positivism, on communi-
cation rather than subjects – place the two approaches close to one another and suggest that,
despite apparent differences, Luhmann and Foucault may be confronted productively with
each other. In this article, no extensive comparison of Foucault and Luhmann is offered. The
aim is more modestly to show that Foucauldian insights on power may generate an
Acta Sociologica ◆ June 2005 ◆ Vol 48(2): 155–167 ◆ DOI: 10.1177/0001699305053769

Copyright © 2005 Scandinavian Sociological Association and SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
www.sagepublications.com
Acta Sociologica 48(2)
immanent critique of systems theory, and to suggest how systems theory may cope with
this.
The article is divided into four sections. In the first section, I outline those conceptions of
power that Luhmann and Foucault dissociate themselves from and against which their own
positions are formulated. According to Luhmann, what must be overcome is a causal notion
of power. Foucault, on his side, is critical of the so-called discourse of sovereignty where power
is understood negatively, reflecting a basically pre-modern social structure, and which he
believes to be inadequate for contemporary power analysis. After this negative positioning, I
then discuss the positive content of Luhmann’s theory of power, above all the two pillars on
which it is based. On the one hand, Luhmann conceptualizes power functionally as a symbol-
ically generalized medium of communication (section II). This medial notion of power is
conceived within a theory of societal evolution according to which the exercise of power is
one among several functionally equivalent means of coping with increasing societal complex-
ity. On the other hand, Luhmann sees power as being constitutively tied to negative sanctions
(section III). It is precisely towards this latter pillar that a Foucauldian critique may be directed.
Thus, Foucault would argue that accepting the negative conception of power tends to endow
power with a pre-modern bias and to ignore its possible historical transformations. Conse-
quently, tying power to negative sanctions runs contrary to the evolutionary objectives of
Luhmann’s theory. It is therefore suggested that systems theory should downplay the a priori
importance it attributes to sanctions, and instead focus on the functional–medial definition of
power – a definition that is more openly formulated in regard to what forms the exercise of
power may take. In section IV, I proceed by illustrating how this functional view on power
would enable systems theory to incorporate one of the crucial dimensions of Foucault’s
analytics of power, subjectification, which, in the present reconstruction, is presented as a
matter of semantic intrusion.
Contrary to what this might suggest, the aim of the article is not to subsume systems theory
under Foucault’s analytics of power. Rather, the intention is, via Foucault, to point to tensions
in Luhmann’s conception of power – especially in regard to the problem with negative
sanctions – and to show how systems theory may come closer to its own objectives by dealing
with these tensions. The constructive contribution of the article thus aims at providing systems
theory’s unique way of conceptualizing power within a general theory of society (which is not
to be found in Foucault) with greater diagnostic and analytical powers that are more attentive
to possible historical transformations in the exercise of power.
I. Common starting-points
Luhmann’s analysis of power takes off from a critique of what he calls ‘classical theory of
power’. The most important common trait of theories within this category is their reliance on
a number of problematic assumptions about causality. As one of the most prominent examples
of how power and causality are conceptualized in classical power theory, Luhmann cites the
following claim by Herbert A. Simon, ‘. . . for the assertion, “A has power over B”, we can
substitute the assertion, “A’s behavior causes B’s behavior”’ (Luhmann, 1969: 150, n. 3). The
central implication – not only in Simon, but in the entire classical theory of power – is that
power is conceived as the decisive event that makes the power subordinate act the way s/he
does and that s/he would have acted differently had s/he not been subject to the exercise of
power (Luhmann, 1969; Brodocz, 1998).
Luhmann is critical of this causal framework. First, he says, an examination of the causes
of power does not tell us where power originates (Luhmann, 1969: 150).2 Second, and more
in line with Luhmann’s general critique of causal explanations, every effect has an infinite
number of causes just as every cause produces an infinite number of effects (Luhmann, 1970a:
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Borch: Systemic Power
16). The determination of a causal relation is, thus, a contingent enterprise, an observer-
dependent ascription or attribution that could have been different. In the same vein, Luhmann
refuses to seek specific intentions or motives behind the exercise of power. Motivation, he
states, is not ‘a “cause” of the action, but an attribution, which makes possible the socially
comprehensible experience of action’ (1979: 120). The point of attribution is illustrated by a
third problem, the question of whether one can envisage the exercise of power as being
decisive for the subordinate’s actual actions. Is it possible causally to preclude that the subordi-
nate would not have acted the way s/he did under all circumstances or, at least, that there
were no other reasons for his/her action than the exercise of power? Finally, a time issue is at
stake: ‘The classical theory of power . . . implies a conception of time in which the future is
seen as a determined, objective and already fixed projection of the past, it is at any rate a future poor
in alternatives’ (Luhmann, 1969: 151–2).3 This is particularly apparent regarding the subordi-
nate whose future actions are presumed to be pre-determinable before power is exercised.
However, when focusing on the present, as Luhmann does, the causal thinking of classical
power theory must be abandoned, since ‘actual entities in the contemporary universe are
causally independent of each other’ (Whitehead, 1978: 123).
Additionally, Luhmann criticizes the classical theory for imaging power as a substance that
can be possessed (1969: 158–9). The problem is, he says, that a simple reference to the posses-
sion of power, where power is transferred from one person to another and from one situation
to another, altogether conceals the systemic conditions of such a modality of power. Further-
more, it assumes that the exercise of power is a zero-sum game where, for example, increas-
ing bureaucratic power is said to take place only with a corresponding loss of parliamentary
power. Luhmann questions this assumption and argues that an adequate theory of power
must be able to take into account that power often increases one place without leading to a
parallel loss elsewhere. Indeed, as Luhmann demonstrates, organizational power increases
simultaneously among both superiors and subordinates when their internal relations intensify
(Luhmann, 1969: 163; 1979: 179–82).
Before proceeding with Luhmann’s alternative, non-causal route into the power question,
i.e. before examining how he replaces the classical theory of power with a systemic notion
of power, we may reflect for a moment on Foucault’s analytics of power, as it deals with
problems that are strikingly similar to those of Luhmann. According to Foucault, what
needs to be overcome is the discourse of sovereignty or the juridico-political conception of
power. Thomas Lemke has identified three main assumptions in this image of power
(Lemke, 1997: 99; cf. also Foucault, 1990: 94–6). First, he points to an assertion of posses-
sion. Power is conceptualized as a substance that can be possessed, exchanged, etc., which
simultaneously implies an idea of power as a zero-sum game. Second, there is an assump-
tion of location. Power, typically political power, is concentrated in a center or ‘head-
quarter’, the monarch or the state apparatus, from which it flows (causally and top-down)
to the rest of society. Finally, the discourse of sovereignty relies on the contention that
power serves purposes of repression. This is particularly apparent in the importance attrib-
uted to prohibitions and law so that power, still according to the juridico-political model,
is essentially in opposition to freedom. To exercise power is to limit freedom (a reiteration
of the zero-sum supposition). According to Foucault, this discourse of sovereignty emerged
in a specific historical context:
Through the development of the monarchy and its institutions this juridico-political dimension was
established. It is by no means adequate to describe the manner in which power was and is exercised,
but it is the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of it. The
history of the monarchy went hand in hand with the covering up of the facts and procedures of power
by the juridico-political discourse. (Foucault, 1990: 87–8)
157
This is Foucault’s real concern. Despite the fact that the social structure, which bred this
conception of power, passed away long ago, the negative-hierarchical notion of power never-
theless prevails in contemporary mainstream social thought, including both liberal and
Marxist positions. In a famous and much quoted statement, Foucault thus complains that in
our present way of conceptualizing and analyzing power, ‘we still have not cut off the head
of the king’ (Foucault, 1990: 88–9). Consequently, Foucault’s approach to power aims at
developing conceptual tools that enable us to seize the powers of our time more adequately.
Interestingly, Foucault’s suggestion that we should leave behind the negative-hierarchical
notion of power is not based on sociological arguments. Rather, he attempts to add plausibil-
ity to his proposal through detailed historical analyses. However, drawing upon Luhmann’s
systems theory, we may, in fact, supply Foucault’s claim with a sociological line of reasoning.
Thus, according to Luhmann, modern society is primarily functionally differentiated. Its
differentiation into operationally autonomous subsystems of politics, law, art, etc. implies that
modern society is ‘without an apex or center’ (Luhmann, 1990: 31). This characterization
suggests the need for replacing notions of power that reinstall a conception of a hierarchically
differentiated society. In short, Luhmann’s description of functional differentiation provides a
radical sociological argument for decapitating the king, both theoretically and analytically. It
suggests that the contemporary semantics of power should not reflect a pre-modern social
structure.
Foucault puts forward several alternative notions of power that do not subscribe to the
discourse of sovereignty. The trajectory of these notions is complex, as Foucault continually
corrects and revises his own earlier accounts (for an excellent overview of this development,
see Lemke, 1997). In the present context, it is neither necessary nor possible to flesh out the
development of Foucault’s power analytics. Instead, I limit myself to sketching only the four
main currents.
Initially, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) introduces his analysis of power as disci-
pline (thereby stressing the productive, creative, and positive aspects of power – in contrast
to the negative ones emphasized by the juridico-political model). Later on, he endorses
‘Nietzsche’s hypothesis’ (Foucault, 2003: 16) according to which power is a continuation of
war with other means. Soon after that, he introduces the concept of ‘bio-power’ (including
partly a political anatomy of the body, i.e. discipline; and partly a regulation of the population,
bio-politics), which leads him to recognize the need for a more general analytics of power. This
whole conceptual development finally ends with the notion of government. Conceptualized as
government, power is defined as ‘conduct of conduct’, or action upon action. According to
this view, to exercise power ‘is to structure the possible field of action of others’, or of oneself
(Foucault, 1982: 221).4 Here power is intimately associated with freedom; power is only power
insofar as it conditions conduct that could have been different. Or, in the words of Foucault
(1982: 221), ‘[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free’.
Additionally, no naïve assumptions of causality are imbedded in this notion of government.
Power is no cause of behavior but basically a mechanism for regulating contingent selections.
In the same vein, government is not located in a headquarter and it is not possessed by any
subject. Rather, governmental power is non-subjective and comprises no hierarchy (cf. also
Foucault, 1990: 94–5).
Methodologically, Foucault resists the temptation to outline a new theory of power, since
that would amount to associating power with essentialism and to ignoring its historical trans-
formations. What is needed is an analytics of power that enables us to analyze power in actu.
Hence, Foucault, similar to Luhmann, establishes a shift from ‘what’ questions to ‘how’
questions, from examining what power ‘is’ to investigating how power is actually exercised.
In sum, Foucault’s entire project on power is an attempt to undermine a particular image
of power, the juridico-political schema, one that wrongfully extrapolates a specific historical
158
representation of power into the present. This discourse of sovereignty is counter-posed with
historical analyses that delineate two alternative dispositivs of power, discipline and govern-
ment. According to Foucault, however, this does not imply
the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society [as it was previously claimed in
Discipline and Punish, CB] and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of
government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty–discipline–government. (1991: 102)
Nonetheless, in spite of the simultaneous workings of these three forms of power, government
must currently be attributed ‘pre-eminence’ (Foucault, 1991: 102).
II. The mediality of power

As should be clear from this brief sketch, similarities can be identified between Luhmann and
Foucault concerning the problems of power and, to be more precise, the assumptions in need
of replacement. Whereas the late Foucault suggests studying power in the form of govern-
ment, Luhmann’s solution consists of a double-pillar conception of power, inspired by Talcott
Parsons. In this section, the first pillar is discussed, which concerns the functional or medial
notion of power. In the following section, I turn to the second pillar, according to which power
is constituted by negative sanctions.
Luhmann’s non-causal starting-point is the problem of double contingency, that is, an inter-
active situation in which both alter and ego have ‘the generalized potential to conceive of facts
as selections implying negations, to negate these negations and to reconstruct other possi-
bilities’ (1976: 509). Historically, Luhmann says, a number of so-called symbolically general-
ized media of communication (truth, love, money, etc.) have emerged which, in a functionally
equivalent way, deal with this Urproblem of sociality. Power is one of these media, as it offers
a mechanism to coordinate alter’s and ego’s selections. Luhmann differentiates symbolically
generalized media of communication according to how they link the action and/or experience
of ego and alter. In the case of power, it is the coordination of alter’s action and ego’s action
that is of interest.5 Thus, the function of the medium of power is to render probable that ego
uses alter’s action as a premise for his/her own action, or, to put it differently, to motivate ego
to condition his/her action by alter’s action (Luhmann, 1997: 355; 2000: 60). This conception
of power, as a relation between action and action, is equivalent to the Foucauldian definition
of power (in the form of government) as conduct of conduct – with the specification that
Luhmann is explicitly concerned with the regulation of selections, of selected action upon
selected action (Luhmann, 1976: 517). Further similarities with Foucault’s power analytics can
be identified. This goes, for example, for the intimate relation between power and freedom,
which in Luhmann is implied by the concept of selection. If ego cannot act in discrepancy with
alter’s requests there is no need for power at all. In contrast, power terminates the very
moment that ego is coerced to obey. Coercion is equal to a lack of (trust in the) regulation of
contingency. Consequently, coercion can only be exercised at a specific cost: ‘The person exer-
cising coercion must himself take over the burden of selection and decision to the same degree
as coercion is being exercised . . . the reduction of complexity is not distributed but is trans-
ferred to the person using coercion’ (Luhmann, 1979: 112).6
Luhmann shares another important point of departure with Foucault that is worth high-
lighting. As previously mentioned, Foucault’s power analytics can be read as an explicit
critique of the discourse of sovereignty and its claim that power can be possessed and trans-
mitted as a substance. One of Foucault’s attempts to escape this conception of power is to
focus on ‘the strictly relational character of power’ (Foucault, 1990: 95). Luhmann also dis-
sociates himself from understanding power substantially and ontologically and he is not far
from Foucault when he refers to the medial character of power. Conceived as a medium, power
159
‘is’ nothing but a ‘code-guided communication’ (Luhmann, 1979: 116) or, to paraphrase
Foucault’s (1990: 93) nominalistic point, power is nothing but the name that is given to this
communication.
However, even though Luhmann repudiates an ontological definition of power, many of his
power analyses are actually encumbered with ontological formulations. Up to the 1980s, his
theory of symbolically generalized media of communication drags along with it a heavy onto-
logical baggage. In his book on power, for example, Luhmann states that: ‘The function of a
communication medium lies in transmitting reduced complexity. . . . In the case of power too,
it is this transmission of selection which is the main point of interest’ (1979: 113; cf. also 1975,
1976, 1977). Power is thereby presented as a question of transmission of selections, as if these
were tangible entities that could be mailed.7 In the famous debate with Jürgen Habermas,
Luhmann specifies that what is transmitted must not be confused with particles or the like;
rather, it is a transmission of premises that is at stake (Luhmann, 1971: 344). However, this
redefinition poses new questions itself. What should we understand by premises (Göbel, 2000:
82, n. 110)? And is it not, in fact, the whole idea of transmission rather than what is trans-
mitted that is problematic?
Eventually, Luhmann realizes the drawbacks that come with the metaphor of transmission.
Therefore, he finally settles with it in Social Systems with the argument that:
The metaphor of transmission is unusable because it implies too much ontology. It suggests that the
sender gives up something that the receiver then acquires. This is already incorrect because the sender
does not give up anything in the sense of losing it. The entire metaphor of possessing, having, giving,
and receiving, the entire ‘thing metaphoric’ is unsuitable for understanding communication.
(Luhmann, 1995: 139)
Consequently, it is also unsuitable for understanding power. Luhmann’s famous foundational

move is now, in light of this problem, to reconstruct systems theory in a way where its basic
concept, communication, is detached from the idea of a sender and a receiver. Instead, he
conceives of communication as a triple selection of information, utterance, and understanding.
This shift in conceptual perspective has consequences for the notion of power as well. Most
importantly, power must now be understood without an ontological notion of transmission.
This is realized not through the general linguistic turn of Luhmann’s theory but rather via
Heider (1926), by observing power through the distinction between medium and form. Hence,
the medium of power is described as a loose coupling of power objectives and sanctions,
whereas the form of power is constituted by the distinction between the execution of a
command and the alternative to this, a negative sanction (Luhmann, 1997: 356).
Before moving on to this notion of negative sanctions, I should note an important conse-
quence of Luhmann’s insertion of power in a media register. By this conceptual strategy, he
undermines the idea that power occupies a societal primacy or that power should be deemed
the key notion in a theory of society. But more than this, as a medium, i.e. as an evolutionary
product, power is conceptualized within an evolutionary framework and not within a general
(a-historical) theory of power. Power is observed as an emergent solution to a specific evol-
utionary problem, that due to escalating societal complexity, it becomes increasingly difficult
to rely on a situational congruence of interest for the regulation and conditioning of contin-
gent selections. In this situation, the development of power as a way of regulating contingency
‘becomes an unavoidable priority for further evolution’ (Luhmann, 1979: 116).
III. Negative sanctions

Whereas Luhmann’s functional-medial perspective on power creates a link to his general
interest in societal evolution, I shall claim that the second pillar of his theory of power – the
160
constitution of power through negative sanctions – endows his conception of power with an
Old-European bias that is not only unnecessary but also in conflict with the general evol-
utionary objectives of his theory. Similar to the case of symbolically generalized media of
communication, the inspiration to Luhmann’s notion of negative sanctions arises from the
work of Parsons. However, while Luhmann modifies the media theory, he does not rework
the idea of sanctions sufficiently critically.
Like Parsons (1969), Luhmann thus establishes a constitutive link between power and
negative sanctions. At one point, for example, he states that ‘the concept of negative sanction
is inevitable for the characterization of power as a symbolically generalized medium of
communication’ (Luhmann, 1987: 119). In a different context, Luhmann stresses that ‘[p]olitical
power is essentially a threatening power [Drohmacht]. At any rate, one cannot conceive of it
without this component’ (Luhmann, 1988: 45). The reference to sanctions does not mean that
power is realized through the actual use of sanctions. Instead, it refers to an alternative, the
realization of which both ego and alter prefer to avoid (a so-called Vermeidungsalternative), but
which it may be necessary for alter to carry out if ego defies alter’s command and does not
use his/her actions as a premise for his/her own.8
I would like to question how evident this linkage of power and negative sanctions is.9
Indeed, I will argue, the claim that power relies on negative sanctions reveals a semantic short-
circuit in Luhmann’s theory. Recalling Foucault’s analytics of power, we may observe that
Luhmann, in fact, reinstalls one of the central characteristics of the juridico-political image of
power (its negativity) which Foucault attacks by demonstrating its pre-modern foundation.
The second pillar of Luhmann’s theory of power – the supplement to the strictly functional
pillar – is thus embedded in an Old-European semantics of power where power relies on the
possibility of sanctioning non-compliance. As Foucault stresses repeatedly, this notion of
power is not necessarily false. However, it is highly inadequate for describing how power is
exercised nowadays where the subtle operations of power, so Foucault argues, should rather
be analyzed in terms of discipline, government or, drawing upon Deleuze (1995), control. The
negative sanctions pillar of Luhmann’s theory of power is thus in a double sense converse to
his own evolutionary objectives. On the one hand, it is at odds with his theory of functional
differentiation because the constitutive notion of sanctions suggests that his conception of
power corresponds to a hierarchically differentiated society. Hence, the second pillar ulti-
mately points to a divergence of semantics and social structure in Luhmann’s theory. On the
other hand, the constitutive tie between power and negative sanctions a priori forecloses the
possibility that power could be exercised in ways that differ from what the Old-European
semantics implies. By deducing the actual operations of power from the prevailing semantics
of power, as Luhmann tends to do, one runs the risk of ignoring historical transformations of
the forms of power.
How should one deal with this tension between the two pillars in Luhmann’s theory of
power? The answer that I opt for in this article is to consider the reliance on negative sanctions
as only one among many ways of conditioning action through action. That is, rather than
deeming negative sanctions compulsory for the exercise of power, I suggest that we view their
use as being contingent. This proposal thus emphasizes the purely functional notion of power
as an evolutionary outgrowth of the need for regulating the contingencies of alter’s and ego’s
actions. What is gained by highlighting only this first pillar? First of all, we acquire a subtle,
open, and flexible perspective on power. Second, and contrary to the Foucaldian position, the
perspective acquired adheres to Luhmann’s explicit emphasis on both societal evolution and
functional differentiation. It is, however, important to stress that, just as Foucault is cautious
to observe the simultaneous operation of sovereignty, discipline, and government, focusing
on the functional dimension of power should not altogether lead us to ignore sanctions. In
some situations, of course, the exercise of power may be supported by negative sanctions. At
161
other times, it will not. When and how this is the case is ultimately an empirical question to
which no answers will be provided here.
Instead, I attempt in the following to demonstrate how the openness and flexibility referred
to may be redeemed. More specifically, the suggestion is that the functional definition of power
may enable us to incorporate into systems theory what Foucault analyzes as exercise of power
through subjectification.10
IV. Subjectification as semantic intrusion

According to Foucault, the ways in which individuals are constructed as specific ‘subjects’,
e.g. as delinquents, consumers, enterprising citizens, etc., may be observed as techniques of
exercising power. ‘This form of power’, Foucault says:
. . . applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize
and which others have to recognize in him. (1982: 212)
Actually, Luhmann and Foucault agree to repudiate the idea of an a-historic, constitutive
subjectivity, but this common point of departure leads them in different directions. Whereas
Foucault examines the power effects of how the subject is constructed in different social
settings, Luhmann entirely excludes the subject from his theory in order to understand
sociality purely in terms of communication. The question is now whether Luhmann thereby
precludes himself from analyzing those ways of exercising of power that Foucauldian studies
of contemporary political power are so successful at diagnosing. In positive terms, the
question is: Is it possible within systems theory to conceive of subjectification as a form of
power? This is, in fact, possible, I will argue, but it requires that power is detached from
negative sanctions. Before arguing for this, I should emphasize that the following reconstruc-
tion is not an attempt to find a place for the subject in Luhmann’s work since that would
amount to a renunciation of one of the theory’s strongest points. What is at stake is merely an
attempt to show how systems theory can be opened towards an analysis of subjectification.
Here, I draw upon Urs Stäheli (2000b) and a problem he has identified within systems theory
concerning Luhmann’s attempt to overcome the sociological action theory of Weber, Parsons,
etc. Luhmann convincingly argues that action must be secondary to communication; hence
action also cannot be considered the fundamental sociological unit – a status that should be
given to communication. Now, what makes the relationship between communication and
action a crucial, but simultaneously precarious, theme in systems theory is not so much the
dismissal of action as the ultimate unit of the social but rather, that actions are still ascribed a
very important – in fact, constitutive – role in social systems.
The problem is situated between the following two assumptions. On the one hand, ‘social
systems can carry out their self-reproduction only with the help of self-observations and self-
descriptions’ (Luhmann, 1995: 167). On the other hand, Luhmann claims, ‘communication
cannot be observed directly, only inferred’ (1995: 164). Communication itself is invisible. But if
communication is invisible the system cannot observe itself, hence self-reproduction,
autopoiesis, and ultimately the system itself is impossible. In order to overcome this tension,
communication must be made visible, which is accomplished when the system is ‘flagged as
an action system’ (Luhmann, 1995: 164). Thus, even though the system is actually a system of
communications, it has to bypass this fact and present itself as a system of actions. In practice,
this is realized by observing communication in a simplified way, namely by interpreting
utterance as action, describing it in an available semantics – as rational, free, etc.
Stäheli is critical of this resurrection of action in the theory of communication and he
questions the necessity of binding communications to actions (Stäheli, 2000b: 42). In the
162
present context, I leave this part of his argument aside and, instead, focus on what power
theoretical consequences it has if one accepts Luhmann’s conceptualization. For then it turns
out that the way in which actions are attributed can be conceived as a systemic counterpart
to the Foucauldian forms of subjectification.
Take, for example, the governmental studies of advanced liberal modes of subjectification,
where individuals are constructed as active, responsible subjects (see Rose, 1999). This may be
interpreted as a strategy of power which, so to speak, seeks to infiltrate the very reproduction
of social systems in that it provides and advances a semantics (of rational choices) which the
systems may use to reproduce themselves as (rational) action systems. In short, the political
promotion of the active, responsible subject facilitates one particular way in which communi-
cations could be flagged as actions (Stäheli, 1998: 324–5). This attempt to steer not only
endeavors to designate or indicate actions as, say, rational choices, it also produces expec-
tations to connecting communications and, often, to particular technologies of the self, i.e.
specific ways in which individuals or social systems are to conduct themselves. In the words
of Luhmann (1995: 168):
The right kind of self-attribution may then be taught more or less successfully to an actor, so that in
time, perhaps even in advance, he can tell if he is acting and relieve the pressure on social controls
by self-control.
How are we to characterize this kind of power within systems theory? Since Luhmann
abandons the subject tradition, I shall – for want of a better notion – entitle the kind of power
that is exercised through subjectification semantic intrusion, or semantic power. The purpose
of introducing this notion is explicitly to stress that the semantics is not external to the
governed systems; rather, it is essential to the constitution of social systems and their repro-
duction, the point at which communications are flagged as actions. To put it as clearly as
possible: All social systems must describe themselves as action systems, otherwise they
cannot observe and thereby reproduce themselves. Providing and promoting a particular
semantics of actions may be interpreted as an attempt to condition the basis of the communi-
cative reproduction, that is, the very way social systems flag and describe their utterances as
actions.
Semantic intrusion, then, is a type of action by which alter aims to condition ego’s action, a
systemic mode of ‘governing at a distance’ (cf. Rose, 1999). It is important to notice that this
form of power operates purely functionally without any reference to negative sanctions.
Nevertheless, sanctions will often support the subjectifications or semantic intrusions – usually
through a power of withdrawal – if one presumes not to behave in accordance with the expec-
tations that are associated with the semantics. In his analysis of advanced liberal modes of
government, for example, Nikolas Rose refers to a particular welfare reform program ‘which
required that children of welfare recipients attend school as a condition of their parents’
receiving benefits’ (1999: 264). Here, the possible use of sanctions serves to buttress the subjec-
tification of active, responsible citizens.
One important issue must be touched upon concerning semantic intrusion. For does not this
notion run contrary to Luhmann’s very idea of operationally closed systems? Does it not imply
that systems are determinable from the outside? To caution against this impression, I should
stress the element of freedom that both Luhmann and Foucault regard as the condition for
any exercise of power. Hence, there is no guarantee that systemic power will succeed any
better than other ways of exercising power. Promoting a particular semantics does not warrant
compliance. On the contrary, every system is left to decide on its own premises how it selects
its operations and how it connects to them. As Luhmann states:
The semantic expenditure required for the communication system to describe itself as an action
system is in part a problem of cultural history, in part a problem of a specific situation. Whether a
163
semantics of vital forces is all that is needed or interests must be taken into consideration . . . – all this
depends on circumstances at the social system’s disposal. (1995: 168; italics added)
Indeed, Luhmann warns against overestimating the reach of power. As systems are auto-
poietically organized, one system cannot interfere in another system’s internal operations.
Luhmann thus offers a sociological perspective that, more clearly and profoundly than
Foucault, explains why the exercise of power often contains ‘a strangely utopian element’
(Dean 1999: 33).
V. Conclusion
Symbolically generalized media of communication are, Luhmann says, differentiated
according to how they connect the action and/or experience of alter and ego. As one of these
media, power is characterized by providing a regulation of alter’s action and ego’s action. This
part of Luhmann’s theory of power is indeed intriguing because it combines a sophisticated,
flexible, and non-causal perspective on power with a general theory of society and its
evolution. Here, power is viewed as a byproduct of societal evolution or, more accurately, as
an effective means of dealing with increasing complexity. What is at once fascinating and, to
some perhaps, provocative is that this conceptualization eludes a widespread tendency in
social and political theory of ascribing power a predominant societal status. In Luhmann’s
analysis, power is placed on a par with other symbolically generalized media (money, truth,
love, etc.), inviting comparisons of their functional contributions.
According to Luhmann, the functionally differentiated subsystems of modern society are
themselves organized around the differentiation of the symbolically generalized media of
communication. In this article, I have argued that this analysis of functional differentiation
offers a profound sociological basis for Foucault’s critique of the discourse of sovereignty and
its negative-hierarchical notion of power. All the more surprising is it that Luhmann himself,
as a second pillar of his theory of power, emphasizes the constitutive import of negative
sanctions on power. Drawing upon Foucault, I argued that the significance attributed to
negative sanctions is converse to Luhmann’s self-proclaimed focus on evolutionary
processes.
I have therefore asserted that systems theory would keep better in line with its evolutionary
objectives by paying primary attention to the functional aspect of power. More accurately, a
sophisticated analytics of power, combining a complex theory of society with an evolutionary
dimension, would profit from using Luhmann’s functional definition of power as analytical
starting-point, examining how action in the concrete is regulated through action, that is,
studying what forms the exercise of power takes in actu. Such an approach would be open to
Foucault’s argument that in modern society we may observe simultaneous workings of
different forms of power. In other words, even if we stress the functional pillar of Luhmann’s
notion of power, this does not preclude that action is often conditioned by action with the help
of negative sanctions. However, sanctions are not required in the exercise of power. In this
article, this was demonstrated in the systemic reconstruction of subjectification, for which
purpose I invented the notion of semantic intrusion.
In sum, through a Foucaldian critique, an immanent problem in systems theory was
identified. In dealing with this problem, a more open systemic conception of and approach to
power has been suggested in which Luhmann’s main contributions to sociology come more
to the fore.
164
Notes
I am deeply indebted to Garrett Batten, Reka Prasad, Urs Stäheli, and three anonymous reviewers for
valuable comments.
1. Previously, Alain Pottage has analyzed power in Luhmann and Foucault, but whereas Pottage uses
systems theory ‘as a sort of critical complement to Foucault’s project’ (Pottage, 1998: 2), the aim of
the following is the reverse: to use Foucault as a corrective to Luhmann. Possible relations between
Luhmann and Foucault are also identified by Brunkhorst (1990), Kneer (1996), Andersen (2003), and
in the contributions in Borch and Larsen (2003).
2. A Nietzschean–Foucauldian critique would problematize this search for an origin (Ursprung),
‘because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their
carefully protected identities’ (Foucault, 2000: 371). In other words, to criticize the classical theory of
power for not being able to uncover the origin of power amounts to an identity position that
Luhmann himself, in his later writings, would reject.
3. All translations from German are by the author.
4. The notion of government has a dual role in Foucault’s historical writings. On the one hand, it is
associated with the problematization of acts and practices in the Ancient World. On the other hand,
it is used to describe the process, ‘or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice
of the Middle Ages, transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, gradually becomes “governmentalized”’ (Foucault, 1991: 103).
5. Against Luhmann’s theory of differentiation, a radical Foucauldian critique would argue that all
symbolically generalized media are fundamentally media of power because they reproduce a normal-
ization of communication (cf. Stäheli, 2000a: 177).
6. This basically economic perspective on power associates Luhmann with Foucault as well. Like
Parsons, Luhmann applies the economic concepts of inflation and deflation in the theory of symbol-
ically generalized media. Power is inflated by empty threats and it is deflated if one relinquishes the
possibility of conditioning action through action too often (Luhmann, 1979: 166). Foucault expresses
similar power-economic considerations: ‘Power is only exercised at a cost. . . . If power is exercised
too violently, there is a risk of provoking revolts; or if the intervention is too discontinuous, there
could be resistance and disobedience’ (Foucault, 1989a: 232).
7. In his early work, Luhmann presumes that the idea of transmission of selections can replace the
assertion of possession (see Luhmann, 1970b: 135, n. 55). Not until much later does he acknowledge
that not even this escapes an ontological framework.
8. According to Luhmann, the sanctions have a negative value to the powerful as well as to the subordi-
nate. They are immediately painful to the latter who is the target of them but they are unpleasant to
the powerful too, as the preferred actions must now be provided in a more difficult way, for example,
through coercion – and then the power ends. Power is only exercised as long as the negative sanctions
remain a possibility. Even though both ego and alter prefer to avoid the sanctions, they appraise them
differently. Thus, the powerful can better live with the sanctions than the subordinate can. It is
precisely this difference that institutes the power of the powerful, Luhmann says.
9. Granted, Luhmann also emphasizes the importance of positive sanctions in modern welfare states
where the exercise of power cannot be based on the most radical negative sanction, physical violence.
But even here, power exists in transforming positive sanctions (social benefits, etc.) into negative
ones; a power of withdrawal relying on the possibility of cutting or entirely withdrawing expected
welfare benefits (Luhmann, 1987: 120–1).
10. One might also consider whether spatial arrangements could be interpreted as another way for alter,
through action, to condition ego’s actions that does not rely on negative sanctions. This is Foucault’s
position when he argues that ‘space is fundamental in any exercise of power’ (Foucault, 1989b: 345).
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Biographical Note: Christian Borch, PhD, is post-doctoral research fellow at the Department of Sociology,
University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His current research focuses on the sociology of crowds.
Address: Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 5, P.O. Box 2099,
DK-1014 Copenhagen K, Denmark. [email: Christian.Borch@sociology.ku.dk]
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Acta Sociologica: Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault, and Analytics of Power

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Acta Sociologica

Systemic Power: Luhmann, Foucault, and Analytics of Power

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abstract: Niklas Luhmann’s theory of power is based on two fundamental pillars.

keywords: communication ◆ evolution ◆ functional analysis ◆ government ◆

Acta Sociologica ◆ June 2005 ◆ Vol 48(2): 155–167 ◆ DOI: 10.1177/0001699305053769

II. The mediality of power

Consequently, it is also unsuitable for understanding power. Luhmann’s famous foundational

III. Negative sanctions

IV. Subjectification as semantic intrusion

Luhmann, N. (1987) ‘Gesellschaftliche Grundlagen der Macht: Steigerung und Verteilung’, in N.

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