Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Process Safety and Environmental Protection

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/psep

Risk precontrol continuum and risk gradient control in underground

coal mining
Quanlong Liu ∗ , Xianfei Meng ∗ , Xinchun Li, Xixi Luo
School of Management, China University of Mining & Technology, Xuzhou, 221116, China

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Underground coal mining is recognized all over the world as one of the riskiest industrial operations. To
Received 30 April 2019 improve the safety management model in underground coal mines from passive management to active
Received in revised form 25 June 2019 management, the risk precontrol continuum and risk gradient control in underground coal mining are
Accepted 27 June 2019
proposed in this paper. The risk precontrol continuum is a continuous process in which three risk state
Available online 19 July 2019
correspond to three management models. Specifically, the stable safety state corresponds to the hazard
management model whose management objectives are hazards; the unstable safety state corresponds to
Keywords:
the defect management model whose management objectives are hidden dangers; and the emergency
Risk precontrol continuum
Risk gradient control
accidents state corresponds to the emergency management model whose management objectives are
Hazards emergencies. These three management models exist simultaneously, and each management model plays
Coal mine safety a role in precontrol to eliminate or reduce certain risks. The management level of these three manage-
ment models determines the risk precontrol level and risk level of a coal mining enterprise. Moreover,
the three management models are not isolated or fragmented but are linked and form the risk precon-
trol continuum together. The risk precontrol level and management initiative rise continuously from
emergency management model to defect management model to hazard management model. Finally, the
idea of risk gradient control is proposed based on the risk precontrol continuum, which includes three
gradients from high to low, namely, hazard control, hidden danger control, and emergency control.
© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction In recent years, several large, state-owned coal industry groups

Underground coal mining is recognized all over the world as
one of the riskiest industrial operations (Paul, 2009; Shahriar and
Bakhtavar, 2009; Zhang et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2019). In the under-
ground coal mines, there are a host of hazards, including “People”,
“Equipment”, “Environment”, and “Management” (Liu et al., 2016).
Thus, researchers have paid increasingly more attention to risk
management which is the coordinated activities to direct and con-
trol an organization with regard to risk (Sari et al., 2009; Bi and
Zhang, 2010; Aven, 2011; Pang et al., 2011; Khanzode et al., 2011;
Cao et al., 2012; Aven, 2013; Wu et al., 2014; Mahdevari et al., 2014),
including identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring
and reviewing risk (AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2009). Active risk manage-
ment does not wait for an injury or damage to occur but encourages
training, processes and systems to address risks that may arise in
the future (Akintoye and MacLeod, 1997; Godfrey et al., 2009).
∗ Corresponding authors at: University RD. 1, Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province, 221116,
China.
E-mail addresses: qll2016@cumt.edu.cn (Q. Liu), xfm@cumt.edu.cn (X. Meng).
in China have actively explored the application of risk management
theory by drawing lessons from international safety management
systems (Joy, 2004; Li and Song, 2009; Onder et al., 2014), such
as the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) management system,
National Occupational Safety Association (NOSA) management
system, and Health Safety and Environment (HSE) management
system. In this way, China has formed new models of safety man-
agement that fit its own situation and that have achieved some
success. For example, the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety
(SACMA) and Shenhua Group jointly launched the project “Coal
Mine Intrinsic Safety Management System (Risk Precontrol Manage-
ment System of Safety in Coal Mines)” on February 13, 2006. Six
research institutes, including the China University of Mining and
Technology (CUMT), were involved in the project. After years of
research and practice, the project has achieved good results. The
risk precontrol management system of safety in coal mining uses
hazard identification and risk assessment as the basis, risk precon-
trol as the core, and unsafe behaviour control as the focus, which
strives for the optimal match among “People”, “Equipment”, “Envi-
ronment”, and “Management” through developing targeted control
standards and measures (Li and Song, 2009; Liu et al., 2016).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2019.06.031
0957-5820/© 2019 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219
Table 1
The development of safety management models.
Stage of development Management model
Inferior stage Accident management model
Middle stage Hidden danger management model
Advanced stage Risk management model
Fig. 1. An example of root hazards and state hazards.
The above explorations of risk management provide promising
support for improving the traditional safety management models in
coal mines. However, many coal enterprises still use the traditional
safety management models that are mainly based on experience or
institutional documents, as shown in Table 1. Moreover, most of the
safety management models in use are passive management mod-
els that manage during or after accidents and are not preventative
in nature. Furthermore, the managed objectives are accidents, hid-
den dangers, or “three violations” (violations in the commanding,
operation, and labour disciplines), not the hazards that could cause
harm or loss and that are sources of risk (OHSAS18001, 2007OHSAS
1, 2007OHSAS18001, 2007; ISO Guide, 2009; AS/NZS ISO 31000,
2009; Liu et al., 2016). Thus, these management models cannot
prevent the occurrence of accidents from their source. Besides, a
large quantity of research on risk management in underground
coal mines has been conducted currently (Duzgun and Einstein,
2004; Li and Song, 2007; Grayson et al., 2009; Li, 2009; Maiti and
Khanzode, 2009; Li et al., 2010; Li, 2010; Liu et al., 2016). Those
research mainly focused on accidents, hidden dangers, or “three
violations” also. However, the specific forms of risks are hazards,
hidden dangers, and emergencies, and the actual management
work mainly includes three parts, namely, hazard management
whose management objectives are hazards, defect management
whose management objectives are hidden dangers, and emergency
management whose management objectives are emergencies. The
risk management is a continuous process and is the unity of emer-
gency management, defect management, and hazard management.
Accordingly, to help address the gaps in the research, the risk pre-
211
Management object Model character
Accident Management after accident based on experience
Hidden danger Management during accident based on institution
Risk and hazard Management before accident based on risk
control continuum model in coal mining is explored in this paper,
and then the idea of risk gradient control is proposed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the preliminaries of this paper including hazard classi-
fications and definitions, relationships among hazards, risks, and
accidents, and risk precontrol. Section 3 proposes the risk pre-
control continuum in underground coal mines, and then the risk
gradient control is proposed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the
proposed risk precontrol continuum and risk gradient control.
Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Hazard classifications and definitions
In this study, hazards are defined as the roots or states that could
cause harm or loss and that are sources of risk, which is consistent
with the definition in the ISO Guide 73. Hazards can be tangible or
intangible. Furthermore, in this paper, hazards are categorized into
root hazards and state hazards.
First, the root hazards are the root causes of accidents, which are
objective and inherent in the underground coal mining and produc-
tion process, whether they are identified or not. They are further
classified into people, equipment, environment, and management.
Specifically, the root hazards from people refers to working posi-
tions in coal mining, such as coal mining machine drivers, gas
monitors, and coal diggers. The root hazards from equipment refer
to all machinery and equipment, such as coal mining machines,
212 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219
Fig. 2. Root hazards and state hazards.
scraper chain conveyers, and hydraulic support. The root hazards
from environment refer to natural geological conditions and the
working environment, which includes methane, groundwater, and
coal and silica dusts. Finally, the root hazards from management
refer to the organizational structure, safety culture, rules, regula-
tions, etc. (Li and Song, 2007; Li, 2009, 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Liu
and Li, 2014; Liu et al., 2016).
Second, the state hazards are the unsafe conditions or unsafe
behaviours of the root hazards, which can release or allow root
hazards to trigger accidents. State hazards are closely related to
root hazards. For example, the state hazards of people mainly refer
to unsafe behaviour, such as a gas drainage worker’s improper gas
emissions monitoring or a ventilator worker’s unreasonable ven-
tilator installation. The state hazards of equipment mainly refer to
a machine’s unsafe state, such as air duct leakage, and unqualified
detonators. The state hazards of the environment mainly refer to
an environment’s unsafe state, such as a high gas concentration in
the heading face or coal spontaneous combustion. Finally, the state
hazards of management mainly refer to management deficiencies,
such as an unreasonable organizational structure, or a shortage of
drainage workers. An illustrative example of the above root hazards
and their corresponding state hazards is shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
The state hazards have the potential to cause harm and/or dam-
age. Furthermore, they are further divided into identified state
hazards and unidentified state hazards. Root hazards are also
divided into identified root hazards and unidentified root hazards.
Risk management in underground coal mines should be established
based on the identified root hazards and their corresponding identi-
fied state hazards. Moreover, the identified state hazards are further
divided into controlled state hazards and uncontrolled state haz-
ards (hidden dangers that are identified as out-of-control state
hazards). Controlled state hazards refer to the situation where
the root hazards are managed within normal and safe operating
parameters. By contrast, uncontrolled state hazards (hidden dan-
gers) refer to the situation where the root hazards operate out of
the safety control criterion, which are operating conditions that
Fig. 3. Hazards classification.
Fig. 4. Relationships among hazards, risks, and accidents.
could trigger accidents under some conditions. An illustration of
this classification of hazards is shown in Fig. 3.
2.2. Relationships among hazards, risks, and accidents
Misunderstanding and confusion surrounds the concepts of haz-
ards, risks, hidden dangers, and accidents, resulting in difficulty
in discerning the objects of risk management and in performing
effective risk management activities. Therefore, differentiating and
analysing the relationships among hazards, risks, hidden dangers,
and accidents is critical. Hazards are the roots or states that could
cause harm or loss and are sources of risk. Risks are the possibil-
ity that harm (death, injury or illness) may occur when exposed
to hazards. Risks are the effects of uncertainty on situations that
are caused by variability and specific uncertain events. Risks are
often measured in terms of consequences and probability. When all
the hazards are safely controlled, there are no risks except residual
risks. Conversely, when a certain hazard is out of control, namely,
there is an uncontrolled state hazard (hidden danger), then there
is an unacceptable level of risk. The goal of risk management is to
implement sufficient controls so that the residual risks of the haz-
ards that result in accidents are reduced to a tolerable or acceptable
level (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2001; Hallikas et al., 2004; McNeil
et al., 2015). The uncontrolled state hazards, namely hidden dan-
gers, are state hazards that are out of control and are the direct
causes of accidents under some conditions. An illustration of these
relationships among hazards, risks, and accidents is shown in Fig. 4.
Further exploration of links between hazards and accidents are
presented in Fig. 5. Given the peculiarity of the state hazards, the
following points are made. First, because of limited knowledge,
the identification of state hazards is a blind area, and there are
unidentified state hazards that are not being protected against. For
this reason, unidentified state hazards are the greatest threats to
mines. Therefore, a comprehensive and in-depth identification of
state hazards, or an elimination of the blind areas, is paramount
in avoiding accidents. Second, control criterion and control mea-
sures should be established to manage the identified state hazards.
The control criterion is the control of hazards to the extent that
the risks of hazards can be eliminated, which can be formulated
according to the relevant state criteria, industry criteria, and man-
ufacturer criteria. Control measures are the methods or means to
achieve the control criterion. If the identified state hazards meet the
control criterion, they are called controlled state hazards, which do
not have the potential to trigger accidents as shown in Fig. 5. If
the state hazards do not achieve the control criterions, then they
 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219
Fig. 5. Practical or potential relationship between hazards and accidents.
are considered uncontrolled state hazards (hidden dangers), which
will result in some out-of-control operations that could potentially
trigger accidents under certain conditions (Fig. 5).
Consider gas concentration, for example. Gas concentration in
the coal face is the identified state hazard, and “Gas concentra-
tion less than 1%” is the control criterion. If the gas concentration
meets the control criterion, then it is under control, and there is no
risk. If the gas concentration does not meet the control criterion,
namely, gas concentration more than 1%, then it is out of control
and called an uncontrolled state hazard (a hidden danger) (Fig. 5).
Once the identified state hazard is out of control, it is crucial to
undertake remedial measures to correct it and help it to return to
a safe state. Therefore, the control criterion, control measures, and
remedial measures are called the “three layer defence” in coal min-
ing risk management (Liu et al., 2016), as shown in Fig. 5. If the
hazards penetrate the “three layer defence”, an accident is likely to
be triggered (Li and Xiao, 2007; Niu, 2012).
Thus, the relationships among hazards, hidden dangers, and
accidents can be summarized as follows. Root hazards are the root
cause of accidents, and state hazards are the unsafe conditions or
unsafe behaviours that can trigger an accident by releasing root
hazards. Controlled state hazards are a prerequisite for safe oper-
ations, uncontrolled state hazards (hidden dangers) are the direct
causes of accidents, and unidentified state hazards are the greatest
threats to mines.
2.3. Risk precontrol
Risks are now defined in terms of the effects of uncertainty
on situations that are caused by variability and specific uncertain
events (ISO Guide, 2009; AS/NZS ISO 31000, 2009; Sari et al., 2009).
Risks are often expressed in terms of a combination of the conse-
quences of an event and the associated likelihood of its occurrence.
When all hazards are safely controlled, there is no risk except resid-
ual risk. Conversely, when a certain hazard is out of control, there
is hidden danger and an unacceptable level of risk. Therefore, the
specific forms of risks are hazards, hidden dangers, and emergen-
cies.
The purpose of studying risk is to control it effectively in
advance. This “risk precontrol” was first proposed by Dy Liacco,
whose basic idea was to make a system’s unsafe state return to nor-
mal and safe by analyzing the system and then by implementing
control measures and remedial measures. Currently, a large quan-
tity of research on risk precontrol management in underground
coal mines has been conducted (Li and Song, 2007; Li, 2009; Li
et al., 2010; Li, 2010; Liu et al., 2016). The current research on coal
mine risk precontrol is focused on accidents and hidden dangers.
However, accidents and hidden dangers are difficult to eliminate
213
because of underground coal mines’ harsh conditions and the over-
all complexity of production. The proper management of accidents
and hidden dangers prevents the occurrence of the same hidden
dangers and accidents. Therefore, in this study, risk precontrol is
defined as all the direct or indirect activities that eliminate or min-
imize risks. The actual management work mainly includes three
parts, namely, hazard management whose management objectives
are hazards, defect management whose management objectives
are hidden dangers, and emergency management whose manage-
ment objectives are emergencies.
3. Modelling the risk precontrol continuum in
underground coal mines
The concept of a continuum comes from the Leadership Contin-
uum Theory which was proposed by R. Tannenbaum and Warren
H. Schmidt in 1958. This theory suggests a continuum of possible
leadership behaviour that is available to a manager, and along this
continuum, many leadership styles can be placed from autocratic
(boss-centred leadership) to free rein (subordinate-centred lead-
ership). The continuum presents a range of actions that relate not
only to the degree of authority that is used by a manager but also to
the area of freedom that is available to non-managers in arriving at
decisions. Based on the Leadership Continuum Theory, this paper
explores the risk precontrol continuum model in coal mining and
then proposes the idea of risk gradient control.
Because of underground coal mines’ harsh conditions and the
complexity of production, “zero accidents” can only be an ideal
state, and relative safety and absolute risk go together in the coal
mine safety production system. The gateway of coal mine safety
management can be divided into hazards, hidden dangers, and acci-
dents. The three gateways correspond to three different states in
the coal mine safety system: hazard management corresponds to
the stable safety state; hidden danger management corresponds to
the unstable safety state; and accident management corresponds
to the emergency accidents state. Moreover, safety management
initiatives rise continuously from the management of accidents to
the management of hazards, and when the gateway is further away
from accidents, the degree of safety assurance is higher. There is a
relationship between the safety level of a coal mine and its safety
management gateway: when the safety level of hazard manage-
ment is the highest, the safety level of accident management is the
lowest. In all, the three management models together form the risk
precontrol continuum, which is shown in Fig. 6.
As shown in Fig. 6, risk precontrol management is a continuous
process in which each risk state corresponds to one management
model. The stable safety state corresponds to the hazard man-
agement model whose management objectives are hazards, the
214 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219
Fig. 6. Risk precontrol continuum.
unstable safety state corresponds to the defect management model
whose management objectives are hidden dangers, and the emer-
gency accidents state corresponds to the emergency management
model whose management objectives are emergencies. As shown
in Fig. 6, the risk precontrol level and management initiative rise
continuously from emergency management model to defect man-
agement model to hazard management model.
As mentioned above, there is no absolute safety, only abso-
lute risk. Even if safety management is in place, unidentified
hazards, hidden dangers, and even accidents are inevitable. There-
fore, hazard management, defect management, and emergency
management exist simultaneously in practical coal mine safety
management. Moreover, each management type will play a role
in precontrol to eliminate or reduce certain risks. Therefore, the
combination of these three management levels constitutes the
entire risk precontrol level (p) of a coal mining enterprise, which is
described in the following formula.
p = ˛ + ˇ(1 − ˛) + (1 − (˛ + ˇ(1 − ˛)))
where ˛ represents the level of controlling hazards, or the hazard
management level, including hazard identification, risk assess-
ment, and risk treatment, and the value ranges from 0 to 1, as shown
in Eq. (2).
controlled state hazards
˛=
controlled state hazards + uncontrolled state hazards
ˇ represents the level of controlling hidden dangers, or the defect
management level, including hidden danger identification, and hid-
den danger rectification, and the value ranges from 0 to 1, and
 represents the level of preventing accident propagation or the
occurrence of secondary accidents, or the emergency management
level, and the value ranges from 0 to 1.
As shown in Eq. (1), the risk precontrol level is continuous and
ranges from 0 to 1. Correspondingly, the risk level (r) is shown in
the following formula.
r =1−p
In the ideal state, when all hazards are thoroughly identified and
properly controlled, ˛ equals 1. In this case, there are no hidden
dangers, the risk precontrol level equals 1, and the risk level equals
0.
When 0<˛ < 1, this means that certain hazards are out of control
or that there are hidden dangers. For example, if ␣ = 0.37, it means
there are sixty-three percent of the hazards out of control, namely,
sixty-three percent of the hazards are hidden dangers. If the hid-
den dangers are thoroughly identified and timely controlled, then
␤ equals 1. This means that once the hidden dangers emerge, reme-
dial measures are quickly taken to correct the hidden dangers and
to help them return to a normal and safe state. In this case, there are
no accidents, the risk precontrol level equals 1, and the risk level
equals 0.
When 0<˛ < 1 and 0<ˇ < 1, the hidden dangers could not be
transformed into controlled state hazards after remedial measures,
and there are emergencies. For example, if ␣ = 0.37 and ␤ = 0.32,
then 1-(␣+␤(1-␣)) = 0.43, it means there forty-three percent of the
hidden dangers are transformed into emergencies. If all the emer-
gencies are thoroughly controlled, and there are no casualties or
property losses, then ␥ equals 1, the risk precontrol level equals 1,
and the risk level equals 0.
Thus, hazard management model, defect management model,
and emergency management model exist simultaneously in a coal
mining enterprise, and each management model plays a role in pre-
control to eliminate or reduce certain risks. The management level
of these three management types determines the risk precontrol
level and risk level of the enterprise. Moreover, the three manage-
ment models are not isolated or fragmented but are linked. For
example, if hazard management is not in place, there will be hidden
dangers that correspond to defect management, and similarly, if
defect management is not in place, there will be accidents that cor-
respond to emergency management. Therefore, the management
gateway should move towards hazards as much as possible based
on the principle of precontrol.
4. Risk gradient control in underground coal mines
4.1. Risk gradient control based on the risk precontrol continuum
As indicated above, risk precontrol management includes emer-
gency management, defect management, and hazard management.
From the sequence of the accident in Fig. 5, it is clear that prior-
ity should be given to hazard management (Saleh and Cummings,
2011; Fan et al., 2014). To minimize the probability of hidden dan-
(1)
gers, hazard identification and control should be thoroughly and
properly maximized. When there are hidden dangers, remedial
measures should be taken to correct them and to help them return
to a normal and safe state. From hazard management to defect
management to emergency management, the management objec-
tives approach the accidents, and the safety management work
(2) becomes increasingly passive. The risk precontrol management ini-
tiative rises continuously from emergency management to hazard
management. Therefore, risk precontrol management has the char-
acteristics of a step-ladder or is a gradient, and the idea of risk
gradient control could be implemented in a coal mining enterprise,
as shown in Fig. 7.
First, as shown in Fig. 7, the highest control gradient is hazard
control, which corresponds to the stable safety state. Hazard con-
trol is followed by defect control, which corresponds to the unstable
safety state. Emergency control corresponds to the emergency acci-
dents state, and accident control corresponds to accidents. Second,
different pre-arranged plans are developed according to different
(3)
risks in the risk gradient control, and once risk emerges, the pre-
arranged plans are translated into actual risk control measures.
Third, the state of the system tends to change and deteriorate with
external adverse disturbances, and risk gradient control should be
implemented. If the previous gradient control measures are inef-
fective, then the control measures of the next gradient should be
started immediately, which thus forms a complete coal mine risk
gradient control system. Fourth, the risk gradient control of a coal
mine is a closed loop management process that follows the PDCA
(Plan, Do, Check, and Action) cycle principle. Specifically, devel-
oping pre-arranged plans, implementing pre-arranged plans, and
revising pre-arranged plans form a complete PDCA cycle, and the
safety management level improves after each cycle.
 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219 215

Fig. 7. Framework of the coal mine risk gradient control.

Fig. 8. Four aspects of hazards identification and treatment.

4.2. Application
Take the stable safety state, namely hazard management model
as an example, the application of the hazard pre-arranged plan is
provided as follows. Hazards identification and treatment are the
core of the risk precontrol management system. The four aspects of
hazards identification and treatment and the implementation steps
are shown in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.
Based on the Root-State Hazard Identification method (Liu et al.,
2016), an illustration that identifies underground coal mines’ haz-
ards in risk management is presented in this section. The specific
steps for performing hazards identification with the RSHI method
are elaborated as follows.
Step 1: Identify the root hazards.
Draw out mines’ tree structure chart of root hazards from
people, machines, the environment, and institutions. In the tree
structure, the node at the end of a path should include all the job
positions, machinery and equipment, natural geological conditions
and working environment, and organization structure, safety cul-
ture, rules, etc. Taking Lingwu Mine as an example, its tree structure
of root hazards from people is shown in Fig. 10.
Step 2: Complete the root hazards form.
Complete the root hazards form based on the above tree struc-
tures, including identifiers and names of the underground coal
mine, identifiers and names of specific root hazards, identifiers of
parent root hazards, identifiers and names of risk types, and iden-
tifiers and names of job positions. Again taking Lingwu Mine as an
example, its simplified root hazards form is shown in Appendix A.
Step 3: Identify the state hazards.
To the greatest extent possible, identify the state hazards of each
root hazard as presented in the root hazards form by combining the
use of a variety of methods, and then complete the state hazards
form. First, describe the state hazards in the state hazards form
based on the root hazards form, from which the identifier of state
hazards should inherit its corresponding root hazard’s identifier.
Second, determine the culture type of the identified state hazard in
the state hazards form, including conceptual culture, behavioural
culture, material culture, and institutional culture. Third, describe
the corresponding consequence and accident type. Fourth, evaluate
the identified state hazards. Taking Lingwu Mine as an example,
part of its state hazards form is shown in Appendix B.
Step 4: Supplement the root hazards and state hazards.
To maximize identification of the root hazards and their corre-
sponding state hazards, the hazards identification methods Work
Task Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis were adopted to supplement
the root hazards and state hazards, as shown in Fig. 9. Coal mines
should synthetically use hazard identification methods according
to their actual conditions.
Finally, the hazards identification form was obtained, includ-
ing root hazards, state hazards, culture type, risk consequences
216 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219

Fig. 9. Implementation steps of hazards identification and treatment.

Fig. 10. Tree structure of root hazards from people in the Lingwu Mine.
Source: The project on the construction of a risk precontrol management system for safety in Lingwu Mine
 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219
description, accident type, and risk level. Furthermore, the hazards
identification forms can be imported into the information system
for risk precontrol management.
5. Discussions
The main characteristics of the proposed risk precontrol contin-
uum and risk gradient control can be described as follows.
(1) Continuity and Unity. First, continuity means that risk precon-
trol management is a continuous process in which each risk
state corresponds to one dominant management model, and the
level of risk precontrol management is a continuous variable
that ranges from 0 to 1. Second, unity means that risk pre-
control management is the unity of emergency management,
defect management, and hazard management, and the risk pre-
control level and management initiative rise continuously from
emergency management to hazard management.
(2) Hierarchical Ranks. The risk precontrol continuum indicates
that emergency management, defect management and haz-
ard management all belong to risk precontrol management.
However, the safety management initiative and its effective-
ness rise continuously from emergency management to defect
management to hazard management, and when the gateway
approaches hazards more, the safety assurance degree is higher.
Therefore, the management gateway should move as close as
possible towards hazards based on the principle of precontrol.
(3) Process. The risk precontrol continuum proposes different risk
precontrol management models in the different stages of risk
management, and these management models include the entire
process of coal mine safety management. The three manage-
ment models that are described above exist simultaneously in
the safety management system and are not isolated or frag-
mented but are linked. Specifically, if the hazard management
model is not in place, then there will be hidden dangers that
correspond to the defect management model. Similarly, if the
defect management model is not in place, then there will
be accidents that correspond to the emergency management
model.
Furthermore, the contributions of the risk precontrol continuum
are as follows. First, it proposes that the level of risk precontrol
is a continuous variable that ranges from 0 to 1. Second, hazard
management, defect management, and emergency management
all belong to risk precontrol management and are unified in avoid-
ing accident occurrence or casualties and property losses, but their
safety gateways are different. Third, the three management levels of
hazard management, defect management, and emergency manage-
ment form the entire risk precontrol level. Thus, the risk precontrol
continuum not only simply divides risk precontrol management
into hazard management, defect management, and emergency
management but also indicates that risk precontrol management is
a unity of the above three management models and is a continuous
process.
6. Conclusions
This paper differentiates the relationships among hazards, risks,
and accidents, explores the risk precontrol continuum, and pro-
Unit identifier Unit name Root hazard Root hazard
identifier
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P People
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-PCM Person in
charge of mine
217
poses risk gradient control. The following are the main conclusions
that can be drawn from this study.
The hazards are the roots or states that could cause harm or loss
and are the sources of risk, including root hazards and state hazards.
State hazards consist of controlled state hazards and uncontrolled
state hazards. Specifically, controlled state hazards refer to the sit-
uation where a state hazard meets the control criteria under the
control measures. However, if the state hazard does not meet the
control criteria, it is an uncontrolled state hazard or hidden danger.
Hidden dangers are state hazards that are out of control. Moreover,
once there is a hidden danger, it is crucial to take remedial steps to
correct it and enable it to return to a normal and safe state. If the
hidden danger cannot be transformed into a controlled state haz-
ard after remedial measures, an accident may occur under some
conditions.
Risk precontrol management is a continuous process in which
three risk states correspond to three management models. Specifi-
cally, the stable safety state corresponds to the hazard management
model whose management objectives are hazards, the unsta-
ble safety state corresponds to the defect management model
whose management objectives are hidden dangers, and the emer-
gency accidents state corresponds to the emergency management
model whose management objectives are emergencies. More-
over, the three management models exist simultaneously in the
safety management system and are not isolated or fragmented
but are linked. If hazard management is not in place, then
hidden dangers may occur, which corresponds to defect man-
agement. Similarly, if defect management is not in place, an
emergency may occur, which corresponds to emergency manage-
ment. Furthermore, the combination of the three management
levels constitutes a coal mining enterprise’s risk precontrol level.
The risk precontrol level and management initiative rise contin-
uously from emergency management to defect management to
hazard management. Thus, the risk precontrol continuum has the
characteristics of continuity, unity, hierarchical ranks, and pro-
cess.
The idea of risk gradient control can be implemented in coal
mining. In the framework of risk gradient control, the hazard
pre-arranged plan, hidden danger pre-arranged plan, and the emer-
gency pre-arranged plan are developed according to different risks,
and once risk emerges, the corresponding pre-arranged plans are
translated into actual risk control measures. Moreover, the three
pre-arranged plans have different gradient characteristics. Specif-
ically, the highest control gradient is hazard control, which is
followed by defect control, then emergency control. If the previ-
ous gradient control measures are ineffective, the control measures
of the next gradient should be started immediately to thus form a
complete coal mine risk gradient control system. Furthermore, the
risk gradient control is a closed loop management process, which
follows the PDCA cycle principle, and the safety management level
improves after each cycle.
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds
for the Central Universities (Grant No. 2017QNA07).
Appendix A. Simplified root hazards form in Lingwu Mine
subordinated to the Shen Hua Ningxia Coal Industry Group
Identifier of Risk type Risk type Identifier of Gob position
parent root identifier gob position type
hazard type
NX-LW-P
218 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219

NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-MM Mine manager NX-LW-P-PCM 1 People 1 Person in

charge of safety
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-ASP Administrator NX-LW-P
of safety
production
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-CE Chief engineer NX-LW-P-ASP 1 People 2 Safety
production
manager
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-DTC Driving team NX-LW-P-ASP 1 People 2 Safety
captain production
manager
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-OA Other NX-LW-P
administrators
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-SPC Secretary of the NX-LW-P-OA 1 People 3 Other
party managers
committee
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P- Workers of NX-LW-P
WSTL special types of
labour
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-GD Gas drainage NX-LW-P- 1 People 4 Workers of
WSTL special types of
labour
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-OTW Other types of NX-LW-P
workers
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-P-VW Ventilation NX-LW-P-OTW 1 People 5 Other types of
worker workers
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-M Machine
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 2 Machine
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-E Environment
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 3 Environment
NX-LW Lingwu Mine NX-LW-I Institution
NX-LW Lingwu Mine . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . 4 Institution
. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
Source: The project on the construction of a risk precontrol management system for safety in Lingwu Mine.

Appendix B. Part of the state hazards form in Lingwu Mine

subordinated to the Shen Hua Ningxia Coal Industry Group

Root hazard identifier Root hazard State hazard State hazard Culture type Culture type Description of Accident type Accident type
identifier description identifier risk identifier
consequence

NX-LW-P-GD Gas drainage NX-LW-P-GD- Gas drainage 3 Behavioural Gas overflow NX-LW-GEA Gas explosion
worker 001 worker did not culture and accident
plug the drill accumulation
hole either in the drilling
tightly or in a field
timely manner.
NX-LW-P-GD Gas drainage NX-LW-P-GD- Drainage 3 Behavioural Gas overrun NX-LW-GEA Gas explosion
worker 002 worker did not culture cannot be accident
install a gas found in time.
sensor in the
pipeline outlet.
NX-LW-P-GD Gas drainage NX-LW-P-GD- . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
worker 003
. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW-M-CC Coal cutter NX-LW-M-CC- The pressure of 4 Material The body of the NX-LW-GEA Electromechanical
001 the hydraulic culture coal cutter accident
nut connected uncouples in
to the coal the process of
shearer body is the coal cutter
insufficient. running and
damages the
coal cutter.
NX-LW-M-CC Coal cutter NX-LW-M-CC- . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
002
. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW-E-G Gas NX-LW-E-G- Gas 4 Material Gas NX-LW-GEA Gas explosion
001 concentration culture concentration accident
in the mining exceeds the
coal face. standard.
 Q. Liu et al. / Process Safety and Environmental Protection 129 (2019) 210–219 219

NX-LW-E-G Gas NX-LW-E-G- . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .

002
. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
NX-LW-I-T Training NX-LW-I-T-001 The form of 2 Institutional Training effects NX-LW-OA Other accident
training lacks culture are not good, as
flexibility and shown by
diversity. employees’ low
professional
skills.
NX-LW-I-T Training NX-LW-I-T-002 . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
. . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . .. . .
Source: The project on the construction of a risk precontrol management system for safety in Lingwu Mine.

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