GM 46668-474711 Rev 4 Nexus DP Operations Manual

DP Operations Manual
DP2 Cable Laying Vessel Nexus
For Damen Shipyard
GM-46668-474711
Rev 4 07/03/2016 Final issue GG JFD JFD
Rev Date Document Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

Status
Table of Contents
GM Doc. No.
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................9 GM-46668-474711 | Rev 4
1.1 GENERAL .................................................................... 9
1.2 PURPOSE .................................................................... 9
1.3 REFERENCE BACKGROUND............................................ 9
1.4 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................ 11
1.5 INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS .......................................... 13
1.6 CONTROL INFORMATION ............................................ 13
1.7 RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................... 14
2. VESSEL DETAILS ........................................15

2.1 VESSEL PARTICULARS ................................................ 15
2.2 RELEVANT CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS ..................... 16
2.3 DP REDUNDANCY CONCEPT ........................................ 16
2.4 WORST CASE FAILURE DESIGN INTENT ........................ 17
2.5 VESSEL CONFIGURATION FOR DP ................................ 17
3. PRINCIPLE OF DP OPERATIONS .................19

3.1 BASIC PRINCIPLES..................................................... 19
3.2 DP CLASS NOTATIONS ............................................... 20
3.3 ACCURACY ................................................................ 20
3.4 COMPUTER CONTROL & MONITORING .......................... 21
3.5 DP EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS .............................. 21

These materials are the Work Product of
3.6 THRUSTER UNITS ...................................................... 21 Global Maritime, and no reliance on this
work product is authorised by Global
3.7 POWER GENERATION ................................................. 22 Maritime, and Global Maritime accepts no
liability for any reliance by any person on
3.8 POWER MANAGEMENT ................................................ 22 the work product contained herein.
3.9 POWER DISTRIBUTION ............................................... 22 © This document is the property of Global

Maritime Consultancy Ltd. and is not to be
3.10 POSITION CONTROL................................................... 23
copied, nor shown, to third parties without
3.11 POSITION REFERENCES .............................................. 24 prior consent.
3.12 ENVIRONMENTAL SENSORS ........................................ 25 Global Maritime Consultancy Ltd.

Saddlers House
3.13 VESSEL SENSORS ...................................................... 26 44 Gutter Lane, Cheapside
London, EC2V 6BR, England
3.14 THE K-POS DP SYSTEM ............................................... 26
3.15 BASIC FORCES AND MOTIONS .................................... 26 T +44 (0) 203 465 2500
F +44 (0) 203 465 2501
3.16 THRUSTERS .............................................................. 28
www.globalmaritime.com
3.17 POSITION REFERENCE SYSTEMS ................................. 29
3.18 DP SYSTEM PRINCIPLES ............................................. 30
3.19 THE EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER .................................. 30
PAGE 2
3.20 DP CONTROLLER........................................................ 32
3.21 OPERATIONAL MODES ................................................ 32
3.22 DP USER INTERFACE .................................................. 33
3.23 DISPLAY LAYOUT ....................................................... 36
4. DP CONTROL SYSTEM .................................37

4.1 GENERAL DETAILS ..................................................... 37
4.2 DP OPERATOR STATION (OS) ...................................... 37
4.3 DP OPERATOR STATION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ..... 38
4.4 DP CONTROLLERS (COMPUTERS) ................................. 38
4.5 DP CONTROL CABINET FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ....... 39
4.6 DP DATA NETWORKS.................................................. 43
4.7 DP DATA NETWORK FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ........... 43
4.8 UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) .................... 45
4.9 230V UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY FAILURE MODES

& EFFECTS ................................................................ 46
4.10 DP LOAD LIMITATION ................................................. 49
4.11 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS........................................... 49
4.13 HYDRO-ACOUSTIC POSITION REFERENCES ................... 50
4.14 HYDRO-ACOUSTIC POSITION REFERENCE FAILURE

MODES AND EFFECTS................................................. 52
4.15 DIFFERENTIAL GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS

(DGNSS)................................................................... 54
4.16 DGNSS FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS............................. 55
4.17 TARGET RELATIVE POSITIONING SYSTEMS ................... 57
4.18 TARGET RELATIVE POSITIONING SYSTEMS FAILURE

MODES ..................................................................... 59
4.19 GYROCOMPASSES ...................................................... 59
4.20 GYROCOMPASS FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ................. 60
4.21 MOTION REFERENCE UNITS ........................................ 60
4.22 MOTION REFERENCE UNIT FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .. 61
4.23 INDEPENDENT JOYSTICK C-JOY ................................... 61
4.24 IJS OPERATOR TERMINAL FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ... 61
5. POWER GENERATION MACHINERY .............62

5.1 GENERAL .................................................................. 62
5.2 DIESEL GENERATORS ................................................. 62
5.3 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .......... 63
PAGE 3
6. POWER DISTRIBUTION ..............................64
6.1 GENERAL .................................................................. 64
6.2 690V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 65
6.3 690V DISTRIBUTION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ......... 65
6.4 440V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 66
6.6 230V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 67
7. POWER MANAGEMENT ................................69

7.1 GENERAL .................................................................. 69
7.2 SWITCHBOARD MODE SELECTION ............................... 69
7.3 GENERATOR START/STOP CONTROL ............................ 71
7.4 BLACKOUT PREVENTION ............................................. 72
7.5 BLACKOUT RECOVERY ................................................ 73
8. THRUSTERS AND PROPULSION ..................75

8.1 GENERAL .................................................................. 75
8.2 MODE SELECTOR SWITCH........................................... 76
8.3 THRUSTER CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS76
8.4 THRUSTER EMERGENCY STOPS ................................... 79
8.5 THRUSTER EMERGENCY STOP FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS80
9. ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITY......81

9.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 81
9.2 ORGANISATION ......................................................... 81
9.3 RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................... 82
9.4 MANNING FOR DP OPERATIONS .................................. 88
10. FAMILIARISATION, ASSESSMENT AND

TRAINING ..................................................90
10.1 FAMILIARISATION...................................................... 90
10.2 ASSESSMENT ............................................................ 90
10.3 TRAINING ................................................................. 90
11. DP OPERATING PROCEDURES ....................92

11.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 92
11.2 DP PHILOSOPHY ........................................................ 92
11.3 LIST OF DP OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES ...................... 92
11.4 DP SETUP PROCEDURES ............................................. 97
PAGE 4
11.6 COMPLETION OF DP OPERATIONS................................ 98
11.7 VESSELS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO WORKSITE .............. 99
11.8 DP OPERATIONS IN DETERIORATING WEATHER

CONDITIONS ............................................................. 99
11.9 DP OPERATIONS IN SHALLOW WATER ........................ 101
12. DP ALERT OPERATING GUIDELINES .........103

12.1 GENERAL ................................................................ 103
12.2 ALERT LEVEL RESPONSE ........................................... 103
12.3 ACTIVITY SPECIFIC OPERATING GUIDELINES (ASOG) .. 104
12.4 ALERT LEVEL RESPONSES ......................................... 106
13. DP EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ..................109

13.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 109
13.2 INCIDENT PRIORITIES.............................................. 109
13.3 INITIAL ACTIONS – DEGRADED OPERATIONAL STATUS 110
13.4 INITIAL ACTIONS – EMERGENCY STATUS ................... 111
13.5 ACTION ON RECEIPT OF ALARMS ............................... 111
14. PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM AND

ROUTINES ................................................115
14.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 115
14.2 ROUTINES FOR DP CONTROL SYSTEM ........................ 115
14.3 SOFTWARE MANAGEMENT......................................... 116
15. DP TRIALS AND VERIFICATION

PROGRAMME ............................................117
15.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 117
15.2 IN-HOUSE DP AUDITING PROGRAMME ....................... 117
15.3 OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF DP VERIFICATION .... 117
15.4 DP FMEA AND PROVING TRIALS................................. 119
15.5 SCOPE OF ANNUAL DP TRIALS................................... 119
15.6 DP PRE-OPERATIONAL / ARRIVAL ON LOCATION ......... 120
15.7 500M ZONE ENTRY CHECKS ...................................... 120
15.8 DP CHANGE OF WATCH HANDOVER CHECKLIST........... 121
15.9 DP FIELD RE- ENTRY CHECKS PROGRAMME ................ 121
15.10 DP LOG BOOK ......................................................... 121
15.11 DP INCIDENTS ........................................................ 122
16. VESSEL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND

LIMITATIONS ...........................................123
16.1 DP CAPABILITY ........................................................ 123
PAGE 5
16.2 UPDATING DP CAPABILITY PLOTS .............................. 124
16.3 HIGH CURRENT DP CAPABILITIES .............................. 124
16.4 DP CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS .................................... 124
17. DP FOOTPRINT PLOTS ..............................126

17.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 126
17.2 PROCEDURE ............................................................ 126
18. REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION .................127

18.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 127
18.2 MANUFACTURES’ MANUALS ....................................... 127
18.3 STANDARD REFERENCES .......................................... 128
19. DP INCIDENT REPORTING ........................129

19.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 129
19.2 RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................. 129
Appendices
APPENDIX A: DP CAPABILITY PLOTS

DAMEN CAPABILITY PLOTS
APPENDIX B: STATION KEEPING INCIDENT FORM

APPENDIX C: DP CHECKLISTS
Figures
FIGURE 1: DP2 CABLE-LAYING VESSEL NEXUS............................. 15
FIGURE 2: REDUNDANCY CONCEPT ............................................ 16
FIGURE 3: FORCES AND MOTIONS ............................................. 27
FIGURE 4: THREE DEGREES OF FREEDOM ................................... 27
FIGURE 5: THRUSTERS ............................................................. 28
FIGURE 6: REFERENCE SYSTEMS ................................................ 29
FIGURE 7: K-POS DP CONTROL SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM ............. 30
FIGURE 8: KALMAN FILTER BLOCK DIAGRAM ............................... 31
FIGURE 9: K-POS OPERATOR STATION........................................ 33
FIGURE 10: K-POS OPERATOR PANEL LAYOUT ............................. 34
FIGURE 11: EXAMPLE OS DISPLAY LAYOUT .................................. 36
FIGURE 12: HIPAP CONFIGURATION ........................................... 51
FIGURE 13: GNSS SATELLITE NETWORK PRINCIPLE ..................... 54
PAGE 6
FIGURE 14: DGNSS PRINCIPLE................................................... 55
FIGURE 15: SPOTTRACK SEALED UNIT ........................................ 58
FIGURE 17: POWER DISTRIBUTION OVERVIEW ............................ 64
FIGURE 18: THRUSTER POSITIONS............................................. 75
FIGURE 19: FLOW CHART OF FMEA AND DP TRIALS & TESTING

PROCEDURES .................................................................. 118
FIGURE 20 DP ONLINE CAPABILITY ANALYSIS............................ 123
FIGURE 21: DP ONLINE CAPABILITY ANALYSIS .......................... 125
Tables
TABLE 1: DP OS DETAILS .......................................................... 37
TABLE 2: CONTROL CABINET DETAILS ........................................ 38
TABLE 3: DP DATA NETWORK DETAILS ....................................... 43
TABLE 4: NETWORKED COMPONENTS ......................................... 43
TABLE 5: 230V UPS POWER SUPPLIES......................................... 45
TABLE 6: TRANSITIONAL SOURCE OF POWER DISTRIBUTION ........ 45
TABLE 7: DP & IJS UPS DISTRIBUTION ....................................... 46
TABLE 8: DIESEL GENERATOR IDENTIFICATION ........................... 63
TABLE 9: THRUSTER IDENTIFICATION ........................................ 75
TABLE 10: CAPABILITY PLOT CASES ......................................... 102
TABLE 11: DP ALERT LEVELS ................................................... 104
TABLE 12: GREEN ALERT STATUS ............................................. 106
TABLE 13: YELLOW ALERT STATUS ........................................... 107
TABLE 14: RED ALERT STATUS ................................................. 108
PAGE 7
Document Issue Record
Rev Date Status Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

0 27/11/14 For Comment IS DJC DJC
1 06/01/15 For Comment IS RW IS
2 09/04/15 For Comment AMD DJC AMD
3 29/02/16 For Comment GG JFD JFD
4 07/03/16 Final issue GG JFD JFD
Document Change Record
Rev Brief Description of Change

0 Original issue to Client for comment. Incomplete – to satisfy Class.
1 Original. Complete issued for client comment.
2 Updated following completion of DP Proving Trials
3 Updated after annual trials
4 Updated after comments from Client
PAGE 8
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
1.1.1 Global Maritime received instructions from Damen Shipyard to prepare and
compile a DP Operations Manual for the Cable Laying Vessel Nexus.
1.1.2 The basis for a vessel specific DP operations manual is laid out in IMCA M103
Section 2. This manual is laid out in compliance with this IMCA document and is
written specifically for the Nexus.
1.1.3 The Nexus is a purpose built cable laying vessel fitted with a Kongsberg K-POS
DP-21 operating system.
1.1.4 This document is an updated version of the original DP Operations Manual and has
been issued after completion of the DP FMEA Proving Trials.
1.2 Purpose
1.2.1 This manual is designed to familiarise and provide guidance to the key DP
personnel on the characteristics, limitations, and operating procedures of the “CS
Nexus” when operating in Dynamically Position mode.
1.2.2 The contents of this manual are intended to assist in the planning, preparation,
and performance of DP operations and will ensure that all such operations are
carried out safely.
1.2.3 Nothing in this manual shall restrain the Master from taking what actions he
considers necessary in circumstances or conditions which may endanger the safety
of the vessel, the crew or the environment.
1.2.4 This manual should be read in conjunction with the K-Pos 21 Operator Manuals as
supplied by Kongsberg Maritime and the DP FMEA and trials documentation. It
should also be read in conjunction with the relevant equipment manuals for the
mechanical and electrical equipment on the vessel.
1.2.5 The primary objectives of this manual are as follows:-
 To describe the vessel’s DP operations, capabilities and limitations
 To describe the DP system, its sub-systems and auxiliaries.
 To describe the ways in which DP operations are organised and managed,
responsibilities and communications.
 To provide guidance on DP status, alerts, emergency responses and
procedures.
 To give clear instructions to the vessel’s staff who have particular duties and
responsibilities in respect of DP operations.
1.3 Reference Background

1.3.1 This manual meets the requirements of the various DP design, construction and
operating rules, regulations and guidelines which provide the necessary
background for establishing performance standards for DP operations.
1.3.2 In particular the requirements of the following documents have been met during
the compilation of this manual:
INTRODUCTION
DP OPERATIONS MANUAL
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 9
 IMCA, Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels - IMCA M 103
Rev. 1, December, 2007
 IMCA, Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems -
1993 – 112 UKOOA Part 2. Issue 2.
 IMO 1994 Guidelines for vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems
 IMO MSC Circular 645
 IMCA M 117 The training and experience of key DP personnel.
 IMCA M109 A guide to DP-related documentation for DP vessels.
A complete list of reference documentation can be found in Section 18.
1.3.3 In particular, this document has been compiled in accordance with IMCA M103
Section 1.5 which states that:
Every DP vessel should have an Operation Manual that is particular to that DP
system and the operating practice of the owners or operators of the vessel. It
should cover all the work for which the vessel is designed or likely to be used. It
should include but not be limited to the following:
 Capability Plots.
 Trials Data.
 Working Profiles and capabilities of equipment.
 DP status, alerts, emergency responses, and procedures.
 Responsibilities and communications.
 Approach, setting up, checking and testing of the DP systems.
 Reporting and recording.
 DP footprints.
 Manning.
 All documents should be controlled and updated in accordance with the
vessels QA (ISM code) procedure.
In addition to the above general document, each work location, task, or operation
of the DP vessel may require a site-specific document that further specifies
additional constraints or procedures for a particular project if the general
document will not suffice e.g. project safety plan, HAZID/HAZOP exercises,
SIMOPS and close out documentation.
1.3.4 In addition, the relevant Classification Society rules have been considered and
adhered to in the compilation of this manual. The relevant Classification Society
is DNV-GL.
1.3.5 The contents of this manual complement the various manuals referred to in the
list in section 17. For detailed operation, fault finding and for procedures for
maintenance and repair of equipment it is necessary to consult the various
manufacturers' manuals.
1.3.6 Any illustration or figure included in this manual and its appendices are for
illustration purposes only. For further systems study, please refer to the vessel’s
approved drawings and manuals.
INTRODUCTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 10
1.4 Abbreviations
1.4.1 The following abbreviations have been used throughout the report:
A/C Air Conditioning ER Engine Room
ADP Automatic DP control ESB Emergency Switchboard
mode ESD Emergency Shutdown
AFE Active Front End (drive) System
AI Analogue Input ETO Electro Technical Officer
ANSI American National F&G Fire & Gas (System)
Standards Institute FMEA Failure Modes & Effects
Standard Device Number Analysis
AO Analogue Output FO Fuel Oil
ARPA Automatic Radar Plotting FPSO Floating Production
Aid Storage and Offloading
AVR Automatic Voltage FU Follow Up (control)
Regulator
FW Freshwater
AZI Azimuth Thruster
GM Global Maritime
BAT Bow (Retractable)
Azimuth Thruster GNSS Global Navigation Satellite
System
BTT Bow Tunnel Thruster
HIPAP High Precision Acoustic
CCW Counter-Clockwise Positioning
(thruster control)
HT High Temperature
CPP Controllable Pitch
Propeller HVAC Heating, Ventilation & Air
Conditioning
CW Clockwise (thruster
control) HVRC Hydraulic Valve Remote
Chilled Water (HVAC) Control
DB Distribution Board I/O (Signal) Input & Output
DE Driven End (bearing) IJS Independent Joystick

System
DG Diesel Generator
IMCA International Maritime
DGNSS Differential Global Contractors Association
Navigation Satellite
System IMO International Maritime
Organisation
DI Digital Input
J/B Junction Box
DIW De-ionised Water
KVM Keyboard, Video & Mouse
DO Digital Output (switch)
DP Dynamic Positioning LESS Large Engine
DPC DP Control Cabinet Protection/Safety System
DPO Dynamic Positioning LO Lubricating Oil
Operator LT Low Temperature
DPVOA Dynamic Positioning MGPS Marine Growth Prevention
Vessels Owners System
Association (Within IMCA)
MRU Motion Reference Unit
ECR Engine Control Room
MSB Main Switchboard
EDG Emergency Diesel
Generator MTS Marine Technology Society
INTRODUCTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 11
NC Normally Closed RCU Remote Controller Unit
NDE Normally De-Energised ROV Remotely Operated
Non-Driven End (bearing) Vehicle
NDU (DP) Network Distribution SAT Stern Azimuth Thruster
Unit (Switch) SBAS Satellite Based
NE Normally Energised Augmentation Service
NFU Non-Follow Up (control) SDPO Senior Dynamic
NO Normally Open Positioning Operator
OCM Offshore Construction SSBL Super Short Base Line

Manager Stbd Starboard
OGUK Oil & Gas UK (Formerly SW Seawater
UKOOA) TC Technical Coordinator
OIM Offshore Installation TMS Tether Management
Manager System
OS (DP) Operator Station UHF Ultra-High Frequency
OT (IJS) Operator Terminal UKOOA United Kingdom Offshore
PLC Programmable Logic Operators Association
Controller UPS Uninterruptible Power
PME Position Monitoring Supply
Equipment USB Universal Serial Bus
PMS Power Management USBL Ultra Short Base Line
System
VFD Variable Frequency Drive
PPU (Deif) Protection &
Paralleling Unit VHF Very High Frequency
PRS Position Reference System WCFDI Worst Case Failure Design

Intent
PSU Power Supply Unit
WTG Wind Turbine Generator
INTRODUCTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 12
1.5 Industry Associations
1.5.1 IMCA is an internationally recognised organisation of DP vessel owners and
operators. One of their objectives is to provide guidance for vessel owners to set
and maintain common high standards of performance in the operation of DP
vessels world-wide.
1.5.2 IMCA is recognised by statutory authorities, classification societies, international
offshore oil companies, DP systems and subsystems manufacturers, owners and
others, as an authoritative and competent body to deal with matters relating to
DP operations, including safety, training, competency, documentation and
auditing.
1.5.3 Van Oord is a member of IMCA. All members of the Association are committed to
carrying out and maintaining high standards of DP operations. The IMCA / DPVOA
Guidelines referred to above provide the standards for all members to comply
with.
1.5.4 In line with other members of IMCA, it is the policy of Van Oord to commit sufficient
resources so that the standards of IMCA are implemented, as appropriate to the
operation of DP vessels.
1.5.5 The resources committed by Van Oord are in line with the principles of reasonable
practicability.
1.6 Control Information

1.6.1 The control of this manual is the responsibility of Van Oord.
1.6.2 This manual should not be released to non-company personnel without gaining
prior approval from Van Oord.
1.6.3 This manual is controlled by the Van Oord Vessel Management System.
1.6.4 This document is controlled, and change must be issued as per companies SMS
policy. Amendments to the manual are issued from time to time. Amendments
should be recorded in the following table.
Amendment No Remarks Date Sign
INTRODUCTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 13
1.7 Responsibilities
1.7.1 Company personnel involved in DP cable laying operations are required to be
familiar with the contents of this manual.
1.7.2 In particular, the following personnel must have a thorough knowledge of the
contents of the manual and are obliged to apply the DP procedures and practices.
 Master
 DPOs
 Chief Engineer
 Engineers & Electricians.
1.7.3 The following staff (where applicable) should also be fully aware of the existence
and content of this manual:
 Vessel Superintendent
 Survey Superintendent
 ROV Superintendent
 Party Chief/Offshore Manager.
INTRODUCTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 14
2. VESSEL DETAILS
2.1 Vessel Particulars
Figure 1: DP2 CABLE-LAYING VESSEL NEXUS
2.1.1 The DP2 Cable-Laying Vessel Nexus (Yard No. 553014) is a dynamically-positioned
cable layer, based on the Damen Offshore Carrier 7500 design. The following are
the principal particulars of the vessel:
Length (overall) 122.75m
Length (between perpendiculars) 116.15m
Beam (moulded) 27.45m
Beam (overall) 27.58m
Draught (max) 5.82m
Draught (with BAT deployed) 8.70m
Deadweight (max draught) 8270t
Flag Netherlands
IMO Number 9715505.
2.1.2 The vessel is a diesel-electric design, with three thrusters at the bow (one
retractable azimuth thruster and two tunnel thrusters) and two azimuth thrusters
at the stern. All thrusters have variable speed fixed pitch propellers.
2.1.3 The vessel is equipped with four main diesel generators, one auxiliary diesel
generator and an emergency diesel generator. The Main Diesel Generators and
the Auxiliary Diesel Generator are located in the single engine room. The
Emergency Diesel Generator is located in a separate space.
2.1.4 The vessel’s automation and power management systems are provided by
Alewijnse Marine Systems and consist of distributed control hardware connected
by a single ring network.
2.1.5 The vessel is equipped with a DP Control System supplied by Kongsberg Maritime,
this system is provided with redundancy. There is an Independent Joystick
System, also supplied by Kongsberg Maritime as an independent backup for the
DP Control System.
VESSEL DETAILS
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 15
2.2 Relevant Classification Standards
2.2.1 The vessel is classed by DNV-GL, equivalent to IMO DP Class 2. This implies the
following:
Power, control and thruster systems and other systems necessary for, or which
could affect the correct functioning of the DP system are to be provided and
configured such that a fault in any active component or system will not result in a
loss of position. […] Such components may include but are not restricted to the
following;
 Prime movers
 Generators and their excitation equipment
 Gearing
 Pumps
 Fans
 Switchgear and control gear, including their assemblies
 Thrusters
 Valves (where power actuated).
Systems which are not part of the DP system but which in the event of a fault
could affect the correct functioning of the DP system (for example, fire suppression
systems, engine ventilation systems, shutdown systems etc.) are to be included
in the FMEA.
2.3 DP Redundancy Concept

2.3.1 The vessel’s power generation and distribution is separated into three redundancy
groups, Port, Centre and Starboard. During DP operations, the emergency
systems are considered to be part of the “Starboard” redundancy group as the
Emergency 440V Switchboard is powered from the Starboard 440V Switchboard
and the Emergency Generator is kept on standby.
2.3.2 The following figure gives a representation of the division of the vessel’s power
and propulsion systems into three redundancy groups.
Port MSB
BTT BTT
SAT Port
BAT
Aft Fwd
Centre MSB
SAT
Starboard
Starboard MSB
Figure 2: REDUNDANCY CONCEPT
2.3.3 The Port 690V Switchboard is powered by two diesel generators (DG1 & DG2) and
the switchboard supplies one bow tunnel thruster (BTT Forward) and one stern
VESSEL DETAILS
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 16
azimuth thruster (SAT Port). The Port 690V Switchboard powers the Port 440V
switchboards and Port 230V switchboards.
2.3.4 The Centre 690V Switchboard is powered by a single diesel generator (DG5) and
the switchboard supplies the Bow Azimuth Thruster (BAT). The Centre 690V
Switchboard powers a single Centre 440V Switchboard, there is no Centre 230V
distribution.
2.3.5 The Starboard 690V Switchboard is powered by two diesel generators (DG3 &
DG4) and the switchboard supplies one bow tunnel thruster (BTT Aft) and one
stern azimuth thruster (SAT Starboard). The Starboard 690V Switchboard powers
the Starboard 440V switchboards and Starboard 230V switchboards.
2.3.6 The design intent is that the three redundancy groups are independent. This
implies that when operating in OPEN BUS Mode; no single failure will result in the
loss of more than two thrusters. Therefore, failures affecting the Port, Centre or
Starboard sections cannot affect any other section.
2.3.7 The most effective thruster is the Bow Azimuth Thruster, failure of this individual
thruster is as significant as failure of a bow tunnel thruster and a stern azimuth
thruster. Reference is made to Damen Document No. 1612072, DP Performance
& Power Consumption Revision D.
2.3.8 Notwithstanding the above the Nexus will be required to conduct DP operations in
shallow water which will preclude the use of the Bow Azimuth Thruster. Under
these circumstances, because there will only be the Port and Starboard
switchboards available, the WCFDI will be the loss of either of these switchboards.
See section 11.9
2.4 Worst Case Failure Design Intent

2.4.1 The Worst Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI) of this vessel when operated in
OPEN BUS Mode is for failure of one 690V main switchboard (Port, Centre or
Starboard). This will cause either the failure of one bow tunnel thruster and one
stern azimuth thruster or (in the case of failure of the Centre 690V Main
Switchboard) the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster.
2.5 Vessel Configuration for DP

2.5.1 The vessel is considered in the DP FMEA to be operated during DP Operations in
OPEN BUS Mode. This is identified in the following points:
 All thrusters running and selected into DP
 The switchboards will be operated in “DP” mode
 DG1 to DG5 Standby/running and connected, DG5 dedicated for BAT.
 Isochronous load share between DG1 & DG2 and between DG3 & DG4, or
each of the relevant Bus-Bars when powered by only one engine with the
other on standby for direct activation by the PMS
 In shallow water mode, with BAT (Thruster 1) retracted and out of DP,
DG5 running and connected to either Port or Starboard switchboards. DP2
class is still maintained but with limited capabilities.
 At least one 690V bus tie breaker open.
 All 440V bus tie breakers open
VESSEL DETAILS
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 17
 All 230V bus tie breakers open
 All DP-essential pumps & fans assigned “duty” are available and running
 All DP-essential pumps & fans in “remote”
 Both DP UPS running, not in bypass mode, with no alarms active
 Both DP OS running, with one selected as “in command”
 Both DP controllers running, one selected as master and in control of the
propulsion
 All three wind sensor inputs selected into DP
 Four gyrocompass data inputs selected into DP
 Three motion reference units data inputs selected into DP.
 At least three position references selected into DP, of which two must
utilise different principles.
VESSEL DETAILS
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3. PRINCIPLE OF DP OPERATIONS
3.1 Basic Principles

3.1.1 The principles of Dynamic Positioning are the same regardless of the
manufacturer, type of system hardware or complexity of vessel. A DP system
controls a vessel’s position and heading automatically.
3.1.2 The active control of thrusters and propellers counteracts the effects of
environmental forces and enables the vessel to remain on location at or very near
to a specified point.
3.1.3 The following basic principles apply to ALL DP Vessels:
 A fully operational DP system is defined as one that is able to reliably keep
a vessel in position when working up to the rated environment, such that the
maximum excursion from vessel motions (surge, sway and yaw) and position
control system accuracy (DP footprint) is equal to, or less than, half the
critical excursion for the work being carried out.
 The DP control system should provide adequate information to operators
such that any change of status of the DP system due to weather, equipment
malfunction, or operator action should be clearly indicated at the
permanently manned position where corrective action is possible and where
the limitation, if any, can be understood by operators. The indication should
be such that the operator is unlikely to make a mistake in assessing the
severity and effect of the status change.
 Safe working limits should be determined for each geographical location,
expected environmental condition/force, and type of task to be performed.
These limits need to consider every failure mode defined by the FMEA and
the likely time to restore position control, recover the divers, disconnect a
gangway, or riser, or otherwise move clear of an area to return to a safe
situation. In the case of simultaneous or close operations, failures on the
other vessels also need to be considered.
Note: A ‘safe situation’ means one where the work has or could immediately cease
with no serious consequences from position loss and the vessel is left in a state
where operations can readily resume once the disturbance is corrected.
3.1.4 It should be possible for the performance and health of a system to be effectively
monitored by suitably trained and experienced personnel without the need to
interrupt the control process. Changing between the various modes of position
control should be simple, secure, and demonstrably effective in meeting the points
in 3.1.3 above.
3.1.5 The above basic philosophy should be applied to all the types of work the vessel
is designed to undertake with careful consideration of the consequences of position
loss. If continuous working means that the vessel is likely to work in a degraded
state the new ‘safe working limits’ and ‘safe situation’ should be agreed by formal
risk assessment. If it is not normal to continue working in a degraded status, but
because of the particular circumstances on board it is considered safe to continue,
then this decision should also be made after an operational risk assessment
involving the key personnel responsible for the work and station keeping before a
decision is made.
PRINCIPLE OF DP OPERATIONS
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3.2 DP Class Notations
3.2.1 There are three principle DP Equipment Classes defined by the IMO as follows:
Equipment Class 1; Loss of position may occur in the event of a single fault.
Equipment Class 2; Loss of position is not to occur in the event of a single fault
in any active component or system. Normally static components will not be
considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated, and
reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include:
 Any active component or system (generators, thrusters, switchboards,
remote controlled valves, etc.).
 Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves, etc.) which
is not properly documented with respect to protection and reliability.
Equipment Class 3; For this class a single failure includes:
 Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static component is
assumed to fail.
 All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire or flooding.
 All components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or flooding.
3.2.2 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be considered as a
single fault if such an act is reasonably probable.
To achieve a DP class notation with certain classification societies may require
additional considerations such as an independent joystick which some societies
require for class 2 or 3.
3.2.3 The decision on which class of vessel is adequate for a particular task or a series
of tasks is addressed in section 2.1 of 113 IMO – Guidelines for vessels with
dynamic positioning systems (IMO MSC Circ.645) which states:
The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be
agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based on a risk analysis
of the consequence of a loss of position. Else, the Administration or coastal State
may decide the equipment class for the particular operation.
3.2.4 This paragraph from the IMO MSC circular is repeated here because this principle
should apply to all DP vessels irrespective of when they were built or what DP
notation or class they have. The risk analysis that is called for need not be
extensive, but it has to adequately reflect the consequences that a loss of position
can reasonably cause or lead to.
The best time to carry out a risk analysis is when the work scope is known and
experienced personnel from the vessel are available.
3.2.5 The Nexus has Equipment Class 2 DNV-GL.
3.3 Accuracy
3.3.1 The position keeping accuracy of a DP system depends on many different factors,
such as vessel shape and construction, power and propulsion available, quality of
position reference and control systems.
3.3.2 Position keeping accuracy is typically within +/- 3 metres or within +/- 3° of
heading.
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3.4 Computer Control & Monitoring
3.4.1 The heart of a DP system is the computer control and monitoring system. It
contains an accurate model of the dynamics of the vessel. The model simulates
the vessel’s responses to various forces, including wind, sea, and current.
3.4.2 Any deviations from the required position and heading of the vessel are detected
by the DP system’s position and reference sensors. This information is then
processed by the model to produce corrective commands to the vessel’s propulsion
system, thus counteracting the deviations from the required position and heading.
3.5 DP Equipment Characteristics

3.5.1 DP vessels differ in their level of complexity and redundancy and even within a DP
equipment class or Class notation there can be significant differences. Irrespective
of the vessel’s equipment class, there are basic equipment characteristics that
apply to all DP systems and these are outlined in the following sub-sections.
3.5.2 It is essential that all DP personnel know the consequences to be expected from
the various failures that are known to be possible on the vessel on which they are
employed (Ref. IMCA M 117 – The training and experience of key DP personnel).
3.6 Thruster Units

3.6.1 Speed of response, efficiency and interference should be considered for all thrust
units and the arrangement should be such that, as far as is possible, a balanced
configuration exists even after the worst failure. It is essential to avoid a thruster
control fault that results in full power or power in an unwanted direction which can
destabilize the whole DP control system. Such problems are overcome by a fail-
safe design; that is, the thruster either:
 Fails as-set;
 Fails to zero thrust;
 Trips the drive motor or engine.
3.6.2 While these safety features should be automatic it is nevertheless essential to
provide an independent emergency stop for each thrust unit, suitably protected
against inadvertent operation and operated from the DP control console or nearby.
Thrust units should be as independent as possible in terms of location, cable runs,
electrical and control power and cooling, to maximize the safe working limits. Each
thrust unit should be independently monitored and alarmed. Sensors causing a
thrust unit to trip should be minimum in number, i.e. tripping should only take
place in situations where continued running will cause the unit to be damaged
within a short space of time, e.g. 30 seconds. Sensors that initiate warning alarms
should themselves be designed to cause an alarm on failure; sensors that trip
important equipment, e.g. generators, pumps, motors and engines should not
themselves fail such that an unwanted loss of important equipment is caused, i.e.
they should fail safe.
3.6.3 The vessels thruster systems are detailed in Section 8.
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3.7 Power Generation
3.7.1 The type, number and arrangement of power generation units, will have a direct
bearing on the safe working limits of the DP system, because the effect of the
failure of any one unit, or common sub-system, will be considered in the
determination of safe working limits. This includes the number and type of engine
shutdowns. The number of engine rooms and engines should be determined by
the safety, reliability and availability required for the work as well as the time to
completely shut down. Utilities supporting power generation systems, e.g. cooling
water, ventilation, fuel oil, lubricating oil should be arranged so that their total
failure is not more critical than failure of the equipment they support.
3.7.2 Safety systems that enable shut down of power generation automatically or
manually should be designed to fail safe so that unwanted shut down does not
take place from single faults. If the design philosophy is that a single fault also
includes a fire in any one compartment (IMO DP equipment class 3) then the
shutdown control system should withstand fire damage or be separated so that in
the worst case adequate power remains to meet the safe working limits.
3.7.3 The vessel’s Power Generation systems are detailed in Section 5.
3.8 Power Management

3.8.1 A system to prevent overload and blackout is essential on all DP vessels. A system
for the prudent starting and stopping of diesel generators is also desirable,
although on some vessels this management can be manual if there is ample time
for operators to react and manage the power on line. On DP vessels that rely on
automatic power management, the system will need to be fast and reliable for the
vessel to work efficiently and give the required priority to maintaining position.
3.8.2 Power management and position control are inseparable in that they both affect
thrust for position keeping. It is essential to clearly define the interfaces and
responsibilities for all operational modes of every vessel. DP vessels which use
substantial amounts of power for equipment other than thrusters, for example, for
winches, cranes, fire pumps, cable equipment and hotel facilities, need to be able
to shed or reduce load (phase back) to maintain power to thrusters. The speed,
effectiveness and reliability of load shedding by a power management system are
factors to take into account when determining safe working limits. The vessel’s
Power Management system is detailed in Section 7
3.9 Power Distribution

3.9.1 A basic requirement for a DP vessel is to maintain power to thrusters for as long
as possible, even in some alarm conditions, so that a safe situation with respect
to position can be maintained until the work is terminated. This very often conflicts
with the shut downs and protection systems normally installed on ships and rigs.
Where emergency switchboards are provided as a classification society
requirement, careful consideration should be given when using this switchboard
for critical DP equipment: loss of the emergency switchboard should not prevent
starting of main generators after a blackout.
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3.9.2 The electrical power distribution to thrusters is usually the aspect of the DP system
design which determines the worst case failure mode. For DP equipment class 3
vessels fire and flood subdivision should not make the design failure case worse.
3.9.3 Examples of single failures in power distribution include the following:
 Undervoltage.
 Underfrequency i.e. governor failure.
 Earth faults.
 Phase-phase short circuits.
 Faults on a bus tie breaker.
 Over/under excitation.
3.9.4 The highest priority should always be given to clearing faults that risk the overall
power and control networks, and maintaining enough power to give time to cease
any operation and reach a safe situation.
3.9.5 The vessel’s Power Distribution system is detailed in Section 6.
3.10 Position Control

3.10.1 There are several options available for the automatic control of thrusters to keep
a vessel in a fixed position. For nearly all DP vessels electronic computers and/or
several microprocessors are used, hence these guidelines assume these control
systems are installed. For designers considering other control technology the
underlying principles can be determined from this section and applied in a similar
way. For good performance of the position control system it is essential that a
period of stabilisation is used after position is first established and after significant
moves or heading changes which may affect the vessel model. The initial
stabilisation period should be at least 20 minutes; subsequent periods of
stabilisation should be determined by the circumstances and conditions.
3.10.2 There are numerous combinations of operator control facilities for thrusters, but
most combine both an automatic and a manual remote system plus local control.
Automatic DP control systems are generally supplied in single, dual or triple
configurations with a back-up DP control system for DP equipment class 3 vessels.
Manual systems are a combined lever or joystick, with or without automatic
heading control. Joysticks can be completely independent of the computer(s) used
for automatic position control, or an integral part of the automatic system in that
they use the same I/O, network or cables to the thrusters. The minimum DP
control facility is a single automatic control system with an integral joystick, which
is adequate for some tasks.
3.10.3 Irrespective of the number of control systems and types of joystick certain
essential features are required to ensure adequate reliability of each. These
include the following:
 Secure power supplies with backup (usually batteries) provided in case of a
mains failure.
 Independent emergency stop for each thruster, adequately protected against
inadvertent operation and for DP equipment class 3, arranged so thrusters
do not trip from fire or flood damage to the stop circuits.
 Separate output command signals for each thruster or sets of thrusters.
 Secure location with negligible risk of fire, flood or overheating.
 Comprehensive data display and alarms.
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 Internal self-checking.
 Independent I/Os for sensors.
3.10.4 The DP control console should ideally be located so that the DPO can see the
controls, the external environment and the working operations of the vessel.
Every reasonable effort should be made to compensate in the event that this is
not fully achievable for example by CCTV.
3.10.5 DPO inputs to the system should require a confirming action before being accepted
by the computer to prevent accidental changes being made by a single inadvertent
act.
3.10.6 Power supplies for position control should be redundant, secure and so arranged
that no short circuit, cable damage, earth fault, or automatic changeover could
result in the loss of position control.
3.10.7 The location of the secure power supplies should be chosen such that:
 They can be easily checked.
 They are unlikely to be misused or to fail from mechanical damage, fire,
inadequate ventilation etc.
3.10.8 Where position references, environmental sensors and vessel sensors are powered
by the position control system’s secure supply, care should be taken to ensure
adequate sensors remain after the worst power failure, for example failure of the
UPS’s inverter.
3.10.9 Control information should be displayed or be easily available to meet the DP Class
principles. For all DP vessels this should include the following:
 Thrust units status and power ordered and used;
 Power generation and distribution arrangement in use;
 Reference sensor status and performance;
 Position performance present and past;
 Alarm status and sensor trends.
3.10.10 The DP control should enable automatic position and heading changes to be made
in any preselected direction at rates within the vessel’s capability so that the new
heading and/or position is quickly established without instability, or a position
excursion, or overshoot above acceptable limits for the work.
3.11 Position References

3.11.1 The number and types of position references installed will be determined by the
class notation sought or assigned. This may also depend upon the nature of the
work to be performed as well as the environment in which they are required to
operate. Care is needed to determine whether redundancy is completely provided
by duplication of similar sensors which may have common failure modes.
3.11.2 All position references should be designed so that they cannot give an unchanging
position when data is lost and the vessel is moving.
3.11.3 A DP vessel’s HPR should be designed so that it cannot accept any signal that is
not intended (by design or procedure) to be used for position information. The
limits of performance of an acoustic position reference should be determined prior
to work commencing so that the limits of movement of the vessel using the HPR,
as deployed, are known. Seabed sensors that are tethered, or attached to vessel
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equipment, so that they could give a false steady position reference with the vessel
moving, should be avoided whenever practicable, and this limitation considered
when determining redundancy and safe working limits. The positioning of acoustic
units in the hull should take into account the likely sources of noise that could
interfere with the acoustic signals and result in the loss of position reference data.
If two acoustic systems are installed their independence or dependence should be
clearly established and this reflected in how they are treated by the DP control
software.
3.11.4 Deploying more than one transponder does not make the acoustic position
reference redundant if it is still subject to a common failure mode, for example
thruster noise.
3.11.5 Short range radio position reference systems can suffer sudden failure from loss
of line of sight or a fault at a remote station. They should be designed so that
they cannot accept any signal that is not unique by design or procedure to the DP
vessel on which they are being used. Precautions should be taken to avoid all
failures or faults that cause the position data to ‘freeze’ irrespective of whether
the vessel is stationary or not (IMCA M 170 – A review of marine laser positioning
systems; IMCA M 224 RADius; IMCA M 142 – Position reference reliability study).
3.11.6 The use of DGPS as more than one position reference depends on the level of
independence achieved with respect to hardware and software, the number of
satellites available, the antennae locations, the quality and number of differential
corrections available and their effects if giving the same incorrect data. However
when two separate DGPS inputs of position are used by the DP control system,
their contribution to the estimated position together with other position references
needs to be properly balanced. Here balanced means that two DGPSs (or GPS or
GPS Relative) should never out-vote one or more other position references and
operate the system such that a loss of position could result.
3.11.7 The DGPS input should also provide information on fix quality for use by the DP
control systems (Ref. 128 DPVOA – QRA for the use of a dual DGPS system for
dynamic positioning – and IMCA M 141 – Guidelines of the use of DGPS as a
position reference in DP control systems).
3.11.8 The vessels Position Reference systems are detailed in section 4.12
3.12 Environmental Sensors

3.12.1 The position keeping performance and speed of response of the DP system can be
improved by the incorporation of environmental sensors to provide feed forward
to the DP control system. DP control systems should use wind sensors as a
minimum. To provide an overall position keeping improvement the wind sensor(s)
should be positioned such that they are not subject to vessel turbulence or
interference for example from cranes, helicopters and platforms. Irrespective of
the suitability of the location of the sensor, the wind feed forward input to position
control should be so arranged that it will not cause a critical excursion when
suddenly shielded or unshielded from the wind. It should also be noted that wind
sensors may be subject to icing up in certain conditions. Where the vessel has
more than one wind sensor every consideration should be made so that all wind
sensors are available for use by the DP control system.
3.12.2 The vessels Environmental Reference systems are detailed in Section 4.
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3.13 Vessel Sensors
3.13.1 Position keeping includes the control of the vessel’s heading; gyro compasses are
normally used for this purpose. Failure of heading input has a dramatic effect on
position keeping and excursion, particularly if the heading data is lost to all position
references or if the DP rotation centre is remote from the geometrical centre of
the vessel. Provision of gyro compass redundancy and the ability of the DP system
to detect failure, including a slow drift of the on-line unit, are factors to be taken
into account when determining safe limits, particularly on mono-hulled vessels.
3.13.2 The vessels Gyrocompasses are detailed in Section 4.
3.14 The K-Pos DP System

3.14.1 Kongsberg K-Pos DP system is a computerised system for automatic position and
heading control of a vessel and to control the vessel's heading, the K-Pos DP
system uses data from one or more gyrocompasses, while at least one position-
reference system (for example, DGPS or SpotTrack) enables the K-Pos DP system
to position the vessel.
3.14.2 The set-points for heading and position are specified by the operator and are then
processed by the K-Pos DP system to provide thrust control signals to the vessel's
thruster and main propeller systems. The K-Pos DP system always allocates
optimum thrust to whichever propulsion units are in use. Deviations from the
desired heading or position are automatically detected and appropriate
adjustments are made by the system.
3.14.3 The K-Pos DP system also provides a manual joystick control which may be used
for manual control alone or for combined manual/auto control.
3.14.4 Without a position-reference system, the K-Pos DP system can provide automatic
stabilization and control of the vessel heading using the gyrocompass as the
heading reference. The DP system includes control strategies that will reduce fuel
consumption and greenhouse gases.
3.15 Basic Forces and Motions

3.15.1 A sea going vessel is subject to wind, wave and current forces. Wind speed and
direction are measured by the wind sensors. The vessel’s response to wave and
current forces is accurately calculated.
3.15.2 The DP system controls the vessels motion in the three horizontal degrees of
freedom - SURGE, SWAY and YAW. Vessel movements are measured by the
Gyrocompasses and the reference systems. Reference system readings are
corrected for roll and pitch and heave using readings from the Vertical Reference
Sensors (3 x MRU-2).
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Figure 3: FORCES AND MOTIONS
3.15.3 The vessel also moves in three vertical degrees of freedom: pitch, roll, and heave.
Figure 4: THREE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
The pitch and roll motions are not controlled by the K-POS DP system, however,
in order to allow the position-reference system to correct for these motions, the
system must have information about them. The K-POS system does not control
or require information about the heave motion, but the motion can be measured
and displayed.
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3.16 Thrusters
3.16.1 The most common principle of thrusters and azi propellers are shown below.
Thrust is normally controlled by varying either azi propeller RPM or propeller pitch.
Tunnel Thruster
Generate sideways thrust in either transverse direction. Can be fixed-pitch,
variable speed or controllable pitch propeller (CPP).
Azimuth Thrusters
3.16.2 These are rotatable and control both thrust magnitude and direction. The
complete unit with the propeller mounted in a nozzle can be retractable (drop-
down or swing-up type) or in a fixed position in the hull for either main propulsion
and/or auxiliary thruster propulsion. Azimuthing main propulsion is now very
popular with diesel electric DP propulsion systems for offshore vessels.
Main Propulsion
3.16.3 These are normally conventional fixed-pitch (FP), variable-speed, or controllable
pitch propellers (CPP) which, in conjunction with rudders/steering, control the
magnitude of the ahead/astern thrust or azimuth units that control magnitude and
direction of thrust at the stern.
Figure 5: THRUSTERS
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3.17 Position Reference Systems
3.17.1 Accurate measurement of the vessels position at any point in time is necessary for
precise Dynamic Positioning. A typical DP2 reference system arrangement would
consist of 2 x DGNSS, 1 x HPR and 1 x SpotTrack.
3.17.2 If two different DGPS systems are in use as two of the three required reference
systems (three reference systems on – line are minimum in Class 2 operation) the
GPS receivers and the differential receivers include the antennas must be supplied
from different power supplies and receive the differential signal from different
sources.
3.17.3 A typical arrangement of reference systems on an offshore support vessel is shown
on the diagram below.
Figure 6: REFERENCE SYSTEMS
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3.18 DP System Principles
3.18.1 The K-Pos 21 DP system relies on a mathematical vessel model which includes
hydrodynamic characteristics such as current drag coefficients and virtual mass
data. This model, called the Mathematical Vessel Model, describes how the vessel
responds to an applied force, e.g. from wind or thrusters.
 Mathematical model and Kalman filtering techniques improve noise filtering
of all measurements which reduces thruster modulation and wear.
 Optimum controller and wind feed-forward signals assure accurate
positioning.
 Mathematical modelling provides dead reckoning control mode
 Ease of operation
 Simultaneous use of all reference systems.
Figure 7: K-POS DP CONTROL SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
3.19 The Extended Kalman Filter

3.19.1 The Extended Kalman Filter estimates the vessel's heading, position and velocity
in each of the three degrees of freedom i.e. surge, sway and yaw. It also
incorporates algorithms for estimating the effect of sea current and waves. The
Extended Filter uses a mathematical model of the vessel. A mathematical model
itself is never a 100% accurate representation of the real vessel. However, by
using the Extended Kalman filtering technique, the model is continuously
corrected.
3.19.2 The vessel's heading and position are measured using the gyrocompasses and
position-reference systems, and are used as input data to the K-Pos DP system.
These measurements are compared with the predicted or estimated data produced
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by the mathematical model, and the differences are then used to update the
model.
Figure 8: KALMAN FILTER BLOCK DIAGRAM
3.19.3 The Extended Kalman Filter provides the following advantages:

 Optimum self-adaptive noise filtering of heading and position measurements
according to noise level and measurement-update rate.
 Optimum combination of data from the different position-reference systems.
The system calculates a variance for each position-reference system in use,
and places different weighting on their measurements according to each
system's individual quality.
 In the absence of position measurements, the model provides a “dead-
reckoning” mode. This means that the system is able to perform positioning
for some time without position measurement updates from any position-
reference systems.
3.19.4 In the Extended Kalman Filter, the Mathematical Vessel Model's reliability and the
noise level of the position measurement are the basis for deciding how much to
trust each measurement. As time elapses the model uncertainty will decrease by
learning from measured vessel response.
3.19.5 The process is adaptive. If, for example, only one position-reference system is
active and it has a low update rate, the model uncertainty will increase in the
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periods between measurements, and the vessel model will therefore be heavily
updated, with each measurement.
3.20 DP Controller
3.20.1 The controller calculates the resulting force to be exerted by the
thrusters/propellers in order for the vessel to remain on station. In station-
keeping operations, the K-Pos DP Controller can be working in several of the
following modes, all with special characteristics:
 High Precision control
 Relaxed control
 Green control.
3.20.2 The transition between K-Pos DP controller modes is bumpless.
High Precision control
3.20.3 Provides high accuracy station-keeping in any weather condition at the expense
of power consumption and exposure to wear and tear of machinery and thrusters.
Relaxed control
3.20.4 Uses the thrusters more smoothly, at the expense of station-keeping accuracy.
However, this type of control cannot guarantee that the vessel will stay within its
operational area, and is mainly applicable for calm weather conditions.
Green control
3.20.5 Uses a different control technology called non-linear Model Predictive Control,
which is optimised for precise area keeping with minimum power consumption.
Green control is applicable in all weather conditions.
3.20.6 In Green Control mode, the system maintains the vessel within an allowed area
with minimum use of power. The software consists of two parts; the
Environmental Compensator which is designed to compensate for the averaged
environmental forces and the Model Predictive Controller which uses a prediction
of the vessel movement as input for the control and ensures that the vessel stays
within the operational area.
3.21 Operational Modes

3.21.1 The Kongsberg KPos-21 system incorporates the following operational modes:
 Standby mode.
This is a waiting and reset mode in which the system is in a state of
readiness, but in which no control of the vessel can be made using the
system.
 Joystick mode.
In this mode, the vessel movement can be controlled in all three axes using
the joystick. The Joystick mode also allows automatic control of either one
or two of the surge, sway and yaw axes.
 Auto Position mode.
In the Auto Position mode, the vessel is under full automatic control in all
three axes.
 Auto Track (move-up, low and high speed) mode.
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This mode enables the vessel to automatically follow a predefined track. The
system controls the position, the heading, and the speed using all available
propulsion forces.
 Autopilot mode.
This mode enables the vessel to steer along a selected course
 Follow Target mode
This mode allows the vessel to follow a moving submerged target, such as a
Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV), while keeping the vessel at a constant
position relative to the target.
3.21.2 The system incorporates either a Trainer function or a Simulator function. The
built-in Trainer function provides simple simulations for operator training
purposes, and for analysing the vessel behaviour during changes in operational
conditions. The Simulator function provides the same features as the Trainer
function but with more functionality and flexibility in defining the operational
conditions.
3.22 DP User Interface
Figure 9: K-POS OPERATOR STATION
3.22.1 The K-Pos DP operator station includes a high-resolution colour flat screen for
monitoring and operation of the system, and an operator panel with push buttons,
lamps, and joystick controls.
The power switch and adjustment controls for the screen are placed on the right
hand side of the screen. For DP2 systems, there are two identical operator
stations.
3.22.2 The operator panel provides:
 Dedicated buttons
 Keypad
 Trackball
 3-axis joystick
 Heading wheel and buttons.
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3.22.3 Dedicated buttons with status lamps are provided on the operator panel for
activation of main modes, position-reference systems, thrusters, and functions
where indicator lights can assist the assessment of the situation. Other frequently-
used functions, such as selection of display views and dialog boxes, may also be
initiated from dedicated panel buttons. The buttons are grouped according to their
main function. For safety reasons, some of the buttons must be pressed twice
within four seconds to invoke action. These buttons are indicated by a separate
colour. The panel also provides a keypad for input of numeric data, a trackball to
control the screen cursor and a 3-axis joystick. A heading wheel to set the vessel’s
heading may also be supplied.
Figure 10: K-POS OPERATOR PANEL LAYOUT
3.22.4 The Modes buttons group contains buttons for selecting the main operational
modes. Three additional buttons allow the selection of Surge, Sway, and Yaw axes
for automatic control.
3.22.5 The Controls buttons group contains buttons for enabling thrusters and for
accessing system functions and dialog boxes.
3.22.6 The Sensors buttons group contains buttons for enabling position-reference
systems, and for initiating dialogue boxes related to other system sensors.
3.22.7 The Views buttons group contain buttons for selecting the view to be displayed in
the main working area of the screen.
3.22.8 The Alarms button group contains indicators and buttons to display and
acknowledge alarms and events.
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3.22.9 The Command button group contains buttons for transferring command from one
operator station or operator terminal to another.
3.22.10 The Heading Wheel comprises one heading wheel and seven buttons. Three of
these buttons are located on the front and the other four form a circle close to the
heading wheel. The functions that are available depend on the present mode. To
activate the Heading Wheel, one of its three associated buttons must be pressed.
The heading set-point can be changed by turning the Heading Wheel or by using
the Decrease or Increase button.
3.22.11 The Keypad provides numeric, function and cursor buttons. The numeric keys are
used to enter values into dialog boxes. The function keys are used to select
predefined view configurations.
3.22.12 The Trackball is used to position the cursor on the screen. The left button is used
to click on buttons, operate menus, and select displayed symbols. The right button
is used to display a pop-up view menu. The middle button is not used.
3.22.13 The 3-axis joystick is used for joystick thruster control in all three axes (when
these axes are not selected for automatic control). To move the vessel in the
surge and sway axes (alongships and athwartships directions), tilt the joystick.
The direction in which the joystick is tilted determines the direction of applied
thruster force, and the angle of tilt determines the amount of applied thruster
force. To rotate the vessel (the yaw axis), rotate the joystick. The direction in
which the joystick is rotated determines the direction of the rotational moment
demand, and the angle through which the joystick is rotated determines the
amount of applied rotational moment.
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3.23 Display Layout
3.23.1 The display interface uses standard Microsoft Windows NT operating features such
as menus and dialog boxes.
3.23.2 The display is divided into a number of predefined areas, and dialog boxes are
displayed whenever operator interaction is required. The Title Bar, Menu Bar, and
Message Line are at the top of the page. The Performance Area, Monitoring Area,
and Working Area arranged in the centre of the display, and the Status Line and
Status Bar at the foot of the page as shown below.
Figure 11: EXAMPLE OS DISPLAY LAYOUT
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4. DP CONTROL SYSTEM
4.1 General Details

4.1.1 The DP Control System provided is a Kongsberg Maritime K-Pos DP-21 system.
This system is designed for DP Class 2 applications and consists of redundancy in
operator stations, controllers and data networks. The signal I/O is not itself
redundant; however it is segregated according to the DP redundancy concept.
4.1.2 The control system can execute position control of the vessel utilising all thrusters
in all combinations of surge, sway and yaw.
4.2 DP Operator Station (OS)

4.2.1 There are two DP operator stations provided, these are both located in the
Wheelhouse and face astern. From each of the Wheelhouse operator stations (OS
01 & OS 02) full control of the DP Control System is possible.
4.2.2 Each operator station is identical and consists of a marine PC with dual Ethernet
interface, 27” colour display, operator panel (including trackball, heading wheel
and three axis joystick) and a retractable keyboard.
4.2.3 The operator stations are operated in a master/slave arrangement. Command is
transferred from one operator station to another via use of the give/take command
buttons on each operator station.
4.2.4 The following table identifies power supplies for the two DP operator stations:
DP OS Location Power Supply
DP OS 1 Wheelhouse Aft Console (DP) UPS 1
DP OS 2 Wheelhouse Aft Console (DP) UPS 2
Table 1: DP OS DETAILS
4.2.5 Each operator station is connected to the dual automation network (Net A & Net
B).
4.2.6 Each operator station runs a history recording; this contains data for
approximately twenty-four hours. There is also a printer connected to the DP
Control System, which is used for printing alarm logs and for other hardcopy data
export from the DP Control System. The Alarm Printer is located next to the DP
OS on the Wheelhouse Aft Console and is powered from (DP) UPS 1.
4.2.7 The Mode Selector Switch is mounted on the Wheelhouse Aft Console next to DP
OS 1. This is used for selection of the active control system for all thrusters. The
switch has three positions:
 Manual Lever
 Independent Joystick
 DP.
4.2.8 The switch is provided with 24VDC from the local operator station (DP OS 1) and
is configured to route switch position to each of the five thrusters, there are
separate contacts for each thruster. The selector switch is covered to prevent acts
of inadvertent mal-operation changing the mode of thruster operation.
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4.3 DP Operator Station Failure Modes & Effects
4.3.1 Failure of an individual DP operator station will have little effect as control can be
maintained via another DP operator station. If the in command operator station
fails, the operator will have to take command on another operator station, there
will be no effect on the vessel’s positioning (as the control cabinet is unaffected).
4.3.2 Common failure of both DP OS (following a systemic software failure/error) may
deprive the operator of control of the DP Control System. In principle, the DP
controllers will continue to maintain DP control of the vessel, however these
controllers are connected to the same data network as the operator stations and
there may be an effect to their performance.
4.3.3 The operator can in this eventuality, take command of the vessel on the
Independent Joystick System or on the manual (remote) thruster levers.
4.3.4 The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
manufacturer actively provides updates to guard against any known failure
mechanism. This is based on their experience of thousands of DP controllers in
operation worldwide.
4.3.5 Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigations against occurrence
and the effects of this failure mode.
4.3.6 Failure of the printer (power failure, unit failure, connection failure, paper jams,
zero paper and zero ink/toner) will not raise an alarm (except locally on the
printer), there will be no effect to the operation of the DP Control System, however
alarm and event recording will be degraded (each DP OS will maintain its own
history record).
4.3.7 The Selector Switch is covered to prevent acts of inadvertent mal-operation
changing the mode of thruster operation.
4.3.8 Power failure to the Selector Switch is alarmed and will result in the switch failing
as set and the operator not being able to make any changes to the operational
mode. All thrusters will remain in their previously assigned control mode (i.e. DP).
4.3.9 Open circuit or short circuit failure of any contact to within the Selector Switch for
an individual thruster will not affect the operating mode of the thruster.
4.3.10 Although all thrusters are switched through the Selector Switch the only
commonality between thrusters is via the mechanical linkage of the switch to each
thruster’s contacts.
4.4 DP Controllers (computers)

4.4.1 There is a single control cabinet for the DP Control System; this contains two DP
controllers (RCU 501 processors) and fifteen remote I/O panels (RSER200-4 &
RMP201-8).
4.4.2 The power supplies to the DP control cabinet are outlined in the following table:
DP Control Cabinet Location Power Supply
(DP) UPS 1 via DPC-21 PSU A
DPC-21 Technical Space
(DP) UPS 2 via DPC-21 PSU B
Table 2: CONTROL CABINET DETAILS
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4.4.3 The DP Control Cabinet is dual supplied from two 230V UPS sources. Each UPS is
fed to a power supply unit within the DPC-2 cabinet. Each PSU (A & B) supplies
both DP controllers and all remote I/O modules. Each PSU supplies 24VDC power
to the DP cabinet. There are alarms for total failure of either PSU.
4.4.4 The duplex DP controllers within DPC-2 are configured in a master/slave
arrangement, where both controllers perform the same calculations (with the
same data), however only one is in command of the thrusters. Upon failures
affecting the master controller, the slave controller will become the master. The
transfer of command between controllers will be ‘bumpless’ and there will be no
impact on the DP function of the vessel. Failures to a slave controller will be
alarmed, and similarly have no effect on DP control.
4.4.5 Each DP controller individually is connected with the dual automation network (Net
A & Net B).
4.4.6 Within the cabinet there is a dual (i.e. redundant) RBus network connecting both
DP controllers and all I/O modules. These are founded on network hubs located
on I/O modules WU3 U31 (RBus A) and WU6 U61 (RBus B).
4.4.7 The DP cabinet is interfaced with the PMS, all thrusters, vessel sensors and
position references (except the HPR) via hardwired signals to the RIO units. Data
with the HPR is interfaced via the dual Ethernet network.
4.4.8 The signal I/O is not itself redundant; however, redundancy is achieved by the
segregation of I/O.
4.4.9 An internal fault to a remote I/O unit can result in the loss from the DP Control
System of the connected signals, therefore each remote I/O unit is arranged to
have no more than one thruster or one of a type of sensor or one of a type of
position reference connected.
4.4.10 Each remote I/O unit is dual supplied from the internal cabinet 24VDC power
distribution and is connected with each DP controller via the dual RBus network.
4.5 DP Control Cabinet Failure Modes & Effects

4.5.1 Failure of the internal power supply for a DP controller will result in loss of that
single DP controller. Power would be maintained to the other redundant DP
controller, owing to the segregation of supply. In case of loss of the master DP
controller, there would be a seamless transfer to the slave DP controller and
system functionality would remain unaffected.
4.5.2 Each DP controller is dual supplied, so power supply faults at the PSUs will not
affect the DP controllers or the signal I/O.
4.5.3 Similarly, an internal mechanical or electrical failure of a DP controller resulting in
a shutdown of the affected DP controller would present no disturbance to position
keeping, as the other DP controller would remain functional.
4.5.4 Failure of the slave DP controller is alarmed within the system. This will prevent
a future transfer to that controller; there will be no effect to the control system.
4.5.5 Failure of a slave DP controller to take over control could result in total loss of DP
control. This however would normally be regarded as a double failure (i.e. failure
of the master DP controller and subsequent failure of the slave DP controller to
take control) as each controller is alarmed for its status. If transfer failure occurs
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during switching between two functional DP controllers, control will be maintained
by the original master controller.
4.5.6 As both DP controllers are running identical software with identical inputs, it is
possible that a common (systemic) fault could occur in the controller
programming. This may result in failure of the DP Control System to provide
effective control of the thrusters.
4.5.7 The operator can in this eventuality, take command of the vessel on the
Independent Joystick System or on the manual (remote) thruster levers.
4.5.8 The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
4.5.9 Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigation against occurrence
4.5.10 It should be noted that a common (systemic) failure has the potential to affect the
IJS as it has the same RCU as the DP controllers (the manual levers do not share
such commonality).
4.5.11 A communication failure to one of the DP controllers from a network failure (or
fault) will not be critical, as there is redundancy in the DP controllers (and in RBus
and Ethernet networks).
4.5.12 Failure in communication between a vessel sensor and the DP Control System will
result in that sensor being rejected from DP. Likewise, a sudden jump in sensor
value would result in rejection.
4.5.13 Failure in communication between a position reference and the DP Control System
will result in that position reference being rejected from DP. Likewise, a sudden
jump in measured position would result in rejection.
4.5.14 A signal freeze in the input signal from a vessel sensor to the DP Control System
will be automatically detected and the sensor will be rejected from the DP Control
System.
4.5.15 A signal freeze in the input signal from a position reference to the DP Control
System will be automatically detected and the reference will be disregarded by the
DP Control System (the weighting will be set to zero).
4.5.16 A slowly varying signal from a bad reference or poor sensor will not be instantly
detected by the DP Control System. After the signal has drifted outside the mean
position fix (when using at least three position references) or outside the
acceptance limits (for the vessel sensors) the DP Control System will then reject
the faulty reference or sensor.
4.5.17 There is a danger upon rejection of a faulty signal of a drive off, as the mean
position fix (or sensor value) may jump following rejection of the erroneous signal.
The mitigations against this are twofold; the first is provided by use of three
sensors or position references, such that the rejected sensor is always outweighed
by the two healthy sensors and the second is provided by prompt recognition of
this problem by the operator, this relies heavily on operator training and
experience.
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4.5.18 Failure of I/O module WU3 U31 will fail RBus A communication throughout the DP
control cabinet. Internal cabinet communication will be maintained on RBus B.
4.5.19 Failure of I/O module WU3 U32 (RSER200-4) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Wind 1, Wind 3, Gyro 1 and DGNSS 1.
The DP Control System will remain operating with no effect to station keeping,
utilising the other wind sensor, three remaining gyrocompasses and with HPR,
DGNSS 2, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack still available.
System from the Forward Draught Sensor, Tensioner 1, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack.
with HPR, DGNSS 1 and DGNSS 2 still available.
4.5.21 Failure of I/O module WU3 U34 (RMP201-8) will fail input into the DP Control
System from Gyro 1 and the connection with the Bow Azimuth Thruster.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the three remaining
gyrocompasses. The Bow Azimuth Thruster will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control
System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters. This failure is
equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent.
System from MRU 1 and the connection with the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the two remaining motion
reference units. The Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control
System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters.
4.5.23 Failure of I/O module WU3 U36 (RMP201-8) will fail the connection between the
DP Control System and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
The DP Control System will remain operating. The Stern Azimuth Thruster
Starboard will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control System will maintain positioning
with the remaining thrusters.
System from DG1 and (DP) UPS 1.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of (DP) UPS 1 will
have no effect.
Loss of data relating to DG1’s status and load may affect the power available for
the Port thrusters (BTT Forward & SAT Port). If the thrusters are using more than
95% of the power available from DG2 (i.e. >2432kW), then the DP Control System
will institute a power chop for the Port thrusters. The Centre and Starboard
thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning by
themselves.
System from DG3 and Bus Tie 2.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of Bus Tie 2 will have
no effect as the bus tie is open (NO) during DP operations.
the Starboard thrusters (BTT Aft & SAT Starboard). If the thrusters are using
more than 95% of the power available from DG4 (i.e. >1815kW), then the DP
Control System will institute a power chop for the Starboard thrusters. The Port
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and Centre thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning
by themselves.
System from MRU 3.
utilising the two remaining motion reference units.
4.5.27 Failure of I/O module WU6 U61 will fail RBus A communication throughout the DP
control cabinet. Internal cabinet communication will be maintained on RBus B.
System from Wind 2, Gyro 2, Gyro 3, MRU 2 and DGNSS 2.
utilising the other wind sensor, two remaining gyrocompasses, two remaining
motion reference units and with HPR, DGNSS 1, DGNSS 3 and SpotTrack still
available.
System from Gyro 4 and both Waypoint inputs.
utilising the three remaining gyrocompasses. The effect of failure of the waypoint
input will prevent import of future waypoints into the DP Control System. Any
active waypoints being followed by the DP Control System will not be affected.
System from Gyro 2 and the connection with the Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward.
The DP Control System will remain operating utilising the three remaining
gyrocompasses. The Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward will fail to zero rpm; the DP
Control System will maintain positioning with the remaining thrusters.
4.5.31 Failure of I/O module WU6 U65 (RMP201-8) will fail the connection between the
DP Control System and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
The DP Control System will remain operating. The Stern Azimuth Thruster Port
will fail to zero rpm; the DP Control System will maintain positioning with the
remaining thrusters.
System from DG2, Bus Tie 1 and (DP) UPS 2.
The DP Control System will remain operating; loss of status of Bus Tie 1 will have
no effect as the bus tie is open (NO) during DP operations. Loss of status of (DP)
UPS 2 will have no effect.
the Port thrusters (BTT Forward & SAT Port). If the thrusters are using more than
95% of the power available from DG1 (i.e. >1815kW), then the DP Control System
will institute a power chop for the Port thrusters. The Centre and Starboard
thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning by
themselves.
System from DG4.
the Starboard thrusters (BTT Aft & SAT Starboard). If the thrusters are using
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more than 95% of the power available from DG3 (i.e. >2432kW), then the DP
Control System will institute a power chop for the Starboard thrusters. The Port
and Centre thrusters will not be affected and are capable of maintaining positioning
by themselves.
System from DG5.
The DP Control System will remain operating, however it will consider there to be
a blackout on the Centre 690V MSB. The Bow Azimuth Thruster will remain
running; however, the power available from the DP Control System’s perspective
for the thruster will be zero.
4.6 DP Data Networks

4.6.1 The DP operator stations, DP control cabinet, HPR and printers are all interfaced
on a dual Ethernet network. Each network is mounted via a micro-hub contained
within a DP operator station. The hub for Network A is contained within (and
powered from) DP OS 1 and the hub for Network B is contained within (and
powered from) DP OS 2.
4.6.2 The table below identifies the power supply to the network switches:
Network Switch Location Power Supply
NDU A within DP OS 1 24VDC derived from DP OS 1
NDU B within DP OS 2 24VDC derived from DP OS 2
Table 3: DP DATA NETWORK DETAILS
4.6.3 8.6.3 The table below identifies the networked components:

Network Networked Component Network Networked Component
DP OS 1 DP OS 1
DP OS 2 DP OS 2
DPC-2 (1) DPC-2 (1)
Net A Net B
DPC-2 (2) DPC-2 (2)
HPR OS (APC-10) HPR OS (APC-10)
Alarm Printer
Table 4: NETWORKED COMPONENTS
4.7 DP Data Network Failure Modes & Effects

4.7.1 A failure of communication on one network (triggered by lost packet detection)
will raise an alarm for failure of that network; the DP control, alarm and monitoring
functions of the DP Control System will remain unaffected, as the other network
is healthy.
4.7.2 Failure of NDU A will fail Network A to all interfaced components; all systems
(except the Printer) will maintain communication on Network B.
4.7.3 Failure of NDU B will fail Network B to all interfaced components; all systems will
maintain communication on Network A.
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4.7.4 A systemic error (failure of communication on both networks in a pair) may occur
as a result of a network storm, which can cause a loss of the DP system. Filters
on the networks are used to guard against network storms. This, according to the
manufacturer, is sufficient protection. Protection is installed on both the DP
Ethernet networks and on the DP RBus networks.
4.7.5 Another failure mode which can cause systemic failure is ‘clogging’ of network
communications. This is where high levels of valid network traffic exceeds the
available bandwidth. Networks are designed to have sufficient bandwidth with
safety margins, however as a result of modifications and additions to the DP
Control System, the safety margin may be reduced.
4.7.6 As the DP controllers and operator stations are connected to each other via data
networks, there exists a pathway for computer viruses, trojans and other malware
to be propagated across the DP Control System. Each operator station is
configured with a firewall and has anti-virus software. However, as the vessels
systems are not connected to the internet (for security), the virus definitions will
only be updated during periods of maintenance; therefore newer viruses, trojans
or other malware may be able to bypass these protections.
4.7.7 The presence of viruses, trojans or other malware can cause an increase in
network traffic, compromise the security settings of operator stations (and allow
further infection), reduce the reliability of operator stations and may affect the
correct operation of field stations.
4.7.8 The primary pathway for introduction of viruses, trojans or other malware for
networks is via USB stick. Procedures should be in place to control the use of USB
sticks with the DP control computers. USB ports that are not required should be
deactivated.
4.7.9 In the event of a systemic failure of network communication, the operator can
take command of the vessel on the Independent Joystick System or on the manual
(remote) thruster levers.
The incidence of this form of failure is very low and the DP Control System
Proper operational procedures, sufficient operator training/competence and good
maintenance of the DP Control System all will act as mitigations against occurrence
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4.8 Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
4.8.1 There are five 230V UPS provided, these are each identified in the following table:
UPS Charging Power Supply
14UPS 440V ESB (12EP)
(DP) UPS 1 Port 230V MSB (11L1)
(DP) UPS 2 Starboard 230V MSB (11L2)
(IJS) UPS 3 440V ESB 13EL6
Owner (Van Oord) UPS Port 220V MSB (11L1)
Table 5: 230V UPS POWER SUPPLIES
4.8.2 The DP-relevant consumers of the Transitional Source of Power (14UPS) are
identified in the following table:
Transitional Source of Power Consumers (14UPS1)
Auto-Telephone System
PA System 1
PA System 2
Fire Detection System
Local Fire Fighting System Engine Room
Table 6: TRANSITIONAL SOURCE OF POWER DISTRIBUTION
4.8.3 The DP-relevant consumers of the DP & IJS UPS are identified in the following
tables:
(DP) UPS 1 (DP) UPS 2
DPC-21 PSU A (& MRU 3) DPC-21 PSU B (& MRU 1)
DP OS 1 DP OS 2
DP Alarm Printer
Wind 1 Wind 2
Gyro 1 Interface Gyro 2 Interface
Gyro 1 PSU Gyro 2 PSU
Wind 3 HYDRINS
HPP OS
HPR Transceiver HPR Transceiver
DGNSS 1 PSU DGNSS 2 PSU
Seapath 330
DGNSS Differential Correction Receiver
SpotTrack
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(IJS) UPS 3
IJS cC-1
Table 7: DP & IJS UPS DISTRIBUTION
4.9 230V Uninterruptible Power Supply Failure Modes & Effects

Transitional Source of Power (14UPS)
4.9.1 Failure of supply to 14UPS battery charger or failure of the battery charging unit
itself, will cause the distribution to revert to battery backup and an alarm will be
raised in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached consumers will be
maintained.
4.9.2 Failure of 14UPS’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in the
Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached consumers will be maintained.
4.9.3 If 14UPS’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or following
a failure, an alarm will be raised in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached
consumers will be maintained.
4.9.4 Failure of 14UPS1’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure of
the charging power supply (or battery charging unit) and subsequent (hidden)
failure of the battery to maintain the distribution will cause the attached
consumers to fail.
A single power supply will be failed to the Auto-Telephone system and to both PA
systems; these systems will remain operating on their backup 24VDC supplies.
Power will be failed to the Fire Detection System and to the Local Fire Fighting
System in the Engine Room; this will not affect the operation of any DP-essential
machinery.
(DP) UPS 1
4.9.5 Failure of supply to (DP) UPS 1’s battery charger or failure of the battery charging
unit itself, will cause the distribution to revert to battery backup and an alarm will
be raised in the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
attached consumers will be maintained.
4.9.6 Failure of (DP) UPS 1’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in
the DP Control System and in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The attached
4.9.7 If (DP) UPS 1’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or
following a failure, an alarm will be raised in the Alarm & Monitoring System. The
4.9.8 Failure of (DP) UPS 1’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure
of the charging power supply (or battery charging unit) and subsequent (hidden)
consumers to fail.
Power will be failed to a single power supply unit for the DP Control Cabinet (DPC-
21 PSU A), this will have little effect to the operation of the cabinet as all
components are dual supplied, failure of the power supply to the PSU will be
alarmed. MRU 3 will be failed as it derives power from the DP Control Cabinet.
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Power will be failed to a single DP operator station (DP OS 1) and to the Alarm
Printer. The DP Control System will remain operating and the operator can use
the remaining DP OS (which is adjacent to the failed OS).
Power will be failed to Wind 1 and Wind 3, the wind speed and direction input into
the DP Control System from Wind 1 and Wind 3 will be failed, this will be alarmed.
There will be no effect to the operation of the DP Control System as there is
another wind sensor available.
Power will be failed to Gyro 1, the heading input into the DP Control System from
Gyro 1 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no effect to the operation
of the DP Control System as there are other gyrocompasses available.
Power will be failed to a single power supply for the HPR Transceiver, this will be
alarmed, however there will be no effect to the operation of the transceiver or the
HPR system as the unit is dual supplied.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS 1; this will fail the input
of this reference into the DP Control System.
Power will be failed for the Seapath (DGNSS 3); this will fail the input of this
reference into the DP Control System. As the unit also outputs MRU data and
gyrocompass data the Gyro 4 input and MRU 3 input to the DP Control System will
also be failed.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS Differential Correction
Receiver, this will degrade the performance of DGNSS 2 (DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3 are
already failed).
In all, two out of four gyrocompass inputs to the DP Control System will be failed
(Gyro 1 & Gyro 4); the DP Control System will remain operating with the remaining
gyrocompass inputs.
In all, a single MRU will be failed (MRU 3); the DP Control System will remain
operating with the remaining MRU inputs.
In all, two out of five position reference inputs to the DP Control System will be
failed (DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3); provided sufficient other position references are
selected (i.e. HPR, DGNSS 2 & SpotTrack) the DP Control System will remain
operational.
(DP) UPS 2
4.9.9 Failure of supply to (DP) UPS 2’s battery charger or failure of the battery charging
4.9.10 Failure of (DP) UPS 2’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in
4.9.11 If (DP) UPS 2’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or
4.9.12 Failure of (DP) UPS 2’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure
consumers to fail.
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Power will be failed to a single power supply unit for the DP Control Cabinet (DPC-
21 PSU B), this will have little effect to the operation of the cabinet as all
components are dual supplied, failure of the power supply to the PSU will be
alarmed. MRU 1 will be failed as it derives power from the DP Control Cabinet.
Power will be failed to a single DP operator station (DP OS 2). The DP Control
System will remain operating and the operator can use the remaining DP OS
(which is adjacent to the failed OS).
Power will be failed to Wind 2, the wind speed and direction input into the DP
Control System from Wind 2 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no
effect to the operation of the DP Control System as there is another wind sensor
available.
Power will be failed to Gyro 2, the heading input into the DP Control System from
Gyro 2 will be failed, this will be alarmed. There will be no effect to the operation
of the DP Control System as there are other gyrocompasses available.
Power will be failed to the HYDRINS inertial measurement unit; failure of this unit
is alarmed. The MRU 2 and Gyro 3 input into the DP Control System will be failed.
The DP Control System will maintain operation using the remaining MRUs and
gyrocompasses.
Power will be failed to the HPR OS, this will fail the HPR input into the DP Control
System as the interface between the HPR system, external sensors and the DP
Control System will be failed. Power will also be failed to a single power supply
for the HPR Transceiver, this will be alarmed, however there will be no effect to
the operation of the transceiver as the unit is dual supplied.
Power will be failed to the power supply unit for DGNSS 2; this will fail the input
of this reference into the DP Control System.
Power will be failed for the SpotTrack position reference; this will fail the input of
this reference into the DP Control System.
In all, three out of four gyrocompass inputs to the DP Control System will be failed
(Gyro 2, Gyro 3 & Gyro 4); the DP Control System will remain operating with the
remaining gyrocompass inputs.
In all, three out of five position reference inputs to the DP Control System will be
failed (HPR, DGNSS 2 & SpotTrack); provided sufficient other position references
are selected (i.e. DGNSS 1 & DGNSS 3) the DP Control System will remain
operational.
(IJS) UPS 3
4.9.13 Failure of supply to (IJS) UPS 3’s battery charger or failure of the battery charging
4.9.14 Failure of (IJS) UPS 3’s battery such that it has low charge, will raise an alarm in
4.9.15 If (IJS) UPS 3’s battery is bypassed, either from mal-operation in this mode or
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4.9.16 Failure of (IJS) UPS 3’s distribution owing to local electrical fault or following failure
consumers to fail.
4.9.17 Power will be failed to the Independent Joystick System; this will not affect the
operation of the DP Control System.
4.10 DP Load Limitation

4.10.1 The DP control system will execute a reduction in the rpm command signal (DP
Power Chop) to all thrusters on a connected switchboard section when the thruster
load is (instantaneously) greater than a predetermined percentage of the
calculated available power.
This value is set to 95% of power available.
4.10.2 The calculation of power available is performed by the DP control system utilising
information on the switchboard configuration (generator and bus tie status), the
measured kW load per switchboard section and the rated loads for each of the
diesel generators.
This function is similar to the action of the PMS reduction in power available.
4.11 Consequence Analysis

4.11.1 The DP control system incorporates a consequence analysis program that monitors
the thrust necessary to maintain position under the prevailing environmental
conditions. The consequence analysis also performs calculations to verify that, in
the event of a single failure, there shall be sufficient thrust available to maintain
position. An alarm notifies the DPO when a failure can cause loss of position in
the present weather conditions. The function of this module is to determine if the
failure of certain equipment will affect the station-keeping ability of the vessel
given existing environmental conditions. If the station-keeping ability would be
compromised, an advisory alarm shall appear at the console. The operator can
acknowledge the alarm and take appropriate action. Single failures include the
following:-
 Loss of one switchboard
 Loss of one Thruster.

4.12.1 The vessel is provided with four types of position reference; one subsea acoustic
based, three satellite based (including one with inertial measurement), and one
target relative position reference.
4.12.2 The position reference systems available are:
 1× Hydro-acoustic Position Reference (HPR)
 2× Differential Global Navigation Satellite Systems (DGNSS)
 1× Seapath Position Aggregator
 1× SpotTrack Target Relative Laser Position Reference
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4.12.3 The HPR reference is connected to the DP Control System via the dual redundant
Ethernet. The remaining references are hardwired into the DP Control Cabinet.
4.12.4 During DP operations, at least three position references must be selected into DP.
This is mandated in IMO & Class rules and in IMCA guidance.
4.12.5 Three position references selected into the DP Control System allow for voting on
the references to be enabled. This allows for the identification and rejection of
faulty position references.
4.12.6 The selection of position references should be such that no single common failure
can outvote other healthy reference systems. Therefore, no selection of position
references should be used where more than 50% of the weighting of references
(user adjustable) in the DP Control System derives from systems operating on
common principles (e.g. simultaneous loss of all satellite based position reference
systems).
4.13 Hydro-acoustic Position References

4.13.1 The vessel is provided with a single hydro-acoustic position reference of type
Kongsberg Seatex HiPAP 501.
4.13.2 The component parts of the HPR system are:
 HPR Operator Station
 HPR Slave Monitor & KVM Switch
 HPR Network Switch
 HPR Responder Driver Unit
 HPR Transceiver
 HPR Main Control Unit
 HPR Transducer Pole Winch.
4.13.3 The transducer extends below the hull and uses a spherical transducer with over
240 elements and electronic controls. This helps give a narrow beam transmission
and focused reception in the direction of the transponder to try and reduce the
noise that is always present.
4.13.4 In SSBL, the system calculates a three-dimensional subsea position of a
transponder relative to the vessel mounted transducer unit. The directional
stability of the unit is obtained firstly fixing the transponder location by a wide
beam and subsequently by aiming a narrow reception beam towards the
transponder. The system uses a digital beam form that takes its input from all
the transducer elements. The system controls the beam dynamically so it is
always pointing towards the target, roll, pitch and yaw is input to the tracking
algorithm to direct the beam in the correct direction thus enabling the correction
for these motions to be effectively applied continuously.
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Figure 12: HiPAP CONFIGURATION
4.13.5 The transducer receives the data, and a position estimator will then use the data
to estimate the transponder position. The system can calculate a variance for its
measurements and determine the known system accuracy and standard deviation.
The HiPAP has a built-in Kalman filter, which improves the stability and accuracy
of the initial narrow beam guidance but does not interfere with raw fixed data
being sent to the DP control computers or cause a lag in the data.
4.13.6 The Hoist Control Unit and Main control Unit are only required for
deployment/recovery of the transducer pole, it is not required during normal DP
operations.
4.13.7 The HPR Operator Station is interfaced with the DP Control System over the dual
DP network. The HPR Operator Station also is connected with a range of other
sensors and position references, HPR data is also fed to the Survey Rack
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4.13.8 The inputs to the HPR reference system are identified below:
 MRU 1
 MRU 2 (HYDRINS)
 Gyro 1
 Gyro 2
 DGNSS 1
 DGNSS 2
 DGNSS 3 (Seapath).
4.13.9 The inputs from the Motion reference units and gyrocompasses are used to permit
operation of the HPR as vessel attitude and motion is used to direct the acoustic
signal.
4.13.10 The input from the DGNSS is used as an input for the geographical calibration
(during setup) of arrays (SSBL & LBL), is used for representation in APOS.exe of
vessel and transponder position in geographical coordinates and is used for
synchronising the HPR system clock.
4.13.11 IMCA has a library of guidance documents on the use of HPR as a position
reference for DP operations. For further reading on hydro-acoustic position
reference systems, see the following IMCA publications:
 IMCA M200.
4.14 Hydro-acoustic Position Reference Failure Modes and Effects

4.14.1 Failure of a single HPR Operator Station (from power supply failure, computer fault
etc.) will result in the loss of the HPR input to DP. The DP Control System will
maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.2 Failure of the HPR Slave Monitor & KVM Switch (from power supply failure,
hardware fault etc.) will fail indication and control of the HPR at the DP operating
location. There will be no effect to the functioning of the HPR and the DP Control
System.
4.14.3 Failure of the HPR Network Switch (from power supply failure, communication fault
etc.) will fail communication between the HPR Operator Station and the HPR
Transceiver, this will result in the loss of the HPR input to DP. The DP Control
System will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.4 Failure of the Responder Driver Unit (from power supply failure, communication
fault etc.) will fail the ability to send responder trigger signals to the responders.
In the case that the HPR is configured to use responder signals, these will be failed
and the HPR input to the DP Control System will be degraded if not failed.
4.14.5 Failure of the power supplied from (DP) UPS 2 to the HPR Junction Box will fail the
HPR Operator Station, HPR Slave Monitor & KVM Switch, HPR Network Switch and
HPR Responder Driver Unit. This will result in the loss of the HPR input to DP. The
DP Control System will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.6 Failure of the input from MRU 1 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second motion
reference unit input connected.
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4.14.7 Failure of the input from MRU 2 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second motion
reference unit input connected.
4.14.8 Failure of the input from Gyro 1 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second gyrocompass
input connected.
4.14.9 Failure of the input from Gyro 2 will raise an alarm in the HPR Operator Station S;
however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is a second gyrocompass
input connected.
4.14.10 Failure of the DGNSS input (DGNSS 1) to the HPR Operator Station will fail clock
synchronisation of the HPR, there will be no operational effect to the HPR.
4.14.11 Failure of the DGNSS input (DGNSS 2) to the HPR Operator Station will only
prevent the setup and configuration of the HPR, there will be no operational effect
to the HPR.
4.14.12 Failure of a single power supply to the HPR Transceiver will raise an alarm in the
HPR Operator Station; however, the HPR input to DP will be unaffected as there is
a second power supply.
4.14.13 Failure of the HPR Transceiver (from dual power supply failure, communication
fault etc.) will result in the loss of the HPR input to DP. The DP Control System
will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.14 Failure of the transducer head will fail the HPR position reference. The DP Control
System will maintain operation with the remaining position references.
4.14.15 Failure of the Hoist Control Unit, either from power supply failure or following a
local fault, will prevent operation of the HPR Transducer Pole’s hoist. This will not
affect the operation of the HPR while deployed.
4.14.16 Failure of the Main Control Unit, either from power supply failure or following a
local fault, will prevent operation of the HPR Gate Valve and HPR Transducer Pole’s
hoist. This will not affect the operation of the HPR while deployed.
4.14.17 Total failure of the acoustic system can be caused by dragging or lifting of a
transponder, transponder failure or battery failure. These are largely a matter of
good procedures. If only one or two transponders are deployed, the HiPAP is
vulnerable to such a failure.
The effects of total failure of the acoustic system will not be significant, as the
vessel will be operated with sufficient other position reference systems available.
4.14.18 Noise interference is generally the typical problem affecting acoustic systems. The
transceiver head is mounted a reasonable distance from the thrusters. When
working in heavy weather, noise turbulence, thruster interference and vibrations
may cause occasional signal loss.
In all cases, loss of the acoustic input the DP Control System will not have a
significant effect, as there will be sufficient other position reference systems
available.
4.14.19 Reverberation can arise as a direct consequence of using an acoustic positioning
system. Reverberation can be subdivided into four major classifications:
 Volume reverberation - scattering by particle matter, both animate and
inanimate
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 Sea surface reverberation - scattering off the surface
 Sea bottom reverberation - scattering off bottom layers
 Structure reverberation - scattering off synthetic structures.
4.14.20 The latter three types are the most dangerous, as ‘multipath echoes’ can be highly
coherent and cause total destructive interference with the ‘direct’ path signal from
an interrogator or transponder.
The effects of reverberation may present a misleading position fix, in this case,
the DP Control System will reject the reference, as it will fail the median test (i.e.
the position fix is out of limits).
4.15 Differential Global Navigation Satellite Systems (DGNSS)

4.15.1 GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) is a satellite system that is used to
pinpoint the geographic location of a user's receiver anywhere in the world. Two
main GNSS systems are currently in operation: the United States' Global
Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian Federation's Global Orbiting Navigation
Satellite System (GLONASS). Each of the GNSS systems employs a constellation
of orbiting satellites working in conjunction with a network of ground stations.
Figure 13: GNSS SATELLITE NETWORK PRINCIPLE
4.15.2 Satellite-based navigation systems use a version of triangulation to locate the

user, through calculations involving information from a number of satellites. Each
satellite transmits coded signals at precise intervals. The receiver converts signal
information into position, velocity, and time estimates. Using this information,
any receiver on or near the earth's surface can calculate the exact position of
the transmitting satellite and the distance (from the transmission time delay)
between it and the receiver. Coordinating current signal data from four or more
satellites enables the receiver to determine its position (accurate >5 meters).
4.15.3 Differential Global Navigation Satellite System (DGNSS) uses a network of fixed,
ground-based reference stations to broadcast the difference between the positions
indicated by the satellite systems and the known fixed positions. These stations
broadcast the difference between the measured satellite distance and actual
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(internally computed) distance, and receiver stations may correct their distance
by the same amount (accuracy 1.0-0.1m). The digital correction signal is typically
broadcast locally over ground-based transmitters of shorter range or via satellites
for longer range systems.
Figure 14: DGNSS PRINCIPLE
4.15.4 The DP Control System is provided with three satellite based position references.
Two of these come from conventional differential global navigation satellite
systems and one from a Seapath unit, which combines satellite based signals with
MRU and gyrocompass inputs.
4.15.5 IMCA has a library of guidance documents on the use of DGNSS as a position
reference for DP operations. For further reading on DGNSS, see the following
IMCA publications:
 IMCA M141
 IMCA M199
 IMCA S012
 IMCA S018.
4.16 DGNSS Failure Modes & Effects

4.16.1 Loss of power supply to a DGNSS will result in loss that DGNSS from DP. Total
failure of one reference sensor input would result in the sensor being automatically
rejected by the DP control system. This is not likely to have any destabilising
effect on the control system, provided there are sufficient reference systems
online.
4.16.2 Failure of a single differential correction input will not have a serious effect, as
there are multiple correction inputs to the system.
The system however should be configured (in K-Pos) to accept raw GNSS, this will
maintain the GNSS signal to the DP control system albeit with reduced accuracy.
The automatic weighting in the software will eventually reject the GNSS input if it
is sufficiently inaccurate (exceeds voting limit) or imprecise (weighting to zero).
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4.16.3 These three DGNSS position references cannot be classed as independent as there
are common failure modes, which can affect all DGNSS. These are described in
the following paragraphs.
4.16.4 DGNSS will suffer from scintillation due to atmospheric conditions placing sole
reliance on the remaining systems, which highlights the importance of selecting
as many reference systems as possible. The vulnerabilities of reliance on GNSS
are discussed further in the Royal Academy of Engineering report ‘Global
Navigation Space Systems, Reliance and Vulnerability’, 2011.
4.16.5 One of the most common failures of DGNSS is loss of differential signal and or
satellites. Both are susceptible to shielding, and the quality and stability of
receiving signals from them, and the differential link stations. Loss of all DGNSS
as a reference to the DP Control System at the same time is likely to happen if the
loss is due to scintillation or shielding. Correct positioning of the antennae avoids
the loss of signal due to shielding and multipath errors.
4.16.6 A DGNSS receiver measures the direct path distance between the satellite and the
vessel’s antenna. When working near a platform or other offshore structures,
fixed or mobile, then a reflection of the signal may occur this will then degrade
the direct signal. This effect is known as multipath and it will cause the positional
accuracy to deteriorate and possibly jump. Any number of satellites within a
satellite constellation can be affected by multipath depending on the geometry
between the antenna, nearby objects and the satellite constellation in view.
Multipath manifests itself in a noisy and unstable position. This effect may only
be experienced at particular times of day and may vary in a cyclical fashion.
4.16.7 Most multipath will be due to obstructions within 150m of the antenna, and it is
extremely important to consider the presence of local reflectors when installing
the vessel antenna.
4.16.8 Most problems experienced with DGNSS relate to the differential link being lost.
Loss of radio-based differential links is often due to poor differential antenna
installation. Other problems with radio links are loss of HF during dawn and dusk
periods and extreme atmospheric conditions. Loss of differential input will
normally (default setting) result in the DGNSS reference being rejected from DP,
the operator should set the reference rejection criteria to alarm only on loss of
correction, not rejection.
4.16.9 A commonly reported problem is interference such as radio interference to high
frequency differential links caused by choice of a frequency too close to that of the
correction link. At its most extreme, this can result in complete loss of satellite
differential position computation.
4.16.10 DGNSS is vulnerable to jamming of the satellite and differential signals, the
sources can arise from other HF signals similar in frequency or from deliberate
flooding of the near electromagnetic spectrum. The effects of jamming from
transmissions, from military sources, other hostile jamming or from other sources
may render the system inoperable or at worst may present a misleading position
fix.
4.16.11 Complete loss of positioning may also be due to the vessel’s location or antenna
masking, or to one of the following causes of malfunction:
 Water in cable
 Perished cable
 Lightning strike on antenna
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 Defective hardware
 Old almanac or different almanac in mobile and reference receivers
 Insufficient channels in receiver
 Operator error.
4.16.12 A change in satellite geometry will normally show a small change in position.
However, some systems may exhibit significant jumps, possibly as high as 25m.
In the event of very poor geometry, a reduction in the satellite mask angle from
10° to 5° may introduce additional satellites, which will improve the geometry.
However, lower elevation satellites are less stable than higher elevations, and can
degrade the quality of the position. The K-Pos software deals with position jumps
more easily than drift. Slow position drift can be a more serious problem. With
insufficient redundancy, it is sometimes not seen by the DP control system. It is
important to be able to check what is happening at the DGNSS reference station(s)
in use when slow drift is suspected.
4.16.13 When the number of satellites in use by the DGNSS is reduced, the weighting of
the DGNSS is reduced to the point where a timeout alarm is received and the
reference will be rejected from DP. There is not likely to be any unwanted thrust
or position excursion in this event.
4.16.14 The effects of DGNSS failure, or differential drop out, can be mitigated by
comparing the following recommendations drawn from various IMCA Marine
Division reports (M141, M199, S018. See section 18.3):
 Altitude aiding is selected
 Alarms are provided when less than four satellites are available in each
system
 Antennae are properly installed and checked
 The operators are properly trained in DGNSS
 The latest signal processing firmware is used
 Interference checks are made on board for all radio equipment, particularly
mobile phones
 Line of sight can be maintained to all DGNSS satellites (management of
obstructions e.g. masts)
 The geometry is such that one axis of the vessel is not dependent on one
satellite
 Common software is avoided or identified and thoroughly tested (e.g. the
DP control systems interface)
 Checks for blind sectors.
4.16.15 Implementation of multiple DGNSS receivers utilising multiple correction signals
and two types of satellite constellation will improve the redundancy of DGNSS as
a position reference for the vessel. However, sole reliance on DGNSS should not
be attempted for DP operations.
4.17 Target Relative Positioning Systems

4.17.1 The vessel is equipped with one position reference system which makes use of
relative target positioning; this is the laser based SpotTrack system which works
on the principle of computing the time of travel of reflected radiation.
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SpotTrack
4.17.2 SpotTrack is an advanced multi-target laser based relative position reference
system.
4.17.3 The SpotTrack reference system is powered from (DP) UPS No. 2.
4.17.4 SpotTrack is a highly robust, yet lightweight, motion stabilised rotating laser
sensor offering precision range and bearing readings to one or multiple retro-
reflective targets. As a multi-target sensor, SpotTrack uses an advanced detection
system and tracking algorithms for true target recognition – minimising lock-on to
false reflections. Motion stabilisation provides improved target lock on a moving
platform. SpotTrack can utilise already established, optical targets.
Figure 15: SPOTTRACK SEALED UNIT
4.17.5 The sensor itself is a completely sealed unit, with all moving parts housed inside,
so the system is less prone to mechanical wear from exposure to the elements.
4.17.6 By utilising roll and pitch stabilisation from a motion reference unit, (KONGSBERG
MRU) SpotTrack can track targets even at high elevation angles.
4.17.7 The SpotTrack has a range of 250m with a stated distance accuracy of 20cm and
a stated bearing accuracy of 0.01°. A pulse of light is fired at the reflective targets
and the round trip is timed to provide the distance measurement. At the instant
the pulse from a target is returned, an optical encoder on the shaft is triggered to
provide the angle.
4.17.8 The reflected beam is picked up by the receiving lens and converted to an electrical
signal by a photo diode. The time interval measured between the transmitting
and receiving of the beam is used to compute the range.
4.17.9 The quality and type of material used for reflectors is critical to the reliable
operation of the SpotTrack. The system can make use of flat or cylindrical targets
using prism clusters.
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4.18 Target Relative Positioning Systems Failure Modes
SpotTrack
4.18.1 There are several failure modes, which can affect the performance of the
SpotTrack.
 Signals can be blocked by dirt on the unit lens
 The acquisition of false targets, e.g. reflective tape on working gear,
lifeboats etc. (This has been mitigated by using digital pulses)
 Signals can be distorted by a low rising or setting sun
 Inclement weather, e.g. heavy rain, snow or fog can reduce system
efficiency
 Loss of the serial link
 Loss of supply from PSU
 Loss of encoder feedback.
For each of the above failures, the DP Control System will reject the SpotTrack if
it is sufficiently inaccurate. The DP Control System will maintain operation with
the remaining position references.
4.18.2 The most serious failure of the SpotTrack is that it could track a new target.
Software in place and digital coding should prevent this from occurring. If the
system tracks another mobile target (e.g. a reflective jacket), then the position
reference will drift. In this case, the DP Control System will reject the reference,
as it will fail the median test. The DP Control System will maintain operation with
the remaining position references.
4.18.3 Operation of the SpotTrack system in poor weather conditions where visibility is
limited (e.g. fog) will reduce the maximum range of the system because it uses
an infrared laser beam as this is easily absorbed by moist air.
4.19 Gyrocompasses
4.19.1 The vessel is fitted with four gyrocompass inputs; these are used to translate
position reference data (from all position reference systems at different offsets) to
a single vessel position fix and to provide heading data to the DP Control System,
DGNSS and the HPR. Stable heading data is of high importance as the DP Control
Systems are generally run in heading priority mode (especially for monohull
vessels).
4.19.2 The gyrocompass input to the DP Control Systems is used for heading control and
for correcting the DGNSS. The gyrocompass input to the HPR is used for
converting relative X and Y into Eastings and Northings as well as for offset
corrections.
4.19.3 The Gyro 3 input to the DP Control System is a signal derived from the HYDRINS
inertial measurement unit which utilises internal motion detection and heading
detection corrected by inputs from DGNSS.
4.19.4 Gyro 4 input to the DP Control System is a signal derived from the Seapath 330,
which generates smoothed heading data utilising inputs of gyrocompass data from
Gyro 1, motion reference data from MRU 3 and DGNSS data from the Seapath Unit
itself.
4.19.5 As there are at least three gyrocompass signals available to the DP Control
System, voting is enabled to allow detection of faulty signals, including
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gyrocompass drift. This will present no disruption to heading control as faulty
units can be automatically rejected from the DP Control System.
4.19.6 Each gyrocompass is fitted with a serial splitter to distribute the heading data to
separate signal consumers, the signals to the DP Control System are routed
directly from each gyrocompass interface (Gyro 1 & Gyro 2).
4.19.7 9.4.8 The gyrocompass output from the HYDRINS unit is fed to the DP Control
System and to the Survey Rack; likewise the Gyrocompass output of the Seapath
unit is fed to the DP Control System and to the Survey Rack.
4.20 Gyrocompass Failure Modes & Effects

4.20.1 Gyrocompass failures can cause total loss of the output and the gyrocompass
being rejected, or cause the output to drift and a difference alarm being given.
4.20.2 Sudden failure of the gyrocompass in use will result in the next enabled
gyrocompass taking over, however a slow drift off may result in heading drift off
(within the normal footprint) until the drift is high enough for the voting to reject
the failed gyrocompass.
4.20.3 Gyrocompass failures are usually due to power supply failure. Failure of a power
supply to a gyrocompass will activate an internal gyrocompass alarm and an alarm
in the affected DP Control System.
4.20.4 Gyro 3 is dual supplied; failure of a single power supply to the HYDRINS unit will
raise an alarm; however, the operation of the unit will be maintained.
4.20.5 Differences between the gyrocompass headings can be compensated for in the DP
Control System, with an operator definable offset compensation and an operator
definable difference alarm (usually 1.5°) and rejection of the faulty unit by voting.
4.20.6 Failure of the NMEA serial link will generate an alarm at the DP operator stations
and the gyrocompass will be automatically rejected from the DP Control System.
4.20.7 Failure of the gyrocompass input to the Seapath unit will degrade the position and
heading output of the Seapath unit.
At worst, the gyrocompass output of the Seapath will be failed. In this case, there
will remain at least two unaffected gyrocompass inputs to DP (Gyro 2 & Gyro 3).
4.20.8 Failure of gyrocompass heading input to the HPR Operator Station will result in
the HPR displaying relative position fixes in X and Y. This is not a problem if the
HPR was in use at the time of the failure.
4.21 Motion Reference Units

4.21.1 The vessel has three motion reference units; one is a MRU-5 and is located in the
Port corridor, frame No. 56; and another is a HYDRINS unit located in the
Starboard corridor, frame No. 111. The third unit is an MRU-5 (MRU 3) and is part
of the Seapath assembly.
4.21.2 The MRUs are used by the DP Control System for correcting for the HPR, DGNSS
& SpotTrack offsets due to vessel motion in roll and pitch.
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4.21.3 The DGNSS each have the ability to self-correct for vessel motion (including
heave) so that the signals can be exported to the Survey System; this is as each
DGNSS is fed with data from individual MRUs.
4.21.4 The MRUs are much more important for use by the HPR particularly when operating
in SSBL mode.
4.22 Motion Reference Unit Failure Modes & Effects

4.22.1 As there are three motion reference units (or at least three MRU signals), the DP
Control System can identify faulty/inaccurate sensors. Voting across all three
MRUs will identify signal drift or freeze and allow auto-rejection of the faulty value.
The next available MRU will be automatically selected for use. If only two units
are made available to the control system, no voting can take place and only a
difference alarm will be generated.
4.22.2 Failure of a MRU can be caused by power failure or failure of the circuit itself. This
will result in the sensor being rejected from DP.
4.22.3 Failure of the signal from the MRU to the control system or failure out of limits will
similarly produce a rejection of the sensor from DP.
4.22.4 The effects of single MRU failure to the DP Control System will be limited to an
alarm and the changeover of the in use sensor to another healthy MRU.
4.23 Independent Joystick C-Joy

4.23.1 The DP Control System provided is a Kongsberg Maritime cJoy system. This
system is designed for operation as an independent joystick or for DP Class 1
applications. The system is not provided with redundancy, as it is not normally in
use during DP Class 2 operations.
4.23.2 This system is conceived as a backup form of unified remote thruster control in
the event of a common failure affecting both DP controllers.
4.23.3 The operational functionalities of the IJS are not of importance for this DP FMEA.
However, as the IJS can have control of the thrusters, analysis is made of the
effects of failures of the IJS to the operation of the DP Control System.
4.23.4 There is a single cJoy operator terminal; this is mounted in the Wheelhouse at the
Aft Bridge Console. The operator terminal is powered from its junction box.
4.23.5 The operator terminal is fitted with a joystick and buttons for control of the vessel
and a small screen for feedback of the joystick position and thruster feedbacks.
4.24 IJS Operator Terminal Failure Modes & Effects

4.24.1 Failure of the operator terminal while the IJS is in command of the thrusters (not
DP) will result in the thrusters failing to idle.
4.24.2 While in DP mode, failure of the IJS will not affect the operation of the DP Control
System.
DP CONTROL SYSTEM
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5. POWER GENERATION MACHINERY
5.1 General
5.1.1 The vessel is a diesel-electric design; power for the thruster prime movers is
supplied via the 690V switchboard sections. 690V electric power is developed by
four main diesel generators and one auxiliary diesel generator; these are all
located in the Engine Room.
5.1.2 The design of the power generation machinery (and their control hardware) is in-
line with the DP Redundancy Concept as the control hardware is segregated per
diesel generator. Where connections exist between diesel generators, these are
only active when the machines are connected in a load sharing pair.
5.1.3 There is an Emergency Diesel Generator, however during normal DP operations
this is operated in standby and it is not required as part of the DP redundancy
concept.
Following a blackout of the 440V Emergency Switchboard the Emergency Diesel
Generator will start and connect, this is not required for maintenance of position.
The Emergency Generator will not be considered any further in this failure modes
and effects analysis.
5.2 Diesel Generators

5.2.1 During DP operations the five diesel generators will be running and connected to
the 690V switchboards, four are “main” diesel generators and are built by MaK
and one is an “auxiliary” diesel generator built by Caterpillar.
5.2.2 There is an option to operate with only three generators connected to the 690V
switchboards, with the remaining two on standby ready for immediate activation
by the PMS. This option is dependent on weather conditions and cable lay
operations.
5.2.3 The main diesel generators are arranged in pairs, with two powering the Port 690V
Main Switchboard and two powering the Starboard 690V Main Switchboard. In
each diesel generator pair the two engines are different sizes, one diesel generator
is a MaK 6M25 engine with AEM SE710S10 alternator and the other diesel
generator is a MaK 8M25 engine with AEM SE710SA10 alternator.
5.2.4 The auxiliary diesel generator is self-contained, powers the Centre 690V Main
Switchboard and is a Caterpillar 3512C with a Leroy Somer LSA 51.2 S55
alternator.
POWER GENERATION MACHINERY

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 62
5.2.5 The principle information for each of the diesel generators is shown in the following
figure:
DG Engine Alternator Speed Output Rating
1910kW, 2390kVA,
DG1 MaK 6M25 AEM SE710SA10 720rpm
690V, 3ph, 60Hz
2560kW, 3200kVA,
DG2 MaK 8M25 AEM SE710S10 720rpm
690V, 3ph, 60Hz
2560kW, 3200kVA,
DG3 MaK 8M25 AEM SE710S10 720rpm
690V, 3ph, 60Hz
1910kW, 2390kVA,
DG4 MaK 6M25 AEM SE710SA10 720rpm
690V, 3ph, 60Hz
1300kW, 1500kVA,
DG5 Caterpillar 3512C LSA 51.2 S55 720rpm
690V, 3ph, 60Hz
Table 8: Diesel Generator Identification
5.2.6 Control voltage for each of the generator’s breaker is derived internally from the
generator’s 690V output (690V230V) and is not supported by battery systems.
5.3 Diesel Generator Failure Modes & Effects

Main Diesel Generators
5.3.1 Failure (i.e. shutdown) of DG1 will reduce the power available on the Port 690V
Switchboard by 43%, DG2 will ramp to accommodate this; however there may be
load reductions of the consumers of the Port 690V Switchboard.
5.3.2 Failure (i.e. shutdown) of DG2 will reduce the power available on the Port 690V
Switchboard by 57%, DG1 will ramp up to accommodate this; however there may
be load reductions of the consumers of the Port 690V Switchboard.
5.3.3 Failure (i.e. shutdown) of DG3 will reduce the power available on the Starboard
690V Switchboard by 57%, DG4 will ramp to accommodate this; however there
may be load reductions of the consumers of the Starboard 690V Switchboard.
5.3.4 Failure (i.e. shutdown) of DG4 will reduce the power available on the Starboard
690V Switchboard by 43%, DG3 will ramp to accommodate this; however there
may be load reductions of the consumers of the Starboard 690V Switchboard.
Auxiliary Diesel Generator
5.3.5 Failure (i.e. shutdown) of DG5 will fail the power supply to the Centre 690V
Switchboard, this will cause the Bow Azimuth Thruster to fail. The other thrusters
will ramp to accommodate the reduction in available thrust; this is equivalent to
the WCFDI.
POWER GENERATION MACHINERY

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6. POWER DISTRIBUTION
6.1 General
6.1.1 The primary distribution of the vessel is 690VAC, 3Ph, 60Hz, this is divided into
three sections; Port, Centre and Starboard. The 690V Main Switchboard DP design
intent is to operate the switchboard in a split bus configuration with the 690V
switchboard bus ties open.
6.1.2 The design of the power distribution is in-line with the DP Redundancy Concept as
the distribution boards and consumers are segregated per redundancy group. This
is achieved by operating in a split bus configuration and by segregation of
consumers.
6.1.3 Each 690V switchboard supports one 440V main switchboard and (Port and
Starboard only) one 230V switchboard for the low voltage distributions. The 440V
Emergency Switchboard is normally powered from the Starboard 440V Main
Switchboard. There are five 230V UPS and seven 24VDC systems; these are
charged from the low voltage distributions.
6.1.4 The principle power distribution of the vessel is illustrated in the following figure:
DG1 DG2 DG5 DG3 DG4
690V 10P-PS 10P-M 10P-SB
SAT BTT BTT SAT

BAT
Port Fwd Aft St bd
10T1 10T3 10T2 EDG
440V 10P10 10P90 10P20 12EP
11T1 11T2 13T1
230V 11L1 11L2 13EL
FIGURE 16: POWER DISTRIBUTION OVERVIEW
POWER DISTRIBUTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 64
6.2 690V Distribution
6.2.1 The 690V distribution is divided in to three parts; Port, Centre and Starboard. The
Port and Starboard sections are each powered from two diesel generators (Port:
DG1 & DG2, Starboard: DG3 & DG4), the Centre section is powered from a single
diesel generator (DG5).
6.2.2 During DP operations, these three sections will be operated split, i.e. open bus.
6.3 690V Distribution Failure Modes & Effects

6.3.1 A switchboard can fail for various reasons, such as a short circuit (phase-to-phase
fault), an earth fault or a 24VDC control voltage failure. When operating with open
690V bus tie breakers, this failure will be limited to the loss of one 690V
switchboard section only.
The PMS and DP system will monitor the healthy switchboard and thruster loading
and will prevent a black out condition due to overloading.
6.3.2 The malfunction of a single diesel engine, alternator or generator circuit breaker
will lead to that diesel generator tripping the faulty unit from the 690V main
switchboard section and a reduction in the power available for DP.
6.3.3 The failure of a generator AVR voltage sensing circuit will lead to an unacceptable
increase in bus voltage, this will result in a trip of the affected (local) generator
and consumer breakers.
6.3.4 It is possible that a breaker (all types) cannot be automatically disconnected from
the switchboard due to a mechanical failure of the breaker or failure of the opening
control circuit. The failure can go undetected and the operator will not be aware
that the protection is unavailable when needed. Failure of a single breaker can
equal the WCFDI as it may require the switchboard section power to be removed
to allow the faulty breaker to be manually retracted.
During DP operations, the main bus bar breakers are operated open to prevent
fault transfer between Port, Centre and Starboard switchboards.
Port 690V Main Switchboard
6.3.5 Failure (partial blackout) of the Port 690V Main Switchboard (10P-PS) will fail the
Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Port, this is
equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent. The remaining thrusters will
ramp load to maintain position, there will be sufficient power available on the
remaining switchboards to meet this demand.
6.3.6 The power supply to the Port 440V MSB (via 690V/440V Transformer 10T1) will
be failed, this will cause a loss of consumers as outlined in Section 6.5, these
failure effects will not affect any of the remaining running thrusters and hence the
Worst Case Failure Design Intent will not be exceeded.
6.3.7 The failure will also fail the power supply to two LO purifiers and a single FO
separator, this will not affect the operation of the Centre and Starboard machinery.
Centre 690V Main Switchboard
6.3.8 Failure (partial blackout) of the Centre 690V Main Switchboard (10P-M) will fail
the Bow Azimuth Thruster, this is equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design
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Intent. The remaining thrusters will ramp load to maintain position, there will be
sufficient power available on the remaining switchboards to meet this demand.
6.3.9 The power supply to the Centre 440V MSB (via 690V/440V Transformer 10T3) will
be failed, this will cause a loss of consumers as outlined in Section 6.5, these
Starboard 690V Main Switchboard
6.3.10 Failure (partial blackout) of the Starboard 690V Main Switchboard (10P-SB) will
fail the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft and the Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard, this is
equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent. The remaining thrusters will
ramp load to maintain position, there will be sufficient power available on the
remaining switchboards to meet this demand.
6.3.11 The power supply to the Starboard 440V MSB (via 690V/440V Transformer 10T2)
will be failed, this will cause a loss of consumers as outlined in Section 6.5, these
6.3.12 The failure will also fail the power supply to two LO purifiers and a single FO
separator, this will not affect the operation of the Port and Centre machinery

6.4.1 There are four primary 440V distributions, three relate to supporting the Port,
Centre and Starboard machinery and the fourth relates to the Emergency
distribution.
6.4.2 The three main 440V distributions are derived from the 690V distributions by
690V/440V transformers (one Port, one Centre and one Starboard). There are
cross connections available between the Port and Starboard 440V main
switchboards, but these are not used during DP, i.e. they are operated split.
6.4.3 The 440V Emergency Switchboard can be powered from the Emergency Generator
or via a connection from the Starboard 440V Main Switchboard (10P20). During
DP operations, the 440V Emergency Switchboard will be powered from the
Starboard 440V Main Switchboard (10P20) and the Emergency Generator will be
maintained in a standby condition.

6.5.1 Failure of a 690V/440V main transformer or associated breaker would result in the
loss of power to the appropriate 440V switchboard and subsequently the services
supplied from that switchboard (including 230V distributions). The 440V
switchboard supplies a number of consumers that provide crucial services required
for DP operations, such as cooling pumps.
6.5.2 Failure of the Port 440V Main Switchboard (10P10) can be caused by supply failure
(supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or following local
electrical fault. The failure will affect auxiliary systems supporting the Port power
generation machinery (DG1 & DG2), Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward and Stern
POWER DISTRIBUTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 66
Azimuth Thruster Port. This will cause failure effects equivalent to the Worst Case
Failure Design Intent.
Centre 440V Main Switchboard
6.5.3 Failure of the Centre 440V Main Switchboard (10P90) can be caused by supply
failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or following local
electrical fault. The failure will affect the auxiliary systems supporting DG5 and
the Bow Azimuth Thruster. This will cause failure effects equivalent to the Worst
Case Failure Design Intent.
6.5.4 Failure of the Starboard 440V Main Switchboard (10P20) can be caused by supply
failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or following local
electrical fault. The failure will affect the auxiliary systems supporting the
Starboard power generation machinery (DG3 & DG4), Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft
and Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard. This will cause failure effects equivalent
to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent.
440V Emergency Switchboard
6.5.5 Failure of the 440V Emergency Switchboard (12EP) by itself can be caused by
supply failure (supply breaker, transformer or higher distribution failure) or
following local electrical fault. The failure will affect emergency systems required
in case of blackout recovery.
6.5.6 The Emergency Diesel Generator will start upon detection of the blackout on the
440V Emergency Switchboard and attempt to connect. The start or connection of
the Emergency Diesel Generator has no implication on DP.

6.6.1 There are three primary 230V distributions, two relate to supporting the Port and
Starboard machinery and the third relates to the Emergency distribution.
6.6.2 The two main 230V distributions are derived from the 440V distributions by
440V/230V transformers (one Port and one Starboard). There are cross
connections available between the Port and Starboard 230V main switchboards,
but these are not used during DP, i.e. they are operated split.
6.6.3 The 230V Emergency Switchboard is powered from the 440V Emergency
Switchboard via 440V/230V Transformer (13T1).

6.7.1 Failure of the Port 230V Main Switchboard (11L1) will cause loss of; 14BCH11,
14BCH31, 14BCH51, BAT VFD Auxiliary Supply, BTT Forward VFD Auxiliary Supply
& SAT Port VFD Auxiliary Supply. DP UPS 1 will fail to battery backup. Two
thrusters will be failed (BTT Forward & SAT Port) as the auxiliary supply to their
VFDs trip. This failure is equivalent to the WCFDI.
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6.7.2 Failure of the Starboard 230V Main Switchboard (11L2) will cause loss of;
14BCH21, 14BCH41, 14BCH61, BTT Aft VFD Auxiliary Supply & SAT Starboard VFD
Auxiliary Supply. DP UPS 2 will fail to battery backup. Two thrusters will be failed
(BTT Aft & SAT Starboard) as the auxiliary supply to their VFDs trip. This failure
is equivalent to the WCFDI.
230V Emergency Switchboard
6.7.3 Failure of the 230V Emergency Switchboard will cause loss of; 14BCH12,
14BCH22, 14BCH32, 14BCH42, 14BCH52, 14BCH62 & 14BCH72. All 24VDC
systems dual charged and battery supported. All thrusters and main machinery
will remain running, with no effect to positioning.
POWER DISTRIBUTION
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 68
7. POWER MANAGEMENT
7.1 General
7.1.1 All automation functions are governed by a distributed hardware networked
remote control system. This system contains functions for power management
and remote control, alarm and monitoring of machinery.
7.1.2 The primary functions of the automation system are:
 Diesel generator & power plant monitoring
 Power management functions
 Automatic & manual remote control of connected machinery.
7.1.3 The power management system consists of three controllers each governing one
section of the 690V main switchboard (Port, Centre and Starboard).
7.1.4 The power management system is assisted at a local level (i.e. per main diesel
generator) by each engine’s governor, LESS and each generator’s AVR and PPU.
7.1.5 Load share is normally executed by each engine’s governor; load share is
isochronous between the main diesel generators (DG1 & DG2 and DG3 & DG4),
or each of the relevant Bus-Bars when powered by only one engine with the other
on standby for direct activation by the PMS. If the system is operated in PMS droop
mode, the load share is controlled for all engines from the Deif PPU.
Synchronisation of a diesel generator to a switchboard is provided by the Deif PPU.
7.1.6 The primary functions of the power management system are:
 Switchboard Mode Selection
 Generator start/stop control
 Blackout prevention
 Blackout recovery.
7.2 Switchboard Mode Selection

7.2.1 Configuration of the 690V switchboard can be controlled remotely via the
automation system; the switchboard can be selected into one of three operational
modes:
 Semi-Auto
 Auto
 DP.
7.2.2 During DP operations, the switchboard will be operated in “DP” mode (as described
in the FMEA analysis). “DP” mode is defined in the PMS as the following:
“The bus tie 440VAC must be open and at least one bus tie 690VAC must be open.
Generators are automatically connected depending on the requested power and
priority. Generators will not be automatically disconnected. When there is a
request from a heavy consumer and there is not enough power available, the next
generator will be connected.”
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7.2.3 The switchboard configuration of the vessel when conducting DP operations is
normally identified as the following;
 Switchboard selected to “DP” mode
 Bus Tie 1 (TB1) open between Port 690V MSB & Centre 690V MSB
AND/OR
Bus Tie 2 (TB2) open between Centre 690V MSB & Starboard 690V MSB
 DG1 & DG2 running & connected to the Port 690V MSB
 DG3 & DG4 running & connected to the Starboard 690V MSB
 DG5 running & connected to the Centre 690V MSB.
Extensive load tests were successfully carried out on the effects of carrying out
DP operations with one engine online for each of the Port and Starboard
Switchboards, with the remaining engines on standby for direct activation by the
PMS. This DP operation would be subject to weather conditions and cable lay
operations. The switchboard configuration for Port and Starboard would then be
identified as the following:
 DG1 running and connected to the Port 690V MSB, DG2 on standby
 DG3 running and connected to the Starboard 690V MSB, DG4 on standby
 DG5 running and connected to the Centre 690V MSB
The FMEA considers both 690V bus ties to be open, i.e. OPEN BUS Mode. This is
to demonstrate the independence of each of the three redundancy groups.
7.2.4 The Worst Case Failure Design Intent (WCFDI) of this vessel when operated in
OPEN BUS Mode is for failure of one 690V main switchboard (Port, Centre or
Starboard). This will cause either the failure of one bow tunnel thruster and one
stern azimuth thruster or (in the case of failure of the Centre 690V Main
Switchboard) the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster.
GM has no objection (provided that there are suitable DP capability plots) to
operating the vessel in configurations where two independent redundancy groups
are operated combined, these are:
 SPLIT BUS Mode 1; the 690V switchboard is operated in two sections, [Port
& Centre] and [Starboard].
 SPLIT BUS Mode 2; the 690V switchboard is operated in two sections, [Port]
and [Centre & Starboard].
 SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 1; the 690V switchboard is operated in two
sections, [Port & Centre] and [Starboard], DG5 and BAT are not in use.
 SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 2; the 690V switchboard is operated in two
sections, [Port & Centre] and [Starboard], DG5 and BAT are not in use.
The DP Capability of the vessel will be dependent on the configuration used, as
the vessel’s WCFDI will vary for each of these modes:
 SPLIT BUS Mode 1; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for failure of
both the Port 690V Main Switchboard and Centre 690V Main Switchboard.
This will cause the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster, Bow Tunnel Thruster
Forward and Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
 SPLIT BUS Mode 2; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for failure of
both the Centre 690V Main Switchboard and Starboard 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster, Bow
Tunnel Thruster Aft and Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
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 SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 1; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for
failure of both the Port 690V Main Switchboard and Centre 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward
and Stern Azimuth Thruster Port.
 SHALLOW DRAUGHT Mode 2; the WCFDI of this vessel in this mode is for
failure of both the Centre 690V Main Switchboard and Starboard 690V Main
Switchboard. This will cause the failure of the Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft and
Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard.
7.2.5 Selection of the in use switchboard mode is operator selectable via the automation
system workstations.
Selection of “Auto” mode will not have an immediate effect; however, the
restrictions to closing the bus tie breakers will be removed. If one or both 690V
bus ties close, the load sharing mode will be switched to governor droop as there
are no isochronous load share lines for DG5. The load dependant stop function of
diesel generators is enabled.
Selection of “Semi-auto” mode will not have an immediate effect; however, the
restrictions to closing the bus tie breakers will be removed. If one or both 690V
bus ties close, the load sharing mode will be switched to governor droop as there
are no isochronous load share lines for DG5.
Selection of either “Auto” or “Semi-auto” mode will not cause any immediate
change in the switchboard’s configuration, however, restrictions for the operator
changing the switchboard configuration will be removed, which in turn may reduce
the power available to the thrusters and permit failure modes which could exceed
the Worst Case Failure Design Intent (e.g. total blackout from a closed bus
configuration).
7.3 Generator Start/Stop Control

7.3.1 The PMS is configured to command and execute (with the local control equipment)
the starting and stopping of diesel generators in response to predetermined
settings.
7.3.2 A diesel generator can be started in response to an automation system operator’s
command, as a result of insufficient power available on the switchboard (a load
dependant start request) or because another diesel generator is being pre-
emptively shutdown.
The next diesel generator to be started will be the diesel generator with the highest
priority number (a user selectable value) which is available and can be connected
to the desired switchboard section.
7.3.3 The diesel generators can be remotely stopped by the PMS, this can be in response
to an operator’s command, as a result of excess power available on the
switchboard (a load dependant stop request) or because of an identified fault
condition requiring shutdown.
In a DP context, the switchboard is operated in “DP” mode, this will prevent the
operation of the load dependant stop logic (which is only active in “Auto” mode).
The PMS will not prevent the operator from shutting down a diesel generator nor
action following a safety shutdown condition.
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7.4 Blackout Prevention
7.4.1 The blackout prevention system is provided to prevent the vessel from suffering a
total blackout as a result of the load demanded of a switchboard section exceeding
the available power.
If the system did not have this functionality, the resulting frequency drop and then
breaker trips could cause one or all parts of the 690V main switchboards to black
out.
7.4.2 When operating in DP mode, it is anticipated that there will be enough spinning
reserve to maintain power on two 690V switchboard sections following the loss of
one third of the power generation for the vessel (Worst Case Failure Design
Intent).
Transitioning from the intact situation to the degraded situation may pose risks to
the healthy switchboard sides, as they will be suddenly heavily loaded. The
blackout prevention logic will assist during such a failure by reducing the load
demand from the thrusters and other heavy consumers (the MaK engines are
arranged to give a pre-trip warning).
7.4.3 The blackout prevention logic is provided at the expense of position keeping as it
functions by ultimately reducing the thrust available to the vessel. This may cause
a small loss of position (drift off); however, this can then be recovered. This is
regarded as more advantageous than a blackout, where the loss of position will
be greater.
7.4.4 The PMS executes some of the blackout prevention barriers arranged to protect
the vessel’s power systems. The blackout prevention barriers arranged for the
vessel’s power systems are:
 Non-Preferential Consumer Tripping
 PMS Thruster Power Limitation
 PMS Thruster Power Limitation (Fast)
 DP Thruster Power Chop
 Local Thruster VFD Phase Back.
7.4.5 Non-preferential consumer tripping is arranged to reduce the load on a
switchboard by the trip of non-essential/preferential consumers. This logic is
triggered if the used generator power is greater than 105% for more than 20s or
bus bar frequency is less than 55Hz for more than 2s.
The nominated consumers to be tripped are:
 Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward Noise Reduction Air Injection System
 Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft Noise Reduction Air Injection System
 Auxiliary Deck Crane
 Engine Room Chiller 1
 Engine Room Chiller 2
 Ballast Water Treatment Systems
 50% of crane supply
 Trencher
These consumers are not essential for operation of the power generation
machinery or the thrusters. Operation of the non-essential trip function will not
affect operation of the DP Control System.
7.4.6 The PMS calculates the available power for the thrusters per connected
switchboard section (the difference between the kW power generated and the kW
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power consumed by non-thrusters), this value is fed to each local thruster drive
to set the maximum demand the drive can make of the switchboard section. In
the case of a reduction of the generating power (e.g. following a diesel generator
trip) the power available signal fed to the thrusters on the affected switchboard
section will be reduced. This may (depending on thruster load) cause a reduction
in the thruster rpm output.
This function is similar to the action of the DP Power Chop.
7.4.7 The PMS will apply a fast power limitation immediately following trip of a generator
breaker or a bus tie breaker or following receipt of a “generator shutdown delay
1s” signal. The PMS will reduce the “power available for thrust” signal to 10% for
all thrusters per connected switchboard section.
The limitation will remain active until after 1s of normal operation.
7.4.8 The DP control system will execute a reduction in the rpm command signal (DP
Power Chop) to all thrusters on a connected switchboard section when the thruster
load is (instantaneously) greater than a predetermined percentage of the
calculated available power (set to 98% of power available).
The calculation of power available is performed by the DP control system utilising
information on the switchboard configuration (generator and bus tie status), the
measured kW load per switchboard section and the rated loads for each of the
diesel generators.
This function is similar to the action of the PMS reduction in power available.
7.4.9 Upon a measured rapid drop in frequency (currently set to if the measured
frequency is below 55Hz) the thruster’s VFD will phase back to 10% of the
thrusters rated load. This function is independent of the PMS. The limitation will
remain active until after 10s of normal operation.
7.5 Blackout Recovery

7.5.1 In the case of a detected blackout on a switchboard section, the automation
system will assist the operator to recover the vessel. The blackout recovery
procedure is identified below:
1) 690V bus ties will be opened & 440V Bus Tie will be opened upon detection of
a blackout condition.
2) All standby diesel generators (if ready) are to be commanded to start.
3) The first available generator per switchboard section is to be connected to
energise the bus.
4) Once each 690V switchboard section is energised, the respective 690V/440V
transformer is to be connected to restore the 440V power distribution.
5) Thruster auxiliaries (LO pumps and steering systems) will recover following
restoration of the 440V power distribution.
Thruster restart and selection into DP is manual, by the operator. Once the
thruster auxiliaries are available/running the thruster will be ready to start, the
operator then must start the thruster and then select it back into DP.
7.5.2 In the event of a total blackout (in excess of the Worst Case Failure Design Intent),
this procedure is performed in parallel on each of the three 690V main switchboard
POWER MANAGEMENT
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sections. The system will not attempt to close the breakers between the 690V
main switchboard sections.
7.5.3 In the event of a blackout of the power supply to the 440V Emergency
Switchboard, the Emergency Generator is started. A typical time for start and
connect of the Emergency Generator is forty-five seconds.
Power to the 440V Emergency Switchboard is not essential for DP operations.
7.5.4 It should be considered that blackout on a single 690V main switchboard section
(partial blackout) is equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent. Recovery
from this state is not required for the vessel to maintain position (if operated
correctly and in conditions which do not exceed the vessel’s capability after the
Worst Case Failure Design Intent).
7.5.5 Failure of any part of the blackout recovery system may prevent the vessel from
recovering from a partial blackout. As the partial blackout state is the Worst Case
Failure Design Intent, this is not critical for station keeping.
POWER MANAGEMENT
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8. THRUSTERS AND PROPULSION
8.1 General
8.1.1 The vessel is equipped with five thrusters, there are three thrusters at the bow
(one retractable azimuth thruster and two tunnel thrusters) and there are two
azimuth thrusters at the stern. This is indicated in the following figure and table:
Port MSB
BTT BTT
SAT Port
BAT
Aft Fwd
Centre MSB
SAT
Starboard
Starboard MSB
Figure 17: THRUSTER POSITIONS
Thruster Type VFD Rating

Bow Azimuth Thruster Schottel SRP 1012 Vacon NXP 1000kW
Bow Tunnel Thruster Forward Berg BTT 552 Vacon NXP 1000kW
Bow Tunnel Thruster Aft Berg BTT 552 Vacon NXP 1000kW
Stern Azimuth Thruster Port Berg BAT 626 Vacon NXP 2100kW
Stern Azimuth Thruster Starboard Berg BAT 626 Vacon NXP 2100kW
Table 9: THRUSTER IDENTIFICATION
8.1.2 In general each thruster is independent, therefore failures to a single thruster will
not affect the other thrusters (except for an increase/change in thruster demand
to maintain station keeping).
8.1.3 DP rules require analysis of the failure behaviour of each thruster to ensure that a
thruster does not fail to full thrust nor to an unpredictable azimuth (where
relevant).
8.1.4 All thrusters are fitted with fixed pitch propellers and are driven by variable speed
(frequency) drives. The primary power supply to each thruster derives from the
690V distribution.
8.1.5 The lubrication and hydraulic systems for each thruster are independent to the
thruster. The bow tunnel thrusters each have a single hydraulic lubrication
system. The Bow Azimuth Thruster has a hydraulic lubrication system and
hydraulic steering gear, the two stern azimuth thrusters each have a hydraulic
lubrication system and two steering gear motors.
THRUSTERS AND PROPULSION

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8.2 Mode Selector Switch
8.2.1 The command mode of all thrusters is switched between DP, IJS, Autopilot and
Manual Lever FU Remote Control at the Mode Selection Switch.
8.2.2 The switch is provided with 24VDC from the local operator station (DP OS 1) and
is configured to route switch position to each of the five thrusters, there are
separate contacts for each thruster.
The selector switch is covered to prevent acts of inadvertent mal-operation
changing the mode of thruster operation.
8.2.3 NFU control mode is done on each of the stern azimuth thruster’s manual lever
panels (in the Wheelhouse or in the ECR) or on the local control panel at each
thruster. Selection of NFU mode will override any previously selected control mode
of the thruster and the thruster will be lost from DP control.
8.3 Thruster Control System Failure Modes & Effects

Bow Azimuth Thruster
8.3.1 Failure of the 440V power supply to the Bow Azimuth Thruster’s Switch Box Unit
will raise an alarm; however, the operation of the Bow Azimuth Thruster will not
be affected, as the thruster’s control cabinet is also supplied with 24VDC from a
24VDC source.
8.3.2 Failure of the 24VDC power supply to the Bow Azimuth Thruster’s Switch Box Unit
will raise an alarm; however, the operation of the Bow Azimuth Thruster will not
be affected, as the thruster’s control cabinet is also supplied with 24VDC from the
440V input.
8.3.3 Failure of the 230V power supply to the Bow Azimuth Thruster’s Switch Box Unit
will not have an effect as this supply is provided for service use only.
8.3.4 Total failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster’s Control Cabinet (caused by failure of
both 24VDC power supplies, internal power distribution fault or following failure of
the single controller, will cause the thruster to be failed. The thruster will be
deselected from DP and the thruster will fail to zero RPM. Failure of the Bow
Azimuth Thruster from DP is equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design Intent
(WCFDI).
8.3.5 Overvoltage or overcurrent on one of the supplying 440V or 24VDC distributions
has the potential to damage the control cabinet causing failure of the unit’s internal
power distribution, the effects of this are as described previously.
8.3.6 Failure of the RPM command signal from DPC-21 to BAT Control Cabinet will raise
an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail the ready signal
for DP and the thruster will be deselected. The DP Control System will remain
operating with the remaining thrusters at the WCFDI state.
8.3.7 Failure of the RPM command signal from BAT Control Cabinet to the thruster’s VFD
will raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail the
ready signal for DP and the thruster will be deselected. The DP Control System
will remain operating with the remaining thrusters at the WCFDI state.
8.3.8 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from the thruster’s VFD to the BAT Control
Cabinet will raise an alarm, however the thruster will remain running and selected
into DP (following the RPM command signal) in a form of non-follow up control.

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8.3.9 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from BAT Control Cabinet to DPC-21 will raise
an alarm, however the thruster will remain running and selected into DP (following
the RPM command signal) in a form of non-follow up control.
8.3.10 Failure of the azimuth command signal from DPC-21 to BAT Control Cabinet will
raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail the ready
signal for DP and the thruster will be deselected. The DP Control System will
remain operating with the remaining thrusters at the WCFDI state.
8.3.11 Failure of the azimuth turn command signal (CW or CCW) from BAT Control
Cabinet to the thruster’s steering VFD unit will raise an alarm and cause the
thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail the ready signal for DP and the thruster
will be deselected. The DP Control System will remain operating with the
remaining thrusters at the WCFDI state.
8.3.12 Failure of the azimuth feedback signal from the thruster’s turning position sensor
to BAT Control Cabinet will raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle
speed. This will fail the ready signal for DP and the thruster will be deselected.
The DP Control System will remain operating with the remaining thrusters at the
WCFDI state.
8.3.13 Failure of the azimuth feedback signal from BAT Control Cabinet to DPC-21 will
raise an alarm, however the thruster will remain running and selected into DP
(following the azimuth command signal) in a form of non-follow up control.
8.3.14 Failure of the ready signal for DP, because of a connection fault or because of a
fault condition detected by the thruster controller; will cause the thruster to be
deselected from DP and the thruster speed command will be forced to zero RPM.
Failure of the Bow Azimuth Thruster from DP is equivalent to the Worst Case
Failure Design Intent (WCFDI).
Bow Tunnel Thrusters
8.3.15 Failure of a 24VDC power supply to a bow tunnel thruster’s central unit will raise
an alarm; however, the operation of the thruster itself will not be affected as the
thruster’s control cabinet is dual supplied.
8.3.16 Total failure of a tunnel thruster’s central unit caused by failure of both 24VDC
power supplies, internal power distribution fault or following failure of the single
controller, will cause the thruster to be failed. The thruster will be deselected from
DP and the thruster will fail to zero RPM.
8.3.17 Overvoltage or overcurrent on one of the supplying 24VDC distributions has the
potential to damage the central unit causing failure of the unit’s internal power
distribution, the effects of this are as described previously.
8.3.18 Failure of the RPM command signal from DPC-21 to the thruster’s central unit will
remain operating with the remaining thrusters.
8.3.19 Failure of the RPM command signal from the thruster’s central unit to the thruster’s
VFD will raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail
the ready signal for DP and the thruster will be deselected. The DP Control System
will remain operating with the remaining thrusters.
8.3.20 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from the thruster’s VFD to the thruster’s central
unit will raise an alarm and the thruster ready signal for DP will be failed. The

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thruster will fail to idle RPM. The DP Control System will remain operating with
the remaining thrusters.
8.3.21 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from the thruster’s central unit to DPC-21 will
raise an alarm, however the thruster will remain running and selected into DP
(following the RPM command signal) in a form of non-follow up control.
Failure of the ready signal for DP, because of a connection fault or because of a
deselected from DP and the thruster speed command will be forced to zero.
Stern Azimuth Thrusters
8.3.22 Failure of a 24VDC power supply (power supply A or B) to a stern azimuth
thruster’s central unit will raise an alarm, however the operation of the thruster
itself will not be affected, as the thruster control cabinet is dual supplied.
8.3.23 Total failure of a stern azimuth thruster’s central unit (caused by failure of both
24VDC power supplies, internal power distribution fault or following failure of both
controllers, will cause the thruster to be failed. The thruster will be deselected
from DP and the thruster will fail to zero RPM.
8.3.24 Overvoltage or overcurrent on one of the supplying 24VDC distributions has the
potential to damage the central unit causing failure of the unit’s internal power
distribution, the effects of this are as described previously.
8.3.25 Failure of a single thruster controller within the central unit will raise an alarm;
however, the operation of the stern azimuth thruster’s control system will be
unaffected as the controllers are arranged in a redundant pair (master/slave).
If the failed controller was designated as ‘master’, then the ‘slave’ controller will
assume command of the thruster.
If the failed controller was designated as ‘slave’, then the ‘master’ controller will
maintain command of the thruster.
8.3.26 Failure of the interface unit following internal power supply failure will fail the
communication between the DP Control System and the thruster controller. The
thruster will be deselected from DP and the thruster will fail to zero RPM.
8.3.27 Failure of Bus A or Bus B linking the interface unit with the central unit will raise
an alarm locally on the Berg control panels; however, the operation of the thruster
in DP will not be affected.
8.3.28 Failure of the RPM command signal from DPC-21 to the thruster’s interface unit
will raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will fail the
ready signal for DP and the thruster will be deselected. The DP Control System
8.3.29 Failure of the RPM command signal from the thruster’s central unit to the thruster’s
VFD will raise an alarm and cause the thruster to fail to idle speed. This will raise
a prediction error in DP as the ready signal is maintained. The DP Control System
8.3.30 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from the thruster’s VFD to the thruster’s central

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8.3.31 Failure of the RPM feedback signal from the thruster’s interface unit to DPC-21 will
remain operating with the remaining thrusters.
8.3.32 Failure of the azimuth command signal from DPC-21 to the thruster’s interface
8.3.33 Failure of the azimuth turn command signal (CW or CCW) from the thruster’s
central unit to one thruster’s steering VFD (A/B) will raise an alarm and the
steering VFD will only be able to turn in the opposite direction to the failed signal
(i.e. CCW or CW), the other 100% steering VFD will be unaffected.
8.3.34 Failure of the azimuth feedback signal (A or B) from the thruster’s turning position
sensor (A or B) to the thruster’s central unit will raise an alarm (if the signal was
for the ‘master’ controller and the system will changeover to use the other
controller and turning position sensor input (B or A). The thruster will remain
operating in DP mode.
If the signal was failed for the standby steering system, then there would be no
alarm, however there would be no effect to the operation of the in service steering
system.
8.3.35 Failure of the azimuth feedback signal from the thruster’s interface unit to DPC-
21 will raise an alarm, however the thruster will remain running and selected into
DP (following the azimuth command signal) in a form of non-follow up control.
8.3.36 Failure of the ready signal for DP, because of a connection fault or because of a
deselected from DP and the thruster speed command will be forced to zero.
8.3.37 Failure of the power supply (power supply C) or internal failure of a stern azimuth
thruster’s local control unit will not have an effect on the thruster’s operation in
DP as the local control unit is provided for local NFU control.
8.4 Thruster Emergency Stops

8.4.1 Each thruster is provided with emergency stop buttons, these are arranged to shut
down the thruster as required. There are six emergency stop buttons per thruster
(except for the Bow Azimuth Thruster which only has five), these are located in
the following positions;
 Thruster Drive Panel
 ECR Console (40DE)
 Wheelhouse Console Aft (43DA)
 Wheelhouse Console Aft (42DF) (except BAT)
 Wheelhouse Bridge Wing Port (44DP)
 Wheelhouse Bridge Wing Starboard (45DS)
8.4.2 Each emergency stop is configured to break the emergency stop loop (24VDC),
i.e. all are normally closed contacts (NC).

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8.5 Thruster Emergency Stop Failure Modes & Effects
8.5.1 Activation of an emergency stop (or a failure where the emergency stop is
activated) will cause the thruster to shut down.
The failure effects will depend on which thruster is failed. Shutdown of the Bow
Azimuth Thruster will result in a failure equivalent to the Worst Case Failure Design
Intent. Shutdown of another thruster (bow tunnel thruster or stern azimuth) will
result in a reduction in thruster capacity for the vessel.
In all cases, the remaining thrusters will ramp to accommodate the change in
thruster allocation.
8.5.2 Wire break of the emergency stop circuit will cause the affected thruster to be shut
down.

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9. ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITY
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 Cable-lay operations from a DP mono-hull unit require specialised techniques and
the close co-operation between all departments. All personnel should be aware of
their own responsibilities and duties. These may be different from those on other
vessels.
9.1.2 It is the responsibility of Van Oord SMD to ensure that there is a competent crew
on board the vessel to enable DP operations to be carried out safe.
9.1.3 This manual is to be read in conjunction with the company Safety Management
System (SMS) documentation XXXX_XX with particular reference to:-
 SMS Safety and Environmental Policies
 SMS Company Responsibilities and Authority
 SMS Master’s Responsibility and Authority
 SMS Shipboard Operations Plans
 SMS Emergency Preparedness
 SMS Maintenance of Vessel and Equipment.
9.2 Organisation
9.2.1 The following chart illustrates the lines of responsibility and communication which
are applicable to the DP operation of the vessel. A solid line indicates a line of
responsibility. A dashed line between positions indicates a line of communication.
ORGANISATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

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9.2.2 Van Oord recruitment and training procedures are to ensure that there is a
competent crew on board the vessel to enable DP operations to be carried out
safely. It is the responsibility of the Master to inform the Company if shortcomings
are found. Van Oord exercises that responsibility according to the regulations
relating to certification on merchant vessels, as published under STCW ’95 and
also with regards to IMCA and Industry guidelines for DP Vessel Operations.
9.3.1 The general responsibilities for key employees with regard to DP operations are
outlined below:
The Master
9.3.2 He has the overall responsibility for the safety of the personnel and of the unit.
He is also the ultimate authority on all matters relating to the DP systems and
must be kept informed of any significant changes in operations or equipment
status. In this respect, he is responsible for a proper implementation of the Work
Permit System to cover all unplanned maintenance. In any case, any routine and
extraordinary maintenance interventions related to the DP Systems has to be
assessed for the impact it may have on DP operations and the Master is the final
authority for the corrective actions to be taken.
9.3.3 This does not preclude any competent person from taking immediate action to
protect personnel and equipment without reference to the Master.
9.3.4 Should this be the case, the Master must be informed as soon as possible of the
actions taken and of the present vessel status. The Master reports to the Vessel
Manager and works in close liaison with the Client Rep (if applicable). The Master
must ensure that:
 All key DP personnel are trained, qualified, and competent to carry out their
duties in a safe and efficient manner.
 An induction to the specific nature of vessel operations and an appropriate
period of familiarisation is provided to new comers prior to allowing them to
take independent responsibilities.
 The department heads and supervisors are well informed during the morning
daily meetings and whenever deemed necessary of the DP system status.
 The operation underway at the time and the forthcoming one are covered by
a proper schedule and/or safe job analysis detailing at least the operational
steps, the responsible person for each of them, critical path, expected
duration, check points, communication channels, required equipment and
personnel, the risks involved and relevant contingency plans.
 All personnel involved have understood their role.
 Adequate procedures are in existence to cover the operation underway.
 Whenever deemed appropriate, new procedures are issued to consolidate
the preparatory work performed in advance of special operations.
 A system of written instructions including standing orders, daily orders, and
specific operational procedures in place.
9.3.5 The Master should be a fully trained, qualified, and competent SDPO. His
knowledge and experience should be such as to enable him to perform his
management role i.e. the overall optimisation of the performances of the unit. The
Master directly co-ordinates with the various sections’ heads and closely liaises
with the Project Manager and client (if carried). He should therefore be conversant

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with the DP System and should have a general understanding of the power plant,
power management system, and power distribution system. He should be also
able to appreciate the various operations carried out on the vessel especially in
terms of possible response to emergencies/catastrophic failures that could
potentially be experienced.
9.3.6 The Master is ultimately responsible for the safety of the vessel, all personnel on
board, and the environment. He has the ultimate authority to prevent the start
or order the termination of all operations on grounds of safety to personnel, the
vessel, or the prevention of pollution to the marine environment.
9.3.7 The advice of the Client’s Representative (if applicable) must be taken into
account.
9.3.8 The Master has full practical responsibility for the DP operation of the vessel and
for ensuring that the operating procedures contained in this manual are observed
at all times. When not present on the bridge, the Master should leave clear
instructions as to the conduct of the operations. These instructions should be read
and signed by the relevant personnel.
Senior DP Operator
9.3.9 The Senior DP Operator (SDPO) reports directly to the Master. The SDPO will be
in charge of the bridge. In the absence of the Master from the bridge, he has full
operational authority to exercise the best practices of seamanship to his fullest
potential.
9.3.10 On occasion the Master may relieve the SDPO at the control desk and in this event
the Master becomes the acting SDPO and must fulfil all the requirements of that
position. When a DPO is covering the position, he must work under the direction
of the SDPO. The watch-keeping period is normally 6 hours on the bridge with a
maximum recommended period of two hours in charge of the DP Operating
Station.
9.3.11 Sufficient time must be allowed for the hand over between the incoming and
leaving DP Operators.
9.3.12 The following is a list of duties and requirements, which the DP Operators are to
adhere to in normal DP operations:
 The SDPO has to monitor the operation of the DP Systems which includes
the control desk, the information displayed on the VDUs, the alarm system
printer, position reference and communication equipment.
 The SDPO must comply with all the rules of safe navigation while on watch.
 He is responsible for all VHF voice communications between his own vessel
and other installations in the area (telephone, fax and E-mail are not part of
his scope of work).
 He must not start an operation unless he has obtained permission from the
Master.
 The SDPO must keep the Master informed of any change in the original plan.
 Prior to the vessel approaching its DP position, the SDPO must make sure all
routine maintenance work with relevance to the DP operation has been
completed and tested.

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 At watch hand-over, the oncoming operator must adhere to the following
instructions. (It is to be noted that if a DP operation is in progress it has to
be completed prior to the watch being handed over):
 Check if there are written Master’s orders, and reads and executes
the same.
 Acquaint himself with the position of the vessel relative to any
offshore installation.
 Note the radius of the watch circle in use and the desired position
centre.
 Note the setting limits for position and heading deviation and
maintain the vessel within these limits.
 Acquaint himself with the heading of the vessel relative to the
effects of wind, sea, and current / tide and with respect to the
rotation limits imposed by the operation at the time.
 Check the status of all thrusters.
 Check total power available, machinery room status and that the
vessel set-up is as per the FMEA and other requirements.
 Acquaint himself with all relevant information, and parameters, of
the on-line sensors and check these against the back up sensors.
 Check that the manual manoeuvre back-up system is ready for use
at any time.
 Observe the present weather, and note the past and forecast
weather.
 Acquaint himself with the current and planned operations (including
ROV movements- if carried).
 Check on all present and forthcoming boat and helicopter
movements near the vessel.
 Check the standard of radar picture / reception and note the
parameter settings on the watch keeping monitor.
 Check on current and planned ballast / trim changes, vessel loading,
and stability status.
 Complete and sign the required DP Checklist.
 Have a clear verbal hand-over including an indication when the
watch has been handed over by the duty SDPO and accepted by the
oncoming SDPO.
9.3.13 During the watch the SDPO must:
 Constantly monitor the weather and be aware of changing conditions
 He must read all incoming weather forecasts and inform relevant parties if
there are significant increases forecast
 Communicate to the deck and engine room any relevant information about
weather changes, increased power consumption and relevant operational
changes
 Warn Offshore Construction Manager and Carousel Operator of any
occurrence that might affect operations
 Maintain a good lookout for rain squalls and be aware that they usually bring
a sudden and unpredictable change in wind direction, accompanied by an
equally sudden and substantial increase in wind speed
 Call the Master well in advance of the weather deteriorating such that
discontinuing operations can be considered in good time.

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 Ensure that there is enough power available and thrusters on line to maintain
a safe margin in position keeping capabilities both in the prevailing and
forecast conditions
 Change the heading into the prevailing weather to lower thrust requirements
and to optimise position keeping. Before making any heading alteration and
when the manoeuvre is complete, the SDPO must inform:
 ECR, for possible increased power requirement.
 The client rep (if applicable)
 Other vessels in the vicinity (They should be well clear of the vessel
prior to any heading change)
 When vessels are in the vicinity, the SDPO must communicate with them on
a regular basis and make decisions regarding the suitability of continuing
operations with them
 He must keep the Master, Chief Mate, DPO advised of boat status
 Warn supply boats of the danger to the vessel’s position keeping ability, from
excessive use of their thrusters when manoeuvring alongside
 Record all the heading and position changes and all other relevant
information in the logbook
 Monitor trends with regard to heading and position holding ability.
(These trends may indicate potential problems or a change in environmental
conditions that the operator or client was unaware of)
 Test yellow and red alert alarms (if fitted) and all communication systems
and log both (The alarms must be tested twice per day after the various
departments and engine room have been informed)
 Monitor external and internal communications
 Never leave the DP control desk area when the vessel is on DP until he has
been properly relieved.
DP Operator
9.3.14 The DP Operator (DPO) works under the direction of the SDPO, Chief Mate, and/or
Master. He will be able to operate the DP system and have a good understanding
of the operation, the vessel layout, power status, etc.
9.3.15 He will operate a DP watch together with the SDPO and keep him informed
accordingly. He will both share the watch on the DP desk, preferably one hour at
the desk, and one hour for other duties. In case of high activity both the Senior
DPO and the DPO will be involved in the operation, monitoring the DP desk,
assisting with communications and confirming each other’s actions are in
accordance with safe operating procedures.
9.3.16 His main duties are to assist the SDPO in the safe and efficient running of the DP
control system and general bridge systems.
9.3.17 The DPO shall not be alone at the DP desk until assessed as competent. When on
the DP desk he must confirm all actions with the SDPO before carrying them out.
9.3.18 The DPO shall ensure that he fully understands the IMCA guidelines and shall work
within the requirements both of the IMCA guidelines and the standards laid out in
this manual.
9.3.19 He shall be fully conversant with the contents of the vessel's DP FMEA and
understand the implication of all failure modes on DP Station Keeping.

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Junior DP Operator
9.3.20 A Junior DPO is defined in IMCA guidelines as a trained DP operator who has
completed training to a minimum of Phase 3 as defined by the Nautical Institute.
9.3.21 The Junior DPO should be supervised while on watch by a Senior DPO. The Junior
DPO shall ensure that he fully understands the IMCA guidelines and shall work
within the requirements both of the IMCA Guidelines and of the standards laid out
in this manual.
9.3.22 He/she shall be fully conversant with the contents of the vessel's DP FMEA and
understand the implication of all failure modes on DP Station Keeping
Note: All DP Operators will maintain a personal log of their DP experience (IMCA
logbooks are recommended), which is to be approved by the Master. All DP
operators are required to have their DP training course certificates on board the
vessel.
DP Operator starting his watch
9.3.23 Watch-keepers require full knowledge of the current operations and the status of
all vessel and DP systems. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited
to:
 Current and planned operations
 Master’s orders (night & standing)
 Navigational checks
 Location of the vessel
 Status and performance of the DP system
 Position Reference Systems in use and available
 Location, status of the ROV and any down lines (when applicable)
 Status of generating plant / power distribution, power management systems
and thrusters
 Meteorological / tidal conditions and forecasts
 Internal and external communication checks
 Complete 6hr checklist.
Chief Engineer
9.3.24 The Chief Engineer is responsible to the Master for all aspects of the safe operation
and maintenance of the vessel's machinery and equipment. He is to ensure that
the vessel can maintain DP machinery redundancy at all times when on DP, and is
responsible for ensuring that any degradation or change of status is reported
immediately to the Master and the DPOs.
9.3.25 The Chief Engineer will ensure that:
 The engine room DP checklist is completed prior to commencement of DP
Operations
 The Power Generation and Distribution plant is configured correctly for DP
operations and in accordance with the DP checklist
 He will ensure that no work or maintenance is conducted that could affect
the vessel’s capability during DP Operations
 He will ensure that the Engine Room is properly manned during DP
operations.

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Electrician/ETO
9.3.26 The Electrician/ETO is responsible to the Chief Engineer for maintenance of the
electronic equipment on board, and in particular the upkeep of the vessel's
Dynamic Positioning system. He should have received training, which is specific
to the vessel's Kongsberg K-Pos 21 system. The Electrician should be qualified to
work on the vessel's switchboard and electrical installation.
Watch Keeping Engineer
9.3.27 The Engineer on duty is responsible for the operation and monitoring of the
vessel’s power generation, distribution, auxiliary and propulsion systems. In the
absence of the Chief Engineer he has full operational authority. He shall be aware
of the on-going operation of the vessel, and be aware of all electrical and
mechanical equipment status that may affect this operation. He shall inform the
bridge in the event of any failure or malfunction which has an impact on the vessels
redundancy. He is responsible for the completion of the engine room DP checklists
and reporting their completion to the bridge.
9.3.28 He must keep the SDPO and the Chief Engineer informed of any actual or
anticipated condition which affects, or may affect, the availability or operation of
the Thrusters, generator power or any other sub system necessary for DP
operations.
9.3.29 The duty engineer is responsible for the following:
 Inform the Chief Engineer of any unplanned or unexpected events (e.g.
abnormal changes in machinery behaviour) which may affect a safe/planned
operation and may lead to its termination
 Ensure all routine maintenance work is up to date as much as operations
permit. He shall ensure that people working in the engine room department
do not switch off, bypass, or otherwise work on any DP critical equipment
without a proper risk assessment and work permit in place
 Ensure sufficient power is available at all times and that the DP critical
machinery is configured as per the FMEA and/or ASOG. He shall
communicate to the bridge when he has to start or stop an engine or thruster
 Inform the DPOs on the bridge if the machinery status alters from normal
running, which may have an impact on the vessel’s redundancy or even
cause the termination of the DP operation
 Keep the machinery logbook, planned maintenance system and the oil record
logbook up to date at the end of every watch
 Record all information of relevance to the safe running and DP related
machinery
 Continuously man the ECR when the vessel is under DP control unless he
has been properly relieved or under emergency conditions.
Offshore Construction Manager
9.3.30 The Offshore Construction Manager (OCM) is fully in charge of project and
construction operations on board and will liaise with the Client Representative and
Project Manager.
9.3.31 The OCM coordinates all construction activities with the deck engineer.
9.3.32 When the security of the Nexus, the safety of people on board or the marine
environment is in danger, the OCM shall report to the Vessel Master.

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9.3.33 The OCM ensures that people and materials are deployed effectively within the
scope of the project plan so that project execution can take place correctly, safely
and efficiently, the aim being to achieve the best possible operational result.
9.3.34 Further details and competence requirements as prescribed in the function
profile “Offshore Construction Manager”. For reference, see VO P&O.
9.4 Manning for DP Operations

9.4.1 All personnel will have appropriate training and experience required for their
positions. If these standards cannot be met because of sudden unavailability, the
Master shall take all necessary measures to mitigate the effects of the temporary
shortfall and log the measures taken.
Bridge Manning
9.4.2 When the vessel is in DP mode, two qualified DP officers will be on the bridge at
all times. One will be constantly at the DP console and will concentrate exclusively
on this task. The other officer will handle all navigational and other routine duties.
They will normally change over at one hour intervals, and this should not exceed
2 hours. This is required to reduce the effects of fatigue.
9.4.3 DPO experience should comply with requirements of IMCA document M-117 and
the familiarisation therein serves as a guideline in addition to the companies ISM
documentation. In case of conflicting guidance, the company’s provisions take
precedence. The complete description of required competence and certification
requirements will be based upon IMCA C 002 Rev1 Competence Assurance and
Assessment.
9.4.4 One of the DPOs will be designated the Senior DPO and be in charge of the watch
(Master, Chief Officer ‘or’ senior 2nd Officer). A second Operator will be the junior
DP Operator (2nd or 3rd Officer) and will be capable of taking a shift at the
operating console.
9.4.5 The “On desk” DPO at the console is the active surface co-ordinator of the
operation whilst the vessel is in the DP mode, and as such must remain dedicated
to his responsibilities at the DP console.
9.4.6 On occasions, one of the DPOs might be relieved by the Chief Mate or the Master
who in that case will take the role as SDPO. Sufficient time should be given to
both the Master and the Chief Mate to familiarise themselves before the other DPO
leaves the bridge.
Duration of Bridge Watches
9.4.7 During DP Operations, the duration of watches for the watch-keeping officers shall
not exceed twelve hours continuous watch keeping with normal watch-keeping
arrangements being 12hrs on/off.
9.4.8 The above schedule is to be regarded as a guideline and may be altered by the
Master. However, at all times a minimum of two DP Operators should be on any
shift. Any change of shift will be agreed and authorized by the Master with due
consideration of adequate rest periods between shifts.
Engine Room Manning
9.4.9 The ECR is to be manned at all times by a STCW certified Engineer during DP
Operations. Should a situation arise where there is an indication of a fault or

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abnormality in any of the systems associated with maintaining the vessel in DP
mode, the Bridge must be informed immediately, to determine whether to abort
DP operations. At least one other Engineer should also be on shift in the various
engine room compartments.
9.4.10 In addition, one Electronic Technician / Electrician or Engineer with DP system
training shall be on call 24 hours per day. Either the ETO or the Chief Engineer
shall have attended the DP manufacturer's maintenance course relevant to the DP
equipment on board and have specific experience of the vessel. The ETO or Chief
Engineer shall be competent to work on the main switchboards, the power
distribution, and power management systems.
Duration of Engine Room Watches
9.4.11 The watch keeping officers shall not exceed 12 hours continuous watch keeping,
with an average of 12 hours continuous rest.

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10. FAMILIARISATION, ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING
10.1 Familiarisation
10.1.1 Prior to the clearance as independent DPO, the Master or other qualified person
should ensure that the operator is properly familiarised with the equipment and
the vessel.
10.1.2 The familiarisation should emphasise (not limited to) the following items:
 Ship handling in DP Joystick manual mode
 Vessel propulsion configuration
 DP system reference configuration
 DGPS blind zones if any
 Differential signal antennas blind zones if any
 Communication Bridge / Engine Control Room, Crane and Deck.
10.1.3 The Master is further responsible that DPOs are familiar with following
publications:
 Vessel DP Operation Manual and its checklists.
 Vessel’s FMEA report and last Annual Trials Report.
10.1.4 DPOs should be familiar with and competent in the use of all the manual propulsion
controls such that, in the event of DP Control failure, the DPO can take full control
of the vessel to prevent unnecessary excursion and loss of position.
10.2 Assessment
10.2.1 The assessment process for key DP personnel is meant to be in accordance to the
IMCA C 002 guidelines.
10.2.2 The assessment process is meant to cover knowledge and skill levels in the
position they hold on board.
10.2.3 As a minimum the assessment shall focus on:
 Demonstration of competence
 Knowledge
 Acceptable criteria.
10.3 Training
10.3.1 Training of all DP personnel should be conducted in accordance with the guidelines
set out by IMCA, in their document entitled, “IMCA M117-The Training and
Experience of Key DP Personnel” which is accepted by IMO.
10.3.2 The extent of training and experience necessary for a particular vessel is a matter
for the vessel owner and/or vessel management. Training may take the following
forms:
 Onboard training under the supervision of an experienced operator when on
DP but not when the vessel is operational, for example when vessel is
standing by.
 A shore based training course or courses.
FAMILIARISATION, ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING

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 On board instruction about the particular systems of a vessel from
experienced operators or equipment suppliers.
 A period of supervised operation while the vessel is working (mentoring).
10.3.3 The amount of training and experience necessary for an operator to be a senior
watchkeeper depends on the type of vessel and the risks associated with the
operations to be carried out. Comprehensive records of the training and
experience of key DP personnel should be maintained as part of competence
assurance. These key personnel requiring DP training are generally the same for
all DP vessels namely:
 DPOs and master/OIM
 ECR engineers and chief engineer
 Electrical and electronic engineers.
DP Operators (including the Master of a DP vessel)
10.3.4 The structure of the training programme of the Nautical Institute for DP Operators
(the new scheme come into force January 2015) is divided into four phases as
follows:
 Phase 1 Attendance at a DP induction course at an approved institution,
where the course provides an introduction to the functions and use of a
dynamic positioning system or as a trainee with on board training under the
supervision of an experienced DP Operator.
 Phase 2 Documented practical experience in the use of a DP system(s) on
a DP vessel(s) DP Class 2 / 3 for a minimum period of 30 days as a trainee
DPO.
 Phase 3 Attendance at a simulator course at an approved training
institution, where the course provides training in the use of DP systems
including, simulator exercises, and emergency operations.
(Note: an approved training institution is one which has been accepted by
the industry.)
 Phase 4 Documented confirmation, of six months supervised DP watch
keeping “DP Class 2 vessel” in an approved DP Log Book from the
Master/OIM, showing that the above training programme has been followed,
and completed, will result in the issue of a DP certificate from an approved
body.
Engineers and Electrician
10.3.5 There are no formal DP related training courses for Chief Engineers and other
engineers, but they should attend the recognized DP familiarisation course for the
maker’s equipment on board the vessel. The engineers should understand their
role in the successful DP operations of the vessel.
10.3.6 Vessel owners / operators should always have on board at least one Marine
Engineer or Electrician who has received appropriate training for the DP Control
System and details of such training should be recorded in the DP logbooks.
10.3.7 In addition, personnel related to the specialist nature of the vessel’s work e.g. ROV
operators / crane operators etc., require some basic instruction in the capabilities
and limitations of working on DP.
FAMILIARISATION, ASSESSMENT AND TRAINING

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11. DP OPERATING PROCEDURES
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 The intention of the DP Philosophy guidelines and Operational procedures is to
give the DP operator guidance on how to conduct safe operations.
11.1.2 Nothing in these guidelines and procedures shall be treated as other than a best
practice for a DP operation and shall not over rule the Master’s authority and the
DP operator’s final decision in performing their duty.
11.2 DP Philosophy
11.2.1 The DP philosophy is based on the IMCA guidelines and industry best practise to
archive a safe DP operation.
11.3 List of DP Operational Procedures

Arrival Checks
11.3.1 Arrival checks should be carried out before the vessel comes within 500 meters of
the installation.
11.3.2 The purpose of the arrival checks is to ensure satisfactory operation of the DP
system and should include full functional checks of the operation of the thrusters,
power generation, auto DP and joystick / manual controls.
11.3.3 The checks should also ensure that the DP system is set up correctly for the
appropriate DP capability class, e.g. the bridge manning should be in accordance
with DP capability class requirements.
11.3.4 These checks should be documented and kept on board the vessel and are done
once for each location / operation.
Communications
11.3.5 There should be an effective means of communication between the DP Vessel and
the offshore installation/field controller. In most cases this will be by VHF and will
link the DP control console with appropriate personnel on the installation. These
are likely to be the crane driver, deck foreman and radio room.
11.3.6 Communications should be tested before arrival. There should also be effective
communications between the DP console, the Engine Room, Carousel Operator
and the vessel crew on deck.
Approaching the Installation
11.3.7 The vessel should be manoeuvred at a safe speed when inside 500 meters of the
installation (Wind Turbine or any other structure). The vessel should not approach
the installation unless authorized to do so.
11.3.8 When making a final approach to the installation the vessel should not head
directly towards it. Where a final approach is made to the installation having
conducted DP set up checks, this approach should be conducted on DP or in
manual control using the DP joystick.
DP OPERATING PROCEDURES
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DP Location Setup Checks
11.3.9 Location setup checks should be carried out on every occasion and before the
vessel moves into the final working location.
11.3.10 The principal objectives of these checks are to assess the vessel’s station keeping
performance at the working location and to ensure that the position reference
systems are properly set up.
11.3.11 These checks should be carried out at a safe distance from the installation, in the
region of 50 meters. They should also be carried out, wherever possible, at a
location where, in the event of a loss of thrust, the vessel would drift clear of the
installation. These checks should be documented and kept on board the vessel.
Close Proximity Time
11.3.12 Close proximity time at the working location should be kept to a minimum. The
vessel should only remain in the working location when supply operations are
being carried out.
11.3.13 During periods of inactivity, e.g. when the installation crane is not available for
cargo transfers, the vessel should move a safe distance away from the installation.
11.3.14 Wherever possible, when undertaking hose transfers, sufficient hose length should
be given to allow the vessel to increase the separation distance.
Separation Distance
11.3.15 The separation distance at set up between the vessel and the installation should
be carefully selected.
11.3.16 The distance should be agreed between the vessel and offshore installation before
the start of operations.
11.3.17 The separation distance should take account of the combined movements of the
vessel and the installation, where the installation is not fixed in position
11.3.18 The separation distance should be as large as is attainable in the circumstances,
without adversely affecting the safety of the supply operation.
11.3.19 Wherever possible, such as when hose transfers alone are being carried out,
consideration should be given to maximizing the distance by extending hose
length.
Selecting a Safe Working Location
11.3.20 A safe working location should be selected for every operation. It is safer to work
on the lee side of the installation than on the weather side. It is always preferable
to set up on the lee side.
11.3.21 Other elements to be considered in selecting a safe working location include the
position and reach of the installation cranes, obstructions on the installation and
interaction with installation thrusters.
Safe Working Heading
11.3.22 The most appropriate vessel heading should be selected on the basis that it may
be necessary to make a rapid escape from the installation by driving ahead or
astern. It can be an advantage to provide a good steadying vector by placing the
vessel such that environmental forces are opposed by a steady state thrust output.
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Escape Route
11.3.23 An escape route should be identified. The escape route should provide a clear
path for the vessel to follow when making a routine or emergency departure from
the installation.
11.3.24 Other vessels should stay clear of the escape route. The escape route should, if
possible, extend 500 meters from the installation.
Environmental Forces Monitoring
11.3.25 Environmental forces are never constant. Wind, current and swell should be
monitored continuously as should their effects on position keeping.
11.3.26 Electronic monitoring methods, such as wind sensors and resultant force vectors
provide the DP control system with inputs, but these methods should be supported
by visual monitoring and forecasting.
11.3.27 Great care should be taken where there is likely to be sudden wind and / or current
changes. Preventative measures may require the vessel to cease operations
during these periods and move off to a safe location.
11.3.28 Great care should also be taken in areas where lightning strikes are likely.
Preventative measures may also require the vessel to cease operations during
these periods and move off to a safe location.
Maintaining a Safe Working Location
11.3.29 A safe working location should be maintained at all times at the installation. In
particular this will require constant vigilance in respect of a possible accumulation
of a number of hazards.
11.3.30 These could include, for example, those from environmental forces and other
potential dangers, such as marine and airborne traffic, or cargo operations.
11.3.31 It will also require the vessel to operate within its design parameters and within
the range of the vessel’s DP capability plots.
11.3.32 Consideration should be given to unrestricted view of the work area from the DPO
position. CCTV or an observer could be of assistance.
DP Watch Keeping Handovers
11.3.33 Wherever possible, watch handovers should take place when the vessel is in a
steady state and where the vessel is settled in position.
11.3.34 Using a checklist handover ensures that all relevant information is passed on to
the oncoming watch keeper. See Appendix for a checklist.
On board Engineering, Electrical and Electronics Support
11.3.35 An engineer should be available in engine when the vessel is within 500 meters of
the installation.
11.3.36 Wherever possible, electricians and, where carried, electronics officers should be
on call when the vessel is inside the 500 meter zone.
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11.3.37 Engineers, electricians and electronics officers should take account of the following
when the vessel is inside the 500 meter zone:
 Do not start, stop, or carry out maintenance on any machinery or equipment
that could affect the DP system while the vessel is in DP, when in doubt a
check should be made with the DP bridge watch keeper.
 If problems or potential problems are detected with any DP or associated
equipment during a DP operation then the DP bridge watch keeper is to be
informed immediately.
Critical and Allowable Vessel Excursions
11.3.38 Critical and allowable excursion limits should be set.
11.3.39 The critical limit should not exceed half of separation distance between the vessel
and the installation.
11.3.40 The allowable limit should not exceed half of the critical limit.
Electronic Off Position Warning and Alarm Limits
11.3.41 The electronic warning limit should not exceed the allowable excursion limit above.
The electronic alarm limit should not exceed the critical excursion limit above.
11.3.42 For example, where the separation distance is 10 meters, the warning limit should
not exceed 2.5 meters and the alarm limit should not exceed 5 meters.
11.3.43 However, wherever possible, the warning and alarm limits should be less than the
critical and allowable excursion limits.
Electronic Off-Heading Warning and Alarm Limits
11.3.44 The electronic off-heading warning limit should be set at a value that does not
result in movement of any part of the vessel greater than the allowable excursion
limit.
11.3.45 The electronic off-heading alarm limit should be set at a value that does not result
in movement of any part of the vessel greater than the critical excursion limit.
11.3.46 However, wherever possible, the off-heading warning and alarm limits should be
set at lower values.
11.3.47 In setting the off-heading limits consideration should be given to the alignment of
the vessel and the installation and the vessel’s point of rotation.
Position and Heading Changes
11.3.48 Changes in vessel position and heading are frequently necessary, especially during
supply operations when supply vessels are alongside fixed installations, typically
because of wind and / or current changes, or for operational reasons.
11.3.49 Such changes should be carried out in small increments.
11.3.50 Operators should be aware of the potential dangers of a number of cumulative
changes, e.g. that they may affect the line of sight for some position reference
systems, such as SpotTRack.
Power Consumption and Thruster Output Limits
11.3.51 The power and thruster limits will depend on the nature of the vessel / installation
interface.
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11.3.52 Vessels with DP class notations 2 and 3 can, if agreement is reached with the
installation OIM and or charterer, if applicable, operate to DP class 1 standard on
those occasions when a DP class 1 vessel would be permitted alongside.
11.3.53 For vessels that are operating to DP class 2 or 3 standards, the limits should be
set so that the vessel will be left with sufficient power and thrusters to maintain
position after worst case failure.
11.3.54 The Guidelines thus provide two possible limits. For DP OSV capability 2 and 3,
the vessel operates to worst case failure in the given environmental conditions,
typically half the propulsion.
11.3.55 For DP OSV capability 1, the vessel operates to the intact capability in given
environmental conditions.
11.3.56 Methods of monitoring power consumption and thruster output limits include the
use of the DP computer system’s consequence analysis and effective DPO watch
keeping.
11.3.57 After a failure the main objective would be to make the situation safe. The route
to getting back to work again is to carry out a risk assessment, taking account of
all possibilities.
11.3.58 The risk assessment should determine whether it is safe to do so.
11.3.59 Regional and or charterer’s guidelines may take precedence.
Consequence Analysis
11.3.60 Where classification societies require consequence analysis to be fitted, to IMO DP
equipment class 2 and 3 Vessels and classification society equivalents (see MSC
Circular 645 3.4.2.4), to remain in class it is a requirement for these vessels to
operate with the consequence analysis switched on.
11.3.61 The consequence analyser monitors power, and thrust output and gives a warning
to the operator when it is calculated that the vessel will lose position if the worst
case failure occurs.
11.3.62 Whenever the consequence analysis alarms, the vessel is in a degraded
operational condition and appropriate action should then be taken to ensure the
safety of the vessel. Appropriate action will include a degraded condition risk
assessment.
Safe Operating Limits
11.3.63 Safe operating limits are not solely based on power consumption and thruster
output levels.
11.3.64 In setting safe operating limits consideration should be given to other relevant
factors such as a mariner’s awareness of the weather environment, the nature of
the operation, the safety of the crew and the time needed to move clear.
11.3.65 The safe operating limits should be governed by risk assessment.
Position Reference Systems
11.3.66 Wherever possible, if multiple position references are in use, they should be
independent of each other and should be based on different principles.
11.3.67 Relative position references should be used at installations that are not fixed in
position, such as FPSOs, spar buoys, TLPs, etc. Relative systems include, for
example, SpotTrack.
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11.3.68 The use of relative and absolute position reference systems in this situation can
cause conflicts.
11.3.69 A possible example of ‘three position references’ could be a dual laser system
operating on independent targets on different lines of sight with one DGPS.
Change of Operating Control Mode
11.3.70 There may be occasions during a normal supply operation when it is appropriate
to change over from auto DP control to joystick / manual control.
11.3.71 In this case the vessel will revert to conventional supply vessel mode and will be
subject to appropriate controls. Where the vessel transfers control from DP to
manual or conventional control, transfer back to DP control should be subject to a
repeat of location set up checks.
11.3.72 Another possible issue in relation to control, is that the preferred location for the
DP control console would be the aft end of the bridge to allow unrestricted view
for the DPO of the work deck and the installation.
11.3.73 Where this is not possible some other means should be available to observe
external conditions, e.g. CCTV at the DP control console or an observer on the
bridge with unrestricted view.
Standby Time
11.3.74 There are frequently occasions when the vessel stands down for a period of time.
Standby time should be put to good use. Standby time is useful since it provides
opportunities to practice skills, such as (a) ship handling, (b) DP operating
experience and (c) taking DP footprint plots away from the installation.
Vessel Thruster Efficiency at Different Drafts and Trims
11.3.75 Changes in vessel draft / trim usually occur at an installation.
11.3.76 A smaller draft can have an adverse effect on thruster efficiency, particularly for
bow tunnel thrusters.
11.3.77 This can result in a significant loss of thruster effect, resulting in poor station
keeping as well as impacting on thruster redundancy.
11.3.78 Wherever possible, measures should be taken to maintain an appropriate draft /
trim at all times when at an installation. This may mean taking in water ballast.
11.4 DP Setup Procedures

Manual Control to DP
11.4.1 Ensure that the DP Location Checklist has been started and all possible equipment
is tested according to procedures completed and that all DP related equipment is
operating and on-line.
11.4.2 Take control of the vessel in manual mode at the aft control station by pushing
the command aft button on the controller.
11.4.3 Turn the Mode Selector Switch to DP. Control will then be transferred to the DP.
Select the thrusters required into the DP and select Manual Mode. There are
various combinations of DP joystick (Manual) mode.
11.4.4 Select an appropriate position reference system.
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11.4.5 Stabilise the vessel’s position on DP joystick.
11.4.6 When the vessel’s position is relatively stable and the vessels speed is reduced to
less than 0.5 knots.
11.4.7 Select Yaw control and stabilize the vessels heading. Observe power and thruster
use.
11.4.8 When the vessels heading is stable: Control vessels SWAY motions by use of DP
Joystick. When the vessel is table in the SWAY motions: Select SWAY control to
DP console. Observe power and thruster use.
11.4.9 When the vessels YAW and SWAY motions are stable: Control vessel SURGE
motions by use of DP Joystick. When the vessel is stable in the YAW and SWAY
motions: Select SURGE control to DP console. Observe power and thruster use.
11.4.10 The vessel should now be in Auto Positioning control. Confirm status OK at the
backup system.

11.5.1 For DP operations the minimum requirements for reference systems on line
depends on the type of operation and the vessels’ position. However as a rule of
the thumb as many references as possible should be utilised taking into account
the strengths and weaknesses of each at the operational location(s).
11.5.2 For “Nexus” the following DP modes could occur:
 Operations Outside 500m safety zone of Offshore Installation:
 Operations inside 500m safety zone of Offshore Installation:
Operations Outside 500m safety zone of Offshore Installation:
11.5.3 In this mode usually two (2) DGPSs will initially be used.
Operations inside 500m safety zone of Offshore Installation:
11.5.4 In this mode at least three independent position reference systems should be on
line. For the purpose of this operation, all DGPS references should be considered
as one reference (Unless GPS and GLONASS are used). It is important to note the
difference between absolute and relative positioning reference systems when the
installation is moored rather than fixed.
11.6 Completion of DP Operations

11.6.1 The following should be taken into account during completion of the DP operation:
 Get permission to take vessel out of DP mode, from Master/Duty Officer prior
to commencing procedure.
 Check if all reflectors/prism is retrieved from the installation/location (if
applicable) checks also if all deck cargo is secured on board.
 All relevant parties on board informed e.g. Client/Operation Manager etc.
Inform ECR that vessel will terminate DP mode shortly.
 Move vessel well clear off any danger or obstructions if applicable move
outside installation 500 m zone and ensure that the vessel is in a drift off
position from any danger or obstructions prior terminate DP Mode.
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 Go to manual DP mode; deselect all reference systems and thrusters. Go to
DP Standby Mode and switch over to bridge manual control. Hand over
manoeuvring to officer of watch.
 Inform the ECR that the vessel is off DP and from what time.
11.7 Vessels in Close Proximity to Worksite

11.7.1 This procedure describes the actions to be taken to avoid that any vessel or its
tow/gear/fishing gear comes within close range, thereby jeopardising the safety
of the operation and the positioning of the vessel.
Actions to be taken:
11.7.2 ARPA set for ‘Early Warning’ at 6 Nm and automatic acquisition and plotting of
surface vessels; plotting to be closely monitored by on-shift DPO's;
11.7.3 Inform standby vessel (if available) when a vessel comes into the 6 Nm zone and
it is obvious that the approaching vessel will come within 500 m. The on shift DPO
is to establish contact with the vessel in order to inform her of the on-going
activities and associated dangers and request a clearance of 500 m (or more if the
operation requires such). If the approaching vessel is 2 Nm away and it is still
obvious that she will violate the 500 m zone, the Master should be called to the
bridge.
 If it is clear that the approaching vessel or its tow / trawl will come closer
than 500 metres, operations are to cease immediately.
 Plots, logs of conversations, logs of actions, photographs/video of offending
vessel (showing name if possible) etc. to verify infringement to be collected
to include with report.
Note 1: Above distances serve as a guideline only.
Note 2: It is up to the discretion of the Master to set other limits depending on
the location and type of fishing or tow.
Warning: Particular attention should be paid to small craft as they are not always
detected by ARPA systems.
11.7.4 This procedure does not exempt Master or bridge officers on shift from using other
means of detecting approaching vessels (AIS etc.).
11.7.5 In case a vessel cannot pre-set a certain warning/alarm due to the type of ARPA
presently fitted, adequate measures must be put in place to detect any vessel
moving into close range.
11.8 DP Operations in Deteriorating Weather Conditions

11.8.1 DP Capability plots show the calculated station keeping ability of the vessel in
various situations. However, the ability to hold station at any time will also depend
on the combined state of the sea, swell and current, and therefore, the Master has
sole responsibility and discretion to decide whether the weather conditions are
suitable for DP operations within the following limits.
11.8.2 No operations will take place on DP in wind or current combinations where the
vessels DP capability plots show that the worst case failure as identified in the
FMEA would leave the vessel with less thrust capability than required for the
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4 PAGE 99
environment conditions. At this point, it has to be noted that the capability plots
are a theoretical calculation and can only be taken as a rough guide. Allowance
must be made to the plots due to loss of thruster performance over time, marine
growth accumulation, changing wind surface moment etc.
11.8.3 If the vessel is to work to windward in close proximity of platforms and
obstructions, the Master can cease operations when the safety of the vessel or
personnel is threatened. The situation may also occur where the
Platform/Installation OIM requests a stop of operations after consulting the
Master. The situation has to be carefully assessed before initiating vessel
movements. The associated risks are:
 Vessel contact with surface structure due to inappropriate movements. To
avoid this situation, the vessel’s movements have to be controlled. In many
cases, a simple sideways move on the joystick will cause a closer distance
to the structure due to changing heading of the vessel. A sideways move
away from the platform in increasing blow-on environment may overload the
weakest thruster and limit its output, which subsequently results in a
decrease in thrust at the weaker end of the vessel and a movement of that
end towards the structure.
 The most suitable way in most cases is the controlled movement ahead or
astern in order to keep the distance to the structure and control the thrust
levels required for the ahead/ astern movement.
 In general, this situation can be avoided by careful assessing the forecasted
conditions before committing to the worksite. Give ample notice by
monitoring the present environment (squalls) and not wait until consequence
analysis alarm appears rather than to monitor the DP system to detect trends
which may suggest that thrust levels will be critical within the expected
project duration.
11.8.4 The Master should always carefully consider the position of his vessel relative to
the wind, current and the structure and the limited DP capability athwartships.
Note for DP Operations in High Currents: Tidal Stream atlases are not necessarily
available for all areas of operations, however in these cases some clients should
and will have completed their own tidal current analysis, and they should be made
available to the DPOs. In cases where this information is not available relevant
hydrographical publications should be consulted i.e. Mariners Handbook, Pilots etc.
Personnel
11.8.5 The Master is responsible for ensuring vessel safety, the safety of the crew and
the protection of the environment.
11.8.6 The Master is also responsible for liaisons with the Project Superintendent on all
matters, which affect the vessel's operations, including the operable weather
conditions.
11.8.7 The Master must consider the time taken to recover/abort the jacking when
deciding on whether to recommend to the Project Superintendent to continue or
to abort operations.
11.8.8 The Project Superintendent/project manager is responsible for the execution of
the project and for the wind farm equipment.
11.8.9 The Project Superintendent/project manager is required to consider the opinion of
the Master of the vessel when deciding to continue or to abort the operation,
although the Master has the final decision.
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Action
11.8.10 This procedure to be considered constantly and a system established for each
project, which ensures that weather forecasts are provided on a regular and
frequent basis.
11.8.11 These procedures shall not take precedence over the judgment of the Master when
unusual circumstances are encountered, nor do they relieve him of his duties.
11.8.12 The best available weather forecast shall be obtained at least twice daily and the
weather reporting service shall be requested to give special advisories on sudden
changes and as requested by the Captain under imminent storm conditions. The
actual weather shall be continuously monitored and recorded at least every six
hours.
11.8.13 Any sudden change in conditions should be noted, closely observed, and
evaluated. If there is any potential storm or other bad weather predicted, the
Master shall immediately inform the Project Superintendent/project manager of
the impending weather change.
11.8.14 The Master shall evaluate the weather conditions (forecast and actual), to
determine the course and timing of action to be taken. Actual modification of
normal operations should take into consideration that weather usually increases
over a period of time, which should be used as an alert that action may be
necessary.
11.8.15 After securing for bad weather, a continuous weather watch shall be maintained
together with close surveillance of all equipment, especially the power and DP
units, fuel consumption and planning, ballast and other equipment. Deck
equipment should be sea fastened. Time must be allowed to permit all safety
requirements and evacuation/storm avoidance procedures to be completed before
the storm reaches the vessel. Based on the forecast/storm condition, the Master
shall determine whether to remain on location, seek sheltered waters, or run for
open seas.
11.9 DP Operations in shallow water

11.9.1 The Nexus will, on occasion, conduct DP operations in shallow water. For the
purposes of this manual shallow water may be defined as <10 metres.
11.9.2 Operating in shallow water will preclude the use of the bow azimuth thruster. The
effect of this will be the loss of one third of the available thrust forward.
11.9.3 Capability plots have been produced for the vessel when operating in “shallow
water” mode.
11.9.4 The Worst Case Failure Design Intent of this vessel when operated in OPEN BUS
in “shallow water” mode is for failure of one 690V main switchboard (Port, or
Starboard) which will cause the failure of one bow tunnel thruster and one stern
azimuth thruster.
11.9.5 The Master and DPOs will conduct a full risk analysis and complete the ASOG
bearing in mind that the vessel’s environmental operating envelope is reduced.
The operating envelope will be such, that after a Worst Case Failure is capable of
maintaining position and heading using ONLY one Bow Thruster and one Stern
Thruster.
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11.9.6 It is paramount that the Nexus builds a database of DP footprint plots for the
shallow water condition, both intact and after the Worst Case Failure. (For details
on footprint plots see section 17).
11.9.7 The capability plots will provide some guidance on assessing the environmental
envelopes. The data is included in Appendix A of this document.
The FMEA was written for the Nexus operating with open busbars. The table below
shows the cases to be considered for various operations.
Normal Shallow
Intact 1. 2e
DWCF 2e/3a/3b 3c/3d
Table 10: CAPABILITY PLOT CASES
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12. DP ALERT OPERATING GUIDELINES
12.1 General
The “Nexus” will always operate within the “IMCA Guidelines for the Design and
Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels” document (IMCA M 103). All DPO’s
will have full knowledge of these guidelines and the use of the alert signals. When
vessel is engaged in cable laying or ROV operations, a system of lights and audible
alarms should be provided in the key areas such as Bridge, ECR, Cable Control
Area, ROV Control Van etc. The alert lights will be as follows:
12.2 Alert Level Response

12.2.1 The following system of alert signals (traffic lights) is used during Cable operations
and ROV operations.
Green Status
No action. Operations in progress. Routine communications established.

Standard communications routines apply
Yellow Alert
Degraded Operational Status; The operation shall start preparing to safely

abort the operation. The senior DPO, Captain and OCM shall confer and decide
if any further action is necessary or if operations can continue.
Red Alert
Emergency status; Emergency preparedness sequence to be initiated. All

necessary actions required preventing loss of life or damage to equipment or
the environment shall be taken
12.2.2 The “on desk” DPO has the authority to activate the yellow / red alert on their own
initiative.
Note: The DP alert levels are not to be confused with the Kongsberg Maritime DP
Heading and position alarms.
DP ALERT OPERATING GUIDELINES

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12.2.3 The events that should trigger the alerts should be based on a minimal number of
standard operating status levels reflecting the capability of the DP system to
maintain the vessel on station within safe working limits. Examples are provided
in the table below:
Green: Complies with  Position & heading excursions are within
NORMAL the vessels DP acceptable limits.
OPERATIONS Capability  Power and thrust outputs are within limits
for capability of the vessel
conditions
 Environmental conditions are acceptable
 Minimum risk of loss of position and / or
collision, and DP Equipment redundancy is
intact, and DP system is working within
“Worst Case Failure” limits
Yellow: Not in  A failure in a sub-system has occurred
DEGRADED compliance with leaving the DP system in an operational
CONDITION the vessels DP state (possibly after reconfiguration) but
with no suitable backup available, such
capability
that an additional fault would cause loss of
conditions
position.
 Vessel’s position keeping performance is
deteriorating and/or unstable.
 Vessel’s indicated position deviates beyond
limits determined by risk analysis or
HAZOP without simple explanation.
 Risk of collision exists from another vessel
 Weather conditions are judged to be
becoming unsuitable for current
operations.
 Any other condition or circumstance
affecting the operation of the vessel which
could reduce the status from normal.
Red: ALERT Emergency  Unable to maintain position.
 Imminent threat of collision.
 Any other emergency.
Table 11: DP ALERT LEVELS
12.3 Activity Specific Operating Guidelines (ASOG)

12.3.1 The following table serves as a template for an ASOG as required by some clients.
Depending on the criticality of the particular operation, the alert conditions will
have to be modified.
12.3.2 The Activity Specific Operating Guidelines have to be developed before operations
commence in cooperation between the Client, vessel crew and vessel
management. The completed ASOG is then distributed to all parties involved in
the particular operation.
12.3.3 An instantly accessible copy of the ASOG is to be kept on the bridge close to the
DP control Operator station in order for the DPO to use it for quick reference if
required.
12.3.4 The use of the ASOG reduces the risk of disagreement between parties if the
operation is to be modified or terminated as all parties have signed.

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GREEN ADVISORY YELLOW RED
Inform Client. Inform Client.
Action Required Advise Master / OIM, Others
Normal Status Activate alert, prepare to Activate alert, Abandon
(TBA)
abandon operation operation
Master/OIM and any other who Master/Client and any other who Master/Client and any other who
Notify Master & OIM No
can reflect the situation can reflect the situation can reflect the situation
All Bus Move to red Move to red Abandon the operation
Blackout Main bus closed/open
System Incident
One Bus Move to yellow Prepare for red Move to safe location
Drive Off 0-3m
Intact DP DP
Drift Off / Force Off 0-3m

Reaching yellow area specific Reaching red area specific
Vessel Foot Print 3m
operational limits operational limits
Offset From Start 0-3m
Point
Heading Excursion ≤3° 3° >3° >5°
Power Generator-
≤45% >45% >50% >60%
Power Consumption
Thrusters (System) <60% on individual thruster >60% on individual thruster >60%on individual thruster >70% on individual thruster
Individual Thruster Demand <50% on all thrusters >50% on all thrusters. >50% on all thrusters >60% on all thrusters
Assess whether it is safe to be
Position Reference Available 3 independent reference systems Loss of 1 reference system connected or disconnect Loss of 2 reference system
immediately by using ESD II
DP Control System Kongsberg K-Pos, A & B control Loss of single system, A or B Loss of single system, A or B Loss of system A & B
Loss/or de-selection of single Loss/or de-selection of single
Wind Sensors 3 x Wind Sensors Situation specific
sensor sensor
Motion Sensors (VRS) 3 x VRS Loss of one VRS Loss of one VRS Situation specific
Heading Sensors (Gyro) 3 x Gyrocompass Loss of 1 Gyro Loss of 1 gyro Situation specific
Network All network operational Alarm/Fault indication on network Alarm/Fault indication on network Loss of network
VHF Radio, Clearcomm and UHF
Comms System Internal Loss of any Loss of any Loss of communications
radio
Environment Parameters (Wind Weather & Sea conditions as per
40 knots< reaching agreed limits Situation Specific.
Speed, Hs, Current), Approach operation/location
Environment Parameters (Wind
Speed, Hs, Current),
Offtake/Departure
Weather & Sea conditions as per
Heave, Pitch and Roll Reaching agreed limits Reaching agreed limits Situation specific.
operation/location
Additional emergency
scenarios for DP in event of
fire, imminent collision etc. Actions advisory: Status: Refer to
Actions Red alarm: Abandon
noted in Emergency Response specific Ship’s marine operations Move to yellow Prepare for abandon
operation & relocate
Procedures, shall follow the procedure
Ship’s marine Operation
Instructions.

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12.4 Alert Level Responses
12.4.1 The following actions are a guide for the development of the specific responses
required after development of the ASOG for a specific project.
12.4.2 A simulation of Emergencies before critical operations commence is to be carried
out to validate the developed procedures. The completed Alert responses are to
be communicated to all involved personnel together with ASOG.
GREEN: Normal. No action. Operations in progress
GREEN STATUS
Communications/ Actions
DPO on desk DPO off desk ERO/ ETO Master/ Client Rep
Do not carry out
Monitoring
any maintenance Monitor the
environment,
Navigational watch on DP equipment operation, advice
operating the
as the vessel is including all field/ platform
system efficiently
under way with switchboards operator of changes
and safely. Carry
regards to COLREG without assessing in operational
out periodical
with C/E and status.
checklists
Bridge.
Communicating any Log book entries Gather information
significant changes and routine bridge on projected work
in environmental administration plan from field/
conditions. (radio checks etc.) structure operator.
Assisting the on
Communicating
desk DPO with
forecasts of Renew work
communications,
deteriorating permits as
deploying
weather required.
references etc. as
immediately
required.
Table 12: GREEN ALERT STATUS

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YELLOW: Degraded. Carry out degraded condition Risk Assessment
YELLOW STATUS
DPO on desk DPO off desk ERO/ ETO Master/ Client Rep
Change status from
Terminate auxiliary
Green to Yellow,
operations i.e.
call for assistance
ballasting, supply Try to restart failed Muster on bridge
of 2nd DPO, await
vessel handling and equipment if any. assess situation
acknowledgement
any other on-going
of DP alert
activity
outstations
On PA give a short
and concise
description of the Inform Master and Consulting with
situation and time assist DPO on desk section leaders to
Await instructions
until red alert is with make decision on
from the bridge
expected. If PA communications ceasing of
unavailable, use and documentation. operations
backup
communications
Take every action
required to
maintain the Document changes
Assist DPO on desk
vessels position, in equipment status
until situation is
prepare escape and report to
cleared
route surface and bridge
assess escape route
subsea.
Table 13: YELLOW ALERT STATUS

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RED: Emergency
RED STATUS
Master/ Client
DPO on desk DPO off desk ERO/ ETO
Rep
Terminate all other
Muster on bridge
Change status to on-going Acknowledge to
immediately and
RED operations, inform bridge.
assess situation.
Master
If required, initiate
Undertake all emergency
PA announcement,
Undertake all efforts to restore response
request
efforts required to thrust power. communications
acknowledge of key
regain control over Muster off shift with onshore
operator stations
vessel personnel to ECR if management. Alert
(ROV, ECR, deck.)
required. field operator, if
applicable.
Consult with section
Assess escape leaders and
Advise structure
routes from surface Assist ROV control onshore
operator and other
structure, advise if required management (if
vessels if SIMOPS
Master applicable) to
decide actions.
Assist on desk DPO Establish
with Report all changes appropriate safety
communications in equipment status area and advise
and documentation. to bridge. field operator of
Confirm with ROV if In case of general intentions.
clear to move to marine emergency Client rep to assist
safe location. (fire, collision, Master in
muster the communications
Document events.
necessary with field operator
personnel (off shift) and structure, if
to assist. applicable.
Table 14: RED ALERT STATUS

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13. DP EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
13.1 Introduction
13.1.1 No matter how well operated, managed and maintained a DP vessel is, it is
nevertheless inevitable that at some time in the lifetime of the vessel, an undesired
event will occur during a DP operation which will require emergency action by the
DPOs.
13.1.2 For the purposes of the DP operation of the vessel, an undesired event is defined
as some event, which results in impending or actual loss of vessel position to the
extent that the vessel, the operation, personnel or the environment are at risk.
13.1.3 Such undesired events can be caused by one or more of a number of faults,
including loss of thruster(s), loss of power generating or distribution systems, loss
of DP control caused by loss of position reference signals, onboard emergency
such as fire/collision, sudden and unpredicted onset of excessively bad weather,
etc.
13.1.4 It is impossible to provide DP emergency operating procedures to deal with all
emergency situations; however, it is possible to give guidance as to initial actions
and to allocate particular responsibilities to specific persons.
13.1.5 The emergency procedures contained in this section have been prepared for DPO’s
and those involved in the DP operation of the vessel.
13.1.6 Principal Responsibilities:
 All immediate decisions on DP emergency and intervention actions are to be
taken by the Senior DPO until the Master of the vessel, advises that he has
taken over control.
 The “Nexus” will always operate within the “IMCA M103 Guidelines for the
Design and Operation of Dynamically Positioned Vessels”. All DPOs should
have full knowledge of these guidelines and of the use of the recognized
ALERT Levels as described in the previous section.
 The “on desk” DPO has the authority to activate Yellow/Red Alerts without
contacting any other person and without using the telephone.
13.2 Incident Priorities

13.2.1 If the Senior DPO is in doubt as to the vessels ability to maintain position, he
should use the yellow alert. All must be aware that the Yellow alert process should
be maximised in order to reduce the possibility of Red alert situations. In the
event of an uncontrolled drift off or drive off that cannot be stopped, Red Alert
status should be initiated immediately in order to maximise the time available to
all departments.
13.2.2 Priorities must be established for dealing with a DP problem. The Master and crew
must co-operate closely on these priorities to avoid doubt and confusion in order
that the Senior DPO on watch and the various departments can act quickly and
without unnecessary hesitation.
DP EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
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13.2.3 As a guideline the following information should be assessed during an alert
condition:
 Any position or heading performance loss as a result of alert cause.
 Weather conditions at time of alert.
 Expected changes in work progress planned.
 Additional hazards presented as a result of alert.
 Assessments of additional weather forecasts which may be required.
 Time required to reach a safe situation.
 Blow on / Blow off scenario.
 Escape route from all structures (both surface and subsea) in the vicinity.
13.3 Initial Actions – Degraded Operational Status

13.3.1 In the event of the DP system entering into a degraded operational status, the
personnel are required to follow their responsibilities as follows:
Senior DPO
13.3.2 Remain in command (this does not necessarily mean take control of the DP desk),
until relieved by the Master.
13.3.3 Giving the Yellow Alert will call the Master and a parallel PA announcement will
notify all the personnel who are involved in present operations. Telephone use is
to be limited in order to keep this channel of communications open for priority
information i.e. between ECR and Bridge.
13.3.4 Inform the engineer on watch in the Engine Control Room. This should be done
by the DP alert status lights in the first instance (if fitted), and only via telephone
if prudent with respect to other priorities.
13.3.5 Enter the time and circumstances relating to the degraded operational status in
the DP log book.
DPO
13.3.6 Without necessarily taking, or relinquishing control of the DP desk, assist the
Senior DPO as directed, particularly in documenting events. Times of occurrence
of events are to be taken from the DP operator stations in order to compare the
sequence of events (project) with the print-out of the DP printer.
Master
13.3.7 The Master is to proceed to the Bridge on receipt of the message that a degraded
DP operational status (yellow or red alert) exists.
13.3.8 On arrival on the Bridge, he is to assess the situation as fully as is possible before
assuming command of the situation and before taking executive action.
13.3.9 He is to inform both DPOs that he has taken command of the situation.
NB: It is important that the DPOs do not assume that the Master takes command
of the DP operation immediately upon arrival on the DP Bridge.
Duty Engineer
Maintains power and propulsion to the DP system. He is also responsible for
informing the Chief Engineer.
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13.4 Initial Actions – Emergency Status
DPO
13.4.1 In the event of a DP system or subsystem failure which results in uncontrolled loss
of position, the “on desk” DPO will first initiate Red alert to the various
departments. It is anticipated that in most circumstances this will require him to
attempt to maintain the position of the vessel as close to the intended target as is
possible. This may mean resorting to DP joystick control or may mean taking
control of the vessel's propulsion at another control location i.e. manual thruster
controls or via IJS control.
13.4.2 The ability of the DPO to hold the vessel in position via manual controls will depend
on various issues, experience of the DPO, weather, current / tides, availability of
generators and thrusters, and the proximity of fixed structures to give a visual
reference.
13.4.3 Until the Master arrives on the bridge and has notified the DPO that he takes over,
the DPO on the desk makes all decisions required to minimise the impact of the
situation on human life, vessel integrity, environment, and equipment.
Master
13.4.4 The Master will come to the Bridge as soon as possible and will assess the situation
before taking executive DP action or giving instructions to the DPOs. He will inform
both DPOs when he takes command of the situation.
13.4.5 If the Master is on the bridge at the time of the uncontrolled loss of position he
will similarly inform the DPOs when he has assumed command of the situation.
13.4.6 At this point, effective bridge team management is of utmost importance and the
instructions provided in the vessel’s SMS / Emergency Procedures have to be
adhered to in order to utilise all available resources effectively to regain control
over the vessel.
Duty Engineer
13.4.7 Maintains power and propulsion to the DP system. He is also responsible for
keeping the Chief Engineer informed.
13.5 Action on Receipt of Alarms

13.5.1 The tables below provide a guide to the DPOs on an appropriate course of action
in the event any of the mentioned alarms are received. This generic guide should
be used in conjunction with the “Nexus” Activity Specific Operating Guidelines
(ASOG) spread sheet (see 12.3) and if there is any doubt as to the correct course
of action to be taken, the Master, Senior DPO, Chief Engineer and ETO should be
called.
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DP System Alarms
13.5.2 Loss of all Computers:
Indication Alarms
Results Loss of total DP Control
[Red Alert]
Changeover to IJS / Manual Control
Try and maintain position on Joystick / manual controls
Operator Action
using visual references and other available raw data from
Reference Systems, Survey display, radar range &
bearing.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew, OCM
13.5.3 Loss of Online Computer:
Indication Alarms
Offline computer will take control (No redundancy
Results
available in DP System)
[Yellow Alert]
Operator Action
Prepare to move away from surface structures
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew.
13.5.4 Loss of Computer Stability:
Indication Alarms
Results Loss of Position / Heading
[Yellow Alert] or [Red Alert] (Dependent on severity)
Operator Action
Select other controller as Master and when stable reset
offline.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew.
13.5.5 Loss of Position Reference Systems:
Indication Alarms
Model control of vessels DP Position, however position
Results
keeping will degrade
[Red Alert]
Operator Action If other references available deploy & select into DP desk
and reduce alert level to yellow.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng, Deck crew, OCM.
13.5.6 Wind Sensor Error:

Alarms
Indication Discrepancy in readings between wind sensors
Unusual current vector
Results Degraded DP performance
Operator Action Deselect faulty wind sensor
Notify C.Eng./ETO
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13.5.7 Loss of UPS Power System:
Indication Alarms
Batteries will take over & run DP computers
Results If batteries fail within 30 minutes then DP partial blackout
will occur
[Yellow Alert]
Batteries should be able to maintain power for 30
minutes.
Operator Action
Stop operations.
Prepare to move away from surface structures if problem
cannot be resolved within a short period of time
13.5.8 Loss of position due to unknown cause:
Indication Alarms & / or visual indication

Results Loss of position / heading
[Red Alert]
Select IJS with auto heading if no confidence in DP control
Try and maintain position on Joystick using visual
Operator Action references and other available raw data from Reference
Systems, Survey display, radar range & bearing.
Prepare to move away from surface and/or subsea
structures
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng., Deck crew, OCM.
Thrusters
13.5.9 Loss of Single Thruster Control:
Indication Alarm
Results Degraded thruster performance possible LOP
[Yellow Alert]
Stop defective thruster
Operator Action
Review continuation of Operations depending on available
thruster redundancy. Consider yellow alert.
13.5.10 Suspect Foreign Body in Thrusters:
Indication Thruster Alarm / unusual vibrations

Results Degraded performance or loss of the thruster
[Yellow Alert]
Stop defective thruster
Operator Action
Review continuation of Operations depending on available
thruster redundancy. Consider yellow alert.
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Power Distribution
13.5.11 Loss of a Main Switchboard:
Indication Alarm / Verbal from ECR

Less power available
Degraded operation of thrusters, Loss of thrusters
Results
Possible loss of position
Partial Blackout
[Yellow Alert]
Safely abandon operations.
Operator Action Monitor Power consumption
Prepare to recover ROV.
Prepare to move away from surface structures.
Notify Master, ECR, OCM, ETO, Deck crew.
Power Generation Machinery & Auxiliary Systems

13.5.12 Loss of Engine Cooling Water System:
Indication Verbal from ECR

Results Loss of generators from affected system
[Yellow alert]
Operator Action Safely abandon operations.
13.5.13 Loss of Generator:
Indication Alarm / Verbal from ECR

Results Less power available
[Yellow alert]
Operator Action Monitor power consumption
13.5.14 Loss of Starting Air Compressor:
Indication Verbal from ECR

Results Standby Generators may not start
Review continuing operations taking into account
Operator Action
prevailing weather conditions and power demands.
Notify Master, ECR, Ch.Eng, Deck crew, OCM
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14. PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM AND ROUTINES
14.1 Introduction
14.1.1 The vessel is using the “XXXXXX” planned maintenance system. The planned
maintenance system is certified by the vessel’s class authority and in accordance
with the ISM Code.
14.1.2 For the planned maintenance system to be compliant with the IMCA
recommendations, the planned maintenance system shall as a minimum contain
maintenance procedures of the following:
14.1.3 DP System:
 DP Control System and Sensors
 UPSs
 Power Management System
 Switchboards
 All relevant engine equipment
 Auxiliaries
 Thrusters
 Oil Sampling
 Communication System.
It’s advised that the maintenance routines are as a minimum in line with the
maker’s specification and recommendations with regards to routines.
14.2 Routines for DP Control System

14.2.1 When the vessel is operating on DP for an extended period of time:
 Shutdown and restart of Operator Stations (OS) Controllers and DGPS
system every 14 days if required or as recommended by maker
 Shutdown and restart one by one OS if the vessel is operating in DP mode
 Shutdown and restart the DGPS systems one by one if the vessel is operating
in DP mode
 Periodic cleaning of air filters. (As per PMS)
 Print screen “hardcopy” of DP alarm view if any alarms are present when the
shutdown / restart routine is completed
 If any abnormal alarms are present – inform the Master
 Fill in the DP System Routine Log. Keep the log print screen alarm list
documentation in the DP checklist folder, under: DP System Routine Log
Information
 If trouble with the OS, controllers or the reference systems occurs, the first
action should always be to first attempt to shut – down and restart the unit
before continuing troubleshooting. Always inform the Master if problems or
abnormalities in the DP system occur
 Make an entry in the DP logbook when the routine has been performed.
PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM AND ROUTINES

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14.3 Software Management
14.3.1 The software management should cover manufacturers or system supplier’s
maintenance specifications / instructions and track changes as a result of defects
being detected in hardware and software. It should also inform users of the need
for modification in the event of detecting a defect.
14.3.2 When an alteration or addition to the approved system(s) is proposed, plans shall
be submitted for approval. The alterations or additions should be carried out under
survey.
14.3.3 Details of proposed hardware and software modifications should be submitted for
evaluation. Where modifications may affect compliance with the rules, proposals
for verification and validation shall also be submitted.
14.3.4 If remote software maintenance is arranged for on board, the installation of new
software versions submitted from software suppliers, it is recommended that the
below items and or actions are fulfilled:
 No modification shall be possible without the acceptance and
acknowledgement of the responsible party on board.
 The objective or reason for updating a software module shall be documented
in the ship's systems / software maintenance log.
 Any revision which may affect compliance with the rules shall be approved
by the society and evidence of such shall be available on board.
 An installation procedure and required pre-requisites for installation of the
software module shall be available.
 The security of the installation process and integrity of the new software
shall be verified (especially when software has been transferred using open
lines like the Internet).
 A test program for verification of correct installation and correct functioning
of the functions shall be available.
 In the case that the new software module has not been successfully installed,
the previous version of the system shall be available for re-installation and
re-testing.
Note: The use of USB memory sticks to transfer data/software to/from the DP
Computers should be avoided and strictly controlled to prevent malware and virus
infection.
14.3.5 For further guidance on DP software management, see the vessels class
requirements. Any changes to the system should not be made without proper
authorisation.
PLANNED MAINTENANCE SYSTEM AND ROUTINES

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15. DP TRIALS AND VERIFICATION PROGRAMME
15.1 Introduction
15.1.1 Van Oord has a DP trials and verification programme. This programme is intended
to demonstrate on a continuing basis that the vessel's DP system is in effective
and safe operable condition.
15.2 In-House DP Auditing Programme

15.2.1 In order to conform to the latest IMCA and UKOOA / OGUK recommendations and
to meet the requirements of the corporate management system, there are clearly
distinguishable levels of documented DP verification which consist principally of
in-house trials, and are carried out at predetermined intervals. In addition, there
is provision in the trials programme for ensuring that independent third parties
are called in on a regular basis to witness certain DP trials i.e. “Annual Trials” as
per industry standard.
15.2.2 The ultimate responsibility of the safe DP operation of the vessel rests with the
vessel owner and operator and therefore the implementation of the DP verification
programme and the scheduling and execution of the required tests, trials, and
audits will be determined by the appropriate management levels within Van Oord.
15.2.3 If not otherwise stated in this manual, records of any tests carried out including
supporting evidence in form of alarm printouts, screen shots and DP logbooks have
to be retained on board for a minimum of two years and thereafter archived for a
further two years.
15.3 Objectives and Principles of DP Verification

15.3.1 In establishing an in-house DP verification programme, the first objective is to
ensure that duplication between the various levels of DP verification is kept to a
minimum. A certain amount of overlap is inevitable since it is the same
equipment, which is under examination’ in each case.
15.3.2 The second objective is to give clear and unambiguous guidelines as to when the
various DP checks and trials should be carried out.
15.3.3 The third objective is to integrate IMCA and UKOOA / OGUK recommendations into
the vessel's management system.
15.3.4 The following principles and objectives of DP verification are central to the
successful and effective DP management of “Nexus”.
 To provide a comprehensive and safe testing and checking programme for
the DP system.
 To demonstrate that the DP system is being kept up to its required capability
and integrity.
 To reduce the risk of over-testing of systems such that their life and / or
reliability is unnecessarily reduced.
 To ensure that new problem areas are quickly incorporated into the system
and resolved.
DP TRIALS AND VERIFICATION PROGRAMME

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 All DP checklists and tests should be drawn up in accordance with the
recommendations of the IMCA and UKOOA / OGUK guidelines for DP Vessel
operations.
 To provide a continuous, structured, and audible record of all events that are
relevant to the DP operation of the vessel.
 The following figure illustrates the essential elements in the DP Verification
Programme for “Nexus”.
FMEA Proving Trials Level 1
Annual DP Trials Level 2
Mobilisation Trials Level 3
Field Arrival Level 4
6 Hourly DP Checklist Level 5
DP Logbook Level 6
Figure 18: FLOW CHART OF FMEA AND DP TRIALS & TESTING PROCEDURES
15.3.5 Notwithstanding anything in this section or in this DP Operations Manual as a

whole, any client, class surveyor, or government authority may request additional
tests to any DP sub-system or component. Such requests should however be
made in good time so that Van Oord have the opportunity to ensure that such a
test is practical, safe, and a realistic simulation of a possible operational scenario.
15.3.6 All potential clients, class surveyors, or government body should be made aware
of the DP management policy exercised by Van Oord in this respect.

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15.4 DP FMEA and Proving Trials
15.4.1 A DP Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), has been carried out on the
vessel's DP system as per Global Maritime report number GM-4668-473974.
15.4.2 Identified failure modes have been analysed and considered in the above studies.
The analysis considered sudden loss of major items of equipment, sudden or
sequential loss of several items of equipment with a common link and the onset
of various control instabilities.
15.4.3 The DP FMEA considered the following equipment based DP subsystems:
 Fuel oil system
 Lubrication system
 Cooling system
 Air System
 Ventilation and Air Conditioning System
 Emergency Stops
 Power generation
 Power distribution
 Power management
 DP Control System
 Thrusters
 Main propulsion.
15.4.4 The systems and failure modes referred to above are not detailed in this DP
operations manual. For further information it is necessary to consult the FMEA
report document which should be available to all DP operators.
15.4.5 The DP FMEA Proving Trials program is prepared in order to prove the assumptions
of the DP FMEA. The results from these trials are then incorporated into the final
DP FMEA revision. This programme then constitutes the basis for the annual trials
programme. The DP Proving Trials were conducted in December 2014 and the
report completed by Global Maritime. This report, document GM-46668-474275
should be kept onboard and available to all DP Operators.
15.5 Scope of Annual DP Trials

Purpose:
15.5.1 Annual DP trials are designed to provide an extensive verification of the vessel's
DP capability. The tests are carried out on an annual basis since there is evidence
to indicate that individual components can deteriorate as a result of over-testing,
leading ultimately to a reduction in DP system capability.
15.5.2 The principal purpose of the annual DP trials is to provide verification of the
vessel's DP system FMEA and satisfactory operation of the DP control system
including power plant and propulsion equipment. The trials should test the
performance of the generation and propulsion plant and all fault and failure
conditions known to be important to DP safety and thus to prove that redundancy,
protection systems and responses are satisfactory.
Frequency:
15.5.3 Annual trials should be programmed by owners to fit in with the vessel's operations
and should be carried out at least annually and within 15 months of the previous
annual DP trials. Preferably the trials should be carried out at the end of a refit

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period or, where necessary, following major repairs and/or modifications. All
previous annual DP trials reports should be retained on board the vessel. Copies
should also be kept in the company's head office.
Conduct:
15.5.4 Responsibility for the conduct of the trials rests with Van Oord. An independent
auditor acting for the owner should witness the trials. Potential clients and Class
surveyors should also be invited to attend if applicable.
15.5.5 Reference is made to the DP Proving Trials document GM-46668-474275.
15.6 DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location

15.6.1 The tests and checks contained in this DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location
Programme are designed to provide a thorough assessment of the vessel's DP
equipment and its operability between Annual DP Trials. The tests and checks
required for mobilisation are not as exhaustive as those required for the Annual
DP Trials programme.
15.6.2 The purpose of these tests and checks is to demonstrate that major items of
equipment continue to be available and that DP control performance is
satisfactory.
15.6.3 DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location Trials should be carried out before the
start of every new contract outside of the 500 metre safety zone, or well clear of
the work site and are intended to demonstrate to the new client that the vessel's
DP system is operating correctly. It is the intention of these DP Pre-Operational /
Arrival on Location Trials to avoid over-testing of equipment and to avoid repetition
of failure modes, which are carried out during the Annual DP Trials. Experience
has shown that excessive testing during routine client acceptance trials has caused
equipment damage, reduced component life, and can therefore be
counterproductive.
15.6.4 These DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location Trials should be witnessed by the
client. In the event that a client requires additional tests to be carried out, then
approval of the Master and the Chief Engineer is required.
15.6.5 For DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location Trials the vessel’s systems are to be
configured and set up on DP with all equipment operational as if in intended
working conditions. Bridge and engine room checks for the new location have to
be completed prior to commencing the Trials.
15.6.6 The Senior DPO and DPO will sign the last page of the document to verify that the
DP Field Arrival Trials have taken place and the client representative if he has
witnessed the testing program.
15.6.7 DP Pre-Operational / Arrival on Location record sheets are to be retained on board
for two years and then archived for a further four years in the appropriate folder.
15.7 500m Zone Entry Checks

15.7.1 The 500 metre Safety Zone Entry checks are designed to confirm that the vessels
operating systems (Machinery, Propulsion, Manual and DP controls) are
functioning correctly along with communication protocols and methods, and

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permission to enter has been granted, prior to entering a facilities 500 metre
safety zone.
15.7.2 If the field operator/ structure representative requires any extra checklist to be
completed, they can be completed in parallel with the vessel’s checklist but have
to be filed separately.
15.8 DP Change of Watch Handover Checklist

15.8.1 A Bridge DP Change of Watch handover check list is completed every six hours by
the “on-coming” DPO are designed to provide a record of the status of the DP
system and availability of all necessary systems.
15.8.2 This checklist is to be completed at each DPO watch changeover. The Master if
required will audit the checklists. The most recent checklist is to be placed at the
DP desk to notify all DPOs of any changes to the system setup and equipment
status.
15.9 DP Field Re- Entry Checks Programme

15.9.1 DP Field Re-Entry checks are designed to provide an auditable system of checks
carried out by bridge and engine room staff witnessed, if possible, by the client's
representative to confirm that the equipment is set up correctly and is operating.
15.9.2 The checks are to be carried out on each time the vessel returns to the field on
the same project following a port visit, or interim project mobilisation and after
extended periods in manual control before going back into Auto DP control. During
a typical Cable-laying operation the DP Field Re-Entry checks will be carried out
on return to the work site and should be completed before approaching closer than
500 metres to the worksite. If, for any reason during an operation, such as bad
weather or equipment failure, it is found necessary to break off from DP and
standby, then it is required to complete a new set of DP Field Re-Entry checks.
15.9.3 The checks are to be carried out by the vessel's own staff. The record sheet is
designed for all situations and it will not always be appropriate to complete every
check. The level of checks is to the Master’s discretion, and will be dependent on
the nature of the DP operation, environmental conditions, the reason for coming
out of DP, the duration the vessel was out of DP, and particularly the status of the
position reference systems.
15.9.4 The checklist is to be completed on every occasion that the DPOs carry out a DP
Field Re-Entry trials programme.
15.9.5 DP Field Re-Entry Trials record sheets are to be retained on board for two years
and then archived for a further four years in the appropriate folders.
15.10 DP Log Book

15.10.1 The DP checklists and trials do not constitute an adequate DP verification
programme. One further essential element is the DP Log Book, which is designed
to provide a continuous record of all activities, which are of importance to and are
associated with the DP operation of the vessel.

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15.10.2 As well as providing evidence of the systematic and structured manner in which
DP operations are being carried out, the DP Log Book can prove to be of vital
importance in cases of DP incident or accident. In this respect the importance of
the DP Log Book is that the events are recorded as they happen, without reflection
or modification and that they are accurately timed.
15.10.3 It is impracticable to produce a full list of activities that should be recorded.
Therefore the following list is not exhaustive but should be considered as a guide
to content.
 Selection and de-selection of position reference systems
 Other Vessel movements
 Thruster selection changes
 Deteriorating weather conditions
 Changes to DP status
 Receipt of installation permit to work
 Entry into installation 500 m zones
 Relevant communications with other vessels and installations involved in
the DP operation
 Vessel heading changes
 All installation alerts
 Changes to vessel rotation point
 Times of DP checks
 Times in and out of DP
 Names of DPOs on and off watch
 All DP incidents
 DP Relevant communication with survey
15.10.4 The DP Log is a continuous record and is therefore to be constantly available to
the DPO’s. All DP Log Books are to be retained on board.
15.10.5 The DP Log is to be filled in by the DPOs on watch and countersigned by the
Master.
15.11 DP Incidents
15.11.1 Any DP related incidents are to be recorded and reported to Van OOrd and IMCA
as per IMCA M103 Guidelines for the Design and Operation of Dynamically
Positioned Vessels Appendix A, “DP Incident Reporting” and the ISM Manual
requirements using the appropriate Forms. Copies of Incident Reports sent to Van
Oord and / or IMCA are to be retained on board.
15.11.2 A copy of the IMCA incident reporting form is contained in Appendix B.

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16. VESSEL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
16.1 DP Capability
16.1.1 The DP Capability Analysis function computes the maximum weather conditions in
which the vessel is able to continue DP operations and allows you to select the
optimum heading for safe operation. Analyses are performed cyclically (usually
every five minutes).
16.1.2 When the analyses are performed, a force correction is taken into account. The
following criteria must be satisfied:
 The system is in AUTO POSITION mode.
 The position setpoint status as displayed on the status bar is PRESENT
POSITION.
 The heading setpoint status as displayed on the status bar is PRESENT
HEADING.
16.1.3 The maximum weather conditions in which the vessel can maintain its position and
heading are predicted. The weather conditions are defined by a one-minute mean
wind velocity, a most-probable significant wave height, and a corresponding mean
wave period.
16.1.4 For a discrete number of vessel headings, the mean environmental loads from
wind, waves and current all having constant (fixed) directions, are calculated. The
environmental loads are increased (for example, through an increase in mean wind
speed and corresponding significant wave height), until one or both of the
following situations occur:
 There is insufficient thrust for position and heading keeping.
 There is insufficient power for position and heading keeping.
16.1.5 The results of the analysis are displayed on the Capability view as limiting wind or
current speed capability envelopes, one for each of the situations listed above.
Figure 19 DP ONLINE CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
VESSEL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

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16.2 Updating DP Capability Plots
16.2.1 The plots shown in this section were derived from a mathematical model of the
vessel.
16.2.2 To increase the accuracy of the plots every opportunity should be taken to record
the vessel’s excursions in marginal conditions. This data (footprint plots) can then
be used to verify the plots.
16.2.3 DPOs SHOULD, whenever feasible and safe, complete a “DP Footprint Plot Chart”
for marginal conditions.
16.2.4 These charts should then be copied to vessel management. The vessel Master,
vessel Management and Marine Operations will endeavour to utilise this data to
improve the accuracy of the existing capability plots.
16.2.5 On any significant change to the vessel’s model e.g. added superstructure,
permanent container installation, upgraded thrusters or generators, additional hull
appendices, a new capability analysis should be prepared producing a new set of
capability plots.
16.3 High Current DP Capabilities

16.3.1 In high current areas the favourable heading is bow into the current. Depending
on the operations the Master should select the optimum heading. It is the Master’s
decision to continue or to abandon the operation.
16.4 DP Consequence Analysis

16.4.1 The DP Online Consequence Analysis function performs analyses to determine the
vessel’s ability to maintain its position and heading after predefined worst-case
single equipment failures. The analyses are called “online” because they consider
the present environmental conditions, thruster status and power consumption.
16.4.2 This function satisfies the requirements of IMO Equipment Class 2.
16.4.3 The analysis checks whether the thrusters remaining in operation after a worst-
case failure, are able to generate the same resultant thruster force and moment
as required before the failure, and whether the remaining generators are able to
produce a sufficient amount of power. An alarm message is issued if a failure
would result in lack of thrust or power and subsequent drift off.
16.4.4 The worst-case single failures that are simulated are predefined according to the
power and thruster configuration of the vessel. Typically, these failures will be the
loss of one complete switchboard, one engine room, or a group of thrusters that
can be affected by a single equipment failure.
16.4.5 Consequence analyses are performed cyclically, every minute, whenever the
following criteria are satisfied:
 The vessel is in Auto Position mode (consequence analysis can also be
performed in other modes, if configured).
 The position setpoint status (PosMode) displayed in the Status bar is
PRESENT (for Auto Position mode).
 The heading setpoint status (HdgMode) displayed in the status bar is
PRESENT (for Auto Position mode).

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16.4.6 By default, the DP Online Consequence Analysis is switched off. Prior to engaging
Class 2 operations, the corresponding class of operation must be selected using
the DP Class dialogue box.
Figure 20: DP ONLINE CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

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17. DP FOOTPRINT PLOTS
17.1 Introduction
17.1.1 A DP footprint plot is a record that is made of the vessel’s DP station keeping
ability in particular environmental conditions using various propulsion
configurations, such as:
 With all propulsion units available (i.e. two main azimuths, one bow tunnel
thrusters and one compass thruster),
 With the most effective propulsion unit lost, (i.e. the most effective unit for
the given circumstances) and,
 With the worst case failure (as stated in vessel’s DP FMEA).
17.1.2 A DP footprint plot should define an envelope within which the vessel maintained
station during a test period and should also identify any conditions under which
the vessel was unable to maintain position. In this way DP footprint plots can
verify the accuracy of the computer generated DP capability plots.
17.1.3 DP footprint plots should be recorded as regularly as possible. Opportunities
should be taken during stand-by periods and at times of weather downtime. A file
should be built up during the life of the vessel so that a record is maintained of
the vessel’s station keeping ability in various environmental conditions and with
various propulsion unit configurations.
17.1.4 DP footprint plots provide evidence to clients, classification societies and other
authorities of the vessel’s DP station keeping performance and DP capabilities. In
addition, DP footprint plots provide evidence of continuing thoroughness in DP
vessel management.
17.2 Procedure
17.2.1 DP footprint plots are made in the following manner:
 Set up vessel in auto DP
 Select a 5-10 minute trace on Pos Plot view
 Print screen.
17.2.2 Over the years of vessel operation a portfolio of DP footprint plots should be
compiled.
17.2.3 The DP footprints should only be used as guidance during planning the of a DP
operation.
17.2.4 The Nexus has a permanent survey team onboard. An alternative to the above
method would be to request the survey team to plot the vessel’s position.
DP FOOTPRINT PLOTS
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18. REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
18.1 Introduction
18.1.1 The following documents are considered to be important references for the safe
and efficient conduct of DP operations carried out on board the vessel. All key DP
personnel should be aware of the relevant documents / manuals and should have
a level of knowledge of their contents that is considered appropriate to their
position on board.
18.2 Manufactures’ Manuals

18.2.1 The manufacturer’s manuals should be available on board and in the vicinity of
the DP operation rooms, in an appropriate language and were possible they should
be vessel specific.
18.2.2 The following documents and manuals should be available on board the vessel:
Located on the Bridge:
 Kongsberg Maritime K-Pos 21 Operators Manual
 SpotTrack operations manual
 DGPS112/122 operations Manual
 Navigat Gyro Operations Manual
 MRU operating / maintenance manual
 Gill Wind Observer operations manual
 FMEA GM-
 FMEA Proving Trials GM-
 DP Capability Plots
 DP Footprint plots#
Located in the Engine Control Room:
 Main Engine manuals / drawings
 Thrusters manuals / drawings
 Switchboard & Electrical Distribution manuals/drawings
 Auxiliary Engines
 Auxiliary Systems P & IDs.
 Alarm & Control system
 UPS manuals / drawings
18.2.3 In addition to the above listed documents, the key DP personnel should be aware
of the contents of the following documents and reports that have been prepared
by the Marine Division of IMCA.
 M113 (IMO 645) Guidelines for Vessels with DP Systems
 M103 Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels
 M109 A Guide to DP related documentation for DP Vessels
 M117 The Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel
 M141 Guidelines for the use of DGPS as a position reference in DP Control
Systems.
 M170 A Review of Marine Laser Positioning Systems
 112 pt2 Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with DP Systems (UKOOA)
 M119 Engine Room Fires on DP Vessels
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
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18.3 Standard References
18.3.1 This manual meets the requirements of the various design, construction and
operating rules and guidelines that provide the basis for DP performance
standards. In particular, the documents below have been used as principal
reference standards during the compilation of this manual.
Document Reference Document name
Guidelines for the Design and Operation of
IMCA M103
Dynamically Positioned Vessels.
Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning
IMCA M113 (IMO 645)
Systems.
IMCA M 117 Training and Experience of Key DP Personnel.
Guidelines on the use of DGPS as a position reference
IMCA M 141
in DP control systems.
IMCA M 142 Position reference reliability study.
IMCA M 166, April 2002 Guidance on Failure Modes & Effects Analysis.
IMCA 1997 Safety Interface doc. for a DP vessel
IMCA M 125
working near an Offshore Platform.
QRA for the use of dual DGPS system for Dynamic
DPVOA M128
Positioning.
IMCA M 115, October IMCA 1994 Risk Analysis of collision of Dynamically
1994 Positioned support vessels with offshore installations.
IMCA 1997 Standard Report for DP vessels’ Annual
IMCA M 139, July 1997
Trials.
A review of marine laser positioning systems - Part 1:
IMCA M170
MK IV Fanbeam® and Part 2: Cyscan.
IMO A.481 (XII) Principles of Safe Manning.
International Guidelines for The Safe Operation of
IMCA M182 Dynamically Positioned Offshore Supply Vessels, March
2006.
Guidelines on installation and maintenance of DGNSS-
IMCA M199
based positioning systems.
IMCA M205 Guidance on operational communications.
IMCA M109 Rev. 1 A Guide to DP-Related Documentation for DP Vessels.
Guidelines on installation and maintenance of GNSS-
IMCA S012
based positioning systems.
Guidance on the selection of satellite positioning
IMCA S018
systems for offshore applications.
IMO MSC / Circ. 738. DP operators’ qualification.
International Convention on Standards of Training,
STCW 1995
Certification and Watch keeping for Seafarers.
Good practice guideline: The safe management of
G9 Offshore Wind small service vessels used in the offshore wind
industry. December 2014.
Guidelines for Auditing Vessels with Dynamic
112 UKOOA - 2
Positioning Systems.
REFERENCE DOCUMENTATION
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19. DP INCIDENT REPORTING
19.1 Introduction
19.1.1 A DP Incident Reporting System has been established for a number of years. Users
of DP systems make use of the reporting system for recording and reporting faults,
failures, and problems that have occurred on DP vessels.
19.1.2 The main purpose of the reporting system is to provide a means of disseminating
relevant information to other DP users. In addition, the incidents are analysed
and important conclusions drawn.
19.2.1 The Master is responsible for ensuring that all DP incidents are recorded and
reported on the enclosed form. Reports should be sent to Van Oord head office
and also to the Secretary of IMCA, whose address is given on the form in Appendix
B.
DP INCIDENT REPORTING
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – Damen Capability Plots
Appendix B – Station Keeping Incident Form
Appendix C – DP Checklists
Appendix D – Standing Orders/Instructions

Appendix A: DP CAPABILITY PLOTS
By request of the client a comprehensive set of DP calculations are performed to assess

the DP capability of the DOC7500 – YN 553014 with the main goal to address the
operability of the vessel. Plots are given for the following cases for ERN and Gemini park
weather conditions:
1. Intact
2. Single thruster failure:
a. PS Stern Azimuth Thruster (SAT ps)
b. SB Stern Azimuth Thruster (SAT sb)
c. Forward Bow Tunnel Thruster (BTT fwd)
d. Aft Bow Tunnel Thruster (BTT aft)
e. Bow Azimuth Thruster (BAT).
3. Combined thrusters running:
a. SAT ps + BTT fwd + BAT
b. SAT sb + BTT aft + BAT
c. SAT ps + BTT fwd
d. SAT sb + BTT aft
e. SAT ps + BAT
f. SAT sb + BAT.
Also a reference case is given for the weather conditions in the Wadden Sea:
4. Wadden Sea condition without BAT.
Main Particulars:
Length waterline 119.1 [m]

Breadth waterline 27.5 [m]
Draught 5.8 [m]
Displacement 14209 [t]
Lateral wind area 1739* [m2]
Frontal wind area 630 [m2]
* including deck load corresponding to the last prediction in memo with ref 1612072revE
APPENDIX A: DP CAPABILITY PLOTS -

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Conditions:
ERN: The conditions used for the calculation of the DP capability are those specified by
DNV before the revision of the rules in 2013 (Part 6, Chapter 7, Dynamic Positioning
Systems). The old rules are used to comply with previous reports and to give output for
all directions of wind, wave and current. The probability of non-exceedance is combined
with the JONSWAP wave spectrum, as specified for the North Sea. The current is assumed
to be constant at 0.75 m/s from the same direction as the wind and waves. The position
keeping ability of the vessel shall be calculated according to the concept of the
environmental regularity numbers (ERN). The relation between ERN, wind and wave is
shown below. The ERN conditions represent the Northern North Sea.
25 10
20 8
Wind speed [m/s]
Wave height [m]

15 6
V wind [m/s]
10 4 Hsignificant [m]
5 2
0 0
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
ERN
Gemini: The environmental conditions for the seas near the location of the Gemini Wind
Park is defined from wind and wave statistics, the JONSWAP wave spectrum and a current
speed of 2kn. The wind wave relation is defined as:

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Wadden Sea: For the sheltered area of the Wadden Sea wave characteristics are available
for the location Pannengat. The wind data is obtained from long term measurements of
location Hubertusgat. The current is treated separately.

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Propulsion train:
The DP capability is determined for the propulsion train as presented below. For the sake
of clarity the frequency drives are not shown.

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GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Results:
ERN
According to the calculation, the vessel is able to return to the reference position for wind,
wave and current loads:
Please note again that these results are for the ERN specific wind/wave relation based on
northern north sea data as given by DNV as in the regulations before the last update of
2013 .
Intact
180
Current speed = 0.75 m/s SB Azi failure
210 150 Retractable failure
TT fwd failure
TT aft failure
PS Azi failure
240 120
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Intact
180
Current speed = 0.75 m/s a
210 150 b
c
d
e
f
240 120
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0

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Gemini Wind Park location:
In Gemini Wind park weather conditions:
*PNE = probability of non-exceedance
Intact
180
210 150 b
c
d
e
240 120
270 10 90
20
30
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Intact
180
210 150 b
c
d
e
f
240 120
270 10 90
20
30
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave/current-
330 30 direction,
coming from [deg]
0

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Wadden Sea location:
Some wave statistics were available for the Wadden Sea. Because of the sheltered area
and shallow depth of the sea, the waves are low and short compared with the data of ERN
and Gemini. The wind on the other hand shows higher average values. Please note that
the following calculations not hold any shallow water effects. There is no method available
to incorporate the water depth in the current force, but this will be significant when h/T
will come close to 1. Because of the shallow water condition, the retractable thruster (BAT)
is disabled in the following calculations.
No current
Calculations showed that the vessel is able to return to the reference position 99.9% of
the time corresponding to wind speeds up to 19.8m/s. This includes 1.22m significant
wave height, but is only a small contribution to the total environmental load.
Intact
180
Current speed = 0 m/s, 180 deg
210 150
240 120
270 5 10 90
15
20 25
Wind speed
[m/s]
300 60
Wind/wave direction,
330 30 coming from [deg]
With current
The DP capability will be largely depending on the current force and slightly on the wind
force. The current force is maximum from the side (i.e.+ 90 degree angle) whereas the
wind force will have a strong effect on the yawing moment (i.e + 45 and + 135 degree
angle).
To give some indication of the capability in the sheltered Wadden Sea area, the
maximum current is calculated for the vessel to withstand at an angle of 90 degree (in
deep water). This is approximately 3.0 kn.
When in operation, the vessel will be kept at an angle aligned with the current.
Therefore the current load can easily be taken care off by the main propulsion system.
The wind load on the other hand will not be aligned to the current anymore. Therefore,

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
the maximum wind/wave load from all directions is calculated for several directions of
the current (which is kept constant in direction and speed at 3kn). The results are given
in the plot below.
Capability plot for fixed current directions (3.0 kn) and varying wind and wave loads

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Grounding
The motions that can be expected from these maximum wave height of 1.5 meter does
not give rise to grounding when operating with 2m under keel clearance or more. The
shallow water condition ensures short wave lengths compared to the beam of the vessel.
Remarks:
- In the calculations no dynamic allowance for thrust degradation has been taken into
account as this is not specified in the ERN or in IMCA M140 guidelines. The results
are therefore highly theoretical but suitable for comparison between different
vessels.
- The wave and current coefficients are assumed to be the same as the PSV3300,
model test experiments with a different configuration of the DOC7500 showed a
good agreement between these coefficients and the test results.
- The wind coefficients are determined in a wind tunnel. The additional deckload of
680 m2 is taken into account.
- The calculations in the Wadden Sea condition do not include shallow water effects
on the current. Solutions are given for expected operational conditions.

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Appendix B: Station Keeping Incident Form
Revision: May 2008 (Address update December 2009)
Reportable Station Keeping Incident

This report should be completed and sent to IMCA on the following occasions:
 DP incident - loss of automatic control, loss of position or any incident which
has resulted in or should have resulted in a red alert
 DP undesired event – loss of position or other event which is unexpected /
uncontrolled and has resulted in or should have resulted in a yellow alert
 DP downtime – position keeping problem or loss of redundancy which would not
warrant either a red or yellow alert, however loss of confidence has resulted in
a stand down from operational status for investigation, rectifications, trials etc.
DOCUMENT DETAILS AND ISSUE RECORD
Vessel: Date:
Place: Reported By:
Client: Position:
This section is confidential
APPENDIX B: STATION KEEPING INCIDENT FORM -

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Class Notation: (e.g. DYNPOS AUTR)
Incident Type: (e.g. DP incident, undesired

event, downtime)
Please return completed form to:

Jane Bulger, Technical Director
IMCA, 52 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0AU, United Kingdom
E-mail: incidentreports@imca-int.com Tel: +44 (0) 20 7824 5520Fax: +44 (0) 20 7824 5521
1.) Description of work being carried out:
2.) Environment
Wind Speed: Wind Direction: Wave Height: Visibility:
Current Speed: Current Direction: DP Current or Water Depth:

Real Current:

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3.) Equipment On-Line
Control System: Relevant Switchboard Breaker Positions:
Thrusters On-Line: Thrusters on Stand-By: Generators On-Line: Generators on Stand-

By:
(available for (available for

(selected to DP) (selected to DP)
immediate start) immediate start)
Position References: (populate fields with numbers)
Status: HPR Artemis Fan-Beam Taut Wire DGPS DARPS Other
Available
Stand-By
On-Line
Preferred
Sensors: (populate fields with numbers)
Status GYRO VRS WIND Other
Available
Stand-By
On-Line
Preferred
4.) Sketch (Vessel outline, heading, location of pos. ref., divers, ROV, installation, pipeline)
(Screen grab from DP System if available)

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
5.) Sequence of Events: (attach DP, PMS / VMS alarm printouts, if available)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
6.) Narrative Description of Events: (if available attach internal incident reports)
7.) Incident Numerical Description:
Distance travelled to peak of Excursion (m):
Time to recover from Blackout i.e. DP back on-line (seconds):
Time to recover to Green Watch Circle (seconds):
Hours on DP since last DP incident, undesired event or downtime (hours)
8.) Corrective Action Taken Tick as Appropriate
Modify Procedures
Modify Standing Instructions
Report to Shore Management
Repair
Modify Maintenance Procedures
Report to Supplier
Additional Alarm Installed
Operator / Technician Training
Warning Label fitted

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Other (specify)
Is there more work to do before close out is complete?
Has the incident been closed out with a satisfactory conclusion?
9.) Incident details
Initiating event:
Main cause:
Secondary cause:
10.) Human Factors
Were too many tasks being performed, or were there too many people involved/discussions taking place at
the time of the incident?
Were the factors leading to the incident adequately covered by the circumstances within the training and
familiarisation sessions with the DP Operators?
Would another DP Operator react with a different set of actions?
Have changes been made to the training and familiarisation procedures?
Should changes be made to the Annual DP Trials in light of the incident?
Do you believe that the DP Operator, if faced with a similar situation now, would react in a different way?
11.) Comments
Please add any comments or suggestions that have not been fully covered in the report.

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Have you attached any alarm printouts (DP / VMS / PMS), internal reports, and correspondence that may assist
in the analysis of the incident.

GM-46668-474711 | REV 4
Appendix C: DP Checklists
APPENDIX C: DP CHECKLISTS -
GM-46668-474711 | REV 4

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GM 46668-474711 Rev 4 Nexus DP Operations Manual

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DP Operations Manual

DP2 Cable Laying Vessel Nexus

For Damen Shipyard

Rev 4 07/03/2016 Final issue GG JFD JFD

Rev Date Document Prepared by Reviewed by Approved by

1.1 GENERAL .................................................................... 9

1.2 PURPOSE .................................................................... 9

1.3 REFERENCE BACKGROUND............................................ 9

1.4 ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................ 11

1.5 INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS .......................................... 13

1.6 CONTROL INFORMATION ............................................ 13

1.7 RESPONSIBILITIES .................................................... 14

2. VESSEL DETAILS ........................................15

2.2 RELEVANT CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS ..................... 16

2.3 DP REDUNDANCY CONCEPT ........................................ 16

2.4 WORST CASE FAILURE DESIGN INTENT ........................ 17

2.5 VESSEL CONFIGURATION FOR DP ................................ 17

3. PRINCIPLE OF DP OPERATIONS .................19

3.2 DP CLASS NOTATIONS ............................................... 20

3.3 ACCURACY ................................................................ 20

3.4 COMPUTER CONTROL & MONITORING .......................... 21

3.5 DP EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS .............................. 21

3.9 POWER DISTRIBUTION ............................................... 22 © This document is the property of Global

3.12 ENVIRONMENTAL SENSORS ........................................ 25 Global Maritime Consultancy Ltd.

3.18 DP SYSTEM PRINCIPLES ............................................. 30

3.19 THE EXTENDED KALMAN FILTER .................................. 30

3.21 OPERATIONAL MODES ................................................ 32

3.22 DP USER INTERFACE .................................................. 33

3.23 DISPLAY LAYOUT ....................................................... 36

4. DP CONTROL SYSTEM .................................37

4.2 DP OPERATOR STATION (OS) ...................................... 37

4.3 DP OPERATOR STATION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ..... 38

4.4 DP CONTROLLERS (COMPUTERS) ................................. 38

4.5 DP CONTROL CABINET FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ....... 39

4.6 DP DATA NETWORKS.................................................. 43

4.7 DP DATA NETWORK FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ........... 43

4.8 UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (UPS) .................... 45

4.9 230V UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY FAILURE MODES

4.10 DP LOAD LIMITATION ................................................. 49

4.11 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS........................................... 49

4.12 POSITION REFERENCE SYSTEMS ................................. 49

4.13 HYDRO-ACOUSTIC POSITION REFERENCES ................... 50

4.14 HYDRO-ACOUSTIC POSITION REFERENCE FAILURE

4.15 DIFFERENTIAL GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS

4.16 DGNSS FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS............................. 55

4.17 TARGET RELATIVE POSITIONING SYSTEMS ................... 57

4.18 TARGET RELATIVE POSITIONING SYSTEMS FAILURE

4.19 GYROCOMPASSES ...................................................... 59

4.20 GYROCOMPASS FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ................. 60

4.21 MOTION REFERENCE UNITS ........................................ 60

4.22 MOTION REFERENCE UNIT FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .. 61

4.23 INDEPENDENT JOYSTICK C-JOY ................................... 61

4.24 IJS OPERATOR TERMINAL FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ... 61

5. POWER GENERATION MACHINERY .............62

5.2 DIESEL GENERATORS ................................................. 62

5.3 DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS .......... 63

6.2 690V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 65

6.3 690V DISTRIBUTION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ......... 65

6.4 440V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 66

6.5 440V DISTRIBUTION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ......... 66

6.6 230V DISTRIBUTION .................................................. 67

6.7 230V DISTRIBUTION FAILURE MODES & EFFECTS ......... 67

7. POWER MANAGEMENT ................................69

7.2 SWITCHBOARD MODE SELECTION ............................... 69